177
The Soviets' policy toward China was quite conciliatory at first, a position that reflected their own weakness.
The Soviets' policy toward China was quite conciliatory at first, a position that reflected their own weakness.
Revolution and War_nodrm
152 The government was worried about the impact of Bolshevik propaganda on the British Empire, and Lloyd George saw the restoration of trade as a way to persuade the Soviet government to abandon its subversive activities.
153 Accordingly, tlhe British insisted that any trade agreement include "a mutual undertaking to refrain from hostile actions or measures against the other party and from direct or indirect official propaganda.
" The fear of Bolshevik subversion, which had once justified support for the Whites, now became a rationale for accommodation.
154
The Soviet government accepted the British invitation to begin trade talks in June 1920 and sent Leonid Krasin, a Soviet official with extensive busi- ness experience, to conduct the negotiations. Despite each side's obvious in- terest in restoring commercial ties, the negotiations faced several impressive obstacles. British conservatives still mistrusted the Bolsheviks, and their suspicions were not allayed by the Soviets' public commitment to exporting their revolution. The British government was facing renewed unrest in Ire- land, several rebellious colonies, a threatened strike by the Miners' Federa- tion, and the formation of a trade union Council of Action to oppose British involvement in the Russo-Polish war. Opponents of the trade talks blamed working-class agitation on the presence of the Soviet delegation, and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson began preparations for a military campaign against the Council of Action in August. Sir Basil Thomson, chief of intelli-
151 Lloyd George told Parliament, "The withdrawal of Russia from the supplying markets is contributing to high prices, high cost of living, and to scarcity and hunger. Russia supplied before the war one-fourth of the whole export wheat of the world. . . . The world needs it. " Quoted in Coates and Coates, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 15-16; and see also Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 15-20, 37; Alfred L. P. Dennis, TheForeign Policies ofSoviet Russia (New York: E. P. Dut- ton, 1924), 381-83; Lloyd C. Gardner, Safefor Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Rev- olution, I9IJ-I92J (London: Oxford University Press, 1984), 328; and Stephen White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1 92cr24 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), 15-16.
152 According to Thompson and White, Lloyd George "had never abandoned his hopes for some sort of peaceful settlement in Russia," and the trade talks provided a cover for discus- sions whose "real substance had remained pre-eminently political throughout. " See Thomp- son, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 347; and White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 7?
153 The First Congress of the Communist International in March 1919 had anticipated "open risings and unrest in all colonies" and the liberation of "colonial slaves" by the victo- rious proletariat. Zinoviev called for a "holy war against British imperialism" at a "Congress of Peoples of the East" in September, the Soviet government established a school for training Asian revolutionaries in Tashkent, and fifteen hundred Bolshevik agents were reported to be in India. See Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:245-{)o; Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 349-51, 357-{)7; and White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 82-<)6, 98-104, 11? r24.
154 They also demanded that the Soviet government undertake "not to join in military ac- tivities or propaganda conducted by the Asiatic peoples against British interests or the British Empire. " Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:192-93.
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gence for the Home Office, told the Cabinet in September, "The Russian Trading Delegation has become a greater menace to the stability of this country than anything that has happened since the Armistice. " And where Lloyd George believed that these dangers could be defused by a combina- tion of an armistice in Poland, a trade agreement with Russia, and the ban on Bolshevik propaganda, to his Conservative opponents the threat of rev- olution was a sufficient reason to abandon the talks forthwith. 155
Soviet officials were equally suspicious, and Lenin warned Krasin that "that swine Lloyd George has no scruples or shame in the way he deceives: don't believe a word he says and gull him three times as much. "156 They also exaggerated the revolutionary potential of the British working class, and their misplaced optimism nearly derailed the negotiations completely. 157 In August, the new Soviet negotiator in London, Lev Kamenev, misled the British government regarding the peace terms the Soviets had offered to Poland in order to buy time for the Red Army to reach Warsaw. 158 Kamenev also held several meetings with members of the Council of Action and other left-wing groups and gave ? 75,000 to the left-wing Daily Herald, thereby vi- olating the pledge not to interfere in British domestic politics. The exposure of these deceptions led conservatives to demand the immediate expulsion of the Soviet trade delegation, and Lloyd George promptly informed Kamenev that he was no longer welcome. 159
155 See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 51-52, 222-24, 265-85. On the Council of Action, see White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 43-51 .
156 Chicherin wired Krasin that the Foreign Office was "playing a mos? perfidious and base double-faced game," and Lenin argued that British proposals for a ceasefire in Poland were intended "to snatch victory out of our hands with the aid of false promises. '' Kamenev's own views were more moderate, and he told Lloyd George in August that he was aware that "nei- ther Poland nor Wrangel had the direct support of the British Government. " See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 116-17, 121-22, 166; and Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury, eds. , Documents on1British Foreign Policy, 1 9 1 9-1939, 1st ser. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1958), 8:686.
57 Soviet officials knew that Lloyd George's interest in a trade agreement was based in part on his desire to end Bolshevik propaganda, and Chicherin told Krasin to "make it clear that we are able to cause [England] serious damage in the East if we so wish. " He added: "Picture to them what will happen if we send a Red Army to Persia, Mesopotamia, and Afghanistan. We are awaited and yearned for there, and it is only the moderation of our policy which causes a slow development [of the revolutionary situation] in that country. " Quoted in Ull- man, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 122.
158 Kamenev omitted the Soviet demand that the Polish Army be disarmed and replaced by a "worker's militia" organized under Russian auspices. Ironically, Chicherin had tried to convince Kamenev to make this demand public in order to stimulate revolutionary attitudes among British workers. See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 253-64.
159 After meeting with representatives from the Council of Action on August 7, Kamenev wired Chicherin that "the workers are coming forward on our side, not because we are right or wrong, but because they must be with Russia at all costs; and on any terms. " Similarly, after Soviet hopes for the conquest of Poland had faded, Lenin was still instructing Kamenev to "use all your forces to explain [Lloyd George's treacherous aggression] to the British work- ers. Write articles for them yourself . . . teach them how to agitate among the masses. In this
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Lloyd George was still committed to restoring normal relations, however, and he managed to exempt Krasin from the charges leveled at Kamenev. The basic terms for an agreement had been in place since June, but disputes over a final prisoner exchange and several other issues delayed the final sig- nature until March 1921. In addition to the economic arrangements, each party agreed to "refrain from hostile action . . . and from conducting outside its own borders any hostile propaganda. " The Soviets specifically pledged not to interfere in India or Afghanistan; Britain made a similar commitment regarding the territories of the former Russian Empire. 160
The Anglo-Soviet trade agreement illustrates some of the other obstacles that can impede efforts to normalize relations with a revolutionary regime. First, in addition to each side's suspicions and the complications raised by the Russo-Polish war, the negotiations were prolonged by the inherent diffi- culty of measuring the level of threat that a revolutionary power represents. In 1920, the Bolshevik threat to British interests was based not on Russian economic or military power but on the appeal of Bolshevik ideas, yet no one knew how broadly appealing these ideas really were. Men such as Basil Thomson recognized that the Council of Action was primarily an antiwar movement and not a revolutionary organization, but they could not be cer- tain that pro-Bolshevik sentiment was not growing beneath the surface. In- deed, Sir Henry Wilson eventually became convinced that Lloyd George himself was a Bolshevik and tried to organize a campaign to force him from office. 161 In the same way, Kamenev's misconduct while in England followed from the belief that England was ripe for a revolution, even though his ef- forts to encourage one merely hardened Conservative attitudes and jeopar- dized the process of accommodation. Thus, uncertainty about Britain's revolutionary potential made both sides less willing to compromise.
Interestingly, other forms of uncertainty may have facilitated the negotia- tions. Because of their ignorance about economic conditions in Russia, the British may have exaggerated the economic benefits of trade and thereby overstated their own interest in accommodation. Similarly, the claim that a trade agreement would strengthen Russian "moderates" reveals both wish- ful thinking and the British leaders' continued failure to understand the basic nature of the Soviet system. Interest in the trade agreement was also fueled by unwarranted concerns about Communist subversion in the rest of the British empire, which increased the desire to silence Soviet propaganda. 162
? lies your chief task. " Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 224-25, 254, 269. On Kamenev's expulsion, see Butler and Bury, British Documents, 783-91.
160 The text of the agreement is reprinted in Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 474-78.
161 For the details of this fascinating episode, see Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 274-81, 307-3o8.
162 Ullman,Anglo-SovietAccord,415-19,438-43.
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Thus, despite enduring suspicions, continued insecurity, deep domestic opposition, and a host of misconceptions, Britain and Russia managed to take the first step toward a more normal relationship. Above all else, their willingness to do so reveals a growing recognition of the postwar balance of threats. Although Churchill and Curzon continued to oppose the trade agreement on the grounds that Soviet Russia "makes no secret of its inten- tions to overthrow our institutions everywhere," the claim that the Soviet
government could be toppled easily was now untenable. Lloyd George drew the obvious conclusion: if Bolshevism could not be eliminated, then Britain should come to terms with it. Similarly, although Soviet leaders had not abandoned their hope for a world revolution, they were begin- ning to realize that it might not be imminent and were becoming increas- ingly aware of their own economic liabilities. 163 Agreeing to mute their propaganda offensive was a small price to pay for recognition and the restoration of trade, which they believed would foster recovery and dis- courage a renewed imperialist offensive. Not surprisingly, similar calcula-
tions were beginning to shape Soviet relations with a number of other countries as well.
Soviet Diplomacy in Asia
The Soviet government saw the developing world as a natural ally in the struggle against imperialism, and the liberation of the colonial areas re- ceived particular attention at the Second Comintern Congress in July and August of 1920. 164 The Soviets began cultivating close ties with Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey, and China during this period. In each case, the desire to enhance the security of the Soviet state proved stronger than the commit- ment to world revolution.
Before World War I, Persia's position in international politics was defined by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which gave Russia a sphere of in- fluence in the north of Persia and Britain a sphere of influence in the south. The Soviet government renounced these treaty rights in January 1918, and British forces moved into the vacuum as Russia withdrew. The pro-British Cabinet of Vusuq al-Dawlah signed a new Anglo-Persian treaty on August
163 In November, Lenin admitted, "Though we have not yet won a world victory . . . we have fought our way into a position where we can coexist with the capitalist powers, who now are forced to have trade relations with us. " In December, he acknowledged that "the speed, the tempo, at which revolution is developing in the capitalist countries is far slower than it was in our country. " Quotations from Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 412; and Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, 1:540.
164 At the congress, Lenin called for "the closest alliance, with Soviet Russia, of all the na- tional and colonial liberation movements. " Lenin, Selected Works, 3:434; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:251-59.
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9, 1919; had it been ratified, the agreement would have given Britain de facto control over much of Persia's foreign and domestic policy. 165
Britain's attempt to solidify its influence in Persia sparked a storm of protests, however, and the situation was complicated further when Mirza Kuchik Khan, a dissident nationalist, proclaimed an independent "Republic of Gilan" in northern Persia and began receiving aid and military backing from the Soviet regime in Azerbaijan. The British withdrawal from northern Persia following a Soviet raid on Enzeli shook Persian confidence in British protection, and the Persian government quickly dispatched an envoy to Russia to negotiate the resumption of relations.
British officials responded by arranging for a Persian colonel, Reza Shah, to conduct a coup d'etat in January 1921. 166 This move appeared to backfire when Reza denounced the Anglo-Persian agreement and signed a formal treaty of friendship with the Soviet government in February 1921. The Sovi- ets again renounced any special privileges in Persia, but the treaty autho- rized their entry "should a third power intervene with armed force" on Persian territory. 167 Reza Shah carefully maintained his freedom of action, however, suppressing local Communists and refusing to allow the Soviet ambassador to enter Tehran until all Soviet forces had withdrawn from Per- sian soil. The Soviets abandoned KUchik Khan as relations with Tehran im- proved, and the "Republic of Gilan" quickly collapsed. All told, the initial course of Soviet-Persian relations offered an early indication of Moscow's willingness to disregard immediate revolutionary objectives for the sake of tangible diplomatic benefits. 168
Soviet relations with Afghanistan followed a similar pattern. Prior to World War I, Afghanistan lay largely within the British sphere of influence, but the revolution in Russia inspired Emir Amanullah to declare war on
165 The Soviets renounced any "spheres of influence and exclusive interests" in Persia at Brest-Litovsk, and Lenin sent a formal message to the government of Persia "repudiating all Tsarist privileges and agreements that are contrary to the sovereignty of Persia. " See R. K. Ra- mazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 150o-1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs (Char- lottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966), 148-51; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:232 n. 2; George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949), 49-50; and Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927 (Geneva: Michael Joseph,
1966), 154?
166 For an account of the coup that stresses the British role, see Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 355-57, 376-8;8 for a version downplaying it, see Ramazani, Foreign Policy of Iran, 176-77.
167 The Soviet-Persian treaty was an obvious attempt to balance against Great Britain, but Reza Shah recognized that Russia was a potential threat as well. He therefore tried to main- tain cordial relations with Britain and the United States, a policy consistent with Persia's tra- ditional practice of seeking third powers to balance British and Soviet pressure. See Ramazani, Foreign PolicyofIran, 203-11, 3o8-309.
168 The Soviet ambassador told Khan, "Soviet Russia at this time regards all revolutionary movements as not only fruitless but also harmful. Therefore, Soviet Russia has adopted a new form of policy as evidenced by its new treaty with the government of Iran. " Quoted in R a m a z a n i , F o r e i g n P o l i c y of I r a n , 1 9 1 .
[18o]
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Britain in April 1919 and request aid from Moscow. The Soviet government was in no position to help, however, and Amanullah's forces were soon de- feated. Britairi acknowledged Afghan independence in August, and Lenin subsequently sent a telegram to the emir proposing a trade agreement and a treaty of friendship directed against "the most rapacious imperialist gov- ernment on Earth-Great Britain. "169
This offer led directly to the Soviet-Afghan treaty of February 1921. Ideo- logical solidarity played no role in this agreement (if anything, Amanullah's pan-Islamic beliefs were a potential threat to Soviet control in Central Asia), and the treaty failed to prevent a number of serious disagreements between Moscow and Kabul. 170 Like the Persians, the Afghanis were primarily inter- ested in balancing between Britain and Russia, and the Soviet-Afghan treaty was followed by a similar agreement with Great Britain in November.
Russia's policy toward Afghanistan offers further evidence of its prag- matic approach to diplomatic relations with the border states, particularly in areas where the threat of imperialist interference was especially acute. E. H. Carr notes, "What was significant in all this was not the extension of propaganda for world revolution but the succession of Soviet Russia to the traditional Russian role as Britain's chief rival in central Asia. "171
Soviet policy toward Turkey also sought to counter Western (especially British) influence. Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire had been rivals for centuries, but Soviet Russia and the new Turkish state found them- selves united by a number of common interests. Clandestine discussions between Karl Radek and several prominent members of the Young Turk movement had already raised the possibility of a Soviet-Turkish alliance against British imperialism. Chicherin broadcast a radio message warning of the dangers of imperialism and proposing Soviet-Turkish cooperation to "expel the European robbers" in September 1919. Until the summer of
1920, however, Soviet hopes rested primarily on the Turkish Communist movement. 172
As discussed at length below in chapter 6, foreign interference in Turkey eventually caused a nationalist revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a prominent Ottoman general. In April 1920, when the revolt was well un- derway, Kemal sent a formal note to Moscow proposing diplomatic rela-
169 Lenin'smessagecongratulatedtheAfghanpeopleontheirstruggleagainst"foreignop- pressors" and referred to the "wide possibilities for mutual aid against any attack by foreign bandits on the freedom of others. " Quoted in Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, 1:285-86.
}29CH)2.
171 BolshevikRevolution,3:292. 172 Ibid. , 3:244-47?
170 The
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main dispute concerned the emir of Bokhara, who was ousted by a Bolshevik "Young Bokharan" movement in September 1920. The emir fled to Afghanistan while his supporters tried to oust the new government, and this incident delayed the Soviet-Afghan treaty for several months. See Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 222-28; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution,
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tions and a joint "struggle against foreign imperialism which threatens both countries. "173
The harsh peace terms imposed at Versailles accelerated the Soviet-Turk- ish rapprochement. Turkey and Russia began direct negotiations in Moscow in July, and a Soviet representative arrived in Ankara in November. A friendship treaty emphasizing "their solidarity in the struggle against im- perialism" was signed in March 1921; six months later, the Treaty of Kars settled the remaining border disputes between the new Turkish state and the Soviet republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. 174
Despite these favorable developments, Russia and Turkey faced several enduring disputes during this period. Both states still coveted parts of Transcaucasia, and Kemal's overt anti-Communism was an obvious irritant as well. Soviet self-interest soon overcame any ideological inclinations, and Russia sent a military delegation to Ankara in November 1921 and agreed to provide a subsidy of 3? 5 million gold rubles and enough arms and amum ni- tion for three divisions. This gesture did little to bind Turkey to Moscow, however, and when the Greeks withdrew following their final defeat in 1922, Kemal moved away from Moscow and suppressed the Turkish Com- munist Party even more vigorously. Turkey also reversed its earlier position
on the Turkish Straits and agreed to negotiate a new arrangement with the . Western powers. The Soviets' response to these setbacks was restrained, a policy that paid off when Turkey insisted that Russia be invited to partici- pate in the negotiations for a new straits regime. 175
On the whole, Soviet relations with Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey are best seen as attempts to balance against a common threat. They are thus en- tirely consistent with the dictates of realpolitik. At the same time, Bolshevik ideology clearly affected Moscow's evaluation of alternative partners. The 1921 friendship treaties both stabilized Soviet relations with three of its neighboring countries and presented a worrisome threat to Western influ- ence in the developing world. Although maintaining these connections re- quired Moscow to overlook the persecution of local Communist groups, it was a small price to pay for such obvious diplomatic benefits.
The Far East did not at first appear to be an area of great revolutionary potential. The "Congress of Peoples of the East" held in Baku in 1920 fo- cused primarily on the Near East and South Asia, and the first "Congress of Toilers of the Far East" did not meet until January 1922. The Soviet govern- ment played a only minor role in the founding of the Chinese and Japanese
173 Quoted in ibid. , 248; and also see Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement (Beverly Hills, Calif. : Sage, 1973), 39-42?
174 In an obvious attempt to exclude the Entente, the Treaty of Kars also declared that Rus- sia and Turkey would negotiate a new treaty governing the Straits of Constantinople. See De- gras, Soviet Documents, 1:237-42, 263? 9; and Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 107.
? 175 See Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 109-14, 124-30.
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Communist parties, neither of which was a significant political force at this stage. 176 Lack of interest in the Far East was also a function of timing, as So- viet hopes for an imminent "world revolution" had begun to fade by the time the civil war was over and contact with the Far East restored. As a re- sult, Soviet policy in the Far East initially eschewed direct efforts to foment revolution and focused on reasserting traditional Russian interests.
The task of restoring Soviet power in the Far East was complicated by the turbulent situation in China and the ambiguous status of Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. The overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 had failed to produce an effective government, and China was now ruled by a set of com- peting warlords. The official government in Beijing saw the collapse of Russian power in 1917 as a chance to reassert its authority over Outer Mon- golia and the Chinese Eastern Railway, and China also sent a token force to Vladivostok during the Allied intervention and set up a satellite regime in the Mongolian capital of Urga in the fall of 1919.
177
The Soviets' policy toward China was quite conciliatory at first, a position that reflected their own weakness. They offered to establish diplomatic re- lations immediately and renounced Russia's former privileges in Mongolia and Manchuria. Communications between Moscow and the Far East had been cut off by the civil war, however, and this offer did not reach Beijing until March 1920. Circumstances had changed dramatically by then: a group of rival warlords had ousted the Beijing government, the Whites were nearing defeat, and foreign involvement in the civil war was drawing to a close. When a Chinese delegation finally arrived in Moscow in October
1920, therefore, the Soviet government abandoned its earlier offers and in- sisted on its former rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway. After several false starts and a protracted series of negotiations, the two sides signed a treaty resolving the railway issue and establishing de jure recognition in May 1924. Although Chicherin hailed the agreement as a "historic step in the emancipation of the Eastern peoples," the Sino-Soviet treaty in fact marked the restoration of Russia's former predominance over the official govern- ment in Beijing. 176
176 The Chinese Communist Party had fewer than one hundred members at its founding in 1921, and Zinoviev told the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in January 1922 that the Communist parties in the East "represent at present only small groups. " See Xenia Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 192o-1927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford: Stan- ford University Press, 1957), 222.
m See Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 26--28; Tang, Russian and Soviet Policy, 115-21, 36<>-65; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:491; and Bruce A. Ellemann, "Secret Sino-Soviet Negotiations on Outer Mongolia, 1918-1925,'' Pacific Affairs 66, no. 4 (1993-94).
178 The treaty renounced several earlier concessions and acknowledged Chinese sover- eignty in? Outer Mongolia, but it also gave Moscow the dominant role in managing the Chi- nese Eastern Railway. Allen Whiting observes, "whatever good intentions may have
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The reestablishment of Russian power was even more apparent in the conquest of Outer Mongolia. The turmoil in China had enabled a Cossack adventurer named Baron von Ungem-Stemberg to seize power in Urga in February 1921, but his regime was quickly ousted by Soviet troops in July. A Provisional People's Government "invited" the Soviet troops to remain, and the new "Mongolian People's Republic" signed a treaty restoring Russia's traditional predominance in November. 179
The Japanese withdrawal from Siberia gave an additional boost to Rus- sia's reemergence in the Far East. Pressure from the United States and Great Britain, together with the costs of occupation and the ascendancy of a mod- erate faction in Tokyo, had led Japan to begin a withdrawal from Siberia in 1922. Taliks between Japanese and Soviet representatives were unsucccessful at first, but discussions resumed in January 1923 and culminated in an agreement on "basic rules of relations" two years later. 180 The agreement es- tablished normal diplomatic and consular relations and committed both powers to additional negotiations on a range of other issues. It also com- mitted the signatories "to live in peace and amity with each other" and to refrain from "any act overt or covert liable in any way whatever to endan- ger the order and security" in either state's territory. Negotiations to replace the 1907 Russo-Japanese Fishery Convention began shortly thereafter, andl a new agreement was eventually signed two years later. 181
These advances were possible because both sides were willing to over- look ideological differences for the sake of tangible diplomatic benefits. 182 For the ]apanese, detente with the Soviet Union provided a counterweight to British and U. S. pressure. Japanese officials also hoped that access to the Russian market would spur their sputtering economy. The Soviets shared the hope that trade would accelerate their own recovery, but they also sought fro prevent the capitalist powers from forming an anti-Soviet bloc in the Far East. Soviet-Japanese cooperation was based entirely on self-
prompted the revolutionary foreign policy of self-denial in 1917-1918, by 1923 Soviet Russia was looking at the Far East exactly as had Tsarist Russia. " See his Soviet Policies in China, 28-30, 200; and also Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, 128-30, 245-48, 316-18; Tang, Russian and Soviet Policy, 138-41, 148-78; and Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:212-15.
? 179 See Thomas T. Hammond, "The Soviet Takeover of Outer Mongolia: Model for Eastern Europe? " in his Anatomy of Communist Takeovers; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolu tion, 3:500-502, 5 1 1-23.
180 See Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 1:355-63, 3:536; George Alexander Lensen, Japanese Recog- nition ofthe USSR: Soviet-Japanese Relations, 1921-1930 (Tokyo: Sophia University with the Diplomatic Press, 1970), 11; and Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 381-89.
181 Lensen, Japanese Recognition, 177-95 and chap. 9; Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, 253; and Edward Hallett Carr, Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926 (New York: Macmil- lan, 1958-64), J:87<r76.
182 This policy required certain compromises; for example, the Soviets agreed to refrain from revolutionary activities in Japan and to observe the elaborate religious etiquette of the imperial court. See Lensen, Japanese Recognition, 318, 345?
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interest, therefore, and as Lensen notes, "neither party lowered its guard. "183 The Japanese government continued to repress local Commu- nists and kept the Soviet representatives in Japan under surveillance, but these policies did not prevent the two states from making deals. As in Turkey, Persia, and elsewhere, in short, spreading revolution remained a secondary objective. 184
Viewed as a whole, Soviet relations in Asia were recovering rapidly by the end of 1924. The Soviet government had signed treaties of friendship with Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey; Japan was withdrawing from Russian soil and moving toward recognition, and Moscow had regained control of most of Siberia and Outer Mongolia and reestablished its primacy in the Chinese Railway Zone. These achievements were facilitated by Moscow's willingness to subordinate its revolutionary goals to more immediate polit- ical imperatives, but the lingering commitment to world revolution would have more pernicious effects in the years to come.
Alliance ofOutcasts: The Soviet-German Rapprochement
Allied intervention had pushed Soviet Russia toward Germany even be- fore World War I was over; after the war, the two states were drawn together by their shared status as pariahs and their mutual hostility toward Poland and the Entente. Germany was also the main object of the Bolsheviks' revo- lutionary ambitions, however, and Soviet policy toward the Weimar Re-
public combined efforts to cultivate close political and mili? ary ties with shakier attempts to spark a proletarian revolution. Repeated failures taught the Soviets to focus on direct diplomatic and military cooperation, but be- cause their faifrh in Germany's revolutionary potential proved extremely re- silient, this learning process was surprisingly slow and erratic. 185
Origins. At the end of World War I, Soviet-German relations were not promising. The Bolsheviks viewed the Social Democratic Party in Germany with contempt and expected it to collapse in the face of continued revolu- tionary agitation. Relations were also troubled by the presence of German military units in the Baltic region, where they fought against both Allied
183 Japan refused an offer of Soviet aid after a major earthquake in 1924, fearing that the aid mission might be an instrument of Communist subversion. The Japanese Communist Party disbanded in 1924 and was reconstituted in 1925-26, but government repression kept it on the fringes of Japanese political life. See Lensen, Japanese Recognition, 137-43; Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, 272-79; and Carr, Socialism in One Country, 3:883-iJ4?
184 Lensen concludes in his detailed study of Soviet-Japanese relations, "In the late 1920s, the Russian leaders took pains not to jeopardize Soviet-Japanese relations by overt subver- sion. " Japanese Recognition, 361.
185 See Edward Hallett Carr, German-Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), 25-26.
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and Bolshevik forces during the civil war. 186 Although German officials were already contemplating a closer relationship with Russia, the belief that Bol- shevism was both potentially threatening and unlikely to survive dictated a cautious response. Thus, when some German officers proposed an alliance with Soviet Russia against the Versailles Treaty, the commander of the Ger- man Army, Wilhelm Groener, stated that "an alliance with Russia, that is with Bolshevism, is something for which I cannot take the responsibility. "187
Resentment of the harsh terms imposed at Versailles soon overruled these reservations. As one German diplomat later recalled, most of his colleagues "were more sympathetic to the West than to the East'' but the Versailles Treaty revealed that "the West was much the more dangerous foe. " This view was especially pronounced within the German millltary, where an al- liance with Russia was expected to provide an outlet for German industry in the short term and to improve Germany's bargaining position over time. 188 Gwener's successor, General Helmut von Seeckt, believed that the danger of Communist subversion did not preclude closer ties between the two governments, and he soon decided that "a political and economic agreement with Russia [would be] an irrevocable purpose of our policy. "189
Progress toward rapprochement was swift. Germany had already refused to honor the Allied blockade of Russia in November 1919, and the two states signed an agreement for the release of prisoners in April 1920 and ex- changed diplomatic representatives in June. Berlin took a decidedly pro- Soviet position during the Russo-Polish war, refusing to permit the Allies to send military supplies to the Poles across German territory and briefly rais- ing the possibility of territorial adjustments in the event of a Soviet vic- tory. 190 By the end of 1920, Von Seeckt had established a special bureau to
study the "possibilities of cooperation with the Red Army" and powerful external forces were now pushing the two countries together despite their ideological differences. Lenin observed in November: "The German bour- geois government madly hates the Bolsheviks, but the interests of the inter-
186 See Robert G. Waite, Vanguard ofNazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany, 1918-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), chap. 5?
1 87 At the same time, Groener told the cabinet that Germany "must do what is required to secure Russia's friendship in the future. " See Freund, Unholy Alliance, 3? 40, 43? There is some ambiguous evidence of informal military cooperation between Russia and Germany in October 1919; for details, see Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:247, 361.
188 Quoted in Freund, Unholy Alliance, 4? 50; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 312-19.
189 Quoted in Freund, UnholyAlliance, 46. .
190 On Germany and the blockade, see Robert H. Haigh, David S. Morris, and Anthony R.
Peters, German-Soviet Relations in the Weimar Era: Friendshipfrom Necessity (Totowa, N. J. : Barnes and Noble, 1985), 61-62. During the Russo-Polish war, some German officials feared that the Red Army might continue on to Germany, while Von Seeckt and others believed that a Soviet victory would be a powerful blow against the entire Versailles system. See Freund, Unholy Alliance, 6? 73; and Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921-23 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), So-81.
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? The Russian Revolution
national situation are pushing it towards peace with Soviet Russia against its own will. " And Lenin left no doubt that Russia would welcome these overtures, because "so long as we are alone and the capitalist world is strong, . . . [we are] obliged to utilize [these] disagreements" nn the capitalist world. A preliminary economic accord was completed by mid-February, leaving the two states on the brink of a de facto alliance. l91
Yet despite the failure of the Spartacist uprisings in Berlin in January 1919 and the collapse of the short-lived Communist republic in Bavaria in May, the Soviet government had not lost all hope in the revolutionary potential of the German working class. In March 1920, an abortive coup by right-wing forces (the so-called Kapp putsch) sparked a general strike in Berlin and a brief Communist uprising in the Ruhr. Lenin now predicted that "the time is not far off when we shall march hand in hand with a German Soviet gov- ernment. " Soviet diplomats helped smuggle arms and explosives to Com- munist groups in Germany, and Soviet officials began to intervene directly in the internal politics of the German working-class movement. These ef- forts paid off in October 1920, when Zinoviev persuaded a majority of the Independent Socialist Party to unite with the German Communist Party
(KPD) and join the Comintern. Three months later, Comintern officials arranged the replacement of the KPD leader, Paul Levi, by officials more amenable to Soviet influence. 192
These developments culminated in the KPD's attempt to launch a prole- tarian uprising in March 1921. The party's new leaders were convinced that international and domestic conditions were ripe for revolution, and a dele- gation from the Executive Committee of the Comintem arrived in Germany at the beginning of March and began to press for an armed insurrection. The KPD proceeded to launch a violent but poorly planned revolt on March 23. Their belief that millions of non-Communist workers would rise up and join them proveol false, and the "March action" was quickly crushed. 193
191 Quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revol! :? tion, 3:33D-31. As usual, Lenin saw cooperation with capitalist states as a temporary expedient and not a permanent option. In a prescient passage, he noted that "Germany wants revenge, and we want revolution. For the moment our aims are the same, but when our ways part, they will be our most ferocious and greatest enemies. " Quoted in Dennis, Foreign Policies ofSoviet Russia, 154-55; and see also Lionel Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic (Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1954), 38-39; and Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 409?
192 Lenin's statement is quoted in Freund, Unholy Alliance, 62. On the Spartacist uprisings and Russian manipulation of the KPD, see Angress, Stillborn Revolution, 13-31, 91-100. On the brief career of the Bavarian Soviet Republic, see Allan Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1920: The Eisner Regime arad the Soviet Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
193 The March action is described in detail by Angress in Stillborn Revolution, chap. 4, and "TheTakeoverThatRemained inLimbo:TheGermanExperience, 1918-1923," inHammond, . AnatomyofCommunist Takeovers, 176-S- o. Carr reports that KPD membership declined from 450,000 to 180,000 following the March action, and the debacle "set in motion a wave of re-
? criminations which continued for many years to split the party. " Bolshevik Revolution, J337?
? ? Revolu tion and War
A new sense of realism had set in by the time the Third Comintem Congress met in Moscow in June. Lenin now admitted that "the development of the world revolution . . . did not proceed along the direct line we anticipated," andl Trotsky told the delegates, ''We are not so immediately near . . . to the world rev? olution. In 1919 we said to ourselves: 'it is a question of months. ' Now we say: 'it is perhaps a question of years. ' " When viewed alongside the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement and the friendship treaties with Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iran, such statements were a clear sign that hopes for an immediate world revolution was declining. According to E. H. Carr, "a new and well-grounded pessimism about the prospects of the European revolution confirmed and reinforced the drive towards a temporary accommodation with the capitalist world. "194
By weakening the German left, the debacle in March 1921 made it easier for the German government to move closer to Moscow without fear of leav? ing itself vulnerable to revolutionary subversion. At the same time, the Al? lied announcement of the final reparations bill and the French decision to enforce the reparations clause by occupying parts of the Ruhr had increased! Germany's interest in an alignment with Russia. Germany and Russia signed a secret agreement in April for the production of German aircraft and! munitions in Russia, the economic agreement negotiated in January was completed in May, and the two states agreed to exchange new diplomatic representatives shortly therafter. A German military delegation arrived to provide advice. for the restoration of Russia's military industries, and covert meetings between Soviet and German officers continued through the fall. 195
Rapallo and After. The conference in Genoa in April 1922 brought the Soviet-German rapprochement out into the open. The conference was orig- inally intended to create an international consortium for European recon- struction, including the restoration of regular commerce with Russia. As part of the new policy of peaceful coexistence, Chicherin had issued a for- mal note in October 1921 stating Russia's willingness to make concessions on the debt issue and proposing a conference "to consider the claims of the Powers against Russia and of Russia against the Powers, and to draw up at definite treaty of peace between them. " Following a suggestion from Lloyd George, the Supreme Allied Council agreed to combine the two goals and is- sued a resolution calling for an economic and financial conference "to rem- edy the paralysis of the European system. " 196
194 Quotations from Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 82-84; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, }:338, 385.
? 195 See Freund, Unholy Alliance, 93-94; Craig, Politics ofthe Prussian Army, 409-11; and Hans W. Gatzke, "Russo-German Military Collaboration during the Weimar Republic," American Historical Review 63, no. 3 (1958).
I% The Soviet note is in Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:27<r72; the resolution by the Supreme Allied Council is quoted in Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 98. Lenin personally
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? The Russian Revolution
Unfortunately, the collapse of the Briand government in France returned Rene Poincare to power in January 1922, and his steadfast refusal to alter the reparations arrangements ended any possibility of creating an international body for European recovery. Relations with Russia became the main item of discussion by default, and the German delegates began to fear that the Western powers were about to make a separate deal with Russia. To avoid complete isolation, they accepted a Soviet invitation for a clandestine meet- ing in the neal! "by town of Rapallo and signed an agreement restoring diplo- matic relations between Germany and Russia and committing both powers to consult each other before signing international economic agreements. The Rapallo agreement prevented the Allies from excluding either power from a more general settlement and offered the first sign of an overt Soviet-German alignment. 197
Soviet-German cooperation expanded considerably the following year.
The two states exchanged ambassadors after Rapallo and signed a conven- tion for military cooperation in August. The Soviets supported Germany when the French occupied the Ruhr in January 1923; Izvestiya declared, "So- viet Russia in her own vital interests cannot permit the final su1bjugation and destruction of Germany by . . . France and her vassals," and Bukharin an- nounced that the Red Army would probably intervene if Poland tried to take advantage of Germany's present weakness. 198
The blossoming Soviet-German relationship was soon threatened by an- other misguided outburst of revolutionary enthusiasm. The Soviets' faith in an imminent world revolution had declined steadily after the March action in 1921, but this objective revived whenever conditions seemed more en- couraging. Germany was now reeling from a combination of hyperinflation and domestic political paralysis, and the crisis helped the KPD recover from its earlier setbacks. Several Soviet officials saw the fall of the Cuno cabinet in August as a sign that the German revolution was finally at hand and con- vinced themselves that the German proletariat would rise up once the initial blow had fallen. Lenin's second stroke had removed him as a restraining in-
fluence and the KPD gradually succumbed to Soviet pressure. The day of the insurrection was fixed for November 7, and the campaign began with the appointment of KPD chief Heinrich Brandler and several other KPD members to ministerial posts in the state government of Saxony. The Ger- man chancellor, Gustav Stresemann, quickly obtained emergency powers and ordered the army into Saxony to dissolve the local government. At-
? ? edited Chicherin's speech to the conference in order to eliminate any revolutionary rhetoric that might alarm the other great powers. See Uldricks, "Russia and Europe," 62 n. 27.
197 As Freund points out, "more important than the formal contents of the treaty was the fact that Germany and Russia had dared to sign it. " Unholy Alliance, 118.
198 See Freund, Unholy Alliance, 125-26, 142-46, 152-53.
? ? tempts to organize a general strike were ineffective and the KPD decided to cancel the insurrection. Owing to a failure in communications, however, the KPD organization in Hamburg went ahead and began fthe revolt, but it was easily suppressed by government forces.
The Soviet government accepted the British invitation to begin trade talks in June 1920 and sent Leonid Krasin, a Soviet official with extensive busi- ness experience, to conduct the negotiations. Despite each side's obvious in- terest in restoring commercial ties, the negotiations faced several impressive obstacles. British conservatives still mistrusted the Bolsheviks, and their suspicions were not allayed by the Soviets' public commitment to exporting their revolution. The British government was facing renewed unrest in Ire- land, several rebellious colonies, a threatened strike by the Miners' Federa- tion, and the formation of a trade union Council of Action to oppose British involvement in the Russo-Polish war. Opponents of the trade talks blamed working-class agitation on the presence of the Soviet delegation, and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson began preparations for a military campaign against the Council of Action in August. Sir Basil Thomson, chief of intelli-
151 Lloyd George told Parliament, "The withdrawal of Russia from the supplying markets is contributing to high prices, high cost of living, and to scarcity and hunger. Russia supplied before the war one-fourth of the whole export wheat of the world. . . . The world needs it. " Quoted in Coates and Coates, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 15-16; and see also Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 15-20, 37; Alfred L. P. Dennis, TheForeign Policies ofSoviet Russia (New York: E. P. Dut- ton, 1924), 381-83; Lloyd C. Gardner, Safefor Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Rev- olution, I9IJ-I92J (London: Oxford University Press, 1984), 328; and Stephen White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1 92cr24 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), 15-16.
152 According to Thompson and White, Lloyd George "had never abandoned his hopes for some sort of peaceful settlement in Russia," and the trade talks provided a cover for discus- sions whose "real substance had remained pre-eminently political throughout. " See Thomp- son, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 347; and White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 7?
153 The First Congress of the Communist International in March 1919 had anticipated "open risings and unrest in all colonies" and the liberation of "colonial slaves" by the victo- rious proletariat. Zinoviev called for a "holy war against British imperialism" at a "Congress of Peoples of the East" in September, the Soviet government established a school for training Asian revolutionaries in Tashkent, and fifteen hundred Bolshevik agents were reported to be in India. See Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:245-{)o; Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 349-51, 357-{)7; and White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 82-<)6, 98-104, 11? r24.
154 They also demanded that the Soviet government undertake "not to join in military ac- tivities or propaganda conducted by the Asiatic peoples against British interests or the British Empire. " Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:192-93.
? ? The Russian Revolution
gence for the Home Office, told the Cabinet in September, "The Russian Trading Delegation has become a greater menace to the stability of this country than anything that has happened since the Armistice. " And where Lloyd George believed that these dangers could be defused by a combina- tion of an armistice in Poland, a trade agreement with Russia, and the ban on Bolshevik propaganda, to his Conservative opponents the threat of rev- olution was a sufficient reason to abandon the talks forthwith. 155
Soviet officials were equally suspicious, and Lenin warned Krasin that "that swine Lloyd George has no scruples or shame in the way he deceives: don't believe a word he says and gull him three times as much. "156 They also exaggerated the revolutionary potential of the British working class, and their misplaced optimism nearly derailed the negotiations completely. 157 In August, the new Soviet negotiator in London, Lev Kamenev, misled the British government regarding the peace terms the Soviets had offered to Poland in order to buy time for the Red Army to reach Warsaw. 158 Kamenev also held several meetings with members of the Council of Action and other left-wing groups and gave ? 75,000 to the left-wing Daily Herald, thereby vi- olating the pledge not to interfere in British domestic politics. The exposure of these deceptions led conservatives to demand the immediate expulsion of the Soviet trade delegation, and Lloyd George promptly informed Kamenev that he was no longer welcome. 159
155 See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 51-52, 222-24, 265-85. On the Council of Action, see White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution, 43-51 .
156 Chicherin wired Krasin that the Foreign Office was "playing a mos? perfidious and base double-faced game," and Lenin argued that British proposals for a ceasefire in Poland were intended "to snatch victory out of our hands with the aid of false promises. '' Kamenev's own views were more moderate, and he told Lloyd George in August that he was aware that "nei- ther Poland nor Wrangel had the direct support of the British Government. " See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 116-17, 121-22, 166; and Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury, eds. , Documents on1British Foreign Policy, 1 9 1 9-1939, 1st ser. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1958), 8:686.
57 Soviet officials knew that Lloyd George's interest in a trade agreement was based in part on his desire to end Bolshevik propaganda, and Chicherin told Krasin to "make it clear that we are able to cause [England] serious damage in the East if we so wish. " He added: "Picture to them what will happen if we send a Red Army to Persia, Mesopotamia, and Afghanistan. We are awaited and yearned for there, and it is only the moderation of our policy which causes a slow development [of the revolutionary situation] in that country. " Quoted in Ull- man, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 122.
158 Kamenev omitted the Soviet demand that the Polish Army be disarmed and replaced by a "worker's militia" organized under Russian auspices. Ironically, Chicherin had tried to convince Kamenev to make this demand public in order to stimulate revolutionary attitudes among British workers. See Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 253-64.
159 After meeting with representatives from the Council of Action on August 7, Kamenev wired Chicherin that "the workers are coming forward on our side, not because we are right or wrong, but because they must be with Russia at all costs; and on any terms. " Similarly, after Soviet hopes for the conquest of Poland had faded, Lenin was still instructing Kamenev to "use all your forces to explain [Lloyd George's treacherous aggression] to the British work- ers. Write articles for them yourself . . . teach them how to agitate among the masses. In this
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Lloyd George was still committed to restoring normal relations, however, and he managed to exempt Krasin from the charges leveled at Kamenev. The basic terms for an agreement had been in place since June, but disputes over a final prisoner exchange and several other issues delayed the final sig- nature until March 1921. In addition to the economic arrangements, each party agreed to "refrain from hostile action . . . and from conducting outside its own borders any hostile propaganda. " The Soviets specifically pledged not to interfere in India or Afghanistan; Britain made a similar commitment regarding the territories of the former Russian Empire. 160
The Anglo-Soviet trade agreement illustrates some of the other obstacles that can impede efforts to normalize relations with a revolutionary regime. First, in addition to each side's suspicions and the complications raised by the Russo-Polish war, the negotiations were prolonged by the inherent diffi- culty of measuring the level of threat that a revolutionary power represents. In 1920, the Bolshevik threat to British interests was based not on Russian economic or military power but on the appeal of Bolshevik ideas, yet no one knew how broadly appealing these ideas really were. Men such as Basil Thomson recognized that the Council of Action was primarily an antiwar movement and not a revolutionary organization, but they could not be cer- tain that pro-Bolshevik sentiment was not growing beneath the surface. In- deed, Sir Henry Wilson eventually became convinced that Lloyd George himself was a Bolshevik and tried to organize a campaign to force him from office. 161 In the same way, Kamenev's misconduct while in England followed from the belief that England was ripe for a revolution, even though his ef- forts to encourage one merely hardened Conservative attitudes and jeopar- dized the process of accommodation. Thus, uncertainty about Britain's revolutionary potential made both sides less willing to compromise.
Interestingly, other forms of uncertainty may have facilitated the negotia- tions. Because of their ignorance about economic conditions in Russia, the British may have exaggerated the economic benefits of trade and thereby overstated their own interest in accommodation. Similarly, the claim that a trade agreement would strengthen Russian "moderates" reveals both wish- ful thinking and the British leaders' continued failure to understand the basic nature of the Soviet system. Interest in the trade agreement was also fueled by unwarranted concerns about Communist subversion in the rest of the British empire, which increased the desire to silence Soviet propaganda. 162
? lies your chief task. " Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 224-25, 254, 269. On Kamenev's expulsion, see Butler and Bury, British Documents, 783-91.
160 The text of the agreement is reprinted in Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 474-78.
161 For the details of this fascinating episode, see Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 274-81, 307-3o8.
162 Ullman,Anglo-SovietAccord,415-19,438-43.
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Thus, despite enduring suspicions, continued insecurity, deep domestic opposition, and a host of misconceptions, Britain and Russia managed to take the first step toward a more normal relationship. Above all else, their willingness to do so reveals a growing recognition of the postwar balance of threats. Although Churchill and Curzon continued to oppose the trade agreement on the grounds that Soviet Russia "makes no secret of its inten- tions to overthrow our institutions everywhere," the claim that the Soviet
government could be toppled easily was now untenable. Lloyd George drew the obvious conclusion: if Bolshevism could not be eliminated, then Britain should come to terms with it. Similarly, although Soviet leaders had not abandoned their hope for a world revolution, they were begin- ning to realize that it might not be imminent and were becoming increas- ingly aware of their own economic liabilities. 163 Agreeing to mute their propaganda offensive was a small price to pay for recognition and the restoration of trade, which they believed would foster recovery and dis- courage a renewed imperialist offensive. Not surprisingly, similar calcula-
tions were beginning to shape Soviet relations with a number of other countries as well.
Soviet Diplomacy in Asia
The Soviet government saw the developing world as a natural ally in the struggle against imperialism, and the liberation of the colonial areas re- ceived particular attention at the Second Comintern Congress in July and August of 1920. 164 The Soviets began cultivating close ties with Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey, and China during this period. In each case, the desire to enhance the security of the Soviet state proved stronger than the commit- ment to world revolution.
Before World War I, Persia's position in international politics was defined by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which gave Russia a sphere of in- fluence in the north of Persia and Britain a sphere of influence in the south. The Soviet government renounced these treaty rights in January 1918, and British forces moved into the vacuum as Russia withdrew. The pro-British Cabinet of Vusuq al-Dawlah signed a new Anglo-Persian treaty on August
163 In November, Lenin admitted, "Though we have not yet won a world victory . . . we have fought our way into a position where we can coexist with the capitalist powers, who now are forced to have trade relations with us. " In December, he acknowledged that "the speed, the tempo, at which revolution is developing in the capitalist countries is far slower than it was in our country. " Quotations from Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 412; and Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, 1:540.
164 At the congress, Lenin called for "the closest alliance, with Soviet Russia, of all the na- tional and colonial liberation movements. " Lenin, Selected Works, 3:434; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:251-59.
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9, 1919; had it been ratified, the agreement would have given Britain de facto control over much of Persia's foreign and domestic policy. 165
Britain's attempt to solidify its influence in Persia sparked a storm of protests, however, and the situation was complicated further when Mirza Kuchik Khan, a dissident nationalist, proclaimed an independent "Republic of Gilan" in northern Persia and began receiving aid and military backing from the Soviet regime in Azerbaijan. The British withdrawal from northern Persia following a Soviet raid on Enzeli shook Persian confidence in British protection, and the Persian government quickly dispatched an envoy to Russia to negotiate the resumption of relations.
British officials responded by arranging for a Persian colonel, Reza Shah, to conduct a coup d'etat in January 1921. 166 This move appeared to backfire when Reza denounced the Anglo-Persian agreement and signed a formal treaty of friendship with the Soviet government in February 1921. The Sovi- ets again renounced any special privileges in Persia, but the treaty autho- rized their entry "should a third power intervene with armed force" on Persian territory. 167 Reza Shah carefully maintained his freedom of action, however, suppressing local Communists and refusing to allow the Soviet ambassador to enter Tehran until all Soviet forces had withdrawn from Per- sian soil. The Soviets abandoned KUchik Khan as relations with Tehran im- proved, and the "Republic of Gilan" quickly collapsed. All told, the initial course of Soviet-Persian relations offered an early indication of Moscow's willingness to disregard immediate revolutionary objectives for the sake of tangible diplomatic benefits. 168
Soviet relations with Afghanistan followed a similar pattern. Prior to World War I, Afghanistan lay largely within the British sphere of influence, but the revolution in Russia inspired Emir Amanullah to declare war on
165 The Soviets renounced any "spheres of influence and exclusive interests" in Persia at Brest-Litovsk, and Lenin sent a formal message to the government of Persia "repudiating all Tsarist privileges and agreements that are contrary to the sovereignty of Persia. " See R. K. Ra- mazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 150o-1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs (Char- lottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966), 148-51; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:232 n. 2; George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949), 49-50; and Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927 (Geneva: Michael Joseph,
1966), 154?
166 For an account of the coup that stresses the British role, see Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 355-57, 376-8;8 for a version downplaying it, see Ramazani, Foreign Policy of Iran, 176-77.
167 The Soviet-Persian treaty was an obvious attempt to balance against Great Britain, but Reza Shah recognized that Russia was a potential threat as well. He therefore tried to main- tain cordial relations with Britain and the United States, a policy consistent with Persia's tra- ditional practice of seeking third powers to balance British and Soviet pressure. See Ramazani, Foreign PolicyofIran, 203-11, 3o8-309.
168 The Soviet ambassador told Khan, "Soviet Russia at this time regards all revolutionary movements as not only fruitless but also harmful. Therefore, Soviet Russia has adopted a new form of policy as evidenced by its new treaty with the government of Iran. " Quoted in R a m a z a n i , F o r e i g n P o l i c y of I r a n , 1 9 1 .
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? TheRussian Revolution
Britain in April 1919 and request aid from Moscow. The Soviet government was in no position to help, however, and Amanullah's forces were soon de- feated. Britairi acknowledged Afghan independence in August, and Lenin subsequently sent a telegram to the emir proposing a trade agreement and a treaty of friendship directed against "the most rapacious imperialist gov- ernment on Earth-Great Britain. "169
This offer led directly to the Soviet-Afghan treaty of February 1921. Ideo- logical solidarity played no role in this agreement (if anything, Amanullah's pan-Islamic beliefs were a potential threat to Soviet control in Central Asia), and the treaty failed to prevent a number of serious disagreements between Moscow and Kabul. 170 Like the Persians, the Afghanis were primarily inter- ested in balancing between Britain and Russia, and the Soviet-Afghan treaty was followed by a similar agreement with Great Britain in November.
Russia's policy toward Afghanistan offers further evidence of its prag- matic approach to diplomatic relations with the border states, particularly in areas where the threat of imperialist interference was especially acute. E. H. Carr notes, "What was significant in all this was not the extension of propaganda for world revolution but the succession of Soviet Russia to the traditional Russian role as Britain's chief rival in central Asia. "171
Soviet policy toward Turkey also sought to counter Western (especially British) influence. Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire had been rivals for centuries, but Soviet Russia and the new Turkish state found them- selves united by a number of common interests. Clandestine discussions between Karl Radek and several prominent members of the Young Turk movement had already raised the possibility of a Soviet-Turkish alliance against British imperialism. Chicherin broadcast a radio message warning of the dangers of imperialism and proposing Soviet-Turkish cooperation to "expel the European robbers" in September 1919. Until the summer of
1920, however, Soviet hopes rested primarily on the Turkish Communist movement. 172
As discussed at length below in chapter 6, foreign interference in Turkey eventually caused a nationalist revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a prominent Ottoman general. In April 1920, when the revolt was well un- derway, Kemal sent a formal note to Moscow proposing diplomatic rela-
169 Lenin'smessagecongratulatedtheAfghanpeopleontheirstruggleagainst"foreignop- pressors" and referred to the "wide possibilities for mutual aid against any attack by foreign bandits on the freedom of others. " Quoted in Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, 1:285-86.
}29CH)2.
171 BolshevikRevolution,3:292. 172 Ibid. , 3:244-47?
170 The
? [181]
main dispute concerned the emir of Bokhara, who was ousted by a Bolshevik "Young Bokharan" movement in September 1920. The emir fled to Afghanistan while his supporters tried to oust the new government, and this incident delayed the Soviet-Afghan treaty for several months. See Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 222-28; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution,
? Revolution and War
tions and a joint "struggle against foreign imperialism which threatens both countries. "173
The harsh peace terms imposed at Versailles accelerated the Soviet-Turk- ish rapprochement. Turkey and Russia began direct negotiations in Moscow in July, and a Soviet representative arrived in Ankara in November. A friendship treaty emphasizing "their solidarity in the struggle against im- perialism" was signed in March 1921; six months later, the Treaty of Kars settled the remaining border disputes between the new Turkish state and the Soviet republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. 174
Despite these favorable developments, Russia and Turkey faced several enduring disputes during this period. Both states still coveted parts of Transcaucasia, and Kemal's overt anti-Communism was an obvious irritant as well. Soviet self-interest soon overcame any ideological inclinations, and Russia sent a military delegation to Ankara in November 1921 and agreed to provide a subsidy of 3? 5 million gold rubles and enough arms and amum ni- tion for three divisions. This gesture did little to bind Turkey to Moscow, however, and when the Greeks withdrew following their final defeat in 1922, Kemal moved away from Moscow and suppressed the Turkish Com- munist Party even more vigorously. Turkey also reversed its earlier position
on the Turkish Straits and agreed to negotiate a new arrangement with the . Western powers. The Soviets' response to these setbacks was restrained, a policy that paid off when Turkey insisted that Russia be invited to partici- pate in the negotiations for a new straits regime. 175
On the whole, Soviet relations with Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey are best seen as attempts to balance against a common threat. They are thus en- tirely consistent with the dictates of realpolitik. At the same time, Bolshevik ideology clearly affected Moscow's evaluation of alternative partners. The 1921 friendship treaties both stabilized Soviet relations with three of its neighboring countries and presented a worrisome threat to Western influ- ence in the developing world. Although maintaining these connections re- quired Moscow to overlook the persecution of local Communist groups, it was a small price to pay for such obvious diplomatic benefits.
The Far East did not at first appear to be an area of great revolutionary potential. The "Congress of Peoples of the East" held in Baku in 1920 fo- cused primarily on the Near East and South Asia, and the first "Congress of Toilers of the Far East" did not meet until January 1922. The Soviet govern- ment played a only minor role in the founding of the Chinese and Japanese
173 Quoted in ibid. , 248; and also see Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement (Beverly Hills, Calif. : Sage, 1973), 39-42?
174 In an obvious attempt to exclude the Entente, the Treaty of Kars also declared that Rus- sia and Turkey would negotiate a new treaty governing the Straits of Constantinople. See De- gras, Soviet Documents, 1:237-42, 263? 9; and Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 107.
? 175 See Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 109-14, 124-30.
? ? ? The Russian Revolution
Communist parties, neither of which was a significant political force at this stage. 176 Lack of interest in the Far East was also a function of timing, as So- viet hopes for an imminent "world revolution" had begun to fade by the time the civil war was over and contact with the Far East restored. As a re- sult, Soviet policy in the Far East initially eschewed direct efforts to foment revolution and focused on reasserting traditional Russian interests.
The task of restoring Soviet power in the Far East was complicated by the turbulent situation in China and the ambiguous status of Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. The overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 had failed to produce an effective government, and China was now ruled by a set of com- peting warlords. The official government in Beijing saw the collapse of Russian power in 1917 as a chance to reassert its authority over Outer Mon- golia and the Chinese Eastern Railway, and China also sent a token force to Vladivostok during the Allied intervention and set up a satellite regime in the Mongolian capital of Urga in the fall of 1919.
177
The Soviets' policy toward China was quite conciliatory at first, a position that reflected their own weakness. They offered to establish diplomatic re- lations immediately and renounced Russia's former privileges in Mongolia and Manchuria. Communications between Moscow and the Far East had been cut off by the civil war, however, and this offer did not reach Beijing until March 1920. Circumstances had changed dramatically by then: a group of rival warlords had ousted the Beijing government, the Whites were nearing defeat, and foreign involvement in the civil war was drawing to a close. When a Chinese delegation finally arrived in Moscow in October
1920, therefore, the Soviet government abandoned its earlier offers and in- sisted on its former rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway. After several false starts and a protracted series of negotiations, the two sides signed a treaty resolving the railway issue and establishing de jure recognition in May 1924. Although Chicherin hailed the agreement as a "historic step in the emancipation of the Eastern peoples," the Sino-Soviet treaty in fact marked the restoration of Russia's former predominance over the official govern- ment in Beijing. 176
176 The Chinese Communist Party had fewer than one hundred members at its founding in 1921, and Zinoviev told the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in January 1922 that the Communist parties in the East "represent at present only small groups. " See Xenia Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 192o-1927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford: Stan- ford University Press, 1957), 222.
m See Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 26--28; Tang, Russian and Soviet Policy, 115-21, 36<>-65; Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:491; and Bruce A. Ellemann, "Secret Sino-Soviet Negotiations on Outer Mongolia, 1918-1925,'' Pacific Affairs 66, no. 4 (1993-94).
178 The treaty renounced several earlier concessions and acknowledged Chinese sover- eignty in? Outer Mongolia, but it also gave Moscow the dominant role in managing the Chi- nese Eastern Railway. Allen Whiting observes, "whatever good intentions may have
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The reestablishment of Russian power was even more apparent in the conquest of Outer Mongolia. The turmoil in China had enabled a Cossack adventurer named Baron von Ungem-Stemberg to seize power in Urga in February 1921, but his regime was quickly ousted by Soviet troops in July. A Provisional People's Government "invited" the Soviet troops to remain, and the new "Mongolian People's Republic" signed a treaty restoring Russia's traditional predominance in November. 179
The Japanese withdrawal from Siberia gave an additional boost to Rus- sia's reemergence in the Far East. Pressure from the United States and Great Britain, together with the costs of occupation and the ascendancy of a mod- erate faction in Tokyo, had led Japan to begin a withdrawal from Siberia in 1922. Taliks between Japanese and Soviet representatives were unsucccessful at first, but discussions resumed in January 1923 and culminated in an agreement on "basic rules of relations" two years later. 180 The agreement es- tablished normal diplomatic and consular relations and committed both powers to additional negotiations on a range of other issues. It also com- mitted the signatories "to live in peace and amity with each other" and to refrain from "any act overt or covert liable in any way whatever to endan- ger the order and security" in either state's territory. Negotiations to replace the 1907 Russo-Japanese Fishery Convention began shortly thereafter, andl a new agreement was eventually signed two years later. 181
These advances were possible because both sides were willing to over- look ideological differences for the sake of tangible diplomatic benefits. 182 For the ]apanese, detente with the Soviet Union provided a counterweight to British and U. S. pressure. Japanese officials also hoped that access to the Russian market would spur their sputtering economy. The Soviets shared the hope that trade would accelerate their own recovery, but they also sought fro prevent the capitalist powers from forming an anti-Soviet bloc in the Far East. Soviet-Japanese cooperation was based entirely on self-
prompted the revolutionary foreign policy of self-denial in 1917-1918, by 1923 Soviet Russia was looking at the Far East exactly as had Tsarist Russia. " See his Soviet Policies in China, 28-30, 200; and also Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, 128-30, 245-48, 316-18; Tang, Russian and Soviet Policy, 138-41, 148-78; and Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:212-15.
? 179 See Thomas T. Hammond, "The Soviet Takeover of Outer Mongolia: Model for Eastern Europe? " in his Anatomy of Communist Takeovers; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolu tion, 3:500-502, 5 1 1-23.
180 See Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 1:355-63, 3:536; George Alexander Lensen, Japanese Recog- nition ofthe USSR: Soviet-Japanese Relations, 1921-1930 (Tokyo: Sophia University with the Diplomatic Press, 1970), 11; and Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 381-89.
181 Lensen, Japanese Recognition, 177-95 and chap. 9; Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, 253; and Edward Hallett Carr, Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926 (New York: Macmil- lan, 1958-64), J:87<r76.
182 This policy required certain compromises; for example, the Soviets agreed to refrain from revolutionary activities in Japan and to observe the elaborate religious etiquette of the imperial court. See Lensen, Japanese Recognition, 318, 345?
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interest, therefore, and as Lensen notes, "neither party lowered its guard. "183 The Japanese government continued to repress local Commu- nists and kept the Soviet representatives in Japan under surveillance, but these policies did not prevent the two states from making deals. As in Turkey, Persia, and elsewhere, in short, spreading revolution remained a secondary objective. 184
Viewed as a whole, Soviet relations in Asia were recovering rapidly by the end of 1924. The Soviet government had signed treaties of friendship with Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey; Japan was withdrawing from Russian soil and moving toward recognition, and Moscow had regained control of most of Siberia and Outer Mongolia and reestablished its primacy in the Chinese Railway Zone. These achievements were facilitated by Moscow's willingness to subordinate its revolutionary goals to more immediate polit- ical imperatives, but the lingering commitment to world revolution would have more pernicious effects in the years to come.
Alliance ofOutcasts: The Soviet-German Rapprochement
Allied intervention had pushed Soviet Russia toward Germany even be- fore World War I was over; after the war, the two states were drawn together by their shared status as pariahs and their mutual hostility toward Poland and the Entente. Germany was also the main object of the Bolsheviks' revo- lutionary ambitions, however, and Soviet policy toward the Weimar Re-
public combined efforts to cultivate close political and mili? ary ties with shakier attempts to spark a proletarian revolution. Repeated failures taught the Soviets to focus on direct diplomatic and military cooperation, but be- cause their faifrh in Germany's revolutionary potential proved extremely re- silient, this learning process was surprisingly slow and erratic. 185
Origins. At the end of World War I, Soviet-German relations were not promising. The Bolsheviks viewed the Social Democratic Party in Germany with contempt and expected it to collapse in the face of continued revolu- tionary agitation. Relations were also troubled by the presence of German military units in the Baltic region, where they fought against both Allied
183 Japan refused an offer of Soviet aid after a major earthquake in 1924, fearing that the aid mission might be an instrument of Communist subversion. The Japanese Communist Party disbanded in 1924 and was reconstituted in 1925-26, but government repression kept it on the fringes of Japanese political life. See Lensen, Japanese Recognition, 137-43; Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, 272-79; and Carr, Socialism in One Country, 3:883-iJ4?
184 Lensen concludes in his detailed study of Soviet-Japanese relations, "In the late 1920s, the Russian leaders took pains not to jeopardize Soviet-Japanese relations by overt subver- sion. " Japanese Recognition, 361.
185 See Edward Hallett Carr, German-Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), 25-26.
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and Bolshevik forces during the civil war. 186 Although German officials were already contemplating a closer relationship with Russia, the belief that Bol- shevism was both potentially threatening and unlikely to survive dictated a cautious response. Thus, when some German officers proposed an alliance with Soviet Russia against the Versailles Treaty, the commander of the Ger- man Army, Wilhelm Groener, stated that "an alliance with Russia, that is with Bolshevism, is something for which I cannot take the responsibility. "187
Resentment of the harsh terms imposed at Versailles soon overruled these reservations. As one German diplomat later recalled, most of his colleagues "were more sympathetic to the West than to the East'' but the Versailles Treaty revealed that "the West was much the more dangerous foe. " This view was especially pronounced within the German millltary, where an al- liance with Russia was expected to provide an outlet for German industry in the short term and to improve Germany's bargaining position over time. 188 Gwener's successor, General Helmut von Seeckt, believed that the danger of Communist subversion did not preclude closer ties between the two governments, and he soon decided that "a political and economic agreement with Russia [would be] an irrevocable purpose of our policy. "189
Progress toward rapprochement was swift. Germany had already refused to honor the Allied blockade of Russia in November 1919, and the two states signed an agreement for the release of prisoners in April 1920 and ex- changed diplomatic representatives in June. Berlin took a decidedly pro- Soviet position during the Russo-Polish war, refusing to permit the Allies to send military supplies to the Poles across German territory and briefly rais- ing the possibility of territorial adjustments in the event of a Soviet vic- tory. 190 By the end of 1920, Von Seeckt had established a special bureau to
study the "possibilities of cooperation with the Red Army" and powerful external forces were now pushing the two countries together despite their ideological differences. Lenin observed in November: "The German bour- geois government madly hates the Bolsheviks, but the interests of the inter-
186 See Robert G. Waite, Vanguard ofNazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany, 1918-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), chap. 5?
1 87 At the same time, Groener told the cabinet that Germany "must do what is required to secure Russia's friendship in the future. " See Freund, Unholy Alliance, 3? 40, 43? There is some ambiguous evidence of informal military cooperation between Russia and Germany in October 1919; for details, see Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:247, 361.
188 Quoted in Freund, Unholy Alliance, 4? 50; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 312-19.
189 Quoted in Freund, UnholyAlliance, 46. .
190 On Germany and the blockade, see Robert H. Haigh, David S. Morris, and Anthony R.
Peters, German-Soviet Relations in the Weimar Era: Friendshipfrom Necessity (Totowa, N. J. : Barnes and Noble, 1985), 61-62. During the Russo-Polish war, some German officials feared that the Red Army might continue on to Germany, while Von Seeckt and others believed that a Soviet victory would be a powerful blow against the entire Versailles system. See Freund, Unholy Alliance, 6? 73; and Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921-23 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), So-81.
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national situation are pushing it towards peace with Soviet Russia against its own will. " And Lenin left no doubt that Russia would welcome these overtures, because "so long as we are alone and the capitalist world is strong, . . . [we are] obliged to utilize [these] disagreements" nn the capitalist world. A preliminary economic accord was completed by mid-February, leaving the two states on the brink of a de facto alliance. l91
Yet despite the failure of the Spartacist uprisings in Berlin in January 1919 and the collapse of the short-lived Communist republic in Bavaria in May, the Soviet government had not lost all hope in the revolutionary potential of the German working class. In March 1920, an abortive coup by right-wing forces (the so-called Kapp putsch) sparked a general strike in Berlin and a brief Communist uprising in the Ruhr. Lenin now predicted that "the time is not far off when we shall march hand in hand with a German Soviet gov- ernment. " Soviet diplomats helped smuggle arms and explosives to Com- munist groups in Germany, and Soviet officials began to intervene directly in the internal politics of the German working-class movement. These ef- forts paid off in October 1920, when Zinoviev persuaded a majority of the Independent Socialist Party to unite with the German Communist Party
(KPD) and join the Comintern. Three months later, Comintern officials arranged the replacement of the KPD leader, Paul Levi, by officials more amenable to Soviet influence. 192
These developments culminated in the KPD's attempt to launch a prole- tarian uprising in March 1921. The party's new leaders were convinced that international and domestic conditions were ripe for revolution, and a dele- gation from the Executive Committee of the Comintem arrived in Germany at the beginning of March and began to press for an armed insurrection. The KPD proceeded to launch a violent but poorly planned revolt on March 23. Their belief that millions of non-Communist workers would rise up and join them proveol false, and the "March action" was quickly crushed. 193
191 Quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revol! :? tion, 3:33D-31. As usual, Lenin saw cooperation with capitalist states as a temporary expedient and not a permanent option. In a prescient passage, he noted that "Germany wants revenge, and we want revolution. For the moment our aims are the same, but when our ways part, they will be our most ferocious and greatest enemies. " Quoted in Dennis, Foreign Policies ofSoviet Russia, 154-55; and see also Lionel Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic (Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1954), 38-39; and Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 409?
192 Lenin's statement is quoted in Freund, Unholy Alliance, 62. On the Spartacist uprisings and Russian manipulation of the KPD, see Angress, Stillborn Revolution, 13-31, 91-100. On the brief career of the Bavarian Soviet Republic, see Allan Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-1920: The Eisner Regime arad the Soviet Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
193 The March action is described in detail by Angress in Stillborn Revolution, chap. 4, and "TheTakeoverThatRemained inLimbo:TheGermanExperience, 1918-1923," inHammond, . AnatomyofCommunist Takeovers, 176-S- o. Carr reports that KPD membership declined from 450,000 to 180,000 following the March action, and the debacle "set in motion a wave of re-
? criminations which continued for many years to split the party. " Bolshevik Revolution, J337?
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A new sense of realism had set in by the time the Third Comintem Congress met in Moscow in June. Lenin now admitted that "the development of the world revolution . . . did not proceed along the direct line we anticipated," andl Trotsky told the delegates, ''We are not so immediately near . . . to the world rev? olution. In 1919 we said to ourselves: 'it is a question of months. ' Now we say: 'it is perhaps a question of years. ' " When viewed alongside the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement and the friendship treaties with Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iran, such statements were a clear sign that hopes for an immediate world revolution was declining. According to E. H. Carr, "a new and well-grounded pessimism about the prospects of the European revolution confirmed and reinforced the drive towards a temporary accommodation with the capitalist world. "194
By weakening the German left, the debacle in March 1921 made it easier for the German government to move closer to Moscow without fear of leav? ing itself vulnerable to revolutionary subversion. At the same time, the Al? lied announcement of the final reparations bill and the French decision to enforce the reparations clause by occupying parts of the Ruhr had increased! Germany's interest in an alignment with Russia. Germany and Russia signed a secret agreement in April for the production of German aircraft and! munitions in Russia, the economic agreement negotiated in January was completed in May, and the two states agreed to exchange new diplomatic representatives shortly therafter. A German military delegation arrived to provide advice. for the restoration of Russia's military industries, and covert meetings between Soviet and German officers continued through the fall. 195
Rapallo and After. The conference in Genoa in April 1922 brought the Soviet-German rapprochement out into the open. The conference was orig- inally intended to create an international consortium for European recon- struction, including the restoration of regular commerce with Russia. As part of the new policy of peaceful coexistence, Chicherin had issued a for- mal note in October 1921 stating Russia's willingness to make concessions on the debt issue and proposing a conference "to consider the claims of the Powers against Russia and of Russia against the Powers, and to draw up at definite treaty of peace between them. " Following a suggestion from Lloyd George, the Supreme Allied Council agreed to combine the two goals and is- sued a resolution calling for an economic and financial conference "to rem- edy the paralysis of the European system. " 196
194 Quotations from Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 82-84; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, }:338, 385.
? 195 See Freund, Unholy Alliance, 93-94; Craig, Politics ofthe Prussian Army, 409-11; and Hans W. Gatzke, "Russo-German Military Collaboration during the Weimar Republic," American Historical Review 63, no. 3 (1958).
I% The Soviet note is in Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:27<r72; the resolution by the Supreme Allied Council is quoted in Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 98. Lenin personally
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Unfortunately, the collapse of the Briand government in France returned Rene Poincare to power in January 1922, and his steadfast refusal to alter the reparations arrangements ended any possibility of creating an international body for European recovery. Relations with Russia became the main item of discussion by default, and the German delegates began to fear that the Western powers were about to make a separate deal with Russia. To avoid complete isolation, they accepted a Soviet invitation for a clandestine meet- ing in the neal! "by town of Rapallo and signed an agreement restoring diplo- matic relations between Germany and Russia and committing both powers to consult each other before signing international economic agreements. The Rapallo agreement prevented the Allies from excluding either power from a more general settlement and offered the first sign of an overt Soviet-German alignment. 197
Soviet-German cooperation expanded considerably the following year.
The two states exchanged ambassadors after Rapallo and signed a conven- tion for military cooperation in August. The Soviets supported Germany when the French occupied the Ruhr in January 1923; Izvestiya declared, "So- viet Russia in her own vital interests cannot permit the final su1bjugation and destruction of Germany by . . . France and her vassals," and Bukharin an- nounced that the Red Army would probably intervene if Poland tried to take advantage of Germany's present weakness. 198
The blossoming Soviet-German relationship was soon threatened by an- other misguided outburst of revolutionary enthusiasm. The Soviets' faith in an imminent world revolution had declined steadily after the March action in 1921, but this objective revived whenever conditions seemed more en- couraging. Germany was now reeling from a combination of hyperinflation and domestic political paralysis, and the crisis helped the KPD recover from its earlier setbacks. Several Soviet officials saw the fall of the Cuno cabinet in August as a sign that the German revolution was finally at hand and con- vinced themselves that the German proletariat would rise up once the initial blow had fallen. Lenin's second stroke had removed him as a restraining in-
fluence and the KPD gradually succumbed to Soviet pressure. The day of the insurrection was fixed for November 7, and the campaign began with the appointment of KPD chief Heinrich Brandler and several other KPD members to ministerial posts in the state government of Saxony. The Ger- man chancellor, Gustav Stresemann, quickly obtained emergency powers and ordered the army into Saxony to dissolve the local government. At-
? ? edited Chicherin's speech to the conference in order to eliminate any revolutionary rhetoric that might alarm the other great powers. See Uldricks, "Russia and Europe," 62 n. 27.
197 As Freund points out, "more important than the formal contents of the treaty was the fact that Germany and Russia had dared to sign it. " Unholy Alliance, 118.
198 See Freund, Unholy Alliance, 125-26, 142-46, 152-53.
? ? tempts to organize a general strike were ineffective and the KPD decided to cancel the insurrection. Owing to a failure in communications, however, the KPD organization in Hamburg went ahead and began fthe revolt, but it was easily suppressed by government forces.
