No More Learning

With the death of Henry IV and the reconciliation of Henry V with
the Church, the schism that had lasted virtually for thirty years was at
an end. The desire for peace, rather than any deep conviction of imperial
guilt, had been responsible perhaps for Henry V's revolt, certainly for his
victory over his father. By the tacit consent of both sides the claims and
counter-claims of the years of conflict were ignored; the attempt of each
power to be master of the other was abandoned, and in the relations
between the regnum and sacerdotium the status quo ante was restored.
On the question of lay investiture negotiations had already been started
before the schism began; they were resumed as soon as the schism was
healed, but papal decrees in the intervening years had increased the diffi-
culty of solution. Universal as was the desire for peace, this issue prevented
its consummation for another sixteen years. The contest of Henry V


## p. 99 (#145) #############################################

Lay investiture. Settlements in France and England 99
and the Papacy is solely, and can very rightly be named, an Investiture
Struggle.
Gregory VII's decrees had been directed against the old idea by which
churches and bishoprics were regarded as possessions of laymen, and
against the practice of investiture by ring and staff which symbolised the
donation by the king of spiritual functions. He shewed no disposition
to interfere with the feudal obligations which the king demanded from the
bishops as from all holders of land and offices within his realm. But his suc-
cessors were not content merely to repeat his decrees. At the Council
of Clermont in 1095 Urban II had prohibited the clergy from doing
homage to laymen, and at the Lenten Synod at Rome in 1102 Paschal II
also prohibited the clergy from receiving ecclesiastical property at the
hands of a layman, that is to say, even investiture with temporalities alone.
To Gregory investiture was not important in itself, but only in the lay
control of spiritual functions which it typified, and in the results to which
this led-bad appointments and simony; the prohibition of investiture
was only a means to an end. To Paschal it had become an end in itself.
Rigid in his obedience to the letter of the decrees, he was blind to the
fact that, in order to get rid of the hated word and ceremony, he was
leaving unimpaired the royal control, which was the real evil.
He had already obtained his point in France, and was about to
establish it in England also. In France, owing to the weakness of the
central government, papal authority had for some time been more effective
than elsewhere; Philip I also exposed himself to attack on the moral side,
and had only recently received absolution (in 1104) after a second period
of excommunication. Relations were not broken off again, as the Pope
did not take cognisance of Philip's later lapses. The king, at any rate,
was not strong enough to resist the investiture decrees. There was no
actual concordat; the king simply ceased to invest, and the nobles followed
his example? He, and they, retained control of appointments, and in
place of investiture “conceded” the temporalities of the see, usually after
consecration and without symbol; the bishops took the oath of fealty,
but usually did not do homage.
Paschal was less successful in England, where again political conditions
were largely responsible for bringing Henry I into the mood for compro-
mise. Henry and Paschal were equally stubborn, and on Anselm fell the
brunt of the struggle and the pain of a second exile. At last Henry was
brought to see the wisdom of a reconciliation with Anselm, and the Pope
relented so far as to permit Anselm to consecrate bishops even though
1 The controversial literature shews this very clearly. It is, from now onwards,
confined to the question of lay investiture. Up to this time it was the greater issues
raised by Gregory VII that had been mainly debated.
2 France was peculiar in this, that not only the king but also nobles invested even
to bishoprics. Normandy was in a special position, and what is said with regard to
England should be taken as applying to Normandy also.
CH. II.
7-2


## p. 100 (#146) ############################################

100
The attitude of Henry V
they had received lay investiture or done homage to the king. This paved
the way for the Concordat of August 1107, by which the king gave up
the practice of investing with ring and staff and Anselm consented to
consecrate bishops who had done homage to the king. Thus what the
Pope designed as a temporary concession was turned into a permanent
settlement. The subsequent practice is seen from succeeding elections and
was embodied in the twelfth chapter of the Constitutions of Clarendon.
The king had the controlling voice in the election, the bishop-elect did
homage and took the oath of fealty, and only after that did the consecration
take place. In effect, the king retained the same control as before. The
Pope was satisfied by the abolition of investiture with the ring and staff,
but the king, though hating to surrender an old custom', had his way on
all the essential points.
Paschal II's obsession with the question of investiture is shewn in the
letter he wrote to Archbishop Ruthard of Mayence in November 1105,
a letter which is a fitting prelude to the new struggle. Investiture, he says,
is the cause of the discord between the regnum and the sacerdotium, but
he hopes that the new reign will bring a solution of the difficulty. Actu-
ally it was the new reign that created the difficulty. During the schism
papal decrees were naturally disregarded in Germany; royal investiture
continued uninterruptedly, and Henry V from the beginning of his reign
regularly invested with the ring and staff. But when Germany returned
to the Catholic fold, papal decrees became operative once more, and the
discrepancy between Henry's profession of obedience to Rome and his
practice of investiture was immediately apparent. He was as determined
as his father that the royal prerogative should remain unimpaired, but
he shewed his sense of the direction the controversy was taking and the
weakness of the royal position by insisting that he was only investing with
the regalia’. This made no difference to Paschal, who refused all com-
promise on the exercise of investiture; his assertion of his desire not to
interfere with the royal rights, which had some meaning in Gregory VII's
mouth, carried no conviction. He must have been sanguine indeed if he
expected in Germany a cessation of investiture as in France; there was
nothing to induce Henry V even to follow the precedent set by his English
namesake. In Germany there was no parallel to the peculiar position in
England of St Anselm, the primate who put first his profession of obedience
to the Pope. Archbishops and bishops, as well as lay nobles, were at one
with the king on this question; even the papal legate, Bishop Gebhard
of Constance, who had endured so much in the papal cause, did not
object to consecrate bishops appointed and invested by Henry. And the
German king had legal documents to set against the papal claims—the
1 His reluctance is seen in the jealous complaint he made in 1108 through Anselm,
that the Pope was still allowing the King of Germany to invest.
2 This meant the important part, but not the whole, of the temporalities of
the see.


## p. 101 (#147) ############################################

Unsuccessful negotiations between Pope and king 101
privileges of Pope Hadrian I to Charles the Great and of Pope Leo VIII
to Otto the Great-forged documents, it is true, but none the less useful.
It needed a change in the political atmosphere to induce Henry V to
concessions.
The council summoned by Paschal met at Guastalla on 22 October
1106. The Pope was affronted by the scant attention paid by German
bishops to his summons. Instead there appeared an embassy from Henry
claiming that the Pope should respect the royal rights, and at the same
time inviting him again to Germany. To the first message Paschal replied
by a decree against lay investiture, to the second by an acceptance of the
invitation, promising to be at Mayence at Christnias. He soon repented
of his promise, whether persuaded of the futility of the journey or wishing
to avoid the personal encounter, and hastily made his way into France,
where he could be sure of protection and respect. Here he met with a
reception which fell little short of that accorded to Urban; in particular
he was welcomed by the two kings, Philip I and his son Louis, who
accompanied the Pope to Châlons in May 1107, where he received the
German ambassadors with Archbishop Bruno of Trèves at their head. To
the reasoned statement they presented of the king's demands Paschal re-
turned a direct refusal, which was pointed by the decree he promulgated
against investiture at a council held at Troyes on 23 May. At this council
he took action against the German episcopate, especially for their dis-
obedience to his summons to Guastalla: the Archbishops of Mayence
and Cologne and their suffragans, with two exceptions, were put under
the ban, and his legate Gebhard received a sharp censure. It was of little
avail that he invited Henry to be present at a synod in Rome in the
following year. Henry did not appear, and Paschal was too much occupied
with difficulties in Rome to take any action. But at a synod at Bene-
vento in 1108 he renewed the investiture decrees, adding the penalty of
excommunication against the giver as well as the receiver of investiture.
Clearly he was meditating a definite step against Henry. The king, however,
had a reason for not wishing at this moment toalienate the Pope-his desire
for imperial coronation. Accordingly during 1109 and 1110 negotiations
were resumed. An embassy from Henry proposing his visit to Rome was
well received by Paschal, who welcomed the proposal though remaining
firm against the king's demands. At the Lenten Synod of 1110 he repeated
the investiture decree, but, perhaps to prevent a breach in the negotia-
tions, abstained from pronouncing excommunication on the giver of
investiture. He had reiterated to Henry's embassy his intention not to
infringe the royal rights. Had he already conceived his solution of 1111?
At any rate he took the precaution of obtaining the promise of Norman
support in case of need, a promise which was not fulfilled'.
Duke Roger of Apulia died on 21 February 1111, and the Normans were too
weak to come to the Pope's assistance. In fact they feared an imperial attack upon
themselves.
CH. .


## p. 102 (#148) ############################################

102
The events of 1111
In August 1110 Henry began his march to Rome. From Arezzo, at
the end of December, he sent an embassy to the Pope, making it clear
that he insisted on investing with the temporalities held from the Empire.
Paschal's answer was not satisfactory, but a second embassy (from Acqua-
pendente) was more successful. It was now that Paschal produced his
famous solution of the dilemma—the separation of ecclesiastics from all
secular interests. If Henry would renounce investiture, the Church would
surrender all the regalia held by bishops and abbots, who would be con-
tent for the future with tithes and offerings. Ideally this was an admirable
solution, and it may have appeared to the unworldly monk to be a
practical one as well. Henry must have known better. He must have
realised that it would be impossible to obtain acquiescence from those who
were to be deprived of their privileges and possessions. But he saw that
it could be turned to his own advantage. He adroitly managed to lay on
the Pope the onus of obtaining acquiescence; this the Pope readily un-
dertook, serenely relying on the competency of ecclesiastical censures to
bring the reluctant to obedience. The compact was made by the pleni-
potentiaries of both sides at the church of Santa Maria in Turri on
4 February 1111, and was confirmed by the king himself at Sutri on
9 February
the
On 12 February the king entered St Peter's with the usual prelimi-
nary formalities that attended imperial coronations. The ratification of
compact was to precede the ceremony proper. Henry rose and read
aloud his renunciation of investiture. The Pope then on behalf of the
Church renounced the regalia, and forbade the holding of them by any
bishops or abbots, present or to come. Immediately burst forth the storm
that might have been expected! Not only the ecclesiastics, who saw the
loss of their power and possessions, but also the lay nobles, who anticipated
the decline in their authority consequent on the liberation of churches
from their control, joined in the uproar. All was confusion; the ceremony
of coronation could not proceed. Eventually, after futile negotiations, the
imperialists laid violent hands on the Pope and cardinals; they were
hurried outside the walls to the king's camp, after a bloody conflict with
the Romans. A captivity of two months followed, and then the Pope
yielded to the pressure and conceded all that Henry wished. Not only
was royal investiture permitted; it was to be a necessary preliminary to
consecration. They returned together to St Peter's, where on 13 April
the Pope handed Henry his privilege and placed the imperial crown upon
1 The accounts published afterwards by both sides are contradictory as to the
actual order of events. The imperial manifesto declares that Henry read his privilege
and that the uproar arose when he called upon the Pope to fulfil his share of the
compact. The papal manifesto implies that neither privilege was actually read aloud.
The account that Ekkehard gives in his Chronicle (MGH, Script. vi, p. 224 sq. ) is that
the uproar occurred after the reading of both privileges. Whatever actually happened,
it is clear that the contents of the two documents were in some way made public.


## p. 103 (#149) ############################################

The Pope forced to retract his concession to Henry 103
his head. Immediately after the ceremony the Pope was released; the
Emperor, who had had to barricade the Leonine city against the popu-
lace, hastily quitted Rome and returned in triumph to Germany.
The Pope had had his moment of greatness. He had tried to bring
the ideal into practice and to recall the Church to its true path; but the
time was not ripe, the violence of the change was too great, and the plan
failed. The failure was turned into disaster by the weakness of character
which caused him to submit to force and make the vital concession of in-
vestiture; for the rest of his life he had to pay the penalty. The extreme
Church party immediately gave expression to their feelings. Led by the
Cardinal-bishops of Tusculum and Ostia in Rome, and in France and
Burgundy by the Archbishops of Lyons and Vienne', they clamoured for
the repudiation of the “concession," reminding Paschal of his own previous
decrees and hinting at withdrawal of obedience if the Pope did not retract
his oath. In this oath Paschal had sworn, and sixteen cardinals had sworn
with him, to take no further action in the matter of investiture, and
never to pronounce anathema against the king. Both parts of the oath
he was compelled to forswear, helpless as ever in the presence of strong-
minded men. At the Lenten Synod of 1112 he retracted his concession
of investiture, as having been extracted from him by force and therefore
null and void. The same year Archbishop Guy of Vienne held a synod
which condemned lay investiture as heresy, anathematised the king, and
threatened to withdraw obedience from the Pope if he did not confirm the
decrees. Paschal wrote on 20 October, meekly ratifying Guy's actions.
But his conscience made his life a burden to him, and led him into various
inconsistencies. He felt pledged in faith to Henry, and wrote to Germany
that he would not renounce his pact or take action against the Emperor.
The unhappy Pope, however, was not man enough to maintain this
attitude. Harassed by the vehemence of the extremists, whose scorn for
his action was blended with a sort of contemptuous pity, he was forced at
the Lenten Synod of 1116 to retract again publicly the concession of 1111
and to condemn it by anathema. Moreover, Cuno, Cardinal-bishop of
Palestrina, complained that as papal legate at Jerusalem and elsewhere,
he had in the Pope's name excommunicated Henry, and demanded confir-
mation of his action. The Pope decreed this confirmation, and in a letter
to Archbishop Frederick of Cologne the next year, he wrote that hearing
of the archbishop's excommunication of Henry he had abstained from
intercourse with the king. Paschal had ceased to be Head of the Church
in anything but name.
If the events of 1111 brought humiliation to Paschal from all sides,
the Emperor was to get little advantage from his successful violence. The
1 Their efforts in France were, however, to a large extent discounted by the
moderate party with Bishop lvo of Chartres as its spokesman. He deprecated the
action of the extremists, especially in their implied rebuke of the Pope, and emphati-
cally denied that lay investiture could rightly be stigmatised as heresy.
CH. II.


## p. 104 (#150) ############################################

104
Henry as heir to Countess Matilda
revolt that broke out in Germany in 1112 and lasted with variations of
fortune for nine years was certainly not unconnected with the incidents of
those fateful two months. The Saxons naturally seized the opportunity
to rebel, but it is more surprising to find the leading archbishops and many
bishops of Germany in revolt against the king. Dissatisfaction with the
February compact, indignation at the violence done to the Pope, as
well as the ill-feeling caused by the high-handed policy of Henry in
Germany, were responsible for the outbreak; if Archbishop Adalbert
of Mayence was controlled mainly by motives of personal ambition,
Archbishop Conrad of Salzburg was influenced by ecclesiastical considera-
tions only. Henry's enemies hastened to ally themselves with the extreme
Church party,
and Germany was divided into two
camps
once more. Even
neutrality was dangerous, and Bishop Otto of Bamberg, who had never
lost the favour of Pope or Emperor, found himself placed under anathema
by Adalbert.
An important event in 1115, the death of Countess Matilda of Tuscany,
brought the Emperor again into Italy. He came, early in 1116, to enter
into possession not only of the territory and dignities held from the Em-
pire but, as heir, of her allodial possessions as well. Matilda, at some
time in the years 1077–1080, had made over these allodial possessions, on
both sides of the Alps, to the Roman Church, receiving them back as a
fief from the Papacy, but retaining full right of disposition'. This dona-
tion she had confirmed in a charter of 17 November 1102. Her free right
of disposal had been fully exercised, notably on the occasion of Henry's
first expedition to Italy. Both on his arrival, and again at his departure,
she had shewn a friendliness to him which is most remarkable in view of
his dealings with the Pope. Moreover it seems to be proved that at this
time she actually made him her heir, without prejudice of course to the
previous donation to the Papacy. The Pope must have been aware of the
bequest, as he made no attempt to interfere with Henry when he came
into Italy to take possession. The bequest to Henry at any rate prevented
any friction from arising on the question during the Emperor's lifetime,
especially as Henry, like Matilda, retained full disposal and entered into
no definite vassal-relationship to the Pope. For Henry it was a personal
acquisition of the highest value. By a number of charters to Italian towns,
which were to be of great importance for the future, he sought to con-
solidate his authority and to regain the support his father had lost. His
general relations with the Pope do not seem to have caused him any
uneasiness. It was not until the beginning of 1117 that he proceeded to
Rome, where he planned a solemn coronation at Easter and a display of
imperial authority in the city proper, in which he had been unable to set
foot in 1111.
1 A. Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde von Tuscien, pp. 143-4.
? 16. pp. 43 ff. Overmann shews that this was a personal bequest to her relative
Henry, and was not made to him as Emperor or King of Germany.


## p. 105 (#151) ############################################

Deaths of Paschal II and Gelasius II
105
During the previous year Paschal's position in Rome had been
endangered by the struggles for the prefecture, in which a boy, son of the
late prefect, was set up in defiance of the Pope's efforts on behalf of his
constant supporters the Pierleoni. The arrival of Henry brought a new
terror. Paschal could not face the prospect of having to retract his
retractation; he fled to South Italy. Henry, supported by the prefect,
spent Easter in Rome, and was able to find a complaisant archbishop to
perform the ceremony of coronation in Maurice Bourdin of Braga, who
was immediately excommunicated by the Pope. For the rest of the year
Paschal remained under Norman protection in South Italy, where he re-
newed with certain limitations Urban II's remarkable privilege to Count
Roger of Sicily. Finally in January 1118, as Henry had gone, he could
venture back to Rome, to find peace at last. On 21 January 1118 he died
in the castle of Sant' Angelo.
His successor, John of Gaeta, who took the name of Gelasius II, had
been Chancellor under both Urban II and Paschal II, and had distinguished
his period of office by the introduction of the cursus, which became a
special feature of papal letters and was later imitated by other chanceries'.
His papacy only lasted a year, and throughout he had to endure a continual
conflict with his enemies. The Frangipani made residence in Rome im-
possible for him. The Emperor himself appeared in March, and set up
the
excommunicated Archbishop of Braga as Pope Gregory VIII. In April
at Capua Gelasius excommunicated the Emperor and his anti-Pope, and so
took the direct step from which Paschal had shrunk, and a new schism
definitely came into being. At last in September Gelasius set sail for
Pisa, and from there journeyed to France where he knew he could obtain
peace and protection. On 29 January 1119 he died at the monastery of
Cluny.
The cardinals who had accompanied Gelasius to France did not
hesitate long as to their choice of a successor, and on 2 February Arch-
bishop Guy of Vienne was elected as Pope Calixtus II; the election was
ratified without delay by the cardinals who had remained in Rome. There
was much to justify their unanimity. Calixtus was of high birth, and was
related to the leading rulers in Europe-among others to the sovereigns
of Germany, France, and England; he had the advantage, on which he
frequently insisted, of being able to address them as their equal in birth.
He had also shewn himself to be a man of strong character and inflexible
determination. As Archbishop of Vienne he had upheld the claims of his
see against the Popes themselves, and apparently had not scrupled to
employ forged documents to gain his ends. He had taken the lead in
Burgundy ip opposing the “concession" of Paschal in 1111, and, as we
have seen, had dictated the Pope's recantation. But the characteristics
that made him acceptable to the cardinals at this crisis might seem to have
1 On this see R. L. Poole, The Papal Chancery, ch. iv.
CH. II.


## p. 106 (#152) ############################################

106
Pope Calixtus II
militated against the prospects of peace. The result proved the contrary,
however, and it was probably an advantage that the Pope was a strong
man and would not be intimidated by violence like his predecessor, whose
weakness had encouraged Henry to press his claims to the full. Moreover
the revival of the schism caused such consternation in Germany that it
was perhaps a blessing in disguise. It allowed the opinions of moderate
men, such as Ivo of Chartres and Otto of Bamberg, to make themselves
heard and to force a compromise against the wishes of the extremists on
both sides.
Calixtus soon shewed that he was anxious for peace, by assisting the
promotion of negotiations. These came to a head at Mouzon on 23 Octo-
ber, when the Emperor abandoned investiture to churches, and a settle-
ment seemed to have been arranged. But distrust of Henry was very
strong among the Pope's entourage; they were continually on the alert,
anticipating an attempt to take the Pope prisoner. So suspicious were they
that they decided there must be a flaw in his pledge to abandon investi-
ture; they found it in his not mentioning Church property, investiture
with which was equally repudiated by them. On this point no accommo-
dation could be reached, and the conference broke up. Calixtus returned
to Rheims to preside over a synod which had been interrupted by his
departure to Mouzon. The synod pronounced sentence of excommunication
on Henry V and passed a decree against lay investiture; the decree as
originally drafted included a condemnation of investiture with Church
property, but the opposition of the laity to this clause led to its withdrawal,
and the decree simply condemned investiture with bishoprics and abbeys.
A little less suspicion and the rupture with Henry might have been avoided.
Investiture was not the only important issue at the Synod of Rheims.
During its session the King of France, Louis VI, made a dramatic appeal
to the Pope against Henry I of England! On 20 November Calixtus met
Henry himself at Gisors, and found him ready enough to make peace with
Louis but unyielding on the ecclesiastical questions which he raised him-
self.
They were especially in conflict on the relations between the
Archbishops of Canterbury and York. Calixtus had reversed the decision
of his predecessors and denied the right of Canterbury to the obedience
of York, which Lanfranc had successfully established. Perhaps his own
experience led him to suspect the forgeries by which Lanfranc had built
up his case, or he may have been anxious to curb the power of Canterbury
which had rendered unsuccessful a mission on which he had himself been
employed as papal legate to England. Heinsisted on the non-subordination
of York to Canterbury; in return, he later granted to the Archbishop of
Canterbury the dignity of permanent papal legate in England. This may
have given satisfaction to the king; it also gave a foothold for papal
authority in a country which papal legates had not been allowed to enter
without royal permission.
1 See infra, Chap. xviii, pp. 603-4.


## p. 107 (#153) ############################################

The Concordat of Worms
107
For more than a year Calixtus remained in France. When he made
his
way into Italy and arrived at Rome in June 1120, he met with an
enthusiastic reception ; though he spent many months in South Italy,
his residence in Rome was comparatively untroubled. The failure of the
negotiations at Mouzon delayed peace for three more years, but the
universal desire for it was too strong to be gainsaid. Two events in 1121
prepared the way. Firstly, the capture of the anti-Pope in April by
Calixtus removed a serious obstacle; the wretched Gregory VIII had
received, as he complained, no support from the Emperor who had exalted
him. Secondly, at Michaelmas in the Diet of Würzburg the German
nobles restored peace between Henry and his opponents in Germany,
and promised by their mediation to effect peace with the Church also.
This removed the chief difficulties. Suspicion of the king had ruined
negotiations at Mouzon; his pledges were now to be guaranteed by the
princes of the Empire. Moreover with Germany united for peace, the
Papacy could have little to gain by holding out against it; Calixtus
shewed his sense of the changed situation by the conciliatory, though
firm, letter which he wrote to Henry on 19 February 1122 and sent by
the hand of their common kinsman, Bishop Azzo of Acqui. Henry had
as little to gain by obstinacy, and shewed himself prepared to carry out
the decisions of the Diet of Würzburg and to promote the re-opening of
negotiations. The preliminaries took time. The papal plenipotentiaries
fixed on Mayence as the meeting-place for the council, but the Emperor
won an important success in obtaining the change of venue from this city,
where he had in the archbishop an implacable enemy, to the more loyal
Worms; here on 23 September was at last signed the Concordat which
brought Empire and Papacy into communion once more.
The Concordat of Worms' was a treaty of peace between the two
powers, each of whom signed a diploma granting concessions to the other.
The Emperor, besides a general guarantee of the security of Church
property and the freedom of elections, surrendered for ever investiture
with the ring and staff. The Pope in his concessions made an important
distinction between bishoprics and abbeys in Germany and those in Italy
and Burgundy. In the former he granted that elections should take place
in the king's presence and allowed a certain authority to the king in dis-
puted elections; the bishop or abbot elect was to receive the regalia from
the king by the sceptre, and in return was to do homage and take the
oath of fealty, before consecration. In Italy and Burgundy consecration
was to follow a free election, and within six months the king might bestow
the regalia by the sceptre and receive homage in return? . This distinction
marked a recognition of existing facts. The Emperor had exercised little
1 The original of the imperial diploma is in the Vatican archives. A facsimile of
it is given in MIOGF, Vol. VI.
2 In both cases the words used are: “Sceptrum a te recipiat et quae ex his iure
tibi debet faciat. ”
CH. II.


## p. 108 (#154) ############################################

108
Effect of the Concordat
1
control over elections in Burgundy, and had been gradually losing
authority in Italy. Two factors had reduced the importance of the Italian
bishoprics: the growing power of the communes, often acquiesced in by
the bishops, had brought about a corresponding decline in episcopal
authority, and the bishops had in general acceded to the papal reform
decrees, so that they were far less amenable to imperial control. As far
as Germany was concerned, it remained of the highest importance to the
king to retain control over the elections, as the temporal authority of the
bishops continued unimpaired. And here, though the abolition of the
obnoxious use of spiritual symbols satisfied the papal scruples, the royal
control of elections remained effective. But it cannot be denied that the
Concordat was a real gain to the Papacy. The Emperor's privilege was
a surrender of an existing practice; the Pope's was only a statement of
how much of the existing procedure he was willing to countenance?
On 11 November a diet at Bamberg confirmed the Concordat, which
forthwith became part of the constitutional law of the Empire. In
December the Pope wrote a letter of congratulation to Henry and sent
him his blessing, and at the Lenten Synod of 11232 proceeded to ratify
the Concordat on the side of the Church as well. The imperial diploma
was welcomed with enthusiasm by the synod; against the papal concessions
there was some murmuring, but for the sake of peace they were tolerated
for the time. It was recognised that they were not irrevocable, and
their wording rendered possible the claim that, while Henry's privilege
was binding on his successors, the Pope's had been granted to Henry
alone for his lifetime. There were also wide discrepancies of opinion as
to the exact implication of the praesentia regis at elections and the
influence he could exercise at disputed elections. By Henry V, and later
by Frederick Barbarossa, these were interpreted in the sense most favour-
able to the king. Between Henry and Calixtus, however, no friction arose,
despite the efforts of Archbishop Adalbert to provoke the Pope to action
against the Emperor. Calixtus died in December 1124, Henry in the
following summer, without any violation of the peace. The subordination
of Lothar to ecclesiastical interests allowed the Papacy to improve its
position, which was still further enhanced during the weak reign of Conrad.
Frederick I restored royal authority in this direction as in others, and the
version of the Concordat given by Otto of Freising represents his point
of view; the difference between Italian and German bishoprics is ignored,
and the wording of the Concordat is slightly altered to admit of in-
terpretation in the imperial sense. It is clear that the Concordat
1 See A. Hofmeister, Das Wormser Konkordat (Festschrift Dietrich Schäfer zum
70 Geburtstag). Hofmeister, following Schäfer against Bernheim and others, insists
also that, though Henry's privilege was to the Papacy in perpetuity, the Pope's
was only to Henry for his lifetime. The Church party certainly adopted this view,
but that it was recognised by the imperialists seems to be disproved by subsequent
history.
2 The First Lateran Council.


## p. 109 (#155) ############################################

The enhanced position of the Papacy
109
contained within itself difficulties that prevented it from becoming a
permanent settlement; its great work was to put on a legal footing the
relations of the Emperor with the bishops and abbots of Germany. What
might have resulted in connexion with the Papacy we cannot tell. The
conflict between Frederick I and the Papacy was again a conflict for
mastery, in which lesser subjects of difference were obliterated. Finally
Frederick II made a grand renunciation of imperial rights at elections
on 12 July 1213, before the last great conflict began.
The first great contest between Empire and Papacy had virtually
come to an end with the death of Henry IV. Its results were indecisive.
The Concordat of Worms had provided a settlement of a minor issue,
but the great question, that of supremacy, remained unsettled. It was
tacitly ignored by both sides until it was raised again by the challenging
words of Hadrian IV. But the change that had taken place in the relations
between the two powers was in itself a great victory for the papal idea.
The Papacy, which Henry III had controlled as master from 1046 to 1056,
had claimed authority over his son, and had at any rate treated as an
equal with his grandson. In the ecclesiastical sphere the Pope had obtained
a position which he was never to lose. That he was the spiritual head of
the Church would hardly have been questioned before, but his authority
had been rather that of a suzerain, who was expected to leave the local
archbishops and bishops in independent control of their own districts.
In imitation of the policy of the temporal rulers, the Popes had striven,
with a large measure of success, to convert this suzerainty into a true
sovereignty. This was most fully recognised in France, though it was very
widely accepted also in Germany and North Italy. In England, papal
authority had made least headway, but even here we find in Anselm an
archbishop of Canterbury placing his profession of obedience to the Pope
above his duty to his temporal sovereign. The spiritual sovereignty of
the Papacy was bound to mean a limitation of the authority of the
temporal rulers.
Papal sovereignty found expression in the legislative, executive, and
iudicial supremacy of the Pope. At general synods, held usually at Rome
and during Lent, he promulgated decrees binding on the whole Church;
these decrees were repeated and made effective by local synods also, on
the holding of which the Popes insisted. The government was centralised
in the hands of the Pope, firstly, by means of legates, permanent or
temporary, who acted in his name with full powers: secondly, by the
frequent summons to Rome of bishops and especially of archbishops, who,
moreover, were rarely allowed to receive the pallium except from the
hand of the Pope himself. A more elaborate organisation was contemplated
in the creation of primacies, begun in France by Gregory VII and extended
by his successors; while certain archbishops were thus given authority
over others, they were themselves made more directly responsible to Rome.
CH. II.


## p. 110 (#156) ############################################

110
Ecclesiastical and political considerations
And as papal authority became more real, the authority of archbishops
and bishops tended to decrease. The encouragement of direct appeals to
Rome was a cause of this, as was the papal protection given to monasteries,
especially by Urban II, with exemption in several cases from episcopal
control. Calixtus II, as a former archbishop, was less in sympathy with
this policy and guarded episcopal rights over monasteries with some care.
But the close connexion of the Papacy with so many houses in all parts
tended to exalt its position and to lower the authority of the local bishop;
it had a further importance in the financial advantage it brought to the
Papacy.
Papal elections were now quite free. The rights that had been pre-
served to Henry IV in the Election Decree of Nicholas II had lapsed
during the schism. Imperial attempts to counteract this by the appoint-
ment of subservient anti-Popes had proved a complete failure. In episcopal
elections, too, progress had been made towards greater freedom. There
was a tendency towards the later system of election by the chapter, but at
present clergy outside the chapter and influential laymen had a consider-
able and a lawful share. In Germany and England the royal will was
still the decisive factor. It may be noticed here that the Popes did not
attempt to introduce their own control over elections in place of the lay
control which they deprecated. They did, however, frequently decide in
cases of dispute, or order a new election when they considered the previous
one to be uncanonical in form or invalid owing to the character of the
person elected; occasionally too, as Gregory VII in the case of Hugh and
the archbishopric of Lyons, they suggested to the electors the suitable
candidate. But the papal efforts were directed primarily to preserving
the purity of canonical election.
The Reform Movement had led to a devastating struggle, but in
many respects its results were for good. There was undoubtedly a greater
spirituality noticeable among the higher clergy, in Germany as well as in
France, at the end of the period. The leading figure among the moderates,
Bishop Otto of Bamberg, was to become famous as the apostle of Pome-
rania, and Archbishop Conrad of Salzburg was to be prominent not only in
politics but also for his zeal in removing the clergy from secular pursuits.
In the age that followed, St Bernard and St Norbert were able by their
personality and spiritual example to exercise a dominance over the rulers
of France and Germany denied to the Popes themselves.
There was indeed another side of papal activity which tended to lessen
their purely spiritual influence. The temporal power was to some extent
Ja necessity, for spiritual weapons were of only limited avail. Gregory VII
had apparently conceived the idea of a Europe owning papal suzerainty,
but his immediate successors limited themselves to the Papal States, ex-
tended by the whole of South Italy, where the Normans recognised papal
overlordship. The alliance with the Normans, so often useful, almost
necessary, was dangerous and demoralising. It had led to the fatal results


## p. 111 (#157) ############################################

Papal advance due to Gregory VII
111
of Gregory's last years and was for some time to give the Normans a
considerable influence over papal policy, while the claim of overlordship
of the South was to lead to the terrible struggle with the later Hohen-
staufen and its aftermath in the contest of Angevins and Aragonese. In
Rome itself papal authority, which had been unquestioned during
Gregory's archidiaconate and papacy up to 1083, received a severe check
from Norman brutality; it was long before it could be recovered in full
again.
The great advance of papal authority spiritual and temporal, its rise as
a power co-equal with the Empire, was not initiated indeed by Gregory VII,
but it was made possible by him and he was the creator of the new Papacy.
He had in imagination travelled much farther than his immediate suc-
cessors were willing to follow. But he made claims and set in motion
theories which were debated and championed by writers of greater learning
than his own, and though they lay dormant for a time they were not
forgotten. St Bernard shewed what spiritual authority could achieve.
Gregory VII had contemplated the Papacy exercising this authority,
and his claims were to be brought into the light again, foolishly and
impetuously at first by Hadrian IV, but with more insight and deter-
mination by Innocent III, with whom they were to enter into the region
of the practical and in some measure actually to be carried into effect.
Gregory VII owed much to Nicholas I and the author of the Forged
Decretals; Innocent III owed still more to Gregory VII.
CH. II.


## p. 112 (#158) ############################################

112
CHAPTER III.
GERMANY UNDER HENRY IV AND HENRY V.
The death of Henry III on 5 October 1056 was one of the greatest
disasters which the medieval Empire experienced. It is true that his
power had declined in the latter years of his reign, but the difficulties
before him were not so great that he himself, granted good health, could
not have successfully surmounted them. Imperial prestige had suffered,
especially from Hungary in the south-east; yet even the weak government
of the regency was soon able to restore, though it could not retain, its
overlordship. It was rather in the internal affairs of Germany and in the
Italian kingdom that the death of the great Emperor was fatal. The
German princes needed a master to keep them from usurping or claiming
independence of action. And in Italy the situation was critical, as
Henry III had recognised. Imperial authority was challenged in the
north and centre by Duke Godfrey of Lower Lorraine, the husband of
Beatrice of Tuscany, while in the south the rise of the Norman power
and the prospect of a secular sword on which the now regenerated Papacy
could rely put it in a position to shake off its subservience to its former
rescuer and protector, the Emperor. The more absolute Henry's authority
had been, the greater the loss of imperial prestige should the Papacy be-
come independent.
The heir to the throne was a boy not quite six years
of
had averted the gravest danger to which monarchy was liable—the
danger of a vacancy in the kingdom-as his son Henry had already been
recognised and anointed as king. But he could not avert the lesser,
though often hardly less grave, evil of a regency. Probably in accordance
with the Emperor's own wishes, and certainly following the usual
precedent, the Empress-mother Agnes was recognised as regent, a woman
distinguished only for her piety. Had she combined with this the firm
character of a Blanche of Castile, she might have made of her son a
Louis IX, but she failed alike to maintain imperial government and to
impress her piety on her son. For the few months that Pope Victor II
survived his master and friend, all indeed went well. His counsels brought
peace in Germany (especially in Lorraine and Bavaria), his influence it
was that caused the change in government to be effected with so little
disturbance, and during his lifetime Empire and Papacy were united in
the closest harmony. But with his death Agnes was left to depend on
the counsel of such of the bishops as enjoyed her favour: in particular
Henry of Augsburg, whose influence at court seriously weakened the
regency owing to the jealousy to which it gave rise.
age. Henry III


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Regency of Agnes
113
The effect of the five years and a half of Agnes' regency was to pro-
duce a steady decline in the prestige and power of the central authority.
At first, indeed, there was an improvement on the eastern frontiers. The
birth of a son, Salomo, to King Andrew of Hungary had disappointed
the king's brother Béla in his hopes of the succession. To counteract this
danger Andrew made peace with the Empire in 1058, and a marriage-
alliance was arranged between Salomo and Agnes' daughter Judith.
This alliance, however, only produced disaster. An imperial army sent
in 1060 to the assistance of Andrew was severely defeated. Andrew him-
self was killed in battle, Salomo had to take refuge in Germany, and Béla
and his son Géza established themselves as rulers of Hungary. The Duke
of Poland, who had given a refuge and assistance to Béla, seized the
opportunity to throw off the imperial overlordship, and by his continual
alliance with the anti-German party in both Hungary and Bohemia was
able to maintain himself in a practically independent position. The Duke
of Bohemia, therefore, was on the side of the Empire', and his loyalty was
to be of the greatest value, placed as he was in direct contact with the
duchies both of Saxony and Bavaria. During practically the whole of the
eighty years covered by the reigns of Henry IV and Henry V this
situation prevailed in the three countries. There was frequent civil war
in each of them, and the brothers of the ruler were constantly in revolt
against him, but, while the German party maintained itself in Bohemia,
the anti-German party was successful in both Hungary and Poland. To-
wards the end of the period Hungary became more concerned in Eastern
than in Western politics, though its contest with Venice for the coast of
Dalmatia introduced a further complication into the international
situation.
It was not surprising that the frontier-states refused obedience to a
government which could not enforce its authority within the kingdom.
The majesty of the imperial name was still sufficient to leave the
disposition of appointments, both lay and ecclesiastical, in the hands of
the Empress-regent. Agnes, too, was fortunate in the patronage that she
had to bestow, though singularly unfortunate in its disposal. The duchy
of Franconia, as before, remained in royal hands. When Swabia became
vacant by the death of Duke Otto in 1057, Agnes bestowed the duchy on
the Burgundian Count, Rudolf of Rheinfelden, and his marriage with the
king's sister Matilda in 1059 was designed to bind him to the interests of
the court; but Matilda died in 1060, and his subsequent marriage with
Adelaide, Henry IV's sister-in-law, tended perhaps rather to rivalry than
to union with the king. To the leading noble in Swabia, Count Berthold
of Zähringen, was given the duchy of Carinthia in 1061 ; Carinthia, how-
ever, remained quite independent of its duke, and the local family of
1 In 1085 Vratislav II as a reward for his loyalty received the title of king, and
was crowned by Archbishop Egilbert of Trèves at Prague. The title was for his life-
time only, and did not affect his duties to his overlord.
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. III.
8


## p. 114 (#160) ############################################

114
Weakness of the government
Eppenstein was predominant in the duchy. In Saxony, Agnes does not
seem to have attempted to interfere with the recognised claims of the
Saxons to independence within the duchy or with the hereditary right of
the Billung family, and on the death of Duke Bernard in 1059 his son
Ordulf succeeded without challenge. But it was probably with the aim of
obtaining valuable support in Saxony that in 1061 she handed over the
duchy of Bavaria, which had been entrusted to her own charge by
Henry III, to Count Otto of Nordheim. The dukes so appointed used
their new authority solely to further their own ambitious ends, and the
mother exalted her son's most determined opponents. The leading
ecclesiastics were no more disinterested in their aims than the secular
princes. Archbishop Anno of Cologne was entering into relations with
the leading nobles in Germany, and with the Papacy and Duke Godfrey
in Italy, and was using his influence already in episcopal elections; his
nephew Burchard, who became Bishop of Halberstadt, was one of the
principals in every Saxon revolt. The Archbishop of Mayence, Siegfried',
was a man of little resolution, whose weakness of character prevented him
from playing the part in German history to which his office entitled him.
The most serious rivalry to Anno came from the north, where Archbishop
Adalbert of Bremen was establishing a dominant position, partly by
taking the lead in missionary work in Scandinavia and among the Slavs,
partly by the extension of his secular authority so that even nobles were
willing to accept his overlordship in return for his powerful protection.
His ambition, however, aroused the hostility of the Billung family, and
was directly responsible for the first disturbances in Saxony.
It was in Italy that imperial authority was displayed at its weakest.
Here the death of Henry III had enabled Duke Godfrey of Lower
Lorraine to establish an influence which the German government was
unable to challenge. The election of his brother Frederick as Pope
Stephen IX in 1057 was serious in itself, besides the fact that it marked
the end of the imperial control of papal elections. The Empress-regent,
indeed, ratified this election, as well as that of Nicholas II in 1059, but
even her piety took alarm at the Papal Election Decree and the alliance
with the Normans. It shews how serious the situation was when Agnes
could feel herself bound to oppose the reform party and recognise
Cadalus as Pope in 1061, an action which only damaged imperial prestige
still further, since she was unable to give him any support. On the other
hand, Duke Godfrey intervened, probably in collaboration with Anno,
compelling the rival Popes to return to their dioceses to await the decision
of the German government.
But it was not the decision of Agnes that was to settle this question.
The regency had already been taken out of her hands. Dissatisfaction
1 He was appointed by Agnes in 1060; as he was of high birth, he may have
been designed to counter the ambitions of Anno.


## p. 115 (#161) ############################################

Anno's coup d'état at Kaiserswerth
115
with the weak government of a woman and a child had been for some
time openly expressed, especially by those princes whose selfish ambition
had contributed greatly to this weakness. Archbishop Anno had been
intriguing to get control of the government, and the plot that he contrived
was probably carried out with the connivance of Duke Godfrey. The
plot culminated at Kaiserswerth on the Rhine in April 1062, when Anno,
with the assistance of Duke Otto of Bavaria and Count Ekbert of
Brunswick, beguiled the young king on board a boat, took possession of
his person and of the royal insignia, hurried him by river to Cologne,
and there took charge of the government in his name. Agnes made
no attempt to recover her lost authority, and retired at once to the
life of religion to which indeed she had dedicated herself the previous
year.
For two years Anno retained control, and used his authority to
enrich his province and to advance his relatives'. He thought it politic,
indeed, when the court was in Saxony in 1063, to associate Archbishop
Adalbert in the government, and in a diploma of 27 June Adalbert is
described as patronus, Anno as magister of the young king. This was the
title under which he usually appears; the way in which he performed his
tutorship may be inferred from the charges, so constantly repeated after-
wards, of the vicious life of Henry's early years. Italian affairs in par-
ticular engrossed Anno's attention. In concert with Duke Godfrey he
had certainly decided for Alexander II and against Cadalus, but it was
important that the German government should formally have the decisive
voice. At the diet of Augsburg in 1062, and finally at the synod of
Mantua in 1064, Anno dictated a decision in favour of Alexander. But
in this he clearly over-reached himself, and the Papacy, which was
asserting its independence of imperial authority, did not accept the
position that a German archbishop could have the decisive voice in
a papal election. Both in 1068 and in 1070 Anno received a lesson at
Rome as to who was master and who servant. And his absence at Mantua
gave the opportunity to his rival in Germany. Anno returned to find
himself superseded by Adalbert.
For another two years the control rested with Adalbert, who had won
increased fame by a victory in Hungary which temporarily restored
Salomo. The regency, indeed, came to an end when in his fifteenth year
the young king came of age and girded on the sword at Worms on
29 March 1065. But the archbishop remained master, and made
imperial policy subservient to his own ambitions. He received lavish
grants from the royal domain in Saxony, and further impoverished the
1 On 14 July 1063 a royal charter granted one-ninth of the royal revenues to
the Archbishop of Cologne to be distributed among the monasteries of his province.
On 31 August 1063 Archbishop Engelhard of Magdeburg died, and Anno's brother
Werner (Wezil) was appointed to succeed him; he was only second to Anno's
nephew Burchard in instigating revolt in Saxony.
СВ. І.
8--2


## p. 116 (#162) ############################################

116
Short regency of Adalbert of Bremen
crown by a bountiful distribution of royal abbeys, mainly among bishops.