83
The origins of the war of 1792 support several of my hypotheses about the relationship between revolution and war.
The origins of the war of 1792 support several of my hypotheses about the relationship between revolution and war.
Revolution and War_nodrm
The Girondins persuaded the Assembly to decree the death penalty for counterrevolutionaries and to issue an ultimatum de-
manding that several neighboring rulers expel the emigres from their terri- tories. These measures were intended to reduce the direct threat of counterrevolution and force the king to reveal his true loyalties. 62 Louis ve-
59 The Girondins (so named because many came from the department of Gironde) were known to contemporaries as "Brissotins," in reference to Brissot de Warville. See M. J. Syden- ham, The Girondins (London: Athlone Press, 1961 ); Alison Patrick, The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the French Convention of 1792 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni- versity Press, 1972); and "Girondins" in Jones, Longman Companion, 176-18o.
60 Brissot's first speech on foreign affairs raised the specter of a vast conspiracy against the revolution, and he accused the king of "secret schemes" in December. See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 99-100; Clapham, Origins ofthe Warof1792, 135; Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1989), 592-93; and F. L. Kidner, "The Girondists and the 'Propaganda War' of 1792: A Reevaluation of French Revolutionary For- eign Policy from 1791 to 1793," (Ph. D diss. , Princeton University, 1971), 7<>-74?
61 Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 27, 115, 135. On the central place of "plots" in the mindset of the revolution, see Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, 55-'JO.
62 As Brissot told the Jacobin Club in December 1791, "The accepted leader of the nation will be forced to rule in accordance with the Constitution. If he does his duty, we will support him wholeheartedly. If he betrays us-the people will be ready. " Quoted in Sydenham, Girondins, 104.
? ? Revolution and War
toed the antiemigre decrees on November 12, but he also endorsed an ulti- matum demanding that the elector of Trier disperse the emigre armies the following month, and the Girondins' attempt to provoke a confrontation backfired when the elector promptly agreed to the French demands. The king's popularity soared, and the danger of war temporarily receded.
In addition, the Girondins argued that a successful war would rally pub- lic opinion behind the Assembly and undermine the counterrevolutionary forces within France. As Brissot told the Jacobin Club in December 1791: "A people which has just won its liberty after ten centuries of slavery needs a war in order te bring about its consolidation. " They also claimed that war would permit more active efforts to suppress internal opponents, because "in time of war, measures can be taken that would appear too stern in time of peace. "63
The Girondin orators also successfully stirred the emotions of the deputies by repeatedly invoking French glory and national honor. In his ini- tial speech, Brissot began by reciting a list of alleged offenses committed by foreign powers and told the delegates, "You must avenge your glory, or con- demn yourselves to eternal dishonor. " His associate Maximin Isnard pro- claimed, "The French people have become the foremost people of the universe. As slaves, they were bold and great; are they to be feeble and timid now that they are free? " Brissot addressed the same theme in a speech at the Jacobin Club in December: "Louis XIV could declare war on Spain be- cause his ambassador had been insulted . . . are we who are free, should we for a moment hesitate? " Another Girondin, Jean Baptiste Mailhe, pro- claimed that the French nation would "disappear from the face of the earth rather than violate her oath. " That oath, Brissot reminded the delegates, was a simple one: "The Constitution or death! "64
These invocations of patriotism and national pride led to a final theme: that the war would be easy and a glorious victory inevitable. Echoing the optimistic predictions of the foreign representatives in Paris, the Girondins claimed that foreign peoples would rise up to overthrow the despots who sought to suppress liberty. "In the face of our brave patriots," predicted one speaker, "the allied armies will fade away like the shades of night in the face of the rays of the sun. " The German exile Anacharsis Cloots told the As- sembly, "The German and Bohemian peasants will resume their war against their . . . seigneurs; the Dutch and the Germans, the Italians and the Scandi-
63 Brissotalsoargued,"Waratsuchatimeasthiswouldbeablessingtothenation,andthe only calamity that we should fear is that there will not be a war," and he maintained that "we need spectacular treason cases; the people are ready! " Another Girondin suggested that France "designate the place for traitors beforehand, and let it be the scaffold! " Quoted in Soboul,FrenchRevolution,236-37;Clapham, CausesoftheWarof1792,135-36;andLefebvre, French Revolution, 1:219.
64 Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 100-101, 112.
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? The French Revolu tion
navians, will shake off and shatter their chains with fury. " Brissot described the war as "a crusade for universal liberty," and Isnard proclaimed, "If the cabinets try to raise up against France a war of kings, we shall raise up a war of peoples against kings. . . . At the moment that the enemy armies begin to fight with ours, the daylight of philosophy will open their eyes and the peo- ples will embrace each other in the face of their dethroned tyrants and an
approving heaven and earth. "65
If world revolution was imminent and lacked only the French spark to ig- nite it, then the war would be swift and would bring enormous benefits. As Mailhe reminded the Assembly: "Humanity will doubtless suffer, when one considers that in decreeing war you are also decreeing the death of several thousand men; but consider also that you are perhaps decreeing the liberty of the entire world. . . . Outside France despotism is in its death throes and a prompt attack will precipitate its final agony. "66
This extraordinary optimism also rested on an inflated sense of France's military capabilities and an unwarranted disregard for its opponents. Claiming that free peoples would fight more fiercely than the mercenary armies of the old regime, one of the deputies suggested that "Louis XIV with 40o,ooo slaves, knew how to defy all the powers of Europe; can we, with our millions of free men, fear them? " Another asked, "What is the [French] army? " and provided his own answer: "It is the entire population. " Yet another declared that "if the French people once draws the sword, it will fling the scabbard far away. Inflamed by the fire of freedom, it can . . . sin- glehanded change the whole face of the earth and make the tyrants tremble on their thrones of clay. " Brissot argued that "every advantage is now on our side, for every Frenchmen is a soldier, and a willing soldier at that! Where is the power on earth . . . who could hope to master six million free soldiers? " This confidence was reinforced by misleading reports from the minister of war, who believed that a short war would rally the nation around the constitution and presented the Assembly with an overly rosy picture of the nation's readiness for war. 67
The Girondins also argued that the diplomatic environment was unusu- ally favorable. They predicted that Sweden, Russia, and England would re-
65 The president of the Assembly, Henri Gregoire, declared that "if the princes of Germany continue to favor preparations against the French, the French will not carry fire and the sword to them, they will carry liberty. It is up to them to calculate the possible consequences of an awakening of nations. " Another Girondin predicted, "If the Revolution has already marked 1789 as the first year of French liberty, the date of the xst of January 1792 will mark this as the first year of universal liberty. " Quotations from Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 109-10; Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 77; and Schama, Citizens, 594, 597?
66 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolution in Germany, 63.
67 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, xoB-109; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:385. For evidenceofFrance'slackofreadiness,seeLefebvre, FrenchRevolution, 1:229;butseealsoScott, Response ofthe Royal Army, esp. 161? 2; and Bertaud, Army ofthe French Revolution, 49-74?
? ? Revolution and War
main neutral, while Prussia would abandon Austria and ally with France. Here was logic at its most contradictory: on the one hand, war was neces- sary because France was threatened by a vast aristocratic conspiracy; on the other harid, victory was certain because a key member of the opposing coalition was actually a French ally!
In short, the Girondins' campaign for war was inspired primarily by their desire to undermine the Feuillants and the king and to stave off the coun- terrevolution they believed was imminent. Brissot and company may not have believed all of their own arguments, of course, and their position was neither internally consistent nor supported by a careful survey of the avail- able evidence. 68 The key point, however, is that these arguments touched a sympathetic chord within the Assembly and helped convince the deputies to take an increasingly bellicose position toward the emigres, the Austrians, and the king. By portraying France's foes as implacably hostile, by linking them with the king, emigres, and internal opposition, and by persuading the Assembly that the campaign would be short, cheap, and glorious, the Girondins cast war as an ideal solution to the present turmoil.
Momentum for war increased after the Girondins' opponents also con- cluded that it would advance their own political fortunes. By the fall of 1791, for example, Lafayette was convinced that a short, victorious war would rally popular support behind the new constitution and establish the king's authority. Hence, his followers supported the Girondin campaign for war, but for their own reasons. 69 Ironically, Louis XVI also decided to sup- port a war at this point, because he believed that France was unprepared and a rapid defeat would undermine the Assembly's authority and permit him to negotiate his own restoration? 0 By January, therefore, a number of the contenders for power were in favor of war, each convinced that it would strengthen his own position and weaken his internal rivals.
The Girondins' efforts were aided by the fact that some of their arguments were partly true. The king's acceptance of the constitution was insincere, and although there existed no antirevolutionary "aristocratic plot," the royal fam-
68 The contradictions in the Girondins' position are noted by Kidner, who concludes that they did not seriously expect to spread revolution. See "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 84, 91-<)2 and passim.
69 SeeAlbertMathiez,TheFrenchRevolution,trans. CatherineAlisonPhillips(NewYork:Al- fred A. Knopf, 1928), 139-40; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 99-100; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:217-18.
70 Louis told an advisor, "The physical and moral state of France is such that it is impossi- ble for her to carry on [this war] for half a campaign, but it is necessary that I should appear to enter upon it whole-heartedly . . . . My course of action should be such that the nation may find its only resource in its troubles in throwing itself in to my arms. " The queen shared this view, arguing that "the fools" in the Assembly "do not see that [threatening the Electors] is a service to us, for if we begin [to fight them], it will be necessary . . . for all the powers to in- tervene. " Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 14o-42.
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? ? The French Revolution
ily had been in contact with various counterrevolutionary groups and did hope to reverse the revolution at an opportune moment. 71 The hostility of the emigres was not a fabrication either, even if the actual threat they posed was minimal. And, while there was no European concert against the revolution, Prussia and AustJria had made hostile gestures at Pillnitz, and Sweden, Rus- sia, and Spain had expressed even greater antipathy to the new order in France. Finally, the ease with which the revolts in Holland and Belgium had been suppressed in 1787 and 1790 gave the deputies in the Assembly a rea- sonable basis for fearing that they might suffer a similar fate. Although the Girondins tailored their arguments to suit their political goals, their assertions gained credibility because there was considerable evidence to support them.
In addition to the roles of Prussian ambition and internal French devel- opments, the decision for war was encouraged by a series of misperceptions and miscalculations between France and its main adversaries that intensi- fied perceptions of hostility and strengthened the prowar factions on both sides. The first error arose from Leopold's belief that the Padua Circular and the Declaration of Pillnitz had strengthened the Feuillants and convinced the Assembly to moderate its policies. Unaware that the Feuillants' earlier ascendancy had had little to do with his threats or that conditions within France were changing rapidly, Leopold failed to recognize that further at- tempts to intimidate the the Assembly would have very different effects.
As we have seen, the Girondins' first attempt to provoke a confrontation in November 1791 had backfired when Louis demanded the dispersal of the emigre armies and the German electors complied. Unfortunately, Leopold now chose this moment to try to repeat his actions of the previous August. As head of the Holy Roman Empire, he sent a formal protest regarding the usurping of the imperial princes' feudal rights in Alsace on December 3 and approved the Imperial Diet's resolution on this issue. On December 21, the Austrian chancellor, Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz, informed the As- sembly that Austria would defend the elector of Trier if he were threatened, bluntly warning that armed action by France would lead to "inevitable con- sequences not only from the head and members of the Holy Roman Empire but also from the other sovereigns who have united in a concert for the main- tenance of public order and for the security and honour of monarchs. "72
Despite the insulting tone of the Austrian demarche, Leopold and Kau- nitz did not want war, and the emperor advised the electors to accept the French demands. 73 Instead, their threats were intended to strengthen the
71 See Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 119-22.
72 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 102; and see also Clapham, Causes of the Warof1792, 132-33.
73 See Alfred von Vivenot and H. Zeissberg, eds. , Quellen zur Geschichte derDeutschen Kaiser- politik Osterreichs wiihrend der Franzosichen Revolutionskriege, 179D-1801 (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumiiller, 1873-<)0), 1:304, 316.
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moderates and to force the Assembly to tum to the king. The Austrians did not know that the Feuillants were no longer in control, however, and Kau- nitz's note merely aroused French suspicions and further undermined the moderates. On January 25, 1792, the Assembly voted to issue a counterulti- matum demanding that Leopold renounce any agreements or treaties di- rected against France. Louis promptly vetoed the motion, reminding the deputies tlhat the Constitution of 1791 gave him primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy and pointing out that he had already re- quested assurances of Leopold's peaceful intentions? 4
Louis's opposition stymied the Girondins temporarily, but momentum for war was restored when Austria tried yet again to intimidate the Assem- bly. The Austrian Council of State had already decided on January 17 to re- activate the "European concert" and demand that France disband its forces on the border, restore the German princes' feudal rights, renew Louis's tra- ditional privileges and freedoms, return Avignon to the papacy, and confirm its adherence to all existing treaties. Still convinced that their campaign of intimidation was working (an illusion sustained by a conciliatory message from French foreign minister Antoine Delessart), Austria now sought to transform the convention with Prussia into a formal military alliance, and! Kaunitz dispatched another caustic note to Paris on February 17. 75 Yet even these steps were not intended to lead to war, as Leopold and Kaunitz still believed an armed demonstration with Prussia would be sufficient to strengthen the forces of moderation and restore the position of the king. 76
Frederick William and his ministers welcomed the proposal for an ali? Hance, and a formal treaty was signed on February 7? The Austrians stm hoped to avoid war (although acquisitive ambitions were beginning to emerge in Vienna as well), but Prussia's leaders saw the situation primarily as an opportunity to expand. Their zeal was further increased by thei. r awareness of Russia's designs on Poland, which created the alluring possi- bility that Prussia might receive several Polish territories it had long coveted as compensation for its efforts in France. 77
74 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 105; Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 145-48; Kidner, "Girondins and the 'Propaganda War,' " 95-102.
75 Delessart had tried to satisfy the Assembly's demands without provoking Austria to war, but his measured reply unwittingly reinforced the Austrians' faith in their minatory diplo- macy. See Clapham, Causes of the War of 1 792, 1 54-55, 164-66; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:426-27; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, u6; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:224.
76 See Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 89, 95--97; and also Vivenot and Zeiss? berg, Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiserpolitik, 1:323-41, esp. 327-30.
77 According to Robert Lord, "From the first moment when the enterprise against France appeared possible, Frederick William's dominant aim-the first and last word of his policy- was territorial aggrandizement. " Second Partition ofPoland, 2JD-3J See also Blanning, French R e v o l u t i o n a r y Wa r s , 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; V o n S y b e l , F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , 2 : 6 - 1 1 , 2 2 ; a n d C l a p h a m , C a u s e s of t h e W a r of 1 7 9 2 , 1 5 6 , 1 7 1 - 7 2 .
? ? The French Revolution
Prussia's desire for action was based on the same sort of optimistic beliefs that the Girondins had promulgated so effectively within France. Influenced by the testimony of emigre and royal agents (who portrayed the new regime as unpopular and vulnerable) and by the successful suppression of earlier revolts in Holland and Belgium, the Prussians assumed that the campaign would be short and easy. The belief that the revolution had sapped French
strength was widespread, in part because the exodus of the emigres had robbed the army of many of its officers. Catherine the Great believed that "a corps of 10,000 men would be sufficient to traverse [France] from one end to the other," while a Prussian diplomat reported that "France is without dis- ciplined armies, without experienced generals, without money, and the highest degree of anarchy reigns in all departments. " Similarly, one of Fred- erick William's chief advisors predicted, "The. comedy will not last long. The army of lawyers will be annihilated in Belgium and we shall be home by the autumn. '178 Austria's leaders assumed that the threat of invasion would quiet the Assembly as it had the previous summer, although a few officials were beginning to favor ambitious schemes of their own. Thus, if the Girondins envisioned war as a triumphant crusade for liberty, their op- ponents believed it either would be avoided entirely or would lead to a swift and lucrative victory.
As T. C. W. Blanning writes, "with all three combatants believing their side to be invincible and their opponents on the verge of collapse, the scene was set for the final lurch into war. ''79 The Austrian note of February 17 pro- voked an uproar in the Assembly and led to Delessart's impeachment. The remaining Feuillant ministers resigned, and Louis reluctantly appointed a new cabinet containing several Girondins. For foreign minister he chose Charles-Fran\ois Dumouriez, an ambitious general who believed that the Austrian Netlherlands were ripe for revolt and hoped to establish his own rule there following a successful invasion. 80
Dumouriez began by attempting to isolate the Austrians, whowere cop- ing with Leopold's unexpected death on March 1 . He obtained assurances of neutrality fmm England, Holland, Spain, and Switzerland, but his efforts to sever Prussia and the German states from Vienna failed completely. His first message to Austria (on March 19) was mild, but a second note nine
78 QuotedinCraneBrinton,ADecadeofRevolution:1789-1799(NewYork:HarperandRow, 1934), 84; and Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 1 15-16.
79 Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 1 15-16.
80 DumourieztoldtheCouncilofMinistersonMarch22,"Allthese[Belgian]provincesare permeated by the spirit of liberty and shaken by recent revolution. . . . They will join forces with our troops and will easily drive the dispersed hordes of Austrian mercenaries from their towns. " Quoted in Patricia Chastain Howe, "Charles-Fran,. ois Dumouriez and the Revolu- tionizing of French Foreign Affairs in 1792," French Historical Studies 4, no. 3 (1985-86), 386-87; and see also Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:224; and Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 177-78.
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days later demanded that Austria renounce the concert against France or face "the sternest measures. " Dumouriez had already warned the Assem- bly's Diplomatic Committee that Austrian reinforcements were transform- ing Belgium and Liege into a "formidable military state. " He now argued
. that a preemptive strike was preferable to letting France's enemies complete their preparations. A harsh Austrian reply to Dumouriez's first message brought fresh denunciations within the Assembly, and Austrian agents in France now reported that war was imminent. 81
On April 2o, Dumouriez presented to the Assembly a formal report listing France's motives for war. Louis bowed to the inevitable and asked the As- sembly for a formal declaration of war against "the king of Austria and Hungary. " Although several prominent Jacobins (notably Maximilien Ro- bespierre) opposed the decision, the motion passed with only seven dis- senting votes. 82 Austria and Prussia had already begun mobilizing their forces, and the first shots were to be fired by the end of the month.
83
The origins of the war of 1792 support several of my hypotheses about the relationship between revolution and war. First, the war was not simply the result of ideological antipathies between the old-regime monarchies of Aus- tria and Prussia and the new regime in France. France was still officially a monarchy when the war broke out, and Frederick William of Prussia had been willing to negotiate an alliance with France in 1790. Dumouriez sought a similar arrangement in 1792 and explored the possibility of an alliance with England as well. Even more significantly, the French decided to invite the duke of Brunswick to command the French armies; his reputation as a commander was clearly more important to the Assembly than his status within the ancien regime. 84 These events suggest that internal differences
81 On Dumouriez's efforts to shake the Austro-Prussian alliance, see Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolutionfranfaise, 2:352-56; and Howe, "Dumouriez and French Foreign Affairs," 385-87.
82 Robespierre had opposed war since November, arguing with remarkable foresight that it would either restore the monarchy or usher in a military dictatorship. He ridiculed the uni- versalist pretensions of the Cirondins, arguing that "no one likes an armed missionary, and no more extravagant idea ever sprang from the idea of a politician than to suppose that one people has on1ly to enter another's territory with arms in its hands to make the latter adopt its Constitution. " See J. M. Thompson, Robespierre (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 202-209; Georges Michon, Robespierre et Ia guerre rivolutionnaire (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1937), 51-55; and Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:395-<)6. An equally prophetic warning was given by Henri Becquet, a deputy from Haute-Marne; see Thompson, French Revolution, 261.
83 The Austrians deployed fifty thousand men to the frontiers on April 12, eight days before the formal declaration of war by the French Assembly. Frederick William ordered his own army to mobilize for war on April 24, but Prussia did not declare war for several months.
84 The duke of Brunswick had won renown as a general in the Seven Years War and was considered a reformer within his own domains. Ironically, he was eventually appointed com- mander of the Austro-Prussian armies, and he led the initial invasion of France. See Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1 :397-98; and Biro, German Policy, 1 :56-57.
? ? ? The French Revolution
were less significant than Girondin rhetoric implied; similarly, while foreign monarchs were concerned about the long-term impact of events in France, neither Prussia nor Austria went to war to defend the monarchical principle.
Second, although the impact of the revolution on the balance of power played a role in causing the war, the importance of this factor should not be overstated. Perceptions of French weakness fueled Prussian acquisitiveness and encouraged the belief that victory would be swift, but Prussia would not have gone to war on its own, and the decline of French power also en- couraged other states to concentrate on more pressing issues. England re- mained neutral, Russia and Austria concerned themselves with events in the East, and even Frederick William preferred to gain territory from Poland than from France. French weakness made these gambits seem feasible, but the war did not arise solely (or even primarily) from the desire to exploit France's difficulties.
Third, several significant misperceptions, which both exacerbated and were reinforced by the ideology of the revolutionary movement and the in- ternal struggle for power in France, clearly contributed to the outbreak of the war. The revolution had fostered a profound sense of insecurity within France, culminating in the belief that the king, the emigres, the clergy, and several foreign monarchs were conspiring to restore the ancien regime. This fear helped the Girondins persuade the Assembly that a foreign war was unavoidable and that it would help preserve the revolution. Their argu- ments rested on erroneous beliefs about the influence of the emigres and the hostility of Austria and Prussia, resulting from their misreading of the Aus- tro-Prussian rapprochement, the Padua Circular, and the Declaration of Pill- nitz. Austria's clumsy attempts to browbeat the Assembly merely reinforced these tendencies and facilitated the Girondins' efforts.
Interestingly, the revolution did not provoke a similar degree of insecurity in Austria or Prussia, whose responses were not driven by a strong sense of French bellicosity. 85 Leopold and Frederick William were worried about the spread of revolutionary ideas and by aspects of French behavior, but neither went to war for that reason. Rather, Frederick William's decisions reflected his perennial desire to expand (bolstered by the testimony of certain emi- gres), while Austria was forced into war by the French response to their ear- lier threats and its own latent expansionism. 86 The fear of contagion was
85 That the sense of threat was limited may have been partly due to the modest scope of the changes within France. Although royal authority had been sharply curtailed and the position of the king was still precarious, the Constitution of 1791 not only retained the monarchy but gave the king a substantial role.
86 Kaunitz seems to have discounted the danger of revolutionary subversion prior to the war, writing in November 1791, "The alleged danger of the possible effects that the bad ex- ample of the French could have on other peoples is nothing but a wild-eyed panic, a chimera contradicted by the facts. " Quoted in Vivenot and Zeissberg, Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiser- politik, 1:286.
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more prevalent in Spain, Sweden, Russia, and the smaller German states, but leaders there were not actively involved in the initial decisions for war. In partial contrast to the predictions set forth in chapter 2, therefore, the spi- ral of suspicion that led to the war of 1792 was essentially one-sided.
Fourth, the revolution had obvious and important effects on perceptions of the offense-defense balance, such that the use of force appeared more at- tractive. This factor was most evident in the Girondin campaign for war, which rested! on the claims that Europe was ripe for revolt, foreign merce- naries would be no match for "free" soldiers, and France would win a quick and costless victory. France's opponents evinced equal optimism, based on the widespread assumption that the revolution had left France in no condi- tion to fight. These perceptions were at least partly influenced by self-serv- ing testimony from the emigres or the revolutionary exiles in Paris, which helps explain why their forecasts were so inaccurate.
Finally, lack of information was an important contributing factor. Because they were unfamiliar with the subtleties of old-regime diplomacy, the deputies faHed to realize that Leopold's warnings were largely empty ges- tures. Similarly, because they had no reliable information about the rapid shifts in French domestic politics, Leopold and Kaunitz could not know that their efforts to browbeat the Assembly into a more moderate stance were having the opposite effect. The dearth of information played a key role in driving the spiral to war, therefore, as Austria's actions unintentionally con- firmed French fears and fortified the extremists.
With some qualifications, therefore, the war of 1792 illustrates many of the mechanisms that link revolution and war. The upheaval in France caused a destabilizing shift in the balance of power, an exaggerated percep- tion of hostility, an internal struggle for power in which foreign policy was a potent political issue, and visions of a mutual offensive advantage that in- flated both sides' confidence that they could improve their positions through war.
THE WAR OF THE FIRST CoALITION
When war broke out in April 1792, the combatants anticipated a short war and did not expect it to spread. Although the French proclaimed that they would wage a "war against kings," they delayed the declaration of war against Prussia, in an attempt to isolate Austria, and proceeded to launch a traditional limited war against the Austrian Netherlands. Austrian and Prussian war aims were unfocused, and both powers were soon distracted by the Russian invasion of Poland in May. 87 Divisions within the allied coali-
87 See Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 102-107.
? ? ? The French Revolution
tion helped the revolutionary government survive the initial clashes, and the conflict soon expanded throughout Europe and beyond.
The Second Revolution and the Expansion of the War
Contrary to the optimistic predictions of the Girondins, the war began with a series of embarrassing French defeats. The Army of the North in- vaded the Austrian Netherlands on April 28, but the inexperienced French troops broke and ran at their first encounter with the Austrian forces. A French general was murdered by his own troops, and the re- maining commanders declared an offensive impossible and refused to move. 88
The debacle further polarized the political climate in France. The gener- als blamed the defeat on lack of discipline and ministerial incompetence, while the Girondins accused the army and king of disloyalty, and Brissot warned that a secret "Austrian Committee" was at work to betray the country. 89 Given the initial belief that victory would be swift, treason seemed the only possible explanation for the initial setbacks. To stave off counterrevolution, the Assembly voted to deport the dissident clergy and dissolve the king's Swiss Guards, and ordered the deployment of provin- cial National Guards (known asfederes) around Paris. Louis promptly ve- toed these measures, dismissed the Girondin ministers, and reappointed the Feuillants. Now convinced that the radicals were intent on destroying the constitution, Lafayette left his troops and returned to Paris, where he tried unsuccessfully to rally the Assembly and the National Guard against the Jacobins. These events reunited opposition to the king, and the deputies overrode the royal veto on July 3 and authorized the federes to come to Paris to celebrate the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. The As- sembly declared the country "in danger" on July 11 and decreed a new troop levy the following day. 90
TheFoundingoftheFirstRepublic. Demandstoabolishthemonarchywere growing by this point, exacerbating the divisions within the Jacobin move-
88 These events led Kaunitz to abandon his normal pessimism, and he predicted that France would fall in a single campaign. Another Austrian official declared that "two regi- ments of Hungarian hussars, with whips as their arms, would suffice to terminate the farce. " Quoted in Biro, German Policy, 174. On the failure of the initial campaign, see Ross, European Diplomatic History, 49-50; and Scott, Response of the Royal Army, 1 16-17.
89 Girondin accusations about the "Austrian committee" turned out to be partially true, as agents of the queen had sent information about French military plans to the Austrian com- manders. See Soboul, French Revolution, 242-44; Sutherland, France, 145; and Mathiez, French Revolution, 149-50.
90 See Mathiez, French Revolution, 148-56; and Norman Hampson, A Social History of the French Revolution (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 137-46.
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ment. 91 The Girondins were alarmed by the popular agitation in Paris and the growing strength of the more radical Montagnards, and they began ne- gotiating with Louis for reappointment after the Feuillant cabinet resigned on July 10.
The struggle for power reached a climax after France's opponents made yet another ill-advised attempt to intimidate the Assembly. When the Aus- tro-Prussian invasion finally got underway in July, concern for the royal fam- ily led the duke of Brunswick to issue an ultimatum threatening the destruction of Paris if its members were harmed. The so-called Brunswick Manifesto was actually the brainchild of a royalist emigre, and like Leopold! ' s earlier demarches, the declaration merely intensified French fears and un- dermined the king's position even inore. 92
Spurred on by Jacobin propaganda, deteriorating economic conditions, and the fear of foreign occupation, the population of Paris rose in protest on August 9? Angry sans-culottes replaced the municipal government with a new body-known as the Paris Commune-and a mob of Parisians and
federes stormed the Tuileries and forced the royal family to take refuge with the Assembly. Alarmed by the popular insurgency and fearing for their own safety, the deputies voted to recognize the Commune as a legitimate body and to suspend the king pending election of a national convention based on universal male suffrage. 93 Executive leadership (including the management of foreign policy) would be conducted by a provisional exec- utive council, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned to Pierre Helene-Marie Lebrun, a parvenu journalist and protege of Dumouriez. 94 In a burst of revolutionary fervor, the Assembly voted to bestow French citi- zenship on a number of foreign sympathizers and approved a motion re- nouncing conquests and expressing its desire for "fraternity with all peoples. "95
After another outburst of mob violence and a hasty series of elections, the new National Convention convened in Paris on September 21. The deputies
91 A delegation from the fideres in Paris demanded the suspension of the king on July 17, claiming that "without the treason of the enemies of the interior, the others [i. e. , Austria, Prussia, a111d the emigres] were not to be feared or rather they would not exist. " Quoted in Sutherland, France, 147.
92 For the text of the manifesto, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 306-11; on its origins and effects, see H. A. Barton, "The Origins of the Brunswick Manifesto," French Historical Studies 5, no. 2 (1967); and Biro, German Policy, 1:68-71.
93 See Doyle, History of the French Revolution, 184-89; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:229-35?
94 The Executive Council was first led by Danton and later by Georges Roland, while the Diplomatic Committee of the Assembly included Brissot and several of his associates. See J. T. Murley, "The Origin and Outbreak of the Anglo-French War of 1 793" (Ph. D. diss. , Oxford University, 1959), 5-21.
95 See Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:54-55; and Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolution fran? aise, 3:15.
? ? ? The French Revolution
immediately voted to abolish the monarchy and place the king on trial and began to mobilize the nation for war. In less than six months, the war had destroyed both the monarchy and the Constitution of 1791 and given birth to the First Republic. 96
Revolutionary Expansion. By the end of the year, what had begun as a defensive struggle against a counterrevolutionary expedition had become an offensive war of conquest. This dramatic improvement in France's mil- itary fortunes was partly the result of an outpouring of patriotic feeling, which filled the ranks of the French forces with enthusiastic if unskilled volunteers. 97 Equally important, however, were the rivalries and distrac- tions that weakened France's opponents. The Austro-Prussian invasion was first delayed by negotiations over contributions and compensations and then undermined by overconfidence, mutual suspicions, and a pre- occupation with events in Eastern Europe. As a result, Austria con- tributed only 70,000 of its 2oo,ooo troops and Prussia sent only 40,000 out of 170,000. The invading force did not cross the French border until Au- gust 19, and! its slow rate of advance gave the French invaluable time to prepare. 98
The tide turned on September 20, when a body of French artillery halted a Prussian assault at the Battle of Valmy. With his army weakened from dis- ease and bad weather, Brunswick called off the advance and began negoti- ations with Dumouriez (who had resigned from the cabinet in June and taken command of the French Army of the North). These parleys continued for over a month, and though Frederick William kept up appearances by declining an offer of alliance and ordering Brunswick to issue another threatening manifesto, his enthusiasm for the war was fading rapidly. Du- mouriez eventually permitted the Prussian forces to withdraw unchal- lenged, and Frederick William informed the Austrians in late October that he would require additional compensation in Poland i? he were to continue the war. 99 The Prussian forces had left French territory by the end of Octo-
96 In September, Jacobin efforts to rally the population and reports that the foreign armies were advancing on Paris led to the murder of over a thousand imprisoned criminals who were mistakenly believed to be counterrevolutionaries. See Sutherland, France, 154-55; Thompson, French Revolution, 302-309; Patrice Gueniffy, "Paris Commune," and Fran? ois Furet, "Terror," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 138-39, 52<r-22. .
97 Samuel F. Scott reports that "during 1792 more than 70,000 men enlisted in the line army, an impressive achievement under any circumstances. " Response of the Royal Army, 165; also see Bertaud, Army ofthe French Revolution, 66-74.
98 Ross, European Diplomatic History, 51-52.
99 The negotiations between France and Prussia are recounted in Biro, German Policy, 1:7cr87; Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolution franraise, 3:53-55, 77--96; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 2:139-48, 172-77, 185-88; Karl A. Raider, Jr. , Baron Thugut and Austria's Response to the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), too-101; and Schroeder, Transforma- tion of European Politics, 1 1 8-20.
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ber, while a French army occupied Savoy and Nice and another moved into the Rhineland. 100
J. T. Murley notes, "Had the Republic been prepared to compromise with the Austro-Prussian Coalition, a general peace might have resulted. "101 The main issue was whether the French would insist on imposing republican in- stitutions in the areas it had conquered or permit these peoples to choose their own rulers without interference. The latter outcome was not incon- ceivable, as the negotiations between France and Prussia had shown that the Executive Council was willing to cooperate with foreign monarchs and the Assembly had passed a resolution renouncing foreign conquests in Au- gust. Moreover, the Executive Council had reaffirmed that France would not "interfere in the internal government of other peoples," and the Gi- rondin leaders knew that ending the war would reduce the fear of counter- revolution and aid their ability to control the popular forces. They were increasingly concerned about the costs of the war as well, and some worried that a campaign of expansion would both jeopardize efforts to reach a sep- arate peace with Prussia and contradict the revolutionary ideals of liberty and self-determination. 102
Yet other forces drew the Republic toward a policy of revolutionary ex- pansion. This outcome was partly due to the ambitions of men such as Du- mouriez-who saw the war primarily as an opportunity for personal advancement-as well as latent French hostility to Austria and the anticler- ical sentiments that dominated the Assembly. These concerns-together with a desire for territorial aggrandizement-account for the Executive Council's decision to authorize an invasion "to enfranchise the oppressed peoples" in the Netherlands on October 6. 103
Even more importantly, the policy of revolutionary expansion resulted from the same influences that had driven France to war seven months ear-
? 100 The expedition into the Rhineland was based on the unfulfilled hope of a general upris- ing among the local population. Von Sybel, French Revolution, 2:165-72.
101 See Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 98. Of course, peace in the west would not have ended the rivalries among the eastern powers, and might well have increased them. 102 On October 8, Brissot wrote that while "it would suit us to be surrounded by allied re- publics, our Republic would lose itself in expanding. " On October 24, the Diplomatic Com- mittee of the Convention advised against further expansion and declared that the French were not "conquerors of territory but the benefactors of the human race. " Similarly, Dumouriez's Manifesto to the Belgians, published at the beginning of his invasion, pledged, "We enter to help you plant the tree of liberty, but without involving ourselves at all in the constitution that you
wish to adopt. " All quoted in Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," ttS-19.
103 Brissot wrote Dumouriez that "the French Republic should not have any boundary other than the Rhine," and Lazare Camot justified annexation on the grounds that "the an- cient and natural boundaries of France are the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. " Similarly, Danton argued for the annexation of Belgium by saying it was "pointless to fear overextend- ing the Republic. Its boundaries have been set by nature. " See Denis Richet, "Natural Bor- ders," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 758.
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lier. French foreign policy was in the hands of leaders who still saw them- selves as part of a universal movement for liberty and whose hostility to monarchical nnstitutions had led them to depose their own king. Although these ideological principles could be used to justify nonintervention (as im- posing liberty by force would violate the rights of the alleged beneficiaries), the belief that neighboring peoples were eager to receive the fruits of liberty obscured the possibility that they might actually not welcome the French as- sistance. Moreover, hostility to monarchical institutions increased French perceptions of threat so that expansion seemed necessary for security. For- eign Minister Lebrun told the deputies, "The moment of greatest danger will arrive next spring, when allied tyranny will make its last effort, and then we must repel the combined force of all the kings. " In September, Dan- ton told the Convention, "We have the right to say to the peoples: you shall have no more kings! " and warned that, were France to remain surrounded by monarchs, these peoples "would furnish us with an endless series of tyrants to combat. "104 The president of the Assembly, Henri Gregoire, en- dorsed a petition to annex Savoy by saying, "It in no way adds to the hatred of oppressors for the Revolution. . . . It adds to the resources by which we
shall break their league. . . . All Governments are our enemies, all Peoples are our allies; either we shall fall or all peoples shall become free. "105 Having defined the war as a campaign against kings, it was hard to limit it so long as a single monarch remained on a throne. As in the winter of 1791--92, the beliefs that foreign powers were intrinsically hostile and that the revolution was part of a universal trend combined to justify a policy of expansion.
The impact of these beliefs was accentuated by rivalries between the Girondin and Montagnard factions and the chaotic nature of decision-mak- ing within the Convention. Although the Girondins controlled the Execu- tive Council, they lacked an absolute majority in the Convention, and the Montagnards were more popular among the radical Parisian sections. To compensate for their moderation on domestic issues, therefore, the Girondins returned to the bellicose rhetoric they had used so successfully
104 Danton's words were somewhat disingenuous, as he was simultaneously negotiating for a separate peace with Prussia. Yet his willingness to use such rhetoric in the Convention reveals his awareness of its political potency, and he told the Convention that it "should be a committee of general insurrection against all the kings in the universe, and I ask that in call- ing all peoples to the conquest of liberty [the National Convention] offer them all the means of repulsing tyraMy. . . . The French cannot endure that peoples who aspire to liberty never- theless give themselves a government contrary to their interests. " Quoted in Albert Mathiez,
Danton et Ia paix (Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1919), 58; also see his French Revolution, 278; Norman Hampsoll,l Danton (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), 89-93; and Murley, "Origin oftheAnglo-FrenchWar," 102.
105 Like Danton, Gregoire also maintained that spreading the revolution would protect France from its opponents. In his words: "When my neighbor keeps a nest of vipers, I have the right to smother them lest I become their victim. " Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 285.
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the previous year. And as Murley points out, because the Convention still lacked fixed rules of procedure, "major decisions turned on the chance pas- sions of unregulated debates, . .
manding that several neighboring rulers expel the emigres from their terri- tories. These measures were intended to reduce the direct threat of counterrevolution and force the king to reveal his true loyalties. 62 Louis ve-
59 The Girondins (so named because many came from the department of Gironde) were known to contemporaries as "Brissotins," in reference to Brissot de Warville. See M. J. Syden- ham, The Girondins (London: Athlone Press, 1961 ); Alison Patrick, The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the French Convention of 1792 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni- versity Press, 1972); and "Girondins" in Jones, Longman Companion, 176-18o.
60 Brissot's first speech on foreign affairs raised the specter of a vast conspiracy against the revolution, and he accused the king of "secret schemes" in December. See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 99-100; Clapham, Origins ofthe Warof1792, 135; Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1989), 592-93; and F. L. Kidner, "The Girondists and the 'Propaganda War' of 1792: A Reevaluation of French Revolutionary For- eign Policy from 1791 to 1793," (Ph. D diss. , Princeton University, 1971), 7<>-74?
61 Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 27, 115, 135. On the central place of "plots" in the mindset of the revolution, see Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, 55-'JO.
62 As Brissot told the Jacobin Club in December 1791, "The accepted leader of the nation will be forced to rule in accordance with the Constitution. If he does his duty, we will support him wholeheartedly. If he betrays us-the people will be ready. " Quoted in Sydenham, Girondins, 104.
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toed the antiemigre decrees on November 12, but he also endorsed an ulti- matum demanding that the elector of Trier disperse the emigre armies the following month, and the Girondins' attempt to provoke a confrontation backfired when the elector promptly agreed to the French demands. The king's popularity soared, and the danger of war temporarily receded.
In addition, the Girondins argued that a successful war would rally pub- lic opinion behind the Assembly and undermine the counterrevolutionary forces within France. As Brissot told the Jacobin Club in December 1791: "A people which has just won its liberty after ten centuries of slavery needs a war in order te bring about its consolidation. " They also claimed that war would permit more active efforts to suppress internal opponents, because "in time of war, measures can be taken that would appear too stern in time of peace. "63
The Girondin orators also successfully stirred the emotions of the deputies by repeatedly invoking French glory and national honor. In his ini- tial speech, Brissot began by reciting a list of alleged offenses committed by foreign powers and told the delegates, "You must avenge your glory, or con- demn yourselves to eternal dishonor. " His associate Maximin Isnard pro- claimed, "The French people have become the foremost people of the universe. As slaves, they were bold and great; are they to be feeble and timid now that they are free? " Brissot addressed the same theme in a speech at the Jacobin Club in December: "Louis XIV could declare war on Spain be- cause his ambassador had been insulted . . . are we who are free, should we for a moment hesitate? " Another Girondin, Jean Baptiste Mailhe, pro- claimed that the French nation would "disappear from the face of the earth rather than violate her oath. " That oath, Brissot reminded the delegates, was a simple one: "The Constitution or death! "64
These invocations of patriotism and national pride led to a final theme: that the war would be easy and a glorious victory inevitable. Echoing the optimistic predictions of the foreign representatives in Paris, the Girondins claimed that foreign peoples would rise up to overthrow the despots who sought to suppress liberty. "In the face of our brave patriots," predicted one speaker, "the allied armies will fade away like the shades of night in the face of the rays of the sun. " The German exile Anacharsis Cloots told the As- sembly, "The German and Bohemian peasants will resume their war against their . . . seigneurs; the Dutch and the Germans, the Italians and the Scandi-
63 Brissotalsoargued,"Waratsuchatimeasthiswouldbeablessingtothenation,andthe only calamity that we should fear is that there will not be a war," and he maintained that "we need spectacular treason cases; the people are ready! " Another Girondin suggested that France "designate the place for traitors beforehand, and let it be the scaffold! " Quoted in Soboul,FrenchRevolution,236-37;Clapham, CausesoftheWarof1792,135-36;andLefebvre, French Revolution, 1:219.
64 Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 100-101, 112.
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? The French Revolu tion
navians, will shake off and shatter their chains with fury. " Brissot described the war as "a crusade for universal liberty," and Isnard proclaimed, "If the cabinets try to raise up against France a war of kings, we shall raise up a war of peoples against kings. . . . At the moment that the enemy armies begin to fight with ours, the daylight of philosophy will open their eyes and the peo- ples will embrace each other in the face of their dethroned tyrants and an
approving heaven and earth. "65
If world revolution was imminent and lacked only the French spark to ig- nite it, then the war would be swift and would bring enormous benefits. As Mailhe reminded the Assembly: "Humanity will doubtless suffer, when one considers that in decreeing war you are also decreeing the death of several thousand men; but consider also that you are perhaps decreeing the liberty of the entire world. . . . Outside France despotism is in its death throes and a prompt attack will precipitate its final agony. "66
This extraordinary optimism also rested on an inflated sense of France's military capabilities and an unwarranted disregard for its opponents. Claiming that free peoples would fight more fiercely than the mercenary armies of the old regime, one of the deputies suggested that "Louis XIV with 40o,ooo slaves, knew how to defy all the powers of Europe; can we, with our millions of free men, fear them? " Another asked, "What is the [French] army? " and provided his own answer: "It is the entire population. " Yet another declared that "if the French people once draws the sword, it will fling the scabbard far away. Inflamed by the fire of freedom, it can . . . sin- glehanded change the whole face of the earth and make the tyrants tremble on their thrones of clay. " Brissot argued that "every advantage is now on our side, for every Frenchmen is a soldier, and a willing soldier at that! Where is the power on earth . . . who could hope to master six million free soldiers? " This confidence was reinforced by misleading reports from the minister of war, who believed that a short war would rally the nation around the constitution and presented the Assembly with an overly rosy picture of the nation's readiness for war. 67
The Girondins also argued that the diplomatic environment was unusu- ally favorable. They predicted that Sweden, Russia, and England would re-
65 The president of the Assembly, Henri Gregoire, declared that "if the princes of Germany continue to favor preparations against the French, the French will not carry fire and the sword to them, they will carry liberty. It is up to them to calculate the possible consequences of an awakening of nations. " Another Girondin predicted, "If the Revolution has already marked 1789 as the first year of French liberty, the date of the xst of January 1792 will mark this as the first year of universal liberty. " Quotations from Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 109-10; Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 77; and Schama, Citizens, 594, 597?
66 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolution in Germany, 63.
67 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, xoB-109; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:385. For evidenceofFrance'slackofreadiness,seeLefebvre, FrenchRevolution, 1:229;butseealsoScott, Response ofthe Royal Army, esp. 161? 2; and Bertaud, Army ofthe French Revolution, 49-74?
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main neutral, while Prussia would abandon Austria and ally with France. Here was logic at its most contradictory: on the one hand, war was neces- sary because France was threatened by a vast aristocratic conspiracy; on the other harid, victory was certain because a key member of the opposing coalition was actually a French ally!
In short, the Girondins' campaign for war was inspired primarily by their desire to undermine the Feuillants and the king and to stave off the coun- terrevolution they believed was imminent. Brissot and company may not have believed all of their own arguments, of course, and their position was neither internally consistent nor supported by a careful survey of the avail- able evidence. 68 The key point, however, is that these arguments touched a sympathetic chord within the Assembly and helped convince the deputies to take an increasingly bellicose position toward the emigres, the Austrians, and the king. By portraying France's foes as implacably hostile, by linking them with the king, emigres, and internal opposition, and by persuading the Assembly that the campaign would be short, cheap, and glorious, the Girondins cast war as an ideal solution to the present turmoil.
Momentum for war increased after the Girondins' opponents also con- cluded that it would advance their own political fortunes. By the fall of 1791, for example, Lafayette was convinced that a short, victorious war would rally popular support behind the new constitution and establish the king's authority. Hence, his followers supported the Girondin campaign for war, but for their own reasons. 69 Ironically, Louis XVI also decided to sup- port a war at this point, because he believed that France was unprepared and a rapid defeat would undermine the Assembly's authority and permit him to negotiate his own restoration? 0 By January, therefore, a number of the contenders for power were in favor of war, each convinced that it would strengthen his own position and weaken his internal rivals.
The Girondins' efforts were aided by the fact that some of their arguments were partly true. The king's acceptance of the constitution was insincere, and although there existed no antirevolutionary "aristocratic plot," the royal fam-
68 The contradictions in the Girondins' position are noted by Kidner, who concludes that they did not seriously expect to spread revolution. See "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 84, 91-<)2 and passim.
69 SeeAlbertMathiez,TheFrenchRevolution,trans. CatherineAlisonPhillips(NewYork:Al- fred A. Knopf, 1928), 139-40; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 99-100; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:217-18.
70 Louis told an advisor, "The physical and moral state of France is such that it is impossi- ble for her to carry on [this war] for half a campaign, but it is necessary that I should appear to enter upon it whole-heartedly . . . . My course of action should be such that the nation may find its only resource in its troubles in throwing itself in to my arms. " The queen shared this view, arguing that "the fools" in the Assembly "do not see that [threatening the Electors] is a service to us, for if we begin [to fight them], it will be necessary . . . for all the powers to in- tervene. " Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 14o-42.
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ily had been in contact with various counterrevolutionary groups and did hope to reverse the revolution at an opportune moment. 71 The hostility of the emigres was not a fabrication either, even if the actual threat they posed was minimal. And, while there was no European concert against the revolution, Prussia and AustJria had made hostile gestures at Pillnitz, and Sweden, Rus- sia, and Spain had expressed even greater antipathy to the new order in France. Finally, the ease with which the revolts in Holland and Belgium had been suppressed in 1787 and 1790 gave the deputies in the Assembly a rea- sonable basis for fearing that they might suffer a similar fate. Although the Girondins tailored their arguments to suit their political goals, their assertions gained credibility because there was considerable evidence to support them.
In addition to the roles of Prussian ambition and internal French devel- opments, the decision for war was encouraged by a series of misperceptions and miscalculations between France and its main adversaries that intensi- fied perceptions of hostility and strengthened the prowar factions on both sides. The first error arose from Leopold's belief that the Padua Circular and the Declaration of Pillnitz had strengthened the Feuillants and convinced the Assembly to moderate its policies. Unaware that the Feuillants' earlier ascendancy had had little to do with his threats or that conditions within France were changing rapidly, Leopold failed to recognize that further at- tempts to intimidate the the Assembly would have very different effects.
As we have seen, the Girondins' first attempt to provoke a confrontation in November 1791 had backfired when Louis demanded the dispersal of the emigre armies and the German electors complied. Unfortunately, Leopold now chose this moment to try to repeat his actions of the previous August. As head of the Holy Roman Empire, he sent a formal protest regarding the usurping of the imperial princes' feudal rights in Alsace on December 3 and approved the Imperial Diet's resolution on this issue. On December 21, the Austrian chancellor, Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz, informed the As- sembly that Austria would defend the elector of Trier if he were threatened, bluntly warning that armed action by France would lead to "inevitable con- sequences not only from the head and members of the Holy Roman Empire but also from the other sovereigns who have united in a concert for the main- tenance of public order and for the security and honour of monarchs. "72
Despite the insulting tone of the Austrian demarche, Leopold and Kau- nitz did not want war, and the emperor advised the electors to accept the French demands. 73 Instead, their threats were intended to strengthen the
71 See Kidner, "Girondists and the 'Propaganda War,' " 119-22.
72 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 102; and see also Clapham, Causes of the Warof1792, 132-33.
73 See Alfred von Vivenot and H. Zeissberg, eds. , Quellen zur Geschichte derDeutschen Kaiser- politik Osterreichs wiihrend der Franzosichen Revolutionskriege, 179D-1801 (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumiiller, 1873-<)0), 1:304, 316.
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moderates and to force the Assembly to tum to the king. The Austrians did not know that the Feuillants were no longer in control, however, and Kau- nitz's note merely aroused French suspicions and further undermined the moderates. On January 25, 1792, the Assembly voted to issue a counterulti- matum demanding that Leopold renounce any agreements or treaties di- rected against France. Louis promptly vetoed the motion, reminding the deputies tlhat the Constitution of 1791 gave him primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy and pointing out that he had already re- quested assurances of Leopold's peaceful intentions? 4
Louis's opposition stymied the Girondins temporarily, but momentum for war was restored when Austria tried yet again to intimidate the Assem- bly. The Austrian Council of State had already decided on January 17 to re- activate the "European concert" and demand that France disband its forces on the border, restore the German princes' feudal rights, renew Louis's tra- ditional privileges and freedoms, return Avignon to the papacy, and confirm its adherence to all existing treaties. Still convinced that their campaign of intimidation was working (an illusion sustained by a conciliatory message from French foreign minister Antoine Delessart), Austria now sought to transform the convention with Prussia into a formal military alliance, and! Kaunitz dispatched another caustic note to Paris on February 17. 75 Yet even these steps were not intended to lead to war, as Leopold and Kaunitz still believed an armed demonstration with Prussia would be sufficient to strengthen the forces of moderation and restore the position of the king. 76
Frederick William and his ministers welcomed the proposal for an ali? Hance, and a formal treaty was signed on February 7? The Austrians stm hoped to avoid war (although acquisitive ambitions were beginning to emerge in Vienna as well), but Prussia's leaders saw the situation primarily as an opportunity to expand. Their zeal was further increased by thei. r awareness of Russia's designs on Poland, which created the alluring possi- bility that Prussia might receive several Polish territories it had long coveted as compensation for its efforts in France. 77
74 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 105; Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 145-48; Kidner, "Girondins and the 'Propaganda War,' " 95-102.
75 Delessart had tried to satisfy the Assembly's demands without provoking Austria to war, but his measured reply unwittingly reinforced the Austrians' faith in their minatory diplo- macy. See Clapham, Causes of the War of 1 792, 1 54-55, 164-66; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:426-27; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, u6; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:224.
76 See Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 89, 95--97; and also Vivenot and Zeiss? berg, Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiserpolitik, 1:323-41, esp. 327-30.
77 According to Robert Lord, "From the first moment when the enterprise against France appeared possible, Frederick William's dominant aim-the first and last word of his policy- was territorial aggrandizement. " Second Partition ofPoland, 2JD-3J See also Blanning, French R e v o l u t i o n a r y Wa r s , 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; V o n S y b e l , F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , 2 : 6 - 1 1 , 2 2 ; a n d C l a p h a m , C a u s e s of t h e W a r of 1 7 9 2 , 1 5 6 , 1 7 1 - 7 2 .
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Prussia's desire for action was based on the same sort of optimistic beliefs that the Girondins had promulgated so effectively within France. Influenced by the testimony of emigre and royal agents (who portrayed the new regime as unpopular and vulnerable) and by the successful suppression of earlier revolts in Holland and Belgium, the Prussians assumed that the campaign would be short and easy. The belief that the revolution had sapped French
strength was widespread, in part because the exodus of the emigres had robbed the army of many of its officers. Catherine the Great believed that "a corps of 10,000 men would be sufficient to traverse [France] from one end to the other," while a Prussian diplomat reported that "France is without dis- ciplined armies, without experienced generals, without money, and the highest degree of anarchy reigns in all departments. " Similarly, one of Fred- erick William's chief advisors predicted, "The. comedy will not last long. The army of lawyers will be annihilated in Belgium and we shall be home by the autumn. '178 Austria's leaders assumed that the threat of invasion would quiet the Assembly as it had the previous summer, although a few officials were beginning to favor ambitious schemes of their own. Thus, if the Girondins envisioned war as a triumphant crusade for liberty, their op- ponents believed it either would be avoided entirely or would lead to a swift and lucrative victory.
As T. C. W. Blanning writes, "with all three combatants believing their side to be invincible and their opponents on the verge of collapse, the scene was set for the final lurch into war. ''79 The Austrian note of February 17 pro- voked an uproar in the Assembly and led to Delessart's impeachment. The remaining Feuillant ministers resigned, and Louis reluctantly appointed a new cabinet containing several Girondins. For foreign minister he chose Charles-Fran\ois Dumouriez, an ambitious general who believed that the Austrian Netlherlands were ripe for revolt and hoped to establish his own rule there following a successful invasion. 80
Dumouriez began by attempting to isolate the Austrians, whowere cop- ing with Leopold's unexpected death on March 1 . He obtained assurances of neutrality fmm England, Holland, Spain, and Switzerland, but his efforts to sever Prussia and the German states from Vienna failed completely. His first message to Austria (on March 19) was mild, but a second note nine
78 QuotedinCraneBrinton,ADecadeofRevolution:1789-1799(NewYork:HarperandRow, 1934), 84; and Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 1 15-16.
79 Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 1 15-16.
80 DumourieztoldtheCouncilofMinistersonMarch22,"Allthese[Belgian]provincesare permeated by the spirit of liberty and shaken by recent revolution. . . . They will join forces with our troops and will easily drive the dispersed hordes of Austrian mercenaries from their towns. " Quoted in Patricia Chastain Howe, "Charles-Fran,. ois Dumouriez and the Revolu- tionizing of French Foreign Affairs in 1792," French Historical Studies 4, no. 3 (1985-86), 386-87; and see also Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:224; and Clapham, Causes of the War of 1792, 177-78.
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days later demanded that Austria renounce the concert against France or face "the sternest measures. " Dumouriez had already warned the Assem- bly's Diplomatic Committee that Austrian reinforcements were transform- ing Belgium and Liege into a "formidable military state. " He now argued
. that a preemptive strike was preferable to letting France's enemies complete their preparations. A harsh Austrian reply to Dumouriez's first message brought fresh denunciations within the Assembly, and Austrian agents in France now reported that war was imminent. 81
On April 2o, Dumouriez presented to the Assembly a formal report listing France's motives for war. Louis bowed to the inevitable and asked the As- sembly for a formal declaration of war against "the king of Austria and Hungary. " Although several prominent Jacobins (notably Maximilien Ro- bespierre) opposed the decision, the motion passed with only seven dis- senting votes. 82 Austria and Prussia had already begun mobilizing their forces, and the first shots were to be fired by the end of the month.
83
The origins of the war of 1792 support several of my hypotheses about the relationship between revolution and war. First, the war was not simply the result of ideological antipathies between the old-regime monarchies of Aus- tria and Prussia and the new regime in France. France was still officially a monarchy when the war broke out, and Frederick William of Prussia had been willing to negotiate an alliance with France in 1790. Dumouriez sought a similar arrangement in 1792 and explored the possibility of an alliance with England as well. Even more significantly, the French decided to invite the duke of Brunswick to command the French armies; his reputation as a commander was clearly more important to the Assembly than his status within the ancien regime. 84 These events suggest that internal differences
81 On Dumouriez's efforts to shake the Austro-Prussian alliance, see Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolutionfranfaise, 2:352-56; and Howe, "Dumouriez and French Foreign Affairs," 385-87.
82 Robespierre had opposed war since November, arguing with remarkable foresight that it would either restore the monarchy or usher in a military dictatorship. He ridiculed the uni- versalist pretensions of the Cirondins, arguing that "no one likes an armed missionary, and no more extravagant idea ever sprang from the idea of a politician than to suppose that one people has on1ly to enter another's territory with arms in its hands to make the latter adopt its Constitution. " See J. M. Thompson, Robespierre (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 202-209; Georges Michon, Robespierre et Ia guerre rivolutionnaire (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1937), 51-55; and Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1:395-<)6. An equally prophetic warning was given by Henri Becquet, a deputy from Haute-Marne; see Thompson, French Revolution, 261.
83 The Austrians deployed fifty thousand men to the frontiers on April 12, eight days before the formal declaration of war by the French Assembly. Frederick William ordered his own army to mobilize for war on April 24, but Prussia did not declare war for several months.
84 The duke of Brunswick had won renown as a general in the Seven Years War and was considered a reformer within his own domains. Ironically, he was eventually appointed com- mander of the Austro-Prussian armies, and he led the initial invasion of France. See Von Sybel, French Revolution, 1 :397-98; and Biro, German Policy, 1 :56-57.
? ? ? The French Revolution
were less significant than Girondin rhetoric implied; similarly, while foreign monarchs were concerned about the long-term impact of events in France, neither Prussia nor Austria went to war to defend the monarchical principle.
Second, although the impact of the revolution on the balance of power played a role in causing the war, the importance of this factor should not be overstated. Perceptions of French weakness fueled Prussian acquisitiveness and encouraged the belief that victory would be swift, but Prussia would not have gone to war on its own, and the decline of French power also en- couraged other states to concentrate on more pressing issues. England re- mained neutral, Russia and Austria concerned themselves with events in the East, and even Frederick William preferred to gain territory from Poland than from France. French weakness made these gambits seem feasible, but the war did not arise solely (or even primarily) from the desire to exploit France's difficulties.
Third, several significant misperceptions, which both exacerbated and were reinforced by the ideology of the revolutionary movement and the in- ternal struggle for power in France, clearly contributed to the outbreak of the war. The revolution had fostered a profound sense of insecurity within France, culminating in the belief that the king, the emigres, the clergy, and several foreign monarchs were conspiring to restore the ancien regime. This fear helped the Girondins persuade the Assembly that a foreign war was unavoidable and that it would help preserve the revolution. Their argu- ments rested on erroneous beliefs about the influence of the emigres and the hostility of Austria and Prussia, resulting from their misreading of the Aus- tro-Prussian rapprochement, the Padua Circular, and the Declaration of Pill- nitz. Austria's clumsy attempts to browbeat the Assembly merely reinforced these tendencies and facilitated the Girondins' efforts.
Interestingly, the revolution did not provoke a similar degree of insecurity in Austria or Prussia, whose responses were not driven by a strong sense of French bellicosity. 85 Leopold and Frederick William were worried about the spread of revolutionary ideas and by aspects of French behavior, but neither went to war for that reason. Rather, Frederick William's decisions reflected his perennial desire to expand (bolstered by the testimony of certain emi- gres), while Austria was forced into war by the French response to their ear- lier threats and its own latent expansionism. 86 The fear of contagion was
85 That the sense of threat was limited may have been partly due to the modest scope of the changes within France. Although royal authority had been sharply curtailed and the position of the king was still precarious, the Constitution of 1791 not only retained the monarchy but gave the king a substantial role.
86 Kaunitz seems to have discounted the danger of revolutionary subversion prior to the war, writing in November 1791, "The alleged danger of the possible effects that the bad ex- ample of the French could have on other peoples is nothing but a wild-eyed panic, a chimera contradicted by the facts. " Quoted in Vivenot and Zeissberg, Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiser- politik, 1:286.
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more prevalent in Spain, Sweden, Russia, and the smaller German states, but leaders there were not actively involved in the initial decisions for war. In partial contrast to the predictions set forth in chapter 2, therefore, the spi- ral of suspicion that led to the war of 1792 was essentially one-sided.
Fourth, the revolution had obvious and important effects on perceptions of the offense-defense balance, such that the use of force appeared more at- tractive. This factor was most evident in the Girondin campaign for war, which rested! on the claims that Europe was ripe for revolt, foreign merce- naries would be no match for "free" soldiers, and France would win a quick and costless victory. France's opponents evinced equal optimism, based on the widespread assumption that the revolution had left France in no condi- tion to fight. These perceptions were at least partly influenced by self-serv- ing testimony from the emigres or the revolutionary exiles in Paris, which helps explain why their forecasts were so inaccurate.
Finally, lack of information was an important contributing factor. Because they were unfamiliar with the subtleties of old-regime diplomacy, the deputies faHed to realize that Leopold's warnings were largely empty ges- tures. Similarly, because they had no reliable information about the rapid shifts in French domestic politics, Leopold and Kaunitz could not know that their efforts to browbeat the Assembly into a more moderate stance were having the opposite effect. The dearth of information played a key role in driving the spiral to war, therefore, as Austria's actions unintentionally con- firmed French fears and fortified the extremists.
With some qualifications, therefore, the war of 1792 illustrates many of the mechanisms that link revolution and war. The upheaval in France caused a destabilizing shift in the balance of power, an exaggerated percep- tion of hostility, an internal struggle for power in which foreign policy was a potent political issue, and visions of a mutual offensive advantage that in- flated both sides' confidence that they could improve their positions through war.
THE WAR OF THE FIRST CoALITION
When war broke out in April 1792, the combatants anticipated a short war and did not expect it to spread. Although the French proclaimed that they would wage a "war against kings," they delayed the declaration of war against Prussia, in an attempt to isolate Austria, and proceeded to launch a traditional limited war against the Austrian Netherlands. Austrian and Prussian war aims were unfocused, and both powers were soon distracted by the Russian invasion of Poland in May. 87 Divisions within the allied coali-
87 See Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, 102-107.
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tion helped the revolutionary government survive the initial clashes, and the conflict soon expanded throughout Europe and beyond.
The Second Revolution and the Expansion of the War
Contrary to the optimistic predictions of the Girondins, the war began with a series of embarrassing French defeats. The Army of the North in- vaded the Austrian Netherlands on April 28, but the inexperienced French troops broke and ran at their first encounter with the Austrian forces. A French general was murdered by his own troops, and the re- maining commanders declared an offensive impossible and refused to move. 88
The debacle further polarized the political climate in France. The gener- als blamed the defeat on lack of discipline and ministerial incompetence, while the Girondins accused the army and king of disloyalty, and Brissot warned that a secret "Austrian Committee" was at work to betray the country. 89 Given the initial belief that victory would be swift, treason seemed the only possible explanation for the initial setbacks. To stave off counterrevolution, the Assembly voted to deport the dissident clergy and dissolve the king's Swiss Guards, and ordered the deployment of provin- cial National Guards (known asfederes) around Paris. Louis promptly ve- toed these measures, dismissed the Girondin ministers, and reappointed the Feuillants. Now convinced that the radicals were intent on destroying the constitution, Lafayette left his troops and returned to Paris, where he tried unsuccessfully to rally the Assembly and the National Guard against the Jacobins. These events reunited opposition to the king, and the deputies overrode the royal veto on July 3 and authorized the federes to come to Paris to celebrate the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. The As- sembly declared the country "in danger" on July 11 and decreed a new troop levy the following day. 90
TheFoundingoftheFirstRepublic. Demandstoabolishthemonarchywere growing by this point, exacerbating the divisions within the Jacobin move-
88 These events led Kaunitz to abandon his normal pessimism, and he predicted that France would fall in a single campaign. Another Austrian official declared that "two regi- ments of Hungarian hussars, with whips as their arms, would suffice to terminate the farce. " Quoted in Biro, German Policy, 174. On the failure of the initial campaign, see Ross, European Diplomatic History, 49-50; and Scott, Response of the Royal Army, 1 16-17.
89 Girondin accusations about the "Austrian committee" turned out to be partially true, as agents of the queen had sent information about French military plans to the Austrian com- manders. See Soboul, French Revolution, 242-44; Sutherland, France, 145; and Mathiez, French Revolution, 149-50.
90 See Mathiez, French Revolution, 148-56; and Norman Hampson, A Social History of the French Revolution (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 137-46.
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ment. 91 The Girondins were alarmed by the popular agitation in Paris and the growing strength of the more radical Montagnards, and they began ne- gotiating with Louis for reappointment after the Feuillant cabinet resigned on July 10.
The struggle for power reached a climax after France's opponents made yet another ill-advised attempt to intimidate the Assembly. When the Aus- tro-Prussian invasion finally got underway in July, concern for the royal fam- ily led the duke of Brunswick to issue an ultimatum threatening the destruction of Paris if its members were harmed. The so-called Brunswick Manifesto was actually the brainchild of a royalist emigre, and like Leopold! ' s earlier demarches, the declaration merely intensified French fears and un- dermined the king's position even inore. 92
Spurred on by Jacobin propaganda, deteriorating economic conditions, and the fear of foreign occupation, the population of Paris rose in protest on August 9? Angry sans-culottes replaced the municipal government with a new body-known as the Paris Commune-and a mob of Parisians and
federes stormed the Tuileries and forced the royal family to take refuge with the Assembly. Alarmed by the popular insurgency and fearing for their own safety, the deputies voted to recognize the Commune as a legitimate body and to suspend the king pending election of a national convention based on universal male suffrage. 93 Executive leadership (including the management of foreign policy) would be conducted by a provisional exec- utive council, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned to Pierre Helene-Marie Lebrun, a parvenu journalist and protege of Dumouriez. 94 In a burst of revolutionary fervor, the Assembly voted to bestow French citi- zenship on a number of foreign sympathizers and approved a motion re- nouncing conquests and expressing its desire for "fraternity with all peoples. "95
After another outburst of mob violence and a hasty series of elections, the new National Convention convened in Paris on September 21. The deputies
91 A delegation from the fideres in Paris demanded the suspension of the king on July 17, claiming that "without the treason of the enemies of the interior, the others [i. e. , Austria, Prussia, a111d the emigres] were not to be feared or rather they would not exist. " Quoted in Sutherland, France, 147.
92 For the text of the manifesto, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 306-11; on its origins and effects, see H. A. Barton, "The Origins of the Brunswick Manifesto," French Historical Studies 5, no. 2 (1967); and Biro, German Policy, 1:68-71.
93 See Doyle, History of the French Revolution, 184-89; and Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1:229-35?
94 The Executive Council was first led by Danton and later by Georges Roland, while the Diplomatic Committee of the Assembly included Brissot and several of his associates. See J. T. Murley, "The Origin and Outbreak of the Anglo-French War of 1 793" (Ph. D. diss. , Oxford University, 1959), 5-21.
95 See Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 2:54-55; and Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolution fran? aise, 3:15.
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immediately voted to abolish the monarchy and place the king on trial and began to mobilize the nation for war. In less than six months, the war had destroyed both the monarchy and the Constitution of 1791 and given birth to the First Republic. 96
Revolutionary Expansion. By the end of the year, what had begun as a defensive struggle against a counterrevolutionary expedition had become an offensive war of conquest. This dramatic improvement in France's mil- itary fortunes was partly the result of an outpouring of patriotic feeling, which filled the ranks of the French forces with enthusiastic if unskilled volunteers. 97 Equally important, however, were the rivalries and distrac- tions that weakened France's opponents. The Austro-Prussian invasion was first delayed by negotiations over contributions and compensations and then undermined by overconfidence, mutual suspicions, and a pre- occupation with events in Eastern Europe. As a result, Austria con- tributed only 70,000 of its 2oo,ooo troops and Prussia sent only 40,000 out of 170,000. The invading force did not cross the French border until Au- gust 19, and! its slow rate of advance gave the French invaluable time to prepare. 98
The tide turned on September 20, when a body of French artillery halted a Prussian assault at the Battle of Valmy. With his army weakened from dis- ease and bad weather, Brunswick called off the advance and began negoti- ations with Dumouriez (who had resigned from the cabinet in June and taken command of the French Army of the North). These parleys continued for over a month, and though Frederick William kept up appearances by declining an offer of alliance and ordering Brunswick to issue another threatening manifesto, his enthusiasm for the war was fading rapidly. Du- mouriez eventually permitted the Prussian forces to withdraw unchal- lenged, and Frederick William informed the Austrians in late October that he would require additional compensation in Poland i? he were to continue the war. 99 The Prussian forces had left French territory by the end of Octo-
96 In September, Jacobin efforts to rally the population and reports that the foreign armies were advancing on Paris led to the murder of over a thousand imprisoned criminals who were mistakenly believed to be counterrevolutionaries. See Sutherland, France, 154-55; Thompson, French Revolution, 302-309; Patrice Gueniffy, "Paris Commune," and Fran? ois Furet, "Terror," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 138-39, 52<r-22. .
97 Samuel F. Scott reports that "during 1792 more than 70,000 men enlisted in the line army, an impressive achievement under any circumstances. " Response of the Royal Army, 165; also see Bertaud, Army ofthe French Revolution, 66-74.
98 Ross, European Diplomatic History, 51-52.
99 The negotiations between France and Prussia are recounted in Biro, German Policy, 1:7cr87; Sorel, L'Europe et Ia revolution franraise, 3:53-55, 77--96; Von Sybel, French Revolution, 2:139-48, 172-77, 185-88; Karl A. Raider, Jr. , Baron Thugut and Austria's Response to the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), too-101; and Schroeder, Transforma- tion of European Politics, 1 1 8-20.
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ber, while a French army occupied Savoy and Nice and another moved into the Rhineland. 100
J. T. Murley notes, "Had the Republic been prepared to compromise with the Austro-Prussian Coalition, a general peace might have resulted. "101 The main issue was whether the French would insist on imposing republican in- stitutions in the areas it had conquered or permit these peoples to choose their own rulers without interference. The latter outcome was not incon- ceivable, as the negotiations between France and Prussia had shown that the Executive Council was willing to cooperate with foreign monarchs and the Assembly had passed a resolution renouncing foreign conquests in Au- gust. Moreover, the Executive Council had reaffirmed that France would not "interfere in the internal government of other peoples," and the Gi- rondin leaders knew that ending the war would reduce the fear of counter- revolution and aid their ability to control the popular forces. They were increasingly concerned about the costs of the war as well, and some worried that a campaign of expansion would both jeopardize efforts to reach a sep- arate peace with Prussia and contradict the revolutionary ideals of liberty and self-determination. 102
Yet other forces drew the Republic toward a policy of revolutionary ex- pansion. This outcome was partly due to the ambitions of men such as Du- mouriez-who saw the war primarily as an opportunity for personal advancement-as well as latent French hostility to Austria and the anticler- ical sentiments that dominated the Assembly. These concerns-together with a desire for territorial aggrandizement-account for the Executive Council's decision to authorize an invasion "to enfranchise the oppressed peoples" in the Netherlands on October 6. 103
Even more importantly, the policy of revolutionary expansion resulted from the same influences that had driven France to war seven months ear-
? 100 The expedition into the Rhineland was based on the unfulfilled hope of a general upris- ing among the local population. Von Sybel, French Revolution, 2:165-72.
101 See Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 98. Of course, peace in the west would not have ended the rivalries among the eastern powers, and might well have increased them. 102 On October 8, Brissot wrote that while "it would suit us to be surrounded by allied re- publics, our Republic would lose itself in expanding. " On October 24, the Diplomatic Com- mittee of the Convention advised against further expansion and declared that the French were not "conquerors of territory but the benefactors of the human race. " Similarly, Dumouriez's Manifesto to the Belgians, published at the beginning of his invasion, pledged, "We enter to help you plant the tree of liberty, but without involving ourselves at all in the constitution that you
wish to adopt. " All quoted in Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," ttS-19.
103 Brissot wrote Dumouriez that "the French Republic should not have any boundary other than the Rhine," and Lazare Camot justified annexation on the grounds that "the an- cient and natural boundaries of France are the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. " Similarly, Danton argued for the annexation of Belgium by saying it was "pointless to fear overextend- ing the Republic. Its boundaries have been set by nature. " See Denis Richet, "Natural Bor- ders," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 758.
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lier. French foreign policy was in the hands of leaders who still saw them- selves as part of a universal movement for liberty and whose hostility to monarchical nnstitutions had led them to depose their own king. Although these ideological principles could be used to justify nonintervention (as im- posing liberty by force would violate the rights of the alleged beneficiaries), the belief that neighboring peoples were eager to receive the fruits of liberty obscured the possibility that they might actually not welcome the French as- sistance. Moreover, hostility to monarchical institutions increased French perceptions of threat so that expansion seemed necessary for security. For- eign Minister Lebrun told the deputies, "The moment of greatest danger will arrive next spring, when allied tyranny will make its last effort, and then we must repel the combined force of all the kings. " In September, Dan- ton told the Convention, "We have the right to say to the peoples: you shall have no more kings! " and warned that, were France to remain surrounded by monarchs, these peoples "would furnish us with an endless series of tyrants to combat. "104 The president of the Assembly, Henri Gregoire, en- dorsed a petition to annex Savoy by saying, "It in no way adds to the hatred of oppressors for the Revolution. . . . It adds to the resources by which we
shall break their league. . . . All Governments are our enemies, all Peoples are our allies; either we shall fall or all peoples shall become free. "105 Having defined the war as a campaign against kings, it was hard to limit it so long as a single monarch remained on a throne. As in the winter of 1791--92, the beliefs that foreign powers were intrinsically hostile and that the revolution was part of a universal trend combined to justify a policy of expansion.
The impact of these beliefs was accentuated by rivalries between the Girondin and Montagnard factions and the chaotic nature of decision-mak- ing within the Convention. Although the Girondins controlled the Execu- tive Council, they lacked an absolute majority in the Convention, and the Montagnards were more popular among the radical Parisian sections. To compensate for their moderation on domestic issues, therefore, the Girondins returned to the bellicose rhetoric they had used so successfully
104 Danton's words were somewhat disingenuous, as he was simultaneously negotiating for a separate peace with Prussia. Yet his willingness to use such rhetoric in the Convention reveals his awareness of its political potency, and he told the Convention that it "should be a committee of general insurrection against all the kings in the universe, and I ask that in call- ing all peoples to the conquest of liberty [the National Convention] offer them all the means of repulsing tyraMy. . . . The French cannot endure that peoples who aspire to liberty never- theless give themselves a government contrary to their interests. " Quoted in Albert Mathiez,
Danton et Ia paix (Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1919), 58; also see his French Revolution, 278; Norman Hampsoll,l Danton (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), 89-93; and Murley, "Origin oftheAnglo-FrenchWar," 102.
105 Like Danton, Gregoire also maintained that spreading the revolution would protect France from its opponents. In his words: "When my neighbor keeps a nest of vipers, I have the right to smother them lest I become their victim. " Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 285.
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the previous year. And as Murley points out, because the Convention still lacked fixed rules of procedure, "major decisions turned on the chance pas- sions of unregulated debates, . .
