Yet one having manhood is differently
signified
by the word
"man" and by the word "Jesus" or "Peter.
"man" and by the word "Jesus" or "Peter.
Summa Theologica
"
I answer that, As Jerome [*Gloss, Ord. in Osee 2:16] says, "words
spoken amiss lead to heresy"; hence with us and heretics the very words
ought not to be in common, lest we seem to countenance their error. Now
the Arian heretics said that Christ was a creature and less than the
Father, not only in His human nature, but even in His Divine Person.
And hence we must not say absolutely that Christ is a "creature" or
"less than the Father"; but with a qualification, viz. "in His human
nature. " But such things as could not be considered to belong to the
Divine Person in Itself may be predicated simply of Christ by reason of
His human nature; thus we say simply that Christ suffered, died and was
buried: even as in corporeal and human beings, things of which we may
doubt whether they belong to the whole or the part, if they are
observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of the whole simply,
i. e. without qualification, for we do not say that the Ethiopian is
white but that he is white as regards his teeth; but we say without
qualification that he is curly, since this can only belong to him as
regards his hair.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes, for the sake of brevity, the holy
doctors use the word "creature" of Christ, without any qualifying term;
we should however take as understood the qualification, "as man. "
Reply to Objection 2: All the properties of the human, just as of the
Divine Nature, may be predicated equally of Christ. Hence Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "Christ Who God and Man, is called
created and uncreated, passible and impassible. " Nevertheless things of
which we may doubt to what nature they belong, are not to be predicated
without a qualification. Hence he afterwards adds (De Fide Orth. iv, 5)
that "the one hypostasis," i. e. of Christ, "is uncreated in its Godhead
and created in its manhood": even so conversely, we may not say without
qualification, "Christ is incorporeal" or "impassible"; in order to
avoid the error of Manes, who held that Christ had not a true body, nor
truly suffered, but we must say, with a qualification, that Christ was
incorporeal and impassible "in His Godhead. "
Reply to Objection 3: There can be no doubt how the birth from the
Virgin applies to the Person of the Son of God, as there can be in the
case of creation; and hence there is no parity.
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Whether this Man, i. e. Christ, began to be?
Objection 1: It would seem that this Man, i. e. Christ, began to be. For
Augustine says (Tract. cv in Joan. ) that "before the world was, neither
were we, nor the Mediator of God and men---the Man Jesus Christ. " But
what was not always, has begun to be. Therefore this Man, i. e. Christ,
began to be.
Objection 2: Further, Christ began to be Man. But to be man is to be
simply. Therefore this man began to be, simply.
Objection 3: Further, "man" implies a suppositum of human nature. But
Christ was not always a suppositum of human nature. Therefore this Man
began to be.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:8): "Jesus Christ yesterday and
today: and the same for ever. "
I answer that, We must not say that "this Man"---pointing to
Christ---"began to be," unless we add something. And this for a twofold
reason. First, for this proposition is simply false, in the judgment of
the Catholic Faith, which affirms that in Christ there is one
suppositum and one hypostasis, as also one Person. For according to
this, when we say "this Man," pointing to Christ, the eternal
suppositum is necessarily meant, with Whose eternity a beginning in
time is incompatible. Hence this is false: "This Man began to be. " Nor
does it matter that to begin to be refers to the human nature, which is
signified by this word "man"; because the term placed in the subject is
not taken formally so as to signify the nature, but is taken materially
so as to signify the suppositum, as was said (A[1], ad 4). Secondly,
because even if this proposition were true, it ought not to be made use
of without qualification; in order to avoid the heresy of Arius, who,
since he pretended that the Person of the Son of God is a creature, and
less than the Father, so he maintained that He began to be, saying
"there was a time when He was not. "
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted must be qualified, i. e. we must
say that the Man Jesus Christ was not, before the world was, "in His
humanity. "
Reply to Objection 2: With this word "begin" we cannot argue from the
lower species to the higher. For it does not follow if "this began to
be white," that therefore "it began to be colored. " And this because
"to begin" implies being now and not heretofore: for it does not follow
if "this was not white hitherto" that "therefore it was not colored
hitherto. " Now, to be simply is higher than to be man. Hence this does
not follow: "Christ began to be Man---therefore He began to be. "
Reply to Objection 3: This word "Man," as it is taken for Christ,
although it signifies the human nature, which began to be, nevertheless
signifies the eternal suppositum which did not begin to be. Hence,
since it signifies the suppositum when placed in the subject, and
refers to the nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is
false: "The Man Christ began to be": but this is true: "Christ began to
be Man. "
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Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is a creature"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "Christ as Man is a
creature," or "began to be. " For nothing in Christ is created except
the human nature. But this is false: "Christ as Man is the human
nature. " Therefore this is also false; Christ as Man is a creature.
Objection 2: Further, the predicate is predicated of the term placed in
reduplication, rather than of the subject of the proposition; as when I
say: "A body as colored is visible," it follows that the colored is
visible. But as stated ([4057]AA[8],9) we must not absolutely grant
that "the Man Christ is a creature"; nor consequently that "Christ as
Man is a creature. "
Objection 3: Further, whatever is predicated of a man as man is
predicated of him "per se" and simply, for "per se" is the same as
"inasmuch as itself," as is said Metaph. v, text. 23. But this is
false: "Christ as Man is per se and simply a creature. " Hence this,
too, is false; "Christ as Man is a creature. "
On the contrary, Whatever is, is either Creator or creature. But this
is false: "Christ as Man is Creator. " Therefore this is true: "Christ
as Man is a creature. "
I answer that, When we say "Christ as Man" this word "man" may be added
in the reduplication, either by reason of the suppositum or by reason
of the nature. If it be added by reason of the suppositum, since the
suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and uncreated, this
will be false: "Christ as Man is a creature. " But if it be added by
reason of the human nature, it is true, since by reason of the human
nature or in the human nature, it belongs to Him to be a creature, as
was said [4058](A[8]).
It must however be borne in mind that the term covered by the
reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, since it
is added as a predicate, which is taken formally, for it is the same to
say "Christ as Man" and to say "Christ as He is a Man. " Hence this is
to be granted rather than denied: "Christ as Man is a creature. " But if
something further be added whereby [the term covered by the
reduplication] is attracted to the suppositum, this proposition is to
be denied rather than granted, for instance were one to say: "Christ as
'this' Man is a creature. "
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ is not the human nature, He has
human nature. Now the word "creature" is naturally predicated not only
of abstract, but also of concrete things; since we say that "manhood is
a creature" and that "man is a creature. "
Reply to Objection 2: Man as placed in the subject refers to the
suppositum---and as placed in the reduplication refers to the nature,
as was stated above. And because the nature is created and the
suppositum uncreated, therefore, although it is not granted that "this
man is a creature," yet it is granted that "Christ as Man is a
creature. "
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to every man who is a suppositum of
human nature alone to have his being only in human nature. Hence of
every such suppositum it follows that if it is a creature as man, it is
a creature simply. But Christ is a suppositum not merely of human
nature, but also of the Divine Nature, in which He has an uncreated
being. Hence it does not follow that, if He is a creature as Man, He is
a creature simply.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ, as Man, is God. For Christ is
God by the grace of union. But Christ, as Man, has the grace of union.
Therefore Christ as Man is God.
Objection 2: Further, to forgive sins is proper to God, according to
Is. 43:25: "I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake. " But
Christ as Man forgives sin, according to Mat. 9:6: "But that you may
know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins," etc.
Therefore Christ as Man is God.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is not Man in common, but is this
particular Man. Now Christ, as this Man, is God, since by "this Man" we
signify the eternal suppositum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ
as Man is God.
On the contrary, Whatever belongs to Christ as Man belongs to every
man. Now, if Christ as Man is God, it follows that every man is
God---which is clearly false.
I answer that, This term "man" when placed in the reduplication may be
taken in two ways. First as referring to the nature; and in this way it
is not true that Christ as Man is God, because the human nature is
distinct from the Divine by a difference of nature. Secondly it may be
taken as referring to the suppositum; and in this way, since the
suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the Person of the Son of
God, to Whom it essentially belongs to be God, it is true that Christ,
as Man, is God. Nevertheless because the term placed in the
reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, as
stated above [4059](A[10]), hence this is to be denied rather than
granted: "Christ as Man is God. "
Reply to Objection 1: It is not with regard to the same, that a thing
moves towards, and that it is, something; for to move belongs to a
thing because of its matter or subject---and to be in act belongs to it
because of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same, that it
belongs to Christ to be ordained to be God by the grace of union, and
to be God. For the first belongs to Him in His human nature, and the
second, in His Divine Nature. Hence this is true: "Christ as Man has
the grace of union"; yet not this: "Christ as Man is God. "
Reply to Objection 2: The Son of Man has on earth the power of
forgiving sins, not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the
Divine Nature, in which Divine Nature resides the power of forgiving
sins authoritatively; whereas in the human nature it resides
instrumentally and ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this
passage says [*Implicitly. Hom. xxx in Matth; cf. St. Thomas, Catena
Aurea on Mk. 2:10]: "He said pointedly 'on earth to forgive sins,' in
order to show that by an indivisible union He united human nature to
the power of the Godhead, since although He was made Man, yet He
remained the Word of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: When we say "this man," the demonstrative pronoun
"this" attracts "man" to the suppositum; and hence "Christ as this Man,
is God, is a truer proposition than Christ as Man is God. "
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Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is a hypostasis or person"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as Man is a hypostasis or
person. For what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as Man, since
He is like other men according to Phil. 2:7: "Being made in the
likeness of men. " But every man is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is
a person.
Objection 2: Further, Christ as Man is a substance of rational nature.
But He is not a universal substance: therefore He is an individual
substance. Now a person is nothing else than an individual substance of
rational nature; as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ). Therefore Christ as
Man is a person.
Objection 3: Further, Christ as Man is a being of human nature, and a
suppositum and a hypostasis of the same nature. But every hypostasis
and suppositum and being of human nature is a person. Therefore Christ
as Man is a person.
On the contrary, Christ as Man is not an eternal person. Therefore if
Christ as Man is a person it would follow that in Christ there are two
persons---one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous, as
was said above ([4060]Q[2], A[6];[4061] Q[4], A[2]).
I answer that, As was said ([4062]AA[10],11), the term "Man" placed in
the reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the nature.
Hence when it is said: "Christ as Man is a person," if it is taken as
referring to the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as Man is a
person, since the suppositum of human nature is nothing else than the
Person of the Son of God. But if it be taken as referring to the
nature, it may be understood in two ways. First, we may so understand
it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person, and in this way
it is true, for whatever subsists in human nature is a person. Secondly
it may be taken that in Christ a proper personality, caused by the
principles of the human nature, is due to the human nature; and in this
way Christ as Man is not a person, since the human nature does not
exist of itself apart from the Divine Nature, and yet the notion of
person requires this.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to every man to be a person, inasmuch
as everything subsisting in human nature is a person. Now this is
proper to the Man Christ that the Person subsisting in His human nature
is not caused by the principles of the human nature, but is eternal.
Hence in one way He is a person, as Man; and in another way He is not,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The "individual substance," which is included in
the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of
itself and separate from all else; otherwise, a man's hand might be
called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless,
because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it
cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, can the human
nature in Christ, although it may be called something individual and
singular.
Reply to Objection 3: As a person signifies something complete and
self-subsisting in rational nature, so a hypostasis, suppositum, and
being of nature in the genus of substance, signify something that
subsists of itself. Hence, as human nature is not of itself a person
apart from the Person of the Son of God, so likewise it is not of
itself a hypostasis or suppositum or a being of nature. Hence in the
sense in which we deny that "Christ as Man is a person" we must deny
all the other propositions.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF BEING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider what pertains to Christ's unity in common. For, in
their proper place, we must consider what pertains to unity and
plurality in detail: thus we concluded ([4063]Q[9]) that there is not
only one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter
([4064]Q[35], A[2]) that there is not only one nativity in Christ.
Hence we must consider Christ's unity (1) of being; (2) of will; (3) of
operation.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ is one or two?
(2) Whether there is only one being in Christ?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christ is one or two?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not one, but two. For
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "Because the form of God took the form
of a servant, both are God by reason of God Who assumed, yet both are
Man by reason of the man assumed. " Now "both" may only be said when
there are two. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 2: Further, where there is one thing and another there are
two. Now Christ is one thing and another; for Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxv): "Being in the form of God . . . He took the form of
a servant . . . being both in one; but He was one of these as Word, and
the other as man. " Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is not only man; for, if He were a mere
man, He would not be God. Therefore He is something else than man, and
thus in Christ there is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 4: Further, Christ is something that the Father is, and
something that the Father is not. Therefore Christ is one thing and
another. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 5: Further, as in the mystery of the Trinity there are three
Persons in one Nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there are
two natures in one Person. But on account of the unity of the Nature,
notwithstanding the distinction of Person, the Father and Son are one,
according to Jn. 10:30: "I and the Father are one. " Therefore,
notwithstanding the unity of Person, Christ is two on account of the
duality of nature.
Objection 6: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text. 18) that
"one" and "two" are predicated denominatively. Now Christ has a duality
of nature. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 7: Further, as accidental form makes a thing otherwise
[alterum] so does substantial form make another thing [aliud] as
Porphyry says (Praedic. ). Now in Christ there are two substantial
natures, the human and the Divine. Therefore Christ is one thing and
another. Therefore Christ is two.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ): "Whatever is, inasmuch
as it is, is one. " But we confess that Christ is. Therefore Christ is
one.
I answer that, Nature, considered in itself, as it is used in the
abstract, cannot truly be predicated of the suppositum or person,
except in God, in Whom "what it is" and "whereby it is" do not differ,
as stated in the [4065]FP, Q[29], A[4], ad 1. But in Christ, since
there are two natures, viz. the Divine and the human, one of them, viz.
the Divine, may be predicated of Him both in the abstract and in the
concrete, for we say that the Son of God, Who is signified by the word
Christ, is the Divine Nature and is God. But the human nature cannot be
predicated of Christ in the abstract, but only in the concrete, i. e. as
it is signified by the suppositum. For we cannot truly say that "Christ
is human nature," because human nature is not naturally predicated of
its suppositum. But we say that Christ is a man, even as Christ is God.
Now God signifies one having the Godhead, and man signifies one having
manhood.
Yet one having manhood is differently signified by the word
"man" and by the word "Jesus" or "Peter. " For this word "man" implies
one having manhood indistinctly, even as the word "God" implies
indistinctly one having the Godhead; but the word "Peter" or "Jesus"
implies one having manhood distinctly, i. e. with its determinate
individual properties, as "Son of God" implies one having the Godhead
under a determinate personal property. Now the dual number is placed in
Christ with regard to the natures. Hence, if both the natures were
predicated in the abstract of Christ, it would follow that Christ is
two. But because the two natures are not predicated of Christ, except
as they are signified in the suppositum, it must be by reason of the
suppositum that "one" or "two" be predicated of Christ.
Now some placed two supposita in Christ, and one Person, which, in
their opinion, would seem to be the suppositum completed with its final
completion. Hence, since they placed two supposita in Christ, they said
that God is two, in the neuter. But because they asserted one Person,
they said that Christ is one, in the masculine, for the neuter gender
signifies something unformed and imperfect, whereas the masculine
signifies something formed and perfect. on the other hand, the
Nestorians, who asserted two Persons in Christ, said that Christ is two
not only in the neuter, but also in the masculine. But since we
maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ, as is clear
from[4066] Q[2], AA[2],3, it follows that we say that Christ is one not
merely in the masculine, but also in the neuter.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is not to be taken as if
"both" referred to the predicate, so as to mean that Christ is both;
but it refers to the subject. And thus "both" does not stand for two
supposita, but for two words signifying two natures in the concrete.
For I can say that "both, viz. God and Man, are God" on account of God
Who assumes; and "both, viz. God and Man," are Man on account of the
man assumed.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that "Christ is one thing and
another," this saying is to be explained in this sense---"having this
nature and another. " And it is in this way that Augustine explains it
(Contra Felic. xi), where, after saying, "In the mediator of God and
man, the Son of God is one thing, and the Son of Man another," he adds:
"I say another thing by reason of the difference of substance, and not
another thing by reason of the unity of person. " Hence Gregory
Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): "If we must speak briefly, that of
which the Saviour is, is one thing and another; thus the invisible is
not the same as the visible; and what is without time is not the same
as what is in time. Yet they are not one and another: far from it; for
both these are one. "
Reply to Objection 3: This is false, "Christ is only man"; because it
does not exclude another suppositum, but another nature, since terms
placed in the predicate are taken formally. But if anything is added
whereby it is drawn to the suppositum, it would be a true
proposition---for instance, "Christ is only that which is man. "
Nevertheless, it would not follow that He is "any other thing than
man," because "another thing," inasmuch as it refers to a diversity of
substance, properly refers to the suppositum. even as all relative
things bearing a personal relation. But it does follow: "Therefore He
has another nature. "
Reply to Objection 4: When it is said, "Christ is something that the
Father is"; "something" signifies the Divine Nature, which is
predicated even in the abstract of the Father and Son. But when it is
said: "Christ is something that is not the Father"; "something"
signifies, not the human nature as it is in the abstract, but as it is
in the concrete; not, indeed, in a distinct, but in an indistinct
suppositum, i. e. inasmuch as it underlies the nature and not the
individuating properties. Hence it does not follow that Christ is one
thing and another, or that He is two, since the suppositum of the human
nature in Christ, which is the Person of the Son of God, does not
reckon numerically with the Divine Nature, which is predicated of the
Father and Son.
Reply to Objection 5: In the mystery of the Divine Trinity the Divine
Nature is predicated, even in the abstract of the three Persons; hence
it may be said simply that the three Persons are one. But in the
mystery of the Incarnation both natures are not predicated in the
abstract of Christ; hence it cannot be said simply that Christ is two.
Reply to Objection 6: Two signifies what has duality, not in another,
but in the same thing of which "two" is predicated. Now what is
predicated is said of the suppositum, which is implied by the word
"Christ. " Hence, although Christ has duality of nature, yet, because He
has not duality of suppositum, it cannot be said that Christ is two.
Reply to Objection 7: Otherwise implies diversity of accident. Hence
diversity of accident suffices for anything to be called "otherwise"
simply. But "another thing" implies diversity of substance. Now not
merely the nature, but also the suppositum is said to be a substance,
as is said Metaph. v, text. 15. Hence diversity of nature does not
suffice for anything to be called "another thing" simply, unless there
is diversity of suppositum. But diversity of nature makes "another
thing" relatively, i. e. in nature, if there is no diversity of
suppositum.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is only one being in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there is not merely one
being, but two. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 13) that
whatever follows the nature is doubled in Christ. But being follows the
nature, for being is from the form. Hence in Christ there are two
beings.
Objection 2: Further, the being of the Son of God is the Divine Nature
itself, and is eternal: whereas the being of the Man Christ is not the
Divine Nature, but is a temporal being. Therefore there is not only one
being in Christ.
Objection 3: Further, in the Trinity, although there are three Persons,
yet on account of the unity of nature there is only one being. But in
Christ there are two natures, though there is one Person. Therefore in
Christ there is not only one being.
Objection 4: Further, in Christ the soul gives some being to the body,
since it is its form. But it does not give the Divine being, since this
is uncreated. Therefore in Christ there is another being besides the
Divine being; and thus in Christ there is not only one being.
On the contrary, Everything is said to be a being, inasmuch as it is
one, for one and being are convertible. Therefore, if there were two
beings in Christ, and not one only, Christ would be two, and not one.
I answer that, Because in Christ there are two natures and one
hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ
must be two; and that those belonging to the hypostasis in Christ must
be only one. Now being pertains both to the nature and to the
hypostasis; to the hypostasis as to that which has being---and to the
nature as to that whereby it has being. For nature is taken after the
manner of a form, which is said to be a being because something is by
it; as by whiteness a thing is white, and by manhood a thing is man.
Now it must be borne in mind that if there is a form or nature which
does not pertain to the personal being of the subsisting hypostasis,
this being is not said to belong to the person simply, but relatively;
as to be white is the being of Socrates, not as he is Socrates, but
inasmuch as he is white. And there is no reason why this being should
not be multiplied in one hypostasis or person; for the being whereby
Socrates is white is distinct from the being whereby he is a musician.
But the being which belongs to the very hypostasis or person in itself
cannot possibly be multiplied in one hypostasis or person, since it is
impossible that there should not be one being for one thing.
If, therefore, the human nature accrued to the Son of God, not
hypostatically or personally, but accidentally, as some maintained, it
would be necessary to assert two beings in Christ---one, inasmuch as He
is God---the other, inasmuch as He is Man; even as in Socrates we place
one being inasmuch as he is white, and another inasmuch as he is a man,
since "being white" does not pertain to the personal being of Socrates.
But being possessed of a head, being corporeal, being animated---all
these pertain to the one person of Socrates, and hence there arises
from these only the one being of Socrates. And if it so happened that
after the person of Socrates was constituted there accrued to him hands
or feet or eyes, as happened to him who was born blind, no new being
would be thereby added to Socrates, but only a relation to these, i. e.
inasmuch as he would be said to be, not only with reference to what he
had previously, but also with reference to what accrued to him
afterwards. And thus, since the human nature is united to the Son of
God, hypostatically or personally as was said above ([4067]Q[2],
AA[5],6), and not accidentally, it follows that by the human nature
there accrued to Him no new personal being, but only a new relation of
the pre-existing personal being to the human nature, in such a way that
the Person is said to subsist not merely in the Divine, but also in the
human nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Being is consequent upon nature, not as upon that
which has being, but as upon that whereby a thing is: whereas it is
consequent upon person or hypostasis, as upon that which has being.
Hence it has unity from the unity of hypostasis, rather than duality
from the duality of the nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The eternal being of the Son of God, which is the
Divine Nature, becomes the being of man, inasmuch as the human nature
is assumed by the Son of God to unity of Person.
Reply to Objection 3: As was said in the [4068]FP, Q[50], A[2], ad 3;
[4069]FP, Q[75], A[5], ad 4, since the Divine Person is the same as the
Nature, there is no distinction in the Divine Persons between the being
of the Person and the being of the Nature, and, consequently, the three
Persons have only one being. But they would have a triple being if the
being of the Person were distinct in them from the being of the Nature.
Reply to Objection 4: In Christ the soul gives being to the body,
inasmuch as it makes it actually animated, which is to give it the
complement of its nature and species. But if we consider the body
perfected by the soul, without the hypostasis having both---this whole,
composed of soul and body, as signified by the word "humanity," does
not signify "what is," but "whereby it is. " Hence being belongs to the
subsisting person, inasmuch as it has a relation to such a nature, and
of this relation the soul is the cause, inasmuch as it perfects human
nature by informing the body.
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OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF WILL (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider unity as regards the will; and under this head
there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Divine will and the human are distinct in Christ?
(2) Whether in Christ's human nature the will of sensuality is distinct
from the will of reason?
(3) Whether as regards the reason there were several wills in Christ?
(4) Whether there was free-will in Christ?
(5) Whether Christ's human will was always conformed to the Divine will
in the thing willed?
(6) Whether there was any contrariety of wills in Christ?
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Whether there are two wills in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are not two wills, one
Divine, the other human. For the will is the first mover and first
commander in whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and commander
was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the
Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was only one will,
viz. the Divine.
Objection 2: Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will but by
the will of its mover. Now the human nature of Christ was the
instrument of His Godhead. Hence the human nature of Christ was not
moved by its own will, but by the Divine will.
Objection 3: Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ which belongs
to the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature: for
natural things are of necessity; whereas what is voluntary is not of
necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ.
Objection 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that "to
will in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our
intellect," i. e. our personal intellect. But every will is this or that
will, since there is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time
in some one of its species. Therefore all will belongs to the person.
But in Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ
there is only one will.
On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 22:42): "Father, if Thou wilt,
remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My will but Thine be done. "
And Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian (De Fide ii, 7) says:
"As He assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow;" and on Lk. 22:42 he
says: "His will, He refers to the Man---the Father's, to the Godhead.
For the will of man is temporal, and the will of the Godhead eternal. "
I answer that, Some placed only one will in Christ; but they seem to
have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did not
hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word was
in place of the soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence since
"the will is in the reason," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9),
it followed that in Christ there was no human will; and thus there was
only one will in Him. So, too, Eutyches and all who held one composite
nature in Christ were forced to place one will in Him. Nestorius, too,
who maintained that the union of God and man was one of affection and
will, held only one will in Christ. But later on, Macarius, Patriarch
of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of Constantinople and some
of their followers, held that there is one will in Christ, although
they held that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypostasis;
because they believed that Christ's human nature never moved with its
own motion, but only inasmuch as it was moved by the Godhead, as is
plain from the synodical letter of Pope Agatho [*Third Council of
Constantinople, Act. 4].
And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople [*Act. 18] it was
decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, in the
following passage: "In accordance with what the Prophets of old taught
us concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of
the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two natural wills in
Him and two natural operations. " And this much it was necessary to say.
For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature,
as was shown above (Q[5]; Q[9], A[1]). Now the will pertains to the
perfection of human nature, being one of its natural powers, even as
the intellect, as was stated in the FP, QQ[79],80. Hence we must say
that the Son of God assumed a human will, together with human nature.
Now by the assumption of human nature the Son of God suffered no
diminution of what pertains to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs
to have a will, as was said in the [4070]FP, Q[19], A[1]. Hence it must
be said that there are two wills in Christ, i. e. one human, the other
Divine.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was
moved at the bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow that in
Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for
the good wills of other saints are moved by God's will, "Who worketh"
in them "both to will and to accomplish," as is written Phil. 2:13. For
although the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it can
be moved inwardly by God, as was said in the [4071]FP, Q[105], A[4].
And thus, too, Christ by His human will followed the Divine will
according to Ps. 39:9; "That I should do Thy will, O my God, I have
desired it. " Hence Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "Where the
Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but what Thou willest,' what
do you gain by adding your own words and saying 'He shows that His will
was truly subject to His Father,' as if we denied that man's will ought
to be subject to God's will? "
Reply to Objection 2: It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the
principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its
nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by
the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument
animated by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite, as a
horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a rational soul is
moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is moved
to act, the servant being like an animate instrument, as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2,4; Ethic. viii, 11). And hence it was in
this manner that the human nature of Christ was the instrument of the
Godhead, and was moved by its own will.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will is natural, and necessarily
follows upon the nature; but the movement or act of this power---which
is also called will---is sometimes natural and necessary, e. g. with
respect to beatitude; and sometimes springs from free-will and is
neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated in
the [4072]FS, Q[10], AA[1],[2] [*Cf. [4073]FP, Q[82], A[2]]. And yet
even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is
natural. Hence besides the Divine will it is necessary to place in
Christ a human will, not merely as a natural power, or a natural
movement, but even as a rational movement.
Reply to Objection 4: When we say "to will in a certain way," we
signify a determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards
the thing of which it is the mode. Hence since the will pertains to the
nature, "to will in a certain way" belongs to the nature, not indeed
considered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence the human
will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a
Divine hypostasis, i. e. it was always moved in accordance with the
bidding of the Divine will.
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Whether in Christ there was a will of sensuality besides the will of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no will of
sensuality besides the will of reason. For the Philosopher says (De
Anima iii, text. 42) that "the will is in the reason, and in the
sensitive appetite are the irascible and concupiscible parts. " Now
sensuality signifies the sensitive appetite. Hence in Christ there was
no will of sensuality.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13) the
sensuality is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing
serpent-like in Christ; for He had the likeness of a venomous animal
without the venom, as Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i,
32). Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.
Objection 3: Further, will is consequent upon nature, as was said
[4074](A[1]). But in Christ there was only one nature besides the
Divine. Hence in Christ there was only one human will.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 7): "Mine is the will which
He calls His own; because as Man He assumed my sorrow. " From this we
are given to understand that sorrow pertains to the human will of
Christ. Now sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said in the
[4075]FS, Q[23], A[1]; [4076]FS, Q[25], A[1]. Therefore, seemingly, in
Christ there is a will of sensuality besides the will of reason.
I answer that, As was said ([4077]Q[9], A[1]), the Son of God assumed
human nature together with everything pertaining to the perfection of
human nature. Now in human nature is included animal nature, as the
genus in its species. Hence the Son of God must have assumed together
with the human nature whatever belongs to animal nature; one of which
things is the sensitive appetite, which is called the sensuality.
Consequently it must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual
appetite, or sensuality. But it must be borne in mind that sensuality
or the sensual appetite, inasmuch as it naturally obeys reason, is said
to be "rational by participation," as is clear from the Philosopher
(Ethic. i, 13). And because "the will is in the reason," as stated
above, it may equally be said that the sensuality is "a will by
participation. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on the will, essentially
so called, which is only in the intellectual part; but the will by
participation can be in the sensitive part, inasmuch as it obeys
reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The sensuality is signified by the serpent---not
as regards the nature of the sensuality, which Christ assumed, but as
regards the corruption of the "fomes," which was not in Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: "Where there is one thing on account of another,
there seems to be only one" (Aristotle, Topic. iii); thus a surface
which is visible by color is one visible thing with the color. So, too,
because the sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes of
the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ,
even as there is but one human nature.
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Whether in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as
regards the reason. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
there is a double will in man, viz. the natural will which is called
{thelesis}, and the rational will which is called {boulesis}. Now
Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of
human nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, the appetitive power is diversified in man by the
difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the
difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and
intellective appetite in man. But in the same way as regards man's
apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of
which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one
intellectual and the other rational.
Objection 3: Further, some [*Hugh of St.
I answer that, As Jerome [*Gloss, Ord. in Osee 2:16] says, "words
spoken amiss lead to heresy"; hence with us and heretics the very words
ought not to be in common, lest we seem to countenance their error. Now
the Arian heretics said that Christ was a creature and less than the
Father, not only in His human nature, but even in His Divine Person.
And hence we must not say absolutely that Christ is a "creature" or
"less than the Father"; but with a qualification, viz. "in His human
nature. " But such things as could not be considered to belong to the
Divine Person in Itself may be predicated simply of Christ by reason of
His human nature; thus we say simply that Christ suffered, died and was
buried: even as in corporeal and human beings, things of which we may
doubt whether they belong to the whole or the part, if they are
observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of the whole simply,
i. e. without qualification, for we do not say that the Ethiopian is
white but that he is white as regards his teeth; but we say without
qualification that he is curly, since this can only belong to him as
regards his hair.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes, for the sake of brevity, the holy
doctors use the word "creature" of Christ, without any qualifying term;
we should however take as understood the qualification, "as man. "
Reply to Objection 2: All the properties of the human, just as of the
Divine Nature, may be predicated equally of Christ. Hence Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "Christ Who God and Man, is called
created and uncreated, passible and impassible. " Nevertheless things of
which we may doubt to what nature they belong, are not to be predicated
without a qualification. Hence he afterwards adds (De Fide Orth. iv, 5)
that "the one hypostasis," i. e. of Christ, "is uncreated in its Godhead
and created in its manhood": even so conversely, we may not say without
qualification, "Christ is incorporeal" or "impassible"; in order to
avoid the error of Manes, who held that Christ had not a true body, nor
truly suffered, but we must say, with a qualification, that Christ was
incorporeal and impassible "in His Godhead. "
Reply to Objection 3: There can be no doubt how the birth from the
Virgin applies to the Person of the Son of God, as there can be in the
case of creation; and hence there is no parity.
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Whether this Man, i. e. Christ, began to be?
Objection 1: It would seem that this Man, i. e. Christ, began to be. For
Augustine says (Tract. cv in Joan. ) that "before the world was, neither
were we, nor the Mediator of God and men---the Man Jesus Christ. " But
what was not always, has begun to be. Therefore this Man, i. e. Christ,
began to be.
Objection 2: Further, Christ began to be Man. But to be man is to be
simply. Therefore this man began to be, simply.
Objection 3: Further, "man" implies a suppositum of human nature. But
Christ was not always a suppositum of human nature. Therefore this Man
began to be.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:8): "Jesus Christ yesterday and
today: and the same for ever. "
I answer that, We must not say that "this Man"---pointing to
Christ---"began to be," unless we add something. And this for a twofold
reason. First, for this proposition is simply false, in the judgment of
the Catholic Faith, which affirms that in Christ there is one
suppositum and one hypostasis, as also one Person. For according to
this, when we say "this Man," pointing to Christ, the eternal
suppositum is necessarily meant, with Whose eternity a beginning in
time is incompatible. Hence this is false: "This Man began to be. " Nor
does it matter that to begin to be refers to the human nature, which is
signified by this word "man"; because the term placed in the subject is
not taken formally so as to signify the nature, but is taken materially
so as to signify the suppositum, as was said (A[1], ad 4). Secondly,
because even if this proposition were true, it ought not to be made use
of without qualification; in order to avoid the heresy of Arius, who,
since he pretended that the Person of the Son of God is a creature, and
less than the Father, so he maintained that He began to be, saying
"there was a time when He was not. "
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted must be qualified, i. e. we must
say that the Man Jesus Christ was not, before the world was, "in His
humanity. "
Reply to Objection 2: With this word "begin" we cannot argue from the
lower species to the higher. For it does not follow if "this began to
be white," that therefore "it began to be colored. " And this because
"to begin" implies being now and not heretofore: for it does not follow
if "this was not white hitherto" that "therefore it was not colored
hitherto. " Now, to be simply is higher than to be man. Hence this does
not follow: "Christ began to be Man---therefore He began to be. "
Reply to Objection 3: This word "Man," as it is taken for Christ,
although it signifies the human nature, which began to be, nevertheless
signifies the eternal suppositum which did not begin to be. Hence,
since it signifies the suppositum when placed in the subject, and
refers to the nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is
false: "The Man Christ began to be": but this is true: "Christ began to
be Man. "
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Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is a creature"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "Christ as Man is a
creature," or "began to be. " For nothing in Christ is created except
the human nature. But this is false: "Christ as Man is the human
nature. " Therefore this is also false; Christ as Man is a creature.
Objection 2: Further, the predicate is predicated of the term placed in
reduplication, rather than of the subject of the proposition; as when I
say: "A body as colored is visible," it follows that the colored is
visible. But as stated ([4057]AA[8],9) we must not absolutely grant
that "the Man Christ is a creature"; nor consequently that "Christ as
Man is a creature. "
Objection 3: Further, whatever is predicated of a man as man is
predicated of him "per se" and simply, for "per se" is the same as
"inasmuch as itself," as is said Metaph. v, text. 23. But this is
false: "Christ as Man is per se and simply a creature. " Hence this,
too, is false; "Christ as Man is a creature. "
On the contrary, Whatever is, is either Creator or creature. But this
is false: "Christ as Man is Creator. " Therefore this is true: "Christ
as Man is a creature. "
I answer that, When we say "Christ as Man" this word "man" may be added
in the reduplication, either by reason of the suppositum or by reason
of the nature. If it be added by reason of the suppositum, since the
suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and uncreated, this
will be false: "Christ as Man is a creature. " But if it be added by
reason of the human nature, it is true, since by reason of the human
nature or in the human nature, it belongs to Him to be a creature, as
was said [4058](A[8]).
It must however be borne in mind that the term covered by the
reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, since it
is added as a predicate, which is taken formally, for it is the same to
say "Christ as Man" and to say "Christ as He is a Man. " Hence this is
to be granted rather than denied: "Christ as Man is a creature. " But if
something further be added whereby [the term covered by the
reduplication] is attracted to the suppositum, this proposition is to
be denied rather than granted, for instance were one to say: "Christ as
'this' Man is a creature. "
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ is not the human nature, He has
human nature. Now the word "creature" is naturally predicated not only
of abstract, but also of concrete things; since we say that "manhood is
a creature" and that "man is a creature. "
Reply to Objection 2: Man as placed in the subject refers to the
suppositum---and as placed in the reduplication refers to the nature,
as was stated above. And because the nature is created and the
suppositum uncreated, therefore, although it is not granted that "this
man is a creature," yet it is granted that "Christ as Man is a
creature. "
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to every man who is a suppositum of
human nature alone to have his being only in human nature. Hence of
every such suppositum it follows that if it is a creature as man, it is
a creature simply. But Christ is a suppositum not merely of human
nature, but also of the Divine Nature, in which He has an uncreated
being. Hence it does not follow that, if He is a creature as Man, He is
a creature simply.
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Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ, as Man, is God. For Christ is
God by the grace of union. But Christ, as Man, has the grace of union.
Therefore Christ as Man is God.
Objection 2: Further, to forgive sins is proper to God, according to
Is. 43:25: "I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake. " But
Christ as Man forgives sin, according to Mat. 9:6: "But that you may
know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins," etc.
Therefore Christ as Man is God.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is not Man in common, but is this
particular Man. Now Christ, as this Man, is God, since by "this Man" we
signify the eternal suppositum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ
as Man is God.
On the contrary, Whatever belongs to Christ as Man belongs to every
man. Now, if Christ as Man is God, it follows that every man is
God---which is clearly false.
I answer that, This term "man" when placed in the reduplication may be
taken in two ways. First as referring to the nature; and in this way it
is not true that Christ as Man is God, because the human nature is
distinct from the Divine by a difference of nature. Secondly it may be
taken as referring to the suppositum; and in this way, since the
suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the Person of the Son of
God, to Whom it essentially belongs to be God, it is true that Christ,
as Man, is God. Nevertheless because the term placed in the
reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, as
stated above [4059](A[10]), hence this is to be denied rather than
granted: "Christ as Man is God. "
Reply to Objection 1: It is not with regard to the same, that a thing
moves towards, and that it is, something; for to move belongs to a
thing because of its matter or subject---and to be in act belongs to it
because of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same, that it
belongs to Christ to be ordained to be God by the grace of union, and
to be God. For the first belongs to Him in His human nature, and the
second, in His Divine Nature. Hence this is true: "Christ as Man has
the grace of union"; yet not this: "Christ as Man is God. "
Reply to Objection 2: The Son of Man has on earth the power of
forgiving sins, not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the
Divine Nature, in which Divine Nature resides the power of forgiving
sins authoritatively; whereas in the human nature it resides
instrumentally and ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this
passage says [*Implicitly. Hom. xxx in Matth; cf. St. Thomas, Catena
Aurea on Mk. 2:10]: "He said pointedly 'on earth to forgive sins,' in
order to show that by an indivisible union He united human nature to
the power of the Godhead, since although He was made Man, yet He
remained the Word of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: When we say "this man," the demonstrative pronoun
"this" attracts "man" to the suppositum; and hence "Christ as this Man,
is God, is a truer proposition than Christ as Man is God. "
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Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is a hypostasis or person"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as Man is a hypostasis or
person. For what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as Man, since
He is like other men according to Phil. 2:7: "Being made in the
likeness of men. " But every man is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is
a person.
Objection 2: Further, Christ as Man is a substance of rational nature.
But He is not a universal substance: therefore He is an individual
substance. Now a person is nothing else than an individual substance of
rational nature; as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ). Therefore Christ as
Man is a person.
Objection 3: Further, Christ as Man is a being of human nature, and a
suppositum and a hypostasis of the same nature. But every hypostasis
and suppositum and being of human nature is a person. Therefore Christ
as Man is a person.
On the contrary, Christ as Man is not an eternal person. Therefore if
Christ as Man is a person it would follow that in Christ there are two
persons---one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous, as
was said above ([4060]Q[2], A[6];[4061] Q[4], A[2]).
I answer that, As was said ([4062]AA[10],11), the term "Man" placed in
the reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the nature.
Hence when it is said: "Christ as Man is a person," if it is taken as
referring to the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as Man is a
person, since the suppositum of human nature is nothing else than the
Person of the Son of God. But if it be taken as referring to the
nature, it may be understood in two ways. First, we may so understand
it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person, and in this way
it is true, for whatever subsists in human nature is a person. Secondly
it may be taken that in Christ a proper personality, caused by the
principles of the human nature, is due to the human nature; and in this
way Christ as Man is not a person, since the human nature does not
exist of itself apart from the Divine Nature, and yet the notion of
person requires this.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to every man to be a person, inasmuch
as everything subsisting in human nature is a person. Now this is
proper to the Man Christ that the Person subsisting in His human nature
is not caused by the principles of the human nature, but is eternal.
Hence in one way He is a person, as Man; and in another way He is not,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The "individual substance," which is included in
the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of
itself and separate from all else; otherwise, a man's hand might be
called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless,
because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it
cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, can the human
nature in Christ, although it may be called something individual and
singular.
Reply to Objection 3: As a person signifies something complete and
self-subsisting in rational nature, so a hypostasis, suppositum, and
being of nature in the genus of substance, signify something that
subsists of itself. Hence, as human nature is not of itself a person
apart from the Person of the Son of God, so likewise it is not of
itself a hypostasis or suppositum or a being of nature. Hence in the
sense in which we deny that "Christ as Man is a person" we must deny
all the other propositions.
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OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF BEING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider what pertains to Christ's unity in common. For, in
their proper place, we must consider what pertains to unity and
plurality in detail: thus we concluded ([4063]Q[9]) that there is not
only one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter
([4064]Q[35], A[2]) that there is not only one nativity in Christ.
Hence we must consider Christ's unity (1) of being; (2) of will; (3) of
operation.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ is one or two?
(2) Whether there is only one being in Christ?
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Whether Christ is one or two?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not one, but two. For
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "Because the form of God took the form
of a servant, both are God by reason of God Who assumed, yet both are
Man by reason of the man assumed. " Now "both" may only be said when
there are two. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 2: Further, where there is one thing and another there are
two. Now Christ is one thing and another; for Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxv): "Being in the form of God . . . He took the form of
a servant . . . being both in one; but He was one of these as Word, and
the other as man. " Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is not only man; for, if He were a mere
man, He would not be God. Therefore He is something else than man, and
thus in Christ there is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 4: Further, Christ is something that the Father is, and
something that the Father is not. Therefore Christ is one thing and
another. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 5: Further, as in the mystery of the Trinity there are three
Persons in one Nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there are
two natures in one Person. But on account of the unity of the Nature,
notwithstanding the distinction of Person, the Father and Son are one,
according to Jn. 10:30: "I and the Father are one. " Therefore,
notwithstanding the unity of Person, Christ is two on account of the
duality of nature.
Objection 6: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text. 18) that
"one" and "two" are predicated denominatively. Now Christ has a duality
of nature. Therefore Christ is two.
Objection 7: Further, as accidental form makes a thing otherwise
[alterum] so does substantial form make another thing [aliud] as
Porphyry says (Praedic. ). Now in Christ there are two substantial
natures, the human and the Divine. Therefore Christ is one thing and
another. Therefore Christ is two.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ): "Whatever is, inasmuch
as it is, is one. " But we confess that Christ is. Therefore Christ is
one.
I answer that, Nature, considered in itself, as it is used in the
abstract, cannot truly be predicated of the suppositum or person,
except in God, in Whom "what it is" and "whereby it is" do not differ,
as stated in the [4065]FP, Q[29], A[4], ad 1. But in Christ, since
there are two natures, viz. the Divine and the human, one of them, viz.
the Divine, may be predicated of Him both in the abstract and in the
concrete, for we say that the Son of God, Who is signified by the word
Christ, is the Divine Nature and is God. But the human nature cannot be
predicated of Christ in the abstract, but only in the concrete, i. e. as
it is signified by the suppositum. For we cannot truly say that "Christ
is human nature," because human nature is not naturally predicated of
its suppositum. But we say that Christ is a man, even as Christ is God.
Now God signifies one having the Godhead, and man signifies one having
manhood.
Yet one having manhood is differently signified by the word
"man" and by the word "Jesus" or "Peter. " For this word "man" implies
one having manhood indistinctly, even as the word "God" implies
indistinctly one having the Godhead; but the word "Peter" or "Jesus"
implies one having manhood distinctly, i. e. with its determinate
individual properties, as "Son of God" implies one having the Godhead
under a determinate personal property. Now the dual number is placed in
Christ with regard to the natures. Hence, if both the natures were
predicated in the abstract of Christ, it would follow that Christ is
two. But because the two natures are not predicated of Christ, except
as they are signified in the suppositum, it must be by reason of the
suppositum that "one" or "two" be predicated of Christ.
Now some placed two supposita in Christ, and one Person, which, in
their opinion, would seem to be the suppositum completed with its final
completion. Hence, since they placed two supposita in Christ, they said
that God is two, in the neuter. But because they asserted one Person,
they said that Christ is one, in the masculine, for the neuter gender
signifies something unformed and imperfect, whereas the masculine
signifies something formed and perfect. on the other hand, the
Nestorians, who asserted two Persons in Christ, said that Christ is two
not only in the neuter, but also in the masculine. But since we
maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ, as is clear
from[4066] Q[2], AA[2],3, it follows that we say that Christ is one not
merely in the masculine, but also in the neuter.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is not to be taken as if
"both" referred to the predicate, so as to mean that Christ is both;
but it refers to the subject. And thus "both" does not stand for two
supposita, but for two words signifying two natures in the concrete.
For I can say that "both, viz. God and Man, are God" on account of God
Who assumes; and "both, viz. God and Man," are Man on account of the
man assumed.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that "Christ is one thing and
another," this saying is to be explained in this sense---"having this
nature and another. " And it is in this way that Augustine explains it
(Contra Felic. xi), where, after saying, "In the mediator of God and
man, the Son of God is one thing, and the Son of Man another," he adds:
"I say another thing by reason of the difference of substance, and not
another thing by reason of the unity of person. " Hence Gregory
Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): "If we must speak briefly, that of
which the Saviour is, is one thing and another; thus the invisible is
not the same as the visible; and what is without time is not the same
as what is in time. Yet they are not one and another: far from it; for
both these are one. "
Reply to Objection 3: This is false, "Christ is only man"; because it
does not exclude another suppositum, but another nature, since terms
placed in the predicate are taken formally. But if anything is added
whereby it is drawn to the suppositum, it would be a true
proposition---for instance, "Christ is only that which is man. "
Nevertheless, it would not follow that He is "any other thing than
man," because "another thing," inasmuch as it refers to a diversity of
substance, properly refers to the suppositum. even as all relative
things bearing a personal relation. But it does follow: "Therefore He
has another nature. "
Reply to Objection 4: When it is said, "Christ is something that the
Father is"; "something" signifies the Divine Nature, which is
predicated even in the abstract of the Father and Son. But when it is
said: "Christ is something that is not the Father"; "something"
signifies, not the human nature as it is in the abstract, but as it is
in the concrete; not, indeed, in a distinct, but in an indistinct
suppositum, i. e. inasmuch as it underlies the nature and not the
individuating properties. Hence it does not follow that Christ is one
thing and another, or that He is two, since the suppositum of the human
nature in Christ, which is the Person of the Son of God, does not
reckon numerically with the Divine Nature, which is predicated of the
Father and Son.
Reply to Objection 5: In the mystery of the Divine Trinity the Divine
Nature is predicated, even in the abstract of the three Persons; hence
it may be said simply that the three Persons are one. But in the
mystery of the Incarnation both natures are not predicated in the
abstract of Christ; hence it cannot be said simply that Christ is two.
Reply to Objection 6: Two signifies what has duality, not in another,
but in the same thing of which "two" is predicated. Now what is
predicated is said of the suppositum, which is implied by the word
"Christ. " Hence, although Christ has duality of nature, yet, because He
has not duality of suppositum, it cannot be said that Christ is two.
Reply to Objection 7: Otherwise implies diversity of accident. Hence
diversity of accident suffices for anything to be called "otherwise"
simply. But "another thing" implies diversity of substance. Now not
merely the nature, but also the suppositum is said to be a substance,
as is said Metaph. v, text. 15. Hence diversity of nature does not
suffice for anything to be called "another thing" simply, unless there
is diversity of suppositum. But diversity of nature makes "another
thing" relatively, i. e. in nature, if there is no diversity of
suppositum.
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Whether there is only one being in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there is not merely one
being, but two. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 13) that
whatever follows the nature is doubled in Christ. But being follows the
nature, for being is from the form. Hence in Christ there are two
beings.
Objection 2: Further, the being of the Son of God is the Divine Nature
itself, and is eternal: whereas the being of the Man Christ is not the
Divine Nature, but is a temporal being. Therefore there is not only one
being in Christ.
Objection 3: Further, in the Trinity, although there are three Persons,
yet on account of the unity of nature there is only one being. But in
Christ there are two natures, though there is one Person. Therefore in
Christ there is not only one being.
Objection 4: Further, in Christ the soul gives some being to the body,
since it is its form. But it does not give the Divine being, since this
is uncreated. Therefore in Christ there is another being besides the
Divine being; and thus in Christ there is not only one being.
On the contrary, Everything is said to be a being, inasmuch as it is
one, for one and being are convertible. Therefore, if there were two
beings in Christ, and not one only, Christ would be two, and not one.
I answer that, Because in Christ there are two natures and one
hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ
must be two; and that those belonging to the hypostasis in Christ must
be only one. Now being pertains both to the nature and to the
hypostasis; to the hypostasis as to that which has being---and to the
nature as to that whereby it has being. For nature is taken after the
manner of a form, which is said to be a being because something is by
it; as by whiteness a thing is white, and by manhood a thing is man.
Now it must be borne in mind that if there is a form or nature which
does not pertain to the personal being of the subsisting hypostasis,
this being is not said to belong to the person simply, but relatively;
as to be white is the being of Socrates, not as he is Socrates, but
inasmuch as he is white. And there is no reason why this being should
not be multiplied in one hypostasis or person; for the being whereby
Socrates is white is distinct from the being whereby he is a musician.
But the being which belongs to the very hypostasis or person in itself
cannot possibly be multiplied in one hypostasis or person, since it is
impossible that there should not be one being for one thing.
If, therefore, the human nature accrued to the Son of God, not
hypostatically or personally, but accidentally, as some maintained, it
would be necessary to assert two beings in Christ---one, inasmuch as He
is God---the other, inasmuch as He is Man; even as in Socrates we place
one being inasmuch as he is white, and another inasmuch as he is a man,
since "being white" does not pertain to the personal being of Socrates.
But being possessed of a head, being corporeal, being animated---all
these pertain to the one person of Socrates, and hence there arises
from these only the one being of Socrates. And if it so happened that
after the person of Socrates was constituted there accrued to him hands
or feet or eyes, as happened to him who was born blind, no new being
would be thereby added to Socrates, but only a relation to these, i. e.
inasmuch as he would be said to be, not only with reference to what he
had previously, but also with reference to what accrued to him
afterwards. And thus, since the human nature is united to the Son of
God, hypostatically or personally as was said above ([4067]Q[2],
AA[5],6), and not accidentally, it follows that by the human nature
there accrued to Him no new personal being, but only a new relation of
the pre-existing personal being to the human nature, in such a way that
the Person is said to subsist not merely in the Divine, but also in the
human nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Being is consequent upon nature, not as upon that
which has being, but as upon that whereby a thing is: whereas it is
consequent upon person or hypostasis, as upon that which has being.
Hence it has unity from the unity of hypostasis, rather than duality
from the duality of the nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The eternal being of the Son of God, which is the
Divine Nature, becomes the being of man, inasmuch as the human nature
is assumed by the Son of God to unity of Person.
Reply to Objection 3: As was said in the [4068]FP, Q[50], A[2], ad 3;
[4069]FP, Q[75], A[5], ad 4, since the Divine Person is the same as the
Nature, there is no distinction in the Divine Persons between the being
of the Person and the being of the Nature, and, consequently, the three
Persons have only one being. But they would have a triple being if the
being of the Person were distinct in them from the being of the Nature.
Reply to Objection 4: In Christ the soul gives being to the body,
inasmuch as it makes it actually animated, which is to give it the
complement of its nature and species. But if we consider the body
perfected by the soul, without the hypostasis having both---this whole,
composed of soul and body, as signified by the word "humanity," does
not signify "what is," but "whereby it is. " Hence being belongs to the
subsisting person, inasmuch as it has a relation to such a nature, and
of this relation the soul is the cause, inasmuch as it perfects human
nature by informing the body.
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OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF WILL (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider unity as regards the will; and under this head
there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Divine will and the human are distinct in Christ?
(2) Whether in Christ's human nature the will of sensuality is distinct
from the will of reason?
(3) Whether as regards the reason there were several wills in Christ?
(4) Whether there was free-will in Christ?
(5) Whether Christ's human will was always conformed to the Divine will
in the thing willed?
(6) Whether there was any contrariety of wills in Christ?
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Whether there are two wills in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are not two wills, one
Divine, the other human. For the will is the first mover and first
commander in whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and commander
was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the
Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was only one will,
viz. the Divine.
Objection 2: Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will but by
the will of its mover. Now the human nature of Christ was the
instrument of His Godhead. Hence the human nature of Christ was not
moved by its own will, but by the Divine will.
Objection 3: Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ which belongs
to the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature: for
natural things are of necessity; whereas what is voluntary is not of
necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ.
Objection 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that "to
will in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our
intellect," i. e. our personal intellect. But every will is this or that
will, since there is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time
in some one of its species. Therefore all will belongs to the person.
But in Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ
there is only one will.
On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 22:42): "Father, if Thou wilt,
remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My will but Thine be done. "
And Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian (De Fide ii, 7) says:
"As He assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow;" and on Lk. 22:42 he
says: "His will, He refers to the Man---the Father's, to the Godhead.
For the will of man is temporal, and the will of the Godhead eternal. "
I answer that, Some placed only one will in Christ; but they seem to
have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did not
hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word was
in place of the soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence since
"the will is in the reason," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9),
it followed that in Christ there was no human will; and thus there was
only one will in Him. So, too, Eutyches and all who held one composite
nature in Christ were forced to place one will in Him. Nestorius, too,
who maintained that the union of God and man was one of affection and
will, held only one will in Christ. But later on, Macarius, Patriarch
of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of Constantinople and some
of their followers, held that there is one will in Christ, although
they held that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypostasis;
because they believed that Christ's human nature never moved with its
own motion, but only inasmuch as it was moved by the Godhead, as is
plain from the synodical letter of Pope Agatho [*Third Council of
Constantinople, Act. 4].
And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople [*Act. 18] it was
decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, in the
following passage: "In accordance with what the Prophets of old taught
us concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of
the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two natural wills in
Him and two natural operations. " And this much it was necessary to say.
For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature,
as was shown above (Q[5]; Q[9], A[1]). Now the will pertains to the
perfection of human nature, being one of its natural powers, even as
the intellect, as was stated in the FP, QQ[79],80. Hence we must say
that the Son of God assumed a human will, together with human nature.
Now by the assumption of human nature the Son of God suffered no
diminution of what pertains to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs
to have a will, as was said in the [4070]FP, Q[19], A[1]. Hence it must
be said that there are two wills in Christ, i. e. one human, the other
Divine.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was
moved at the bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow that in
Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for
the good wills of other saints are moved by God's will, "Who worketh"
in them "both to will and to accomplish," as is written Phil. 2:13. For
although the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it can
be moved inwardly by God, as was said in the [4071]FP, Q[105], A[4].
And thus, too, Christ by His human will followed the Divine will
according to Ps. 39:9; "That I should do Thy will, O my God, I have
desired it. " Hence Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "Where the
Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but what Thou willest,' what
do you gain by adding your own words and saying 'He shows that His will
was truly subject to His Father,' as if we denied that man's will ought
to be subject to God's will? "
Reply to Objection 2: It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the
principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its
nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by
the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument
animated by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite, as a
horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a rational soul is
moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is moved
to act, the servant being like an animate instrument, as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2,4; Ethic. viii, 11). And hence it was in
this manner that the human nature of Christ was the instrument of the
Godhead, and was moved by its own will.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will is natural, and necessarily
follows upon the nature; but the movement or act of this power---which
is also called will---is sometimes natural and necessary, e. g. with
respect to beatitude; and sometimes springs from free-will and is
neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated in
the [4072]FS, Q[10], AA[1],[2] [*Cf. [4073]FP, Q[82], A[2]]. And yet
even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is
natural. Hence besides the Divine will it is necessary to place in
Christ a human will, not merely as a natural power, or a natural
movement, but even as a rational movement.
Reply to Objection 4: When we say "to will in a certain way," we
signify a determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards
the thing of which it is the mode. Hence since the will pertains to the
nature, "to will in a certain way" belongs to the nature, not indeed
considered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence the human
will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a
Divine hypostasis, i. e. it was always moved in accordance with the
bidding of the Divine will.
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Whether in Christ there was a will of sensuality besides the will of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no will of
sensuality besides the will of reason. For the Philosopher says (De
Anima iii, text. 42) that "the will is in the reason, and in the
sensitive appetite are the irascible and concupiscible parts. " Now
sensuality signifies the sensitive appetite. Hence in Christ there was
no will of sensuality.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13) the
sensuality is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing
serpent-like in Christ; for He had the likeness of a venomous animal
without the venom, as Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i,
32). Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.
Objection 3: Further, will is consequent upon nature, as was said
[4074](A[1]). But in Christ there was only one nature besides the
Divine. Hence in Christ there was only one human will.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 7): "Mine is the will which
He calls His own; because as Man He assumed my sorrow. " From this we
are given to understand that sorrow pertains to the human will of
Christ. Now sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said in the
[4075]FS, Q[23], A[1]; [4076]FS, Q[25], A[1]. Therefore, seemingly, in
Christ there is a will of sensuality besides the will of reason.
I answer that, As was said ([4077]Q[9], A[1]), the Son of God assumed
human nature together with everything pertaining to the perfection of
human nature. Now in human nature is included animal nature, as the
genus in its species. Hence the Son of God must have assumed together
with the human nature whatever belongs to animal nature; one of which
things is the sensitive appetite, which is called the sensuality.
Consequently it must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual
appetite, or sensuality. But it must be borne in mind that sensuality
or the sensual appetite, inasmuch as it naturally obeys reason, is said
to be "rational by participation," as is clear from the Philosopher
(Ethic. i, 13). And because "the will is in the reason," as stated
above, it may equally be said that the sensuality is "a will by
participation. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on the will, essentially
so called, which is only in the intellectual part; but the will by
participation can be in the sensitive part, inasmuch as it obeys
reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The sensuality is signified by the serpent---not
as regards the nature of the sensuality, which Christ assumed, but as
regards the corruption of the "fomes," which was not in Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: "Where there is one thing on account of another,
there seems to be only one" (Aristotle, Topic. iii); thus a surface
which is visible by color is one visible thing with the color. So, too,
because the sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes of
the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ,
even as there is but one human nature.
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Whether in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as
regards the reason. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
there is a double will in man, viz. the natural will which is called
{thelesis}, and the rational will which is called {boulesis}. Now
Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of
human nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ.
Objection 2: Further, the appetitive power is diversified in man by the
difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the
difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and
intellective appetite in man. But in the same way as regards man's
apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of
which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one
intellectual and the other rational.
Objection 3: Further, some [*Hugh of St.
