10 This discourse implied that departures from tradi-
tion were permissible, provided they were based on reason, and faith in the power of reason helped created a new faith in politics and its unlimited ca- pacity for action.
tion were permissible, provided they were based on reason, and faith in the power of reason helped created a new faith in politics and its unlimited ca- pacity for action.
Revolution and War_nodrm
60 If each side's hopes and fears were accurate, the struggle between them would be a swift and decisive triumph for one side or the other.
But instead of a wave of revolutionary upheavals or the swift collapse of the new regime, the normal result is either a brief, inconclusive clash (such as the Al- lied intervention in Russia or the Bay of Pigs invasion) or a protracted, bloody struggle (such as the Iran-Iraq war or the contra war in Nicaragua).
The final irony, therefore, is that each side's perceptions of threats and vul- nerabilities are usually mistaken.
Why are revolutions hard to export, and why do foreign interventions fail? First, the universalist ideological rhetoric notwithstanding, a revolution
60 Examples of successful counterrevolutions include the Austro-Prussian intervention in Belgium in 1790, the Russian and Austrian interventions in Italy and Greece in the 1830s, the U. S. -backed coups in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, the U. S. invasion of Grenada in 1983- and the Vietnamese overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1979. With the exception of Cambodia, however, none of these regimes carne to power through a prolonged revolution- ary struggle, and none attempted (let alone accomplished) a thorough social transformation. Moreover, these are all cases where the intervening powers were overwhelmingly larger and stronger than the governments they overthrew.
? ? ? Revolution and War
is, above all, a national phenomenon. A campaign to export a revolution to other countries will immediately bring it into conflict with the national loy- alties of the intended recipients. And the principle that people who conceive of themselves as a nation are entitled to their own independent state has proven to be a far more powerful social force in modem history than any notion of universal revolutionary solidarity. 61 Foreign populations are likely to view efforts to export the revolution as unwarranted acts of aggression, in tum making it easier for the ruling elites to resist the revolutionary forces. Even if conditions in other countries resemble those that produced one rev-
olution in a general way, the special circumstances that enabled that one revolution to succeed are unlikely to exist elsewhere. Even if social unrest does transcend national boundaries and the success of one movement does inspire like-minded individuals abroad, actually causing a revolution to occur in a foreign country is another matter altogether.
Second, until a revolution actually occurs, other states may not have taken the possibility seriously, but once the danger is demonstrated, poten- tial victims will take steps to avoid a similar fate (for example, through de-
. fensive alliances, internal reforms, or more extensive repression). Thus, the Cuban Revolution inspired the U. S. "Alliance for Progress" in Latin Amer- ica (intended to forestall additional "Cubas" by promoting economic and political development) and encouraged Latin American oligarchies to sup- press their domestic opponents more vigorously. Again, the point is not that revolutions pose no danger, but rather that other states can usually take a number of steps to contain the threat.
Efforts to support a counterrevolution fail for somewhat different reasons.
Revolutionary leaders are usually dedicated, highly motivated individuals who have been successful precisely because they are good at organizing support in the face of impressive obstacles. They are likely to be formidable adversaries, because the same skills will aid their efforts to mobilize the na- tion for war. 62 Foreign interventions also fail, because they provide the do- mestic legitimacy that a revolutionary regime needs: the same nationalist convictions that prevent a revolution from adapting smoothly to other states will also complicate foreign intervention against a revolutionary regime. And there is an inherent paradox in trying to use exiles as the core of the counterrevolutionary movement: if these groups require extensive foreign assistance in order to challenge the new regime, their ability to com- mand indigenous support is probably limited and their prospects for suc- cess comparatively low.
? 61 See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, t9f! J), 1-7; and Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cam- ? ridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9-12.
62 Skocpol, "Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization. "
? ? A Theory of Revolution and War
To summarize: the pressure for war produced by a revolution results from two parallel myths: the belief that the revolution will spread rapidly if it is not "strangled in its crib," and the belief that such a reversal will be easy to accomplish. Among other things, this argument implies that war would be most likely when the revolutionary state espouses a universalist ideology, because such ideologies can easily be regarded as a potent (though unmeasurable) source of threat by other states. Contrary to these expectations, however, the normal result is neither a swift tide of revolu- tionary contagion nor the quick and easy ouster of the new regime. In- stead, the more frequent result is a prolonged struggle between the unexpectedly resilient revolutionary regime and its surprisingly impervi- ous opponents.
The explanation outlined in this chapter may also provide a more com- plete explanation of why revolutionary states tend to alter their behavior over time. Many of the problems caused by a revolution arise from mis- judging the balance of power, the intentions of others, and the probability of contagion or counterrevolution. From this perspective, "socialization" is simply the process by which both sides acquire greater information about each of these factors. As evidence accumulates, the uncertainty that permits exaggerated perceptions of threat to flourish declines proportion- ately. Even if the new regime does not abandon its ultimate objectives, it is likely to modify its short-term behavior in accordance with this new in-
formation. Relations between the revolutionary states and the rest of the system will become increasingly "normal," assuming, of course, that each side is capable of evaluating and revising its policies in light of experi- ence. 63
Two caveats should be noted at this point. First, because elite revolutions feature less extreme ideological visions and exert less dramatic internal ef- fects than mass revolutions, they will have less effect on the balance of threats, and so the risk of war will be lower than it is after a mass revolution. Second, the level of conflict will be greatest when the revolution creates a new state whose characteristics and ideological foundations depart sharply from the domestic orders of the other great powers. By contrast, if a revolu- tion brings a state into conformity with prevailing sociopolitical forms, then the new regime will be seen as less hostile and the danger of contagion may be slim to nonexistent. One cannot understand the international impact of a revolution by looking solely at the revolutionary state; one must also con-
sider the external environment in which the revolution occurred.
63 David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International So- ciety (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), esp. 302-304. For a useful survey of the literature on how states learn, see Jack Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Mine- field," International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994).
? ? Revolution and War
TESTING THE THEORY
As shown in figure 1, the theory outlined above identifies several inde- pendent, mutually reinforcing mechanisms linking revolution and war. It predicts that revolutions will lead to sharper security competition between states and increase the probability of war. Indeed, the theory suggests that strong pressures for war will be present even when other factors intervene to prevent it.
In each of the case studies that follow, I explore whether the different mechanisms identified in this chapter were present and, if so, whether they had the predicted effects. In general, the theory can be considered sup- ported if, first, the revolution was followed by increased security competi- tion or war; second, conflict and war occurred for the reasons identified in the theory; third, one or more of the causal mechanisms identified in the theory was absent or muted and war did not occur; fourth, the predicted pressures for war were present but other factors intervened to prevent it; and fifth, these effects would have been unlikely to occur had the revolution not taken place.
More specifically, the theory is supported either if other states saw the rev- olution as altering the balance of power, and sought to take advantage of this window of opportunity, or if they were inclined to use force in order to pre- vent other states from doing the same thing. By contrast, if other states did not view the revolution as a potential opportunity (owing to a perceived shift in the balance of power), that would count against this part of the theory.
? ? ? Figure 1.
Revolution
Effects on the Revolutionary State
Change in preferences
Perceptions of external environment shaped by revolutionary ideology (Other states are hostile; victory is inevitable; the revolution has universal relevance)
Increased uncertainty and misinformation
Effects on Relations between States
Spirals of suspicion
Perceptions of offensive advantage
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? A Theory ofRevolution and War
The theory is also supported if the new regime and other states consis- tently exaggerated each other's hostility, especially if these spirals reflected ideological predispositions. The occurrence of a serious dispute does not necessarily mean that a spiral of suspicion occurred; rather, one or both sides must have also misinterpreted the other's actions and exaggerated its hostility. 64 The theory gains further credence if these errors were fueled by uncertainty or problems of communication arising from the revolution, or by the transnational activities of counterrevolutionary exiles or revolution-
ary sympathizers. Again, this element of the theory is undermined if the revolution in question caused little change in either side's perceptions of in- tent or if a subsequent dispute was based solely on a legitimate clash of in- terest that both sides evaluated more or less accurately.
Evidence that the possible spread of revolution (or counterrevolution) magnified each side's perceptions of insecurity or overconfidence supports the theory, especially if these beliefs were central to the decision for war. By contrast, the theory loses credibility if war occurred when the possibility of exporting the revolution was either absent or dismissed, or if both sides be- lieved that the revolution was likely to spread but were able to establish good relations nonetheless.
The theory I have set forth in this chapter explains why revolutions in- tensify security competition between states and increase the probability of war. I do not mean to imply that revolutions are a unique cause of war or that the dynamics that link revolutions and international conflict do not apply in other situations. However, I do regard revolutions as an especially powerful source of these dangers and consider war to be very likely in the aftermath of a successful revolution. In other words, a revolution is a suffi- cient but not necessary cause of security competition and war. The question is whether the effects of major revolutions support this general argument. To provide an answer, I begin by examining the international consequences of the French Revolution.
64 Itcanalsobedifficulttodetermineifstatementsindicatingsuspicionorhostilityareev- idence of genuine fears or merely propapanda intended for other purposes. Even if it is pro- paganda, it is unlikely to be effective when there is not some basis for it, and such campaigns can take on a life of their own if elites begin to believe their own rhetoric or become trapped by public opinion.
? ? ? ? The French Revolution
"Not until statesmen had at last grasped the nature of the forces that had emerged in France and had grasped that new political conditions now obtained in Europe, could they foresee the broad effects alJ this would have on war. "
-Carl von Clausewitz
In this chapter I explore relations between revolutionary France and the other European powers from 1789 to 1799, with particular emphasis on the wars of the First and Second Coalitions. The period illustrates the link be- tween revolution and war in an especially vivid way and provides strong support for the arguments advanced in the previous chapter.
First, as balance-of-threat theory would suggest, the French Revolution made war more likely by altering the balance of power. France's apparenR weakness invited other states to seek gains either at French expense or in other areas, because they believed France could not oppose them effectively. Although neither Prussia nor Austria was strongly committed to over- throwing the new French leaders, the two states' desire to exploit the power vacuum created by the revolution helped place them both on a collision course with the new regime.
Second, the drive to war was fueled by the effects of the revolution on each state's intentions and by the ways that these intentions were perceived! by others. The revolution altered French foreign policy objectives (both for ideological reasons and because competing factions within France used for- eign policy to challenge their internal opponents), and it also distorted other states' perceptions of French intentions in especially dangerous ways.
Third, these fears were exacerbated by each side's belief that its oppo- nents might be able to impose their will with relatively little effort, either through subversion, propaganda, or a rapid military campaign. French leaders were preoccupied with the danger of counterrevolution-based on suspicions of treason, rumors of aristocratic plots, and the possibility of for- eign interference-while foreign leaders came to worry that the revolution in France would spread to their own societies. As we shall see, both sides'
? ? ? The French Revolution
fears were overstated: the French were able to spread their revolution only through direct military conquest, and foreign efforts to reverse the revolu- tion in France were never very effective. Nonetheless, each side's belief in its own vulnerability intensifed its perceptions of threat and encouraged efforts to eliminate the danger before it became irresistible. Instead of the swift and bloodless victories that both sides anticipated, however, the result of these
decisions was a quarter-century of recurring warfare.
And fourth, these problems were exacerbated by the poor information available to national leaders. Throughout this period, political leaders re- peatedly miscalculated the balance of power, misread each other's inten- tions, and exaggerated the prospects for revolution and counterrevolution. Such problems are hardly unusual in international politics, but the revolu- tion aggravated them by severing the normal channels of information be- tween governments, by encouraging a variety of unofficial representatives (such as the French emigres) to purvey a host of self-serving myths, and by forcing statesmen to base policy decisions on estimates of probabilities that were inherently unknowable (such as the revolutionary potential of a given society ) .
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first describes the origins and ideological foundations of the revolution and the causes of the war of 1792. In the second I examine the expansion of the war in 1793 and the subse- quent struggle between France and the First Coalition. I tum in the third part to the War of the Second Coalition. Finally I consider the arguments ad- vanced in chapter 2 in light of these events.
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF 1792
Avant le Deluge: France and Europe under the Old Regime
French prestige and influence declined steadily after 1750, a trend under- scored by its defeat in the Seven Years War (175? 3), its paralysis during the Polish succession of 1764 and the first partition of Poland in 1772, and the various reverses suffered by its Swedish and Ottoman allies. An appar- ent French triumph in the War of American Independence proved to be a hollow victory, as it did little to damage England and contributed to the growing fiscal crisis in France.
England was France's traditional rival, owing to a combination of geo- graphic proximity, colonial competition, and conflicting security interests. An attempt to improve relations through a commercial treaty in 1785 failed to overcome English suspicions, and the growth of French influence in the Low Countries (culminating in the Franco-Dutch alliance of 1785) eventu- ally led England and Prussia to invade Holland in 1787. The invaders
? ? Revolution and War
ousted the pro-French Patriot Party and restored the pro-English Stad- holder, William of Orange, in yet another demonstration of French impo- tence. 1
Austria amd France had been formally allied since 1756, but the tie was in- creasingly seen as a burden by both countries. Yet it endured, because France wanted to keep Austria from allying itself with England, and Austria wanted to keep France away from Prussia. 2 France was also allied to Spain via the Family Compact of 1761, an agreement based on dynastic solidarity between the two Bourbon houses and mutual hostility to England. These as- sets did not outweigh France's many liabilities, however, and France's in- ternational position on the eve of the revolution was not auspicious. 3
Conflicts among the other great powers, endemic in this period, would play an important role in shaping foreign responses to events in France. Austria and Prussia had been rivals since the 1740s, with each one primar- ily concerned with enhancing its position at the expense of the other. Em- peror Joseph II of Austria also hoped to exchange his Belgian possessions for Bavaria (thereby ridding himself of some unruly subjects and consoli- dating Austria's position in Central Europe), but his efforts to do so were re- peatedly thwarted by foreign opposition. Austria did manage to isolate Prussia by allying with Russia in 1781, but Joseph was eventually forced to enter the Russo-Turkish war in 1788 in order to maintain the connection and
to prevent Russia from monopolizing the fruits of victory. The Hapsburgs also faced considerable internal unrest during this period (partly a reaction to Joseph's reform program), including a conservative revolt in the Nether- lands in 1789. 4
Prussia's small size and relative weakness encouraged an expansionist foreign policy, and King Frederick William made several unsuccessful at-
1 On A n g l o - F re n c h r e l a t i o n s p r i o r t o t h e r e v o l u t i o n , se e T . C . W . B l a n n i n g , T h e O r i g i n s of t h e French Revolutionary Wars (New York: Longman, 1986), 45-51; M. S. Anderson, "European Diplpmatic History," in New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 8: The American and French Revo- lutions, 1763-93, ed. Albert Goodwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 267-68; and J. H. Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," in Cambridge History ofBritish Foreign Policy, ed. A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (New York: Macmillan, 1922), 1:159-70. The Patriot revolt in Holland is described by Simon Schama, Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 178o-1813 (New York: Random House, 1977), chap. 3; and Alfred Cobban, Ambassadors and Secret Agents: The Diplomacy of the First Earl of Malmesbury at the Hague (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954).
2 See Blannlng, French Revolutionary Wars, 4o-45; J. H. Clapham, The Causes ofthe War of 1792 (1892; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1969), 5-8; and Paul W. Schroeder, The Trans-
fo r m a t i o n of E u r o p ? a n P o l i t i c s , 1 7 6 3 - 1 8 4 8 ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1 9 9 4 ) , 4 2 - 4 3 .
3 See Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815 (New York:
Longman, 1983), 215-16.
.
4 On the Belgium-Bavaria exchange, see Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 26-35. On Joseph's reforms and the Belgian revolt, see Robert R. Palmer, The Age of the Demo- cratic Revolution: A Political History ofEurope and America, 1760-1800, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 1964), 1:341-57, 374-83.
? ? The French Revolution
tempts to acquire additional territory; Prussia was allied with England and Holland, but the alliance was strictly defensive and England refused to back most of Frederick William's diplomatic gambits, including his pro- posal for an attack on Austria in 1790. As events in France began to cast a shadow over the European system, Frederick William was already contem- plating several new ploys for territorial aggrandizement, ranging from an alliance with France to an attack upon France or an additional partition of Poland. 5
Relations among the great powers were complicated further by the growth of Russian power and the unstable situation in Poland. Catherine II had used the Austro-Prussian rivalry to win concessions from both, while seizing territory from the Ottoman Empire and establishing de facto control of Poland after the first partition in 1772. When Russia was distracted by the war with Turkey and an opportunistic invasion by Sweden in 1788, a group of Polish reformers convened a new Diet and proclaimed a new constitu- tion. Although the effort temporarily succeeded, it was only a matter of time before Catherine would attempt to reassert Russian primacy. 6
Thus the European system was in a state of considerable fluidity when the revolution in France began. France was formally allied with Austria and Spain (though the relationship with Austria was strained) and openly hos- tile to England. England was equally suspicious of France, formally allied to Prussia and Holland, and wary of Russia. Austria was allied with France and Russia and bogged down in a war against the Ottoman Empire while keeping a watchful eye on Prussia. Both Austria and Prussia were interested in territorial revisions, and the internal turmoil in Poland and the Low
Countries added to the endemic instability of the system.
Ideological Underpinnings
Identifying the ideological roots of the French Revolution is especially challenging because none of the leading participants began with a blueprint for the future political order that was well thought out? Without being able to consult an explicit revolutionary program, therefore, students of the pe- riod must try to identify the central ideas that informed political debate and drove political action, while recognizing that this vocabulary shifted in re-
5 See Robert Howard Lord, The Second Partition of Poland: A Study in Diplomatic History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915), 75-82; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 51-55; and Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 190-97?
6 See Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 1:422-29; Lord, Second Partition, chaps. 1, 5-{i,
7 As the Jacobin Camille Desmoulins later recalled: "In all France there were not ten of us who were republicans prior to 1789. " Quoted in Henri Peyre, "The Influence of Eighteenth Century Ideas on the French Revolution," in his Historical and Critical Essays (Lincoln: Uni- versity of Nebraska Press, 1968), 72.
? ? Revolution and War
sponse to the revolutionary process itsel? . 8 The concepts that shaped the rev- olution were not fixed, but they did provide the intellectual arsenal that rival groups employed both to understand the events in which they were immersed and to rally support and discredit opposition. And while these ideological underpinnings did not determine the course or outcome of the revolution, they did form the elements from which it was built. 9
What are the main ideas that shaped the revolution in France? At the risk of oversimplifying, I have identified four interrelated themes in prerevolu- tionary political discourse that merit particular attention.
The first key theme was a commitment to reason and natural law, to- gether with the concomitant belief that political action could correct existing social ills. In addition to undermining support for the Church, the notion that human affairs could be ordered according to the dictates of reason was a potent solvent to a conception of society based on privileged orders and monarchical authority.
10 This discourse implied that departures from tradi-
tion were permissible, provided they were based on reason, and faith in the power of reason helped created a new faith in politics and its unlimited ca- pacity for action. 11
A second theme was a broad ideological assault on the legitimacy of the absolutist state. This discourse contained several distinct but mutually rein- forcing strands: one focusing on "justice" (defined as restraint on monarchi- cal will}, another extolling liberty and equality and attacking the institutions of aristocratic privilege, and a third challenging the image of the king as
8 This war of ideas took place in a society that was experiencing an explosion in publishing. making it possible to disseminate contending opinions more rapidly and widely than ever be- fore. See Robert Damton and Daniel Roche, eds. , Revolution in Print: The Press in France, 1775-1800(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress, 1989);JeremyPopkin,RevolutionaryNews: The Press in France 1 789-1799 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and Colin Jones, ed. , The Longman Companion to the French Revolution (New York: Longman, 1988), 26o-62.
9 "The ideology embraced by the National Assembly . . . was . . . less a blueprint than a set of architectural principles that could be applied to the construction of quite different so- ciopolitical orders. " William Sewell, "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case," Journal ofModern History 57, no. 1 (1985), 71. See also Daniel Momet, Les Ori- gines intellectuelles de Ia revolutionfran? aise (1715-1787) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1933), esp. 477; Peyre, "Influence of Eighteenth Century Ideas"; and Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolu tion, trans. L. G. Cochrane (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989). :
10 "The Enlightenment insisted on the universal applicability of reason to human affairs It had scorn for all privilege no matter how ancient or venerable. " Sewell, "Ideologies and So- cial Revolutions," 65.
11 Fran. ;ois Furet argues that "the very bedrock of revolutionary consciousness" is the be- lief that "there is no human misfortune not amenable to a political solution. " Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 25. As products of the En! ightenment, the revolutionaries "believed in the absolute efficacy of politics-which they thought capable of recasting the body social and regenerating the indi- vidual. " Bronislaw Baczko, "Enlightenment," in A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, ed. Fran. ;ois Furet and Mona Ozouf, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 1989), 662-64; and see Chartier, Cultural Origins, 198.
? ? ? ? The French Revolution
God's chosen representative. If not revolutionary by themselves, each of these strands nourished doubts about the existing order and cleared the way for a fundamental change. 12
Third, the wide-ranging challenge to absolutism featured a continuing debate on the nature of the political community. Over time, the image of France as the personal possession of a sovereign king was supplanted by the idea that sovereignty was held by a single people united by language, terri- tory, blood, and other "natural" characteristics. This transformation from subjects to citizens was already evident in 1788, when Abbe Sieyes declared that the Third Estate was "everything appertaining to the nation. "13 The rev- olution completed this process by replacing an abstract notion of the king as the sovereign authority with a concept of "popular sovereignty" in which the nation was the embodiment of the "general will. "14
Finally, under the influence of Rousseau, Montesquieu, and others, the ideological foundations of the French Revolution also contained a powerful moral dimension, centered on the concept of virtue. The importance at- tached to virtue helped discredit the old regime (which was seen as corrupt) and legitimated efforts to inculcate proper conduct as part of creating a new political order. Abelief in reason and in the limitless possibilities of politics also implied that "human action no longer encounters obstacles or limits, only adversaries, preferably traitors. "15 This tendency reached its peak dur- ing the Reign of Terror, when the Jacobins used the machinery of the state to promote virtue among the citizens, while seeking to eliminate any individ- uals whose opposition to the general will exposed their evil natures. 16
12 See Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), esp. 25-27; Jeffrey Merrick, The Desacralization of the French Monarchy in the Eighteenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990); and Robert Damton, The Literary Underground of the Old Regime (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
13 Sieyes added that "the Nation is prior to everything, it is the source of everything. . . . Its will is always the supreme law. " His attack on privilege placed these orders outside the polit- ical community; illl his words, "the nobility does not belong to the social organization at all. . . . whatever is not off the third estate may not be regarded as belonging to the nation. What is the third estate? Everything! " Joseph Emmanuel Sieyes, "What Is the Third Estate? " in A Docu- mentary Survey ofthe French Revolution, ed. John Hall Stewart (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 44?
14 According to Leah Greenfeld, "the Nation replaced the king as the source of identity and focus of social solidarity, as previously the king had replaced God. " Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. 16<Hi8. See also Alfred Cobban, "The Enlightenment and the French Revolution," in his Aspects ofthe French Revolution (New York: George Braziller, 1968), 25.
15 Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, 26.
16 See Carol Blum, Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue: The Language of Politics in the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), chaps. 8 and 10; and also Alfred Cobban, "The Fundamental Ideas of Robespierre," in his Aspects ofthe French Revolution; and Norman Hampson, Will and Circumstance: Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the French Revolution (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983).
? ? ? ? Revolution and War
These four broad and interrelated themes formed the worldview of the revolutionary vanguard in France? They set the terms and limits of debate throughout the revolutionary period and encouraged a number of specific attitudes and actions. 17 The appeal to reason and natural law contributed to the optimism that is essential for revolutionary action, and this attitude was strongly reinforced by the extraordinary events of 1789-91. The revolution- aries' own experience seemed to prove that society could be transformed ac- cording to the dictates of reason, and the possibilities for political and personal transformation were soon regarded as virtually limitless. This be- lief helped discredit the voices of moderation and encouraged the revolu- tionaries' faith that they could overcome any obstacle.
Like any ideology, the worldview of the French Revolution contained obvi- ous ambiguities and contradictions. On the one hand, faith in the preeminence of reason and the operation of universal laws encouraged the revolutionaries in France to view their achievements as a world-historical event whose prin- ciples were of universal validity. On the other hand, the simultaneous redefi- nition of the political community in terms of the French "nation" encouraged more self-interested and particularistic conceptions, a tendency reinforced by existing animosities (such as the rivalry with England).
Furthermore, the revolutionary process created a profound tension be- tween the explicit goal of liberty and the implicit principle of national unity. It replaced the authority of the king with the authority of "le peuple," and it linked popular sovereignty to equality and Rousseauist notions of the gen- eral will (l! "ather than placing it within a framework of individual rights and representative institutions). The revolution was supposed to free citizens from monarchical tyranny and arbitrary government authority, and create a nation consisting of a single body shorn of privileged orders. 18 In the absence of a theory of representation, however, these principles left France without a legitimate avenue for disagreement. Given the presumption of unity, the only outlet for opposition was conspiracy, which was also the most obvious explanation for any failure to achieve the revolution's lofty goals. Thus, any sign of dissent was a potential hazard to the unity of the nation, leaving rev- olutionary France peculiarly vulnerable to fears of plots and conspiracies. ? 9
Although the French Revolution was not the product of a self-conscious revolutionary movement originating under the ancien regime, its underly-
17 As Sewell puts it, ideologies "are at once constraining and enabling. They block certain possibilities, but they also create others. " "Ideologies and Social Revolutions," 6o.
? 18 As Furet points out, "the 'people' were defined by their aspirations, and as an indistinct aggregate of individual 'right' wills. By that expedient, which precluded representation, the revolutionary consciousness was able to reconstruct an imaginary social cohesion in tlhe name and on the basis of individual wills. " Interpreting the French Revolution, 27.
19 See Norman Hampson, Prelude to Terror: The Constituent Assembly and the Failure of Con-
sensus, 1789-1791 (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), esp. 106-107; and Furet, Interpreting the
French Revolution, 51-55.
.
? ? ? The French Revolution
ing principles resemble the ideal type set forth in chapter 2. The revolution- aries were confident of their ability to reshape politics, society, and even human nature itself, strongly inclined to consider their opponents inher- ently evil and deserving of extermination, and prone to uphold their own experience as a model for others. As we shall see, these views, which con- tinued to shape perceptions and political debate once the revolution was underway, had a powerful influence on relations between revolutionary France and the rest of Europe.
The Dismantling of the Ancien Regime and the Initial Foreign Response
The immediate cause of the French Revolution was the fiscal crisis trig- gered by French aid to the American colonies during their War of Indepen- dence, which broke the back of the archaic French tax system. 20 The nobility successfully resisted Louis XVI's efforts to impose new taxes in 1787, forcing the king to summon the Estates General for the first time since 1614. Under pressure from liberal nobles and provincial authorities, Louis and his min- isters agreed to double the size of the Third Estate (representing the com-
moners) in January 1789. They resisted demands to grant each deputy a single vote, however, in favor of the traditional practice of each order voting in unison. 21
The first decisive break came when the representatives of the three estates met at Versailles in May. After a month of futile debate over the voting pro- cedure, representatives of the Third Estate designated themselves a new Na- tional Assembly and invited members of the other orders to join. Louis reluctantly accepted this measure on June 23, but he also began assembling troops near the capital in preparation for a coup de main against the defiant deputies. Before he could launch his coup, however, the fear of an aristo- cratic reaction sparked a popular uprising in Paris and began to undermine the loyalty of the royal garrisons. Supporters of the Assembly had already begun to mobilize the Parisian population, and an angry mob stormed the
fortress of the Bastille on July 14. Informed that he could no longer count on his troops' allegiance, Louis agreed to disperse the regiments surrounding Paris and declared his support for the National Assembly on July 17. A new
20 See Doyle, Origins ofthe French Revolution, 43-53; Jean Egret, The French Pre-Revolution, 1787-88, trans. Wesley D. Camp, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); and John Fran- cis Bosher, French Finances, 177fr1795: From Business to Bureaucracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
21 The First Estate represented the clergy, the Second Estate the nobility, and the Third Es- tate everyone else. Representatives for each order were chosen through local elections, and the local assemblies drew up petitions of grievances (known as cahiers de do! eances) for con- sideration by the king and Estates General.
? ? Revolution and War
municipal government was formed in Paris, the Marquis de Lafayette be- came commander of the new National Guards, and the first wave of emi- gres departed, including the king's brothers, the comte d'Artois and comte de Provence. 22
The upheaval in Paris was accompanied by similar events in the provinces. The departure of the emigre aristocrats increased concerns about a reactionary conspiracy and helped spark the "Great Fear" that engulfed France from July 20 to August 4? Inspired by reports of armed brigands, food shortages, and aristocratic plots, rural mobs began burning chateaux, destroying manorial records, and seizing noble property. Provincial nota- bles began forming "permanent committees" to restore order, and these bodies began to supplant the municipal institutions of the ancien regime as royal authority waned. 23
Meanwhile, the deputies (now designated the National Constituent As- sembly) were launching a direct assault on the institutions of the ancien regime. The deputies voted to abolish the feudal order "in its entirety" on the night of August 4 and approved the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen on August 27. Over the next twenty-six months, the Assembly abolished noble and clerical privileges and reorganized the insti- tutions of local government and the judiciary. The deputies also voted to confiscate Church property in November 1789, banned religious orders in February 1790, and passed a new Civil Constitution of the Clergy that placed the church under the formal control of the state in July. Clerical op-
position to these measures prompted a further decree in November 1790 that required priests to swear an oath of allegience to the constitution or be removed from office. 24
Predictably, these steps provoked considerable opposition. The king re- fused to sanction the August decrees, and renewed fears of a royalist coup
22 On these events, see William Doyle, The Oxford History ofFrench Revolution (New York: Ox- ford University Press, 1988), 107-11; D. M. G. Sutherland, France 1789-1815: Re-ilolution and Counte-revr olution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 47-48, 59-68; George Rude, The Crowd in the French Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); and Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution, trans. Elizabeth M. Evanson (vol. 1) and John Hall Stewart and James Friguglietti (vol. 2) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 1964); 1:12o-24. On the dis- integration of the army, see Samuel F. Scott, The Response ofthe Royal Army to the French Revo- lution: The Role and Developmentofthe Line Army, 1787-1793 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 51-59; and Jean-Paul Bertaud, The Army ofthe French Revolution:from Citizen-Soldiers to Instru- ment ofPowe-r, trans. Robert R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 22-29.
23 TheclassicanalysisoftheGreatFearisGeorgesLefebvre,TheGreatFearof1789:Rural Panic in Revolutionary France, trans. Joan White (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). On the provincial revolts, see Lynn A. Hunt, "Committees and Communes: Local Politics and National Revolution in 1789,'' Comparative Studies in Society and History, 18, no. 3 (1976); and Sutherland, France, 70'-76.
24 For the texts of these decrees, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, chap. 2; for summaries, see Sutherland, France, 81HJ9; and Michel Vovelle, The Fall of the French Monarchy, 1 787-1792, trans. SusanBurke(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984),146-2-6 .
? ? The French Revolution
led an unruly mob to invade Versailles on October 5 and bring the royal family back to Paris, where the king's activities could be monitored more easily. The anticlerical measures angered many priests and parishioners, economic conditions worsened, and the emigre exodus continued. When the king's brothers began to solicit aid for a restoration from the other Euro- pean governments, the rumors of an "aristocratic conspiracy," once entirely a myth, began to acquire a real basis. 25
Over the next ten months, the debate over the constitution saw the emer- gence of several contending factions within the Assembly. These groups were not formal political parties but loose alignments of delegates who shared similar views on salient political issues. The largest faction was that of the moderates, which was eventually centered around a group meeting at the Feuillant Club. Composed primarily of liberal nobles such as the Mar- quis de Lafayette and members of the upper bourgeoisie, the Feuillants fa- vored a constitutional monarchy, the strict protection of property rights, limited suffrage, and a laissez-faire economic policy. The Feuillants' main ri- vals were their former associates in the Societe des Amis de la Constitution, popularly known as the Jacobin Club, from whom they had split in July
1791. The Jacobins were more distrustful of the king and more supportive of popular democracy, although they shared the Feuillants' desire to safeguard private property and were not yet opposed to the institution of the monar- chy. More radical groups included the Societe des? Amis des Oroits de l'Homme et du Citoyen (known as the Cordeliers Club) and the various popular associations that were then emerging among the artisans and poorer classes of Paris. 26
The next phase followed Louis's unsuccessful attempt to flee from Paris in June 1791? 7 The royal family was captured and returned to Paris on June 25, but this new evidence of the king's attitude sparked renewed fears of a counterrevolutionary conspiracy and brought calls by the more radical deputies for the abolition of the monarchy. The moderates still hoped to persuade the king to accept the new constitution, however, and tried to dis- courage foreign intervention by treating Louis leniently. A commission of inquiry accepted the Feuillants' claims that the king had been abducted and declared Louis innocent of treason but suspended his royal functions provi- sionally. The verdict intensified the divisions within the revolutionary
25 See Sutherland, France, 82-85, 124; Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1 : 13o-35; and Hampson, Prelude to Terror, 77-81.
26 This account does not do justice to the diverse political groups that emerged after 1789; for a summary, see Jones, Longman Companion to the French Revolution, 170"-91. For back- ground, see Michael Kennedy, TheJacobin Club in the French Revolution: The First Years (Prince- ton: Princeton University Press, 1981), esp. chap. 15; and Patrice Gueniffey and Ran Halevi, "Clubs and Popular Societies," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 458-72.
27 The abortive escape is described in detail in J. M. Thompson, The French Revolution (Ox- ford: Basil Blackwell, 1943}, 198-210.
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movement, and Lafayette and the National Guards were forced to suppress a radical demonstration in the Champ de Mars in August. Louis finally agreed to accept the constitution on September 14, and the Constituent As- sembly disbanded pending the election of a new Legislative Assembly. 28
At first, the main effect of the revolution in the international arena was to isolate France. Both allies and adversaries now discounted French power and influence and tended to focus their attention on other matters. At the same time, there were signs that the revolution might affect other states' in- terests adversely, and this fear grew as the revolution progressed.
The potentially threatening character of the French Revolution to foreign states had become apparent once the National Assembly began drafting a constitution in August 1789. By proclaiming that all men had the right to govern themselves, the universalist language of the Declaration of the Rights of Man constituted an implicit challenge to the legitimacy of the other European states. The decrees abolishing the feudal regime in France also threatened the traditional privileges of several foreign rulers, most no- tably in Alsace and Avignon. 29 The Assembly now claimed these territories on the basis of "popular sovereignty," an innovation that called the legal framework of the European political order into question. If the Assembly could rescind an existing treaty merely by invoking the will of the people, then no prior treaty (including any guaranteeing the present borders) was safe. Moreover, the notion of exclusive sovereignty based on the national will clashed with the heterogeneous and overlapping lines of authority that still held sway in much of Europe, especially in Germany. From the very be- ginning, therefore, the principles of the revolution posed a possible danger to political stability in Europe. 30
These inherent conflicts were magnified by some predictable side-effects of the revolutionary process itself. Not only had the events of 1789 gener- ated an enthusiastic response from intellectuals throughout Europe, but Paris quickly became a magnet for revolutionary sympathizers from other
28 See Sutherland, France, 127-31.
29 Alsace had been ceded t o France b y the Treaty o f Westphalia i n 1648, but the treaty also preserved the feudal rights of several German princes "in perpetuity. " The electors of Trier, Cologne, and Mainz, the bishop of Basel, the duke of Wi. irttemberg, and the margrave of Baden protested the Assembly's action.
Why are revolutions hard to export, and why do foreign interventions fail? First, the universalist ideological rhetoric notwithstanding, a revolution
60 Examples of successful counterrevolutions include the Austro-Prussian intervention in Belgium in 1790, the Russian and Austrian interventions in Italy and Greece in the 1830s, the U. S. -backed coups in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, the U. S. invasion of Grenada in 1983- and the Vietnamese overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1979. With the exception of Cambodia, however, none of these regimes carne to power through a prolonged revolution- ary struggle, and none attempted (let alone accomplished) a thorough social transformation. Moreover, these are all cases where the intervening powers were overwhelmingly larger and stronger than the governments they overthrew.
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is, above all, a national phenomenon. A campaign to export a revolution to other countries will immediately bring it into conflict with the national loy- alties of the intended recipients. And the principle that people who conceive of themselves as a nation are entitled to their own independent state has proven to be a far more powerful social force in modem history than any notion of universal revolutionary solidarity. 61 Foreign populations are likely to view efforts to export the revolution as unwarranted acts of aggression, in tum making it easier for the ruling elites to resist the revolutionary forces. Even if conditions in other countries resemble those that produced one rev-
olution in a general way, the special circumstances that enabled that one revolution to succeed are unlikely to exist elsewhere. Even if social unrest does transcend national boundaries and the success of one movement does inspire like-minded individuals abroad, actually causing a revolution to occur in a foreign country is another matter altogether.
Second, until a revolution actually occurs, other states may not have taken the possibility seriously, but once the danger is demonstrated, poten- tial victims will take steps to avoid a similar fate (for example, through de-
. fensive alliances, internal reforms, or more extensive repression). Thus, the Cuban Revolution inspired the U. S. "Alliance for Progress" in Latin Amer- ica (intended to forestall additional "Cubas" by promoting economic and political development) and encouraged Latin American oligarchies to sup- press their domestic opponents more vigorously. Again, the point is not that revolutions pose no danger, but rather that other states can usually take a number of steps to contain the threat.
Efforts to support a counterrevolution fail for somewhat different reasons.
Revolutionary leaders are usually dedicated, highly motivated individuals who have been successful precisely because they are good at organizing support in the face of impressive obstacles. They are likely to be formidable adversaries, because the same skills will aid their efforts to mobilize the na- tion for war. 62 Foreign interventions also fail, because they provide the do- mestic legitimacy that a revolutionary regime needs: the same nationalist convictions that prevent a revolution from adapting smoothly to other states will also complicate foreign intervention against a revolutionary regime. And there is an inherent paradox in trying to use exiles as the core of the counterrevolutionary movement: if these groups require extensive foreign assistance in order to challenge the new regime, their ability to com- mand indigenous support is probably limited and their prospects for suc- cess comparatively low.
? 61 See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, t9f! J), 1-7; and Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cam- ? ridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9-12.
62 Skocpol, "Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization. "
? ? A Theory of Revolution and War
To summarize: the pressure for war produced by a revolution results from two parallel myths: the belief that the revolution will spread rapidly if it is not "strangled in its crib," and the belief that such a reversal will be easy to accomplish. Among other things, this argument implies that war would be most likely when the revolutionary state espouses a universalist ideology, because such ideologies can easily be regarded as a potent (though unmeasurable) source of threat by other states. Contrary to these expectations, however, the normal result is neither a swift tide of revolu- tionary contagion nor the quick and easy ouster of the new regime. In- stead, the more frequent result is a prolonged struggle between the unexpectedly resilient revolutionary regime and its surprisingly impervi- ous opponents.
The explanation outlined in this chapter may also provide a more com- plete explanation of why revolutionary states tend to alter their behavior over time. Many of the problems caused by a revolution arise from mis- judging the balance of power, the intentions of others, and the probability of contagion or counterrevolution. From this perspective, "socialization" is simply the process by which both sides acquire greater information about each of these factors. As evidence accumulates, the uncertainty that permits exaggerated perceptions of threat to flourish declines proportion- ately. Even if the new regime does not abandon its ultimate objectives, it is likely to modify its short-term behavior in accordance with this new in-
formation. Relations between the revolutionary states and the rest of the system will become increasingly "normal," assuming, of course, that each side is capable of evaluating and revising its policies in light of experi- ence. 63
Two caveats should be noted at this point. First, because elite revolutions feature less extreme ideological visions and exert less dramatic internal ef- fects than mass revolutions, they will have less effect on the balance of threats, and so the risk of war will be lower than it is after a mass revolution. Second, the level of conflict will be greatest when the revolution creates a new state whose characteristics and ideological foundations depart sharply from the domestic orders of the other great powers. By contrast, if a revolu- tion brings a state into conformity with prevailing sociopolitical forms, then the new regime will be seen as less hostile and the danger of contagion may be slim to nonexistent. One cannot understand the international impact of a revolution by looking solely at the revolutionary state; one must also con-
sider the external environment in which the revolution occurred.
63 David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International So- ciety (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), esp. 302-304. For a useful survey of the literature on how states learn, see Jack Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Mine- field," International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994).
? ? Revolution and War
TESTING THE THEORY
As shown in figure 1, the theory outlined above identifies several inde- pendent, mutually reinforcing mechanisms linking revolution and war. It predicts that revolutions will lead to sharper security competition between states and increase the probability of war. Indeed, the theory suggests that strong pressures for war will be present even when other factors intervene to prevent it.
In each of the case studies that follow, I explore whether the different mechanisms identified in this chapter were present and, if so, whether they had the predicted effects. In general, the theory can be considered sup- ported if, first, the revolution was followed by increased security competi- tion or war; second, conflict and war occurred for the reasons identified in the theory; third, one or more of the causal mechanisms identified in the theory was absent or muted and war did not occur; fourth, the predicted pressures for war were present but other factors intervened to prevent it; and fifth, these effects would have been unlikely to occur had the revolution not taken place.
More specifically, the theory is supported either if other states saw the rev- olution as altering the balance of power, and sought to take advantage of this window of opportunity, or if they were inclined to use force in order to pre- vent other states from doing the same thing. By contrast, if other states did not view the revolution as a potential opportunity (owing to a perceived shift in the balance of power), that would count against this part of the theory.
? ? ? Figure 1.
Revolution
Effects on the Revolutionary State
Change in preferences
Perceptions of external environment shaped by revolutionary ideology (Other states are hostile; victory is inevitable; the revolution has universal relevance)
Increased uncertainty and misinformation
Effects on Relations between States
Spirals of suspicion
Perceptions of offensive advantage
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? A Theory ofRevolution and War
The theory is also supported if the new regime and other states consis- tently exaggerated each other's hostility, especially if these spirals reflected ideological predispositions. The occurrence of a serious dispute does not necessarily mean that a spiral of suspicion occurred; rather, one or both sides must have also misinterpreted the other's actions and exaggerated its hostility. 64 The theory gains further credence if these errors were fueled by uncertainty or problems of communication arising from the revolution, or by the transnational activities of counterrevolutionary exiles or revolution-
ary sympathizers. Again, this element of the theory is undermined if the revolution in question caused little change in either side's perceptions of in- tent or if a subsequent dispute was based solely on a legitimate clash of in- terest that both sides evaluated more or less accurately.
Evidence that the possible spread of revolution (or counterrevolution) magnified each side's perceptions of insecurity or overconfidence supports the theory, especially if these beliefs were central to the decision for war. By contrast, the theory loses credibility if war occurred when the possibility of exporting the revolution was either absent or dismissed, or if both sides be- lieved that the revolution was likely to spread but were able to establish good relations nonetheless.
The theory I have set forth in this chapter explains why revolutions in- tensify security competition between states and increase the probability of war. I do not mean to imply that revolutions are a unique cause of war or that the dynamics that link revolutions and international conflict do not apply in other situations. However, I do regard revolutions as an especially powerful source of these dangers and consider war to be very likely in the aftermath of a successful revolution. In other words, a revolution is a suffi- cient but not necessary cause of security competition and war. The question is whether the effects of major revolutions support this general argument. To provide an answer, I begin by examining the international consequences of the French Revolution.
64 Itcanalsobedifficulttodetermineifstatementsindicatingsuspicionorhostilityareev- idence of genuine fears or merely propapanda intended for other purposes. Even if it is pro- paganda, it is unlikely to be effective when there is not some basis for it, and such campaigns can take on a life of their own if elites begin to believe their own rhetoric or become trapped by public opinion.
? ? ? ? The French Revolution
"Not until statesmen had at last grasped the nature of the forces that had emerged in France and had grasped that new political conditions now obtained in Europe, could they foresee the broad effects alJ this would have on war. "
-Carl von Clausewitz
In this chapter I explore relations between revolutionary France and the other European powers from 1789 to 1799, with particular emphasis on the wars of the First and Second Coalitions. The period illustrates the link be- tween revolution and war in an especially vivid way and provides strong support for the arguments advanced in the previous chapter.
First, as balance-of-threat theory would suggest, the French Revolution made war more likely by altering the balance of power. France's apparenR weakness invited other states to seek gains either at French expense or in other areas, because they believed France could not oppose them effectively. Although neither Prussia nor Austria was strongly committed to over- throwing the new French leaders, the two states' desire to exploit the power vacuum created by the revolution helped place them both on a collision course with the new regime.
Second, the drive to war was fueled by the effects of the revolution on each state's intentions and by the ways that these intentions were perceived! by others. The revolution altered French foreign policy objectives (both for ideological reasons and because competing factions within France used for- eign policy to challenge their internal opponents), and it also distorted other states' perceptions of French intentions in especially dangerous ways.
Third, these fears were exacerbated by each side's belief that its oppo- nents might be able to impose their will with relatively little effort, either through subversion, propaganda, or a rapid military campaign. French leaders were preoccupied with the danger of counterrevolution-based on suspicions of treason, rumors of aristocratic plots, and the possibility of for- eign interference-while foreign leaders came to worry that the revolution in France would spread to their own societies. As we shall see, both sides'
? ? ? The French Revolution
fears were overstated: the French were able to spread their revolution only through direct military conquest, and foreign efforts to reverse the revolu- tion in France were never very effective. Nonetheless, each side's belief in its own vulnerability intensifed its perceptions of threat and encouraged efforts to eliminate the danger before it became irresistible. Instead of the swift and bloodless victories that both sides anticipated, however, the result of these
decisions was a quarter-century of recurring warfare.
And fourth, these problems were exacerbated by the poor information available to national leaders. Throughout this period, political leaders re- peatedly miscalculated the balance of power, misread each other's inten- tions, and exaggerated the prospects for revolution and counterrevolution. Such problems are hardly unusual in international politics, but the revolu- tion aggravated them by severing the normal channels of information be- tween governments, by encouraging a variety of unofficial representatives (such as the French emigres) to purvey a host of self-serving myths, and by forcing statesmen to base policy decisions on estimates of probabilities that were inherently unknowable (such as the revolutionary potential of a given society ) .
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first describes the origins and ideological foundations of the revolution and the causes of the war of 1792. In the second I examine the expansion of the war in 1793 and the subse- quent struggle between France and the First Coalition. I tum in the third part to the War of the Second Coalition. Finally I consider the arguments ad- vanced in chapter 2 in light of these events.
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF 1792
Avant le Deluge: France and Europe under the Old Regime
French prestige and influence declined steadily after 1750, a trend under- scored by its defeat in the Seven Years War (175? 3), its paralysis during the Polish succession of 1764 and the first partition of Poland in 1772, and the various reverses suffered by its Swedish and Ottoman allies. An appar- ent French triumph in the War of American Independence proved to be a hollow victory, as it did little to damage England and contributed to the growing fiscal crisis in France.
England was France's traditional rival, owing to a combination of geo- graphic proximity, colonial competition, and conflicting security interests. An attempt to improve relations through a commercial treaty in 1785 failed to overcome English suspicions, and the growth of French influence in the Low Countries (culminating in the Franco-Dutch alliance of 1785) eventu- ally led England and Prussia to invade Holland in 1787. The invaders
? ? Revolution and War
ousted the pro-French Patriot Party and restored the pro-English Stad- holder, William of Orange, in yet another demonstration of French impo- tence. 1
Austria amd France had been formally allied since 1756, but the tie was in- creasingly seen as a burden by both countries. Yet it endured, because France wanted to keep Austria from allying itself with England, and Austria wanted to keep France away from Prussia. 2 France was also allied to Spain via the Family Compact of 1761, an agreement based on dynastic solidarity between the two Bourbon houses and mutual hostility to England. These as- sets did not outweigh France's many liabilities, however, and France's in- ternational position on the eve of the revolution was not auspicious. 3
Conflicts among the other great powers, endemic in this period, would play an important role in shaping foreign responses to events in France. Austria and Prussia had been rivals since the 1740s, with each one primar- ily concerned with enhancing its position at the expense of the other. Em- peror Joseph II of Austria also hoped to exchange his Belgian possessions for Bavaria (thereby ridding himself of some unruly subjects and consoli- dating Austria's position in Central Europe), but his efforts to do so were re- peatedly thwarted by foreign opposition. Austria did manage to isolate Prussia by allying with Russia in 1781, but Joseph was eventually forced to enter the Russo-Turkish war in 1788 in order to maintain the connection and
to prevent Russia from monopolizing the fruits of victory. The Hapsburgs also faced considerable internal unrest during this period (partly a reaction to Joseph's reform program), including a conservative revolt in the Nether- lands in 1789. 4
Prussia's small size and relative weakness encouraged an expansionist foreign policy, and King Frederick William made several unsuccessful at-
1 On A n g l o - F re n c h r e l a t i o n s p r i o r t o t h e r e v o l u t i o n , se e T . C . W . B l a n n i n g , T h e O r i g i n s of t h e French Revolutionary Wars (New York: Longman, 1986), 45-51; M. S. Anderson, "European Diplpmatic History," in New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 8: The American and French Revo- lutions, 1763-93, ed. Albert Goodwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 267-68; and J. H. Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," in Cambridge History ofBritish Foreign Policy, ed. A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (New York: Macmillan, 1922), 1:159-70. The Patriot revolt in Holland is described by Simon Schama, Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 178o-1813 (New York: Random House, 1977), chap. 3; and Alfred Cobban, Ambassadors and Secret Agents: The Diplomacy of the First Earl of Malmesbury at the Hague (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954).
2 See Blannlng, French Revolutionary Wars, 4o-45; J. H. Clapham, The Causes ofthe War of 1792 (1892; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1969), 5-8; and Paul W. Schroeder, The Trans-
fo r m a t i o n of E u r o p ? a n P o l i t i c s , 1 7 6 3 - 1 8 4 8 ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1 9 9 4 ) , 4 2 - 4 3 .
3 See Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815 (New York:
Longman, 1983), 215-16.
.
4 On the Belgium-Bavaria exchange, see Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 26-35. On Joseph's reforms and the Belgian revolt, see Robert R. Palmer, The Age of the Demo- cratic Revolution: A Political History ofEurope and America, 1760-1800, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 1964), 1:341-57, 374-83.
? ? The French Revolution
tempts to acquire additional territory; Prussia was allied with England and Holland, but the alliance was strictly defensive and England refused to back most of Frederick William's diplomatic gambits, including his pro- posal for an attack on Austria in 1790. As events in France began to cast a shadow over the European system, Frederick William was already contem- plating several new ploys for territorial aggrandizement, ranging from an alliance with France to an attack upon France or an additional partition of Poland. 5
Relations among the great powers were complicated further by the growth of Russian power and the unstable situation in Poland. Catherine II had used the Austro-Prussian rivalry to win concessions from both, while seizing territory from the Ottoman Empire and establishing de facto control of Poland after the first partition in 1772. When Russia was distracted by the war with Turkey and an opportunistic invasion by Sweden in 1788, a group of Polish reformers convened a new Diet and proclaimed a new constitu- tion. Although the effort temporarily succeeded, it was only a matter of time before Catherine would attempt to reassert Russian primacy. 6
Thus the European system was in a state of considerable fluidity when the revolution in France began. France was formally allied with Austria and Spain (though the relationship with Austria was strained) and openly hos- tile to England. England was equally suspicious of France, formally allied to Prussia and Holland, and wary of Russia. Austria was allied with France and Russia and bogged down in a war against the Ottoman Empire while keeping a watchful eye on Prussia. Both Austria and Prussia were interested in territorial revisions, and the internal turmoil in Poland and the Low
Countries added to the endemic instability of the system.
Ideological Underpinnings
Identifying the ideological roots of the French Revolution is especially challenging because none of the leading participants began with a blueprint for the future political order that was well thought out? Without being able to consult an explicit revolutionary program, therefore, students of the pe- riod must try to identify the central ideas that informed political debate and drove political action, while recognizing that this vocabulary shifted in re-
5 See Robert Howard Lord, The Second Partition of Poland: A Study in Diplomatic History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915), 75-82; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 51-55; and Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 190-97?
6 See Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 1:422-29; Lord, Second Partition, chaps. 1, 5-{i,
7 As the Jacobin Camille Desmoulins later recalled: "In all France there were not ten of us who were republicans prior to 1789. " Quoted in Henri Peyre, "The Influence of Eighteenth Century Ideas on the French Revolution," in his Historical and Critical Essays (Lincoln: Uni- versity of Nebraska Press, 1968), 72.
? ? Revolution and War
sponse to the revolutionary process itsel? . 8 The concepts that shaped the rev- olution were not fixed, but they did provide the intellectual arsenal that rival groups employed both to understand the events in which they were immersed and to rally support and discredit opposition. And while these ideological underpinnings did not determine the course or outcome of the revolution, they did form the elements from which it was built. 9
What are the main ideas that shaped the revolution in France? At the risk of oversimplifying, I have identified four interrelated themes in prerevolu- tionary political discourse that merit particular attention.
The first key theme was a commitment to reason and natural law, to- gether with the concomitant belief that political action could correct existing social ills. In addition to undermining support for the Church, the notion that human affairs could be ordered according to the dictates of reason was a potent solvent to a conception of society based on privileged orders and monarchical authority.
10 This discourse implied that departures from tradi-
tion were permissible, provided they were based on reason, and faith in the power of reason helped created a new faith in politics and its unlimited ca- pacity for action. 11
A second theme was a broad ideological assault on the legitimacy of the absolutist state. This discourse contained several distinct but mutually rein- forcing strands: one focusing on "justice" (defined as restraint on monarchi- cal will}, another extolling liberty and equality and attacking the institutions of aristocratic privilege, and a third challenging the image of the king as
8 This war of ideas took place in a society that was experiencing an explosion in publishing. making it possible to disseminate contending opinions more rapidly and widely than ever be- fore. See Robert Damton and Daniel Roche, eds. , Revolution in Print: The Press in France, 1775-1800(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress, 1989);JeremyPopkin,RevolutionaryNews: The Press in France 1 789-1799 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and Colin Jones, ed. , The Longman Companion to the French Revolution (New York: Longman, 1988), 26o-62.
9 "The ideology embraced by the National Assembly . . . was . . . less a blueprint than a set of architectural principles that could be applied to the construction of quite different so- ciopolitical orders. " William Sewell, "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case," Journal ofModern History 57, no. 1 (1985), 71. See also Daniel Momet, Les Ori- gines intellectuelles de Ia revolutionfran? aise (1715-1787) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1933), esp. 477; Peyre, "Influence of Eighteenth Century Ideas"; and Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolu tion, trans. L. G. Cochrane (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989). :
10 "The Enlightenment insisted on the universal applicability of reason to human affairs It had scorn for all privilege no matter how ancient or venerable. " Sewell, "Ideologies and So- cial Revolutions," 65.
11 Fran. ;ois Furet argues that "the very bedrock of revolutionary consciousness" is the be- lief that "there is no human misfortune not amenable to a political solution. " Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 25. As products of the En! ightenment, the revolutionaries "believed in the absolute efficacy of politics-which they thought capable of recasting the body social and regenerating the indi- vidual. " Bronislaw Baczko, "Enlightenment," in A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, ed. Fran. ;ois Furet and Mona Ozouf, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 1989), 662-64; and see Chartier, Cultural Origins, 198.
? ? ? ? The French Revolution
God's chosen representative. If not revolutionary by themselves, each of these strands nourished doubts about the existing order and cleared the way for a fundamental change. 12
Third, the wide-ranging challenge to absolutism featured a continuing debate on the nature of the political community. Over time, the image of France as the personal possession of a sovereign king was supplanted by the idea that sovereignty was held by a single people united by language, terri- tory, blood, and other "natural" characteristics. This transformation from subjects to citizens was already evident in 1788, when Abbe Sieyes declared that the Third Estate was "everything appertaining to the nation. "13 The rev- olution completed this process by replacing an abstract notion of the king as the sovereign authority with a concept of "popular sovereignty" in which the nation was the embodiment of the "general will. "14
Finally, under the influence of Rousseau, Montesquieu, and others, the ideological foundations of the French Revolution also contained a powerful moral dimension, centered on the concept of virtue. The importance at- tached to virtue helped discredit the old regime (which was seen as corrupt) and legitimated efforts to inculcate proper conduct as part of creating a new political order. Abelief in reason and in the limitless possibilities of politics also implied that "human action no longer encounters obstacles or limits, only adversaries, preferably traitors. "15 This tendency reached its peak dur- ing the Reign of Terror, when the Jacobins used the machinery of the state to promote virtue among the citizens, while seeking to eliminate any individ- uals whose opposition to the general will exposed their evil natures. 16
12 See Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), esp. 25-27; Jeffrey Merrick, The Desacralization of the French Monarchy in the Eighteenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990); and Robert Damton, The Literary Underground of the Old Regime (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
13 Sieyes added that "the Nation is prior to everything, it is the source of everything. . . . Its will is always the supreme law. " His attack on privilege placed these orders outside the polit- ical community; illl his words, "the nobility does not belong to the social organization at all. . . . whatever is not off the third estate may not be regarded as belonging to the nation. What is the third estate? Everything! " Joseph Emmanuel Sieyes, "What Is the Third Estate? " in A Docu- mentary Survey ofthe French Revolution, ed. John Hall Stewart (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 44?
14 According to Leah Greenfeld, "the Nation replaced the king as the source of identity and focus of social solidarity, as previously the king had replaced God. " Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. 16<Hi8. See also Alfred Cobban, "The Enlightenment and the French Revolution," in his Aspects ofthe French Revolution (New York: George Braziller, 1968), 25.
15 Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, 26.
16 See Carol Blum, Rousseau and the Republic of Virtue: The Language of Politics in the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), chaps. 8 and 10; and also Alfred Cobban, "The Fundamental Ideas of Robespierre," in his Aspects ofthe French Revolution; and Norman Hampson, Will and Circumstance: Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the French Revolution (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983).
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These four broad and interrelated themes formed the worldview of the revolutionary vanguard in France? They set the terms and limits of debate throughout the revolutionary period and encouraged a number of specific attitudes and actions. 17 The appeal to reason and natural law contributed to the optimism that is essential for revolutionary action, and this attitude was strongly reinforced by the extraordinary events of 1789-91. The revolution- aries' own experience seemed to prove that society could be transformed ac- cording to the dictates of reason, and the possibilities for political and personal transformation were soon regarded as virtually limitless. This be- lief helped discredit the voices of moderation and encouraged the revolu- tionaries' faith that they could overcome any obstacle.
Like any ideology, the worldview of the French Revolution contained obvi- ous ambiguities and contradictions. On the one hand, faith in the preeminence of reason and the operation of universal laws encouraged the revolutionaries in France to view their achievements as a world-historical event whose prin- ciples were of universal validity. On the other hand, the simultaneous redefi- nition of the political community in terms of the French "nation" encouraged more self-interested and particularistic conceptions, a tendency reinforced by existing animosities (such as the rivalry with England).
Furthermore, the revolutionary process created a profound tension be- tween the explicit goal of liberty and the implicit principle of national unity. It replaced the authority of the king with the authority of "le peuple," and it linked popular sovereignty to equality and Rousseauist notions of the gen- eral will (l! "ather than placing it within a framework of individual rights and representative institutions). The revolution was supposed to free citizens from monarchical tyranny and arbitrary government authority, and create a nation consisting of a single body shorn of privileged orders. 18 In the absence of a theory of representation, however, these principles left France without a legitimate avenue for disagreement. Given the presumption of unity, the only outlet for opposition was conspiracy, which was also the most obvious explanation for any failure to achieve the revolution's lofty goals. Thus, any sign of dissent was a potential hazard to the unity of the nation, leaving rev- olutionary France peculiarly vulnerable to fears of plots and conspiracies. ? 9
Although the French Revolution was not the product of a self-conscious revolutionary movement originating under the ancien regime, its underly-
17 As Sewell puts it, ideologies "are at once constraining and enabling. They block certain possibilities, but they also create others. " "Ideologies and Social Revolutions," 6o.
? 18 As Furet points out, "the 'people' were defined by their aspirations, and as an indistinct aggregate of individual 'right' wills. By that expedient, which precluded representation, the revolutionary consciousness was able to reconstruct an imaginary social cohesion in tlhe name and on the basis of individual wills. " Interpreting the French Revolution, 27.
19 See Norman Hampson, Prelude to Terror: The Constituent Assembly and the Failure of Con-
sensus, 1789-1791 (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), esp. 106-107; and Furet, Interpreting the
French Revolution, 51-55.
.
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ing principles resemble the ideal type set forth in chapter 2. The revolution- aries were confident of their ability to reshape politics, society, and even human nature itself, strongly inclined to consider their opponents inher- ently evil and deserving of extermination, and prone to uphold their own experience as a model for others. As we shall see, these views, which con- tinued to shape perceptions and political debate once the revolution was underway, had a powerful influence on relations between revolutionary France and the rest of Europe.
The Dismantling of the Ancien Regime and the Initial Foreign Response
The immediate cause of the French Revolution was the fiscal crisis trig- gered by French aid to the American colonies during their War of Indepen- dence, which broke the back of the archaic French tax system. 20 The nobility successfully resisted Louis XVI's efforts to impose new taxes in 1787, forcing the king to summon the Estates General for the first time since 1614. Under pressure from liberal nobles and provincial authorities, Louis and his min- isters agreed to double the size of the Third Estate (representing the com-
moners) in January 1789. They resisted demands to grant each deputy a single vote, however, in favor of the traditional practice of each order voting in unison. 21
The first decisive break came when the representatives of the three estates met at Versailles in May. After a month of futile debate over the voting pro- cedure, representatives of the Third Estate designated themselves a new Na- tional Assembly and invited members of the other orders to join. Louis reluctantly accepted this measure on June 23, but he also began assembling troops near the capital in preparation for a coup de main against the defiant deputies. Before he could launch his coup, however, the fear of an aristo- cratic reaction sparked a popular uprising in Paris and began to undermine the loyalty of the royal garrisons. Supporters of the Assembly had already begun to mobilize the Parisian population, and an angry mob stormed the
fortress of the Bastille on July 14. Informed that he could no longer count on his troops' allegiance, Louis agreed to disperse the regiments surrounding Paris and declared his support for the National Assembly on July 17. A new
20 See Doyle, Origins ofthe French Revolution, 43-53; Jean Egret, The French Pre-Revolution, 1787-88, trans. Wesley D. Camp, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); and John Fran- cis Bosher, French Finances, 177fr1795: From Business to Bureaucracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
21 The First Estate represented the clergy, the Second Estate the nobility, and the Third Es- tate everyone else. Representatives for each order were chosen through local elections, and the local assemblies drew up petitions of grievances (known as cahiers de do! eances) for con- sideration by the king and Estates General.
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municipal government was formed in Paris, the Marquis de Lafayette be- came commander of the new National Guards, and the first wave of emi- gres departed, including the king's brothers, the comte d'Artois and comte de Provence. 22
The upheaval in Paris was accompanied by similar events in the provinces. The departure of the emigre aristocrats increased concerns about a reactionary conspiracy and helped spark the "Great Fear" that engulfed France from July 20 to August 4? Inspired by reports of armed brigands, food shortages, and aristocratic plots, rural mobs began burning chateaux, destroying manorial records, and seizing noble property. Provincial nota- bles began forming "permanent committees" to restore order, and these bodies began to supplant the municipal institutions of the ancien regime as royal authority waned. 23
Meanwhile, the deputies (now designated the National Constituent As- sembly) were launching a direct assault on the institutions of the ancien regime. The deputies voted to abolish the feudal order "in its entirety" on the night of August 4 and approved the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen on August 27. Over the next twenty-six months, the Assembly abolished noble and clerical privileges and reorganized the insti- tutions of local government and the judiciary. The deputies also voted to confiscate Church property in November 1789, banned religious orders in February 1790, and passed a new Civil Constitution of the Clergy that placed the church under the formal control of the state in July. Clerical op-
position to these measures prompted a further decree in November 1790 that required priests to swear an oath of allegience to the constitution or be removed from office. 24
Predictably, these steps provoked considerable opposition. The king re- fused to sanction the August decrees, and renewed fears of a royalist coup
22 On these events, see William Doyle, The Oxford History ofFrench Revolution (New York: Ox- ford University Press, 1988), 107-11; D. M. G. Sutherland, France 1789-1815: Re-ilolution and Counte-revr olution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 47-48, 59-68; George Rude, The Crowd in the French Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); and Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution, trans. Elizabeth M. Evanson (vol. 1) and John Hall Stewart and James Friguglietti (vol. 2) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 1964); 1:12o-24. On the dis- integration of the army, see Samuel F. Scott, The Response ofthe Royal Army to the French Revo- lution: The Role and Developmentofthe Line Army, 1787-1793 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 51-59; and Jean-Paul Bertaud, The Army ofthe French Revolution:from Citizen-Soldiers to Instru- ment ofPowe-r, trans. Robert R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 22-29.
23 TheclassicanalysisoftheGreatFearisGeorgesLefebvre,TheGreatFearof1789:Rural Panic in Revolutionary France, trans. Joan White (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). On the provincial revolts, see Lynn A. Hunt, "Committees and Communes: Local Politics and National Revolution in 1789,'' Comparative Studies in Society and History, 18, no. 3 (1976); and Sutherland, France, 70'-76.
24 For the texts of these decrees, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, chap. 2; for summaries, see Sutherland, France, 81HJ9; and Michel Vovelle, The Fall of the French Monarchy, 1 787-1792, trans. SusanBurke(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984),146-2-6 .
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led an unruly mob to invade Versailles on October 5 and bring the royal family back to Paris, where the king's activities could be monitored more easily. The anticlerical measures angered many priests and parishioners, economic conditions worsened, and the emigre exodus continued. When the king's brothers began to solicit aid for a restoration from the other Euro- pean governments, the rumors of an "aristocratic conspiracy," once entirely a myth, began to acquire a real basis. 25
Over the next ten months, the debate over the constitution saw the emer- gence of several contending factions within the Assembly. These groups were not formal political parties but loose alignments of delegates who shared similar views on salient political issues. The largest faction was that of the moderates, which was eventually centered around a group meeting at the Feuillant Club. Composed primarily of liberal nobles such as the Mar- quis de Lafayette and members of the upper bourgeoisie, the Feuillants fa- vored a constitutional monarchy, the strict protection of property rights, limited suffrage, and a laissez-faire economic policy. The Feuillants' main ri- vals were their former associates in the Societe des Amis de la Constitution, popularly known as the Jacobin Club, from whom they had split in July
1791. The Jacobins were more distrustful of the king and more supportive of popular democracy, although they shared the Feuillants' desire to safeguard private property and were not yet opposed to the institution of the monar- chy. More radical groups included the Societe des? Amis des Oroits de l'Homme et du Citoyen (known as the Cordeliers Club) and the various popular associations that were then emerging among the artisans and poorer classes of Paris. 26
The next phase followed Louis's unsuccessful attempt to flee from Paris in June 1791? 7 The royal family was captured and returned to Paris on June 25, but this new evidence of the king's attitude sparked renewed fears of a counterrevolutionary conspiracy and brought calls by the more radical deputies for the abolition of the monarchy. The moderates still hoped to persuade the king to accept the new constitution, however, and tried to dis- courage foreign intervention by treating Louis leniently. A commission of inquiry accepted the Feuillants' claims that the king had been abducted and declared Louis innocent of treason but suspended his royal functions provi- sionally. The verdict intensified the divisions within the revolutionary
25 See Sutherland, France, 82-85, 124; Lefebvre, French Revolution, 1 : 13o-35; and Hampson, Prelude to Terror, 77-81.
26 This account does not do justice to the diverse political groups that emerged after 1789; for a summary, see Jones, Longman Companion to the French Revolution, 170"-91. For back- ground, see Michael Kennedy, TheJacobin Club in the French Revolution: The First Years (Prince- ton: Princeton University Press, 1981), esp. chap. 15; and Patrice Gueniffey and Ran Halevi, "Clubs and Popular Societies," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 458-72.
27 The abortive escape is described in detail in J. M. Thompson, The French Revolution (Ox- ford: Basil Blackwell, 1943}, 198-210.
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movement, and Lafayette and the National Guards were forced to suppress a radical demonstration in the Champ de Mars in August. Louis finally agreed to accept the constitution on September 14, and the Constituent As- sembly disbanded pending the election of a new Legislative Assembly. 28
At first, the main effect of the revolution in the international arena was to isolate France. Both allies and adversaries now discounted French power and influence and tended to focus their attention on other matters. At the same time, there were signs that the revolution might affect other states' in- terests adversely, and this fear grew as the revolution progressed.
The potentially threatening character of the French Revolution to foreign states had become apparent once the National Assembly began drafting a constitution in August 1789. By proclaiming that all men had the right to govern themselves, the universalist language of the Declaration of the Rights of Man constituted an implicit challenge to the legitimacy of the other European states. The decrees abolishing the feudal regime in France also threatened the traditional privileges of several foreign rulers, most no- tably in Alsace and Avignon. 29 The Assembly now claimed these territories on the basis of "popular sovereignty," an innovation that called the legal framework of the European political order into question. If the Assembly could rescind an existing treaty merely by invoking the will of the people, then no prior treaty (including any guaranteeing the present borders) was safe. Moreover, the notion of exclusive sovereignty based on the national will clashed with the heterogeneous and overlapping lines of authority that still held sway in much of Europe, especially in Germany. From the very be- ginning, therefore, the principles of the revolution posed a possible danger to political stability in Europe. 30
These inherent conflicts were magnified by some predictable side-effects of the revolutionary process itself. Not only had the events of 1789 gener- ated an enthusiastic response from intellectuals throughout Europe, but Paris quickly became a magnet for revolutionary sympathizers from other
28 See Sutherland, France, 127-31.
29 Alsace had been ceded t o France b y the Treaty o f Westphalia i n 1648, but the treaty also preserved the feudal rights of several German princes "in perpetuity. " The electors of Trier, Cologne, and Mainz, the bishop of Basel, the duke of Wi. irttemberg, and the margrave of Baden protested the Assembly's action.
