Objection
1: It seems that piety is not a gift.
Summa Theologica
Reply to Objection 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the
Article.
Reply to Objection 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid.
For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since
false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special
kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of
filthy lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under
violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as
insensibility to mercy.
Reply to Objection 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species
rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be
said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he
gives but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is
"tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be
{kyminopristes} [skinflint], a cumin-seller, as it were, because he
makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is
said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and
this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful
means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of
illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such as
whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have
given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to make
little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means, whether
by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the
dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.
Reply to Objection 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums of
money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by
violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.
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OF PRODIGALITY (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?
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Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.
For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some are at
the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not
opposite to covetousness.
Objection 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But
covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions
whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not
seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected
towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality
is not opposite to covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as
stated above ([3256]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now prodigality seems always to
be directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal
squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore
it is stated (Lk. 15:13) of the prodigal son that he "wasted his
substance living riotously. " Therefore it seems that prodigality is
opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness and
liberality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that
prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we
give here the name of covetousness.
I answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue
in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and prodigality
differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards
affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than
he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful of
them than he ought: and as regards external action, prodigality implies
excess in giving, but deficiency in retaining and acquiring, while
covetousness, on the contrary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess
in acquiring and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is
opposed to covetousness.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same
subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from
what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes
the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and
retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard
principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be
"prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be
"covetous. " Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving,
without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv,
1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in
giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same time exceeds in
receiving. This may be due either to some kind of necessity, since
while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he
is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it
may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not for a good
purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares not whence or how he
receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects.
Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money,
not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.
Reply to Objection 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for
the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes
through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on
account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to
intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he
becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the
concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no
pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) "that many a prodigal ends in
becoming intemperate. "
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Whether prodigality is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle
says (1 Tim. 6:10): "Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the
root of all evils. " But it is not the root of prodigality, since this
is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18): "Charge the
rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others. " Now
this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is
not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and
to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming
to the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord (Mat. 6:34), "Be not .
. . solicitous for tomorrow," and (Mat. 19:21), "Sell all [Vulg. :
'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor. " Therefore prodigality is not
a sin.
On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality.
I answer that, As stated above [3257](A[1]), the opposition between
prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either of
which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and sinful
through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that
prodigality is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Some expound this saying of the Apostle as
referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual
covetousness, which is the concupiscence of the "fomes" [*Cf. [3258]FS,
Q[81], A[3], ad 2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is
speaking of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and
in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from
covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good
inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to
satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage
correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the
desire of riches, for he had said previously (1 Tim. 6:9): "They that
will become rich," etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be "the
root of all evils," not that all evils always arise from covetousness,
but because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from
covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of covetousness,
as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in order to curry
favor with certain persons from whom he may receive riches.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and
communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does
not do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), "his
giving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought
to be. For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor,
namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give
nothing. "
Reply to Objection 3: The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not
in the total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought
to be given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the
prodigal man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those
who give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ,
and banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are not
prodigal but perfectly liberal.
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Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not
communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures
himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the wasting
of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an undoing of
his very being. " Now he that injures himself sins more grievously,
according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he
be good? " Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness.
Objection 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable
circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is
sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of
those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to
accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied
by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe
prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as
stated above (Q[56], A[1], ad 1; [3259]FS, Q[61], A[2], ad 1). Now
prodigality is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is
written (Prov. 21:20): "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in
the dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it": and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "it is the mark of a fool to give
too much and receive nothing. " Therefore prodigality is a more grievous
sin than covetousness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "the prodigal
seems to be much better than the illiberal man. "
I answer that, Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous sin
than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because
covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving,
wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving
or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because the
prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the covetous
man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in Ethic. iv,
6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the
prodigal on the way to old age, which is opposed to prodigality, but he
is easily reduced to a state of want, since much useless spending
impoverishes him and makes him unable to exceed in giving. Moreover,
prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its likeness
thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is not easily cured, for
the reason given above ([3260]Q[118], A[5], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: The difference between the prodigal and the
covetous man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter
against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending that
which is his, and his means of support, and against others by spending
the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who
are the dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to the poor whom
they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like manner the covetous
man sins against others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins
against himself, through deficiency in spending: wherefore it is
written (Eccles. 6:2): "A man to whom God hath given riches . . . yet
doth not give him the power to eat thereof. " Nevertheless the prodigal
man exceeds in this, that he injures both himself and others yet so as
to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor
himself, since he does not even use his own goods for his own profit.
Reply to Objection 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them
according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to prodigality
we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard to
covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend too much
for the sake of intemperance points already to several additional sins,
wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in Ethic. iv,
1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs
to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise, yet on
account of the motive for which he does so it calls for blame, since he
is unwilling to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others.
Reply to Objection 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all
virtues are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to
prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.
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OF "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider "epikeia," under which head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether "epikeia" is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
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Whether "epikeia" [*{epieikeia}] is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that "epikeia" is not a virtue. For no virtue
does away with another virtue. Yet "epikeia" does away with another
virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and
seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore "epikeia" is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "With
regard to these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when
they make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge
must pronounce judgment not on them but according to them. " But
seemingly "epikeia" pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems that
the law should not be observed in some particular case. Therefore
"epikeia" is a vice rather than a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, apparently it belongs to "epikeia" to consider
the intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v,
10). But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention
of the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the Codex of Laws and
Constitutions, under Law i: "It is fitting and lawful that We alone
should interpret between equity and law. " Therefore the act of
"epikeia" is unlawful: and consequently "epikeia" is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a
virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([3261]FS, Q[96], A[6]), when we were
treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned,
are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their
diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would
apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what
commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain cases it
will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to the common
good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires deposits to be
restored, because in the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens
sometimes to be injurious---for instance, if a madman were to put his
sword in deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state of madness,
or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to fight
against his country. In these and like cases it is bad to follow the
law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow
the dictates of justice and the common good. This is the object of
"epikeia" which we call equity. Therefore it is evident that "epikeia"
is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: "Epikeia" does not set aside that which is just
in itself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it
opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it ought
to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought not to be
followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the Codex of Laws and
Constitutions under Law v: "Without doubt he transgresses the law who
by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of
the lawgiver. "
Reply to Objection 2: It would be passing judgment on a law to say that
it was not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to
be observed in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law,
but on some particular contingency.
Reply to Objection 3: Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases
where it is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the
interpretation of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there is
need, not of interpretation, but of execution.
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Whether "epikeia" is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that "epikeia" is not a part of justice. For, as
stated above ([3262]Q[58], A[7]), justice is twofold, particular and
legal. Now "epikeia" is not a part of particular justice, since it
extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner,
neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside
that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that "epikeia" is
not a part of justice.
Objection 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the
part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as
being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now
"epikeia" seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as implied
by its name: for it is derived from {epi}, i. e. "above," and {dikaion},
i. e. "just. " Therefore "epikeia" is not a part of justice.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that "epikeia" is the same as modesty.
For where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to
all men," the Greek has {epieikeia} [*{to epieikes}]. Now, according to
Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore
"epikeia" is not a part of justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "epikeia is a
kind of justice. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3263]Q[48]), a virtue has three kinds
of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one
of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the
whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is
predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and
sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and
posteriority, as "being" of substance and accident.
Accordingly, "epikeia" is a part of justice taken in a general sense,
for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10).
Wherefore it is evident that "epikeia" is a subjective part of justice;
and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of
legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of
"epikeia. " Hence "epikeia" is by way of being a higher rule of human
actions.
Reply to Objection 1: Epikeia corresponds properly to legal justice,
and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it.
For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether
as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the
lawgiver, which is of more account, then "epikeia" is the more
important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely
that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then
"epikeia" is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its general
acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10),
"epikeia is better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which
observes the letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of
justice, it is not better than all justice.
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to "epikeia" to moderate something,
namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is
reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life---for
instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term
{epieikeia} is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of
moderation.
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OF PIETY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely,
piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?
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Whether piety is a gift?
Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ
from the virtues, as stated above ([3264]FS, Q[68], A[1]). But piety is
a virtue, as stated above (Q[101], A[3]). Therefore piety is not a
gift.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues,
above all the moral virtues, as above ([3265]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now
among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if
any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion
should be a gift rather than piety.
Objection 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as
stated above ([3266]FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of piety cannot
remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the
inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy": and so there will be
no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q[30],
A[1]]. Therefore piety is not a gift.
On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter
of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: 'godliness'] [*"Pietas," whence our English
word "pity," which is the same as mercy. ]
I answer that, As stated above ([3267]FS, Q[68], A[1]; [3268]FS, Q[69],
AA[1],3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the
soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial
affection towards God, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the
spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father). " And since
it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father,
it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay
worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father
in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God
as Father.
Reply to Objection 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion
does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the
flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as
Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and
Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the
gift of piety is greater than religion.
Reply to Objection 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and
worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his
kindred on account of their being related to his father so by the gift
of piety he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men
on account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to
honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one
understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii).
Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness.
And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the Day
of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to
revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that this
act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, "Behold how they are
numbered among the children of God. " The saints will also mutually
honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day, the saints
have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state.
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Whether the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," corresponds to the
gift of piety?
Objection 1: It seems that the second beatitude, "Blessed are the
meek," does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift
corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude,
"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," or the fifth
beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," since as stated above (A[1],
OBJ[3]), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second
beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety.
Objection 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of
knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts (Is.
11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since,
then, the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," corresponds
to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude
corresponds to piety.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and
gifts, as stated above ([3269]FS, Q[70], A[2]). Now among the fruits,
goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness,
which pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not
correspond to the gift of piety.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Piety is
becoming to the meek. "
I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold
congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they
are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore he
assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the
second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," to piety, and so on. Another
congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each
gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to the
gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and
fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the second. Yet
the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as
meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to
their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to
knowledge and piety: but taking them according to their order,
different beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity
may be observed, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be
directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it
removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.
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OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there
are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;
(3) Of the second;
(4) Of the third;
(5) Of the fourth;
(6) Of the other six.
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not
precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the
citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii,
1. Wherefore, according to Ethic. v, 1, "the law prescribes about all
acts of all virtues. " Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first.
principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.
Objection 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially
the judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as
stated above ([3270]FS, Q[99], A[4]). But the precepts of the decalogue
are moral precepts, as stated above ([3271]FS, Q[100], A[3]). Therefore
the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.
Objection 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of
justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers
and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do not
properly belong to justice.
Objection 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into
two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our
neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.
On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are
directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts
of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore
all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles
of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at once, as to
principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the
notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, appears in justice,
which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate
to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and
that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters that refer to another it
appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another
that which is his due. Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs
pertain to justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts
of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is
about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six
remaining are about justice commonly so called, which is observed among
equals.
Reply to Objection 1: The intention of the law is to make all men
virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them
precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the
moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just
as the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in
so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are
contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the
precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.
Reply to Objection 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be
administered in different ways according to the difference of men.
Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the
decalogue, but among the judicial precepts.
Reply to Objection 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity
as their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, "The end of the commandment is
charity": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer
immediately to acts of justice.
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Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is
unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his father
in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, "How much more shall we [Vulg. :
'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and live? " Now the
precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed
affirmatively in these words: "Honor thy father and thy mother. " Much
more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, whereby all
honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is
naturally prior to negation.
Objection 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to
religion, as stated above [3272](A[1]). Now religion, since it is one
virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are forbidden:
since we read first: "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me";
secondly, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing"; and
thirdly, "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them. " Therefore the
first precept is unfittingly expressed.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that "the
first precept forbids the sin of superstition. " But there are many
wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above ([3273]Q[92],
A[2]). Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it
behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the
order of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now two
things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that
the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the
generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and
in building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation: and
in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the
result of which is that a man makes good use of every other goodness.
Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end.
Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law,
the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of
religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is the last end of
man's will.
The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in
the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the
farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, according
to Jer. 4:3, "Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon
thorns. " Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in
religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief
obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, according to
Mat. 6:24, "You cannot serve God and mammon. " Therefore in the first
precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded.
Reply to Objection 1: In point of fact there is one affirmative precept
about religion, namely: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day. "
Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their
means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though
affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of
generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as
stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning
God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our
insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).
Reply to Objection 2: People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For
some served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to
images. Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans
worshiped gods without using images: and this worship is first
forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods. " Among
others the worship of false gods was observed by using certain images:
and so the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words,
"Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing," as also the worship
of those same images, by the words, "Thou shalt not adore them," etc.
Reply to Objection 3: All other kinds of superstition proceed from some
compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood
to be forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods. "
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Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is
unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the name
of thy God in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7: "Thou
shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature," so that it forbids an
error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Dt. 5:11, "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, " adds, i. e. "by
giving the name of God to wood or stone," as though they forbade a
false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief.
Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion.
Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, whereby
superstition is forbidden.
Objection 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes ---for
instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally speaking
in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col. 3:17, "All
whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the name of the
Lord. " Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of God's name in
vain seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding
superstition, and thus should have preceded it.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, by swearing
to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless swearing,
that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which is
without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much
more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden
them.
Objection 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult
to God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and
other like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.
Objection 5: Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not
have been said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy
God in vain. "
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue it is necessary
to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him in true
religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First,
by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion is given to
others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition.
Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God is
contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated above
(Q[97], in the preamble, and in the Article that follows). Now
superstition hinders religion by preventing man from acknowledging God
so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is engrossed in some undue
worship, he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, according
to Is. 28:20, "The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out," i. e.
either the true God or a false god must fall out from man's heart, "and
a short covering cannot cover both. " On the other hand, irreligion
hinders religion by preventing man from honoring God after he has
acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view
to worship, before honoring Him we have acknowledged.
For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before
the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.
Reply to Objection 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal
explanation is that which is given Dt. 5:11: "Thou shalt not take the
name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, "by swearing on that which is
not [*Vulg. : 'for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon
a vain thing']. "
Reply to Objection 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the
name of God, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a
man's word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name
more frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in
consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by
this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the
explanation quoted in the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which
is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called
perjury, as stated above ([3274]Q[98], A[1], ad 3). For when a man
swears to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it
is not supported by the truth. on the other hand, when a man swears
without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no
vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the
swearer.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science,
we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law,
which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the
decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by
prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common
occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the
decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more frequent
occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the
latter sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part
of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the
signifying words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the
singular: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain":
since it matters not in which of God's names perjury is committed.
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Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the
Sabbath, is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the third precept of the decalogue,
concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed. For
this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in
commenting on Lk. 13:14, "The ruler of the synagogue being angry that
He had healed on the Sabbath," says (Comment. iv): "The Law forbids,
not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works," i. e. "to
burden oneself with sin. " Taken literally it is a ceremonial precept,
for it is written (Ex. 31:13): "See that you keep My Sabbath: because
it is a sign between Me and you in your generations. " Now the precepts
of the decalogue are both spiritual and moral.
