Two entities are neutral in the
absolute
sense.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
This abstention, which is ac- quired having the pure Path as its support, is pure.
This is a part of the Path.
Without doubt, the part (correct speech, etc. ) is not a "thing"
? (dravya), being only abstention: but these are not the only real and distina things which constitute the dharmas; there are for example, the
34
eight worldly dharmas; possession and non-possession; glory and
non-glory; praise and blame; pleasure and suffering. Non-possession of clothes, of food, etc. , is not a thing. (Anguttara, iv. 157, Digha, iii. 260) 7. If the avijnapti does not exist, say the Vaibhasikas, the Pratimoksa
discipline would disappear.
One refutes this objection according to the same principles, by
making a state out of the force of the intention. Discipline is volition which, after it has been translated into the positive action (vidhi) of abstaining from transgression, into the pledge of no longer committing transgression, arrests bad actions and disciplines the body and the voice: the Pratimoksa discipline should be understood in this manner.
The Vaibhasikas object that, if the Pratimoksa discipline is volition, the monk who thinks a thought other than this thought of volition would cease being "disciplined," for he does not then possess the volition which disciplines.
This objection is worthless. In fact, the mental series is perfumed in such a way that, when a thought of transgression starts to appear, the memory of the vow undertaken also appears: the volition of abstention is then found to be present.
8. And this volition has the characteristic of a dike. When one is obliged not to commit transgression, one remembers this obligation, shame (hrt, ii. 32) is present, and one constrains oneself in such a manner that one does not violate morality.
In your system, on the contrary, if immorality is dammed up by an avijnapti independent of memory, then even a person who has a faulty memory would not be able to commit a transgression, since the avijnapti is always there.
Let us stop this discussion here. The Vaibhasikas say that there exists a certain substantial thing (dravya), sui generis, which is avijnaptirupa.
We have seen (i. llb) that the avijnapti arises dependent (upaddya) on the primary elements: the question is then posed whether it derives from the same primary elements which are the support of the vijnapti, that is, the primary elements of the body through which the action termed vijnapti (iv. p. 3,33) is accomplished; or if it derives from other
Karma 567
? 35 primary elements.
The avijnapti derives from primary elements different from those
which serve as the support for the vijnapti: for it is impossible that one
and the same complex of four primary elements would produce both a
subtle, derived rupa,--the avijnapti--, and at the same time a gross, 36
***
The vijnapti is simultaneous to the primary elements from whence it derives; is such also the case for the avijnapti?
The general rule is that all derived rupa is simultaneous to its primary elements. But certain derived rupa,--of the present and the future,--derive from past primary elements:
4c-d. From the first moment, the avijnapti of Kamadhatu arises derived from past primary elements.
The moment the avijnapti arises, it arises derived from primary elements simultaneous to its arising. From this first moment on, avijnapti of the sphere of Kamadhatu--in opposition to the avijnapti arisen from the dhyana, and pure avijnapti (p. 32)--arises, that is, it continues to be reborn, being derived (upadaya) from the same primary elements of the first moment, which are now past: these past primary elements constitute, from the second moment onward, the support of the avijnapti, for they are the cause of its pravrtti, they are its projecting cause; the primary elements simultaneous to each of the moments from the second moment onward are the support of the avijnapti, for they are the cause of its anuvrtti, they are its supporting cause. In the same way, the hand that has hurled the wheel and the ground that the supports the wheel, are the causes, respectively, of the pravrtti and the anuvrtti of the movement of the wheel (see p. 576).
***
To which sphere,--Kamadhatu and the Four Dhyanas--do the primary elements belong, from whence the bodily and vocal aaions of the different spheres derive?
derived rupa, the vijnapti.
? 5a-b. When impure, bodily and vocal action derive from the primary elements of the sphere to which they belong.
Bodily and vocal actions of Kamadhatu derive from the primary, elements of Kamadhatu, and so on to the bodily and vocal actions of the Fourth Dhyana which derives from primary elements of the Fourth Dhyana.
5c. When they are pure, they are from the primary elements of the sphere to which the person who has produced them belongs.
When they are pure, bodily and vocal action derives from the primary elements of the sphere where the person who produces arises: for the pure dharmas are transcendent to the sphere of existence (Kamadhatu, etc. ); for there does not exist any pure primary elements from whence one could derive a pure action; for the pure bodily or vocal action arises by reason of the primary elements, and not only through the mind, since it is derived rupa (upaddyarupa) (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 723b29-c6)
***
What are the characteristics of these two actions, vijnapti and avijfiapti? What are the characteristics of the primary elements from whence they derive?
5d. The avijnapti is not integral to the organism; it is also an outflowing; it belongs solely to living beings. Not of absorption, it derives from the primary elements which are an outflowing, which are integral to the organism, which are differentiated
37
1. The avijnapti is a derived rupa exempt from mass (amurta),
nonextended (apratigha); thus it cannot be a support of the mind and of mental states; thus it is anupdtta, not integral to the sense organism (i. 34c). The avijnapti is never morally neutral (iv. 7a): hence it is not arisen from retribution (i. 37); it is not of increase (i. 36); it remains then
that it is an outflowing (i. 36), that is, produced by sabhagahetu (ii. 52). [The text says, "also of outflowing," because the avijnapti can be also ksanika (i. 38b): the first pure avijnapti is not an outflowing. ]
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2. Not absorbed or, in other words belonging to Kamadhatu, it 38
derives from primary elements which are an outflowing, and which are integral to the organism. These primary elements are differentiated, because each of the seven avijnaptis, the renouncing of killing, etc. , which form the Pratimoksa discipline, derive from a distina group of the four primary elements.
6. Arisen from absorption, it derives from non-differentiated primary elements, not integral to the organism, and increase.
3. Avijnapti which arises from samddhi, is divided into two types, that is, (avijnapti arisen from) absorption, and (avijnapti arisen from) pure discipline. These two both arise from samddhi, are of increase, and not integral to the sense organism. They are both arisen from undifferentiated (i. e. , identical) primary elements.
In the same way that the mind which engenders these renouncings is a unity, the primary elements upon which the renouncings are based constitute a unity.
[II. Concerning the vijnapti. ]
The vijnapti is an outflowing; being bodily, it is integral to the
39 organism.
Does bodily vijnapti, by arising, destroy or not destroy the preexistent bodily figure which is retribution (vipdka)P The two hypotheses create difficulties. That it destroys it, is impossible; for it is
contrary to the principles of the Vaibhasikas that a rupa, retribution by nature, continues again, after having been interrupted (i. 37, trans, p. 103). If on the contrary, bodily vijnapti does not destroy the previous figure, two figures,--the first of retribution, the second of out- flowing,--would be found to coexist in one and the same spot.
We must admit that bodily vijiiapti arises deriving from new primary elements, outflowing in its nature, and that it does not destroy the previous figure.
If this is the case, the part by means of which a bodily vijnapti is produced would be greater than has existed previously, being pene- trated by new primary elements from whence this vijnapti derives. If the part has not been penetrated by these new elements, one could not say that the avijnapti is created by the whole part.
We could answer that the body--retribution in nature--presents
? some voids: thus place is found for the new primary elements, outflowing by nature, from whence the vijnapti derives.
We have said that action is of two types, cetana and cetanakrta, volition and action created by the volition; of three types, mental, bodily, vocal; of five types, cetana, bodily vijnapti, bodily avijnapti, vocal vijnapti, and vocal avijnapti.
40
[What are these action, good, bad, or neutral? To which realm of
existence (dhdtu), to which sphere (bhumi) do they belong? ] 7a. The avijnapti is never neutral.
It is either good or bad
In fact, neutral volition is weak; it is not capable of engendering a powerful action as is the avijnapti, which continues reproducing itself after its initial cause has disappeared
7b. Other action are of three types.
Other actions, namely volition and the vijnapti, can be good, bad, or neutral.
7b-c. Bad action exists in Kamadhatu.
Not in the other spheres, for, in the other spheres the three roots of evil (iv. 8c-d and v. 19), and non-shame and imprudence (ii. 26c-d), are missing.
The restriction of the stanza refers only to bad actions; hence good actions and neutral actions are in all of the Three Dhatus.
7c. Avijnapti also exists in Rupadhatu.
"Also" that is to say: in Kamadhatu as well as in Rupadhatu; not in Arupyadhatu, for the primary elements are missing there [from whence the avijnapti is derived (iv. 6b). ] Only where body and voice exist, do we find [the avijnapti which] is the discipline of the body and voice.
Objection. There are no pure primary elements and yet there is a pure avijnapti. Pwe avijnapti derives from the primary elements of the sphere wherein the person arises who produces the pure avijnaptiln the. same way, when a person arisen in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu enters into an drupya absorption, he produces an avijnapti of
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? Arupyadhatu deriving from the primary elements of Kamadhatu or Rupadhatu.
The case is not the same, for the pure avijnapti transcends the spheres; it has nothing in common with the defilements of the sphere where the person who has produced it is found; it is neither of the same type, nor of a different type through rapport with the primary elements of the sphere. On the contrary, an avijnapti of Arupyadhatu cannot derive from the primary elements, of a different type, of Kamadhatu or Rupadhatu.
Further, turning away from all rupa--since any idea of rupa is absent in it--an drupya absorption is not capable of producing an avijnapti, which is rupa.
The Vaibha? ikas say: Morality exists in opposition to immorality. Immorality is of the sphere of Kamadhatu; morality, consisting of avijnapti, of the realm of Rupadhatu is opposed to it. But the arupyas are removed from Kamadhatu by the four estrangements of dsraya,
prakara, ddlambana, pratipaksa (ii. 67; Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 495c23). 7d. Vijnapti exists in the two spheres where there is vicara.
There is vijnapti, bodily and a vocal action, only in the spheres of
41
"Also," in the spheres where there is no vicara, and "also" in Kamadhatu. ]
Such vijnapti does not exist in Kamadhatu, [where all defiled vijnapti is bad, not neutral. ]
This means that vijnapti of the anivrtavydkrta class exists only in the world of Brahma. It is reported that Mahabrahma produced a false vocal action: in his assembly Mahabrahma boasted falsely, in order to
42 avoid the inquires of the venerable Asvajit.
***
But if vocal avijnapti is absent above the First Dhyana, how can sound (sabdayatana) exist in the Second Dhyana and above?
Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana, where there'isvicara (i. 32c, viii 7). 8a. The vijnapti termed nivrta is also missing in Kamadhatu.
{Nivrta signifies nivrta-avyakrta (ii. 66), defiled but neutral.
? It exists there, but it has for its cause the external primary elements:
43 sound caused by the wind, etc. (i. lOb).
Other masters say: Vijnapti exists in the Second Dhyana and in the
following Dhyanas; it is there in the anivrtdvydkrta class, undefiled-
neutral, not good, but not defiled. In fact the beings who are born in
these Dhyanas do not call forth a good or defiled mind of a lower sphere,
by which mind they would be able to produce a good or defiled
Brahma? Why is the vijnapti of the defiled-neutral class absent in Kamadhatu?
8b. Because the cause which produces it is absent.
i. It is the mind associated with vitarka and vicara which gives rise to the vijnapti: such a mind is absent in the Second Dhyana and above. (iv. 7d).
ii. The nivrtavydkrta mind gives rise to a vijnapti of the same characteristics, since this mind belongs to the class "to be abandoned through Mediation. " (See p. 575 and foil. )
[In Kamadhatu, only the nivrtavydkrta mind is the mind associated with satkdyadrsti and with antagrdhadrsti,'] Thus, it does not give rise to vijnapti (ii. 67, v. 12).
***
Is it solely by reason of the nature of the mind which gives rise (samutthapaka) to them--good or bad nature--that the dharmas are good or bad?
The dharmas are good or bad in four ways: absolutely (param- arthatas), in and of themselves (svabhavatas), through association
46 (samprayOgatas), and through their original cause (samutthanatas).
8b-c. Deliverance is absolute good
Nirvana, being the cessation of all suffering, is perfectly tranquil-
47
and-happy; hence it is absolute good. Comparison: like the absence of
vijnapti. For the good mind of a lower sphere is of an inferior order; and 44
the defiled mind has been abandoned.
But [the Vaibhasikas] defend the first opinion.
Why is the vijnapti, whatever it may be, absent above the world of
45
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sickness (Majjhima, i. 510).
8c-d The roots, respect and fear, are good in and of them-
48 selves.
The three roots of good, respect and fear (and lack of greed) (ii. 25), independent of their associations and of their causes, are good in and of themselves. Comparison: like a salutary medicine.
9a. That which is associated [with the roots, etc,] is good through association.
The dharmas, volitions, and mental states, which are associated with the roots of good, with respect, and with fear, are good by association. Associated with these principles, they are good; not associated with these principles, they are not good. Comparison: like a drink wherein one has mixed a salutary medicine.
9b. Actions, etc are good by reason of their original cause. Having their origin in dharmas good in and of themselves or good
through association, bodily aaion, vocal aaion, [the laksanas,] praptis, 49
nirodhasamdpatti, asamjnisamdpatti (ii. 35 and foil. ), are good by reason of their original cause. Comparison: like the milk of a cow which has drunk a drink mixed with a salutary medicine.
How can praptis be good when they have their origin in a mind
50
which is not good?
9c Evil is the contrary.
The contrary of good is as shall now be taught:
1. Samsdra--or existence--has for its nature the process of all
suffering: it is thus perfealy unhappy, and so absolute evil
2. The roots of evil, the absence of shame and imprudence (ii. 26c-d)
are bad in themselves.
3. The dharmas associated with these principles are bad in
themselves.
4. Having their origin in the roots, etc, and in the dharmas
associated with these roots, etc, bodily aaion, vocal aaion, their charaaeristics (arising, etc. ) and the praptis of the bad dharmas, are bad by reason of their original cause.
? Comparison: sickness, unhealthy drugs, etc.
But, one would say, everything that is impure is integral to samsdra: hence can nothing which is impure be good or neutral?
From the absolute point of view, this is true. But putting oneself in the point of view of retribution, the impure dharma which is not defined as to how it should be retributed is called undefined, or neutral (ii. 54), and the impure dharma which produces an agreeable retribu- tion, is called good
What is absolutely neutral?
9d.
Two entities are neutral in the absolute sense.
The two unconditioned things (asamskrta, i. 5), namely space and apratisamkhydnirodha, are, without ambiguity, neutral.
A difficulty. The Vaibhasikas teach that aaion, bodily or vocal, is good or bad by reason of its original cause, [namely a good or bad volition. ]The same rule should apply to the primary elements which constitute bodily or vocal aaion (iv. 2b, 3d).
No, answer the Vaibhasikas, for the intention of the agent corresponds to the aaion, not to the primary elements: [he wants to create a certain aaion, not any primary elements. ]
But, we should say, how will the avijnapti produced by absorption (iv. 6c-d) be good? The agent, entered into absorption, does not have any intention with regard to the avijnapti and so does not think, "Let us create an avijnaptiV We cannot admit that the avijnapti produced by the absorption has its origin in a non-absorbed mind which proceeds from the absorption, for this mind is of another class. Thus the avijnapti produced by the absorption is not good; or rather, if the Vaibhasikas maintain that it is good, they should consider as good the divine eye and the divine ear which they regard as neutral (ii. 72a, trans, p. 315, vii. 45).
There is a difficulty here that the Vaibhasikas should resolve.
It has been said above (iv. 8b) that the mind susceptible of being abandonedthroughSeeingdoesnotgiverisetovijnaptiYettheBlessed One said, "From bad views there proceeds bad resolution, bad speech, bad aaion, bad livelihood. " Now bad views are abandoned through Seeing (v. 4).
This Sutra does not contradia this theory. In faa
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10a-b. That which gives rise (samutthana) is of two types, which 1
are known as hetusamutthana and tatksanasamutthana^
Samutthana is that through which the action arises. What is both cause (hetu) and samutthana is hetusamutthana. What is samutthana at the very moment of the action is tatksanasamutthana.
lOc-d. Which are respectively first setter into motion and second mover.
The hetusamutthana projects, that is to say, produces. It is thus promoter. The tatksanasamutthana is second mover because it is contemporary to the action (see above, p. 568).
But what is [with regard to the action {vijnapti)] the efficacy done by the tatksanasamutthana which makes it the second mover?
If the tatksanasamutthana is absent, the action will not take place, even if it was projected [by the agent; as, for example, the action does not take place when the one who has projected an action ("I shall go to the village") dies. ]
[But if the vijnapti does not take place in the absence of the second mover,] how is there vijnapti for a person free from a mind which
53
undertakes the discipline? (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 586a8).
[One will then have recourse to another explanation. ] The vijnapti is clearer in him who is endowed with the mind, which is at the moment of the vijnapti, the "second mover" mind. Such is the efficacy of this mind.
lla-b. The consciousness to be abandoned through Seeing is solely agent.
The mind which is abandoned through Seeing is alone the agent of the vijnapti, because it is the cause of the mental process {vitarka and vicara) which gives rise to the vijnapti It is not the second mover 1. ) because it no longer exists at the moment when the vijnapti takes place: this latter is put into motion by a thought "turned inward," [to be abandoned through Meditation, which is the second mover;] 2. ) because, to suppose that it is a second mover, it would then follow that the rupa (that is, the vijnapti) created by it would also be abandoned by
? this Seeing; [in the same way that the vijnapti created by a thought abandoned through Mediation is itself to be abandoned through Meditation. ] And this hypothesis is in contradiction to the Abhidharma (i. 40c-d).
In fact, rupa (-vijnapti) is not contradicted either by vidya (correct knowledge), or by avidya (error, ignorance): hence it cannot be
54 abandoned by means of Seeing the Truths.
[The Sautrantikas would answer that this affirmation, "Rupa is not contradiaed by vidya,"] should be proved. For he who maintains the thesis of the abandoning of rtipa through Seeing would not admit that rupa is not contradiaed by vidya.
[The Vaibhasikas say: If the rupa (-vijnapti) which has its origin in a thought to be abandoned through Seeing is, itself also, to be abandoned through Seeing, then the primary elements which serve as a substrate (dsraya) to this rupa, to this vijnapti, will be, themselves also, abandoned through Seeing, for they take their origin from the same thought. But this is inadmissible, for these primary elements belong to the class of undefiled-neutral dharmas, and everything that is to be abandoned through Seeing is defiled (klista, ii. 40c-d). ]
We deny this consequence. In faa, the primary elements in question are not good or bad by reason of the thought which gives rise to them, whereas this is the case for the vijnapti (iv. 9d). Or rather, we admit this consequence; the primary elements in question are abandoned through Seeing.
[The Vaibhasikas repeat that] this is impossible. The primary elements cannot be abandoned through Seeing; they are no longer not-to-be-abandoned. For the undefiled dharma is not contradiaed either by vidya or by avidya.
[In faa, the undefiled dharma, either of the anivrtdvyakrta, undefiled-neutral class, or of the kuScdasdsrava, good-impure class, is not contradiaed by vidya, that is to say through the pure (andsrava) Path, as is the case for the defiled dharma which perishes by the faa that its prdpti is cut off by this said Path. . .
Hence the Sutra quoted above (p. 575, line 32) does not invalidate our thesis: "The thought susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing
ff
does not give rise to vijnapti, for this Sutra refers to false views
Karma yjl
? considered as agent. (Vibfodsd, TD 27, p. 610c22)
llb-c The manas susceptible of being abandoned through
Meditation is twofold
The mental consciousness of the bhavanaheya category is at one and 55
the same time both agent and mover. lid. The five are solely mover.
The five vijndnakdyas, [visual consciousness, etc. ,] are solely mover,
56
[being free from reflexion (vikdpa, i. 33)]
There are thus four cases:
i. The mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing is
exclusively agent.
ii. The five sense consciousnesses are exclusively mover.
iii. The mental consciousness susceptible of being abandoned
through Meditation is both promoter and mover.
iv. The pure mind is neither promoter nor mover.
***
Is the "mover" of the same [nature--good, bad, neutral--] as the agent?
There is no rule on this subject:
12a-b. From a good agent, etc. , a mover of three types.
A good, bad, or neutral mover can come from a good agent. The same for a bad or neutral agent.
58 12c With regard to the Muni, mover of the same type.
With regard to the Buddha the Blessed One, the mover is of the same species as the agent: from a good mover, a good mover; from a neutral agent, a neutral mover.
12c Or good
Or rather, it happens that a good mover comes out of a neutral
agent, whereas a neutral mover never comes out of a good agent: the
59 teaching of the Buddhas is not subject to diminutioa
(Vibfodsd, TD 27, p. 6l0a6)
57
? 60
According to other Schools, the mind of the Buddhas is never
neutral: they are always in absorption; their mental series is exclusively a series of good thoughts. This is why the Sutra says, "The Naga is absorbed when he walks, when he stands still, when he dreams, and when he is seated"
The Vaibhasikas say: The Sutra expresses itself in this manner because the mind of the Blessed One does not disperse itself towards objects without his wishing it. [The Blessed One is always absorbed in the sense that memory is always present in him: walking, he knows that he walks. ]But this is not to say that the Blessed One is exempt from neutral dharmas: dharmas of retribution (vipdkaja), dharmas related to attitudes (irydpatha), a mind capable of creating fictive beings (nir- mdnacitta) (ii. 66).
We have seen that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation is at one and the same time agent and mover, and can be good, bad, or neutral
61 12d That which arises from retribution is neither of the two.
The mind that has arisen from retribution (vipdkaja, i. 36, ii. 60, iv. 85), is produced without effort, spontaneously, [and so is neither agent nor mover. ]
Is the vijnapti good, bad, or neutral, 1. ) according to the character- istics of the agent, or 2. ) according to the characteristic of its mover?
To what does this question lead?
i. First hypothesis. The two wrong views,--personalism, and past- and-future-of-the-personality--are the agent (iv. lla-b); they are of the defiled-neutral class. [If the vijnapti to which they give rise follows their nature, one will then have, in Kamadhatu, a defiled-neutral action: and you regard this consequence as inadmissible (iv. 8b). ]If you maintain your opinion with regard to this point, you must then admit, [contrary to your thesis, (iv. Ua-b)] that all thoughts susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing are not agents: whereas satkayadrsti and the antdgrdhadrsti are not agents, the other wrong views are agents.
Second hypothesis. The vijnapti through which a person under- takes theJPratimoksa discipline will not be good, if this person, while he is receiving the ordination, has a bad or neutral mind
ii. The Vaibhasikas answer. The vijnapti is of the same nature as its
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agent when this latter is of a mind susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation. It is not of the same nature as its agent when this latter is of a mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing, for example, the thought "the soul exists," for, in this case, another agent arises between the promoter and the action (vijnapti), a thought susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation, turned inward, accompanied by victim and by vitarka, through which, for example, one preaches the existence of a soul. The first agent is neutral; the second is bad; the action is bad From the agent susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing, there arises an agent susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation and which is good, bad, or neutral; from this second agent, there arises an action (vijriapti) of the same nature.
iii. But if the action (vijnapti) is not good, bad, or neutral by reason of the mover, the explanation that you have given (iv. lOa-b) of the Sutra does not hold You have said in effect that the Sutra considers a "wrong view" (drsti) as agent and that, as a consequence, by affirming that a wrong view is the generator of vijnapti, the Sutra contradias neither the principle that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing does not engender vijnapti, nor its corollary that, in Kamadhatu, there is no vijnapti of the defiled-neutral class. One must say that the Sutra considers a wrong view as an agent to which there follows, separating it from the action (vijnapti), another agent which is susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation.
This is enough on this point which has been defined above ( i l l , iv. 3d).
13a-b. Avijnapti is threefold, discipline {samvara), un-discipline (asamvara), and different from either discipline or un-discipline.
It is of three types, 1. ) samvara, discipline, so called because it constrains thefluxof immorality, because it destroys or arrests the flux of immorality; 2. ) asamvara, the opposite of discipline, un-discipline (iv. 24c-d), and 3. ) naivasamvaranasamvara, [an avijnapti which has neither the characteristic of samvara nor asamvara. ]
13c-d Pratimoksa discipline, pure discipline, discipline arising from dhytina.
There are three types of discipline: 1. ) the discipline called
? Pratimoksa: this is the morality of the sphere of Kamadhatu, the morality of beings of this world; 2. ) the discipline produced through dhyana is morality of the sphere of Rupadhatu; and 3. ) pure discipline, which arises from the Path, pure morality.
[Chinese: What is the difference in the characteristics of the first two disciplines? ]
14a. The Pratimoksa is of eight types.
It includes the discipline of the Bhiksu, the Bhiksuni, the Sik-
62
samana, the Sramanera (novice), the Sramanerika, the Upasaka
(pious layman, iv. 30), the Upasika, and the Upavasastha ("faster," iv. 28). These eight disciplines are the Pratimoksa disciplines: thus, from the point of view of the names given to them, the discipline of the Pratimoksa is of eight types.
14b. In substance however, the Pratimoksa is of four types.
Four types that present distinct characteristics: the discipline of the Bhiksu, the Sramanera, the Upasaka and the Upavasastha.
In fact, the discipline of the Bhiksuni does not differ, does not exist separately from the discipline of the Bhiksu; the discipline of the Siksamana and the Sramanerika do not differ from the discipline of the Sramanera; and the discipline of the Upasika does not differ from that of the Upasaka.
14c. The name changes with the gender.
Unga is vyanjana, that which distinguishes men and women. It is by reason of gender that the names, Bhiksu, Bhiksuni, etc. , differ.
When their gender is modified, the Bhiksu becomes a Bhiksuni; the Bhiksuni, a Bhiksu; the Sramanera, a Sramanerika; the Sramanerika, like the Siksamana, becomes a Sramanera; the Upasaka, an Upasika; and the Upasika, an Upasaka. Now one cannot admit that a person, by changing his gender, abandons the former discipline and acquires a new
63
one; the change of gender cannot have this influence. Thus the four
female disciplines are indentical with the three male disciplines.
***
Karma 581
? When the disciplines are undertaken successively,--Le. , the dis- cipline of the Upasaka with its five precepts, the discipline of the Sramanera with its ten precepts, and the discipline of the Bhiksu with its two hundred and fifty precepts,--do these disciplines differ solely through the successive additions of new precepts (virati, renouncings), as the numbers five, ten, twenty differ, as one coin and two coins differ? Or rather do these disciplines, produced all of a piece, exist separately one from the other?
I4d [The disciplines exist] separately.
They are not mixed, for in the parts that are common to them all--Upasakas, Sramaneras and Bhiksus all renounce (virati) killing, stealing, illicit sexuality, lying, intoxicating liquors--the three dis- ciplines have some distinct characteristics.
Their differencs lie in the difference of the occasions (nidana) of
transgression. In fact, the person who undertakes the observation of a
greater number of rules, avoids by this action itself a greater number of
occasions of intoxication-pride (mada, ii. 33c-d) and of non-diligence
(pramadasthana, ii. 26a); he avoids, by this action, a greater number of
64
occasions of transgression, killing, etc
of renouncings are not identical with one another. If it were otherwise, that is, if the disciplines of Upasaka and Sramanera were integral to the discipline of a Bhiksu, then the Bhiksu who renounces the discipline of a Bhiksu would renounce at the same time all three disciplines: a thesis that is not admitted. Hence the disciplines exist separately.
I4d. But they do not contradict one another.
They can coexist: by undertaking the following disciplines, one does
65
not abandon the preceeding ones. Thus the fact that a Bhiksu who
renounces his quality of Bhiksu remains in possession of the discipline of Upasaka and Sramanera is explained. **
***
How does one become an Upasaka, an Upavasastha, a Sramanera, or a Bhiksu?
Consequently the three series
? 15. By undertaking the renouncing of the five things to avoid, of
the eight, the ten, of all the things to avoid, one obtains the
67 quality of Upasaka, Upavasastha, Sramanera, and Bhiksu.
1. By undertaking the renouncing of five items: 1. murder, 2. stealing, 3. illicit sexuality, 4. lying, and 5. intoxicating liquors, one places himself in the discipline of an Upasaka.
2. By undertaking the renouncing of eight items: 1. killing, 2.
stealing, 3. unchastity,4. lying, 5. intoxicating liquors, 6. scents,garlands,
68
and unguents; dances, songs, music; 7. high beds, broad beds, and 8.
meals at forbidden times, one places himself in the discipline of an Upavasastha.
3. By undertaking the renouncing of these same items and, further, gold and silver, which make ten, one places himself in the discipline of a Sramanera. These make ten items, for one counts "scents, garlands, and unguents"separately from "dances, songs, and music"
4. By undertaking the renouncing of all the actions of the body and the voice which should be avoided, one is a Bhiksu.
***
The Pratimoksa discipline is
I6a-b. Morality, good conduct, action and discipline.
Without doubt, the part (correct speech, etc. ) is not a "thing"
? (dravya), being only abstention: but these are not the only real and distina things which constitute the dharmas; there are for example, the
34
eight worldly dharmas; possession and non-possession; glory and
non-glory; praise and blame; pleasure and suffering. Non-possession of clothes, of food, etc. , is not a thing. (Anguttara, iv. 157, Digha, iii. 260) 7. If the avijnapti does not exist, say the Vaibhasikas, the Pratimoksa
discipline would disappear.
One refutes this objection according to the same principles, by
making a state out of the force of the intention. Discipline is volition which, after it has been translated into the positive action (vidhi) of abstaining from transgression, into the pledge of no longer committing transgression, arrests bad actions and disciplines the body and the voice: the Pratimoksa discipline should be understood in this manner.
The Vaibhasikas object that, if the Pratimoksa discipline is volition, the monk who thinks a thought other than this thought of volition would cease being "disciplined," for he does not then possess the volition which disciplines.
This objection is worthless. In fact, the mental series is perfumed in such a way that, when a thought of transgression starts to appear, the memory of the vow undertaken also appears: the volition of abstention is then found to be present.
8. And this volition has the characteristic of a dike. When one is obliged not to commit transgression, one remembers this obligation, shame (hrt, ii. 32) is present, and one constrains oneself in such a manner that one does not violate morality.
In your system, on the contrary, if immorality is dammed up by an avijnapti independent of memory, then even a person who has a faulty memory would not be able to commit a transgression, since the avijnapti is always there.
Let us stop this discussion here. The Vaibhasikas say that there exists a certain substantial thing (dravya), sui generis, which is avijnaptirupa.
We have seen (i. llb) that the avijnapti arises dependent (upaddya) on the primary elements: the question is then posed whether it derives from the same primary elements which are the support of the vijnapti, that is, the primary elements of the body through which the action termed vijnapti (iv. p. 3,33) is accomplished; or if it derives from other
Karma 567
? 35 primary elements.
The avijnapti derives from primary elements different from those
which serve as the support for the vijnapti: for it is impossible that one
and the same complex of four primary elements would produce both a
subtle, derived rupa,--the avijnapti--, and at the same time a gross, 36
***
The vijnapti is simultaneous to the primary elements from whence it derives; is such also the case for the avijnapti?
The general rule is that all derived rupa is simultaneous to its primary elements. But certain derived rupa,--of the present and the future,--derive from past primary elements:
4c-d. From the first moment, the avijnapti of Kamadhatu arises derived from past primary elements.
The moment the avijnapti arises, it arises derived from primary elements simultaneous to its arising. From this first moment on, avijnapti of the sphere of Kamadhatu--in opposition to the avijnapti arisen from the dhyana, and pure avijnapti (p. 32)--arises, that is, it continues to be reborn, being derived (upadaya) from the same primary elements of the first moment, which are now past: these past primary elements constitute, from the second moment onward, the support of the avijnapti, for they are the cause of its pravrtti, they are its projecting cause; the primary elements simultaneous to each of the moments from the second moment onward are the support of the avijnapti, for they are the cause of its anuvrtti, they are its supporting cause. In the same way, the hand that has hurled the wheel and the ground that the supports the wheel, are the causes, respectively, of the pravrtti and the anuvrtti of the movement of the wheel (see p. 576).
***
To which sphere,--Kamadhatu and the Four Dhyanas--do the primary elements belong, from whence the bodily and vocal aaions of the different spheres derive?
derived rupa, the vijnapti.
? 5a-b. When impure, bodily and vocal action derive from the primary elements of the sphere to which they belong.
Bodily and vocal actions of Kamadhatu derive from the primary, elements of Kamadhatu, and so on to the bodily and vocal actions of the Fourth Dhyana which derives from primary elements of the Fourth Dhyana.
5c. When they are pure, they are from the primary elements of the sphere to which the person who has produced them belongs.
When they are pure, bodily and vocal action derives from the primary elements of the sphere where the person who produces arises: for the pure dharmas are transcendent to the sphere of existence (Kamadhatu, etc. ); for there does not exist any pure primary elements from whence one could derive a pure action; for the pure bodily or vocal action arises by reason of the primary elements, and not only through the mind, since it is derived rupa (upaddyarupa) (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 723b29-c6)
***
What are the characteristics of these two actions, vijnapti and avijfiapti? What are the characteristics of the primary elements from whence they derive?
5d. The avijnapti is not integral to the organism; it is also an outflowing; it belongs solely to living beings. Not of absorption, it derives from the primary elements which are an outflowing, which are integral to the organism, which are differentiated
37
1. The avijnapti is a derived rupa exempt from mass (amurta),
nonextended (apratigha); thus it cannot be a support of the mind and of mental states; thus it is anupdtta, not integral to the sense organism (i. 34c). The avijnapti is never morally neutral (iv. 7a): hence it is not arisen from retribution (i. 37); it is not of increase (i. 36); it remains then
that it is an outflowing (i. 36), that is, produced by sabhagahetu (ii. 52). [The text says, "also of outflowing," because the avijnapti can be also ksanika (i. 38b): the first pure avijnapti is not an outflowing. ]
Karma 569
? 570 Chapter Four
2. Not absorbed or, in other words belonging to Kamadhatu, it 38
derives from primary elements which are an outflowing, and which are integral to the organism. These primary elements are differentiated, because each of the seven avijnaptis, the renouncing of killing, etc. , which form the Pratimoksa discipline, derive from a distina group of the four primary elements.
6. Arisen from absorption, it derives from non-differentiated primary elements, not integral to the organism, and increase.
3. Avijnapti which arises from samddhi, is divided into two types, that is, (avijnapti arisen from) absorption, and (avijnapti arisen from) pure discipline. These two both arise from samddhi, are of increase, and not integral to the sense organism. They are both arisen from undifferentiated (i. e. , identical) primary elements.
In the same way that the mind which engenders these renouncings is a unity, the primary elements upon which the renouncings are based constitute a unity.
[II. Concerning the vijnapti. ]
The vijnapti is an outflowing; being bodily, it is integral to the
39 organism.
Does bodily vijnapti, by arising, destroy or not destroy the preexistent bodily figure which is retribution (vipdka)P The two hypotheses create difficulties. That it destroys it, is impossible; for it is
contrary to the principles of the Vaibhasikas that a rupa, retribution by nature, continues again, after having been interrupted (i. 37, trans, p. 103). If on the contrary, bodily vijnapti does not destroy the previous figure, two figures,--the first of retribution, the second of out- flowing,--would be found to coexist in one and the same spot.
We must admit that bodily vijiiapti arises deriving from new primary elements, outflowing in its nature, and that it does not destroy the previous figure.
If this is the case, the part by means of which a bodily vijnapti is produced would be greater than has existed previously, being pene- trated by new primary elements from whence this vijnapti derives. If the part has not been penetrated by these new elements, one could not say that the avijnapti is created by the whole part.
We could answer that the body--retribution in nature--presents
? some voids: thus place is found for the new primary elements, outflowing by nature, from whence the vijnapti derives.
We have said that action is of two types, cetana and cetanakrta, volition and action created by the volition; of three types, mental, bodily, vocal; of five types, cetana, bodily vijnapti, bodily avijnapti, vocal vijnapti, and vocal avijnapti.
40
[What are these action, good, bad, or neutral? To which realm of
existence (dhdtu), to which sphere (bhumi) do they belong? ] 7a. The avijnapti is never neutral.
It is either good or bad
In fact, neutral volition is weak; it is not capable of engendering a powerful action as is the avijnapti, which continues reproducing itself after its initial cause has disappeared
7b. Other action are of three types.
Other actions, namely volition and the vijnapti, can be good, bad, or neutral.
7b-c. Bad action exists in Kamadhatu.
Not in the other spheres, for, in the other spheres the three roots of evil (iv. 8c-d and v. 19), and non-shame and imprudence (ii. 26c-d), are missing.
The restriction of the stanza refers only to bad actions; hence good actions and neutral actions are in all of the Three Dhatus.
7c. Avijnapti also exists in Rupadhatu.
"Also" that is to say: in Kamadhatu as well as in Rupadhatu; not in Arupyadhatu, for the primary elements are missing there [from whence the avijnapti is derived (iv. 6b). ] Only where body and voice exist, do we find [the avijnapti which] is the discipline of the body and voice.
Objection. There are no pure primary elements and yet there is a pure avijnapti. Pwe avijnapti derives from the primary elements of the sphere wherein the person arises who produces the pure avijnaptiln the. same way, when a person arisen in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu enters into an drupya absorption, he produces an avijnapti of
Karma 571
? Arupyadhatu deriving from the primary elements of Kamadhatu or Rupadhatu.
The case is not the same, for the pure avijnapti transcends the spheres; it has nothing in common with the defilements of the sphere where the person who has produced it is found; it is neither of the same type, nor of a different type through rapport with the primary elements of the sphere. On the contrary, an avijnapti of Arupyadhatu cannot derive from the primary elements, of a different type, of Kamadhatu or Rupadhatu.
Further, turning away from all rupa--since any idea of rupa is absent in it--an drupya absorption is not capable of producing an avijnapti, which is rupa.
The Vaibha? ikas say: Morality exists in opposition to immorality. Immorality is of the sphere of Kamadhatu; morality, consisting of avijnapti, of the realm of Rupadhatu is opposed to it. But the arupyas are removed from Kamadhatu by the four estrangements of dsraya,
prakara, ddlambana, pratipaksa (ii. 67; Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 495c23). 7d. Vijnapti exists in the two spheres where there is vicara.
There is vijnapti, bodily and a vocal action, only in the spheres of
41
"Also," in the spheres where there is no vicara, and "also" in Kamadhatu. ]
Such vijnapti does not exist in Kamadhatu, [where all defiled vijnapti is bad, not neutral. ]
This means that vijnapti of the anivrtavydkrta class exists only in the world of Brahma. It is reported that Mahabrahma produced a false vocal action: in his assembly Mahabrahma boasted falsely, in order to
42 avoid the inquires of the venerable Asvajit.
***
But if vocal avijnapti is absent above the First Dhyana, how can sound (sabdayatana) exist in the Second Dhyana and above?
Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana, where there'isvicara (i. 32c, viii 7). 8a. The vijnapti termed nivrta is also missing in Kamadhatu.
{Nivrta signifies nivrta-avyakrta (ii. 66), defiled but neutral.
? It exists there, but it has for its cause the external primary elements:
43 sound caused by the wind, etc. (i. lOb).
Other masters say: Vijnapti exists in the Second Dhyana and in the
following Dhyanas; it is there in the anivrtdvydkrta class, undefiled-
neutral, not good, but not defiled. In fact the beings who are born in
these Dhyanas do not call forth a good or defiled mind of a lower sphere,
by which mind they would be able to produce a good or defiled
Brahma? Why is the vijnapti of the defiled-neutral class absent in Kamadhatu?
8b. Because the cause which produces it is absent.
i. It is the mind associated with vitarka and vicara which gives rise to the vijnapti: such a mind is absent in the Second Dhyana and above. (iv. 7d).
ii. The nivrtavydkrta mind gives rise to a vijnapti of the same characteristics, since this mind belongs to the class "to be abandoned through Mediation. " (See p. 575 and foil. )
[In Kamadhatu, only the nivrtavydkrta mind is the mind associated with satkdyadrsti and with antagrdhadrsti,'] Thus, it does not give rise to vijnapti (ii. 67, v. 12).
***
Is it solely by reason of the nature of the mind which gives rise (samutthapaka) to them--good or bad nature--that the dharmas are good or bad?
The dharmas are good or bad in four ways: absolutely (param- arthatas), in and of themselves (svabhavatas), through association
46 (samprayOgatas), and through their original cause (samutthanatas).
8b-c. Deliverance is absolute good
Nirvana, being the cessation of all suffering, is perfectly tranquil-
47
and-happy; hence it is absolute good. Comparison: like the absence of
vijnapti. For the good mind of a lower sphere is of an inferior order; and 44
the defiled mind has been abandoned.
But [the Vaibhasikas] defend the first opinion.
Why is the vijnapti, whatever it may be, absent above the world of
45
Karma 573
? Chapter Four ________ .
sickness (Majjhima, i. 510).
8c-d The roots, respect and fear, are good in and of them-
48 selves.
The three roots of good, respect and fear (and lack of greed) (ii. 25), independent of their associations and of their causes, are good in and of themselves. Comparison: like a salutary medicine.
9a. That which is associated [with the roots, etc,] is good through association.
The dharmas, volitions, and mental states, which are associated with the roots of good, with respect, and with fear, are good by association. Associated with these principles, they are good; not associated with these principles, they are not good. Comparison: like a drink wherein one has mixed a salutary medicine.
9b. Actions, etc are good by reason of their original cause. Having their origin in dharmas good in and of themselves or good
through association, bodily aaion, vocal aaion, [the laksanas,] praptis, 49
nirodhasamdpatti, asamjnisamdpatti (ii. 35 and foil. ), are good by reason of their original cause. Comparison: like the milk of a cow which has drunk a drink mixed with a salutary medicine.
How can praptis be good when they have their origin in a mind
50
which is not good?
9c Evil is the contrary.
The contrary of good is as shall now be taught:
1. Samsdra--or existence--has for its nature the process of all
suffering: it is thus perfealy unhappy, and so absolute evil
2. The roots of evil, the absence of shame and imprudence (ii. 26c-d)
are bad in themselves.
3. The dharmas associated with these principles are bad in
themselves.
4. Having their origin in the roots, etc, and in the dharmas
associated with these roots, etc, bodily aaion, vocal aaion, their charaaeristics (arising, etc. ) and the praptis of the bad dharmas, are bad by reason of their original cause.
? Comparison: sickness, unhealthy drugs, etc.
But, one would say, everything that is impure is integral to samsdra: hence can nothing which is impure be good or neutral?
From the absolute point of view, this is true. But putting oneself in the point of view of retribution, the impure dharma which is not defined as to how it should be retributed is called undefined, or neutral (ii. 54), and the impure dharma which produces an agreeable retribu- tion, is called good
What is absolutely neutral?
9d.
Two entities are neutral in the absolute sense.
The two unconditioned things (asamskrta, i. 5), namely space and apratisamkhydnirodha, are, without ambiguity, neutral.
A difficulty. The Vaibhasikas teach that aaion, bodily or vocal, is good or bad by reason of its original cause, [namely a good or bad volition. ]The same rule should apply to the primary elements which constitute bodily or vocal aaion (iv. 2b, 3d).
No, answer the Vaibhasikas, for the intention of the agent corresponds to the aaion, not to the primary elements: [he wants to create a certain aaion, not any primary elements. ]
But, we should say, how will the avijnapti produced by absorption (iv. 6c-d) be good? The agent, entered into absorption, does not have any intention with regard to the avijnapti and so does not think, "Let us create an avijnaptiV We cannot admit that the avijnapti produced by the absorption has its origin in a non-absorbed mind which proceeds from the absorption, for this mind is of another class. Thus the avijnapti produced by the absorption is not good; or rather, if the Vaibhasikas maintain that it is good, they should consider as good the divine eye and the divine ear which they regard as neutral (ii. 72a, trans, p. 315, vii. 45).
There is a difficulty here that the Vaibhasikas should resolve.
It has been said above (iv. 8b) that the mind susceptible of being abandonedthroughSeeingdoesnotgiverisetovijnaptiYettheBlessed One said, "From bad views there proceeds bad resolution, bad speech, bad aaion, bad livelihood. " Now bad views are abandoned through Seeing (v. 4).
This Sutra does not contradia this theory. In faa
51
Karma 575
? 576 Chapter Four
10a-b. That which gives rise (samutthana) is of two types, which 1
are known as hetusamutthana and tatksanasamutthana^
Samutthana is that through which the action arises. What is both cause (hetu) and samutthana is hetusamutthana. What is samutthana at the very moment of the action is tatksanasamutthana.
lOc-d. Which are respectively first setter into motion and second mover.
The hetusamutthana projects, that is to say, produces. It is thus promoter. The tatksanasamutthana is second mover because it is contemporary to the action (see above, p. 568).
But what is [with regard to the action {vijnapti)] the efficacy done by the tatksanasamutthana which makes it the second mover?
If the tatksanasamutthana is absent, the action will not take place, even if it was projected [by the agent; as, for example, the action does not take place when the one who has projected an action ("I shall go to the village") dies. ]
[But if the vijnapti does not take place in the absence of the second mover,] how is there vijnapti for a person free from a mind which
53
undertakes the discipline? (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 586a8).
[One will then have recourse to another explanation. ] The vijnapti is clearer in him who is endowed with the mind, which is at the moment of the vijnapti, the "second mover" mind. Such is the efficacy of this mind.
lla-b. The consciousness to be abandoned through Seeing is solely agent.
The mind which is abandoned through Seeing is alone the agent of the vijnapti, because it is the cause of the mental process {vitarka and vicara) which gives rise to the vijnapti It is not the second mover 1. ) because it no longer exists at the moment when the vijnapti takes place: this latter is put into motion by a thought "turned inward," [to be abandoned through Meditation, which is the second mover;] 2. ) because, to suppose that it is a second mover, it would then follow that the rupa (that is, the vijnapti) created by it would also be abandoned by
? this Seeing; [in the same way that the vijnapti created by a thought abandoned through Mediation is itself to be abandoned through Meditation. ] And this hypothesis is in contradiction to the Abhidharma (i. 40c-d).
In fact, rupa (-vijnapti) is not contradicted either by vidya (correct knowledge), or by avidya (error, ignorance): hence it cannot be
54 abandoned by means of Seeing the Truths.
[The Sautrantikas would answer that this affirmation, "Rupa is not contradiaed by vidya,"] should be proved. For he who maintains the thesis of the abandoning of rtipa through Seeing would not admit that rupa is not contradiaed by vidya.
[The Vaibhasikas say: If the rupa (-vijnapti) which has its origin in a thought to be abandoned through Seeing is, itself also, to be abandoned through Seeing, then the primary elements which serve as a substrate (dsraya) to this rupa, to this vijnapti, will be, themselves also, abandoned through Seeing, for they take their origin from the same thought. But this is inadmissible, for these primary elements belong to the class of undefiled-neutral dharmas, and everything that is to be abandoned through Seeing is defiled (klista, ii. 40c-d). ]
We deny this consequence. In faa, the primary elements in question are not good or bad by reason of the thought which gives rise to them, whereas this is the case for the vijnapti (iv. 9d). Or rather, we admit this consequence; the primary elements in question are abandoned through Seeing.
[The Vaibhasikas repeat that] this is impossible. The primary elements cannot be abandoned through Seeing; they are no longer not-to-be-abandoned. For the undefiled dharma is not contradiaed either by vidya or by avidya.
[In faa, the undefiled dharma, either of the anivrtdvyakrta, undefiled-neutral class, or of the kuScdasdsrava, good-impure class, is not contradiaed by vidya, that is to say through the pure (andsrava) Path, as is the case for the defiled dharma which perishes by the faa that its prdpti is cut off by this said Path. . .
Hence the Sutra quoted above (p. 575, line 32) does not invalidate our thesis: "The thought susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing
ff
does not give rise to vijnapti, for this Sutra refers to false views
Karma yjl
? considered as agent. (Vibfodsd, TD 27, p. 610c22)
llb-c The manas susceptible of being abandoned through
Meditation is twofold
The mental consciousness of the bhavanaheya category is at one and 55
the same time both agent and mover. lid. The five are solely mover.
The five vijndnakdyas, [visual consciousness, etc. ,] are solely mover,
56
[being free from reflexion (vikdpa, i. 33)]
There are thus four cases:
i. The mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing is
exclusively agent.
ii. The five sense consciousnesses are exclusively mover.
iii. The mental consciousness susceptible of being abandoned
through Meditation is both promoter and mover.
iv. The pure mind is neither promoter nor mover.
***
Is the "mover" of the same [nature--good, bad, neutral--] as the agent?
There is no rule on this subject:
12a-b. From a good agent, etc. , a mover of three types.
A good, bad, or neutral mover can come from a good agent. The same for a bad or neutral agent.
58 12c With regard to the Muni, mover of the same type.
With regard to the Buddha the Blessed One, the mover is of the same species as the agent: from a good mover, a good mover; from a neutral agent, a neutral mover.
12c Or good
Or rather, it happens that a good mover comes out of a neutral
agent, whereas a neutral mover never comes out of a good agent: the
59 teaching of the Buddhas is not subject to diminutioa
(Vibfodsd, TD 27, p. 6l0a6)
57
? 60
According to other Schools, the mind of the Buddhas is never
neutral: they are always in absorption; their mental series is exclusively a series of good thoughts. This is why the Sutra says, "The Naga is absorbed when he walks, when he stands still, when he dreams, and when he is seated"
The Vaibhasikas say: The Sutra expresses itself in this manner because the mind of the Blessed One does not disperse itself towards objects without his wishing it. [The Blessed One is always absorbed in the sense that memory is always present in him: walking, he knows that he walks. ]But this is not to say that the Blessed One is exempt from neutral dharmas: dharmas of retribution (vipdkaja), dharmas related to attitudes (irydpatha), a mind capable of creating fictive beings (nir- mdnacitta) (ii. 66).
We have seen that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation is at one and the same time agent and mover, and can be good, bad, or neutral
61 12d That which arises from retribution is neither of the two.
The mind that has arisen from retribution (vipdkaja, i. 36, ii. 60, iv. 85), is produced without effort, spontaneously, [and so is neither agent nor mover. ]
Is the vijnapti good, bad, or neutral, 1. ) according to the character- istics of the agent, or 2. ) according to the characteristic of its mover?
To what does this question lead?
i. First hypothesis. The two wrong views,--personalism, and past- and-future-of-the-personality--are the agent (iv. lla-b); they are of the defiled-neutral class. [If the vijnapti to which they give rise follows their nature, one will then have, in Kamadhatu, a defiled-neutral action: and you regard this consequence as inadmissible (iv. 8b). ]If you maintain your opinion with regard to this point, you must then admit, [contrary to your thesis, (iv. Ua-b)] that all thoughts susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing are not agents: whereas satkayadrsti and the antdgrdhadrsti are not agents, the other wrong views are agents.
Second hypothesis. The vijnapti through which a person under- takes theJPratimoksa discipline will not be good, if this person, while he is receiving the ordination, has a bad or neutral mind
ii. The Vaibhasikas answer. The vijnapti is of the same nature as its
Karma 579
? $80 Chapter Four
agent when this latter is of a mind susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation. It is not of the same nature as its agent when this latter is of a mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing, for example, the thought "the soul exists," for, in this case, another agent arises between the promoter and the action (vijnapti), a thought susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation, turned inward, accompanied by victim and by vitarka, through which, for example, one preaches the existence of a soul. The first agent is neutral; the second is bad; the action is bad From the agent susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing, there arises an agent susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation and which is good, bad, or neutral; from this second agent, there arises an action (vijriapti) of the same nature.
iii. But if the action (vijnapti) is not good, bad, or neutral by reason of the mover, the explanation that you have given (iv. lOa-b) of the Sutra does not hold You have said in effect that the Sutra considers a "wrong view" (drsti) as agent and that, as a consequence, by affirming that a wrong view is the generator of vijnapti, the Sutra contradias neither the principle that the mind susceptible of being abandoned through Seeing does not engender vijnapti, nor its corollary that, in Kamadhatu, there is no vijnapti of the defiled-neutral class. One must say that the Sutra considers a wrong view as an agent to which there follows, separating it from the action (vijnapti), another agent which is susceptible of being abandoned through Meditation.
This is enough on this point which has been defined above ( i l l , iv. 3d).
13a-b. Avijnapti is threefold, discipline {samvara), un-discipline (asamvara), and different from either discipline or un-discipline.
It is of three types, 1. ) samvara, discipline, so called because it constrains thefluxof immorality, because it destroys or arrests the flux of immorality; 2. ) asamvara, the opposite of discipline, un-discipline (iv. 24c-d), and 3. ) naivasamvaranasamvara, [an avijnapti which has neither the characteristic of samvara nor asamvara. ]
13c-d Pratimoksa discipline, pure discipline, discipline arising from dhytina.
There are three types of discipline: 1. ) the discipline called
? Pratimoksa: this is the morality of the sphere of Kamadhatu, the morality of beings of this world; 2. ) the discipline produced through dhyana is morality of the sphere of Rupadhatu; and 3. ) pure discipline, which arises from the Path, pure morality.
[Chinese: What is the difference in the characteristics of the first two disciplines? ]
14a. The Pratimoksa is of eight types.
It includes the discipline of the Bhiksu, the Bhiksuni, the Sik-
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samana, the Sramanera (novice), the Sramanerika, the Upasaka
(pious layman, iv. 30), the Upasika, and the Upavasastha ("faster," iv. 28). These eight disciplines are the Pratimoksa disciplines: thus, from the point of view of the names given to them, the discipline of the Pratimoksa is of eight types.
14b. In substance however, the Pratimoksa is of four types.
Four types that present distinct characteristics: the discipline of the Bhiksu, the Sramanera, the Upasaka and the Upavasastha.
In fact, the discipline of the Bhiksuni does not differ, does not exist separately from the discipline of the Bhiksu; the discipline of the Siksamana and the Sramanerika do not differ from the discipline of the Sramanera; and the discipline of the Upasika does not differ from that of the Upasaka.
14c. The name changes with the gender.
Unga is vyanjana, that which distinguishes men and women. It is by reason of gender that the names, Bhiksu, Bhiksuni, etc. , differ.
When their gender is modified, the Bhiksu becomes a Bhiksuni; the Bhiksuni, a Bhiksu; the Sramanera, a Sramanerika; the Sramanerika, like the Siksamana, becomes a Sramanera; the Upasaka, an Upasika; and the Upasika, an Upasaka. Now one cannot admit that a person, by changing his gender, abandons the former discipline and acquires a new
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one; the change of gender cannot have this influence. Thus the four
female disciplines are indentical with the three male disciplines.
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Karma 581
? When the disciplines are undertaken successively,--Le. , the dis- cipline of the Upasaka with its five precepts, the discipline of the Sramanera with its ten precepts, and the discipline of the Bhiksu with its two hundred and fifty precepts,--do these disciplines differ solely through the successive additions of new precepts (virati, renouncings), as the numbers five, ten, twenty differ, as one coin and two coins differ? Or rather do these disciplines, produced all of a piece, exist separately one from the other?
I4d [The disciplines exist] separately.
They are not mixed, for in the parts that are common to them all--Upasakas, Sramaneras and Bhiksus all renounce (virati) killing, stealing, illicit sexuality, lying, intoxicating liquors--the three dis- ciplines have some distinct characteristics.
Their differencs lie in the difference of the occasions (nidana) of
transgression. In fact, the person who undertakes the observation of a
greater number of rules, avoids by this action itself a greater number of
occasions of intoxication-pride (mada, ii. 33c-d) and of non-diligence
(pramadasthana, ii. 26a); he avoids, by this action, a greater number of
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occasions of transgression, killing, etc
of renouncings are not identical with one another. If it were otherwise, that is, if the disciplines of Upasaka and Sramanera were integral to the discipline of a Bhiksu, then the Bhiksu who renounces the discipline of a Bhiksu would renounce at the same time all three disciplines: a thesis that is not admitted. Hence the disciplines exist separately.
I4d. But they do not contradict one another.
They can coexist: by undertaking the following disciplines, one does
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not abandon the preceeding ones. Thus the fact that a Bhiksu who
renounces his quality of Bhiksu remains in possession of the discipline of Upasaka and Sramanera is explained. **
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How does one become an Upasaka, an Upavasastha, a Sramanera, or a Bhiksu?
Consequently the three series
? 15. By undertaking the renouncing of the five things to avoid, of
the eight, the ten, of all the things to avoid, one obtains the
67 quality of Upasaka, Upavasastha, Sramanera, and Bhiksu.
1. By undertaking the renouncing of five items: 1. murder, 2. stealing, 3. illicit sexuality, 4. lying, and 5. intoxicating liquors, one places himself in the discipline of an Upasaka.
2. By undertaking the renouncing of eight items: 1. killing, 2.
stealing, 3. unchastity,4. lying, 5. intoxicating liquors, 6. scents,garlands,
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and unguents; dances, songs, music; 7. high beds, broad beds, and 8.
meals at forbidden times, one places himself in the discipline of an Upavasastha.
3. By undertaking the renouncing of these same items and, further, gold and silver, which make ten, one places himself in the discipline of a Sramanera. These make ten items, for one counts "scents, garlands, and unguents"separately from "dances, songs, and music"
4. By undertaking the renouncing of all the actions of the body and the voice which should be avoided, one is a Bhiksu.
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The Pratimoksa discipline is
I6a-b. Morality, good conduct, action and discipline.
