The remainder may
obey, but their vanity demands that they may
feel themselves dependent, not upon great men,
but upon principles.
obey, but their vanity demands that they may
feel themselves dependent, not upon great men,
but upon principles.
Nietzsche - v15 - Will to Power - b
197 (#227) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
197
tract, the criminal is a man who breaks that
contract. This at least is a clear concept. But
in that case, anarchists and enemies of social
order could not be tolerated.
740.
Crimes belong to the category of revolt against
the social system. A rebel is not punished, he
A
is simply suppressed. He may be an utterly
contemptible and pitiful creature; but there is
nothing intrinsically despicable about rebellion
in fact, in our particular society revolt is far from
being disgraceful. There are cases in which a
rebel deserves honour precisely because he is
conscious of certain elements in society which
cry aloud for hostility; for such a man rouses us
from our slumbers. When a criminal commits
but one crime against a particular person, it does
not alter the fact that all his instincts urge him
to make a stand against the whole social system.
His isolated act is merely a symptom.
The idea of punishment ought to be reduced
to the concept of the suppression of revolt, a
weapon against the vanquished (by means of long
or short terms of imprisonment). But punish-
ment should not be associated in any way with
contempt. A criminal is at all events a man who
has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake;
he is therefore a man of courage.
Neither should
punishment be regarded as penance or retribution,
as though there were some recognised rate of
exchange between crime and punishment. Punish-
## p. 198 (#228) ############################################
198
THE WILL TO POWER.
ment does not purify, simply because crime does
not sully.
A criminal should not be prevented from
making his peace with society, provided he does
not belong to the race of criminals. In the latter
case, however, he should be opposed even before
he has committed an act of hostility. (As soon
as he gets into the clutches of society the first
operation to be performed upon him should be
that of castration. ) A criminal's bad manners
and his low degree of intelligence should not be
reckoned against him. Nothing is more common
than that he should misunderstand himself (more
particularly when his rebellious instinct—the ran-
cour of the unclassed has not reached conscious-
ness simply because he has not read enough). It
is natural that he should deny and dishonour his
deed while under the influence of fear at its failure.
All this is quite distinct from those cases in which,
psychologically speaking, the criminal yields to
an incomprehensible impulse, and attributes a
motive to his deed by associating it with a merely
incidental and insignificant action (for example,
robbing a man, when his real desire was to take
his blood).
The worth of a man should not be measured by
any one isolated act. Napoleon warned us against
this. Deeds which are only skin-deep are more
particularly insignificant. If we have no crime-
let us say no murder—on our conscience; why is
it ? It simply means that a few favourable circum-
stances have been wanting in our lives.
posing we were induced to commit such a crime
a
And sup-
## p. 199 (#229) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
199
As a
would our worth be materially affected ?
matter of fact, we should only be despised, if we
were not credited with possessing the power to kill a
man under certain circumstances. In nearly every
crime certain qualities come into play without
which no one would be a true man. Dostoievsky
was not far wrong when he said of the inmates of
the penal colonies in Siberia, that they constituted
the strongest and most valuable portion of the
Russian people. The fact that in our society the
criminal happens to be a badly nourished and
stunted animal is simply a condemnation of our
system. In the days of the Renaissance the
criminal was a flourishing specimen of humanity,
and acquired his own virtue for himself. Virtue in
the sense of the Renaissance—that is to say, virtù ;
free from moralic acid.
It is only those whom we do not despise that
we are able to elevate. Moral contempt is a far
greater indignity and insult than any kind of crime.
741.
Shame was first introduced into punishment
when certain penalties were inflicted on persons
held in contempt, such as slaves. It was a de-
spised class that was most frequently punished, and
thus it came to pass that punishment and contempt
were associated.
742.
In the ancient idea of punishment a religious con-
cept was immanent, namely, the retributive power
## p. 200 (#230) ############################################
200
THE WILL TO POWER.
of chastisement. Penalties purified : in modern
society, however, penalties degrade. Punishment
is a form of paying off a debt: once it has been
paid, one is freed from the deed for which one was
so ready to suffer. Provided belief in the power
of punishment exist, once the penalty is paid a feel-
ing of relief and lightheartedness results, which is
not so very far removed from a state of conval-
escence and health. One has made one's peace
with society, and one appears to one's self more
dignified—"pure. " . . To-day, however, punish-
ment. isolates even more than the crime; the fate
behind the sin has become so formidable that it is
almost hopeless. One rises from punishment still
.
an enemy of society. Henceforward it reckons yet
another enemy against it. The jus talionis may
spring from the spirit of retribution (that is to say,
from a sort of modification of the instinct of re-
venge); but in the Book of Manu, for instance, it
is the need of having some equivalent in order to
do penance, or to become free in a religious sense.
743
My pretty radical note of interrogation in
the case of all more modern laws of punish-
ment is this: should not the punishment fit the
crime? —for in your heart of hearts thus would
you have it. But then the susceptibility of the
particular criminal to pain would have to be taken
into account. In other words, there should be no
such thing as a preconceived penalty for any crime
-no fixed penal code. But as it would be no
## p. 201 (#231) ############################################
· SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
201
easy matter to ascertain the degree of sensitiveness
of each individual criminal, punishment would have
to be abolished in practice? What a sacrifice !
a
Is it not ? Consequently
744.
Ah! and the philosophy of jurisprudence! That
is a science which, like all moral sciences, has not
even been wrapped in swaddling-clothes yet. Even
among jurists who consider themselves liberal, the
oldest and most valuable significance of punish-
ment is still misunderstood-it is not even known.
So long as jurisprudence does not build upon a
new foundation-on history and comparative an-
thropology-it will never cease to quarrel over the
fundamentally false abstractions which are fondly
imagined to be the "philosophy of law," and which
have nothing whatever to do with modern man.
The man of to-day, however, is such a complicated
woof even in regard to his legal valuation that he
allows of the most varied interpretation,
745.
An old Chinese sage once said he had heard that
when mighty empires were doomed they began to
have numberless laws.
746.
Schopenhauer would have all rapscallions cast-
rated, and all geese shut up in convents. But from
## p. 202 (#232) ############################################
202
THE WILL TO POWER.
what point of view would this be desirable? The
rascal has at least this advantage over other men-
that he is not mediocre; and the fool is superior
to us inasmuch as he does not suffer at the sight
of mediocrity. It would be better to widen the
gulf—that is to say, roguery and stupidity should
be increased. In this way human nature would
become broader . .
. . but, after all, this is Fate, and
it will happen, whether we desire it or not. Idiocy
and roguery are increasing: this is part of modern
progress.
747.
Society, to-day, is full of consideration, tact, and
reticence, and of good-natured respect for other
people's rights—even for the exactions of strangers.
To an even greater degree is there a certain charit-
able and instinctive depreciation of the worth of man
as shown by all manner of trustful habits. Respect
for men, and not only for the most virtuous, is
perhaps the real parting of the ways between us
and the Christian mythologists. We also have our
good share of irony even when listening to moral
sermons. He who preaches morality to us debases
himself in our eyes and becomes almost comical.
Liberal-mindedness regarding morality is one of
the best signs of our age. In cases where it is
most distinctly wanting, we regard it as a sign of a
morbid condition (the case of Carlyle in England,
of Ibsen in Norway, and Schopenhauer's pessimism
throughout Europe). If there is anything which
can reconcile us to our own age, it is precisely the
amount of immorality which it allows itself without
## p. 203 (#233) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
203
falling in its own estimation-very much the re-
verse! In what, then, does the superiority of culture
over the want of culture consist of the Renais-
sance, for instance, over the Middle Ages? In this
alone: the greater quantity of acknowledged im-
morality. From this it necessarily follows that the
very senith of human development must be regarded
by the moral fanatic as the non plus ultra of cor-
ruption in this connection let us recall Savona-
rola's judgment of Florence, Plato's indictment of
Athens under Pericles, Luther's condemnation of
Rome, Rousseau's anathemas against the society of
Voltaire, and Germany's hostility to Goethe).
748.
A little more fresh air, for Heaven's sake! This
ridiculous condition of Europe must not last any
longer.
Is there a single idea behind this bovine
nationalism ? What possible value can there be in
encouraging this arrogant self-conceit when every-
thing to-day points to greater and more common
interests at a moment when the spiritual de-
pendence and denationalisation, which are obvious
to all, are paving the way for the reciprocal
rapprochements and fertilisations which make up
the real value and sense of present-day culture !
And it is precisely now that "the new German
Empire” has been founded upon the most thread-
bare and discredited of ideas—universal suffrage
and equal right for all.
Think of all this struggling for advantage among
conditions which are in every way degenerate: of
1
## p. 204 (#234) ############################################
204
- THE WILL TO POWER.
this culture of big cities, of newspapers, of hurry and
scurry, and of “aimlessness”! The economic unity
of Europe must necessarily come—and with it, as
a reaction, the pacivist movement.
A pacivist party, free from all sentimentality,
which forbids its children to wage war; which
forbids recourse to courts of justice; which for-
swears all fighting, all contradiction, and all perse-
cution: for a while the party of the oppressed, and
later the powerful party :this party would be op-
posed to everything in the shape of revenge and
resentment.
There will also be a war party, exercising the
same thoroughness and severity towards itself, which
will proceed in precisely the opposite direction.
749.
The princes of Europe should really consider
whether as a matter of fact they can dispense with
our services with us, the immoralists. We are
to-day the only power which can win a victory
without allies : and we are therefore far and away
the strongest of the strong. We can even do with-
out lying, and let me ask what other power can
dispense with this weapon? A strong temptation
fights for us; the strongest, perhaps, that exists
--the temptation of truth. . . Truth? How do
I come by this word? I must withdraw it: I must
repudiate this proud word. But no. We do not
even want it- we shall be quite able to achieve our
victory of power without its help. The real charm
which fights for us, the eye of Venus which our
-
## p. 205 (#235) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
205
opponents themselves deaden and blind this
charm is the magic of the extreme. The fascina-
tion which everything extreme exercises : we
immoralists—we are in every way the extremists.
750.
The corrupted ruling classes have brought ruling
into evil odour. The State administration of justice
is a piece of cowardice, because the great man
who can serve as a standard is lacking. At last
the feeling of insecurity becomes so great that
men fall in the dust before any sort of will-power
that commands.
751.
“The will to power" is so loathed in democratic
ages that the whole of the psychology of these ages
seems directed towards its belittlement and slander.
The types of men who sought the highest honours
are said to have been Napoleon! Cæsar! and
Alexander ! -as if these had not been precisely
the greatest scorners of honour.
And Helvetius would fain show us that we strive
after power in order to have those pleasures which
are at the disposal of the mighty—that is to say,
according to him, this striving after power is the
will to pleasure-hedonism !
1
-
752.
According as to whether a people feels : "the
rights, the keenness of vision, and the gifts of lead-
ing, etc. , are with the few” or “with the many"-
"
## p. 206 (#236) ############################################
206
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
it constitutes an oligarchic or a democratic com-
munity.
Monarchy represents the belief in a man who
is completely superior a leader, a saviour, a
demigod.
Aristocracy represents the belief in a chosen
few-in a higher caste.
Democracy represents the disbelief in all great
men and in all élite societies : everybody is every-
body else's equal " At bottom we are all herd
and mob. ”
753.
I am opposed to Socialism because it dreams
ingenuously of “goodness, truth, beauty, and
equal rights" (anarchy pursues the same ideal,
but in a more brutal fashion).
I am opposed to parliamentary government
and the power of the press, because they are the
means whereby cattle become masters.
»
754.
The arming of the people means in the end
the arming of the mob.
755.
Socialists are particularly ridiculous in my eyes,
because of their absurd optimism concerning the
"good man" who is supposed to be waiting in their
cupboard, and who will come into being when the
present order of society has been overturned and
has made way for natural instincts. But the
## p. 207 (#237) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
207
opposing party is quite as ludicrous, because it
will not see the act of violence which lies beneath
every law, the severity and egoism inherent in
every kind of authority. “I and my kind will
rule and prevail. Whoever degenerates will be
either expelled or annihilated. ”—This was the
fundamental feeling of all ancient legislation.
The idea of a higher order of man is hated
much more profoundly than monarchs themselves.
Hatred of aristocracy always uses hatred of
monarchy as a mask.
756.
How treacherous are all parties! They bring
to light something concerning their leaders which
the latter, perhaps, have hitherto kept hidden
beneath a bushel with consummate art.
757.
Modern Socialism would fain create a profane
counterpart to Jesuitism: everybody a perfect
instrument. · But as to the object of it all, the
purpose of it—this has not yet been ascertained.
758.
The slavery of to-day : a piece of barbarism.
Where are the masters for whom these slaves
work? One must not always expect the
simultaneous appearance of the two complement-
ary castes of society.
Utility and pleasure are slave theories of life.
## p. 208 (#238) ############################################
208
THE WILL TO POWER.
“The blessing of work” is an ennobling phrase
for slaves. Incapacity for leisure.
759.
There is no such thing as a right to live, a
right to work, or a right to be happy: in this
respect man is not different from the meanest
worm.
760.
We must undoubtedly think of these things
as uncompromisingly as Nature
does: they
preserve the species.
761.
We should look upon the needs of the masses
with ironic compassion: they want something
which we have got-Ah!
762.
European democracy is only in a very slight
degree the manifestation of unfettered powers.
It represents, above all, the unfettering of laziness,
fatigue, and weakness.
763.
Concerning the future of the workman. --Work-
men should learn to regard their duties as soldiers
do. They receive emoluments, incomes, but they
do not get wages !
There is no relationship between work done
and money received; the individual should,
## p. 209 (#239) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
209
according to his kind, be so placed as to perform
the highest that is compatible with his powers.
764
Noblemen ought one day to live as the bour-
geois do now -- but above them, distinguishing
themselves by the simplicity of their wants-
the superior caste will then live in a poorer
and simpler way and yet be in possession of
power.
For lower orders of mankind the reverse
valuations hold good: it is a matter of implanting
“ virtues ” in them. Absolute commands, terrible
compulsory methods, in order that they may rise
above mere ease in life.
The remainder may
obey, but their vanity demands that they may
feel themselves dependent, not upon great men,
but upon principles.
765.
“ The Atonement of all Sin. "
People speak of the “profound injustice” of
the social arrangement, as if the fact that one man
is born in favourable circumstances and that
another is born in unfavourable ones—or that
one should possess gifts the other has not, were
on the face of it an injustice. Among the more
honest of these opponents of society, this is what
is said: “We, with all the bad, morbid, criminal
qualities which we acknowledge we possess, are
only the inevitable result of the oppression for
O
VOL. II.
## p. 210 (#240) ############################################
210
THE WILL TO POWER.
ages of the weak by the strong"; thus they insinu-
ate their evil natures into the consciences of the
ruling classes. They threaten and storm and curse.
They become virtuous from sheer indignation-
they don't want to have become bad men and
canaille for nothing. The name for this attitude,
which is an invention of the last century, is, if I am
not mistaken, pessimism; and even that pessimism
which is the outcome of indignation. It is in this
attitude of mind that history is judged, that it
is deprived of its inevitable fatality, and that
responsibility and even guilt is discovered in it.
For the great desideratum is to find guilty people
in it. The botched and the bungled, the de-
cadents of all kinds, are revolted at themselves,
and require sacrifices in order that they may not
slake their thirst for destruction upon themselves
(which might, indeed, be the most reasonable
procedure). But for this purpose they at least
require a semblance of justification, i. e. a theory
according to which the fact of their existence, and
of their character, may be expiated by a scapegoat.
This scapegoat may be God, --in Russia such
resentful atheists are not wanting, or the order
of society, or education and upbringing, or the
Jews, or the nobles, or, finally, the well-constituted
of every kind. “It is a sin for a man to have been
born in decent circumstances, for by so doing
he disinherits the others, he pushes them aside, he
imposes upon them the curse of vice and of
work. . . How can I be made answerable
for my misery; surely some one must be respons-
ible for it, or I could not bear to live. "
.
## p. 211 (#241) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
211
In short, resentful pessimism discovers responsible
parties in order to create a pleasurable sensation
for itself-revenge.
“Sweeter than honey”-
thus does even old Homer speak of revenge.
*
The fact that such a theory no longer meets with
understanding—or rather, let us say, contempt-
is accounted for by that particle of Christianity
which still circulates in the blood of every one
of us; it makes us tolerant towards things simply
because we scent a Christian savour about them. . . .
The Socialists appeal to the Christian instincts;
this is their really refined piece of cleverness. .
Thanks to Christianity, we have now grown
accustomed to the superstitious concept of a
soul-of an immortal soul, of soul monads,
which, as a matter of fact, hails from somewhere
else, and which has only become inherent in
certain cases—that is to say, become incarnate
in them-by accident: but the nature of these
cases is not altered, let alone determined by it.
The circumstances of society, of relationship, and
of history are only accidents for the soul, perhaps
misadventures : in any case, the world is not their
work. By means of the idea of soul the individual
is made transcendental; thanks to it, a ridiculous
amount of importance can be attributed to him.
As a matter of fact, it was Christianity which
first induced the individual to take up this position
of judge of all things. It made megalomania
almost his duty: it has made everything temporary
and limited subordinate to eternal rights ! What
## p. 212 (#242) ############################################
212
THE WILL TO POWER.
is the State, what is society, what are historical
laws, what is physiology to me? Thus speaks
something from beyond Becoming, an immutable
entity throughout history: thus speaks something
immortal, something divine--it is the soul !
Another Christian, but no less insane, concept
has percolated even deeper into the tissues of
modern ideas : the concept of the equality of all
souls before God. In this concept the prototype of
all theories concerning equal rights is to be found.
Man was first taught to stammer this proposition
religiously : later, it was converted into a moral;
no wonder he has ultimately begun to take it
seriously, to take it practically ! —that is to say,
politically, socialistically, resento-pessimistically.
Wherever responsible circumstances or people
have been looked for, it was the instinct of revenge
that sought them.
This instinct of revenge
obtained such an ascendancy over man in the
course of centuries that the whole of metaphysics,
psychology, ideas of society, and, above all,
morality, are tainted with it. Man has nourished
this idea of responsibility to such an extent that
he has introduced the bacillus of vengeance into
everything. By means of it he has made God
Himself ill, and killed innocence in the universe,
by tracing every condition of things to acts of
will, to intentions, to responsible agents. The
whole teaching of will, this most fatal fraud that
has ever existed in psychology hitherto, was
invented essentially for the purpose of punishment.
It was the social utility of punishment that lent
this concept its dignity, its power, and its truth.
## p. 213 (#243) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
213
The originator of that psychology, that we shall
call volitional psychology, must be sought in
those classes which had the right of punishment
in their hands; above all, therefore, among the
priests who stood on the very pinnacle of ancient
social systems: these people wanted to create for
themselves the right to wreak revenge they
wanted to supply God with the privilege of
vengeance. For this purpose; man was declared
"free": to this end every action had to be re-
garded as voluntary, and the origin of every deed
had to be considered as lying in consciousness.
But by such propositions as these ancient psych-
ology is refuted.
To-day, when Europe seems to have taken the
contrary direction; when we halcyonians would
fain withdraw, dissipate, and banish the concept of
guilt and punishment with all our might from the
world; when our most serious endeavours are
concentrated upon purifying psychology, morality,
history, nature, social institutions and privileges,
and even God Himself, from this filth; in whom
must we recognise our most mortal enemies?
Precisely in those apostles of revenge and
resentment, in those who
are par excellence
pessimists from indignation, who make it their
mission to sanctify their filth with the name of
righteous indignation. ” . . . We others, whose
one desire is to reclaim innocence on behalf of
Becoming, would fain be the missionaries of a
purer thought, namely, that no one is responsible
for man's qualities; neither God, nor society, nor
his parents, nor his ancestors, nor himself—in fact,
66
i
!
## p. 214 (#244) ############################################
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THE WILL TO POWER.
that no one is to blame for him . . . The being
who might be made responsible for a man's exist-
ence, for the fact that he is constituted in a
particular way, or for his birth in certain circum-
stances and in a certain environment, is absolutely
lacking. –And it is a great blessing that such a
being is non-existent. . . . We are not the result
of an eternal design, of a will, of a desire: there
is no attempt being made with us to attain to an
“ideal of perfection,” to an “ideal of happiness,"
to an “ideal of virtue,"—and we are just as little
the result of a mistake on God's part in the
presence of which He ought to feel uneasy (a
thought which is known to be at the very root
of the Old Testament). There is not a place
nor a purpose nor a sense to which we can
attribute our existence or our kind of existence.
In the first place, no one is in a position to do
this: it is quite impossible to judge, to measure,
or to compare, or even to deny the whole universe!
And why ? -For five reasons, all accessible to the
man of average intelligence: for instance, because
there is no existence outside the universe . . . and
let us say it again, this is a great blessing, for
therein lies the whole innocence of our lives.
2. THE INDIVIDUAL.
766.
Fundamental errors : to regard the herd as an
aim instead of the individual! The herd is only
means and nothing more! But nowadays
a
## p. 215 (#245) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
215
people are trying to understand the herd as they
would an individual, and to confer higher rights
upon it than upon isolated personalities. Terrible
mistake! ! In addition to this, all that makes for
gregariousness, e. g. sympathy, is regarded as the
more valuable side of our natures.
767.
The individual is something quite new, and
capable of creating new things. He is something
absolute, and all his actions are quite his own.
The individual in the end has to seek the valua-
tion for his actions in himself: because he has
to give an individual meaning even to traditional
words and notions. His interpretation of a
formula is at least personal, even if he does not
create the formula itself: at least as an interpreter
he is creative.
768.
The "ego" oppresses and kills. It acts like
an organic cell. It is predatory and violent. It
would fain regenerate itself-pregnancy. It would
fain give birth to its God and see all mankind at
its feet.
769.
Every living organism gropes around as far as
its power permits, and overcomes all that is
weaker than itself: by this means it finds pleasure
in its own existence. The increasing “ humanity"
of this tendency consists in the fact that we are
beginning to feel ever more subtly how difficult
## p. 216 (#246) ############################################
216
THE WILL TO POWER.
it is really to absorb others: while we could show
our power by injuring him, his will estranges him
from us, and thus makes him less susceptible of
being overcome.
770.
The degree of resistance which has to be con-
tinually overcome in order to remain at the top, is
the measure of freedom, whether for individuals or
for societies : freedom being understood as positive
power, as will to power. The highest form of
individual freedom, of sovereignty, would, according
to this, in all probability be found not five feet
away from its opposite that is to say, where the
danger of slavery hangs over life, like a hundred
swords of Damocles. Let any one go through the
whole of history from this point of view: the ages
when the individual reaches perfect maturity, i. e. the
free ages, when the classical type, sovereign man, is
attained to—these were certainly not humane times!
There should be no choice : either one must
be uppermost nethermost
like a worm,
despised, annihilated, trodden upon. One must
have tyrants against one in order to become a
tyrant, i. e. in order to be free. It is no small
advantage to have a hundred swords of Damocles
suspended over one: it is only thus that one
learns to dance, it is only thus that one attains
to any freedom in one's movements.
or
771.
Man more than any other animal was originally
altruistic-hence his slow growth (child) and lofty
## p. 217 (#247) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
217
was
development. Hence, too, his extraordinary and
latest kind of egoism. —Beasts of prey are much
more individualistic.
772.
A criticism of selfishness. The involuntary
ingenuousness of La Rochefoucauld, who believed
that he was saying something bold, liberal, and
paradoxical (in his days, of course, truth in
psychological matters
something that
astonished people) when he said: "Les grandes
åmes ne sont pas celles qui ont moins de passions
et plus de vertus que les âmes communes, mais seule-
ment celles qui ont de plus grands desseins. "
Certainly, John Stuart Mill (who calls Chamfort
the noble and philosophical La Rochefoucauld of
the eighteenth century) recognises in him merely
an astute and keen-sighted observer of all that
which is the result of habitual selfishness in the
human breast, and he adds: “A noble spirit is
unable to see the necessity of a constant observa-
tion of baseness and contemptibility, unless it were
to show against what corrupting influences a
lofty spirit and a noble character were able to
triumph. ”
773
The Morphology of the Feelings of Self.
First standpoint. -To what extent are sympathy
or communal feelings, the lower or preparatory
states, at a time when personal self-esteem and
initiative in valuation, on the part of individuals,
are not yet possible ?
## p. 218 (#248) ############################################
218
THE WILL TO POWER.
Second standpoint. - To what extent is the zenith
of collective self-esteem, the pride in the distinc-
tion of the clan, the feeling of inequality and a
certain abhorrence of mediation, of equal rights and
of reconciliation, the school for individual self-
esteem? It may be this in so far as it compels the
individual to represent the pride of the community
-he is obliged to speak and act with tremendous
self-respect, because he stands for the community
And the same holds good when the individual re-
gards himself as the instrument or speaking-tube
of a godhead.
Third standpoint. To what extent do these
forms of impersonality invest the individual with
enormous importance ?
In so far as higher powers
are using him as an intermediary: religious shy-
ness towards one's self is the condition of prophets
and poets.
Fourth standpoint. —To what extent does re-
sponsibility for a whole educate the individual in
foresight, and give him a severe and terrible hand,
a calculating and cold heart, majesty of bearing
and of action-things which he would not allow
himself if he stood only for his own rights ?
In short, collective self-esteem is the great pre-
paratory school for personal sovereignty. The
noble caste is that which creates the heritage of
this faculty
774.
The disguised forms of will to power :-
(1) The desire for freedom, for independence
for equilibrium, for peace, for co-ordination. Also
## p. 219 (#249) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
219
that of the anchorite, the “Free-Spirit. ” In its
lowest form, the will to live at all costs-the
instinct of self-preservation.
(2) Subordination, with the view of satisfying
the will to power of a whole community; submis-
siveness, the making of one's self indispensable and
useful to him who has the power; love, a secret
path to the heart of the powerful, in order to be-
come his master.
(3) The feeling of duty, conscience, the imagin-
ary comfort of belonging to a higher order than
those who actually hold the reins of power; the
acknowledgment of an order of rank which allows
of judging even the more powerful; self-deprecia-
tion; the discovery of new codes of morality (of
which the Jews are a classical example).
775.
Praise and gratitude as forms of will to power. -
Praise and gratitude for harvests, for good weather,
victories, marriages, and peace—all festivals need
a subject on which feeling can be outpoured. The
desire is to make all good things that happen to
one appear as though they had been done to one:
people will have a donor. The same holds good
of the work of art: people are not satisfied with
it alone, they must praise the artist. —What, then,
is praise? It is a sort of compensation for benefits
received, a sort of giving back, a manifestation of
our power-for the man who praises assents to,
blesses, values, judges: he arrogates to himself the
right to give his consent to a thing, to be able to
.
## p. 220 (#250) ############################################
220
THE WILL TO POWER.
confer honours. An increased feeling of happiness
or of liveliness is also an increased feeling of power,
and it is as a result of this feeling that a man
praises (it is as the outcome of this feeling that
he invents a donor, a “subject"). Gratitude is
thus revenge of a lofty kind : it is most severely
exercised and demanded where equality and pride
both require to be upheld—that is to say, where
revenge is practised to its fullest extent.
776.
Concerning the Machiavellism of Power.
The will to power appears :
(a) Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds,
in the form of will to "freedom": the mere fact of
breaking loose from something seems to be an end
in itself (in a religio-moral sense : "One is only
answerable to one's own conscience"; "evangelical
freedom," etc. etc. ).
(6) In the case of a stronger species, ascending
to power, in the form of the will to overpower. If
this fails, then it shrinks to the “ will to justice”.
that is to say, to the will to the same measure of
rights as the ruling caste possesses.
© In the case of the strongest, richest, most
independent, and most courageous, in the form of
“ love of humanity,” of “love of the people," of the
“gospel,” of “truth,” of “God,” of “pity,” of “self-
sacrifice,” etc. etc. ; in the form of overpowering, of
deeds of capture, of imposing service on some one,
of an instinctive reckoning of one's self as part of a
great mass of power to which one attempts to give
»
## p. 221 (#251) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
221
a direction: the hero, the prophet, the Cæsar, the
Saviour, the bell-wether. (The love of the sexes
also belongs to this category; it will overpower
something, possess it utterly, and it looks like self-
abnegation. At bottom it is only the love of one's
instrument, of one's “horse”--the conviction that
things belong to one because one is in a position
to use them. )
Freedom,” “ Justice," “ Love"! ! !
777
Love. —Behold this love and pity of women-
what could be more egoistic ? . . . And when they
do sacrifice themselves and their honour or reputa-
tion, to whom do they sacrifice themselves ? To the
man? Is it not rather to an unbridled desire ?
These desires are quite as selfish, even though they
may be beneficial to others and provoke gratitude.
To what extent can such a hyperfcetation of
one valuation sanctify everything else! !
778.
“ Senses," “ Passions. "—When the fear of the
senses and of the passions and of the desires be-
comes so great as to warn us against them, it is
already a symptom of weakness: extreme measures
always characterise abnormal conditions. That
which is lacking here, or more precisely that which
is decaying, is the power to resist an impulse : when
one feels instinctively that one must yield,—that is
to say, that one must react,—then it is an excellent
thing to avoid opportunities (temptations).
## p. 222 (#252) ############################################
222
THE WILL TO POWER.
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
197
tract, the criminal is a man who breaks that
contract. This at least is a clear concept. But
in that case, anarchists and enemies of social
order could not be tolerated.
740.
Crimes belong to the category of revolt against
the social system. A rebel is not punished, he
A
is simply suppressed. He may be an utterly
contemptible and pitiful creature; but there is
nothing intrinsically despicable about rebellion
in fact, in our particular society revolt is far from
being disgraceful. There are cases in which a
rebel deserves honour precisely because he is
conscious of certain elements in society which
cry aloud for hostility; for such a man rouses us
from our slumbers. When a criminal commits
but one crime against a particular person, it does
not alter the fact that all his instincts urge him
to make a stand against the whole social system.
His isolated act is merely a symptom.
The idea of punishment ought to be reduced
to the concept of the suppression of revolt, a
weapon against the vanquished (by means of long
or short terms of imprisonment). But punish-
ment should not be associated in any way with
contempt. A criminal is at all events a man who
has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake;
he is therefore a man of courage.
Neither should
punishment be regarded as penance or retribution,
as though there were some recognised rate of
exchange between crime and punishment. Punish-
## p. 198 (#228) ############################################
198
THE WILL TO POWER.
ment does not purify, simply because crime does
not sully.
A criminal should not be prevented from
making his peace with society, provided he does
not belong to the race of criminals. In the latter
case, however, he should be opposed even before
he has committed an act of hostility. (As soon
as he gets into the clutches of society the first
operation to be performed upon him should be
that of castration. ) A criminal's bad manners
and his low degree of intelligence should not be
reckoned against him. Nothing is more common
than that he should misunderstand himself (more
particularly when his rebellious instinct—the ran-
cour of the unclassed has not reached conscious-
ness simply because he has not read enough). It
is natural that he should deny and dishonour his
deed while under the influence of fear at its failure.
All this is quite distinct from those cases in which,
psychologically speaking, the criminal yields to
an incomprehensible impulse, and attributes a
motive to his deed by associating it with a merely
incidental and insignificant action (for example,
robbing a man, when his real desire was to take
his blood).
The worth of a man should not be measured by
any one isolated act. Napoleon warned us against
this. Deeds which are only skin-deep are more
particularly insignificant. If we have no crime-
let us say no murder—on our conscience; why is
it ? It simply means that a few favourable circum-
stances have been wanting in our lives.
posing we were induced to commit such a crime
a
And sup-
## p. 199 (#229) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
199
As a
would our worth be materially affected ?
matter of fact, we should only be despised, if we
were not credited with possessing the power to kill a
man under certain circumstances. In nearly every
crime certain qualities come into play without
which no one would be a true man. Dostoievsky
was not far wrong when he said of the inmates of
the penal colonies in Siberia, that they constituted
the strongest and most valuable portion of the
Russian people. The fact that in our society the
criminal happens to be a badly nourished and
stunted animal is simply a condemnation of our
system. In the days of the Renaissance the
criminal was a flourishing specimen of humanity,
and acquired his own virtue for himself. Virtue in
the sense of the Renaissance—that is to say, virtù ;
free from moralic acid.
It is only those whom we do not despise that
we are able to elevate. Moral contempt is a far
greater indignity and insult than any kind of crime.
741.
Shame was first introduced into punishment
when certain penalties were inflicted on persons
held in contempt, such as slaves. It was a de-
spised class that was most frequently punished, and
thus it came to pass that punishment and contempt
were associated.
742.
In the ancient idea of punishment a religious con-
cept was immanent, namely, the retributive power
## p. 200 (#230) ############################################
200
THE WILL TO POWER.
of chastisement. Penalties purified : in modern
society, however, penalties degrade. Punishment
is a form of paying off a debt: once it has been
paid, one is freed from the deed for which one was
so ready to suffer. Provided belief in the power
of punishment exist, once the penalty is paid a feel-
ing of relief and lightheartedness results, which is
not so very far removed from a state of conval-
escence and health. One has made one's peace
with society, and one appears to one's self more
dignified—"pure. " . . To-day, however, punish-
ment. isolates even more than the crime; the fate
behind the sin has become so formidable that it is
almost hopeless. One rises from punishment still
.
an enemy of society. Henceforward it reckons yet
another enemy against it. The jus talionis may
spring from the spirit of retribution (that is to say,
from a sort of modification of the instinct of re-
venge); but in the Book of Manu, for instance, it
is the need of having some equivalent in order to
do penance, or to become free in a religious sense.
743
My pretty radical note of interrogation in
the case of all more modern laws of punish-
ment is this: should not the punishment fit the
crime? —for in your heart of hearts thus would
you have it. But then the susceptibility of the
particular criminal to pain would have to be taken
into account. In other words, there should be no
such thing as a preconceived penalty for any crime
-no fixed penal code. But as it would be no
## p. 201 (#231) ############################################
· SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
201
easy matter to ascertain the degree of sensitiveness
of each individual criminal, punishment would have
to be abolished in practice? What a sacrifice !
a
Is it not ? Consequently
744.
Ah! and the philosophy of jurisprudence! That
is a science which, like all moral sciences, has not
even been wrapped in swaddling-clothes yet. Even
among jurists who consider themselves liberal, the
oldest and most valuable significance of punish-
ment is still misunderstood-it is not even known.
So long as jurisprudence does not build upon a
new foundation-on history and comparative an-
thropology-it will never cease to quarrel over the
fundamentally false abstractions which are fondly
imagined to be the "philosophy of law," and which
have nothing whatever to do with modern man.
The man of to-day, however, is such a complicated
woof even in regard to his legal valuation that he
allows of the most varied interpretation,
745.
An old Chinese sage once said he had heard that
when mighty empires were doomed they began to
have numberless laws.
746.
Schopenhauer would have all rapscallions cast-
rated, and all geese shut up in convents. But from
## p. 202 (#232) ############################################
202
THE WILL TO POWER.
what point of view would this be desirable? The
rascal has at least this advantage over other men-
that he is not mediocre; and the fool is superior
to us inasmuch as he does not suffer at the sight
of mediocrity. It would be better to widen the
gulf—that is to say, roguery and stupidity should
be increased. In this way human nature would
become broader . .
. . but, after all, this is Fate, and
it will happen, whether we desire it or not. Idiocy
and roguery are increasing: this is part of modern
progress.
747.
Society, to-day, is full of consideration, tact, and
reticence, and of good-natured respect for other
people's rights—even for the exactions of strangers.
To an even greater degree is there a certain charit-
able and instinctive depreciation of the worth of man
as shown by all manner of trustful habits. Respect
for men, and not only for the most virtuous, is
perhaps the real parting of the ways between us
and the Christian mythologists. We also have our
good share of irony even when listening to moral
sermons. He who preaches morality to us debases
himself in our eyes and becomes almost comical.
Liberal-mindedness regarding morality is one of
the best signs of our age. In cases where it is
most distinctly wanting, we regard it as a sign of a
morbid condition (the case of Carlyle in England,
of Ibsen in Norway, and Schopenhauer's pessimism
throughout Europe). If there is anything which
can reconcile us to our own age, it is precisely the
amount of immorality which it allows itself without
## p. 203 (#233) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
203
falling in its own estimation-very much the re-
verse! In what, then, does the superiority of culture
over the want of culture consist of the Renais-
sance, for instance, over the Middle Ages? In this
alone: the greater quantity of acknowledged im-
morality. From this it necessarily follows that the
very senith of human development must be regarded
by the moral fanatic as the non plus ultra of cor-
ruption in this connection let us recall Savona-
rola's judgment of Florence, Plato's indictment of
Athens under Pericles, Luther's condemnation of
Rome, Rousseau's anathemas against the society of
Voltaire, and Germany's hostility to Goethe).
748.
A little more fresh air, for Heaven's sake! This
ridiculous condition of Europe must not last any
longer.
Is there a single idea behind this bovine
nationalism ? What possible value can there be in
encouraging this arrogant self-conceit when every-
thing to-day points to greater and more common
interests at a moment when the spiritual de-
pendence and denationalisation, which are obvious
to all, are paving the way for the reciprocal
rapprochements and fertilisations which make up
the real value and sense of present-day culture !
And it is precisely now that "the new German
Empire” has been founded upon the most thread-
bare and discredited of ideas—universal suffrage
and equal right for all.
Think of all this struggling for advantage among
conditions which are in every way degenerate: of
1
## p. 204 (#234) ############################################
204
- THE WILL TO POWER.
this culture of big cities, of newspapers, of hurry and
scurry, and of “aimlessness”! The economic unity
of Europe must necessarily come—and with it, as
a reaction, the pacivist movement.
A pacivist party, free from all sentimentality,
which forbids its children to wage war; which
forbids recourse to courts of justice; which for-
swears all fighting, all contradiction, and all perse-
cution: for a while the party of the oppressed, and
later the powerful party :this party would be op-
posed to everything in the shape of revenge and
resentment.
There will also be a war party, exercising the
same thoroughness and severity towards itself, which
will proceed in precisely the opposite direction.
749.
The princes of Europe should really consider
whether as a matter of fact they can dispense with
our services with us, the immoralists. We are
to-day the only power which can win a victory
without allies : and we are therefore far and away
the strongest of the strong. We can even do with-
out lying, and let me ask what other power can
dispense with this weapon? A strong temptation
fights for us; the strongest, perhaps, that exists
--the temptation of truth. . . Truth? How do
I come by this word? I must withdraw it: I must
repudiate this proud word. But no. We do not
even want it- we shall be quite able to achieve our
victory of power without its help. The real charm
which fights for us, the eye of Venus which our
-
## p. 205 (#235) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
205
opponents themselves deaden and blind this
charm is the magic of the extreme. The fascina-
tion which everything extreme exercises : we
immoralists—we are in every way the extremists.
750.
The corrupted ruling classes have brought ruling
into evil odour. The State administration of justice
is a piece of cowardice, because the great man
who can serve as a standard is lacking. At last
the feeling of insecurity becomes so great that
men fall in the dust before any sort of will-power
that commands.
751.
“The will to power" is so loathed in democratic
ages that the whole of the psychology of these ages
seems directed towards its belittlement and slander.
The types of men who sought the highest honours
are said to have been Napoleon! Cæsar! and
Alexander ! -as if these had not been precisely
the greatest scorners of honour.
And Helvetius would fain show us that we strive
after power in order to have those pleasures which
are at the disposal of the mighty—that is to say,
according to him, this striving after power is the
will to pleasure-hedonism !
1
-
752.
According as to whether a people feels : "the
rights, the keenness of vision, and the gifts of lead-
ing, etc. , are with the few” or “with the many"-
"
## p. 206 (#236) ############################################
206
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
it constitutes an oligarchic or a democratic com-
munity.
Monarchy represents the belief in a man who
is completely superior a leader, a saviour, a
demigod.
Aristocracy represents the belief in a chosen
few-in a higher caste.
Democracy represents the disbelief in all great
men and in all élite societies : everybody is every-
body else's equal " At bottom we are all herd
and mob. ”
753.
I am opposed to Socialism because it dreams
ingenuously of “goodness, truth, beauty, and
equal rights" (anarchy pursues the same ideal,
but in a more brutal fashion).
I am opposed to parliamentary government
and the power of the press, because they are the
means whereby cattle become masters.
»
754.
The arming of the people means in the end
the arming of the mob.
755.
Socialists are particularly ridiculous in my eyes,
because of their absurd optimism concerning the
"good man" who is supposed to be waiting in their
cupboard, and who will come into being when the
present order of society has been overturned and
has made way for natural instincts. But the
## p. 207 (#237) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
207
opposing party is quite as ludicrous, because it
will not see the act of violence which lies beneath
every law, the severity and egoism inherent in
every kind of authority. “I and my kind will
rule and prevail. Whoever degenerates will be
either expelled or annihilated. ”—This was the
fundamental feeling of all ancient legislation.
The idea of a higher order of man is hated
much more profoundly than monarchs themselves.
Hatred of aristocracy always uses hatred of
monarchy as a mask.
756.
How treacherous are all parties! They bring
to light something concerning their leaders which
the latter, perhaps, have hitherto kept hidden
beneath a bushel with consummate art.
757.
Modern Socialism would fain create a profane
counterpart to Jesuitism: everybody a perfect
instrument. · But as to the object of it all, the
purpose of it—this has not yet been ascertained.
758.
The slavery of to-day : a piece of barbarism.
Where are the masters for whom these slaves
work? One must not always expect the
simultaneous appearance of the two complement-
ary castes of society.
Utility and pleasure are slave theories of life.
## p. 208 (#238) ############################################
208
THE WILL TO POWER.
“The blessing of work” is an ennobling phrase
for slaves. Incapacity for leisure.
759.
There is no such thing as a right to live, a
right to work, or a right to be happy: in this
respect man is not different from the meanest
worm.
760.
We must undoubtedly think of these things
as uncompromisingly as Nature
does: they
preserve the species.
761.
We should look upon the needs of the masses
with ironic compassion: they want something
which we have got-Ah!
762.
European democracy is only in a very slight
degree the manifestation of unfettered powers.
It represents, above all, the unfettering of laziness,
fatigue, and weakness.
763.
Concerning the future of the workman. --Work-
men should learn to regard their duties as soldiers
do. They receive emoluments, incomes, but they
do not get wages !
There is no relationship between work done
and money received; the individual should,
## p. 209 (#239) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
209
according to his kind, be so placed as to perform
the highest that is compatible with his powers.
764
Noblemen ought one day to live as the bour-
geois do now -- but above them, distinguishing
themselves by the simplicity of their wants-
the superior caste will then live in a poorer
and simpler way and yet be in possession of
power.
For lower orders of mankind the reverse
valuations hold good: it is a matter of implanting
“ virtues ” in them. Absolute commands, terrible
compulsory methods, in order that they may rise
above mere ease in life.
The remainder may
obey, but their vanity demands that they may
feel themselves dependent, not upon great men,
but upon principles.
765.
“ The Atonement of all Sin. "
People speak of the “profound injustice” of
the social arrangement, as if the fact that one man
is born in favourable circumstances and that
another is born in unfavourable ones—or that
one should possess gifts the other has not, were
on the face of it an injustice. Among the more
honest of these opponents of society, this is what
is said: “We, with all the bad, morbid, criminal
qualities which we acknowledge we possess, are
only the inevitable result of the oppression for
O
VOL. II.
## p. 210 (#240) ############################################
210
THE WILL TO POWER.
ages of the weak by the strong"; thus they insinu-
ate their evil natures into the consciences of the
ruling classes. They threaten and storm and curse.
They become virtuous from sheer indignation-
they don't want to have become bad men and
canaille for nothing. The name for this attitude,
which is an invention of the last century, is, if I am
not mistaken, pessimism; and even that pessimism
which is the outcome of indignation. It is in this
attitude of mind that history is judged, that it
is deprived of its inevitable fatality, and that
responsibility and even guilt is discovered in it.
For the great desideratum is to find guilty people
in it. The botched and the bungled, the de-
cadents of all kinds, are revolted at themselves,
and require sacrifices in order that they may not
slake their thirst for destruction upon themselves
(which might, indeed, be the most reasonable
procedure). But for this purpose they at least
require a semblance of justification, i. e. a theory
according to which the fact of their existence, and
of their character, may be expiated by a scapegoat.
This scapegoat may be God, --in Russia such
resentful atheists are not wanting, or the order
of society, or education and upbringing, or the
Jews, or the nobles, or, finally, the well-constituted
of every kind. “It is a sin for a man to have been
born in decent circumstances, for by so doing
he disinherits the others, he pushes them aside, he
imposes upon them the curse of vice and of
work. . . How can I be made answerable
for my misery; surely some one must be respons-
ible for it, or I could not bear to live. "
.
## p. 211 (#241) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
211
In short, resentful pessimism discovers responsible
parties in order to create a pleasurable sensation
for itself-revenge.
“Sweeter than honey”-
thus does even old Homer speak of revenge.
*
The fact that such a theory no longer meets with
understanding—or rather, let us say, contempt-
is accounted for by that particle of Christianity
which still circulates in the blood of every one
of us; it makes us tolerant towards things simply
because we scent a Christian savour about them. . . .
The Socialists appeal to the Christian instincts;
this is their really refined piece of cleverness. .
Thanks to Christianity, we have now grown
accustomed to the superstitious concept of a
soul-of an immortal soul, of soul monads,
which, as a matter of fact, hails from somewhere
else, and which has only become inherent in
certain cases—that is to say, become incarnate
in them-by accident: but the nature of these
cases is not altered, let alone determined by it.
The circumstances of society, of relationship, and
of history are only accidents for the soul, perhaps
misadventures : in any case, the world is not their
work. By means of the idea of soul the individual
is made transcendental; thanks to it, a ridiculous
amount of importance can be attributed to him.
As a matter of fact, it was Christianity which
first induced the individual to take up this position
of judge of all things. It made megalomania
almost his duty: it has made everything temporary
and limited subordinate to eternal rights ! What
## p. 212 (#242) ############################################
212
THE WILL TO POWER.
is the State, what is society, what are historical
laws, what is physiology to me? Thus speaks
something from beyond Becoming, an immutable
entity throughout history: thus speaks something
immortal, something divine--it is the soul !
Another Christian, but no less insane, concept
has percolated even deeper into the tissues of
modern ideas : the concept of the equality of all
souls before God. In this concept the prototype of
all theories concerning equal rights is to be found.
Man was first taught to stammer this proposition
religiously : later, it was converted into a moral;
no wonder he has ultimately begun to take it
seriously, to take it practically ! —that is to say,
politically, socialistically, resento-pessimistically.
Wherever responsible circumstances or people
have been looked for, it was the instinct of revenge
that sought them.
This instinct of revenge
obtained such an ascendancy over man in the
course of centuries that the whole of metaphysics,
psychology, ideas of society, and, above all,
morality, are tainted with it. Man has nourished
this idea of responsibility to such an extent that
he has introduced the bacillus of vengeance into
everything. By means of it he has made God
Himself ill, and killed innocence in the universe,
by tracing every condition of things to acts of
will, to intentions, to responsible agents. The
whole teaching of will, this most fatal fraud that
has ever existed in psychology hitherto, was
invented essentially for the purpose of punishment.
It was the social utility of punishment that lent
this concept its dignity, its power, and its truth.
## p. 213 (#243) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
213
The originator of that psychology, that we shall
call volitional psychology, must be sought in
those classes which had the right of punishment
in their hands; above all, therefore, among the
priests who stood on the very pinnacle of ancient
social systems: these people wanted to create for
themselves the right to wreak revenge they
wanted to supply God with the privilege of
vengeance. For this purpose; man was declared
"free": to this end every action had to be re-
garded as voluntary, and the origin of every deed
had to be considered as lying in consciousness.
But by such propositions as these ancient psych-
ology is refuted.
To-day, when Europe seems to have taken the
contrary direction; when we halcyonians would
fain withdraw, dissipate, and banish the concept of
guilt and punishment with all our might from the
world; when our most serious endeavours are
concentrated upon purifying psychology, morality,
history, nature, social institutions and privileges,
and even God Himself, from this filth; in whom
must we recognise our most mortal enemies?
Precisely in those apostles of revenge and
resentment, in those who
are par excellence
pessimists from indignation, who make it their
mission to sanctify their filth with the name of
righteous indignation. ” . . . We others, whose
one desire is to reclaim innocence on behalf of
Becoming, would fain be the missionaries of a
purer thought, namely, that no one is responsible
for man's qualities; neither God, nor society, nor
his parents, nor his ancestors, nor himself—in fact,
66
i
!
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214
THE WILL TO POWER.
that no one is to blame for him . . . The being
who might be made responsible for a man's exist-
ence, for the fact that he is constituted in a
particular way, or for his birth in certain circum-
stances and in a certain environment, is absolutely
lacking. –And it is a great blessing that such a
being is non-existent. . . . We are not the result
of an eternal design, of a will, of a desire: there
is no attempt being made with us to attain to an
“ideal of perfection,” to an “ideal of happiness,"
to an “ideal of virtue,"—and we are just as little
the result of a mistake on God's part in the
presence of which He ought to feel uneasy (a
thought which is known to be at the very root
of the Old Testament). There is not a place
nor a purpose nor a sense to which we can
attribute our existence or our kind of existence.
In the first place, no one is in a position to do
this: it is quite impossible to judge, to measure,
or to compare, or even to deny the whole universe!
And why ? -For five reasons, all accessible to the
man of average intelligence: for instance, because
there is no existence outside the universe . . . and
let us say it again, this is a great blessing, for
therein lies the whole innocence of our lives.
2. THE INDIVIDUAL.
766.
Fundamental errors : to regard the herd as an
aim instead of the individual! The herd is only
means and nothing more! But nowadays
a
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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
215
people are trying to understand the herd as they
would an individual, and to confer higher rights
upon it than upon isolated personalities. Terrible
mistake! ! In addition to this, all that makes for
gregariousness, e. g. sympathy, is regarded as the
more valuable side of our natures.
767.
The individual is something quite new, and
capable of creating new things. He is something
absolute, and all his actions are quite his own.
The individual in the end has to seek the valua-
tion for his actions in himself: because he has
to give an individual meaning even to traditional
words and notions. His interpretation of a
formula is at least personal, even if he does not
create the formula itself: at least as an interpreter
he is creative.
768.
The "ego" oppresses and kills. It acts like
an organic cell. It is predatory and violent. It
would fain regenerate itself-pregnancy. It would
fain give birth to its God and see all mankind at
its feet.
769.
Every living organism gropes around as far as
its power permits, and overcomes all that is
weaker than itself: by this means it finds pleasure
in its own existence. The increasing “ humanity"
of this tendency consists in the fact that we are
beginning to feel ever more subtly how difficult
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216
THE WILL TO POWER.
it is really to absorb others: while we could show
our power by injuring him, his will estranges him
from us, and thus makes him less susceptible of
being overcome.
770.
The degree of resistance which has to be con-
tinually overcome in order to remain at the top, is
the measure of freedom, whether for individuals or
for societies : freedom being understood as positive
power, as will to power. The highest form of
individual freedom, of sovereignty, would, according
to this, in all probability be found not five feet
away from its opposite that is to say, where the
danger of slavery hangs over life, like a hundred
swords of Damocles. Let any one go through the
whole of history from this point of view: the ages
when the individual reaches perfect maturity, i. e. the
free ages, when the classical type, sovereign man, is
attained to—these were certainly not humane times!
There should be no choice : either one must
be uppermost nethermost
like a worm,
despised, annihilated, trodden upon. One must
have tyrants against one in order to become a
tyrant, i. e. in order to be free. It is no small
advantage to have a hundred swords of Damocles
suspended over one: it is only thus that one
learns to dance, it is only thus that one attains
to any freedom in one's movements.
or
771.
Man more than any other animal was originally
altruistic-hence his slow growth (child) and lofty
## p. 217 (#247) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
217
was
development. Hence, too, his extraordinary and
latest kind of egoism. —Beasts of prey are much
more individualistic.
772.
A criticism of selfishness. The involuntary
ingenuousness of La Rochefoucauld, who believed
that he was saying something bold, liberal, and
paradoxical (in his days, of course, truth in
psychological matters
something that
astonished people) when he said: "Les grandes
åmes ne sont pas celles qui ont moins de passions
et plus de vertus que les âmes communes, mais seule-
ment celles qui ont de plus grands desseins. "
Certainly, John Stuart Mill (who calls Chamfort
the noble and philosophical La Rochefoucauld of
the eighteenth century) recognises in him merely
an astute and keen-sighted observer of all that
which is the result of habitual selfishness in the
human breast, and he adds: “A noble spirit is
unable to see the necessity of a constant observa-
tion of baseness and contemptibility, unless it were
to show against what corrupting influences a
lofty spirit and a noble character were able to
triumph. ”
773
The Morphology of the Feelings of Self.
First standpoint. -To what extent are sympathy
or communal feelings, the lower or preparatory
states, at a time when personal self-esteem and
initiative in valuation, on the part of individuals,
are not yet possible ?
## p. 218 (#248) ############################################
218
THE WILL TO POWER.
Second standpoint. - To what extent is the zenith
of collective self-esteem, the pride in the distinc-
tion of the clan, the feeling of inequality and a
certain abhorrence of mediation, of equal rights and
of reconciliation, the school for individual self-
esteem? It may be this in so far as it compels the
individual to represent the pride of the community
-he is obliged to speak and act with tremendous
self-respect, because he stands for the community
And the same holds good when the individual re-
gards himself as the instrument or speaking-tube
of a godhead.
Third standpoint. To what extent do these
forms of impersonality invest the individual with
enormous importance ?
In so far as higher powers
are using him as an intermediary: religious shy-
ness towards one's self is the condition of prophets
and poets.
Fourth standpoint. —To what extent does re-
sponsibility for a whole educate the individual in
foresight, and give him a severe and terrible hand,
a calculating and cold heart, majesty of bearing
and of action-things which he would not allow
himself if he stood only for his own rights ?
In short, collective self-esteem is the great pre-
paratory school for personal sovereignty. The
noble caste is that which creates the heritage of
this faculty
774.
The disguised forms of will to power :-
(1) The desire for freedom, for independence
for equilibrium, for peace, for co-ordination. Also
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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
219
that of the anchorite, the “Free-Spirit. ” In its
lowest form, the will to live at all costs-the
instinct of self-preservation.
(2) Subordination, with the view of satisfying
the will to power of a whole community; submis-
siveness, the making of one's self indispensable and
useful to him who has the power; love, a secret
path to the heart of the powerful, in order to be-
come his master.
(3) The feeling of duty, conscience, the imagin-
ary comfort of belonging to a higher order than
those who actually hold the reins of power; the
acknowledgment of an order of rank which allows
of judging even the more powerful; self-deprecia-
tion; the discovery of new codes of morality (of
which the Jews are a classical example).
775.
Praise and gratitude as forms of will to power. -
Praise and gratitude for harvests, for good weather,
victories, marriages, and peace—all festivals need
a subject on which feeling can be outpoured. The
desire is to make all good things that happen to
one appear as though they had been done to one:
people will have a donor. The same holds good
of the work of art: people are not satisfied with
it alone, they must praise the artist. —What, then,
is praise? It is a sort of compensation for benefits
received, a sort of giving back, a manifestation of
our power-for the man who praises assents to,
blesses, values, judges: he arrogates to himself the
right to give his consent to a thing, to be able to
.
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THE WILL TO POWER.
confer honours. An increased feeling of happiness
or of liveliness is also an increased feeling of power,
and it is as a result of this feeling that a man
praises (it is as the outcome of this feeling that
he invents a donor, a “subject"). Gratitude is
thus revenge of a lofty kind : it is most severely
exercised and demanded where equality and pride
both require to be upheld—that is to say, where
revenge is practised to its fullest extent.
776.
Concerning the Machiavellism of Power.
The will to power appears :
(a) Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds,
in the form of will to "freedom": the mere fact of
breaking loose from something seems to be an end
in itself (in a religio-moral sense : "One is only
answerable to one's own conscience"; "evangelical
freedom," etc. etc. ).
(6) In the case of a stronger species, ascending
to power, in the form of the will to overpower. If
this fails, then it shrinks to the “ will to justice”.
that is to say, to the will to the same measure of
rights as the ruling caste possesses.
© In the case of the strongest, richest, most
independent, and most courageous, in the form of
“ love of humanity,” of “love of the people," of the
“gospel,” of “truth,” of “God,” of “pity,” of “self-
sacrifice,” etc. etc. ; in the form of overpowering, of
deeds of capture, of imposing service on some one,
of an instinctive reckoning of one's self as part of a
great mass of power to which one attempts to give
»
## p. 221 (#251) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
221
a direction: the hero, the prophet, the Cæsar, the
Saviour, the bell-wether. (The love of the sexes
also belongs to this category; it will overpower
something, possess it utterly, and it looks like self-
abnegation. At bottom it is only the love of one's
instrument, of one's “horse”--the conviction that
things belong to one because one is in a position
to use them. )
Freedom,” “ Justice," “ Love"! ! !
777
Love. —Behold this love and pity of women-
what could be more egoistic ? . . . And when they
do sacrifice themselves and their honour or reputa-
tion, to whom do they sacrifice themselves ? To the
man? Is it not rather to an unbridled desire ?
These desires are quite as selfish, even though they
may be beneficial to others and provoke gratitude.
To what extent can such a hyperfcetation of
one valuation sanctify everything else! !
778.
“ Senses," “ Passions. "—When the fear of the
senses and of the passions and of the desires be-
comes so great as to warn us against them, it is
already a symptom of weakness: extreme measures
always characterise abnormal conditions. That
which is lacking here, or more precisely that which
is decaying, is the power to resist an impulse : when
one feels instinctively that one must yield,—that is
to say, that one must react,—then it is an excellent
thing to avoid opportunities (temptations).
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THE WILL TO POWER.
