3:9):
"They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid
it.
"They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid
it.
Summa Theologica
Therefore it is not lawful for any other
reason to maim a person.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot. "
I answer that, Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is
for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a
member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is
expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself
useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen
to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to
the whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and retains
its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury to the
whole body. But as the whole of man is directed as to his end to the
whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above
([2907]Q[61], A[1];[2908] Q[64], AA[2],5), it may happen that although
the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may
nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so far as it
is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of restraining
sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is lawfully deprived of
life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so is he
deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins. But this is not
lawful for a private individual, even with the consent of the owner of
the member, because this would involve an injury to the community, to
whom the man and all his parts belong. If, however, the member be
decayed and therefore a source of corruption to the whole body, then it
is lawful with the consent of the owner of the member, to cut away the
member for the welfare of the whole body, since each one is entrusted
with the care of his own welfare. The same applies if it be done with
the consent of the person whose business it is to care for the welfare
of the person who has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether
unlawful to maim anyone.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a
particular nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus
death and corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the
particular nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping
with universal nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary
to the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is
nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common
good.
Reply to Objection 2: The life of the entire man is not directed to
something belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is
directed to his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to
take anyone's life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted
the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be
directed to the good of one man, and consequently in certain cases can
pertain to him.
Reply to Objection 3: A member should not be removed for the sake of
the bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to
further the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further
one's spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, because
sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no case is it
allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever. Hence
Chrysostom, in his exposition on Mat. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in Matth. ),
"There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of
heaven," says: "Not by maiming themselves, but by destroying evil
thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself, since they are
murderers who do such things. " And further on he says: "Nor is lust
tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more importunate, for the
seed springs in us from other sources, and chiefly from an incontinent
purpose and a careless mind: and temptation is curbed not so much by
cutting off a member as by curbing one's thoughts. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their
slaves?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their
children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4):
"You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger"; and further on
(Eph. 9:6): "And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves [Vulg. :
'to them'] forbearing threatenings. " Now some are provoked to anger by
blows, and become more troublesome when threatened. Therefore neither
should parents strike their children, nor masters their slaves.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a
father's words are admonitory and not coercive. " Now blows are a kind
of coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their
children.
Objection 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for
this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above ([2909]Q[32],
A[2]). If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children
for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for
any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same
conclusion follows.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod
hateth his son," and further on (Prov. 23:13): "Withhold not correction
from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he shall not die.
Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul from hell. "
Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): "Torture and fetters are for a
malicious slave. "
I answer that, Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as when
it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while a blow
merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much less harm
than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a person a harm,
except by way of punishment in the cause of justice. Again, no man
justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction.
Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have
some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject
to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a
parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that
instruction may be enforced by correction.
Reply to Objection 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is
aroused chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to
provoke their children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking
their children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows
on them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear
from threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that
they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of
correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their
threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness
temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: The greater power should exercise the greater
coercion. Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of
a city has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable
punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the father
and the master who preside over the family household, which is an
imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is exercised
by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows, which do not
inflict irreparable harm.
Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a
willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to
those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by
blows.
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Whether it is lawful to imprison a man?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which
deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above
([2910]FS, Q[18], A[2]). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter
for imprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is
unlawful to imprison a man.
Objection 2: Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice.
Now according to Ecclus. 15:14, "God left man in the hand of his own
counsel. " Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by
chains or prisons.
Objection 3: Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from
doing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from doing
this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order to
restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put a
man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion
follows.
On the contrary, We read in Lev. 24 that a man was imprisoned for the
sin of blasphemy.
I answer that, In the goods three things may be considered in due
order. First, the substantial integrity of the body, and this is
injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or rest of the senses,
and to this striking or anything causing a sense of pain is opposed.
Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and this is hindered by
binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention.
Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, unless
it be done according to the order of justice, either in punishment, or
as a measure of precaution against some evil.
Reply to Objection 1: A man who abuses the power entrusted to him
deserves to lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the
free use of his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the order of His wisdom God
sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to Job
5:12: "Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so that
their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes He
allows them to do what they will. " In like manner, according to human
justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain ones.
Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a
time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man
prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from
striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in
general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong
primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him
from doing not only evil but also good deeds.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sin is aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are
perpetrated on those who are connected with others?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact
that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected
with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character from
inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil
inflicted on a man's own person is more against his will than that
which is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an injury
inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous.
Objection 2: Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do
injuries to orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17):
"He will not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when
she poureth out her complaint. " Now the widow and the orphan are not
connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated
through an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others.
Objection 3: Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own
just as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary
for him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the
case of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now these
injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary
commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 28:32) as though indicating an
aggravating circumstance: "Thy sons and thy daughters shall be given to
another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg. : 'May thy sons and thy
daughters be given,' etc. ]. "
I answer that, Other things being equal, an injury is a more grievous
sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is that it is a
more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in authority than a
private individual, because it conduces to the injury of the whole
community, as stated above ([2911]FS, Q[73], A[9]). Now when an injury
is inflicted on one who is connected in any way with another, that
injury affects two persons, so that, other things being equal, the sin
is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen, however, that in view
of certain circumstances, a sin committed against one who is not
connected with any other person, is more grievous, on account of either
the dignity of the person, or the greatness of the injury.
Reply to Objection 1: An injury inflicted on a person connected with
others is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than
if it were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view
it is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the
person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man is
guilty through injuring the other one in himself.
Reply to Objection 2: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more
insisted upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the
same injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they
have no one to turn to for relief.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to
the adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is
concerned, for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed
her by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her
husband, since "the wife hath not power of her own body; but the
husband" (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. of adultery,
however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to chastity, we
shall speak in the treatise on Temperance ([2912]Q[154], A[8]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THEFT AND ROBBERY (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man injures
his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery.
Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things?
(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own?
(3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another's property?
(4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft?
(5) Whether every theft is a sin?
(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?
(7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity?
(8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin?
(9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is natural for man to possess external things?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess
external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is
God's. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God, according
to Ps. 23:1, "The earth is the Lord's," etc. Therefore it is not
natural for man to possess external things.
Objection 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man
(Lk. 12:18), "I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my
goods," says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: "Tell me: which are thine? where
did you take them from and bring them into being? " Now whatever man
possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does
not naturally possess external things.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad
Gratianum, i, 1]) "dominion denotes power. " But man has no power over
external things, since he can work no change in their nature. Therefore
the possession of external things is not natural to man.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 8:8): "Thou hast subjected all
things under his feet. "
I answer that, External things can be considered in two ways. First, as
regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, but
only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as
regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion over
external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use
them for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the
imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated above
([2913]Q[64], A[1]). It is by this argument that the Philosopher proves
(Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external things is natural to man.
Moreover, this natural dominion of man over other creatures, which is
competent to man in respect of his reason wherein God's image resides,
is shown forth in man's creation (Gn. 1:26) by the words: "Let us make
man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the
fishes of the sea," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: God has sovereign dominion over all things: and
He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the
sustenance of man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion
over things, as regards the power to make use of them.
Reply to Objection 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external
things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received them
from another, namely from God.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the dominion over
external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to God
alone, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as his
own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now
according to the natural law all things are common property: and the
possession of property is contrary to this community of goods.
Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external thing
to himself.
Objection 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man
quoted above (A[1], OBJ[2]), says: "The rich who deem as their own
property the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who
by going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and
appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use. " Now it
would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of common
goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what belongs
to the community.
Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp. ], and his
words are quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii. , Can. Sicut hi. ]: "Let
no man call his own that which is common property": and by "common" he
means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it seems
unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres. , haer. 40): "The
'Apostolici' are those who with extreme arrogance have given themselves
that name, because they do not admit into their communion persons who
are married or possess anything of their own, such as both monks and
clerics who in considerable number are to be found in the Catholic
Church. " Now the reason why these people are heretics was because
severing themselves from the Church, they think that those who enjoy
the use of the above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope
of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that it is unlawful
for a man to possess property.
I answer that, Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior
things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this
regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is
necessary to human life for three reasons. First because every man is
more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is
common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labor and
leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where
there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs
are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with
taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be
confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately.
Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is
contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise
more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed.
The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external
things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external
things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to
communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says (1
Tim. 6:17,18): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to
communicate to others," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural
law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be
possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one's own:
but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural
law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive
law, as stated above ([2914]Q[57], AA[2],3). Hence the ownership of
possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto
devised by human reason.
Reply to Objection 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going
beforehand to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts
unlawfully if by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner
a rich man does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking
possession of something which at first was common property, and gives
others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately from
using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): "Why are you rich
while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a
good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? "
Reply to Objection 3: When Ambrose says: "Let no man call his own that
which is common," he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore
he adds: "He who spends too much is a robber. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the essence of theft consists in taking another's thing secretly?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take
another's thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not,
apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends
to diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as
indicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some (Is.
3:9):
"They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid
it. " Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in
taking another's thing secretly.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp. , A[2],
OBJ[3], Can. Sicut hi. ]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals
[*Dist. xlvii]: "It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than
to refuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off. " Therefore
just as theft consists in taking another's thing, so does it consist in
keeping it back.
Objection 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that
which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with
another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it is
not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's thing
secretly.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Fur' [thief] is derived from
'furvus' and so from 'fuscus' [dark], because he takes advantage of the
night. "
I answer that, Three things combine together to constitute theft. The
first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to
each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take
possession of what is another's. The second thing belongs to theft as
distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such
as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be
about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another's not as a
possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as
a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his daughter
or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. The third
difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in
a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it belongs properly
to theft that it consists in "taking another's thing secretly. "
Reply to Objection 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a
man employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and
guile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a species
of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is merely a
circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both because it is a
sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.
Reply to Objection 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the
same kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust
detention is included in an unjust taking.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person
simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit
belongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is
the depositary's, and the thing stolen is the thief's, not simply, but
as regards its custody.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether theft and robbery are sins of different species?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of
different species. For theft and robbery differ as "secret" and
"manifest": because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery
is to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of
sins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically. Therefore
theft and robbery are not different species of sin.
Objection 2: Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as
stated above ([2915]FS, Q[1], A[3]; Q[18], A[6]). Now theft and robbery
are directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another's
property. Therefore they do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of
possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore
Isidore says (Etym. x) that "he who commits a rape is called a
corrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted. " Now it
is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or
secretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken by
force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and
robbery do not differ.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft from
robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that robbery is
done openly.
I answer that, Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in as
much as one man does another an injustice. Now "no man suffers an
injustice willingly," as stated in Ethic. v, 9. Wherefore theft and
robbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking being
involuntary on the part of the person from whom something is taken. Now
the involuntary is twofold, namely, through violence and through
ignorance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect of
robbery differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ
specifically.
Reply to Objection 1: In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is
not derived from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to
justice: and so where there is a different kind of involuntary, there
is a different species of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The remote end of robbery and theft is the same.
But this is not enough for identity of species, because there is a
difference of proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing
by his own power, but the thief, by cunning.
Reply to Objection 3: The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the
part of the woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as
regards the others from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery
remains on the part of the woman to whom violence is done.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether theft is always a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin
is commanded by God, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): "He hath
commanded no man to do wickedly. " Yet we find that God commanded theft,
for it is written (Ex. 12:35,36): "And the children of Israel did as
the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg. : 'as Moses had commanded']. . . and
they stripped the Egyptians. " Therefore theft is not always a sin.
Objection 2: Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes
it, he seems to commit a theft, for he takes another's property. Yet
this seems lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold.
[*See loc. cit. in Reply. ] Therefore it seems that theft is not always
a sin.
Objection 3: Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to
sin, because he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy
its equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his
own property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another.
Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:15): "Thou shalt not steal. "
I answer that, If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will find
that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its opposition to
justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that for this reason
theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking of what belongs to
another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the
thief, by laying hands on another's property secretly and cunningly.
Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: It is no theft for a man to take another's
property either secretly or openly by order of a judge who has
commanded him to do so, because it becomes his due by the very fact
that it is adjudicated to him by the sentence of the court. Hence still
less was it a theft for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the
Egyptians at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done on
account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the Egyptians without
any cause: wherefore it is written significantly (Wis. 10:19): "The
just took the spoils of the wicked. "
Reply to Objection 2: With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must
be made. For some there are that were never in anyone's possession, for
instance precious stones and jewels, found on the seashore, and such
the finder is allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst.
II, i, De rerum divis. ]. The same applies to treasure hidden
underground long since and belonging to no man, except that according
to civil law the finder is bound to give half to the owner of the land,
if the treasure trove be in the land of another person [*Inst. II, i,
39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris]. Hence in the parable of the Gospel (Mat.
13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden in a field that
he bought the field, as though he purposed thus to acquire the right of
possessing the whole treasure. On the other Land the treasure-trove may
be nearly in someone's possession: and then if anyone take it with the
intention, not of keeping it but of returning it to the owner who does
not look upon such things as unappropriated, he is not guilty of theft.
In like manner if the thing found appears to be unappropriated, and if
the finder believes it to be so, although he keep it, he does not
commit a theft [*Inst. II, i, 47]. In any other case the sin of theft
is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De acquirend, rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II,
i, 48]: wherefore Augustine says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb.
Apost. ): "If thou hast found a thing and not returned it, thou hast
stolen it" (Dig. xiv, 5, can. Si quid invenisti).
Reply to Objection 3: He who by stealth takes his own property which is
deposited with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound either
to restitution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is clearly
guilty of sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his burden. On
the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own property, if this be
unjustly detained by another, he sins indeed; yet not because he
burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to restitution or
compensation: but he sins against general justice by disregarding the
order of justice and usurping judgment concerning his own property.
Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor to allay whatever
scandal he may have given his neighbor by acting this way.
Whether theft is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it is
written (Prov. 6:30): "The fault is not so great when a man hath
stolen. " But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is not
a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death.
But in the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity,
according to Ex. 22:1, "If any man steal an ox or a sheep . . . he
shall restore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep. "
Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great
things. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with eternal
death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a quill.
Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save for a
mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to Zech. 5:3,
"This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the earth; for
every thief shall be judged as is there written. " Therefore theft is a
mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[59], A[4]; [2916]FS, Q[72], A[5]), a
mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life of
the soul. Now charity consists principally in the love of God, and
secondarily in the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our wishing
and doing him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our neighbor
in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another habitually, human
society would be undone. Therefore theft, as being opposed to charity,
is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The statement that theft is not a great fault is
in view of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through
necessity. This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we
shall show further on [2917](A[7]). Hence the text continues: "For he
stealeth to fill his hungry soul. " Secondly, theft is stated not to be
a great fault in comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is
punished with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that
"if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold . . . but he that is an
adulterer . . . shall destroy his own soul. "
Reply to Objection 2: The punishments of this life are medicinal rather
than retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment
which is pronounced against sinners "according to truth" (Rom. 2:2).
Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death
punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such as
inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some horrible
deformity. Hence according to the present judgment the pain of death is
not inflicted for theft which does not inflict an irreparable harm,
except when it is aggravated by some grave circumstance, as in the case
of sacrilege which is the theft of a sacred thing, of peculation, which
is theft of common property, as Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super
Joan. ), and of kidnaping which is stealing a man, for which the pain of
death is inflicted (Ex. 21:16).
Reply to Objection 3: Reason accounts as nothing that which is little:
so that a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters:
and the person who takes such things can presume that this is not
against the will of the owner. And if a person take such like very
little things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet
if his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a
mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be
through consent in a mere thought.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to steal through stress of need?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need.
For penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is
stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): "If anyone, through stress of
hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do penance
for three weeks. " Therefore it is not lawful to steal through stress of
need.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "there
are some actions whose very name implies wickedness," and among these
he reckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done
for a good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to
remedy a need.
Objection 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now,
according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal in
order to succor one's neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore neither
is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one's own needs.
On the contrary, In cases of need all things are common property, so
that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property, for
need has made it common.
I answer that, Things which are of human right cannot derogate from
natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order
established by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for the
purpose of succoring man's needs by their means. Wherefore the division
and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do not
preclude the fact that man's needs have to be remedied by means of
these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in superabundance
is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. For this
reason Ambrose [*Loc. cit. , A[2], OBJ[3]] says, and his words are
embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut ii): "It is the
hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
store away, the money that you bury in the earth is the price of the
poor man's ransom and freedom. "
Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible
for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is
entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them
he may come to the aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the
need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present
need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a
person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible
remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of
another's property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this
properly speaking theft or robbery.
Reply to Objection 1: This decretal considers cases where there is no
urgent need.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not theft, properly speaking, to take
secretly and use another's property in a case of extreme need: because
that which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own
property by reason of that need.
Reply to Objection 3: In a case of a like need a man may also take
secretly another's property in order to succor his neighbor in need.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether robbery may be committed without sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin.
For spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the
essence of robbery, according to what has been said [2918](A[4]). Now
it is lawful to take spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De
Patriarch. 4 [*De Abraham i, 3]): "When the conqueror has taken
possession of the spoils, military discipline demands that all should
be reserved for the sovereign," in order, to wit, that he may
distribute them. Therefore in certain cases robbery is lawful.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his.
Now the things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine
says (Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. xciii. ): "You falsely call things your
own, for you do not possess them justly, and according to the laws of
earthly kings you are commanded to forfeit them. " Therefore it seems
that one may lawfully rob unbelievers.
Objection 3: Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from
their subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would seem a
grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that case
nearly every prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases robbery is
lawful.
On the contrary, Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to God in
sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds of
robbery, according to Is. 61:8, "I am the Lord that love judgment, and
hate robbery in a holocaust. " Therefore it is not lawful to take
anything by robbery.
I answer that, Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion employed
in taking unjustly from a man that which is his.
reason to maim a person.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot. "
I answer that, Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is
for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a
member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is
expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself
useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen
to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to
the whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and retains
its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury to the
whole body. But as the whole of man is directed as to his end to the
whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above
([2907]Q[61], A[1];[2908] Q[64], AA[2],5), it may happen that although
the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may
nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so far as it
is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of restraining
sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is lawfully deprived of
life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so is he
deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins. But this is not
lawful for a private individual, even with the consent of the owner of
the member, because this would involve an injury to the community, to
whom the man and all his parts belong. If, however, the member be
decayed and therefore a source of corruption to the whole body, then it
is lawful with the consent of the owner of the member, to cut away the
member for the welfare of the whole body, since each one is entrusted
with the care of his own welfare. The same applies if it be done with
the consent of the person whose business it is to care for the welfare
of the person who has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether
unlawful to maim anyone.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a
particular nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus
death and corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the
particular nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping
with universal nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary
to the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is
nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common
good.
Reply to Objection 2: The life of the entire man is not directed to
something belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is
directed to his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to
take anyone's life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted
the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be
directed to the good of one man, and consequently in certain cases can
pertain to him.
Reply to Objection 3: A member should not be removed for the sake of
the bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to
further the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further
one's spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, because
sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no case is it
allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever. Hence
Chrysostom, in his exposition on Mat. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in Matth. ),
"There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of
heaven," says: "Not by maiming themselves, but by destroying evil
thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself, since they are
murderers who do such things. " And further on he says: "Nor is lust
tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more importunate, for the
seed springs in us from other sources, and chiefly from an incontinent
purpose and a careless mind: and temptation is curbed not so much by
cutting off a member as by curbing one's thoughts. "
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Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their
slaves?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their
children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4):
"You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger"; and further on
(Eph. 9:6): "And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves [Vulg. :
'to them'] forbearing threatenings. " Now some are provoked to anger by
blows, and become more troublesome when threatened. Therefore neither
should parents strike their children, nor masters their slaves.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a
father's words are admonitory and not coercive. " Now blows are a kind
of coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their
children.
Objection 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for
this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above ([2909]Q[32],
A[2]). If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children
for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for
any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same
conclusion follows.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod
hateth his son," and further on (Prov. 23:13): "Withhold not correction
from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he shall not die.
Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul from hell. "
Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): "Torture and fetters are for a
malicious slave. "
I answer that, Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as when
it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while a blow
merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much less harm
than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a person a harm,
except by way of punishment in the cause of justice. Again, no man
justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction.
Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have
some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject
to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a
parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that
instruction may be enforced by correction.
Reply to Objection 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is
aroused chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to
provoke their children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking
their children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows
on them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear
from threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that
they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of
correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their
threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness
temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: The greater power should exercise the greater
coercion. Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of
a city has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable
punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the father
and the master who preside over the family household, which is an
imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is exercised
by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows, which do not
inflict irreparable harm.
Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a
willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to
those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by
blows.
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Whether it is lawful to imprison a man?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which
deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above
([2910]FS, Q[18], A[2]). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter
for imprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is
unlawful to imprison a man.
Objection 2: Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice.
Now according to Ecclus. 15:14, "God left man in the hand of his own
counsel. " Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by
chains or prisons.
Objection 3: Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from
doing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from doing
this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order to
restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put a
man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion
follows.
On the contrary, We read in Lev. 24 that a man was imprisoned for the
sin of blasphemy.
I answer that, In the goods three things may be considered in due
order. First, the substantial integrity of the body, and this is
injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or rest of the senses,
and to this striking or anything causing a sense of pain is opposed.
Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and this is hindered by
binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention.
Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, unless
it be done according to the order of justice, either in punishment, or
as a measure of precaution against some evil.
Reply to Objection 1: A man who abuses the power entrusted to him
deserves to lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the
free use of his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the order of His wisdom God
sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to Job
5:12: "Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so that
their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes He
allows them to do what they will. " In like manner, according to human
justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain ones.
Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a
time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man
prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from
striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in
general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong
primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him
from doing not only evil but also good deeds.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sin is aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are
perpetrated on those who are connected with others?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact
that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected
with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character from
inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil
inflicted on a man's own person is more against his will than that
which is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an injury
inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous.
Objection 2: Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do
injuries to orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17):
"He will not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when
she poureth out her complaint. " Now the widow and the orphan are not
connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated
through an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others.
Objection 3: Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own
just as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary
for him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the
case of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now these
injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary
commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 28:32) as though indicating an
aggravating circumstance: "Thy sons and thy daughters shall be given to
another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg. : 'May thy sons and thy
daughters be given,' etc. ]. "
I answer that, Other things being equal, an injury is a more grievous
sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is that it is a
more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in authority than a
private individual, because it conduces to the injury of the whole
community, as stated above ([2911]FS, Q[73], A[9]). Now when an injury
is inflicted on one who is connected in any way with another, that
injury affects two persons, so that, other things being equal, the sin
is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen, however, that in view
of certain circumstances, a sin committed against one who is not
connected with any other person, is more grievous, on account of either
the dignity of the person, or the greatness of the injury.
Reply to Objection 1: An injury inflicted on a person connected with
others is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than
if it were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view
it is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the
person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man is
guilty through injuring the other one in himself.
Reply to Objection 2: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more
insisted upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the
same injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they
have no one to turn to for relief.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to
the adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is
concerned, for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed
her by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her
husband, since "the wife hath not power of her own body; but the
husband" (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. of adultery,
however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to chastity, we
shall speak in the treatise on Temperance ([2912]Q[154], A[8]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THEFT AND ROBBERY (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man injures
his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery.
Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things?
(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own?
(3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another's property?
(4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft?
(5) Whether every theft is a sin?
(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?
(7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity?
(8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin?
(9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is natural for man to possess external things?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess
external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is
God's. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God, according
to Ps. 23:1, "The earth is the Lord's," etc. Therefore it is not
natural for man to possess external things.
Objection 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man
(Lk. 12:18), "I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my
goods," says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: "Tell me: which are thine? where
did you take them from and bring them into being? " Now whatever man
possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does
not naturally possess external things.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad
Gratianum, i, 1]) "dominion denotes power. " But man has no power over
external things, since he can work no change in their nature. Therefore
the possession of external things is not natural to man.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 8:8): "Thou hast subjected all
things under his feet. "
I answer that, External things can be considered in two ways. First, as
regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, but
only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as
regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion over
external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use
them for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the
imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated above
([2913]Q[64], A[1]). It is by this argument that the Philosopher proves
(Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external things is natural to man.
Moreover, this natural dominion of man over other creatures, which is
competent to man in respect of his reason wherein God's image resides,
is shown forth in man's creation (Gn. 1:26) by the words: "Let us make
man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the
fishes of the sea," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: God has sovereign dominion over all things: and
He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the
sustenance of man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion
over things, as regards the power to make use of them.
Reply to Objection 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external
things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received them
from another, namely from God.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the dominion over
external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to God
alone, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as his
own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now
according to the natural law all things are common property: and the
possession of property is contrary to this community of goods.
Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external thing
to himself.
Objection 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man
quoted above (A[1], OBJ[2]), says: "The rich who deem as their own
property the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who
by going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and
appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use. " Now it
would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of common
goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what belongs
to the community.
Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp. ], and his
words are quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii. , Can. Sicut hi. ]: "Let
no man call his own that which is common property": and by "common" he
means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it seems
unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres. , haer. 40): "The
'Apostolici' are those who with extreme arrogance have given themselves
that name, because they do not admit into their communion persons who
are married or possess anything of their own, such as both monks and
clerics who in considerable number are to be found in the Catholic
Church. " Now the reason why these people are heretics was because
severing themselves from the Church, they think that those who enjoy
the use of the above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope
of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that it is unlawful
for a man to possess property.
I answer that, Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior
things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this
regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is
necessary to human life for three reasons. First because every man is
more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is
common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labor and
leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where
there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs
are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with
taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be
confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately.
Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is
contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise
more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed.
The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external
things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external
things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to
communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says (1
Tim. 6:17,18): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to
communicate to others," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural
law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be
possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one's own:
but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural
law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive
law, as stated above ([2914]Q[57], AA[2],3). Hence the ownership of
possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto
devised by human reason.
Reply to Objection 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going
beforehand to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts
unlawfully if by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner
a rich man does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking
possession of something which at first was common property, and gives
others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately from
using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): "Why are you rich
while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a
good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? "
Reply to Objection 3: When Ambrose says: "Let no man call his own that
which is common," he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore
he adds: "He who spends too much is a robber. "
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Whether the essence of theft consists in taking another's thing secretly?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take
another's thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not,
apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends
to diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as
indicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some (Is.
3:9):
"They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid
it. " Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in
taking another's thing secretly.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp. , A[2],
OBJ[3], Can. Sicut hi. ]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals
[*Dist. xlvii]: "It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than
to refuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off. " Therefore
just as theft consists in taking another's thing, so does it consist in
keeping it back.
Objection 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that
which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with
another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it is
not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's thing
secretly.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Fur' [thief] is derived from
'furvus' and so from 'fuscus' [dark], because he takes advantage of the
night. "
I answer that, Three things combine together to constitute theft. The
first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to
each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take
possession of what is another's. The second thing belongs to theft as
distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such
as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be
about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another's not as a
possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as
a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his daughter
or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. The third
difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in
a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it belongs properly
to theft that it consists in "taking another's thing secretly. "
Reply to Objection 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a
man employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and
guile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a species
of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is merely a
circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both because it is a
sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.
Reply to Objection 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the
same kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust
detention is included in an unjust taking.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person
simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit
belongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is
the depositary's, and the thing stolen is the thief's, not simply, but
as regards its custody.
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Whether theft and robbery are sins of different species?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of
different species. For theft and robbery differ as "secret" and
"manifest": because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery
is to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of
sins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically. Therefore
theft and robbery are not different species of sin.
Objection 2: Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as
stated above ([2915]FS, Q[1], A[3]; Q[18], A[6]). Now theft and robbery
are directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another's
property. Therefore they do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of
possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore
Isidore says (Etym. x) that "he who commits a rape is called a
corrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted. " Now it
is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or
secretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken by
force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and
robbery do not differ.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft from
robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that robbery is
done openly.
I answer that, Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in as
much as one man does another an injustice. Now "no man suffers an
injustice willingly," as stated in Ethic. v, 9. Wherefore theft and
robbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking being
involuntary on the part of the person from whom something is taken. Now
the involuntary is twofold, namely, through violence and through
ignorance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect of
robbery differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ
specifically.
Reply to Objection 1: In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is
not derived from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to
justice: and so where there is a different kind of involuntary, there
is a different species of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The remote end of robbery and theft is the same.
But this is not enough for identity of species, because there is a
difference of proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing
by his own power, but the thief, by cunning.
Reply to Objection 3: The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the
part of the woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as
regards the others from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery
remains on the part of the woman to whom violence is done.
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Whether theft is always a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin
is commanded by God, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): "He hath
commanded no man to do wickedly. " Yet we find that God commanded theft,
for it is written (Ex. 12:35,36): "And the children of Israel did as
the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg. : 'as Moses had commanded']. . . and
they stripped the Egyptians. " Therefore theft is not always a sin.
Objection 2: Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes
it, he seems to commit a theft, for he takes another's property. Yet
this seems lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold.
[*See loc. cit. in Reply. ] Therefore it seems that theft is not always
a sin.
Objection 3: Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to
sin, because he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy
its equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his
own property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another.
Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:15): "Thou shalt not steal. "
I answer that, If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will find
that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its opposition to
justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that for this reason
theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking of what belongs to
another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the
thief, by laying hands on another's property secretly and cunningly.
Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: It is no theft for a man to take another's
property either secretly or openly by order of a judge who has
commanded him to do so, because it becomes his due by the very fact
that it is adjudicated to him by the sentence of the court. Hence still
less was it a theft for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the
Egyptians at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done on
account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the Egyptians without
any cause: wherefore it is written significantly (Wis. 10:19): "The
just took the spoils of the wicked. "
Reply to Objection 2: With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must
be made. For some there are that were never in anyone's possession, for
instance precious stones and jewels, found on the seashore, and such
the finder is allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst.
II, i, De rerum divis. ]. The same applies to treasure hidden
underground long since and belonging to no man, except that according
to civil law the finder is bound to give half to the owner of the land,
if the treasure trove be in the land of another person [*Inst. II, i,
39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris]. Hence in the parable of the Gospel (Mat.
13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden in a field that
he bought the field, as though he purposed thus to acquire the right of
possessing the whole treasure. On the other Land the treasure-trove may
be nearly in someone's possession: and then if anyone take it with the
intention, not of keeping it but of returning it to the owner who does
not look upon such things as unappropriated, he is not guilty of theft.
In like manner if the thing found appears to be unappropriated, and if
the finder believes it to be so, although he keep it, he does not
commit a theft [*Inst. II, i, 47]. In any other case the sin of theft
is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De acquirend, rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II,
i, 48]: wherefore Augustine says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb.
Apost. ): "If thou hast found a thing and not returned it, thou hast
stolen it" (Dig. xiv, 5, can. Si quid invenisti).
Reply to Objection 3: He who by stealth takes his own property which is
deposited with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound either
to restitution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is clearly
guilty of sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his burden. On
the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own property, if this be
unjustly detained by another, he sins indeed; yet not because he
burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to restitution or
compensation: but he sins against general justice by disregarding the
order of justice and usurping judgment concerning his own property.
Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor to allay whatever
scandal he may have given his neighbor by acting this way.
Whether theft is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it is
written (Prov. 6:30): "The fault is not so great when a man hath
stolen. " But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is not
a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death.
But in the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity,
according to Ex. 22:1, "If any man steal an ox or a sheep . . . he
shall restore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep. "
Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great
things. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with eternal
death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a quill.
Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save for a
mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to Zech. 5:3,
"This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the earth; for
every thief shall be judged as is there written. " Therefore theft is a
mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[59], A[4]; [2916]FS, Q[72], A[5]), a
mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life of
the soul. Now charity consists principally in the love of God, and
secondarily in the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our wishing
and doing him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our neighbor
in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another habitually, human
society would be undone. Therefore theft, as being opposed to charity,
is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The statement that theft is not a great fault is
in view of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through
necessity. This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we
shall show further on [2917](A[7]). Hence the text continues: "For he
stealeth to fill his hungry soul. " Secondly, theft is stated not to be
a great fault in comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is
punished with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that
"if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold . . . but he that is an
adulterer . . . shall destroy his own soul. "
Reply to Objection 2: The punishments of this life are medicinal rather
than retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment
which is pronounced against sinners "according to truth" (Rom. 2:2).
Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death
punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such as
inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some horrible
deformity. Hence according to the present judgment the pain of death is
not inflicted for theft which does not inflict an irreparable harm,
except when it is aggravated by some grave circumstance, as in the case
of sacrilege which is the theft of a sacred thing, of peculation, which
is theft of common property, as Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super
Joan. ), and of kidnaping which is stealing a man, for which the pain of
death is inflicted (Ex. 21:16).
Reply to Objection 3: Reason accounts as nothing that which is little:
so that a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters:
and the person who takes such things can presume that this is not
against the will of the owner. And if a person take such like very
little things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet
if his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a
mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be
through consent in a mere thought.
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Whether it is lawful to steal through stress of need?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need.
For penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is
stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): "If anyone, through stress of
hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do penance
for three weeks. " Therefore it is not lawful to steal through stress of
need.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "there
are some actions whose very name implies wickedness," and among these
he reckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done
for a good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to
remedy a need.
Objection 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now,
according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal in
order to succor one's neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore neither
is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one's own needs.
On the contrary, In cases of need all things are common property, so
that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property, for
need has made it common.
I answer that, Things which are of human right cannot derogate from
natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order
established by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for the
purpose of succoring man's needs by their means. Wherefore the division
and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do not
preclude the fact that man's needs have to be remedied by means of
these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in superabundance
is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. For this
reason Ambrose [*Loc. cit. , A[2], OBJ[3]] says, and his words are
embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut ii): "It is the
hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
store away, the money that you bury in the earth is the price of the
poor man's ransom and freedom. "
Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible
for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is
entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them
he may come to the aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the
need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present
need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a
person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible
remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of
another's property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this
properly speaking theft or robbery.
Reply to Objection 1: This decretal considers cases where there is no
urgent need.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not theft, properly speaking, to take
secretly and use another's property in a case of extreme need: because
that which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own
property by reason of that need.
Reply to Objection 3: In a case of a like need a man may also take
secretly another's property in order to succor his neighbor in need.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether robbery may be committed without sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin.
For spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the
essence of robbery, according to what has been said [2918](A[4]). Now
it is lawful to take spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De
Patriarch. 4 [*De Abraham i, 3]): "When the conqueror has taken
possession of the spoils, military discipline demands that all should
be reserved for the sovereign," in order, to wit, that he may
distribute them. Therefore in certain cases robbery is lawful.
Objection 2: Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his.
Now the things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine
says (Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. xciii. ): "You falsely call things your
own, for you do not possess them justly, and according to the laws of
earthly kings you are commanded to forfeit them. " Therefore it seems
that one may lawfully rob unbelievers.
Objection 3: Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from
their subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would seem a
grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that case
nearly every prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases robbery is
lawful.
On the contrary, Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to God in
sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds of
robbery, according to Is. 61:8, "I am the Lord that love judgment, and
hate robbery in a holocaust. " Therefore it is not lawful to take
anything by robbery.
I answer that, Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion employed
in taking unjustly from a man that which is his.
