The
royal resources were distinctly inferior to those of the English kings, for
a large part of the land was not held directly from the king and he had
no power of instituting general taxation.
royal resources were distinctly inferior to those of the English kings, for
a large part of the land was not held directly from the king and he had
no power of instituting general taxation.
Cambridge Medieval History - v5 - Contest of Empire and the Papacy
R.
T.
C. W. P. -O.
Z. N. B.
January, 1926.
## p. vi (#8) ###############################################
1
## p. vii (#9) ##############################################
INTRODUCTION.
The century and a half, roughly from 1050 to 1200, with which this
volume is concerned, follows on a period when the disorganisation and
anarchy of the ninth century had barely been made good. Order had
been to some extent restored; the desire for order and for peace was at
any rate widespread. The opportunity for fruitful development, both in
the sphere of ecclesiastical and of secular government, and also in those
pursuits which especially needed peace for their prosecution, such as
culture and commerce, had now arrived. We have to deal, then, with a
period, on the one hand, of new movements and new ideas—the appearance
of new monastic orders, a renaissance of thought and learning, the rise of
towns and the expansion of commerce; on the other, of consolidation and
centralisation-the organisation of the monarchical government of the
Church, the development of monarchical institutions in the various
countries of Europe, and, to give direction and solidity to the whole, the
revived study of Civil and Canon Law. Finally, and most novel of all,
we see Europe at once divided by the great conflict of Empire and Papacy
and united by the Crusades in the holy war against the infidel. The
former as well as the latter implies a conception of the unity of Western
Christendom, a unity which found expression in the universal Church,
For the Church alone was universal, European, international; and, as its
institutions begin to take more definite form, the more deeply is this
character impressed upon them.
The volume opens with a chapter on the Reform of the Church,
which was not merely a prelude to, but also a principal cause of, the
striking events that followed; for in the pursuit of the work of reform
the Papacy both developed its own organisation and was brought into
conflict with the secular power. In the first half of the eleventh century,
it had been entirely dominated by the secular interests of the local nobles.
It had been rescued by the Emperor Henry III, and Pope Leo IX had
immediately taken his natural place as leader of the reform movement.
When he undertook personally, in France, Germany, and Italy, the
promulgation and enforcement of the principles of reform, he made the
universality of papal power a reality; the bishops might mutter, but the
people adored. The Papacy was content to take a subordinate place
while Henry III was alive; Henry IV's minority worked a complete
## p. viii (#10) ############################################
viii
Introduction
change. The first great step was the Papal Election Decree of Nicholas
II, and, though the attempt of the Roman nobles to recover their influence
was perhaps the immediate cause, the Papacy took the opportunity to
shake off imperial control as well. An opening for interference still
remained in the case of a disputed election, as was clearly shewn in the
contest of Innocent II and Anastasius II, and especially in that of
Alexander III and Victor IV. This gap was closed by the Third Lateran
Council in 1179, which decreed that whoever obtained the votes of two-
thirds of the cardinals should be declared Pope.
The Papal Election Decree had a further result. By giving to the
cardinals the decision at an election, and reducing other interests to a
merely nominal right of assent, it raised the College of Cardinals to a
position of the highest importance. There were normally at this time
7 (later 6) cardinal-bishops, 28 cardinal-priests, and 18 cardinal-deacons,
and, unless they were employed on papal business, their functions were
confined to Rome. Leo IX had surrounded himself with cardinals who
were reformers like himself; they composed the chief element in the Pope's
Council, or, as it came to be called, the Curia. But he could not find
them in Rome, and had to recruit them from the chief reforming centres,
especially north of the Alps. As they were, and continued to be, drawn from
different countries, so in them was displayed the international character
of the Roman Church; and from their number, in almost every case, was
the Pope elected. A further development came when Alexander III
instituted the practice of including bishops from different parts of
Europe among the cardinals; for the regular duties and residence of such
cardinals were no longer in Rome itself.
The freedom of episcopal elections in general was in the forefront of
the reform programme. The papal policy was to restore canonical
election “by clergy and people," a vague phrase which received its
definition at Rome in the Election Decree. During the twelfth century
a similar definition was arrived at for other sees. The cathedral chapter,
helped by its corporate unity, and especially by the fact that it constituted
the permanent portion of the bishop's concilium and that its consent was
necessary in any disposition of the property of the see, established itself
as the electoral body. To the clergy of the diocese and the lay vassals of
the see was left, as at Rome, only the right of assent and acclamation.
The chapter thus became the local counterpart of the College of Cardinals.
The Papacy was principally concerned with the freedom of elections, and
did not yet claim the right of appointment for itself, except in cases of
dispute. The Third Lateran Council, which gave the decision at a papal
election to a majority vote, expressly decreed that elsewhere the old rule
## p. ix (#11) ##############################################
Introduction
ix
of the “maior et sanior pars” was to hold good; for, with the exception
of Rome, there was a higher authority which could decide in cases of
dispute.
Leo IX had initiated the campaign of reform at Councils in France and
Germany. The Councils over which the Popes presided passed decrees
which were to be universally binding. Usually they were held in Rome,
and regularly in Lent by Gregory VII. In them, besides the Curia, any
leading ecclesiastic who happened to be at the papal court, whether on a
visit or in obedience to a personal summons, took part, just as the nobles
did in a king's Council. A further development occurred in the twelfth
century. Hitherto all the Councils recognised by the Western Church as
Ecumenical had taken place in the East. The schism of 1054 had cut off
the Greek Church from communion with Rome, and in the twelfth
century three Councils were held, each of them at Rome in the Lateran
basilica, which, owing to the importance of their business and the general
rather than particular summonses which were issued, were included later
among the Ecumenical Councils. The First Lateran Council in 1123
ratified the Concordat of Worms, the Second in 1139 solemnised the end
of a schism, and the Third in 1179 the end of another and a greater one.
The next step was the local enforcement of the papal decrees. The
Church had its local officials—archbishops, bishops etc. —and they were
expected both to promulgate the decrees at local synods and to enforce
their execution. It soon became clear that the bishops regarded them-
selves as anything but the docile officials of the central government, and
the Papacy had to establish its authority and to work out a coordinated
system of government by which its policy could be carried into effect.
First of all, for the Pope could no longer do everything in person
like
Leo IX, legates were sent to act in his name, travelling about, like the
Carolingian missi, with overriding authority, to investigate the local
churches and put into force the papal decrees. The appointment of legates
for this general work tends more and more to take a permanent form, and
soon the post of permanent legate—a position of high honour and at the
same time of personal responsibility to the Pope-becomes the prerogative
of the leading ecclesiastics in each country. But the Pope still continued
to send legates from Rome, both as ambassadors to temporal sovereigns
and as functionaries with special commissions; these legates a latere as
direct papal agents again had overriding powers. It was not sufficient,
however, for the Pope to control the local officials through his repre-
sentatives. He insisted on their personal contact with himself. Visits
ad limina were first of all encouraged and then directly ordered, and
archbishops were expected to receive the pallium from the Pope in person. .
## p. x (#12) ###############################################
X
Introduction
It is impossible to say how far at any time this development of papal
authority was deliberate, and how far it arose out of the practical
exigencies of the moment. It became conscious at any rate with Gregory
VII, though even with him the moving cause at first was to enforce the
principles of reform. Opposition, whether from the local officials or from
the lay power, led to a definition of the bases on which this authority
rested and the sphere within which it could be exercised. The decretals,
especially the Forged Decretals, provided a solid foundation, and to
build upon this came opportunely the revived study of the Canon Law.
It is not a question of a finished legal system, but of a continuous process
of construction, in which the legal training of Popes like Urban II and
Alexander III was of great value. Collections of decretals and opinions,
of which Gratian's was the most complete, were continually being added
to by the decrees of Roman Councils and the decisions of Popes given in
their letters. This led to uniformity in ritual also, to the victory of the
Roman use over local customs; for here again it was the Roman that
was to be universal.
In the papal government, even on its ecclesiastical side, there is a
general resemblance to the secular governments of the day. Like a lay
monarch, the Pope was concerned with the organisation of central and
local government, with the formation of a legal system, and with the
recognition of his overriding jurisdiction. When we come to the secular
side of papal government, the resemblance is still more close. Both as
landlord and overlord the Pope acted as any secular ruler, though payments
in money and kind are the usual services rendered to him, rather than
military service; for this he was really dependent on external assistance.
The problem of finance faced him, as it faced every secular ruler. The
work of government, both ecclesiastical and secular, involved the expenses
of government, and, though in ordinary times the revenue from the Papal
States might be sufficient, a period of conflict, by increasing expenditure
or by preventing the Pope from obtaining his ordinary revenues, would
create serious financial difficulties. This was especially the case with
Urban II, and still more with Alexander III, in the crisis of the conflict
with the Empire; and, in the interval of peace, the Pope was seriously
embarrassed by the sustained effort of the Roman people to obtain self-
government.
We have a detailed account of various sources of papal revenue at the
end of our period in the Liber Censuum drawn up under the direction of
the camerarius Cencius, afterwards Pope Honorius III, in the year 1192.
Besides the revenue from the papal domain proper, a census
received: (1) from monasteries who had placed themselves under the papal
was
## p. xi (#13) ##############################################
Introduction
xi
"protection," and who in the course of the twelfth century gained
exemption from the spiritual as well as the temporal control of their
diocesans ; (2) from some lay rulers and nobles, who put themselves under
papal “protection " or, like the kings of Aragon and the Norman rulers
of South Italy and Sicily, recognised papal overlordship; (3) in the form
of Peter's Pence, from England since Anglo-Saxon times, and, in the
twelfth century, from Norway, Sweden, and some other countries as well.
But the census provided only a relatively small revenue, and this was
difficult to collect; there were frequent complaints of arrears of payment,
especially with regard to Peter's Pence. On the other hand, the papal ex-
penditure was often heavy. Alexander III had frequently to have recourse
to borrowing; and his complaints about some of his creditors seem to have
an echo in the decree against usury at the Third Lateran Council. In its
difficulties the Papacy had to depend upon the voluntary offerings of the
faithful, especially from France, on subsidies from the Normans, or on
the support of a wealthy Roman family; thus the Pierleoni constantly
supplied the Popes with money, until one member of the family,
Anacletus II, was defeated in his attempt to ascend the papal throne.
We are still in the early days of papal financial history. Not yet were
the visitation offerings from bishops made compulsory, and the servitia
taxes and annates had not yet been introduced. Nor did the Popes claim
the right to tax the clergy, though perhaps the first step to this was taken
in the second half of the twelfth century, when prohibitions were issued
against the taxation of the clergy by lay rulers without papal consent.
At any rate the desire to finance the Crusades soon led them to assert the
right.
As the Reform Movement had led directly to the creation of a
centralised government of the Church, so too it led, almost inevitably, to
the contest for supremacy between the Papacy and its counterpart on the
secular side, the Empire. Those ecclesiastics whom the Pope expected to
be his obedient officials in the local government of the Church were
already the obedient officials of the Empire both in its central and its
local government. The Pope was on strong ground in insisting that the
spiritual duties of the bishop were his primary consideration. But the
Emperor was on strong ground too. The ecclesiastical nobles were an
essential part of the economic framework and the political machinery of
the Empire, and to justify his authority over them the Emperor could
point to an almost unbroken tradition. The relative importance of
spiritual and temporal considerations in the medieval mind gave an
initial advantage to the Pope, and in the end the victory. On the other
## p. xii (#14) #############################################
xii
Introduction
hand, the Emperor could appeal not only to the iron law of necessity, but
to the medieval reverence for custom and precedent. Henry IV, moreover,
could not forget that the Papacy had itself been subject to his father, and
it was his object to recover what he considered to be his lawful authority.
With this aim he deliberately provoked the contest. The details of the
struggle are described in several chapters in this volume, and need only
be briefly alluded to here. Henry's challenge was taken up by his greater
opponent, Pope Gregory VII, who in his turn claimed the supreme power
for the Papacy; there could be no real peace until the question of
supremacy was settled. Though on this issue the first contest was
indecisive, the Papacy registered a striking advance. The Concordat of
Worms marked a definite limitation of imperial authority over the
ecclesiastical nobility, and it was followed by the reigns of Lothar III and
Conrad III, when the German ruler was too complaisant or too weak to
press his claims. The Pope was emboldened to take the offensive, and
Hadrian IV threw down the challenge that was taken up by Frederick
Barbarossa. The positions were reversed, but again the challenger found
himself faced by a greater opponent, who again defended himself by
asserting his own supremacy. Once more the result was indecisive.
The Pope had a single cause to maintain, the Emperor a dual one.
i Henry IV was defeated by revolt in Germany, Frederick Barbarossa by
revolt in Italy, and both alike had been forced to recognise the
impossibility of maintaining a subservient anti-Pope. But the greatness
of Frederick was never so conspicuous as in his recovery after defeat, and
his son Henry VI seemed to be on the point of making the Empire once
more supreme when death intervened to ruin the imperial cause. Herein
was revealed the second great asset of the Papacy. Built on the rock of
spiritual power, the weakness or death of its head was of little permanent
moment. The Empire, however, depended on the personality of each of
its rulers, and the transference of authority on the deaths of Henry III
and Henry VI was on each occasion disastrous. During the minority of
Henry IV, the Papacy had built up its power; in the minority of
Frederick II, Innocent III was Pope.
In this struggle of Empire and Papacy no insignificant part was played
by the Norman rulers of South Italy and Sicily, whose history falls
exactly within the compass of this volume. Frequently did they come to
the help of the Papacy in its extremity, and skilfully did they make use
of papal exigencies to improve their own position. Only once did the
Pope whom they supported fail to maintain himself; and the victory of
Innocent II over Anastasius II, chosen by a majority of the cardinals and
backed by Norman arms, was in many respects unique. Then, and then
!
## p. xiii (#15) ############################################
Introduction
xiii
only, did Pope and Emperor combine against the Normans, but there was
no stability in an alliance so unusual. In the Sicilian kingdom were
displayed the peculiar characteristics of the Norman race—its military
prowess and ferocity, its genius for administration, its adaptability and
eclecticism. They brought from Normandy the feudal customs they had
there acquired, but they maintained and converted to their use the
officials and institutions, the arts and sciences, of the races they conquered-
Italian, Greek, and Arab—each of which was tolerated in the use of its
own language, religion, and customs. The court of Roger II at Palermo
presented an appearance unlike anything else in the West; and the
essential product of this extraordinary environment was “the wonder of
the world,” Frederick II. The Normans pieced together a most remarkable
mosaic, but they never made a nation of their subjects; the elements were
too discordant, and they themselves too few. They remained a ruling
caste, and then, as the royal house, once so prolific, gradually became
sterile, Frederick Barbarossa seized the opportunity to marry his son
Henry VI to the heiress Constance and to unite the crowns of Germany
and Sicily. But, though the Norman rulers had disappeared, their deeds
survived; for their own purposes they had recognised papal overlordship
and received from the Pope their titles as dukes and kings. By so doing
they added materially to the temporal authority of the Papacy, and
created the situation which made so bitter the conflict of Empire and
Papacy in the thirteenth century.
As the Normans exercised an important influence on the great
struggle which divided the unity of Europe, so did they also have a de-
cisive effect upon the other great struggle, in which Europe was united
against the infidel. The story of the Crusades is described in this volume
from the Western point of view, and it has already been told from the
Eastern standpoint in Volume IV. Its importance in world-history, and
also in the more limited field of European history, need not be stressed
here; but it is worth while to characterise the different interests involved,
and to regard the Crusading movement in its proper setting, as an episode
in the general history of the relations of East and West. It was not
merely a Holy War between Christian and Muslim. The Seljūqs, already
in decline and hampered by internal divisions, were concerned with the
effort to maintain what they had won. The Eastern Empire was con-
cerned firstly with the defence of its existence, secondly with the recovery
of Asia Minor. The Latins, to whom they appealed for help, were inte-
rested rather in Syria and Palestine, to which they were equally attracted
by religious enthusiasm and by the prospects of territory or trade. Europe
also had its own injuries to avenge. It too had suffered from Saracen
C. MED. H. VOL. V.
b
## p. xiv (#16) #############################################
xiv
Introduction
invaders, against whom it was now beginning to react—in the advance of
the Christian kingdoms in Spain, in the Norman conquest of Sicily, in
the capture of Mahdiyah by Genoa and Pisa in 1087. The Crusades were,
in one aspect, an extension Eastwards of this reaction, a change
from the defensive to the offensive. Against a common foe Eastern and
Western Christians had a common cause, but the concord went no further.
In the first place, seventeen years before the fatal battle of Manzikert,
which had caused the Eastern Empire to turn to the West for aid, the
great Schism between the Eastern and Western Churches had already
occurred. One of the results hoped for from the First Crusade was the
healing of that schism, and to the Western mind the obstinate perversity
of the Greek Church made it as dangerous an enemy of the faith as
Mohammedanism itself. And, secondly, the Normans in South Italy had
conquered Greeks as well as Saracens, and their first advance eastwards
was against Greeks not against Saracens. Robert Guiscard by his attack
on the Eastern Empire in 1081 began the policy, which was continued
by his successors and was adopted by the Emperor Henry VI as part of
his Norman inheritance. In other quarters, too, the experiences of the
first two Crusades created a body of opinion in favour of the conquest of
the Eastern Empire as a necessary part of the whole movement; this
opinion gathered strength when the Eastern Emperor came to terms with
Saladin to oppose the Western advance which was now a menace to both.
Finally, Venice was alienated by the ambition of Manuel Comnenus and
the folly of Andronicus, and from being the chief obstacle to the Norman
policy became its chief supporter. It was now the aim of the Crusaders
to conquer the whole of the Near East, Christian and Muslim alike, and
their first objective was Constantinople.
In the internal history of Europe this volume deals, outside Italy,
with the three leading countries of Germany, France, and England; the
history of the outlying and more backward countries—Spain, Scandinavia,
Poland, Bohemia, Hungary-is reserved for the next volume. In these
three countries there was much that was similar, for the underlying ideas
inherent in feudal society were common to them all. But similar concep-
tions produced widely differing results. On the one hand, feudal society
with its deep reverence for custom and tradition was much affected by
local conditions and lapse of time. On the other hand, it was peculiarly
sensitive to the workings of human nature, to the ambition of individuals
who stressed the privileges and minimised the obligations arising from the
idea of contract on which the feudal system was essentially based; it was
poised on a delicate balance which the accident of death might immedi-
## p. xv (#17) ##############################################
1
Introduction
XV
ately upset. In the secular governments, as in the ecclesiastical government
of the Church, the trend is in favour of monarchy, and the rulers make,
with varying success, a continual effort towards centralisation; but they
were all at an initial disadvantage compared with the Pope. The success
of the electoral principle might be fatal to monarchical authority; and
the hereditary principle had its dangers too, in the event of a minority
or the failure of a direct heir. The hereditary principle could not be
applied to the Papacy, for which the electoral system worked as a means
of continual development; for the cardinals, having no opportunity of
obtaining an independent position apart from the Pope, had everything
to gain as individuals and nothing to lose by electing the ablest of their
number as Pope.
Monarchy was in the most favourable position in England, and here
it was therefore the most successful. William I started with the initial
advantage that the whole land was his by conquest, and to be dealt with as
he chose. The Normans, here as in Sicily, displayed their genius in adminis-
tration, their adaptability and eclecticism. The political feudalism they
brought from Normandy placed the king in England in the strong posi-
tion that, as duke, he had held in Normandy; and he adopted what he
found suitable to his purpose already existing—the manorial system, the
shire and hundred courts, Danegeld. As it had been won by conquest,
the whole land was royal domain. Wisely the king kept a large share for
himself, though feudal dues and the precedent of general taxation made
him less dependent on his own estates for revenue than were his French
and German contemporaries. The lands he granted out were held
directly from him, as fiefs on military tenure, liable to forfeiture and not
transferable at will. No individual baron could match himself with the
king or hope to establish an independent position. The king was not
dependent upon the barons in the central government, nor were they,
as on the Continent, all-powerful in local government. They were not
officials but tenants-in-chief, and the strength of the Crown in local affairs
is clearly displayed in that the king not only appointed and dismissed
the sheriffs at will, but also insisted on their attendance at his Court and
a rendering of their stewardship at his Exchequer—just as the Pope in-
sisted on the visits ad limina of his local officials, the archbishops and
bishops. So too did royal justice penetrate through the country, with
the system of inquests, writs, and itinerant judges; the local courts were
maintained under royal control, and it was the baronial jurisdiction that
suffered. Not that it was directly attacked; the kings were careful not
to transgress the letter of the feudal contract. But they preserved their
supremacy, and in Church as well as in State; moreover, in spite of
62
## p. xvi (#18) #############################################
xvi
Introduction
1
Henry I's dispute with Anselm and Henry II's long contest with Becket,
they avoided any serious conflict with the Papacy. They were, from
the English point of view, too much absorbed in their continental posses-
sions, which involved long absences of the king and too heavy a burden on
English resources. Yet still, at the end of our period, the monarchy is
at the height of its power, both in England and on the Continent. A
rapid decline set in with John, who not only lost most of his continental
possessions but, by making the mistakes which the wisdom of his pre-
decessors had avoided, entered into a serious conflict both with the Pope
and with the united baronage.
France presents a complete contrast. In the eleventh century the
French monarchy was almost helpless. The great nobles had become
practically independent, and, unlike the nobles in Germany, had ceased
to be even in theory royal officials. The king had to start de novo, and
perhaps in the long run this was an advantage. He was not fettered by
all those traditions of the past which hampered royal initiative in Ger-
many, and the strongest of the fetters had rusted from disuse. The
Capetians had enjoyed the supreme fortune of an uninterrupted succession;
the custom of two centuries hardened into a right; and the electoral
privileges of the nobles gave way to the hereditary right of the eldest
son. In this volume we deal only with the reigns of Louis VI and VII,
during which the monarchy recovered from the weakness of the eleventh
century and prepared the way for the great period which begins with
Philip Augustus. The king had two assets: a domain, which though
small was compact, and the potentialities inherent in the kingly office.
Louis VI, by his wisdom in concentrating almost entirely on the former,
was able eventually to make use of the latter. After a long series of petty
wars, he overcame the brigand-nobles of the domain, and so established
peace and order within it, made the roads safe for merchants and travellers,
and made royal justice attractive. He had his reward in the appeals for
his intervention that came from other quarters. So sure was his building
that even Louis VII managed to add a few bricks to the edifice. The
great vassals absorbed in their own domains ignored the central govern-
ment, and the king, much to his advantage, was able to create a body of
officials directly dependent upon himself. In local government he was
confined almost entirely to the royal domain, but soon, by escheat and
conquest, this was to become the larger part of France; the king reaped
the advantage from the over-aggrandisement of his greatest vassal.
Finally, one source of strength had grown out of past weakness. The
Papacy in the eleventh century had succeeded in carrying out its reform
policy more completely in France than elsewhere, because of the weakness
## p. xvii (#19) ############################################
Introduction
xvii
។
of royal opposition. On France, therefore, it could rely for welcome and
a refuge, whatever the king's attitude, and frequently the Popes availed
themselves of this. The result was that they came to depend, Alexander
III in particular, on French support; this, as the king became powerful,
meant the support of the French king, who soon attained a unique posi-
tion among lay rulers in his relations with the Papacy.
In Germany the situation is much harder to assess; monarchy was
firmly established, with a long tradition of power, but the king was handi-
capped by tradition as well, and still more by his imperial position.
His Italian kingdom prevented him from concentrating upon Germany,
while the long struggle with the Papacy gave the opportunity for the
anti-monarchical forces in both countries to defeat his aims at centralisa-
tion. Another weakness was the lack of continuity. More than once
already the king had left no son to succeed him, and twice again this
happened within our period. So the hereditary principle was never estab-
lished, and the grip of the electors tightened with each vacancy.
The
royal resources were distinctly inferior to those of the English kings, for
a large part of the land was not held directly from the king and he had
no power of instituting general taxation. The royal domain, in which in
a sense must be included the ecclesiastical territories held from the king,
was widely scattered, and the king was unable to concentrate on one area,
as Louis VI did in France. Henry IV attempted this in Saxony, and was
defeated by the Saxon revolt; Henry V's attempt in the Rhine district
was cut short by his death; Lothar III started with an extensive Saxon
domain, but again a change of dynasty upset his plans; Frederick Bar-
barossa, who added his Swabian domain to the Salian inheritance, was
the most favourably placed of all, and he was the most powerful. He it
was too who solved the problem of the duchies.
The German kings, while very powerful compared with their French
contemporaries, were still hampered by the conditions to which the
weakness of the ninth century had given rise, and from which they had
never been able to shake themselves free. Germany had been saved from
the fate of France in the ninth century by the tribal feeling, which
prevented her from breaking up into small units. But the very cohesion
of the tribal duchies was a handicap to the central authority. In the first
place, tribal institutions and tribal customs were too strong to be over-
ridden, and tended to make of Germany a federation rather than a nation;
and, secondly, the dukes, as leaders of the tribes, were a constant embar-
rassment to the king. Various expedients had been adopted, from Otto I
onwards, to control them, but once again in the twelfth century they had
risen, in Swabia, Bavaria, and Saxony, to a position little inferior to that
## p. xviii (#20) ###########################################
xviii
Introduction
of their predecessors in the ninth century. The fall of Henry the Lion
at last gave Frederick Barbarossa the opportunity, by partitioning the
duchies, to destroy the old tribal units. The smaller units he could more
easily control, but he did nothing to replace the tribal bond by a national
bond, and so Germany became a federation of many small states in place
of a few large ones.
What stood in his way particularly was the status of the German
nobility. Dukes, margraves, and counts remained in theory what they
had once been in fact-royal officials, entrusted with local government
and jurisdiction. These functions they now exercised by hereditary right,
and themselves reaped the financial advantages. So, while the nobles
could often interfere in the central government, the king, where he was
not present, could not control the local government. One important
change he did make, by which a landed status tended to supersede the
official status. The first rank of German nobles, the principes, had included
all holders of official titles, lay and ecclesiastical. After 1180, only those
who held directly from the king were ranked as “princes. ” So, while the
bishops and the abbots of royal abbeys retained princely rank (and were
often, in a real sense, royal officials), only some sixteen lay nobles remained
in the highest grade. The princes of Germany had the right of choosing
the king; this right was now confined to a much smaller number, and
already it was recognised that with a privileged few the real decision lay.
The elective system was becoming crystallised, and both Frederick
Barbarossa and Henry VI vainly attempted to combat it. Frederick was
a great ruler himself, a great respecter of law, a great guardian of order.
But, though he was successful in preserving order in Germany, he had to
be present himself to enforce it. The local magnates, though with a landed
rather than an official status, continued like the princes to exercise local
control. No attempt was made by Frederick to imitate the English kings,
to create a bureaucracy directly responsible to himself and by a system
of itinerant justices to enforce locally the king's law and to make the
king's justice universal. He was so scrupulous in his administration of
feudal custom that it was hardly possible that he should contemplate
such a change. It was the nobles who instituted the process against
Henry the Lion, and it was they, and not the king, who reaped the results
of his fall. In fact, there was no real effort at centralisation in Germany,
and this was fatal to German unity and so to monarchy in Germany.
Hitherto the political side of feudalism had been displayed in arrange-
ments or conflicts between the king on the one side and the nobles on
the other. But now, as the more settled state of things gave opportunity
## p. xix (#21) #############################################
Introduction
xix
for the development of more peaceful pursuits, a third factor enters in
with the rise of the towns. In this volume we are concerned with the
political importance of these urban communities, and the economic history
of the development and organisation of trade and industry, as well as of
agricultural conditions, is reserved for later volumes. The king was
naturally interested in keeping control of the towns, which provided
useful sources of revenue: in England the leading boroughs were retained
as royal boroughs by William I and were heavily taxed by Henry I; in
Germany there were many royal towns, and, as most towns were under
a bishop, royal control was usually maintained. The towns, for their part,
were anxious to hold directly from the king, and were willing to pay the
price. For the king alone could legally grant the privileges they coveted,
and a strong monarchy was the best guarantee of the peace which was
so necessary a condition for the expansion of trade and industry. They
were, therefore, naturally on the side of the king against the nobles, and
often rendered him valuable support. The work of Louis VI in the royal
domain was so much to their interest that we find the towns a constant
ally of monarchy in France, though the kings until Philip Augustus were
slow to recognise the advantage this gave them. In England, the support
of London was one of Stephen's chief assets. In Germany, the assistance
of the Rhine towns turned the tide in favour of Henry IV when his fortunes
were at their lowest ebb, and he never lost their support. Henry V,
depending at first on the nobles, had to throw over the towns, but he tried
energetically, though not altogether successfully, to regain their support
later on. The twelfth century was the great flowering period of corporate
town-life in Germany, aided by royal grants of self-government.
Frederick II in the thirteenth century handed the towns over to the
nobles ; they were forced to depend upon themselves, and adopted the
plan of leagues for mutual support and the furtherance of trade.
In the towns of northern and central Italy, for different reasons, this
stage had already been reached in the twelfth century; the motives
governing their actions, though the same as elsewhere, led to contrary
results. The Italian towns had been accustomed to city-organisation from
Roman times, and their geographical situation caused an earlier develop-
ment of trade and greater prosperity than elsewhere in Europe. Some
of them had already acquired charters and liberties in the eleventh century,
and they found their opportunity when they were practically left to
themselves by Lothar III and Conrad III. During this period they
suppressed the local feudal nobility, who made peaceful trading impossible,
and, getting rid of their episcopal lords, established themselves as self-
governing communities. The royal power had not assisted them, and was
## p. xx (#22) ##############################################
XX
Introduction
now the only bar to complete independence. They had violated the
sovereign rights of the Emperor, and such a breach with feudal law could
only be made good by revolution. Frederick Barbarossa was entirely
within his rights in enforcing at Roncaglia the recovery of the regalia, so
important a source of revenue, which they had usurped. The towns
justified themselves by success, and, though they consented to an outward
recognition of imperial overlordship, the tie was too slender to affect their
independence. But the league of Italian cities, its defensive purpose
achieved, did not continue, as the later leagues in Germany, for the
preservation of order and the mutual furtherance of trade. City rivalries
and trade jealousies counterbalanced the bond of common interest, and
the cities suffered from constant internal as well as external strife;
rise of oligarchies of wealth led to class struggles, and the competition
of different crafts to conflicts between the gilds.
In an age when monarchical government, secular and ecclesiastical,
was not only regarded as divinely instituted but was also the best guarantee
of peace and order, the capacity of the ruler was of the first importance
and attention is focussed upon individuals. The second half of the eleventh
century is dominated by the personality of Pope Gregory VII, the second
half of the twelfth by that of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. In the
middle period it is neither lay ruler nor ecclesiastical ruler, but a Cistercian
abbot, St Bernard, who fills the centre of the stage; and that this could
be so is a sign of the effect on medieval life of spiritual considerations.
It was the admiration felt for the holiness of his life, and his reputation
as a great and fearless preacher, that gave St Bernard his extraordinary
influence over his generation. He figures in several chapters in this volume,
and his life-story provides an epitome of most of the leading features
of contemporary human endeavour. It was an age of new monastic experi-
ments, which were of great importance in the life of the Church; for
monastic reform had preluded, and constantly recurred to reinvigorate,
the Reform of the Church as a whole. Not only did St Bernard's out-
standing personality make Cistercianism the most popular Order of the
day; his ardent zeal put new life into the older Benedictine monasteries
and materially assisted the beginnings of the other new Orders-
Carthusians, Templars, Premonstratensians, Augustinian canons; par-
ticularly did he encourage the substitution of regular for secular canons
in cathedral chapters. The twelfth century witnessed also a new wave of
intellectual endeavour, and St Bernard was the arbiter on some of the
leading questions of the day, including the condemnation of Abelard and
Arnold of Brescia in 1140, and the less successful trial of Gilbert de la
## p. xxi (#23) #############################################
Introduction
xxi
Porrée in 1147. In this way he exercised an unfortunate influence; his
rigid orthodoxy made him immediately suspicious of a critical mind, and
was more in place in combating the heresy which was already beginning
to spread in the south of France.
In a larger sphere he also predominated. It was his decision in favour
of Innocent II that settled the issue of the papal schism following the
death of Honorius II in 1130. It was his preaching that kindled the
Second Crusade, and his influence that caused the Kings of France and
Germany to participate in it; its disastrous failure reacted on his
popularity but did not deter him from attempting to assemble a new
crusade. He not only laid down rules of life for bishops, monks, secular
clergy, and laity, but he dispatched admonitions and censures, in the
plainest of language, to Popes, cardinals, and kings. Most interesting of
all is the long lecture he addressed to Eugenius III on the duties of the
papal office—the De Consideratione. In this he develops a view of the
extent of spiritual authority that did not fall short of the extreme concep-
tion of Gregory VII; he speaks of the plenitudo potestatis of the Pope and
of the two swords, material as well as spiritual, belonging to the Church.
But, on the other hand, he was quite emphatic that this power must be
used for spiritual purposes only, and the idea of the Pope as a ruler is
abhorrent to him. The Pope has a ministerium not a dominatio; the
Roman Church is the mater not the domina of all the churches; the Pope's
power is “in criminibus non in possessionibus. ” He is especially vehement
against the increasing absorption of the Pope in the pomps and secular
cares of his office, and though his treatise does not supply a very practical
solution of the difficulties with which the Pope was faced, it does convey
a timely warning, and in a sense a prophecy of the fate that was soon
to overtake the Papacy.
## p. xxii (#24) ############################################
xxii
CORRIGENDA.
Vol. III.
p. 121, 1. 19. For Courci-sur-Dive read Courci-sur-Dives.
p. 250, 1. 6. For St Vanne's read St Vannes.
INDEX.
p. 663, col. 2. For Courci-sur-Dive read Courci-sur-Dives.
Vol. IV.
p. xvi, Chap. 1, 1. 2. Delete late.
p. 119, 1. 11. For Hubaira read Hubairah.
p. 120, 11. 6-7. For still 7000 men read 7000 men to meet the advancing enemy.
p. 120, 1. 36, p. 124, 1. 10, p. 126, 11. 33, 38, p. 128, 1. 23, p. 133, 1. 5. For Semaluos
read Semalus.
p. 120, n. 2. For "Taiba' read "Țaibah. '
p. 123, passim and p. 124, 1. 6. For Thumāma read Thumămah.
p. 123, 11. 18 and 16 from bottom and p. 124, 1. 7. For īsa read ‘īsà.
p. 126, 1. 9. For Vardan read Bardanes.
p. 127, 11. 11 and 13-14. For Harthama reud Harthamah.
p. 133, 1. 4. For Bugha read Bughā.
p. 135, 11. 3 and 8. For Balāta read Balātah.
p. 138, headline and I. 15. For Khafāja read Khafājah.
p. 234, 1. 5. For a thousand read eleven hundred.
p. 316, last line. For Kerbogha read Karboghā.
p. 359, 1. 7 from bottom. For Bizāʻa read Buzāʻah.
p. 367, 1. 22. For abandoned the Crusade read quitted the army.
p. 375, 1. 7 from bottom. For Bukaia read Buqai'ah.
p. 711, 1. 10 from bottom. For 911 read 912.
p. 899, an. 757. For Paul IV read Paul I.
Index.
p. 913, col 1. Insert entry Andrasus, p. 125 n.
p. 918, col. 1. For Balāța read Balāțah.
p. 920, col. 2. Delete entry Bizā‘a.
p. 922, col. 1. For Bugha read Bughā.
Delete entry Bukaia.
p. 922, col. 2. Insert entry Buqai'ah, the, battle of, 375.
C. W. P. -O.
Z. N. B.
January, 1926.
## p. vi (#8) ###############################################
1
## p. vii (#9) ##############################################
INTRODUCTION.
The century and a half, roughly from 1050 to 1200, with which this
volume is concerned, follows on a period when the disorganisation and
anarchy of the ninth century had barely been made good. Order had
been to some extent restored; the desire for order and for peace was at
any rate widespread. The opportunity for fruitful development, both in
the sphere of ecclesiastical and of secular government, and also in those
pursuits which especially needed peace for their prosecution, such as
culture and commerce, had now arrived. We have to deal, then, with a
period, on the one hand, of new movements and new ideas—the appearance
of new monastic orders, a renaissance of thought and learning, the rise of
towns and the expansion of commerce; on the other, of consolidation and
centralisation-the organisation of the monarchical government of the
Church, the development of monarchical institutions in the various
countries of Europe, and, to give direction and solidity to the whole, the
revived study of Civil and Canon Law. Finally, and most novel of all,
we see Europe at once divided by the great conflict of Empire and Papacy
and united by the Crusades in the holy war against the infidel. The
former as well as the latter implies a conception of the unity of Western
Christendom, a unity which found expression in the universal Church,
For the Church alone was universal, European, international; and, as its
institutions begin to take more definite form, the more deeply is this
character impressed upon them.
The volume opens with a chapter on the Reform of the Church,
which was not merely a prelude to, but also a principal cause of, the
striking events that followed; for in the pursuit of the work of reform
the Papacy both developed its own organisation and was brought into
conflict with the secular power. In the first half of the eleventh century,
it had been entirely dominated by the secular interests of the local nobles.
It had been rescued by the Emperor Henry III, and Pope Leo IX had
immediately taken his natural place as leader of the reform movement.
When he undertook personally, in France, Germany, and Italy, the
promulgation and enforcement of the principles of reform, he made the
universality of papal power a reality; the bishops might mutter, but the
people adored. The Papacy was content to take a subordinate place
while Henry III was alive; Henry IV's minority worked a complete
## p. viii (#10) ############################################
viii
Introduction
change. The first great step was the Papal Election Decree of Nicholas
II, and, though the attempt of the Roman nobles to recover their influence
was perhaps the immediate cause, the Papacy took the opportunity to
shake off imperial control as well. An opening for interference still
remained in the case of a disputed election, as was clearly shewn in the
contest of Innocent II and Anastasius II, and especially in that of
Alexander III and Victor IV. This gap was closed by the Third Lateran
Council in 1179, which decreed that whoever obtained the votes of two-
thirds of the cardinals should be declared Pope.
The Papal Election Decree had a further result. By giving to the
cardinals the decision at an election, and reducing other interests to a
merely nominal right of assent, it raised the College of Cardinals to a
position of the highest importance. There were normally at this time
7 (later 6) cardinal-bishops, 28 cardinal-priests, and 18 cardinal-deacons,
and, unless they were employed on papal business, their functions were
confined to Rome. Leo IX had surrounded himself with cardinals who
were reformers like himself; they composed the chief element in the Pope's
Council, or, as it came to be called, the Curia. But he could not find
them in Rome, and had to recruit them from the chief reforming centres,
especially north of the Alps. As they were, and continued to be, drawn from
different countries, so in them was displayed the international character
of the Roman Church; and from their number, in almost every case, was
the Pope elected. A further development came when Alexander III
instituted the practice of including bishops from different parts of
Europe among the cardinals; for the regular duties and residence of such
cardinals were no longer in Rome itself.
The freedom of episcopal elections in general was in the forefront of
the reform programme. The papal policy was to restore canonical
election “by clergy and people," a vague phrase which received its
definition at Rome in the Election Decree. During the twelfth century
a similar definition was arrived at for other sees. The cathedral chapter,
helped by its corporate unity, and especially by the fact that it constituted
the permanent portion of the bishop's concilium and that its consent was
necessary in any disposition of the property of the see, established itself
as the electoral body. To the clergy of the diocese and the lay vassals of
the see was left, as at Rome, only the right of assent and acclamation.
The chapter thus became the local counterpart of the College of Cardinals.
The Papacy was principally concerned with the freedom of elections, and
did not yet claim the right of appointment for itself, except in cases of
dispute. The Third Lateran Council, which gave the decision at a papal
election to a majority vote, expressly decreed that elsewhere the old rule
## p. ix (#11) ##############################################
Introduction
ix
of the “maior et sanior pars” was to hold good; for, with the exception
of Rome, there was a higher authority which could decide in cases of
dispute.
Leo IX had initiated the campaign of reform at Councils in France and
Germany. The Councils over which the Popes presided passed decrees
which were to be universally binding. Usually they were held in Rome,
and regularly in Lent by Gregory VII. In them, besides the Curia, any
leading ecclesiastic who happened to be at the papal court, whether on a
visit or in obedience to a personal summons, took part, just as the nobles
did in a king's Council. A further development occurred in the twelfth
century. Hitherto all the Councils recognised by the Western Church as
Ecumenical had taken place in the East. The schism of 1054 had cut off
the Greek Church from communion with Rome, and in the twelfth
century three Councils were held, each of them at Rome in the Lateran
basilica, which, owing to the importance of their business and the general
rather than particular summonses which were issued, were included later
among the Ecumenical Councils. The First Lateran Council in 1123
ratified the Concordat of Worms, the Second in 1139 solemnised the end
of a schism, and the Third in 1179 the end of another and a greater one.
The next step was the local enforcement of the papal decrees. The
Church had its local officials—archbishops, bishops etc. —and they were
expected both to promulgate the decrees at local synods and to enforce
their execution. It soon became clear that the bishops regarded them-
selves as anything but the docile officials of the central government, and
the Papacy had to establish its authority and to work out a coordinated
system of government by which its policy could be carried into effect.
First of all, for the Pope could no longer do everything in person
like
Leo IX, legates were sent to act in his name, travelling about, like the
Carolingian missi, with overriding authority, to investigate the local
churches and put into force the papal decrees. The appointment of legates
for this general work tends more and more to take a permanent form, and
soon the post of permanent legate—a position of high honour and at the
same time of personal responsibility to the Pope-becomes the prerogative
of the leading ecclesiastics in each country. But the Pope still continued
to send legates from Rome, both as ambassadors to temporal sovereigns
and as functionaries with special commissions; these legates a latere as
direct papal agents again had overriding powers. It was not sufficient,
however, for the Pope to control the local officials through his repre-
sentatives. He insisted on their personal contact with himself. Visits
ad limina were first of all encouraged and then directly ordered, and
archbishops were expected to receive the pallium from the Pope in person. .
## p. x (#12) ###############################################
X
Introduction
It is impossible to say how far at any time this development of papal
authority was deliberate, and how far it arose out of the practical
exigencies of the moment. It became conscious at any rate with Gregory
VII, though even with him the moving cause at first was to enforce the
principles of reform. Opposition, whether from the local officials or from
the lay power, led to a definition of the bases on which this authority
rested and the sphere within which it could be exercised. The decretals,
especially the Forged Decretals, provided a solid foundation, and to
build upon this came opportunely the revived study of the Canon Law.
It is not a question of a finished legal system, but of a continuous process
of construction, in which the legal training of Popes like Urban II and
Alexander III was of great value. Collections of decretals and opinions,
of which Gratian's was the most complete, were continually being added
to by the decrees of Roman Councils and the decisions of Popes given in
their letters. This led to uniformity in ritual also, to the victory of the
Roman use over local customs; for here again it was the Roman that
was to be universal.
In the papal government, even on its ecclesiastical side, there is a
general resemblance to the secular governments of the day. Like a lay
monarch, the Pope was concerned with the organisation of central and
local government, with the formation of a legal system, and with the
recognition of his overriding jurisdiction. When we come to the secular
side of papal government, the resemblance is still more close. Both as
landlord and overlord the Pope acted as any secular ruler, though payments
in money and kind are the usual services rendered to him, rather than
military service; for this he was really dependent on external assistance.
The problem of finance faced him, as it faced every secular ruler. The
work of government, both ecclesiastical and secular, involved the expenses
of government, and, though in ordinary times the revenue from the Papal
States might be sufficient, a period of conflict, by increasing expenditure
or by preventing the Pope from obtaining his ordinary revenues, would
create serious financial difficulties. This was especially the case with
Urban II, and still more with Alexander III, in the crisis of the conflict
with the Empire; and, in the interval of peace, the Pope was seriously
embarrassed by the sustained effort of the Roman people to obtain self-
government.
We have a detailed account of various sources of papal revenue at the
end of our period in the Liber Censuum drawn up under the direction of
the camerarius Cencius, afterwards Pope Honorius III, in the year 1192.
Besides the revenue from the papal domain proper, a census
received: (1) from monasteries who had placed themselves under the papal
was
## p. xi (#13) ##############################################
Introduction
xi
"protection," and who in the course of the twelfth century gained
exemption from the spiritual as well as the temporal control of their
diocesans ; (2) from some lay rulers and nobles, who put themselves under
papal “protection " or, like the kings of Aragon and the Norman rulers
of South Italy and Sicily, recognised papal overlordship; (3) in the form
of Peter's Pence, from England since Anglo-Saxon times, and, in the
twelfth century, from Norway, Sweden, and some other countries as well.
But the census provided only a relatively small revenue, and this was
difficult to collect; there were frequent complaints of arrears of payment,
especially with regard to Peter's Pence. On the other hand, the papal ex-
penditure was often heavy. Alexander III had frequently to have recourse
to borrowing; and his complaints about some of his creditors seem to have
an echo in the decree against usury at the Third Lateran Council. In its
difficulties the Papacy had to depend upon the voluntary offerings of the
faithful, especially from France, on subsidies from the Normans, or on
the support of a wealthy Roman family; thus the Pierleoni constantly
supplied the Popes with money, until one member of the family,
Anacletus II, was defeated in his attempt to ascend the papal throne.
We are still in the early days of papal financial history. Not yet were
the visitation offerings from bishops made compulsory, and the servitia
taxes and annates had not yet been introduced. Nor did the Popes claim
the right to tax the clergy, though perhaps the first step to this was taken
in the second half of the twelfth century, when prohibitions were issued
against the taxation of the clergy by lay rulers without papal consent.
At any rate the desire to finance the Crusades soon led them to assert the
right.
As the Reform Movement had led directly to the creation of a
centralised government of the Church, so too it led, almost inevitably, to
the contest for supremacy between the Papacy and its counterpart on the
secular side, the Empire. Those ecclesiastics whom the Pope expected to
be his obedient officials in the local government of the Church were
already the obedient officials of the Empire both in its central and its
local government. The Pope was on strong ground in insisting that the
spiritual duties of the bishop were his primary consideration. But the
Emperor was on strong ground too. The ecclesiastical nobles were an
essential part of the economic framework and the political machinery of
the Empire, and to justify his authority over them the Emperor could
point to an almost unbroken tradition. The relative importance of
spiritual and temporal considerations in the medieval mind gave an
initial advantage to the Pope, and in the end the victory. On the other
## p. xii (#14) #############################################
xii
Introduction
hand, the Emperor could appeal not only to the iron law of necessity, but
to the medieval reverence for custom and precedent. Henry IV, moreover,
could not forget that the Papacy had itself been subject to his father, and
it was his object to recover what he considered to be his lawful authority.
With this aim he deliberately provoked the contest. The details of the
struggle are described in several chapters in this volume, and need only
be briefly alluded to here. Henry's challenge was taken up by his greater
opponent, Pope Gregory VII, who in his turn claimed the supreme power
for the Papacy; there could be no real peace until the question of
supremacy was settled. Though on this issue the first contest was
indecisive, the Papacy registered a striking advance. The Concordat of
Worms marked a definite limitation of imperial authority over the
ecclesiastical nobility, and it was followed by the reigns of Lothar III and
Conrad III, when the German ruler was too complaisant or too weak to
press his claims. The Pope was emboldened to take the offensive, and
Hadrian IV threw down the challenge that was taken up by Frederick
Barbarossa. The positions were reversed, but again the challenger found
himself faced by a greater opponent, who again defended himself by
asserting his own supremacy. Once more the result was indecisive.
The Pope had a single cause to maintain, the Emperor a dual one.
i Henry IV was defeated by revolt in Germany, Frederick Barbarossa by
revolt in Italy, and both alike had been forced to recognise the
impossibility of maintaining a subservient anti-Pope. But the greatness
of Frederick was never so conspicuous as in his recovery after defeat, and
his son Henry VI seemed to be on the point of making the Empire once
more supreme when death intervened to ruin the imperial cause. Herein
was revealed the second great asset of the Papacy. Built on the rock of
spiritual power, the weakness or death of its head was of little permanent
moment. The Empire, however, depended on the personality of each of
its rulers, and the transference of authority on the deaths of Henry III
and Henry VI was on each occasion disastrous. During the minority of
Henry IV, the Papacy had built up its power; in the minority of
Frederick II, Innocent III was Pope.
In this struggle of Empire and Papacy no insignificant part was played
by the Norman rulers of South Italy and Sicily, whose history falls
exactly within the compass of this volume. Frequently did they come to
the help of the Papacy in its extremity, and skilfully did they make use
of papal exigencies to improve their own position. Only once did the
Pope whom they supported fail to maintain himself; and the victory of
Innocent II over Anastasius II, chosen by a majority of the cardinals and
backed by Norman arms, was in many respects unique. Then, and then
!
## p. xiii (#15) ############################################
Introduction
xiii
only, did Pope and Emperor combine against the Normans, but there was
no stability in an alliance so unusual. In the Sicilian kingdom were
displayed the peculiar characteristics of the Norman race—its military
prowess and ferocity, its genius for administration, its adaptability and
eclecticism. They brought from Normandy the feudal customs they had
there acquired, but they maintained and converted to their use the
officials and institutions, the arts and sciences, of the races they conquered-
Italian, Greek, and Arab—each of which was tolerated in the use of its
own language, religion, and customs. The court of Roger II at Palermo
presented an appearance unlike anything else in the West; and the
essential product of this extraordinary environment was “the wonder of
the world,” Frederick II. The Normans pieced together a most remarkable
mosaic, but they never made a nation of their subjects; the elements were
too discordant, and they themselves too few. They remained a ruling
caste, and then, as the royal house, once so prolific, gradually became
sterile, Frederick Barbarossa seized the opportunity to marry his son
Henry VI to the heiress Constance and to unite the crowns of Germany
and Sicily. But, though the Norman rulers had disappeared, their deeds
survived; for their own purposes they had recognised papal overlordship
and received from the Pope their titles as dukes and kings. By so doing
they added materially to the temporal authority of the Papacy, and
created the situation which made so bitter the conflict of Empire and
Papacy in the thirteenth century.
As the Normans exercised an important influence on the great
struggle which divided the unity of Europe, so did they also have a de-
cisive effect upon the other great struggle, in which Europe was united
against the infidel. The story of the Crusades is described in this volume
from the Western point of view, and it has already been told from the
Eastern standpoint in Volume IV. Its importance in world-history, and
also in the more limited field of European history, need not be stressed
here; but it is worth while to characterise the different interests involved,
and to regard the Crusading movement in its proper setting, as an episode
in the general history of the relations of East and West. It was not
merely a Holy War between Christian and Muslim. The Seljūqs, already
in decline and hampered by internal divisions, were concerned with the
effort to maintain what they had won. The Eastern Empire was con-
cerned firstly with the defence of its existence, secondly with the recovery
of Asia Minor. The Latins, to whom they appealed for help, were inte-
rested rather in Syria and Palestine, to which they were equally attracted
by religious enthusiasm and by the prospects of territory or trade. Europe
also had its own injuries to avenge. It too had suffered from Saracen
C. MED. H. VOL. V.
b
## p. xiv (#16) #############################################
xiv
Introduction
invaders, against whom it was now beginning to react—in the advance of
the Christian kingdoms in Spain, in the Norman conquest of Sicily, in
the capture of Mahdiyah by Genoa and Pisa in 1087. The Crusades were,
in one aspect, an extension Eastwards of this reaction, a change
from the defensive to the offensive. Against a common foe Eastern and
Western Christians had a common cause, but the concord went no further.
In the first place, seventeen years before the fatal battle of Manzikert,
which had caused the Eastern Empire to turn to the West for aid, the
great Schism between the Eastern and Western Churches had already
occurred. One of the results hoped for from the First Crusade was the
healing of that schism, and to the Western mind the obstinate perversity
of the Greek Church made it as dangerous an enemy of the faith as
Mohammedanism itself. And, secondly, the Normans in South Italy had
conquered Greeks as well as Saracens, and their first advance eastwards
was against Greeks not against Saracens. Robert Guiscard by his attack
on the Eastern Empire in 1081 began the policy, which was continued
by his successors and was adopted by the Emperor Henry VI as part of
his Norman inheritance. In other quarters, too, the experiences of the
first two Crusades created a body of opinion in favour of the conquest of
the Eastern Empire as a necessary part of the whole movement; this
opinion gathered strength when the Eastern Emperor came to terms with
Saladin to oppose the Western advance which was now a menace to both.
Finally, Venice was alienated by the ambition of Manuel Comnenus and
the folly of Andronicus, and from being the chief obstacle to the Norman
policy became its chief supporter. It was now the aim of the Crusaders
to conquer the whole of the Near East, Christian and Muslim alike, and
their first objective was Constantinople.
In the internal history of Europe this volume deals, outside Italy,
with the three leading countries of Germany, France, and England; the
history of the outlying and more backward countries—Spain, Scandinavia,
Poland, Bohemia, Hungary-is reserved for the next volume. In these
three countries there was much that was similar, for the underlying ideas
inherent in feudal society were common to them all. But similar concep-
tions produced widely differing results. On the one hand, feudal society
with its deep reverence for custom and tradition was much affected by
local conditions and lapse of time. On the other hand, it was peculiarly
sensitive to the workings of human nature, to the ambition of individuals
who stressed the privileges and minimised the obligations arising from the
idea of contract on which the feudal system was essentially based; it was
poised on a delicate balance which the accident of death might immedi-
## p. xv (#17) ##############################################
1
Introduction
XV
ately upset. In the secular governments, as in the ecclesiastical government
of the Church, the trend is in favour of monarchy, and the rulers make,
with varying success, a continual effort towards centralisation; but they
were all at an initial disadvantage compared with the Pope. The success
of the electoral principle might be fatal to monarchical authority; and
the hereditary principle had its dangers too, in the event of a minority
or the failure of a direct heir. The hereditary principle could not be
applied to the Papacy, for which the electoral system worked as a means
of continual development; for the cardinals, having no opportunity of
obtaining an independent position apart from the Pope, had everything
to gain as individuals and nothing to lose by electing the ablest of their
number as Pope.
Monarchy was in the most favourable position in England, and here
it was therefore the most successful. William I started with the initial
advantage that the whole land was his by conquest, and to be dealt with as
he chose. The Normans, here as in Sicily, displayed their genius in adminis-
tration, their adaptability and eclecticism. The political feudalism they
brought from Normandy placed the king in England in the strong posi-
tion that, as duke, he had held in Normandy; and he adopted what he
found suitable to his purpose already existing—the manorial system, the
shire and hundred courts, Danegeld. As it had been won by conquest,
the whole land was royal domain. Wisely the king kept a large share for
himself, though feudal dues and the precedent of general taxation made
him less dependent on his own estates for revenue than were his French
and German contemporaries. The lands he granted out were held
directly from him, as fiefs on military tenure, liable to forfeiture and not
transferable at will. No individual baron could match himself with the
king or hope to establish an independent position. The king was not
dependent upon the barons in the central government, nor were they,
as on the Continent, all-powerful in local government. They were not
officials but tenants-in-chief, and the strength of the Crown in local affairs
is clearly displayed in that the king not only appointed and dismissed
the sheriffs at will, but also insisted on their attendance at his Court and
a rendering of their stewardship at his Exchequer—just as the Pope in-
sisted on the visits ad limina of his local officials, the archbishops and
bishops. So too did royal justice penetrate through the country, with
the system of inquests, writs, and itinerant judges; the local courts were
maintained under royal control, and it was the baronial jurisdiction that
suffered. Not that it was directly attacked; the kings were careful not
to transgress the letter of the feudal contract. But they preserved their
supremacy, and in Church as well as in State; moreover, in spite of
62
## p. xvi (#18) #############################################
xvi
Introduction
1
Henry I's dispute with Anselm and Henry II's long contest with Becket,
they avoided any serious conflict with the Papacy. They were, from
the English point of view, too much absorbed in their continental posses-
sions, which involved long absences of the king and too heavy a burden on
English resources. Yet still, at the end of our period, the monarchy is
at the height of its power, both in England and on the Continent. A
rapid decline set in with John, who not only lost most of his continental
possessions but, by making the mistakes which the wisdom of his pre-
decessors had avoided, entered into a serious conflict both with the Pope
and with the united baronage.
France presents a complete contrast. In the eleventh century the
French monarchy was almost helpless. The great nobles had become
practically independent, and, unlike the nobles in Germany, had ceased
to be even in theory royal officials. The king had to start de novo, and
perhaps in the long run this was an advantage. He was not fettered by
all those traditions of the past which hampered royal initiative in Ger-
many, and the strongest of the fetters had rusted from disuse. The
Capetians had enjoyed the supreme fortune of an uninterrupted succession;
the custom of two centuries hardened into a right; and the electoral
privileges of the nobles gave way to the hereditary right of the eldest
son. In this volume we deal only with the reigns of Louis VI and VII,
during which the monarchy recovered from the weakness of the eleventh
century and prepared the way for the great period which begins with
Philip Augustus. The king had two assets: a domain, which though
small was compact, and the potentialities inherent in the kingly office.
Louis VI, by his wisdom in concentrating almost entirely on the former,
was able eventually to make use of the latter. After a long series of petty
wars, he overcame the brigand-nobles of the domain, and so established
peace and order within it, made the roads safe for merchants and travellers,
and made royal justice attractive. He had his reward in the appeals for
his intervention that came from other quarters. So sure was his building
that even Louis VII managed to add a few bricks to the edifice. The
great vassals absorbed in their own domains ignored the central govern-
ment, and the king, much to his advantage, was able to create a body of
officials directly dependent upon himself. In local government he was
confined almost entirely to the royal domain, but soon, by escheat and
conquest, this was to become the larger part of France; the king reaped
the advantage from the over-aggrandisement of his greatest vassal.
Finally, one source of strength had grown out of past weakness. The
Papacy in the eleventh century had succeeded in carrying out its reform
policy more completely in France than elsewhere, because of the weakness
## p. xvii (#19) ############################################
Introduction
xvii
។
of royal opposition. On France, therefore, it could rely for welcome and
a refuge, whatever the king's attitude, and frequently the Popes availed
themselves of this. The result was that they came to depend, Alexander
III in particular, on French support; this, as the king became powerful,
meant the support of the French king, who soon attained a unique posi-
tion among lay rulers in his relations with the Papacy.
In Germany the situation is much harder to assess; monarchy was
firmly established, with a long tradition of power, but the king was handi-
capped by tradition as well, and still more by his imperial position.
His Italian kingdom prevented him from concentrating upon Germany,
while the long struggle with the Papacy gave the opportunity for the
anti-monarchical forces in both countries to defeat his aims at centralisa-
tion. Another weakness was the lack of continuity. More than once
already the king had left no son to succeed him, and twice again this
happened within our period. So the hereditary principle was never estab-
lished, and the grip of the electors tightened with each vacancy.
The
royal resources were distinctly inferior to those of the English kings, for
a large part of the land was not held directly from the king and he had
no power of instituting general taxation. The royal domain, in which in
a sense must be included the ecclesiastical territories held from the king,
was widely scattered, and the king was unable to concentrate on one area,
as Louis VI did in France. Henry IV attempted this in Saxony, and was
defeated by the Saxon revolt; Henry V's attempt in the Rhine district
was cut short by his death; Lothar III started with an extensive Saxon
domain, but again a change of dynasty upset his plans; Frederick Bar-
barossa, who added his Swabian domain to the Salian inheritance, was
the most favourably placed of all, and he was the most powerful. He it
was too who solved the problem of the duchies.
The German kings, while very powerful compared with their French
contemporaries, were still hampered by the conditions to which the
weakness of the ninth century had given rise, and from which they had
never been able to shake themselves free. Germany had been saved from
the fate of France in the ninth century by the tribal feeling, which
prevented her from breaking up into small units. But the very cohesion
of the tribal duchies was a handicap to the central authority. In the first
place, tribal institutions and tribal customs were too strong to be over-
ridden, and tended to make of Germany a federation rather than a nation;
and, secondly, the dukes, as leaders of the tribes, were a constant embar-
rassment to the king. Various expedients had been adopted, from Otto I
onwards, to control them, but once again in the twelfth century they had
risen, in Swabia, Bavaria, and Saxony, to a position little inferior to that
## p. xviii (#20) ###########################################
xviii
Introduction
of their predecessors in the ninth century. The fall of Henry the Lion
at last gave Frederick Barbarossa the opportunity, by partitioning the
duchies, to destroy the old tribal units. The smaller units he could more
easily control, but he did nothing to replace the tribal bond by a national
bond, and so Germany became a federation of many small states in place
of a few large ones.
What stood in his way particularly was the status of the German
nobility. Dukes, margraves, and counts remained in theory what they
had once been in fact-royal officials, entrusted with local government
and jurisdiction. These functions they now exercised by hereditary right,
and themselves reaped the financial advantages. So, while the nobles
could often interfere in the central government, the king, where he was
not present, could not control the local government. One important
change he did make, by which a landed status tended to supersede the
official status. The first rank of German nobles, the principes, had included
all holders of official titles, lay and ecclesiastical. After 1180, only those
who held directly from the king were ranked as “princes. ” So, while the
bishops and the abbots of royal abbeys retained princely rank (and were
often, in a real sense, royal officials), only some sixteen lay nobles remained
in the highest grade. The princes of Germany had the right of choosing
the king; this right was now confined to a much smaller number, and
already it was recognised that with a privileged few the real decision lay.
The elective system was becoming crystallised, and both Frederick
Barbarossa and Henry VI vainly attempted to combat it. Frederick was
a great ruler himself, a great respecter of law, a great guardian of order.
But, though he was successful in preserving order in Germany, he had to
be present himself to enforce it. The local magnates, though with a landed
rather than an official status, continued like the princes to exercise local
control. No attempt was made by Frederick to imitate the English kings,
to create a bureaucracy directly responsible to himself and by a system
of itinerant justices to enforce locally the king's law and to make the
king's justice universal. He was so scrupulous in his administration of
feudal custom that it was hardly possible that he should contemplate
such a change. It was the nobles who instituted the process against
Henry the Lion, and it was they, and not the king, who reaped the results
of his fall. In fact, there was no real effort at centralisation in Germany,
and this was fatal to German unity and so to monarchy in Germany.
Hitherto the political side of feudalism had been displayed in arrange-
ments or conflicts between the king on the one side and the nobles on
the other. But now, as the more settled state of things gave opportunity
## p. xix (#21) #############################################
Introduction
xix
for the development of more peaceful pursuits, a third factor enters in
with the rise of the towns. In this volume we are concerned with the
political importance of these urban communities, and the economic history
of the development and organisation of trade and industry, as well as of
agricultural conditions, is reserved for later volumes. The king was
naturally interested in keeping control of the towns, which provided
useful sources of revenue: in England the leading boroughs were retained
as royal boroughs by William I and were heavily taxed by Henry I; in
Germany there were many royal towns, and, as most towns were under
a bishop, royal control was usually maintained. The towns, for their part,
were anxious to hold directly from the king, and were willing to pay the
price. For the king alone could legally grant the privileges they coveted,
and a strong monarchy was the best guarantee of the peace which was
so necessary a condition for the expansion of trade and industry. They
were, therefore, naturally on the side of the king against the nobles, and
often rendered him valuable support. The work of Louis VI in the royal
domain was so much to their interest that we find the towns a constant
ally of monarchy in France, though the kings until Philip Augustus were
slow to recognise the advantage this gave them. In England, the support
of London was one of Stephen's chief assets. In Germany, the assistance
of the Rhine towns turned the tide in favour of Henry IV when his fortunes
were at their lowest ebb, and he never lost their support. Henry V,
depending at first on the nobles, had to throw over the towns, but he tried
energetically, though not altogether successfully, to regain their support
later on. The twelfth century was the great flowering period of corporate
town-life in Germany, aided by royal grants of self-government.
Frederick II in the thirteenth century handed the towns over to the
nobles ; they were forced to depend upon themselves, and adopted the
plan of leagues for mutual support and the furtherance of trade.
In the towns of northern and central Italy, for different reasons, this
stage had already been reached in the twelfth century; the motives
governing their actions, though the same as elsewhere, led to contrary
results. The Italian towns had been accustomed to city-organisation from
Roman times, and their geographical situation caused an earlier develop-
ment of trade and greater prosperity than elsewhere in Europe. Some
of them had already acquired charters and liberties in the eleventh century,
and they found their opportunity when they were practically left to
themselves by Lothar III and Conrad III. During this period they
suppressed the local feudal nobility, who made peaceful trading impossible,
and, getting rid of their episcopal lords, established themselves as self-
governing communities. The royal power had not assisted them, and was
## p. xx (#22) ##############################################
XX
Introduction
now the only bar to complete independence. They had violated the
sovereign rights of the Emperor, and such a breach with feudal law could
only be made good by revolution. Frederick Barbarossa was entirely
within his rights in enforcing at Roncaglia the recovery of the regalia, so
important a source of revenue, which they had usurped. The towns
justified themselves by success, and, though they consented to an outward
recognition of imperial overlordship, the tie was too slender to affect their
independence. But the league of Italian cities, its defensive purpose
achieved, did not continue, as the later leagues in Germany, for the
preservation of order and the mutual furtherance of trade. City rivalries
and trade jealousies counterbalanced the bond of common interest, and
the cities suffered from constant internal as well as external strife;
rise of oligarchies of wealth led to class struggles, and the competition
of different crafts to conflicts between the gilds.
In an age when monarchical government, secular and ecclesiastical,
was not only regarded as divinely instituted but was also the best guarantee
of peace and order, the capacity of the ruler was of the first importance
and attention is focussed upon individuals. The second half of the eleventh
century is dominated by the personality of Pope Gregory VII, the second
half of the twelfth by that of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. In the
middle period it is neither lay ruler nor ecclesiastical ruler, but a Cistercian
abbot, St Bernard, who fills the centre of the stage; and that this could
be so is a sign of the effect on medieval life of spiritual considerations.
It was the admiration felt for the holiness of his life, and his reputation
as a great and fearless preacher, that gave St Bernard his extraordinary
influence over his generation. He figures in several chapters in this volume,
and his life-story provides an epitome of most of the leading features
of contemporary human endeavour. It was an age of new monastic experi-
ments, which were of great importance in the life of the Church; for
monastic reform had preluded, and constantly recurred to reinvigorate,
the Reform of the Church as a whole. Not only did St Bernard's out-
standing personality make Cistercianism the most popular Order of the
day; his ardent zeal put new life into the older Benedictine monasteries
and materially assisted the beginnings of the other new Orders-
Carthusians, Templars, Premonstratensians, Augustinian canons; par-
ticularly did he encourage the substitution of regular for secular canons
in cathedral chapters. The twelfth century witnessed also a new wave of
intellectual endeavour, and St Bernard was the arbiter on some of the
leading questions of the day, including the condemnation of Abelard and
Arnold of Brescia in 1140, and the less successful trial of Gilbert de la
## p. xxi (#23) #############################################
Introduction
xxi
Porrée in 1147. In this way he exercised an unfortunate influence; his
rigid orthodoxy made him immediately suspicious of a critical mind, and
was more in place in combating the heresy which was already beginning
to spread in the south of France.
In a larger sphere he also predominated. It was his decision in favour
of Innocent II that settled the issue of the papal schism following the
death of Honorius II in 1130. It was his preaching that kindled the
Second Crusade, and his influence that caused the Kings of France and
Germany to participate in it; its disastrous failure reacted on his
popularity but did not deter him from attempting to assemble a new
crusade. He not only laid down rules of life for bishops, monks, secular
clergy, and laity, but he dispatched admonitions and censures, in the
plainest of language, to Popes, cardinals, and kings. Most interesting of
all is the long lecture he addressed to Eugenius III on the duties of the
papal office—the De Consideratione. In this he develops a view of the
extent of spiritual authority that did not fall short of the extreme concep-
tion of Gregory VII; he speaks of the plenitudo potestatis of the Pope and
of the two swords, material as well as spiritual, belonging to the Church.
But, on the other hand, he was quite emphatic that this power must be
used for spiritual purposes only, and the idea of the Pope as a ruler is
abhorrent to him. The Pope has a ministerium not a dominatio; the
Roman Church is the mater not the domina of all the churches; the Pope's
power is “in criminibus non in possessionibus. ” He is especially vehement
against the increasing absorption of the Pope in the pomps and secular
cares of his office, and though his treatise does not supply a very practical
solution of the difficulties with which the Pope was faced, it does convey
a timely warning, and in a sense a prophecy of the fate that was soon
to overtake the Papacy.
## p. xxii (#24) ############################################
xxii
CORRIGENDA.
Vol. III.
p. 121, 1. 19. For Courci-sur-Dive read Courci-sur-Dives.
p. 250, 1. 6. For St Vanne's read St Vannes.
INDEX.
p. 663, col. 2. For Courci-sur-Dive read Courci-sur-Dives.
Vol. IV.
p. xvi, Chap. 1, 1. 2. Delete late.
p. 119, 1. 11. For Hubaira read Hubairah.
p. 120, 11. 6-7. For still 7000 men read 7000 men to meet the advancing enemy.
p. 120, 1. 36, p. 124, 1. 10, p. 126, 11. 33, 38, p. 128, 1. 23, p. 133, 1. 5. For Semaluos
read Semalus.
p. 120, n. 2. For "Taiba' read "Țaibah. '
p. 123, passim and p. 124, 1. 6. For Thumāma read Thumămah.
p. 123, 11. 18 and 16 from bottom and p. 124, 1. 7. For īsa read ‘īsà.
p. 126, 1. 9. For Vardan read Bardanes.
p. 127, 11. 11 and 13-14. For Harthama reud Harthamah.
p. 133, 1. 4. For Bugha read Bughā.
p. 135, 11. 3 and 8. For Balāta read Balātah.
p. 138, headline and I. 15. For Khafāja read Khafājah.
p. 234, 1. 5. For a thousand read eleven hundred.
p. 316, last line. For Kerbogha read Karboghā.
p. 359, 1. 7 from bottom. For Bizāʻa read Buzāʻah.
p. 367, 1. 22. For abandoned the Crusade read quitted the army.
p. 375, 1. 7 from bottom. For Bukaia read Buqai'ah.
p. 711, 1. 10 from bottom. For 911 read 912.
p. 899, an. 757. For Paul IV read Paul I.
Index.
p. 913, col 1. Insert entry Andrasus, p. 125 n.
p. 918, col. 1. For Balāța read Balāțah.
p. 920, col. 2. Delete entry Bizā‘a.
p. 922, col. 1. For Bugha read Bughā.
Delete entry Bukaia.
p. 922, col. 2. Insert entry Buqai'ah, the, battle of, 375.
