28 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
of the total in 1930, compared to one-eighth in 1928.
of the total in 1930, compared to one-eighth in 1928.
Soviet Union - 1931 - Fighting the Red Trade Menace
Italian foreign
trade in general has declined since 1929, but Italo-
American trade has declined in particular and Italo-
Russian trade has increased.
In 1929 Italy imported from America $187,000,-
000 worth of goods, in 1930, $134,000,000. She ex-
ported to America $90,000,000 worth of goods in
1929, and $70,000,000 worth in 1930. Italy imported
from the Soviet Union $18,000,000 worth of goods
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? 16 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
in 1929 and $28,000,000 worth in 1930. She ex-
ported to the Soviet Union $3,700,000 worth of
goods in 1929, and $5,000,000 worth in 1930.
In the Soviet Union not the faintest whisper of
criticism of the Five-Year Plan may be uttered with
impunity. Nor in Fascist Italy is criticism of the
Government one of the healthiest of occupations. It
is therefore difficult to determine what, if any, at-
titude the broad public here has toward the question
of trade with the Soviet Union. I talked with a score
of business men and from all received the identical
answer that they had never heard expressed by Ital-
ians the least apprehension over possible consequences
of Italian aid to the Soviet economic expansion. There
is no talk about the Five-Year Plan, for nobody
knows anything about it. References to it in the press
are meager and from a short-period of observation
it was my impression that the Italian public must be
the least informed of any in Europe on Russia.
In every other country on the continent, including
Germany, the country doing the largest trade with
the Soviet Union, there are at least groups of public
men who assert that aid to Soviet economic growth
is a suicidal policy for the bourgeois world. In its
complete lack of any critical expression, the Italian
public is unique, perhaps unwillingly silent, perhaps
merely ignorant, perhaps genuinely acquiescent in
the Government's attitude.
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 17
This attitude is fairly clear: Italy, it claims, from
a purely commercial standpoint at this moment has
everything to gain and nothing to lose from trade
with the Soviet Union. The financial status of the
government with a confessed budget deficit estimated
at more than $100,000,000 and with about $150,-
000,000 payments on treasury bonds coming due in
October, 1931, does not permit Italy to let any trade
chances slip. In a period of economic depression and
loss of foreign markets Italy cannot afford to ignore
any opportunities for business.
Specifically, the American tariff has cost Italy
money and Italy hopes to make up some of her losses
by trade with the Soviet Union. Italy, it is true, buys
five times as much from the Soviet Union as she sells
to the Soviet Union, and this is serious at a time when
the Italian foreign trade balance is $250,000,000 pas-
sive, but the new trade agreement, it is hoped, may
remedy that. And, anyway, the products that Italy
takes from Russia are products Italy has to have
but cannot supply herself, four-fifths of all Italian
imports from the Soviet Union being petroleum and
wheat. As to the "Red Trade Menace," says the
Italian Government, "Fascist Italy fears no menace,
least of all Russia. "
These are the economic arguments of Italy for
trade with the Soviet Union. Political considerations
have placed at least as large a role. On bad terms
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? 18 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
with France, distrustful in general of democratic
regimes, the Fascist Government has not yet given
up hope of establishing some kind of understanding
among the defeated nations of Central Europe, in-
cluding Germany, together with the Soviet Union
as a political counterpoise to the French post-
Versailles hegemony in Europe. As will appear later,
Italian military and naval circles are obviously in
favor of developing closer relations with the Soviet
Union, scarcely with the hope of any sort of active
alliance, but with the intention of insuring, in the
event of war with France, secure sources of petro-
leum and wheat from Russia through the Black Sea,
and this development may be observed actually tak-
ing place.
These were considerations that led up to the Italo-
Soviet trade agreement that has just been extended.
A glance at the text shows how advantageous are its
terms to the Soviet Union.
The first trade agreement of 1930 provided for
Soviet purchases from Italy of at least $10,000,000;
the new agreement provides for purchases of at least
$15,000,000 and foresees Soviet purchases next year
of at least $20,000,000. American observers here are
of the opinion that Soviet purchases will probably
exceed the stipulated figure.
There is good reason to believe that some part of
these Soviet purchases have been and will be diverted
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 19
from America. Bogdanoff, head of the Amtorg Trad-
ing Agency, recently announced that Soviet pur-
chases in the United States had declined from $60,-
441,000 in the six months ended March 31, 1930,
to $33,385,000 for the six months ended March 31,
1931, and that this decline was largely attributable
to lack of credit facilities in the United States and
improvement of credit facilities in "some European
countries. " He meant, among others, Italy.
The Italo-Soviet trade agreement provides, first,
that the Soviets need only buy in Italy "in so far as
technical and commercial conditions are the same as
those existing in other countries for the products
requested. " Thus the Soviet Union is safeguarded
against losing the advantage of playing off the Ger-
man industrialist against the Italian industrialist,
of shopping around, of choosing the best quality at
the least price. Italy must deliver at least as cheaply
and excellently as any other seller.
The most important clause in the agreement is the
well-known section providing that the Italian Gov-
ernment guarantees to Italian business men 75 per
cent of the value of their sales to the Soviet Union,
enough to cover labor and materials and requiring the
seller to take the risk only on the estimated profits and
overhead. This liberal guarantee exceeds by 5 per cent
the German guarantee. It is sufficient, particularly
in a country where the banks are under Government
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? 20 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
control, to make the question of discounting Soviet
bills in Italy of subordinate importance.
For comparison with the credit time terms previ-
ously granted in America to Amtorg, it is interesting
to note the length of time Italy grants the Soviet Un-
ion on twelve categories of products subject to Soviet
orders which were distributed by the Italian Govern-
ment in this manner in order to spread trade evenly
throughout her industry: On ships, payments must
be made in a maximum of fifty-four months, aver-
age forty-two; on ball and roller bearings, maximum
thirty-six, average twenty-four; machinery for ma-
chine shops, maximum thirty-six, average twenty-
nine; electrical machinery, maximum, thirty-six;
average twenty-nine; machinery for chemical in-
dustry, maximum thirty-six, average twenty-four;
other machinery, maximum thirty, average twenty-
one; automobiles and tractors, maximum thirty-six,
average twenty-four; auto parts, average twelve;
airplanes and airplane motors, maximum thirty-six,
average twenty-eight; precision, measuring and op-
tical instruments, maximum twenty-eight, average
twenty; metals, average twelve; chemicals and dyes,
twelve, and fertilizers, twelve months. General aver-
age payment will take place in twenty-five months.
But an Italian Government official would object if
one commented that Fascist Italy has faith in Com-
munist Russia's solvency for at least two years. He
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 21
would point out that as far as payments go Italy
feels secure, inasmuch as she pays out to the Soviet
Union five times what she receives, and there should
always be a balance in the Soviet trade delegation's
treasury here.
An important item in Soviet purchases from Italy
is ships. The new agreement limits them by Italian
stipulation to $5,000,000 worth, sufficient, however,
to buy four. Two have been ordered by Soviets and
are now under construction, but do not appear yet
in trade statistics. Why Italy limited the Soviets to
$5,000,000 worth of ships is also interesting. The
Italian ship subsidy law, designed to stimulate the
creation of a merchant marine that would be of serv-
ice as well in war as in peace, has some remarkable
provisions.
There is a basic subsidy of 32 lire per gross ton
for all metal hulls and drawback, tariff exemption,
of 100 per cent on all customs duties for metal ma-
terial imported for ship construction. There is a pre-
mium for efficiency in ? fuel consumption running
from 16 lire to 12 lire per 100 kilograms of weight
for all auxiliary machinery installed. This is to pro-
mote the use of labor-saving devices. Finally, the
basic subsidy of 32 lire per ton may be increased by
30 per cent if the speed of the boat reaches fourteen
knots, and this increase scales upward until if the
boat reaches as high as twenty-seven knots, the basic
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? 22 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
subsidy is increased by 235 per cent. These subsidies,
that apply as well to the construction of foreign
ships, mount very high and though they are limited
to a total of 114,000,000 lire a year from 1930 to
1934, they enable the Italian shipbuilders comfort-
ably to compete with older shipbuilding countries.
Hitherto, the Soviet Union has placed most of its
shipbuilding contracts in Germany. Today Italy has
made her shipyards so attractive that the Soviet
Union would like to place more orders here, but
the Italian Government will only permit shipbuilding
for the Soviet Union in proportion to total Soviet
orders at a ratio of $5,000,000 worth of ships out
of a total of $20,000,000 for all purchases. This is
a feature of Italo-Soviet relations being closely
watched by France, for the Soviet Union needs tor-
pedo boats, small cruisers and submarines for the
minimum requirements of its long neglected navy
and Italian yards are well equipped to supply them.
Another item of interest that does not, however,
appear as yet in the Italo-Soviet statistics concerns
airplanes. Early in March the Soviet Union ordered
seventy-five Savoya Macchetti hydroplanes equipped
with 750-horsepower Fraschini single motors, the
order including 150 spare motors. They were the
type of planes used by Balbo in his South American
flight and Maddalena for his rescue flight to the
Pole for Nobile.
Besides this deal, Italian manufacturers recently
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 23
had almost closed the sale to the Soviet Union of
150 Savoya Pomillo planes, deliverable fifty per year,
Italy to take wheat for them, but the transaction
broke down for causes unknown. The barter feature,
however, was taken up by the Fiat Company, and
according to unofficial information, Italy has agreed
to deliver 2,000 Fiat trucks for grain, the Italian
Government Treasury giving two-year notes for 75
per cent of the sum to Fiat who are to discount
them. The Government promises to take up the notes
within a year, the Soviet Union to deliver wheat to
the amount of the sales price, and the Italian Gov-
ernment to sell the wheat and with the proceeds re-
deem the Fiat notes.
Included in the new treaty is a clause wherein the
Italian Government promises to invite the attention
of Italian engineers hitherto seldom employed in the
Soviet Union to the opportunities for rendering
technical assistance in the Five-Year Plan. Italian
industry is hopeful over the agreement and for the
moment producer interest is in the foreground of
Italian economic thinking about the Soviet Union. It
is, however, the consumer interest in Italy that is
really decisive for the Italian attitude toward Rus-
sia. And it is the Italian market for wheat, oil, lum-
ber, coal that interests most the American and other
exporters, who, under Soviet competition, have seen
or fear they may see their Italian customers slip-
ping away from them into Russian hands.
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? CHAPTER III
Savona, Italy:
Tucked away in this little Mediterranean port,
surrounded by vineyards, almost hidden in a hollow
of the hills and unknown to any except the alert
observers of foreign oil companies, there is going up
an outpost of the Soviet's Five-Year Plan in Europe.
A huge oil depot for the storage of Soviet petro-
leum and petroleum products, the Savona station
of the Soviet Oil Trust provides one of the most
impressive evidences to be found anywhere in Eu-
rope of the far-reaching plans and self-confidence
of the Soviet foreign trade monopoly and of the
hospitality the Russians have found in Italy.
Here is a bit, and a very significant bit, of Soviet
Russia in Italy. After a prolonged tour of Soviet
industrial plants in Russia under the Five-Year
Plan, it brought a flood of familiar recollections to
find in Savona just such another plant, also not
quite completed, also very large, also packed full of
meaning for the future.
Only the environment is quite different from the
bleak surroundings of most great Soviet plants in
Russia. A fast hour and a half drive along a highway
that skirts the Gulf of Genoa, past coves and bays
24
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 25
improbably blue, through tunnels that pierce pro-
jecting cliffs, through sleepy towns, where sun-
browned girls sit knitting at flowery doorways,
brings one to Savona. The port is full of idle ships,
beflagged. It is a national holiday. We inquire the
way to the new Soviet oil station. The car winds and
turns through narrow village streets, walled high on
either side by gray stone, topped by nodding blos-
soms. Out of such an alley we emerge into a broader
way and there before us lies a huge complex of
freshly built buildings encompassed by a brick wall
and dominated by a tall water tower. The plant
looks foreign--an intruder among the peaceful hills.
Designed to accommodate an initial capacity of
50,000 tons of petroleum, the plant's liberal use of
space makes it appear even larger, The walled in-
closure is about 400 yards long by 150 wide. Inside
there are an administration building, a double row
of fifteen of the largest size oil tanks, two rows of
warehouses, various auxiliary buildings, all con-
nected by narrow-gauge railroad tracks.
Nearly completed, the plant should be ready to use
this summer. There is no doubt about the permanent
character of the structure. It would do credit to any
great bourgeois oil trust.
Walking about the interior of the enclosure, I
thought involuntarily of Baku, the oil capital of the
Soviet Union, of its streets placarded with signs
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? 26 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
"Five-Year Plan for oil in two and one-half years. "
Just this spring Moscow announced that the Five-
Year Plan for oil actually had been accomplished
in two and a half years. On that occasion the presi-
dent of the Soviet Oil Trust announced "our daily
production now has reached 58,000 tons, compared
with an estimate of 57,000 tons for the conclusion of
the Five-Year Plan in 1933. "
Here in Savona this new Soviet plant will hold
about one-tenth of all the petroleum Italy imports
in a year, but it would lack 8,000 tons of holding
even one day's production of the Soviet Oil Trust.
Second oil producing country in the world, now
having leaped ahead of Venezuela and only behind
--though, of course, far behind--America, the So-
viet Union plans to produce this year 27,500,000
tons as compared with the original estimate of 20,-
800,000 tons for 1933, and has shoved its production
goal for 1933 ahead to 46,000,000 tons. The United
States produced 137,000,000 tons in 1929. If Amer-
ican production under restrictive measures remains
about static, and if the Soviet Union carries out the
Five-Year Plan for oil in the future as it has done in
the past, the Soviet Union by 1933 will have nearly
one-third of the production of the United States.
These are considerations that are bringing wrin-
kles to the brows of representatives of foreign oil
companies in Italy, as well, it may be said, as almost
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 27
everywhere else in the world. "The Five-Year Plan
for oil," remarked one American oil man in a neigh-
boring country, "is a catastrophe for us. "
Why the sober-minded representative of one of the
most realistic business organizations on earth should
feel justified in using such strong language may per-
haps be understood by consideration of the oil situ-
ation in Italy.
Until Russian oil re-entered the field, Standard
and Shell divided between themselves the Italian mar-
ket, Russian production had sunk from the pre-war
figure of 8,000,000 tons to 5,000,000 in 1924 and
the field was clear for the Americans and British.
It took until 1926 for the Soviet Oil Trust to re-
cover lost ground and reach approximately pre-war
production. There had been some Russian oil coming
into Italy, but not much until the formation about
this time of "Acienda Generale Italiana Petrolio,"
called "Agip" for short, which under Italian Govern-
ment control took over on contract all Soviet oil for
Italy and in a short time was disposing of 25 per
cent of all the petroleum and petroleum products
consumed in this country. Soviet imports of fuel
oil alone into Italy rose from 102,000 tons out of
a total import of 420,000 tons in 1928 to 264,000
tons out of a total of 705,000 tons in 1930. In crude
oil Soviet imports reached one-third of the total by
1930 and in benzine Soviet imports were one-fifth
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?
28 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
of the total in 1930, compared to one-eighth in 1928.
Shell and Standard were hit but could do nothing
effective, for "Agip," an Italian Government cor-
poration, was selling the Russian oil and if any
charge of "dumping" was to be made, it would have
to be a charge of Italian, not Russian, dumping.
"Agip's" contracts with the Russians were an in-
teresting example of Soviet price practice. They pro-
vided for the sale of oil products f. o. b. Batum or
Novorossisk at a base price always a bit below that
of similar American products f. o. b. Gulf ports. With
this initial advantage, the Italian purchaser then
had the advantage of difference in transport costs
between Gulf-Italy and Black Sea-Italy, a difference
that sometimes mounted as high as thirty-five shil-
lings per ton, although it is now four shillings per
ton.
Even with this diminution in transport price dif-
ference, the net advantage of Soviet over American
and other foreign oil in Italy is very considerable.
It enables the "Agip" to sell Russian gasoline at
from three-quarters to one and one-half cents per
gallon less than the Americans' price, or about 18 to
20 per cent lower at the present market.
On bunkering oil the resale price of Russian
Mazout here is 35 shillings per ton, against 45 to 50
for American fuel oil, but no American fuel oil is
now being offered in face of this competition.
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 29
All this is not well and not good for the other
foreign oil companies operating in Italy, but until
now they have been able at least to keep a good
share of the market and have not suffered fatally.
What they now fear, however, is that the Italian
Government intends to permit the Russians to open
their own direct selling agency. The Savona plant
seems to them clear proof that this is the Govern-
ment's intention, for the Savona plant has been
built by and belongs directly to the Soviet Govern-
ment. Somewhere on the books of the Five-Year
Planners, among countless items of Russian fac-
tories, is one item, "Savona plant. "
Hitherto, other foreign oil companies have felt
Soviet competition only through the Italian Govern-
ment agency. "Agip" has been able to sell Russian
oil under the market and thus to cause discomfort to
foreign competitors, but there was a limit to "Agip's
price-cutting capacity. It could never go below the
price it had paid the Russians. Now foreign com-
panies fear that if the Russians are permitted to
open their own importing and distributing agencies
the specter of real Russian "dumping" will be upon
them, for the Russians, independent of intermedi-
aries, may fix what price they please. This is why
Savona is an unpleasant spot for foreign oil men in
Italy.
Behind this fear is the apprehension that the
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? 30 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
Italian Government may be planning to give the
Soviet Union a virtual monopoly on the importation
of fuel and crude oil. The Italian navy uses large
quantities of Soviet fuel oil now and from year to
year is progressively using more.
American and other foreign oil men are looking
at Italo-Russian rapprochement anxiously, but not
more anxiously than the French Government. De-
spite Italian protestations that there is nothing
political in the economic cooperation of Rome with
Moscow, the French worriedly check off: Soviet oil
to Italian navy, Italian ships and Italian airplanes
to the Soviets, to mention only items of immediate
wartime significance. Oil men and Frenchmen have
their own special interests in Italo-Soviet relations.
For the world at large the important conclusion is
that Italian Fascism has, for business and political
reasons, joined hands with Russian Communism.
Six years ago I attended the trial in Moscow of
three students, two German youths, one Esthonian,
charged with entering the country for the purpose
of attempting to assassinate Stalin and Trotzky.
Attorney General Nicholas Krylenko, who had
charged the defendants with being members of a
Fascist organization, wound up his address to the
court with the flaming sentence, "Bayonets and ma-
chine guns are our welcome to Fascists who come
to the Soviet Union. " Upon the conclusion of the new
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 31
Italo-Soviet trade agreement, the Soviet Government
invited a group of Italian industrialists to follow
the example of the German business tourists and
come to Moscow as guests. The invitation has been
accepted.
From the Italian side one is bound to admit the
cogency of the comment made by the Fascist organ,
"Lavoro Fascista," upon the conclusion of the Italo-
Soviet trade agreement, "It is true we are aiding in a
way the execution of the Five-Year Plan, which in-
tends to put Russia in a state of complete economic
independence. But are not there quite a few demo-
cratic countries which have not refused to have com-
mercial relations with the Soviet Union? "
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? CHAPTER IV
Genoa:
"Red Trade Menace? "
"Please give us more of it. "
This is the attitude of Italians in Italy today.
For it is not the Italians, but Americans, Canadians,
British, Argentinians, Swedes, Finns, Jugoslavians,
Rumanians,--in fact, all exporters of countries sup-
plying the great staples, grain, oil, lumber and coal
who are suffering from Soviet competition in Italy.
Soviet prices are the chief object of criticism on
the part of Soviet competitors. As a general rule, the
complainant charges broadly that the Soviets for
other than economic reasons are "dumping" to "ruin
the market," "upset trade," "cause unrest. " A sub-
jective examination of Soviet intentions at present
is just as impossible as a certain forecast of what
they may do in the future, but an objective examina-
tion of the actual comparative prices of Soviet and
other goods, at least in Italy, does not bear out this
particular description of Soviet export policy.
Summarily, this examination shows that Soviet ex-
port policy just now, is designed first and last to
get the business and that Soviet prices are, as a rule,
just low enough--but always low enough--to get the
32
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 33
business and not, if the Soviets can help it, any
lower. On a commodity market, where business is
done on exchanges, as in the grain market, Soviet
prices are just a shade below their competitors. On
a market where the Soviets must compete with power-
ful foreign trusts, as in oil, the Soviets cut fairly
heavily, because only fairly heavy cuts may not be
equaled by countercuts from competing trusts. On a
market where the Soviets are new, where they must
"muscle in," they do so ruthlessly with slashing re-
ductions, as in the lumber market here.
This market presents a classical example of Soviet
methods of conquering a new field. Italy is a large
user of plywood and the Russians in the last two
years have developed an extraordinary production
of that commodity, admitted even by competitors to
be of first-class quality. They only began this spring
to campaign for the Italian market seriously. It was
necessary to make the campaign a determined one,
since the Baltic countries, Jugoslavia and Rumania,
had for years enjoyed a firm and, as they believed,
unshakable position in the Italian trade. A few quota-
tions will show just how determined the Russian
campaign was and how shakable the old-established
purveyors proved to be.
A leading lumber broker supplied the informa-
tion. On grade BB plywood the Russians quote a
price about 30 per cent under the Finnish price on
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? 34 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
similar material, and, surprisingly enough, deliver
grade B plywood, one grade better. Buyers here
now have become accustomed to this practice and are
sure that when they order from the Russians BB
quality they will get B quality. Such competition, not
only on price but on quality, makes Russian plywood
almost irresistibly attractive to brokers, even though
they may wish to remain loyal to their old sources.
Prices are illustrative. On BB plywood the Rus-
sians quote from $32 to $38. 80 per cubic meter
against Baltic countries' quotations of from $44. 37
to $53. 35. On B grade plywood the Russians quote
$37. 31 to $43. 65 per cubic meter against Baltic
quotations on similar material to $61. 56 to $69. 10.
In addition to these price differences of 30 or more
per cent, the Russian prices carry a flat discount of
4 per cent, plus 3 per cent cash discount, while Bal-
tic prices are net. Taking quality and price differ-
ences into consideration, the Russians, it may be esti-
mated, offer a 50 per cent advantage on plywood.
All prices given are c. i. f. Italian ports.
Other plywood exporters complain that as soon as
they reduce their prices, down go the Russian prices
still lower. Under these circumstances, lumber deal-
ers in Genoa and Baltic, Finnish Rumanian and
Jugoslavian exporters are convinced that the Soviets
soon will control completely the Italian plywood
market. It is reported that Soviet exports of ply-
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 35
wood into Italy will reach 24,000 cubic meters this
year, while Italy's entire consumption last year was
only 25,000 cubic meters. At the present moment,
however, the market is stagnant, for consumer brok-
ers are reluctant to buy, uncertain whether the Rus-
sians have touched rock bottom with their prices.
Lumber brokers, and these are the only Italian
merchants I found dissatisfied over Soviet trade, are
not cheerful over their cheap plywood because many
of them were caught with supplies or contracts for
supplies with the Soviet's competitors, and the ply-
wood market having slumped so heavily considerable
sums of money must be lost before the market is
readjusted.
As concerns the United States, there is no Amer-
ican plywood competing on the Italian market, but
there is a tendency here to substitute cheap Russian
white pine where before American long leaf yellow
pine or Swedish redwood had been used. For doors
and window sashes, the Russian product at the usual
price advantage is being accorded preference.
In all Russian exports it is not so much the ab-
solute figures that are meaningful but the direction
and rate of change. The Soviets are just beginning
to develop their anthracite industry. It is not today
a serious competitor in the Italian market. But
whereas in 1928 the Soviet Union sent 66,000 tons
of anthracite to Italy, or six-tenths of one per cent
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? 36 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
of Italy's total imports, Soviet anthracite exports to
Italy in 1930 were nearly 300,000 tons, or about two
and five-tenths per cent of a total of 12,000,000 tons
imported.
The United States only exported 366,000 tons of
anthracite to Italy in 1930 and it is anticipated that
this year the Soviet anthracite will pass the American
product. Neither the Soviet Union nor America are
yet important factors in the Italian anthracite
market, as Great Britain supplies 60 per cent of the
total imports and Germany 30. Important, however,
is the declaration of Italian anthracite dealers that
they are prepared to take all the anthracite the Soviet
Union has to offer, declaring it is of superior quality
and cheaper. This "most backward" sector of the
Soviet's Five-Year Plan is suffering difficulties but
produced last year 17 per cent more than the year
before.
Much more important for the United States is
Russian competition in wheat here. The wheat market
presents a quite different picture from that, for ex-
ample, of the plywood market. It only takes a shade
to get the business on the grain market, but that
shade will usually get it. The Soviets have cut the
shade regularly. Their share of the Italian grain
market is growing steadily, although it is difficult
to speak of a steady line of development in grain
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 87
exports of a country that, according to the London
"Grain Seed and Oil Reporter," exported 37,736,-
000 bushels in 1927; 8,000 bushels in 1928; 7,088,-
000 bushels in 1929; and already in the period of
this season from August 1, 1930, to April 2, 1931,
had exported 89,880,000 bushels.
The general expectation that the Soviets would
resume grain shipments this spring has been ful-
filled. Their shipments in January had fallen to
1,536,000 bushels. In February Soviet shipments
picked up to 5,800,000 bushels and in March to
6,800,000 bushels.
How large a part of Italy's wheat needs have been
met by these spring shipments of Soviet wheat is
indicated by "Bulletin of Arrivals" published in
Genoa, showing that out of a total of 1,980,000
bushels of wheat arriving in Italy in January, 759,-
000 were from the Soviet Union, while in February
out of a total of 3,234,000 bushels, 1,518,000 were
from the Soviet Union and in March out of 7,689,000
bushels, 2,156,000 were Russian.
It is most interesting to observe on the general
question of Russian wheat how its role in the world
market varies from month to month. In August,
1930, Soviet shipments of wheat were ten per cent of
world shipments; in September they were 11 per
cent, in October thirty-seven: November, thirty-
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? 38 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
eight; December, twenty-one; January, 1931, two
per cent; February, nine per cent, March, ten per
cent.
It was in October and November when the Soviet
Union was pouring on the market more than one-
third of the total world wheat supply that cries of
pain were loudest from the other wheat-producing
countries. The injuries inflicted during those two
months have not been forgotten and the wheat world
is looking anxiously toward the Black Sea.
This anxiety is explicable on the part of Amer-
ican wheat exporters, for to consider the Italian
market alone it would appear from the Italian Gov-
ernment's figures on wheat imports that in the calen-
dar year 1930 the Soviet Union took away from the
United States a quite perceptible share of the Ital-
ian wheat business. Italy bought a total of 6,600,000
bushels more wheat in 1930 than she did in 1929, yet
the United States, that sold Italy 13,827,000 bushels
in 1929, sold her only 11,385,000 in 1930, although
American supplies in 1930 were the largest in his-
tory, while the Soviet Union, that sold no wheat to
Italy in 1929, sold her 9,900,000 bushels in 1930.
American sales of wheat to Italy fell off 2,442,000
bushels in 1930, while Soviet sales increased by the
total amount of her sales--nearly 10,000,000 bushels.
Most of last year's Soviet wheat, however, re-
placed that of the Argentine, whose sales to Italy
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 39
declined 8,000,000 bushels from 14,421,000 in 1929
to 5,511,000 in 1930. These figures shed some light
on the bitter complaints of the Argentine repre-
sentative at the world wheat conference in Rome
over Soviet competition.
Grain dealers handling Soviet wheat here assert
it is only reasonable that Italy should buy from the
Soviet Union; that the shorter haul from the Black
Sea to Mediterranean ports makes it naturally
cheaper than American, Argentine or Manitoba
wheat. They say that the high gluten content of
Russian hard wheat is particularly desirable for
macaroni and that this quality of Russian grain is
just as good as the more expensive Manitoba and
American hards.
Italy is the third largest wheat-importing country.
Her average yearly import is from 60,000,000 to 90,-
000,000 bushels. Despite the most determined efforts
of the Italian Government to develop its home sup-
ply, the "battle of wheat" appears to have been
stale-mated at the 1929 domestic production of 260,-
000,000 bushels, the top limit ever reached, 32,000,-
000 more than the previous year, itself a record.
In 1930, the Italian crop was 216,000,000 bushels,
34,000,000 less than the 1929 high. In 1929 the
best year, Italy, nevertheless, had to import 63,000,-
000 bushels. This would appear to be her minimum
requirement from abroad, enough to make the Ital-
? ?
trade in general has declined since 1929, but Italo-
American trade has declined in particular and Italo-
Russian trade has increased.
In 1929 Italy imported from America $187,000,-
000 worth of goods, in 1930, $134,000,000. She ex-
ported to America $90,000,000 worth of goods in
1929, and $70,000,000 worth in 1930. Italy imported
from the Soviet Union $18,000,000 worth of goods
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? 16 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
in 1929 and $28,000,000 worth in 1930. She ex-
ported to the Soviet Union $3,700,000 worth of
goods in 1929, and $5,000,000 worth in 1930.
In the Soviet Union not the faintest whisper of
criticism of the Five-Year Plan may be uttered with
impunity. Nor in Fascist Italy is criticism of the
Government one of the healthiest of occupations. It
is therefore difficult to determine what, if any, at-
titude the broad public here has toward the question
of trade with the Soviet Union. I talked with a score
of business men and from all received the identical
answer that they had never heard expressed by Ital-
ians the least apprehension over possible consequences
of Italian aid to the Soviet economic expansion. There
is no talk about the Five-Year Plan, for nobody
knows anything about it. References to it in the press
are meager and from a short-period of observation
it was my impression that the Italian public must be
the least informed of any in Europe on Russia.
In every other country on the continent, including
Germany, the country doing the largest trade with
the Soviet Union, there are at least groups of public
men who assert that aid to Soviet economic growth
is a suicidal policy for the bourgeois world. In its
complete lack of any critical expression, the Italian
public is unique, perhaps unwillingly silent, perhaps
merely ignorant, perhaps genuinely acquiescent in
the Government's attitude.
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 17
This attitude is fairly clear: Italy, it claims, from
a purely commercial standpoint at this moment has
everything to gain and nothing to lose from trade
with the Soviet Union. The financial status of the
government with a confessed budget deficit estimated
at more than $100,000,000 and with about $150,-
000,000 payments on treasury bonds coming due in
October, 1931, does not permit Italy to let any trade
chances slip. In a period of economic depression and
loss of foreign markets Italy cannot afford to ignore
any opportunities for business.
Specifically, the American tariff has cost Italy
money and Italy hopes to make up some of her losses
by trade with the Soviet Union. Italy, it is true, buys
five times as much from the Soviet Union as she sells
to the Soviet Union, and this is serious at a time when
the Italian foreign trade balance is $250,000,000 pas-
sive, but the new trade agreement, it is hoped, may
remedy that. And, anyway, the products that Italy
takes from Russia are products Italy has to have
but cannot supply herself, four-fifths of all Italian
imports from the Soviet Union being petroleum and
wheat. As to the "Red Trade Menace," says the
Italian Government, "Fascist Italy fears no menace,
least of all Russia. "
These are the economic arguments of Italy for
trade with the Soviet Union. Political considerations
have placed at least as large a role. On bad terms
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? 18 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
with France, distrustful in general of democratic
regimes, the Fascist Government has not yet given
up hope of establishing some kind of understanding
among the defeated nations of Central Europe, in-
cluding Germany, together with the Soviet Union
as a political counterpoise to the French post-
Versailles hegemony in Europe. As will appear later,
Italian military and naval circles are obviously in
favor of developing closer relations with the Soviet
Union, scarcely with the hope of any sort of active
alliance, but with the intention of insuring, in the
event of war with France, secure sources of petro-
leum and wheat from Russia through the Black Sea,
and this development may be observed actually tak-
ing place.
These were considerations that led up to the Italo-
Soviet trade agreement that has just been extended.
A glance at the text shows how advantageous are its
terms to the Soviet Union.
The first trade agreement of 1930 provided for
Soviet purchases from Italy of at least $10,000,000;
the new agreement provides for purchases of at least
$15,000,000 and foresees Soviet purchases next year
of at least $20,000,000. American observers here are
of the opinion that Soviet purchases will probably
exceed the stipulated figure.
There is good reason to believe that some part of
these Soviet purchases have been and will be diverted
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 19
from America. Bogdanoff, head of the Amtorg Trad-
ing Agency, recently announced that Soviet pur-
chases in the United States had declined from $60,-
441,000 in the six months ended March 31, 1930,
to $33,385,000 for the six months ended March 31,
1931, and that this decline was largely attributable
to lack of credit facilities in the United States and
improvement of credit facilities in "some European
countries. " He meant, among others, Italy.
The Italo-Soviet trade agreement provides, first,
that the Soviets need only buy in Italy "in so far as
technical and commercial conditions are the same as
those existing in other countries for the products
requested. " Thus the Soviet Union is safeguarded
against losing the advantage of playing off the Ger-
man industrialist against the Italian industrialist,
of shopping around, of choosing the best quality at
the least price. Italy must deliver at least as cheaply
and excellently as any other seller.
The most important clause in the agreement is the
well-known section providing that the Italian Gov-
ernment guarantees to Italian business men 75 per
cent of the value of their sales to the Soviet Union,
enough to cover labor and materials and requiring the
seller to take the risk only on the estimated profits and
overhead. This liberal guarantee exceeds by 5 per cent
the German guarantee. It is sufficient, particularly
in a country where the banks are under Government
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? 20 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
control, to make the question of discounting Soviet
bills in Italy of subordinate importance.
For comparison with the credit time terms previ-
ously granted in America to Amtorg, it is interesting
to note the length of time Italy grants the Soviet Un-
ion on twelve categories of products subject to Soviet
orders which were distributed by the Italian Govern-
ment in this manner in order to spread trade evenly
throughout her industry: On ships, payments must
be made in a maximum of fifty-four months, aver-
age forty-two; on ball and roller bearings, maximum
thirty-six, average twenty-four; machinery for ma-
chine shops, maximum thirty-six, average twenty-
nine; electrical machinery, maximum, thirty-six;
average twenty-nine; machinery for chemical in-
dustry, maximum thirty-six, average twenty-four;
other machinery, maximum thirty, average twenty-
one; automobiles and tractors, maximum thirty-six,
average twenty-four; auto parts, average twelve;
airplanes and airplane motors, maximum thirty-six,
average twenty-eight; precision, measuring and op-
tical instruments, maximum twenty-eight, average
twenty; metals, average twelve; chemicals and dyes,
twelve, and fertilizers, twelve months. General aver-
age payment will take place in twenty-five months.
But an Italian Government official would object if
one commented that Fascist Italy has faith in Com-
munist Russia's solvency for at least two years. He
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 21
would point out that as far as payments go Italy
feels secure, inasmuch as she pays out to the Soviet
Union five times what she receives, and there should
always be a balance in the Soviet trade delegation's
treasury here.
An important item in Soviet purchases from Italy
is ships. The new agreement limits them by Italian
stipulation to $5,000,000 worth, sufficient, however,
to buy four. Two have been ordered by Soviets and
are now under construction, but do not appear yet
in trade statistics. Why Italy limited the Soviets to
$5,000,000 worth of ships is also interesting. The
Italian ship subsidy law, designed to stimulate the
creation of a merchant marine that would be of serv-
ice as well in war as in peace, has some remarkable
provisions.
There is a basic subsidy of 32 lire per gross ton
for all metal hulls and drawback, tariff exemption,
of 100 per cent on all customs duties for metal ma-
terial imported for ship construction. There is a pre-
mium for efficiency in ? fuel consumption running
from 16 lire to 12 lire per 100 kilograms of weight
for all auxiliary machinery installed. This is to pro-
mote the use of labor-saving devices. Finally, the
basic subsidy of 32 lire per ton may be increased by
30 per cent if the speed of the boat reaches fourteen
knots, and this increase scales upward until if the
boat reaches as high as twenty-seven knots, the basic
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? 22 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
subsidy is increased by 235 per cent. These subsidies,
that apply as well to the construction of foreign
ships, mount very high and though they are limited
to a total of 114,000,000 lire a year from 1930 to
1934, they enable the Italian shipbuilders comfort-
ably to compete with older shipbuilding countries.
Hitherto, the Soviet Union has placed most of its
shipbuilding contracts in Germany. Today Italy has
made her shipyards so attractive that the Soviet
Union would like to place more orders here, but
the Italian Government will only permit shipbuilding
for the Soviet Union in proportion to total Soviet
orders at a ratio of $5,000,000 worth of ships out
of a total of $20,000,000 for all purchases. This is
a feature of Italo-Soviet relations being closely
watched by France, for the Soviet Union needs tor-
pedo boats, small cruisers and submarines for the
minimum requirements of its long neglected navy
and Italian yards are well equipped to supply them.
Another item of interest that does not, however,
appear as yet in the Italo-Soviet statistics concerns
airplanes. Early in March the Soviet Union ordered
seventy-five Savoya Macchetti hydroplanes equipped
with 750-horsepower Fraschini single motors, the
order including 150 spare motors. They were the
type of planes used by Balbo in his South American
flight and Maddalena for his rescue flight to the
Pole for Nobile.
Besides this deal, Italian manufacturers recently
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 23
had almost closed the sale to the Soviet Union of
150 Savoya Pomillo planes, deliverable fifty per year,
Italy to take wheat for them, but the transaction
broke down for causes unknown. The barter feature,
however, was taken up by the Fiat Company, and
according to unofficial information, Italy has agreed
to deliver 2,000 Fiat trucks for grain, the Italian
Government Treasury giving two-year notes for 75
per cent of the sum to Fiat who are to discount
them. The Government promises to take up the notes
within a year, the Soviet Union to deliver wheat to
the amount of the sales price, and the Italian Gov-
ernment to sell the wheat and with the proceeds re-
deem the Fiat notes.
Included in the new treaty is a clause wherein the
Italian Government promises to invite the attention
of Italian engineers hitherto seldom employed in the
Soviet Union to the opportunities for rendering
technical assistance in the Five-Year Plan. Italian
industry is hopeful over the agreement and for the
moment producer interest is in the foreground of
Italian economic thinking about the Soviet Union. It
is, however, the consumer interest in Italy that is
really decisive for the Italian attitude toward Rus-
sia. And it is the Italian market for wheat, oil, lum-
ber, coal that interests most the American and other
exporters, who, under Soviet competition, have seen
or fear they may see their Italian customers slip-
ping away from them into Russian hands.
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? CHAPTER III
Savona, Italy:
Tucked away in this little Mediterranean port,
surrounded by vineyards, almost hidden in a hollow
of the hills and unknown to any except the alert
observers of foreign oil companies, there is going up
an outpost of the Soviet's Five-Year Plan in Europe.
A huge oil depot for the storage of Soviet petro-
leum and petroleum products, the Savona station
of the Soviet Oil Trust provides one of the most
impressive evidences to be found anywhere in Eu-
rope of the far-reaching plans and self-confidence
of the Soviet foreign trade monopoly and of the
hospitality the Russians have found in Italy.
Here is a bit, and a very significant bit, of Soviet
Russia in Italy. After a prolonged tour of Soviet
industrial plants in Russia under the Five-Year
Plan, it brought a flood of familiar recollections to
find in Savona just such another plant, also not
quite completed, also very large, also packed full of
meaning for the future.
Only the environment is quite different from the
bleak surroundings of most great Soviet plants in
Russia. A fast hour and a half drive along a highway
that skirts the Gulf of Genoa, past coves and bays
24
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 25
improbably blue, through tunnels that pierce pro-
jecting cliffs, through sleepy towns, where sun-
browned girls sit knitting at flowery doorways,
brings one to Savona. The port is full of idle ships,
beflagged. It is a national holiday. We inquire the
way to the new Soviet oil station. The car winds and
turns through narrow village streets, walled high on
either side by gray stone, topped by nodding blos-
soms. Out of such an alley we emerge into a broader
way and there before us lies a huge complex of
freshly built buildings encompassed by a brick wall
and dominated by a tall water tower. The plant
looks foreign--an intruder among the peaceful hills.
Designed to accommodate an initial capacity of
50,000 tons of petroleum, the plant's liberal use of
space makes it appear even larger, The walled in-
closure is about 400 yards long by 150 wide. Inside
there are an administration building, a double row
of fifteen of the largest size oil tanks, two rows of
warehouses, various auxiliary buildings, all con-
nected by narrow-gauge railroad tracks.
Nearly completed, the plant should be ready to use
this summer. There is no doubt about the permanent
character of the structure. It would do credit to any
great bourgeois oil trust.
Walking about the interior of the enclosure, I
thought involuntarily of Baku, the oil capital of the
Soviet Union, of its streets placarded with signs
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? 26 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
"Five-Year Plan for oil in two and one-half years. "
Just this spring Moscow announced that the Five-
Year Plan for oil actually had been accomplished
in two and a half years. On that occasion the presi-
dent of the Soviet Oil Trust announced "our daily
production now has reached 58,000 tons, compared
with an estimate of 57,000 tons for the conclusion of
the Five-Year Plan in 1933. "
Here in Savona this new Soviet plant will hold
about one-tenth of all the petroleum Italy imports
in a year, but it would lack 8,000 tons of holding
even one day's production of the Soviet Oil Trust.
Second oil producing country in the world, now
having leaped ahead of Venezuela and only behind
--though, of course, far behind--America, the So-
viet Union plans to produce this year 27,500,000
tons as compared with the original estimate of 20,-
800,000 tons for 1933, and has shoved its production
goal for 1933 ahead to 46,000,000 tons. The United
States produced 137,000,000 tons in 1929. If Amer-
ican production under restrictive measures remains
about static, and if the Soviet Union carries out the
Five-Year Plan for oil in the future as it has done in
the past, the Soviet Union by 1933 will have nearly
one-third of the production of the United States.
These are considerations that are bringing wrin-
kles to the brows of representatives of foreign oil
companies in Italy, as well, it may be said, as almost
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 27
everywhere else in the world. "The Five-Year Plan
for oil," remarked one American oil man in a neigh-
boring country, "is a catastrophe for us. "
Why the sober-minded representative of one of the
most realistic business organizations on earth should
feel justified in using such strong language may per-
haps be understood by consideration of the oil situ-
ation in Italy.
Until Russian oil re-entered the field, Standard
and Shell divided between themselves the Italian mar-
ket, Russian production had sunk from the pre-war
figure of 8,000,000 tons to 5,000,000 in 1924 and
the field was clear for the Americans and British.
It took until 1926 for the Soviet Oil Trust to re-
cover lost ground and reach approximately pre-war
production. There had been some Russian oil coming
into Italy, but not much until the formation about
this time of "Acienda Generale Italiana Petrolio,"
called "Agip" for short, which under Italian Govern-
ment control took over on contract all Soviet oil for
Italy and in a short time was disposing of 25 per
cent of all the petroleum and petroleum products
consumed in this country. Soviet imports of fuel
oil alone into Italy rose from 102,000 tons out of
a total import of 420,000 tons in 1928 to 264,000
tons out of a total of 705,000 tons in 1930. In crude
oil Soviet imports reached one-third of the total by
1930 and in benzine Soviet imports were one-fifth
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?
28 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
of the total in 1930, compared to one-eighth in 1928.
Shell and Standard were hit but could do nothing
effective, for "Agip," an Italian Government cor-
poration, was selling the Russian oil and if any
charge of "dumping" was to be made, it would have
to be a charge of Italian, not Russian, dumping.
"Agip's" contracts with the Russians were an in-
teresting example of Soviet price practice. They pro-
vided for the sale of oil products f. o. b. Batum or
Novorossisk at a base price always a bit below that
of similar American products f. o. b. Gulf ports. With
this initial advantage, the Italian purchaser then
had the advantage of difference in transport costs
between Gulf-Italy and Black Sea-Italy, a difference
that sometimes mounted as high as thirty-five shil-
lings per ton, although it is now four shillings per
ton.
Even with this diminution in transport price dif-
ference, the net advantage of Soviet over American
and other foreign oil in Italy is very considerable.
It enables the "Agip" to sell Russian gasoline at
from three-quarters to one and one-half cents per
gallon less than the Americans' price, or about 18 to
20 per cent lower at the present market.
On bunkering oil the resale price of Russian
Mazout here is 35 shillings per ton, against 45 to 50
for American fuel oil, but no American fuel oil is
now being offered in face of this competition.
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 29
All this is not well and not good for the other
foreign oil companies operating in Italy, but until
now they have been able at least to keep a good
share of the market and have not suffered fatally.
What they now fear, however, is that the Italian
Government intends to permit the Russians to open
their own direct selling agency. The Savona plant
seems to them clear proof that this is the Govern-
ment's intention, for the Savona plant has been
built by and belongs directly to the Soviet Govern-
ment. Somewhere on the books of the Five-Year
Planners, among countless items of Russian fac-
tories, is one item, "Savona plant. "
Hitherto, other foreign oil companies have felt
Soviet competition only through the Italian Govern-
ment agency. "Agip" has been able to sell Russian
oil under the market and thus to cause discomfort to
foreign competitors, but there was a limit to "Agip's
price-cutting capacity. It could never go below the
price it had paid the Russians. Now foreign com-
panies fear that if the Russians are permitted to
open their own importing and distributing agencies
the specter of real Russian "dumping" will be upon
them, for the Russians, independent of intermedi-
aries, may fix what price they please. This is why
Savona is an unpleasant spot for foreign oil men in
Italy.
Behind this fear is the apprehension that the
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? 30 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
Italian Government may be planning to give the
Soviet Union a virtual monopoly on the importation
of fuel and crude oil. The Italian navy uses large
quantities of Soviet fuel oil now and from year to
year is progressively using more.
American and other foreign oil men are looking
at Italo-Russian rapprochement anxiously, but not
more anxiously than the French Government. De-
spite Italian protestations that there is nothing
political in the economic cooperation of Rome with
Moscow, the French worriedly check off: Soviet oil
to Italian navy, Italian ships and Italian airplanes
to the Soviets, to mention only items of immediate
wartime significance. Oil men and Frenchmen have
their own special interests in Italo-Soviet relations.
For the world at large the important conclusion is
that Italian Fascism has, for business and political
reasons, joined hands with Russian Communism.
Six years ago I attended the trial in Moscow of
three students, two German youths, one Esthonian,
charged with entering the country for the purpose
of attempting to assassinate Stalin and Trotzky.
Attorney General Nicholas Krylenko, who had
charged the defendants with being members of a
Fascist organization, wound up his address to the
court with the flaming sentence, "Bayonets and ma-
chine guns are our welcome to Fascists who come
to the Soviet Union. " Upon the conclusion of the new
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 31
Italo-Soviet trade agreement, the Soviet Government
invited a group of Italian industrialists to follow
the example of the German business tourists and
come to Moscow as guests. The invitation has been
accepted.
From the Italian side one is bound to admit the
cogency of the comment made by the Fascist organ,
"Lavoro Fascista," upon the conclusion of the Italo-
Soviet trade agreement, "It is true we are aiding in a
way the execution of the Five-Year Plan, which in-
tends to put Russia in a state of complete economic
independence. But are not there quite a few demo-
cratic countries which have not refused to have com-
mercial relations with the Soviet Union? "
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? CHAPTER IV
Genoa:
"Red Trade Menace? "
"Please give us more of it. "
This is the attitude of Italians in Italy today.
For it is not the Italians, but Americans, Canadians,
British, Argentinians, Swedes, Finns, Jugoslavians,
Rumanians,--in fact, all exporters of countries sup-
plying the great staples, grain, oil, lumber and coal
who are suffering from Soviet competition in Italy.
Soviet prices are the chief object of criticism on
the part of Soviet competitors. As a general rule, the
complainant charges broadly that the Soviets for
other than economic reasons are "dumping" to "ruin
the market," "upset trade," "cause unrest. " A sub-
jective examination of Soviet intentions at present
is just as impossible as a certain forecast of what
they may do in the future, but an objective examina-
tion of the actual comparative prices of Soviet and
other goods, at least in Italy, does not bear out this
particular description of Soviet export policy.
Summarily, this examination shows that Soviet ex-
port policy just now, is designed first and last to
get the business and that Soviet prices are, as a rule,
just low enough--but always low enough--to get the
32
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 33
business and not, if the Soviets can help it, any
lower. On a commodity market, where business is
done on exchanges, as in the grain market, Soviet
prices are just a shade below their competitors. On
a market where the Soviets must compete with power-
ful foreign trusts, as in oil, the Soviets cut fairly
heavily, because only fairly heavy cuts may not be
equaled by countercuts from competing trusts. On a
market where the Soviets are new, where they must
"muscle in," they do so ruthlessly with slashing re-
ductions, as in the lumber market here.
This market presents a classical example of Soviet
methods of conquering a new field. Italy is a large
user of plywood and the Russians in the last two
years have developed an extraordinary production
of that commodity, admitted even by competitors to
be of first-class quality. They only began this spring
to campaign for the Italian market seriously. It was
necessary to make the campaign a determined one,
since the Baltic countries, Jugoslavia and Rumania,
had for years enjoyed a firm and, as they believed,
unshakable position in the Italian trade. A few quota-
tions will show just how determined the Russian
campaign was and how shakable the old-established
purveyors proved to be.
A leading lumber broker supplied the informa-
tion. On grade BB plywood the Russians quote a
price about 30 per cent under the Finnish price on
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? 34 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
similar material, and, surprisingly enough, deliver
grade B plywood, one grade better. Buyers here
now have become accustomed to this practice and are
sure that when they order from the Russians BB
quality they will get B quality. Such competition, not
only on price but on quality, makes Russian plywood
almost irresistibly attractive to brokers, even though
they may wish to remain loyal to their old sources.
Prices are illustrative. On BB plywood the Rus-
sians quote from $32 to $38. 80 per cubic meter
against Baltic countries' quotations of from $44. 37
to $53. 35. On B grade plywood the Russians quote
$37. 31 to $43. 65 per cubic meter against Baltic
quotations on similar material to $61. 56 to $69. 10.
In addition to these price differences of 30 or more
per cent, the Russian prices carry a flat discount of
4 per cent, plus 3 per cent cash discount, while Bal-
tic prices are net. Taking quality and price differ-
ences into consideration, the Russians, it may be esti-
mated, offer a 50 per cent advantage on plywood.
All prices given are c. i. f. Italian ports.
Other plywood exporters complain that as soon as
they reduce their prices, down go the Russian prices
still lower. Under these circumstances, lumber deal-
ers in Genoa and Baltic, Finnish Rumanian and
Jugoslavian exporters are convinced that the Soviets
soon will control completely the Italian plywood
market. It is reported that Soviet exports of ply-
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 35
wood into Italy will reach 24,000 cubic meters this
year, while Italy's entire consumption last year was
only 25,000 cubic meters. At the present moment,
however, the market is stagnant, for consumer brok-
ers are reluctant to buy, uncertain whether the Rus-
sians have touched rock bottom with their prices.
Lumber brokers, and these are the only Italian
merchants I found dissatisfied over Soviet trade, are
not cheerful over their cheap plywood because many
of them were caught with supplies or contracts for
supplies with the Soviet's competitors, and the ply-
wood market having slumped so heavily considerable
sums of money must be lost before the market is
readjusted.
As concerns the United States, there is no Amer-
ican plywood competing on the Italian market, but
there is a tendency here to substitute cheap Russian
white pine where before American long leaf yellow
pine or Swedish redwood had been used. For doors
and window sashes, the Russian product at the usual
price advantage is being accorded preference.
In all Russian exports it is not so much the ab-
solute figures that are meaningful but the direction
and rate of change. The Soviets are just beginning
to develop their anthracite industry. It is not today
a serious competitor in the Italian market. But
whereas in 1928 the Soviet Union sent 66,000 tons
of anthracite to Italy, or six-tenths of one per cent
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? 36 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
of Italy's total imports, Soviet anthracite exports to
Italy in 1930 were nearly 300,000 tons, or about two
and five-tenths per cent of a total of 12,000,000 tons
imported.
The United States only exported 366,000 tons of
anthracite to Italy in 1930 and it is anticipated that
this year the Soviet anthracite will pass the American
product. Neither the Soviet Union nor America are
yet important factors in the Italian anthracite
market, as Great Britain supplies 60 per cent of the
total imports and Germany 30. Important, however,
is the declaration of Italian anthracite dealers that
they are prepared to take all the anthracite the Soviet
Union has to offer, declaring it is of superior quality
and cheaper. This "most backward" sector of the
Soviet's Five-Year Plan is suffering difficulties but
produced last year 17 per cent more than the year
before.
Much more important for the United States is
Russian competition in wheat here. The wheat market
presents a quite different picture from that, for ex-
ample, of the plywood market. It only takes a shade
to get the business on the grain market, but that
shade will usually get it. The Soviets have cut the
shade regularly. Their share of the Italian grain
market is growing steadily, although it is difficult
to speak of a steady line of development in grain
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 87
exports of a country that, according to the London
"Grain Seed and Oil Reporter," exported 37,736,-
000 bushels in 1927; 8,000 bushels in 1928; 7,088,-
000 bushels in 1929; and already in the period of
this season from August 1, 1930, to April 2, 1931,
had exported 89,880,000 bushels.
The general expectation that the Soviets would
resume grain shipments this spring has been ful-
filled. Their shipments in January had fallen to
1,536,000 bushels. In February Soviet shipments
picked up to 5,800,000 bushels and in March to
6,800,000 bushels.
How large a part of Italy's wheat needs have been
met by these spring shipments of Soviet wheat is
indicated by "Bulletin of Arrivals" published in
Genoa, showing that out of a total of 1,980,000
bushels of wheat arriving in Italy in January, 759,-
000 were from the Soviet Union, while in February
out of a total of 3,234,000 bushels, 1,518,000 were
from the Soviet Union and in March out of 7,689,000
bushels, 2,156,000 were Russian.
It is most interesting to observe on the general
question of Russian wheat how its role in the world
market varies from month to month. In August,
1930, Soviet shipments of wheat were ten per cent of
world shipments; in September they were 11 per
cent, in October thirty-seven: November, thirty-
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? 38 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
eight; December, twenty-one; January, 1931, two
per cent; February, nine per cent, March, ten per
cent.
It was in October and November when the Soviet
Union was pouring on the market more than one-
third of the total world wheat supply that cries of
pain were loudest from the other wheat-producing
countries. The injuries inflicted during those two
months have not been forgotten and the wheat world
is looking anxiously toward the Black Sea.
This anxiety is explicable on the part of Amer-
ican wheat exporters, for to consider the Italian
market alone it would appear from the Italian Gov-
ernment's figures on wheat imports that in the calen-
dar year 1930 the Soviet Union took away from the
United States a quite perceptible share of the Ital-
ian wheat business. Italy bought a total of 6,600,000
bushels more wheat in 1930 than she did in 1929, yet
the United States, that sold Italy 13,827,000 bushels
in 1929, sold her only 11,385,000 in 1930, although
American supplies in 1930 were the largest in his-
tory, while the Soviet Union, that sold no wheat to
Italy in 1929, sold her 9,900,000 bushels in 1930.
American sales of wheat to Italy fell off 2,442,000
bushels in 1930, while Soviet sales increased by the
total amount of her sales--nearly 10,000,000 bushels.
Most of last year's Soviet wheat, however, re-
placed that of the Argentine, whose sales to Italy
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? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 39
declined 8,000,000 bushels from 14,421,000 in 1929
to 5,511,000 in 1930. These figures shed some light
on the bitter complaints of the Argentine repre-
sentative at the world wheat conference in Rome
over Soviet competition.
Grain dealers handling Soviet wheat here assert
it is only reasonable that Italy should buy from the
Soviet Union; that the shorter haul from the Black
Sea to Mediterranean ports makes it naturally
cheaper than American, Argentine or Manitoba
wheat. They say that the high gluten content of
Russian hard wheat is particularly desirable for
macaroni and that this quality of Russian grain is
just as good as the more expensive Manitoba and
American hards.
Italy is the third largest wheat-importing country.
Her average yearly import is from 60,000,000 to 90,-
000,000 bushels. Despite the most determined efforts
of the Italian Government to develop its home sup-
ply, the "battle of wheat" appears to have been
stale-mated at the 1929 domestic production of 260,-
000,000 bushels, the top limit ever reached, 32,000,-
000 more than the previous year, itself a record.
In 1930, the Italian crop was 216,000,000 bushels,
34,000,000 less than the 1929 high. In 1929 the
best year, Italy, nevertheless, had to import 63,000,-
000 bushels. This would appear to be her minimum
requirement from abroad, enough to make the Ital-
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