No More Learning

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is about the passions. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about pleasure
and pain. " Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions, as stated
above [*[2855]FS, Q[23], A[4]; [2856]FS, Q[31], A[1]; [2857]FS, Q[35],
A[1]] when we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a
moral virtue, is about the passions.

Objection 2: Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's
operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot
be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is owing to
disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the aforesaid
operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of
money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs be about the
passions.

Objection 3: Further, even as particular justice is towards another
person so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions,
else it would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are
evidently about the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is
about operations.

I answer that, The true answer to this question may be gathered from a
twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i. e. from the will,
whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above ([2858]FS,
Q[22], A[3]; [2859]FS, Q[59], A[4]), for it is only the sensitive
appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not
about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the
irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the matter,
because justice is about man's relations with another, and we are not
directed immediately to another by the internal passions. Therefore
justice is not about the passions.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain
as its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but
every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be
acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure and
pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this is an
evil, and that a good": and in this way too they belong to justice,
since "a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions" (Ethic. i,
8).

Reply to Objection 2: External operations are as it were between
external things, which are their matter, and internal passions, which
are their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in
one of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may
steal another's property, not through the desire to have the thing, but
through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet
another's property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the
directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external things,
belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the passions, it
belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the passions. Hence
justice hinders theft of another's property, in so far as stealing is
contrary to the, equality that should be maintained in external things,
while liberality hinders it as resulting from an immoderate desire for
wealth. Since, however, external operations take their species, not
from the internal passions but from external things as being their
objects, it follows that, external operations are essentially the
matter of justice rather than of the other moral virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: The common good is the end of each individual
member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each
part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end of
another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to the
common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions
whereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than
particular justice which is directed to the good of another individual:
although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of
their external operations, in so far, to wit, as "the law commands us
to perform the actions of a courageous person . . . the actions of a
temperate person . . . and the actions of a gentle person" (Ethic. v,
5).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real
mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now moral
virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which
observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason. " Therefore justice
observes the rational and not the real mean.

Objection 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither
excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is
clearly the case with the virtues, according to Ethic. ii, 6. Now
justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in Ethic. v.
Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.

Objection 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to
observe the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case
the mean varies according to different persons, since what is too much
for one is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the
case in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same
punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice
also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the
mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical" proportion,
so that it is the real mean.

I answer that, As stated above [2860](A[9]; [2861]FS, Q[59], A[4]), the
other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the
regulation of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very
man who is the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and
desire are vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean
in such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to
another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so
that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our
regard.

On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so
far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly
proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists
in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the
external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and
less, as stated in Metaph. x [*Didot ed. , ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4]:
wherefore justice observes the real mean.

Reply to Objection 1: This real mean is also the rational mean,
wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two
ways. First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are
good; and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good
simply in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply
through being good absolutely i. e. in its nature, although it may
become evil through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in
the like it is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards
men who can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice
is about things that are good simply.

Reply to Objection 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion
to a prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore
each injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way:
and this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of justice is not to render to
each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to justice
the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we give them
what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice does not
consist in rendering to each one his own.

Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that "beneficence
which we may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice. " Now it
pertains to liberality to give to another of one's own, not of what is
his. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each
one his own.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute
things duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder,
adultery and so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his
seems to belong solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act
of justice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in
rendering to each one his own.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "It is justice that
renders to each one what is his, and claims not another's property; it
disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity. "

I answer that, As stated above ([2862]AA[8],10), the matter of justice
is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use by
it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by
justice. Now each man's own is that which is due to him according to
equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is nothing
else than to render to each one his own.

Reply to Objection 1: Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other
secondary virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected
with it, as we shall state further on ([2863]Q[80], A[1]). Wherefore to
succor the needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally
beneficent, which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction
ascribed to justice as to their principal virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in
matters of justice, the name of "profit" is extended to whatever is
excessive, and whatever is deficient is called "loss. " The reason for
this is that justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in
voluntary interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein
those expressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred
to all other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to
each one of what is his own.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among
all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to each
one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of one's own,
and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a greater virtue
than justice.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than
itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all the
virtues, according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more
excellent than justice.

Objection 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and
"good," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But fortitude is about more
difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death,
according to Ethic. iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent than
justice.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most
resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man. "

I answer that, If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it
stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common
good transcends the individual good of one person. In this sense the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent of the
virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the
evening or the morning star. " But, even if we speak of particular
justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first
reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more
excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite or will, whereas
the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto
appertain the passions which are the matter of the other moral virtues.
The second reason is taken from the object, because the other virtues
are commendable in respect of the sole good of the virtuous person
himself, whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous
person being well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat
the good of another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be
those which are most profitable to other persons, because virtue is a
faculty of doing good to others. For this reason the greatest honors
are accorded the brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others
in warfare, and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time
of peace. "

Reply to Objection 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he
does so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own
virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through
consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards
all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which
gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each
man what is his.

Reply to Objection 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases
the latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a
virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Although fortitude is about the most difficult
things, it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare,
whereas justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________

OF INJUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether injustice is a special vice?

(2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?

(3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?

(4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether injustice is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For it
is written (1 Jn. 3:4): "All sin is iniquity [*Vulg. : 'Whosoever
committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity']. " Now
iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a
kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as
inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues.
But injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery
it is opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness,
and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is
not a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the
will. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus
Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

On the contrary, Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a
special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.

I answer that, Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal injustice
which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially a special
vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the common good
which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as regards the
intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of
sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the common good, have
the character of injustice, as though they arose from injustice, in
accord with what has been said above about justice ([2864]Q[58],
AA[5],6). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an inequality
between one person and another, when one man wishes to have more goods,
riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses,
and thus injustice has a special matter and is a particular vice
opposed to particular justice.

Reply to Objection 1: Even as legal justice is referred to human common
good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to which all
sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be iniquity.

Reply to Objection 2: Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to
all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both
to justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways
as stated above ([2865]Q[58], A[9], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 3: The will, like the reason, extends to all moral
matters, i. e. passions and those external operations that relate to
another person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in
the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and
the same applies to injustice.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing an
unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated
above ([2866]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the proper object of justice is the
just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man
should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through
doing an unjust thing.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they
hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do
suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of
doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not be
false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust.
Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he does an
unjust thing.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its
proper act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever
does what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever
does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may do
an unjust thing without being unjust. "

I answer that, Even as the object of justice is something equal in
external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal,
through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him.
To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of its
proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in
two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: first, on
account of a lack of correspondence between the operation and its
proper object. For the operation takes its species and name from its
direct and not from its indirect object: and in things directed to an
end the direct is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is
beside the intention. Hence if a man do that which is unjust, without
intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he do it through
ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust, properly speaking he does
an unjust thing, not directly, but only indirectly, and, as it were,
doing materially that which is unjust: hence such an operation is not
called an injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of a lack of
proportion between the operation and the habit. For an injustice may
sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, anger or desire, and
sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the
direct object of one's complacency. In the latter case properly
speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit,
whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly,
to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the
unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of
injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through
passion, without having the habit of injustice.

Reply to Objection 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct
and formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing
from choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for
the sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).

Reply to Objection 3: The object of temperance is not something
established externally, as is the object of justice: the object of
temperance, i. e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to
the man himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional
cannot be said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like
manner neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there
is dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as
regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is similarity
in all respects.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?

Objection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For
injustice is inequality, as stated above [2867](A[2]). Now a man by
injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another.
Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another. But
whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. Therefore a
man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by
himself.

Objection 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for
having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished
according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable
burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can
do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a man
suffers injustice voluntarily.
Objection 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers
that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one
who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it is
worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily.

On the contrary, To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are
contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore on
the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.

I answer that, Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent,
whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in
the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys.
iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the will,
wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily,
and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he suffers against
his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a principle in
himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather than passive.
Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly speaking no man
can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an injustice save
involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so to speak, it is
possible for that which is unjust in itself either to be done
involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally), or to be
suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to another more
than he owes him).

Reply to Objection 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that
which he does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality.
For a man's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion
if he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by
another's action.

Reply to Objection 2: An individual person may be considered in two
ways. First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury
on himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin,
intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because
injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person.
Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the State
as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and image; and
thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but
to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with
both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of
the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): "If any man violate the temple of God,
him shall God destroy. "

Reply to Objection 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now
in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is
that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above
[2868](A[2]), and the formal and essential element is on the part of
the will of agent and patient, as stated above [2869](A[2]).
Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and
injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the
material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an
injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other
man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and
on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an
injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury
unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally?

Objection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins
mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes
a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in
reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they do not merely in
ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter. " Therefore not
everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.

Objection 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter,
departs but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant
and should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an injustice
sins mortally.

Objection 3: Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues"
[*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary
thereto that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to
the other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal
sin to do an injustice.

On the contrary, Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal
sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the
law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to
murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on
(Q[64], seqq. ). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.

I answer that, As stated above ([2870]FS, Q[12], A[5]), when we were
treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is
contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury
inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which
moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always
consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that
to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls "ignorance
of particular circumstances" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which deserves
pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he
who does an injustice through ignorance, does no injustice except
accidentally, as stated above [2871](A[2])

Reply to Objection 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls
short of the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he does
may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who
suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such
thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is
not hurt or displeased.

Reply to Objection 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues
are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder
affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________

OF JUDGMENT (SIX ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are
six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?

(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?

(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?

(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?

(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written
law?

(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether judgment is an act of justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice. The
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what he
knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty.
Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. Therefore judgment
belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which is in the will, as
stated above ([2872]Q[58], A[4]).

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual
man judgeth all things. " Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the
virtue of charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy
Ghost Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to
charity rather than to justice.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its
proper matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure in
everything," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore
judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral
virtues.

Objection 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But
the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then judges
are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the proper act
of justice.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until justice be turned
into judgment. "

I answer that, Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such.
Now a judge [judex] is so called because he asserts the right [jus
dicens] and right is the object of justice, as stated above
([2873]Q[57], A[1]). Consequently the original meaning of the word
"judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to
decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from
the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about matters
relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which denotes a right
decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For this
reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that "men have recourse to a
judge as to one who is the personification of justice. "

Reply to Objection 1: The word "judgment," from its original meaning of
a right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a
right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a
right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the
virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is an
act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or define.
The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which depends
his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice,
judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of fortitude, it
proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act of justice in
so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of prudence in so
far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore {synesis} (judging well
according to common law) which belongs to prudence is said to "judge
rightly," as stated above ([2874]Q[51], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of
charity, has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to
the Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces
judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces
judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of
the law.

Reply to Objection 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself,
whereas justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown
above ([2875]Q[58], A[2]). Now man is master in things concerning
himself, but not in matters relating to others. Consequently where the
other virtues are in question, there is no need for judgment other than
that of a virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as
explained above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further
need for the judgment of a superior, who is "able to reprove both, and
to put his hand between both" [*Job 9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more
specifically to justice than to any other virtue.

Reply to Objection 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue
[*Cf. [2876] Q[58], A[6]], commanding and prescribing what is just;
while it is in the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue.
Hence judgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to
justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is lawful to judge?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished
except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with
punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Mat.
7:1, "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged. " Therefore it is unlawful
to judge.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that
judgest another man's servant. To his own lord he standeth or falleth. "
Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

Objection 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 Jn. 1:8, "If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. " Now it is unlawful for
a sinner to judge, according to Rom. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable, O man,
whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another,
thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou
judgest. " Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint judges
and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the people
with just judgment. "

I answer that, Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice.
Now it follows from what has been stated above (A[1], ad 1,3) that
three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice:
first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice; secondly, that
it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced
according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be
lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, when it is
contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is called "perverted"
or "unjust": secondly, when a man judges about matters wherein he has
no authority, and this is called judgment "by usurpation": thirdly,
when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid
motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it
is called judgment by "suspicion" or "rash" judgment.

Reply to Objection 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment
which is about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as
Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids
judgment about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply
believe, since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary
on Mat. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in
the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross], He
forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from
bitterness of heart.

Reply to Objection 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore
it is written (Dt. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on
(Dt. 1:17), "because it is the judgment of God. "

Reply to Objection 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should
not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as
Chrysostom [*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Mat. 7:1, "Judge not. "
Above all does this hold when such sins are public, because there would
be an occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however
they are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for
the judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove
or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte ii, 19): "If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as
another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to
strive against it together with us. " And yet it is not through acting
thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned once
again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be equally
deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment
from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion about
an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion
is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible to have any
but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. Since then human
judgment is about human acts, which are about singular and contingent
matters, it seems that no judgment would be lawful, if it were not
lawful to judge from suspicions.

Objection 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him
unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a man's
opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the injury of
another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not unlawful.

Objection 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to
an injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above
[2877](A[1]). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its
genus, as stated above (Q[59], A[4]). Therefore a judgment based on
suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this
is false, because "we cannot avoid suspicions," according to a gloss of
Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan. ) on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the
time. " Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to be
unlawful.

On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross] in comment on
the words of Mat. 7:1, "Judge not," etc. , says: "By this commandment
our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly
motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his
own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part on
mere suspicion. "

I answer that, As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion denotes
evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to three
causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this very
fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to think
evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, "The fool when he walketh in
the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools. "
Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards another: for
when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of
him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because
everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this is due to long
experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "old
people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults
of others. " The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote
perversity of the affections, while the third diminishes the nature of
suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty which is
contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently suspicion denotes a
certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it
is.

Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a
man begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications. This
is a venial and a light sin; for "it belongs to human temptation
without which no man can go through this life," according to a gloss on
1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the time. " The second degree is when a
man, from slight indications, esteems another man's wickedness as
certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it
cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes
on to say: "If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are human,
we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from forming a
definite and fixed opinion. " The third degree is when a judge goes so
far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains directly to
injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts,
not indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting
the matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable
witnesses.

Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of
another without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore
does him an injury.

Reply to Objection 3: Since justice and injustice are about external
operations, as stated above ([2878]Q[58], AA[8],10,11;[2879] Q[59],
A[1], ad 3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice
when it is betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as
stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as
it is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the
external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or
anger to murder.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?

Objection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for
the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most part.
But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the number
of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the imagination and thought
of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Gn. 8:21). Therefore
doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he
leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, and
turns neither to this side nor to that. " Now he who interprets a
doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should
not be done.

Objection 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with
regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the
worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works. " Therefore it
seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be
interpreted for the worst.

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him not
judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in the best
sense.