1
Official
Army Lists.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
The anomalous position of the officers and crews of the Marine,
who were not subject to the provisions of the Naval Discipline Act
and Merchant Shipping Act, was regulated by the passing of the
Indian Marine Service Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 38), which enabled
the governor-general in council to legislate for the maintenance of
discipline; and simultaneously the post of assistant secretary to the
Government of India (Marine Department), which had been created
in 1880 and held by Admiral Bythesea, was replaced by that of
assistant director of the Indian Marine. An Admiralty warrant of
the same year (1884) sanctioned the use by ships of the Indian Marine
as ensign of a blue flag with the Star of India in the fly, and as marine
jack of a union jack with a narrow blue border. Finally in 1891 the
title of the service was once more altered to that of“The Royal Indian
Marine” by an order in council, which also provided that officers
of the service, with the titles of commander, lieutenant and sub-
lieutenant, should rank with, but junior to, officers of the Royal Navy
of equal rank, and should wear the same uniform as the latter, with
the exception of the device on epaulettes, sword-hilt, badges and
buttons, and of the gold lace on the sleeves.
This retrospect may fitly conclude with a brief notice of the Naval
Defence Squadron and of the later progress of the Indian Marine
Survey. The former, which was established at Bombay in 1871 for the
defence of the Indian coasts, consisted in 1889 of two turret-ships and
seven torpedo boats, commanded by officers and manned by crews
of the Indian Marine. In 1892 the squadron, which had been increased
by the purchase of two torpedo gunboats, was placed under the com-
mand of an officer of the Royal Navy, while the other officers were
chosen partly from the Royal Navy and partly from the Royal Indian
Marine. The crews comprised both bluejackets and lascars. In 1903
the squadron was abolished, and the defence of India by sea was
entrusted wholly to the Royal Navy.
The history of the survey during the nineteenth century opens with
the establishment in 180g of a Marine Survey department in Bengal,
a
## p. 152 (#188) ############################################
152
THE COMPANY'S MARINE
which charted the east coast of Africa as far south as Zanzibar, the
Persian Gulf and other seas, before it was abolished in 1828 during
Lord William Bentinck's administration. The work of the depart-
ment, however, was considered sufficiently important to be carried
on between 1828 and 1839 by two vessels, which explored the coasts
of Africa and Socotra, the Maldive and Laccadive islands, and the
mouth of the Indus. After 1844 comprehensive surveys were con-
ducted on the Jehlam and Indus rivers, in the Gulf of Cutch and
other parts of the west coast of India, in the Bay of Bengal, on the
Pegu coast and the rivers of Burma, and in Malacca and Sumatra.
In 1861 the control of the Indian Marine Survey was transferred to
the Admiralty, but seventeen years later (1878) it was again organised
in Calcutta as a department of the Indian Marine. The headquarters
were transferred from Calcutta to Bombay in 1882, and a year later
it was decided to reserve the appointments of surveyor in charge and
his senior assistants for officers of the Royal Navy and to fill the junior
officers' grades from the Royal Indian Marine. From 1894 the senior
assistants' appointments were also thrown open to the latter service.
Since its first establishment the Royal Indian Marine has performed
much valuable work in the charting and delineation of the coasts of
India, Burma, the Persian Gulf and Africa, besides materially ad-
vancing scientific knowledge of the fauna of the Indian seas.
## p. 153 (#189) ############################################
CHAPTER IX
THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
It was not for many years after its incorporation that the Company
of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies found it necessary
to employ military forces to protect its possessions and its interests,
but guards of peons, undisciplined and armed after the native fashion,
were enrolled in its factories, from the time when these were first
established. These peons could hardly be regarded as soldiers, and
were employed rather to add to the dignity of the Company's officials
than for purposes of defence. Later in the seventeenth century pro-
vision was made for the defence of the larger factories by the main-
tenance at each of a small body of European soldiers, under an ensign,
and a “gun-room crew"supplied by the Company's ships, to work the
guns of the factory.
In 1662 King Charles II sent out a small force to defend Bombay,
which was part of the dowry of his queen, but the Portuguese did not
vacate the factory until 1665, by which time the force had suffered
severely from the climate, and numbered, besides Captain Henry
Cary, who commanded it, only one ensign, four sergeants, six corporals,
four drummers, ninety-seven privates and some details, including
two gunners and a gunner's mate. In 1668, when the king leased
Bombay to the East India Company, its garrison consisted of twenty
commissioned and non-commissioned officers, 124 privates and fifty-
four Topasses, or half-caste Portuguese, and this force eventually
became the nucleus of the ist Bombay European Regiment. ' In 1711
the garrison of Madras consisted of 250 European soldiers and 200
Topasses, and in 1748 various independent companies were embodied
as a regiment, afterwards the ist Madras Fusiliers, in which Robert
Clive received his first commission as an ensign. 2
It is generally believed that Dupleix, in his war with the English
Company on the east coast, was the first to employ Indian sepoys
trained in the European manner, but this was not so. The French
settlement of Mahé was founded in 1721, near the English settlement
of Tellicherri, on the west coast, and it was here, in hostilities which
lasted from 1721 to 1729, that the term sepoy first appears as the
name of a military force in European service. They were condottieri,
whose loyalty was not always above suspicion, but they had some
knowledge of European methods of war, for a French royal officer
described them as well trained. 3
1 Foster, Factories, 1668-9, p. 67; Malabari, Bombay in the Making, pp. 188–97.
• In 1748, G. B. Macleson, Lord Clive, p. 33.
• Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, pp. 2, 6, 7.
## p. 154 (#190) ############################################
154
THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
Dumas, the predecessor of Dupleix, first employed on the east
coast sepoys from the west coast. În 1744 the council at Pondichery
considered the company of sepoys to be hardly worth its pay, but the
outbreak of war with the English Company obliged them not only to
retain it, but to obtain another company from Mahé. 1 The French
capture Madras in 1746, and the English Company was obliged to
turn its attention to the organisation of a force for the defence of its
possessions. In 1748 Captain Stringer Lawrence of the 14th Foot,
the "father of the Indian Army", arrived at Fort St David, then
temporarily the Company's principal factory on the east coast, with
the king's commission as major, to command all the Company's
troops in the East Indies. He embodied the Madras European
Regiment and enlisted 2000 sepoys, “at first scarcely better disciplined
than common peons”, who were organised in independent companies,
out his activities were arrested by his capture by the French. Admiral
Boscawen, who arrived at Fort St David with orders to assume the
command both at sea and on land, sent him to attack Ariancopang,
near Pondichery, where he was taken and was detained until the
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, concluded in October, 1748, led to a cessa-
tion of hostilities and the restoration of Madras to the English Com-
pany. The organisation of the Company's forces then proceeded; the
sepoys were placed under an English commander and the "gun-
were superseded by two companies of artillery from
England, one at Fort St George and one at Fort St David. Lawrence
was granted leave to England, and his task was carried on by Robert
Clive, now a captain. His great feat of capturing and defending Arcot
in 1751 was performed with 200 European soldiers and 300 sepoys,
and the conduct of the latter proved how greatly their military spirit
had improved under Clive. The quality of Eastern troops always
depends largely on the character of those by whom they are led.
Lawrence returned from England, and the hostilities between the
two Companies continued in India, though their countries were at
peace. In September, 1754, a squadron of six ships under Admiral
Charles Watson, with the 39th Foot (Primus in Indis) under Colonel
John Adlercron, and a detachment of Royal Artillery, arrived at
Fort St George, and in the following year Clive, who in 1753 had
gone to England for reasons of health, returned with the king's com-
mission as a lieutenant-colonel, and assumed charge of Fort St David
as governor. Late in 1756 he was obliged to proceed to Bengal, in
order to recover Calcutta, and the troops which accompanied him,
or joined him later, consisted of detachments of the artillery, of the
39th Foot under Major Eyre Coote, and of the Madras and Bombay
European Regiments, and a force of sepoys from Madras; and he had
also at his disposal the Bengal European Regiment recently enrolled
1 Dodwell, op. cit. p. 5.
· Idem, p. 8.
Love, Vestiges of Old Madras, II, 447.
room crews
a
3
## p. 155 (#191) ############################################
ORIGIN OF THE PRESIDENCY ARMIES
155
by Major Killpatrick, and a force of Bengal sepoys. His campaign
in Bengal will be noticed later.
In 1757 the Seven Years' War broke out, and the two Companies
were again involved in hostilities in India. The war had not been
unforeseen, and the Madras Council was fully aware of the risk which
it ran in detaching so large a force, with its best officer, to Bengal, but
the plight of that presidency admitted of no delay. In June, 1758,
the French, under Lally, captured Fort St David, and in December
occupied the Black Town of Madras and opened the siege of Fort
St George, but were obliged to retreat on the arrival of a British
squadron in February, 1759.
Till then the sepoys had been organised in independent companies.
But the important development of organising them in battalions was
now introduced. The English Company had decided on the measure
before war broke out, but had had no opportunity of accomplishing it.
Lally's siege had provided further evidence of the difficulty of con-
trolling independent companies, and early in 1759 Lawrence presided
over a committee, whose proposals provided for a sepoy force of 7000
men, formed into seven battalions, each consisting of a grenadier com-
pany and eight battalion companies, each company commanded by a
subadar, with a jamadar and a due proportion of non-commissioned
officers. Each battalion was commanded by a native commandant,
but its training was the care of two British subaltern officers and three
sergeants, and three inspecting captains were appointed to supervise
the training of the whole force, which was the real foundation of the
Indian Army as it exists to-day. 2
Clive's victory at Plassey, and the deposition of Siraj-ud-daula,
established the Company as the predominant authority in Bengal,
and the maintenance of its power required a respectable military
force. The 39th Foot was recalled to Europe, but all ranks were
permitted to volunteer for the Company's service, and five officers
and about 350 men were transferred to the Bengal establishment, the
officers receiving a step in rank. : The two companies of the Bombay
European Regiment and the detachment of the Madras European
Regiment were also transferred to Bengal," and a few battalions of
sepoys were raised, to each of which were posted two officers from
the European Regiment.
The armies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay now developed in-
dependently. Communication between the three presidencies was
difficult and tedious, and each was confronted with dangers which
necessitated a rapid increase in and improvement of its armed forces.
In Bengal the outbreak of war between the Company and Mir Kasim,
his massacre of 2000 sepoys at Patna, and of about two hundred
Britons there and elsewhere, and his alliance with the Nawab-
1 Innes, Bengal European Regiment, pp. 15, 16. • Love, op. cit. 11, 566.
• Idem, 11, 513.
• Innes, op. cit. pp. 69, 70.
## p. 156 (#192) ############################################
156 THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
Wazir of Oudh and the Emperor Shah 'Alam against the Company
led to a great expansion of the Bengal army, and Clive, during his
second term of office in Bengal, which ended in 1767, reorganised
both the army and the civil administration. In the Madras
Presidency the wars with the principality of Mysore, and in Bombay
the Maratha wars, lasting from 1775 to 1782, lcd in like manner
to great increases in the presidency armies. Thus, in Bengal the
number of sepoy battalions rose from one in 1757 to nineteen in
1764. The native ranks in each battalion consisted of a commandant,
an adjutant and ten companies, two of which were grenadiers, each
company commanded by a subadar, with three jamadars, and con-
sisting of five havildars, four naiks, two tomtoms and seventy sepoys.
Each company had its own stand of colours. Besides these sepoys,
there were on the strength of the Bengal army in 1765 four companies
of artillery, twenty-four companies of European infantry, a troop of
hussars, and about 1200 irregular cavalry. After the conclusion of
peace the hussars were dismounted and incorporated with the
European infantry, all the irregular cavalry, except 300, were dis-
missed, the European battalion, 1600 strong, was augmented and
formed into three single-battalion regiments of nine companies each,
and each consisting of 731 rank and file with the same establishment
of officers as a king's regiment of the line, and three more battalions
of sepoys were raised. Clive then organised the Bengal army in three
brigades, each consisting of a troop of irregular cavalry, a company
of artillery, a battalion of European infantry, and seven battalions
of sepoys. In the Maratha War six sepoy battalions from the first
brigade were ordered to the West of India, but six new battalions
were raised to take their place in Bengal, and several battalions
trained by British officers for the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh were
incorporated in the Bengal army.
In 1780, in consequence of the defeat of Colonel Baillie and the
invasion by Hyder Ali of the Lower Carnatic, the Bengal Government
increased its military establishment by raising the strength of each
sepoy battalion to 1000 and dividing it into two battalions of five
companies. A major commanded each regiment, a captain each
battalion, and a lieutenant each company.
During the war in the Carnatics the Bengal Presidency assisted the
Madras Presidency with both European and native troops, and in
1785 the Bengal army was reorganised. Each of the two-battalion
regiments of sepoys was amalgamated into a single-battalion regiment
of ten companies, and the army was divided into six brigades. Each
of the three European battalions was divided into a two-battalion
regiment, allowing one European battalion to each brigadę,& the
1 Innes, op. cit. pp. 229, 230.
3 Broome, Bengal Army, p. 431.
5 Vol. v, p. 284.
2 Williams, Bengal Infantry, p. 5.
4 Idem, pp. 533-40.
• Inncs, op. cit. p. 280.
## p. 157 (#193) ############################################
RECRUITMENT OF OFFICERS
157
other troops assigned to each brigade being a company of artillery,
with lascars, and six battalions of sepoys. These orders remained in
force until 1796.
In 1765 the Madras establishment of seven battalions of sepoys was
increased to ten battalions, each 900 strong, a captain, a lieutenant
and an ensign being posted to each battalion; and in the following
year, when the Northern Circars (Sarkars) fell into the Company's
possession, eight new battalions were raised there. These, known as
the Circar battalions, were numbered separately from the Carnatic
battalions. They invariably served, in time of peace, in the Telugu
country, where they were raised, and were inferior, both in discipline
and courage, to the Carnatic battalions. The military force of the
Madras Presidency grew throughout the Mysore War, and was re-
organised in 1784, when the distinction between the Carnatic and
Circar battalions was abolished, the former being numbered from
1 to 21, and the latter from 22 to 29, while the raising of new bat-
talions brought the number up to thirty-five; but in 1785 the number
of battalions on the Madras establishment was reduced to twenty-one,
the Circar battalions being broken up and distributed among the
battalions which were retained. This introduced a “mixed”
system
of recruiting, under which the composition of each unit was a matter
of accident, “tempered from time to time by the predilections of the
officer who commanded it".
The Bombay army developed on a smaller scale. Its European
soldiers were formed into a regiment during the War of the Austrian
Succession, and before 1796 its sepoy battalions had reached twelve
in number.
The recruitment of European officers for the Company's troops was
at first a matter of difficulty. Until 1748 and again later, when the
seven sepoy battalions were formed, many sergeants were promoted
to the rank of ensign, but such promotions gradually became excep-
tional. “The great objection to these ranker-officers was their un-
seasonable drunkenness” and a tendency to continue to associate
with those of the rank from which they had risen. Both Clive and
Cootc observed these faults, and Coote remarked: “There is little
dependence on this kind of men's behaviour, who are raised from
sergeants to rank with gentlemen ”. 3. A few young writers followed
Clive's example, and received commissions.
Mixed blood was not a disqualification for the Company's com-
mission, which was often given to the sons of officers who had formed
irregular unions in India, as an acknowledgement of their fathers'
services, but colour was to some extent a bar, and later the Company
required of cadets appointed in India a certificate that they were not
a
the sons of wives or concubines of pure Indian blood. Foreign
i Wilson, Madras Army, 1, 224.
? Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitmenl, pp. 25-7.
• Dodwell, Nabobs of Madras, p. 42.
• Idem.
## p. 158 (#194) ############################################
158 THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
1
officers, deserters and released prisoners of war were sometimes ad-
mitted to the Company's service, and in some instances served it well,
but naturally could not always be trusted when opposed to their own
countrymen, and an attempt to maintain a Foreign Legion failed.
A Frenchman who served in the ranks of the Madras European
Regiment, but never received a commission, was Bernadotte, after-
wards a marshal of France and king of Sweden.
The most valuable source of recruitment was the royal army.
Officers of king's regiments leaving India were permitted to volunteer
for the Company's service, in which they usually received a step in
rank, and when peace in Europe led to the reduction of regiments
there was always a number of officers on half-pay and in reduced
circumstances who were glad to accept employment under the East
India Company. Such officers improved the efficiency, the social
status and the military spirit of the officers in the Company's armies.
When service in those armies became attractive the directors dis-
couraged local appointments, and took the military patronage, as it
became more valuable, into their own hands. They first sent out
volunteers, who served in the ranks until vacancies occurred, and
later, cadets, who were sent out as such, and received commissions as
soon as they had acquired a sufficient knowledge of drill and military
duties.
The native troops first employed against the French were Moplahs,
and “Moors” and Hindus from Mangalore and Tellicherri. Later,
in the Carnatic battalions, Muslims were the most numerous class,
Tamils coming next. The “Telingas” of the Circar battalions have
already been noticed, and in spite of their poor reputation as soldiers
they continued to be recruited after the amalgamation of the Carnatic
and Circar battalions, the classes in the mixed battalions coming in
the following order in numerical strength: (1) Muslims, (2) Telingas,
(3) Tamils, (4) Rajputs, Marathas and Brahmans, and (5) other
castes.
Of the quality of the early sepoy force various opinions were ex-
pressed, some very unfavourable, but the Carnatic regiments, at least,
fought well when well led, and against the low opinion of them held
by some of the Company's officials we may set the confession of Lally:
You would be surprised at the difference between the black troops of the English
and ours; it is greater than that between a Nawab and a cooly; theirs will even
venture to attack white troops, while ours will not even look at their black ones. ”
Nevertheless, the poor quality of recruits obtainable even in the
Carnatic was noticed as early as in 1788, and in 1795 the Madras
Government, probably in consequence of Lord Cornwallis's criticism
of the produce of their recruiting grounds, proposed to draw recruits,
1 Broome, op. cit. pp. 392, 393.
2 Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, chap. vii.
3 Idem, p. 12.
## p. 159 (#195) ############################################
SEPOY RECRUITMENT
159
to the number of six or seven hundred annually, from Bengal and
Bombay. The Bombay Government rejected the proposal, on the
ground that the natives of their presidency would not willingly serve
beyond its limits, and that they could not find, within those limits,
sufficient recruits for their own army, but the Supreme Government
agreed to supply recruits, not "stout Bengalese", as the originator of
the scheme, in his ignorance of Bengal and its inhabitants, had sug-
gested, but men more accustomed to military service. Two large
drafts were supplied, but the scheme was an utter failure. Owing to
the price of grain in the south, which was so high that a sepoy could
hardly live on his pay, and the uncongenial surroundings, it was found
impossible to keep the Bengal recruits with the colours, and they
deserted in such numbers that recruitment in the north was aban-
doned. 1
The Bengal army at first drew its recruits from the mixed classes
of adventurers to be found in the Bengal provinces, and from 1776
onwards from the kingdom of Oudh, enlisting chiefly Brahmans and
Rajputs, described as a brave, manly race of people. ”
It is not necessary to suppose that the discipline was exact, or the training perfect,
but both were infinitely superior to anything possessed by the Company's opponents.
The power of marching and manæuvring in solid formations, and of concentrating
fire, and the use of well-served guns enabled small bodies of the Company's soldiers
to overcome the loosely arrayed hordes of their adversaries. 3
In 1796 the armies of the three presidencies were, for the first time,
completely reorganised. 4 To Bengal were allotted three, and to
Madras two battalions, and to Bombay six companies of artillery, all
with complementary companies of lascars. Bengal was to maintain
three, and Madras and Bombay each two battalions of European
infantry, of ten companies, and Bengal and Madras were each to
maintain four regiments of regular native cavalry. The single-
battalion native infantry regiments were formed into regiments of
two battalions, of which Bengal had twelve, Madras eleven, and
Bombay six, with a single battalion of marines. The establishment of
British officers allowed to regiments of native cavalry and infantry
was nearly the same as in king's regiments. The reorganisation had
more than one serious defect. To the colonel commanding an infantry
regiment was transferred most of the authority which should have
been exercised by lieutenant-colonels commanding battalions, with
the result that the latter officers lost the respect of the sepoys. Both
Sir Thomas Munro and Sir John Malcolm considered the establish-
ment of British officers excessive, and believed that it would diminish
the sense of responsibility in the native officers. They would have
preferred the allotment, made after the Mutiny of 1857, of six or seven
1 Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, pp. 33-7.
• Imperial Gazetteer of India, iv, 330.
Malcolm, Political History, pp. 495-6.
Broome, op. cit. p. 503.
• Idem, iv, 333.
## p. 160 (#196) ############################################
160 THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
British officers to a battalion, to act as field officers and regimental
staff, the command of companies being left to the native officers; but
the provision of British officers was less generous than it appeared to
be. As the Company's territories extended, and it attended more
closely toʻmatters of administrative detail, Europeans were required
for many duties for which the establishment of the civil service was
insufficient, and with which its members were not well fitted to cope.
Public works, the staff and commissariat of the army, “political”,
that is to say diplomatic service at the courts of ruling chiefs, surveys,
the supervision of trunk roads, the administration of newly annexed
territory, the command and control generally of contingents and
irregular troops raised in native states and newly annexed territory,
and, later, the control of the civil police, were provided almost en-
tirely by officers of the army, and those deputed on such duties
remained on the establishments of their regiments, which they rejoined
when the regiment was ordered on active service, or when, by seniority,
they succeeded to the command. Allowing, besides this heavy drain,
for the number of officers on furlough, now, with pensions, granted
for the first time, the number of officers actually on duty with a regi-
ment of cavalry or a battalion of infantry was seldom more than half
the establishment. 1
The sources of recruitment have already been described. The
quality of the officers was for some time poor, with several brilliant
exceptions. This was partly due to the Company's treatment of its
military officers, which was parsimonious in the extreme, and pro-
duced many unfortunate results. The material inducement offered to
tempt candidates was an initial salary of about £120 a year, often in
an expensive environment and a noxious climate. It was practically
impossible for a young officer to keep out of debt. To set up the most
modest of households cost about £200,2 and an extract from a junior
officer's account-book shows his expenditure, in no way extravagant,
to have been Rs. 265 a month, while his pay was Rs. 195. Sir Thomas
Munro, who joined the Madras army in 1780, and held a staff ap-
pointment as a lieutenant, thus describes his attempts to live within
his means:
My dress grows tattered in one quarter whilst I am establishing funds to repair
it in another, and my coat is in danger of losing the sleeves, while I am pulling it
off to try a new waistcoat.
Later, while holding a comparatively lucrative civil appointment, he
writes:
I have dined to-day on porridge, made of half-ground flour instead of oatmeal,
and I shall most likely dine to-morrow on plantain fritters, this simplicity of fare
being the effect of necessity, not of choice.
If the Company had many bad bargains it had largely itself to thank.
1 Official Army Lists.
2 Williamson, East India Vade Mecum, 1, 173.
• Carey, Good Old Days, 1, 233.
• Idem, I, 229.
3
## p. 161 (#197) ############################################
ARMY LIFE
161
Cadets were at first allowed to find accommodation for themselves
in punch-houses, but were afterwards lodged in barracks, and sub-
jected to discipline. Early in the nineteenth century a college was
established at Barasat, fourteen miles from Calcutta, where they were
instructed in drill and the Hindustani language, but the officers in
charge of them lived at a distance, and except in class and on parade
they were subjected to hardly any control or discipline. The ruin of
many promising young men, the premature deaths of not a few, and
the disgrace and shame that overtook no mean portion of the crowd
of unfortunate youths, led to the closing of the college in 1811, and
cadets were then posted to regiments, but, owing to the comparatively
small number of British officers then doing duty with most native regi-
ments, discipline was not sufficiently strict, and it would have been
well for the Company's armies if Sir Thomas Munro's advice that all
· young men destined for native regiments should be attached for a year
or two to a British regiment, in order to learn their duties and acquire
military discipline, had been followed then, instead of much later.
The college for cadets at Addiscombe was founded in 1812.
The life of regimental officers in cantonments far from presidency
towns was insufferably dull and tedious. Books, book-clubs and news-
papers were few; there was practically no civilised female society, and
the monotony of the long hot-weather days, perforce spent indoors,
was dreary. Some procured books for themselves, and studied their
profession, the languages of the country, and history; some practised
music and painting, and some indulged in sport, but the sole relaxa-
tions of many were gambling and drinking. Their drink, beer, claret,
sherry, madeira and brandy, was expensive, and, if indulged in to
excess, unwholesome in the Indian climate. The mortality was great,
and ill-health, gambling and drinking produced tempers ready to take,
and equally ready to give, offence. Duels were not uncommon, and
were sometimes fatal. Concubinage was the natural result of the
absence of European women.
The number of European women to be found in Bengal and its dependencies
(early in the nineteenth century] cannot amount to two hundred and fifty, while
the European male inhabitants of respectability, including military officers, may
be taken at four thousand,
writes one officer, in a book” dedicated to the directors of the East
India Company. “The case speaks for itself”, he continues, “for, even
T
if disposed to marry, the latter have not the means. ” Young officers
could not be expected to accept a state of lifelong celibacy, and the
native “housekeeper" was an established institution. From such
unions, and from the marriages of European soldiers, sprang the class
known first as East Indians, then as Indo-Britons, then as Eurasians,
Carey, op. cit. I, 236–43.
· Buckle, Bengal Artillery, pp. 33, 34.
3 Williamson, op. cit. 1, 453.
CHIVI
11
## p. 162 (#198) ############################################
162 THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
and now, officially but inaccurately, as “Anglo-Indians”. These
irregular unions were recognised not only by the officers' comrades
and superiors, but by the court of directors, who perceived that a
body of officers living with native mistresses would cost them less than
officers married to ladies of their own class and nation, and requiring
provision for their families. After the introduction of the furlough
rules, and as India became more accessible, the standard of morals
gradually improved, and, though it was long before the native mistress
ceased to be an institution, she retired 1, y degrees into the background,
and finally disappeared.
In 1824 the armies of the three presidencies, having grown greatly
in numbers during the third Maratha, the Pindari, and the Nepal
wars, were again reorganised. The two-battalion regiments of native
infantry were divided into single-battalion regiments, of which Bengal
now had sixty-eight, Madras fifty-two, and Bombay twenty-four. The
artillery was more than doubled in strength, and was divided into
brigades and batteries of horse, and battalions and companies of foot,
artillery. Bengal and Madras each had eight, and Bombay three
regiments of regular native cavalry, and Bengal had, in addition, five,
and Bombay three regiments of irregular cavalry. 1
In the same year the first Burmese War broke out, and three regiments
of Bengal infantry, ordered to march overland to Arakan, providing
their own transport, mutinied. Whether or not transport, as was urged
on their behalf, was unprocurable, there is no doubt that it was most
difficult to obtain, and most costly, and the men suspected that the
order was a device to compel them to cross the “black water”, and
thus to break their caste. Their petitions were disregarded, they broke
into mutiny, and they were““shot down and sabred on parade”. The
commander-in-chief protested against the finding of the court of
enquiry that the mutiny was “an ebullition of despair against being
compelled to march without the means of doing so”, but it was
certainly just.
The Company's behaviour to its military forces was too obviously
that of a group of traders towards their servants ever to command
from them that unquestioning loyalty and obedience with which the
royal troops served the king, and the record of disaffection and
mutinies in its armies is a long one. In 1674 and 1679 the European
force in Bombay mutinied in consequence of reductions in its pay, 4
and in 1683 Captain Richard Keigwin, commanding that force,
having been deprived of his seat in council, and the allowances
attached to it, rebelled against the Company, and declared that he
held the fort and island of Bombay on behalf of the king. Vice-
Admiral Sir Thomas Grantham eventually persuaded him, on the
1 Imperial Gazetteer of India, iv, 336.
2 Idem, iv, 336.
• Malcolm, Political History, p. 484.
• Malabari, op. cit. pp. 189, 190.
## p. 163 (#199) ############################################
MUTINIES
163
promise of a free pardon, to surrender in accordance with the royal
command, and he left for England. 1
In 1758 nine captains of the Bengal European Regiment, resenting
their supersession by officers of the Madras and Bombay detachments,
which were incorporated with the regiment, resigned their com-
missions together, but Clive dealt firmly with them. Six were dismissed
the service, and the other three were restored, with loss of seniority,
on expressing their contrition. In 1764 a mutiny in the Bengal Euro-
pean Regiment, fomented by the large numbers of foreigners who
had been enlisted, was suppressed, but was followed by a mutiny of
the sepoys, who were discontented with their share of the prize-money,
and with a new code of regulations and system of manquvres intro-
duced by Major Hector Munro, then commanding the Bengal army.
Munro quelled this mutiny with great, but not unnecessary severity,
the leading mutineers being blown from guns in the presence of their
disaffected comrades. "
The mutiny of the British officers of the Bengal army caused by the
reduction of batta, or field allowance, has been described in volume v. 5
In 1806 a mutiny broke out in the native ranks of the Madras army.
Orders had been issued that the sepoys were to wear shakos instead
of turbans, that they were to shave their beards, and that caste-marks
and ear-rings were not to be worn on parade. The men regarded these
orders as an attack on their religion, and the garrison of Vellore,
where some of the Mysore princes were interned, hoisted the Mysore
flag, and murdered their British officers and some of the European
soldiers, but the remnant of these, under Sergeant Brodie, held out
against them until a small force under Colonel Gillespie arrived from
Arcot, blew open the gates of the fortress, cut down 400 mutineers,
and captured nearly all the rest. There had also been trouble at
Hyderabad, but Gillespie's prompt action crushed the mutiny.
In 1809 a "white mutiny” broke out in the Madras army. Some
of its senior officers had personal grievances, some allowances had
been reduced, and the pay of the officers generally was less than that
of those on the Bengal establishment, but their chief complaint was
that the officers of the king's service monopolised the favours of the
local government, and held most of the staff appointments and
“situations of active trust, respectability, and emolument”, as they
were described by Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Arthur St Leger, one
of the leaders of the movement. The relative status of the officers of
the king's and the Company's services had long been a thorny ques-
tion, and the case for the Company's officers was thus moderately
>
1 Vol. v, p. 102, supra.
· Inncs, op. cit. pp. 71, 72.
• Idem, pp. 179-84.
• Broome, op. cit. pp. 458-61.
Pp. 178-80, and Broome, op. cit. chap. vi.
• Wilson, op. cit. in, chap. xviii.
5
## p. 164 (#200) ############################################
164 THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
stated by Colonel (afterwards Major-General Sir John) Malcolm,
writing in 1811:
If it (the British Empire in India] cannot afford to give high pecuniary rewards,
it should purchase the services of men of birth and education; and remunerate the
great sacrifices which they make in entering the native army of India by approba-
tion, rank, and honours; and, instead of leaving them in a state of comparative
obscurity, depressed by the consideration that they are an inferior service, and that
military fame, and the applause of their King and country, are objects placed
almost beyond their hopes; their minds should be studiously elevated to these
objects; and they should be put upon a footing which would make them have an
honourable pride in the service to which they belong. This they never can have
(such is the nature of military feeling), while they consider themselves one shade
even below another, with which they are constantly associated. "
The officers of the Madras army had long been discontented, and
the commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General Hay Macdowell, who
sympathised with them, had done nothing to allay their discontent,
and had left for England before it reached its climax. Sir George
Barlow, the governor, at first acted injudiciously, and at Masulipatam
the officers of the European Regiment openly defied the orders of
government. The mutiny spread to Gooty, Secunderabad, Jalna,
Bellary, Cumbum, Trichinopoly, Dindigul, Madras, Pallamcottah,
Cannanore, Quilon and Seringapatam, the troops in the last-named
place rising in arms against the government. Treasure was seized,
acts of violence were committed, and the intention of the mutineers
appeared to be the subversion of the civil government. At length
vigorous action was taken. European troops were obtained from
Ceylon, and the officers who were in revolt were called upon to sign
a test, or declaration of obedience. The influence of the governor-
general, Lord Minto, and of such officers as Colonels Close and Conran,
of Colonel Montresor and Captain Sydenham at Secunderabad, and
Colonel Davis at Seringapatam, the fear lest the king's troops should
be employed against them, the lukewarm support of the sepoys when
they understood that the quarrel was not theirs, and the removal of
many officers from their regiments, when their places were taken by
king's officers, brought them to reason. Eventually no more than
twenty-one were selected for punishment, as examples to the rest. Of
these one died, four were cashiered, and sixteen dismissed the service;
but of those cashiered three, and of those dismissed twelve, were after-
wards restored. This leniency amounted to an admission that the
offence of the officers, grave though it was, was not unprovoked. ?
The growth of the presidency armies failed to keep pace with that
of the Company's territories and responsibilities, and it was found
necessary to raise local corps, “more rough and ready than the regular
army”,3 for the defence of new territories and the protection of native
ruling chiefs. In the Mysore and Maratha wars the Nizam, as the
1 Malcolm, Political History, pp. 482, 483.
2 Malcolm, Observations; Cardew, White Mutiny.
: Imperial Gazetteer of India, IV, 337:
) 3
## p. 165 (#201) ############################################
LOCAL AND IRREGULAR CORPS
165
Company's ally, had provided contingents of troops, and Arthur
Wellesley had found the contingent provided in 1803 inefficient and
useless. As the Company maintained by treaty a large subsidiary
force for the protection of the Nizam and his dominions, it was entitled
to demand that he should provide troops fit to take the field with it
and this demand led to the establishment of the Hyderabad con-
tingent, a force of four regiments of cavalry, four field batteries and
six battalions of infantry, officered, but not on the same scale as the
Company's regular troops, by “respectable Europeans”. ?
The fighting qualities of the Gurkhas were discovered in the Nepal
War (1814-16), and a few irregular battalions of Gurkhas were
raised. The first, the Malaon Regiment, was incorporated in the line,
in 1850, as the 66th Bengal Native Light Infantry, but in 1861, after
the Mutiny, it and four other Gurkha battalions were removed from
the line and numbered separately.
In 1838, when the Company foolishly undertook the restoration of
Shah Shuja to. the throne of Afghanistan,4 an irregular force was
raised in India for his service, and the 3rd Infantry, which had dis-
tinguished itself in the defence of Kalat-i-Ghilzai,5 was retained in
the Company's service, at first as an irregular regiment, but after the
Mutiny incorporated in the line as the 12th Bengal Native Infantry.
In 1846, after the first Sikh War, a brigade of irregular troops was
raised for police and general duties on the Satlej frontier, and to it was
added the Corps of Guides, a mixed regiment of cavalry and infantry,
which was incorporated in 1849, after the second Sikh War,” in an
irregular force, known later as the Panjab Frontier Force, raised and
formed for duty in the Panjab and on the North-West Frontier. It
consisted at first of three field batteries, five regiments of cavalry, five
of infantry, and the Corps of Guides, to which were added shortly
afterwards a company of garrison artillery, a sixth regiment of Panjab
infantry, five regiments of Sikh infantry, and two mountain batteries,
and in 1876 all its artillery was converted into mountain batteries.
This force, which did excellent service against the mutineers in 1857
and 1858, remained under the control of the local government of the
Panjab for many years before it was placed under that of the com-
mander-in-chief.
A local force was raised after the annexation of Nagpur in 1854,
and the Oudh Irregular Force after the annexation of Oudh in 1856,
but the former disappeared in the Mutiny, and the latter was broken
up shortly after it.
The history of the great Mutiny of the Bengal army, which raged
for nearly two years, is recorded in the following chapter. The in-
eptitude of senile and incompetent officers, and the pathetic con-
1 Burton, History of the Hyderabad Contingent, chap. iv.
• See vol. v, pp. 377-9.
Vol. v, pp. 495-521.
• Idem, pp. 548–53.
? Idem, pp. 555-7.
2 Idem.
5 Idem, p. 515
## p. 166 (#202) ############################################
166 THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
fidence of old colonels, in whom esprit de corps was so strong that even
while regiments lying beside their own were butchering their officers
they refused to believe in the possibility of treason in their own men,
made the tragedy more ghastly than it need have been. The de-
moralisation of the Bengal army was due to more than one cause. The
great additions recently made to the Company's dominions demanded
for the administration of the newly acquired territory, and for the
irregular troops and police required for its defence and for the main-
tenance of peace and order, a far larger number of British officers
than the civil service could provide, and the principal source of
supply was the Bengal army. Those to whom the government of the
new territories was entrusted refused to be satisfied with any but the
most active and zealous officers whom the army could supply, and
the army was thus deprived of the services of a large number of its
best officers, the insufficient number left for regimental duty con-
sisting, to some extent, of the Company's bad bargains. Another
reason for the decay of discipline was the system of promotion, which
was regulated solely by seniority, so that many failed to reach com-
missioned rank before the time when, in the interests of the service,
they should have been superannuated, and were inclined to regard
their promotion rather as a reward for long service than as admission
to a sphere of more important duties. In the Madras and Bombay
armies seniority, as a qualification for promotion, was tempered by
selection, and the British officers refused to pander to the caste
prejudices of their men to the same extent as the British officers in
Bengal. Partly for these reasons, and partly owing to their dislike of
the Bengal army and its airs of superiority, these armies remained
faithful; and the irregular forces of the Panjab joined with glee in
crushing the “Pandies”, as the mutineers were called, from Pande,
one of the commonest surnames among the Oudh Brahmans, which
had been borne by a sepoy who had shot the adjutant of his regiment
at Barrackpore, a few months before the Mutiny broke out.
## p. 167 (#203) ############################################
CHAPTER X
>
>
THE MUTINY
“I WISH”, wrote the late Lord Cromer, “the younger generation
',
of Englishmen would read, mark, learn and inwardly digest the
history of the Indian Mutiny; it abounds in lessons and warnings.
During the generation that preceded the Mutiny various influences
were weakening the discipline of the sepoy army in the presidency of
Bengal, and awakening discontent, here and there provoking thoughts
of rebellion, in certain
groups of the civil population. In considering
the measures that produced these results it should be borne in mind
that the mere fact of their having caused discontent does not condemn
them. While some were injudicious, others were beneficial, and some
helped also to minimise the disturbances to which discontent gave
rise.
In the settlement of the North-Western Provinces, by which
arrangements were made for the collection of the revenue, the re-
sponsible officers, anxious to promote the greatest happiness of the
greatest number, decided that the agreement should be concluded,
not with middlemen, but with the actual occupants of the land, who
were generally either single families or village communities. Ac-
cordingly they deprived the talukdars, through whom the native
government had collected the revenue, and who were really the
territorial aristocracy, of the right of settling for any land to which
they could not establish a clear proprietary title. At the same time
holders of rent-free tenures, many of which had been fraudulently
acquired before the Company's government was established, were
required to prove the original validity of their titles; and since even
those whose estates had been obtained honestly were unable to pro-
duce documentary evidence, the tenures were for the most part
abolished, and the revenue was augmented for the benefit of the
government. The sale law, under which the estates of proprietors
were bought by speculators who were strangers to their new tenants,
aroused no less bitterness; and under Dalhousie the policy of re-
sumption was developed. In Bombay, for instance, the Inam Com-
mission enquired into a large number of titles to land and resumed
a large number of estates. 2
In 1853 an event occurred which provoked resentment that was
not immediately manifested. Baji Rao, the ex-Peshwa with whom
Wellesley had concluded the Treaty of Bassein, died, and his adopted
son, Nana Sahib, demanded that his pension should be continued to
1 Cf. pp. 80-4, supra.
· Cf. Baden Powell, Land Systems of British India, II, 302 sqq.
## p. 168 (#204) ############################################
168
THE MUTINY
a
him. In accordance with the terms of the original agreement the
demand was rejected, although the Nana was allowed to retain rent
free the Peshwa's landed estate.
The annexations which Dalhousie carried out under the title of
lapse, and by which he not only consolidated the empire, strengthened
its military communications, and increased its resources, but also
benefited millions who had suffered from misgovernment, caused
uneasiness to many who had submitted without any sense of injustice
to annexation that had followed conquest, and in one case provoked
passionate indignation. Under this right, Dalhousie annexed Satara,
Nagpur, Jhansi, and several minor principalities. The annexation of
Oudh was of a different kind. Misgovernment so scandalous that
even Colonel Sleeman and Henry Lawrence, those sympathetic
champions of native rulers, urged that the paramount power should
assume the administration, impelled the Board of Control and the
court of directors to insist upon a peremptory course which Dalhousie,
remembering the fidelity of the king of Oudh, was reluctant to adopt.
He urged that merely to withdraw'the British troops by whose support
the king had been maintained upon the throne, on the ground that
he had not fulfilled the conditions of the treaty concluded by Wellesley,
would compel him to accept a new treaty which should provide for
the administration by British officers in his name; the directors
decided that he should be required to accept such a treaty with the
alternative of submitting to annexation. As he rejected the proffered
treaty, which, while it vested the government in the Company,
guaranteed to him the royal title, an adequate pension, and main-
tenance for all collateral branches of his family, Oudh was forthwith
annexed. Though Muhammadan pride was doubtless offended, such
discontent as the annexation aroused mattered little in comparison
with the manner in which it was carried into effect. Perhaps it was
of no great moment that the revenues of the province were not
exclusively appropriated, as Sleeman and Lawrence had recom-
mended, to the benefit of the people and the royal family; nor would
it be just to blame Dalhousie because he decided that the provisional
settlement of the revenue should be made with the actual occupants
of the soil, and because the talukdars, although their claims were for
the most part examined with scrupulous fairness, resented the de-
cisions that compelled them to surrender their villages, and the
restraint that forced them to cease from controlling their neighbours.
What did cause indignation was that after the departure of Dalhousie,
orders which he had given were disregarded. For more than a year
no allowances were paid to the king's stipendiaries, among whom
were some of his relations; the officiating chief commissioner took
possession of a palace which had been expressly reserved for the royal
family; the officials employed by the late court were excluded from
pensions; the disbandment of the king's army had thrown professional
>
## p. 169 (#205) ############################################
DALHOUSIE'S ADMINISTRATION
169
1
soldiers upon the world with inadequate means of support; and in
many cases the demands of the settlement officers were excessive.
Nothing was done to guard against the disturbances which adminis-
trative changes might produce. Although Dalhousie had resolved to
disarm the country and raze every fort, his successor did nothing,
and supposed that one weak regiment of infantry and one battery of
artillery would be sufficient to keep the peace.
More provocative than settlements and annexations were other
measures by which Dalhousie endeavoured to confer upon India the
benefits of Western civilisation. In the railways which he began to
construct, the telegraph wires by which he connected Calcutta with
Peshawar and Bombay, and Bombay with Madras, the canal which
he linked to the sacred stream of the Ganges, Brahmans fancied that'
sorcery was at work. The more conservative elements of native society
suspected the European education by which he hoped to enlarge the
minds of the young, but by which the priests felt that their power was
endangered; and laws such as that permitting the remarriage of Hindu
widows, which he contemplated and which his successor passed, gave
deep offence.
Since it is impossible to describe by any comprehensive generalisa-
tion the sentiments of a vast heterogeneous population, divided into
numerous groups, the respective characteristics of which were more
dissimilar than those of the peoples of Europe, let us approach the
subject from different points of view. The Hindus, except in so far as
they had been offended by the measures of Dalhousie, were not
antagonistic to the government on the score of religion. While some
Muhammadans admired the strength and the justice of British rule,
others—notably the Wahabis—resented the loss of the supremacy
which their forefathers had enjoyed, and hoped to destroy as enemies
of Islam the aliens who had seized it. The mercantile and shop-
keeping classes, indeed all who knew that their position and pros-
perity were staked upon the continuance of orderly rule, were dis-
posed to support the British Government so long as it could keep the
upper hand and secure to them the enjoyment of their gains. The
magnates who had lost their lands were naturally resentful. The
countless millions who lived by tilling the soil did not care what
government might be in power, if it protected them and did not tax
them too heavily; but in some districts, especially in Bengal, they had
suffered so much from the venality of the police and the harpies who
infested the courts of justice that they were ill-disposed. In some parts
of the peninsula, notably in the Panjab and Rajputana, the people
were aware that they had profited by British rule. Ponder these words
of Sir John Strachey:
The duty was once imposed upon me of transferring a number of villages which
had long been included in a British district to one of the best governed of the native
1 Lee-Warner, Dalhousie, 11, 338–9; Baird, Private Letters of Dalhousie, pp. 401-3.
## p. 170 (#206) ############################################
170
THE MUTINY
states. I shall not forget the loud and universal protests of the people against the
cruel injustice with which they considered they were being treated. Everyone who
has had experience of similar cases tells the same story. Nevertheless I cannot say
that our government is loved; it is too good for that.
Reforms which interfered with native usages were resented as meddle-
some. Differences of colour, of religion, of custom, and of sympathies
separated the masses, which differed so widely among themselves,
from the ruling class. It is true that the more thoughtful acknowledged
that the British government was juster, more merciful, and more
efficient than any that had preceded it: but still many thought regret-
fully of the good old times, when, if there had been less peace, there
had been more stir, more excitement, and a wider field for adventure;
a
when, if there had been less security for life and property, there had
been more opportunities for gratifying personal animosities and
making money; when, if taxation had been heavier, there had been
some chance of evading it; when, if justice had been more uncertain,
there had been more room for chicanery and intrigue. The rulers
did not conceal their sense of racial superiority, and the French critic
who described their administration as "just, but not amiable” probed
a weak spot. Though the examples of Henry Lawrence, and John
Nicholson, and Meadows Taylor, prove that individuals could win
personal loyalty and even devotion, there was no real loyalty, except
in the rare instances of such men as the illustrious Muhammadan,
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, towards the alien government. For efficiency
was not enough to keep India contented; and since, as Lord Cromer
wrote, the Englishman is
always striving to attain two ideals, which are apt to be mutually destructive—the
ideal of good government, which connotes the continuance of his own supremacy,
and the ideal of self-government, which connotes the whole or partial abdication
of his supreme position-
there were Anglo-Indian statesmen, even before the Mutiny, who
desired to associate Indians with British rule. As early as 1818 Lord
Hastings looked forward to a
time not very remote when England will. . . wish to relinquish the domination
which she has gradually and unintentionally assurned over this country, and from
which she cannot at present recede;1
a few years later Sir Thomas Munro declared that eventually it would
“probably be best for both countries that the British control over
India should be gradually withdrawn";' and Dalhousie, the most
autocratic of governors-general, urged in vain that parliament should
authorise him to nominate an Indian member to his legislative council. 3
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, one of the wisest of Muhammadans, after-
wards declared that the absence of such members, who would have
kept their colleagues in touch with popular sentiment, prevented the
i Private Journal, 11, 326. 2 Gleig, Life of Munro, II, 388.
• Lee-Warner, op.
who were not subject to the provisions of the Naval Discipline Act
and Merchant Shipping Act, was regulated by the passing of the
Indian Marine Service Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 38), which enabled
the governor-general in council to legislate for the maintenance of
discipline; and simultaneously the post of assistant secretary to the
Government of India (Marine Department), which had been created
in 1880 and held by Admiral Bythesea, was replaced by that of
assistant director of the Indian Marine. An Admiralty warrant of
the same year (1884) sanctioned the use by ships of the Indian Marine
as ensign of a blue flag with the Star of India in the fly, and as marine
jack of a union jack with a narrow blue border. Finally in 1891 the
title of the service was once more altered to that of“The Royal Indian
Marine” by an order in council, which also provided that officers
of the service, with the titles of commander, lieutenant and sub-
lieutenant, should rank with, but junior to, officers of the Royal Navy
of equal rank, and should wear the same uniform as the latter, with
the exception of the device on epaulettes, sword-hilt, badges and
buttons, and of the gold lace on the sleeves.
This retrospect may fitly conclude with a brief notice of the Naval
Defence Squadron and of the later progress of the Indian Marine
Survey. The former, which was established at Bombay in 1871 for the
defence of the Indian coasts, consisted in 1889 of two turret-ships and
seven torpedo boats, commanded by officers and manned by crews
of the Indian Marine. In 1892 the squadron, which had been increased
by the purchase of two torpedo gunboats, was placed under the com-
mand of an officer of the Royal Navy, while the other officers were
chosen partly from the Royal Navy and partly from the Royal Indian
Marine. The crews comprised both bluejackets and lascars. In 1903
the squadron was abolished, and the defence of India by sea was
entrusted wholly to the Royal Navy.
The history of the survey during the nineteenth century opens with
the establishment in 180g of a Marine Survey department in Bengal,
a
## p. 152 (#188) ############################################
152
THE COMPANY'S MARINE
which charted the east coast of Africa as far south as Zanzibar, the
Persian Gulf and other seas, before it was abolished in 1828 during
Lord William Bentinck's administration. The work of the depart-
ment, however, was considered sufficiently important to be carried
on between 1828 and 1839 by two vessels, which explored the coasts
of Africa and Socotra, the Maldive and Laccadive islands, and the
mouth of the Indus. After 1844 comprehensive surveys were con-
ducted on the Jehlam and Indus rivers, in the Gulf of Cutch and
other parts of the west coast of India, in the Bay of Bengal, on the
Pegu coast and the rivers of Burma, and in Malacca and Sumatra.
In 1861 the control of the Indian Marine Survey was transferred to
the Admiralty, but seventeen years later (1878) it was again organised
in Calcutta as a department of the Indian Marine. The headquarters
were transferred from Calcutta to Bombay in 1882, and a year later
it was decided to reserve the appointments of surveyor in charge and
his senior assistants for officers of the Royal Navy and to fill the junior
officers' grades from the Royal Indian Marine. From 1894 the senior
assistants' appointments were also thrown open to the latter service.
Since its first establishment the Royal Indian Marine has performed
much valuable work in the charting and delineation of the coasts of
India, Burma, the Persian Gulf and Africa, besides materially ad-
vancing scientific knowledge of the fauna of the Indian seas.
## p. 153 (#189) ############################################
CHAPTER IX
THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
It was not for many years after its incorporation that the Company
of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies found it necessary
to employ military forces to protect its possessions and its interests,
but guards of peons, undisciplined and armed after the native fashion,
were enrolled in its factories, from the time when these were first
established. These peons could hardly be regarded as soldiers, and
were employed rather to add to the dignity of the Company's officials
than for purposes of defence. Later in the seventeenth century pro-
vision was made for the defence of the larger factories by the main-
tenance at each of a small body of European soldiers, under an ensign,
and a “gun-room crew"supplied by the Company's ships, to work the
guns of the factory.
In 1662 King Charles II sent out a small force to defend Bombay,
which was part of the dowry of his queen, but the Portuguese did not
vacate the factory until 1665, by which time the force had suffered
severely from the climate, and numbered, besides Captain Henry
Cary, who commanded it, only one ensign, four sergeants, six corporals,
four drummers, ninety-seven privates and some details, including
two gunners and a gunner's mate. In 1668, when the king leased
Bombay to the East India Company, its garrison consisted of twenty
commissioned and non-commissioned officers, 124 privates and fifty-
four Topasses, or half-caste Portuguese, and this force eventually
became the nucleus of the ist Bombay European Regiment. ' In 1711
the garrison of Madras consisted of 250 European soldiers and 200
Topasses, and in 1748 various independent companies were embodied
as a regiment, afterwards the ist Madras Fusiliers, in which Robert
Clive received his first commission as an ensign. 2
It is generally believed that Dupleix, in his war with the English
Company on the east coast, was the first to employ Indian sepoys
trained in the European manner, but this was not so. The French
settlement of Mahé was founded in 1721, near the English settlement
of Tellicherri, on the west coast, and it was here, in hostilities which
lasted from 1721 to 1729, that the term sepoy first appears as the
name of a military force in European service. They were condottieri,
whose loyalty was not always above suspicion, but they had some
knowledge of European methods of war, for a French royal officer
described them as well trained. 3
1 Foster, Factories, 1668-9, p. 67; Malabari, Bombay in the Making, pp. 188–97.
• In 1748, G. B. Macleson, Lord Clive, p. 33.
• Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, pp. 2, 6, 7.
## p. 154 (#190) ############################################
154
THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
Dumas, the predecessor of Dupleix, first employed on the east
coast sepoys from the west coast. În 1744 the council at Pondichery
considered the company of sepoys to be hardly worth its pay, but the
outbreak of war with the English Company obliged them not only to
retain it, but to obtain another company from Mahé. 1 The French
capture Madras in 1746, and the English Company was obliged to
turn its attention to the organisation of a force for the defence of its
possessions. In 1748 Captain Stringer Lawrence of the 14th Foot,
the "father of the Indian Army", arrived at Fort St David, then
temporarily the Company's principal factory on the east coast, with
the king's commission as major, to command all the Company's
troops in the East Indies. He embodied the Madras European
Regiment and enlisted 2000 sepoys, “at first scarcely better disciplined
than common peons”, who were organised in independent companies,
out his activities were arrested by his capture by the French. Admiral
Boscawen, who arrived at Fort St David with orders to assume the
command both at sea and on land, sent him to attack Ariancopang,
near Pondichery, where he was taken and was detained until the
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, concluded in October, 1748, led to a cessa-
tion of hostilities and the restoration of Madras to the English Com-
pany. The organisation of the Company's forces then proceeded; the
sepoys were placed under an English commander and the "gun-
were superseded by two companies of artillery from
England, one at Fort St George and one at Fort St David. Lawrence
was granted leave to England, and his task was carried on by Robert
Clive, now a captain. His great feat of capturing and defending Arcot
in 1751 was performed with 200 European soldiers and 300 sepoys,
and the conduct of the latter proved how greatly their military spirit
had improved under Clive. The quality of Eastern troops always
depends largely on the character of those by whom they are led.
Lawrence returned from England, and the hostilities between the
two Companies continued in India, though their countries were at
peace. In September, 1754, a squadron of six ships under Admiral
Charles Watson, with the 39th Foot (Primus in Indis) under Colonel
John Adlercron, and a detachment of Royal Artillery, arrived at
Fort St George, and in the following year Clive, who in 1753 had
gone to England for reasons of health, returned with the king's com-
mission as a lieutenant-colonel, and assumed charge of Fort St David
as governor. Late in 1756 he was obliged to proceed to Bengal, in
order to recover Calcutta, and the troops which accompanied him,
or joined him later, consisted of detachments of the artillery, of the
39th Foot under Major Eyre Coote, and of the Madras and Bombay
European Regiments, and a force of sepoys from Madras; and he had
also at his disposal the Bengal European Regiment recently enrolled
1 Dodwell, op. cit. p. 5.
· Idem, p. 8.
Love, Vestiges of Old Madras, II, 447.
room crews
a
3
## p. 155 (#191) ############################################
ORIGIN OF THE PRESIDENCY ARMIES
155
by Major Killpatrick, and a force of Bengal sepoys. His campaign
in Bengal will be noticed later.
In 1757 the Seven Years' War broke out, and the two Companies
were again involved in hostilities in India. The war had not been
unforeseen, and the Madras Council was fully aware of the risk which
it ran in detaching so large a force, with its best officer, to Bengal, but
the plight of that presidency admitted of no delay. In June, 1758,
the French, under Lally, captured Fort St David, and in December
occupied the Black Town of Madras and opened the siege of Fort
St George, but were obliged to retreat on the arrival of a British
squadron in February, 1759.
Till then the sepoys had been organised in independent companies.
But the important development of organising them in battalions was
now introduced. The English Company had decided on the measure
before war broke out, but had had no opportunity of accomplishing it.
Lally's siege had provided further evidence of the difficulty of con-
trolling independent companies, and early in 1759 Lawrence presided
over a committee, whose proposals provided for a sepoy force of 7000
men, formed into seven battalions, each consisting of a grenadier com-
pany and eight battalion companies, each company commanded by a
subadar, with a jamadar and a due proportion of non-commissioned
officers. Each battalion was commanded by a native commandant,
but its training was the care of two British subaltern officers and three
sergeants, and three inspecting captains were appointed to supervise
the training of the whole force, which was the real foundation of the
Indian Army as it exists to-day. 2
Clive's victory at Plassey, and the deposition of Siraj-ud-daula,
established the Company as the predominant authority in Bengal,
and the maintenance of its power required a respectable military
force. The 39th Foot was recalled to Europe, but all ranks were
permitted to volunteer for the Company's service, and five officers
and about 350 men were transferred to the Bengal establishment, the
officers receiving a step in rank. : The two companies of the Bombay
European Regiment and the detachment of the Madras European
Regiment were also transferred to Bengal," and a few battalions of
sepoys were raised, to each of which were posted two officers from
the European Regiment.
The armies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay now developed in-
dependently. Communication between the three presidencies was
difficult and tedious, and each was confronted with dangers which
necessitated a rapid increase in and improvement of its armed forces.
In Bengal the outbreak of war between the Company and Mir Kasim,
his massacre of 2000 sepoys at Patna, and of about two hundred
Britons there and elsewhere, and his alliance with the Nawab-
1 Innes, Bengal European Regiment, pp. 15, 16. • Love, op. cit. 11, 566.
• Idem, 11, 513.
• Innes, op. cit. pp. 69, 70.
## p. 156 (#192) ############################################
156 THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
Wazir of Oudh and the Emperor Shah 'Alam against the Company
led to a great expansion of the Bengal army, and Clive, during his
second term of office in Bengal, which ended in 1767, reorganised
both the army and the civil administration. In the Madras
Presidency the wars with the principality of Mysore, and in Bombay
the Maratha wars, lasting from 1775 to 1782, lcd in like manner
to great increases in the presidency armies. Thus, in Bengal the
number of sepoy battalions rose from one in 1757 to nineteen in
1764. The native ranks in each battalion consisted of a commandant,
an adjutant and ten companies, two of which were grenadiers, each
company commanded by a subadar, with three jamadars, and con-
sisting of five havildars, four naiks, two tomtoms and seventy sepoys.
Each company had its own stand of colours. Besides these sepoys,
there were on the strength of the Bengal army in 1765 four companies
of artillery, twenty-four companies of European infantry, a troop of
hussars, and about 1200 irregular cavalry. After the conclusion of
peace the hussars were dismounted and incorporated with the
European infantry, all the irregular cavalry, except 300, were dis-
missed, the European battalion, 1600 strong, was augmented and
formed into three single-battalion regiments of nine companies each,
and each consisting of 731 rank and file with the same establishment
of officers as a king's regiment of the line, and three more battalions
of sepoys were raised. Clive then organised the Bengal army in three
brigades, each consisting of a troop of irregular cavalry, a company
of artillery, a battalion of European infantry, and seven battalions
of sepoys. In the Maratha War six sepoy battalions from the first
brigade were ordered to the West of India, but six new battalions
were raised to take their place in Bengal, and several battalions
trained by British officers for the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh were
incorporated in the Bengal army.
In 1780, in consequence of the defeat of Colonel Baillie and the
invasion by Hyder Ali of the Lower Carnatic, the Bengal Government
increased its military establishment by raising the strength of each
sepoy battalion to 1000 and dividing it into two battalions of five
companies. A major commanded each regiment, a captain each
battalion, and a lieutenant each company.
During the war in the Carnatics the Bengal Presidency assisted the
Madras Presidency with both European and native troops, and in
1785 the Bengal army was reorganised. Each of the two-battalion
regiments of sepoys was amalgamated into a single-battalion regiment
of ten companies, and the army was divided into six brigades. Each
of the three European battalions was divided into a two-battalion
regiment, allowing one European battalion to each brigadę,& the
1 Innes, op. cit. pp. 229, 230.
3 Broome, Bengal Army, p. 431.
5 Vol. v, p. 284.
2 Williams, Bengal Infantry, p. 5.
4 Idem, pp. 533-40.
• Inncs, op. cit. p. 280.
## p. 157 (#193) ############################################
RECRUITMENT OF OFFICERS
157
other troops assigned to each brigade being a company of artillery,
with lascars, and six battalions of sepoys. These orders remained in
force until 1796.
In 1765 the Madras establishment of seven battalions of sepoys was
increased to ten battalions, each 900 strong, a captain, a lieutenant
and an ensign being posted to each battalion; and in the following
year, when the Northern Circars (Sarkars) fell into the Company's
possession, eight new battalions were raised there. These, known as
the Circar battalions, were numbered separately from the Carnatic
battalions. They invariably served, in time of peace, in the Telugu
country, where they were raised, and were inferior, both in discipline
and courage, to the Carnatic battalions. The military force of the
Madras Presidency grew throughout the Mysore War, and was re-
organised in 1784, when the distinction between the Carnatic and
Circar battalions was abolished, the former being numbered from
1 to 21, and the latter from 22 to 29, while the raising of new bat-
talions brought the number up to thirty-five; but in 1785 the number
of battalions on the Madras establishment was reduced to twenty-one,
the Circar battalions being broken up and distributed among the
battalions which were retained. This introduced a “mixed”
system
of recruiting, under which the composition of each unit was a matter
of accident, “tempered from time to time by the predilections of the
officer who commanded it".
The Bombay army developed on a smaller scale. Its European
soldiers were formed into a regiment during the War of the Austrian
Succession, and before 1796 its sepoy battalions had reached twelve
in number.
The recruitment of European officers for the Company's troops was
at first a matter of difficulty. Until 1748 and again later, when the
seven sepoy battalions were formed, many sergeants were promoted
to the rank of ensign, but such promotions gradually became excep-
tional. “The great objection to these ranker-officers was their un-
seasonable drunkenness” and a tendency to continue to associate
with those of the rank from which they had risen. Both Clive and
Cootc observed these faults, and Coote remarked: “There is little
dependence on this kind of men's behaviour, who are raised from
sergeants to rank with gentlemen ”. 3. A few young writers followed
Clive's example, and received commissions.
Mixed blood was not a disqualification for the Company's com-
mission, which was often given to the sons of officers who had formed
irregular unions in India, as an acknowledgement of their fathers'
services, but colour was to some extent a bar, and later the Company
required of cadets appointed in India a certificate that they were not
a
the sons of wives or concubines of pure Indian blood. Foreign
i Wilson, Madras Army, 1, 224.
? Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitmenl, pp. 25-7.
• Dodwell, Nabobs of Madras, p. 42.
• Idem.
## p. 158 (#194) ############################################
158 THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
1
officers, deserters and released prisoners of war were sometimes ad-
mitted to the Company's service, and in some instances served it well,
but naturally could not always be trusted when opposed to their own
countrymen, and an attempt to maintain a Foreign Legion failed.
A Frenchman who served in the ranks of the Madras European
Regiment, but never received a commission, was Bernadotte, after-
wards a marshal of France and king of Sweden.
The most valuable source of recruitment was the royal army.
Officers of king's regiments leaving India were permitted to volunteer
for the Company's service, in which they usually received a step in
rank, and when peace in Europe led to the reduction of regiments
there was always a number of officers on half-pay and in reduced
circumstances who were glad to accept employment under the East
India Company. Such officers improved the efficiency, the social
status and the military spirit of the officers in the Company's armies.
When service in those armies became attractive the directors dis-
couraged local appointments, and took the military patronage, as it
became more valuable, into their own hands. They first sent out
volunteers, who served in the ranks until vacancies occurred, and
later, cadets, who were sent out as such, and received commissions as
soon as they had acquired a sufficient knowledge of drill and military
duties.
The native troops first employed against the French were Moplahs,
and “Moors” and Hindus from Mangalore and Tellicherri. Later,
in the Carnatic battalions, Muslims were the most numerous class,
Tamils coming next. The “Telingas” of the Circar battalions have
already been noticed, and in spite of their poor reputation as soldiers
they continued to be recruited after the amalgamation of the Carnatic
and Circar battalions, the classes in the mixed battalions coming in
the following order in numerical strength: (1) Muslims, (2) Telingas,
(3) Tamils, (4) Rajputs, Marathas and Brahmans, and (5) other
castes.
Of the quality of the early sepoy force various opinions were ex-
pressed, some very unfavourable, but the Carnatic regiments, at least,
fought well when well led, and against the low opinion of them held
by some of the Company's officials we may set the confession of Lally:
You would be surprised at the difference between the black troops of the English
and ours; it is greater than that between a Nawab and a cooly; theirs will even
venture to attack white troops, while ours will not even look at their black ones. ”
Nevertheless, the poor quality of recruits obtainable even in the
Carnatic was noticed as early as in 1788, and in 1795 the Madras
Government, probably in consequence of Lord Cornwallis's criticism
of the produce of their recruiting grounds, proposed to draw recruits,
1 Broome, op. cit. pp. 392, 393.
2 Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, chap. vii.
3 Idem, p. 12.
## p. 159 (#195) ############################################
SEPOY RECRUITMENT
159
to the number of six or seven hundred annually, from Bengal and
Bombay. The Bombay Government rejected the proposal, on the
ground that the natives of their presidency would not willingly serve
beyond its limits, and that they could not find, within those limits,
sufficient recruits for their own army, but the Supreme Government
agreed to supply recruits, not "stout Bengalese", as the originator of
the scheme, in his ignorance of Bengal and its inhabitants, had sug-
gested, but men more accustomed to military service. Two large
drafts were supplied, but the scheme was an utter failure. Owing to
the price of grain in the south, which was so high that a sepoy could
hardly live on his pay, and the uncongenial surroundings, it was found
impossible to keep the Bengal recruits with the colours, and they
deserted in such numbers that recruitment in the north was aban-
doned. 1
The Bengal army at first drew its recruits from the mixed classes
of adventurers to be found in the Bengal provinces, and from 1776
onwards from the kingdom of Oudh, enlisting chiefly Brahmans and
Rajputs, described as a brave, manly race of people. ”
It is not necessary to suppose that the discipline was exact, or the training perfect,
but both were infinitely superior to anything possessed by the Company's opponents.
The power of marching and manæuvring in solid formations, and of concentrating
fire, and the use of well-served guns enabled small bodies of the Company's soldiers
to overcome the loosely arrayed hordes of their adversaries. 3
In 1796 the armies of the three presidencies were, for the first time,
completely reorganised. 4 To Bengal were allotted three, and to
Madras two battalions, and to Bombay six companies of artillery, all
with complementary companies of lascars. Bengal was to maintain
three, and Madras and Bombay each two battalions of European
infantry, of ten companies, and Bengal and Madras were each to
maintain four regiments of regular native cavalry. The single-
battalion native infantry regiments were formed into regiments of
two battalions, of which Bengal had twelve, Madras eleven, and
Bombay six, with a single battalion of marines. The establishment of
British officers allowed to regiments of native cavalry and infantry
was nearly the same as in king's regiments. The reorganisation had
more than one serious defect. To the colonel commanding an infantry
regiment was transferred most of the authority which should have
been exercised by lieutenant-colonels commanding battalions, with
the result that the latter officers lost the respect of the sepoys. Both
Sir Thomas Munro and Sir John Malcolm considered the establish-
ment of British officers excessive, and believed that it would diminish
the sense of responsibility in the native officers. They would have
preferred the allotment, made after the Mutiny of 1857, of six or seven
1 Dodwell, Sepoy Recruitment, pp. 33-7.
• Imperial Gazetteer of India, iv, 330.
Malcolm, Political History, pp. 495-6.
Broome, op. cit. p. 503.
• Idem, iv, 333.
## p. 160 (#196) ############################################
160 THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
British officers to a battalion, to act as field officers and regimental
staff, the command of companies being left to the native officers; but
the provision of British officers was less generous than it appeared to
be. As the Company's territories extended, and it attended more
closely toʻmatters of administrative detail, Europeans were required
for many duties for which the establishment of the civil service was
insufficient, and with which its members were not well fitted to cope.
Public works, the staff and commissariat of the army, “political”,
that is to say diplomatic service at the courts of ruling chiefs, surveys,
the supervision of trunk roads, the administration of newly annexed
territory, the command and control generally of contingents and
irregular troops raised in native states and newly annexed territory,
and, later, the control of the civil police, were provided almost en-
tirely by officers of the army, and those deputed on such duties
remained on the establishments of their regiments, which they rejoined
when the regiment was ordered on active service, or when, by seniority,
they succeeded to the command. Allowing, besides this heavy drain,
for the number of officers on furlough, now, with pensions, granted
for the first time, the number of officers actually on duty with a regi-
ment of cavalry or a battalion of infantry was seldom more than half
the establishment. 1
The sources of recruitment have already been described. The
quality of the officers was for some time poor, with several brilliant
exceptions. This was partly due to the Company's treatment of its
military officers, which was parsimonious in the extreme, and pro-
duced many unfortunate results. The material inducement offered to
tempt candidates was an initial salary of about £120 a year, often in
an expensive environment and a noxious climate. It was practically
impossible for a young officer to keep out of debt. To set up the most
modest of households cost about £200,2 and an extract from a junior
officer's account-book shows his expenditure, in no way extravagant,
to have been Rs. 265 a month, while his pay was Rs. 195. Sir Thomas
Munro, who joined the Madras army in 1780, and held a staff ap-
pointment as a lieutenant, thus describes his attempts to live within
his means:
My dress grows tattered in one quarter whilst I am establishing funds to repair
it in another, and my coat is in danger of losing the sleeves, while I am pulling it
off to try a new waistcoat.
Later, while holding a comparatively lucrative civil appointment, he
writes:
I have dined to-day on porridge, made of half-ground flour instead of oatmeal,
and I shall most likely dine to-morrow on plantain fritters, this simplicity of fare
being the effect of necessity, not of choice.
If the Company had many bad bargains it had largely itself to thank.
1 Official Army Lists.
2 Williamson, East India Vade Mecum, 1, 173.
• Carey, Good Old Days, 1, 233.
• Idem, I, 229.
3
## p. 161 (#197) ############################################
ARMY LIFE
161
Cadets were at first allowed to find accommodation for themselves
in punch-houses, but were afterwards lodged in barracks, and sub-
jected to discipline. Early in the nineteenth century a college was
established at Barasat, fourteen miles from Calcutta, where they were
instructed in drill and the Hindustani language, but the officers in
charge of them lived at a distance, and except in class and on parade
they were subjected to hardly any control or discipline. The ruin of
many promising young men, the premature deaths of not a few, and
the disgrace and shame that overtook no mean portion of the crowd
of unfortunate youths, led to the closing of the college in 1811, and
cadets were then posted to regiments, but, owing to the comparatively
small number of British officers then doing duty with most native regi-
ments, discipline was not sufficiently strict, and it would have been
well for the Company's armies if Sir Thomas Munro's advice that all
· young men destined for native regiments should be attached for a year
or two to a British regiment, in order to learn their duties and acquire
military discipline, had been followed then, instead of much later.
The college for cadets at Addiscombe was founded in 1812.
The life of regimental officers in cantonments far from presidency
towns was insufferably dull and tedious. Books, book-clubs and news-
papers were few; there was practically no civilised female society, and
the monotony of the long hot-weather days, perforce spent indoors,
was dreary. Some procured books for themselves, and studied their
profession, the languages of the country, and history; some practised
music and painting, and some indulged in sport, but the sole relaxa-
tions of many were gambling and drinking. Their drink, beer, claret,
sherry, madeira and brandy, was expensive, and, if indulged in to
excess, unwholesome in the Indian climate. The mortality was great,
and ill-health, gambling and drinking produced tempers ready to take,
and equally ready to give, offence. Duels were not uncommon, and
were sometimes fatal. Concubinage was the natural result of the
absence of European women.
The number of European women to be found in Bengal and its dependencies
(early in the nineteenth century] cannot amount to two hundred and fifty, while
the European male inhabitants of respectability, including military officers, may
be taken at four thousand,
writes one officer, in a book” dedicated to the directors of the East
India Company. “The case speaks for itself”, he continues, “for, even
T
if disposed to marry, the latter have not the means. ” Young officers
could not be expected to accept a state of lifelong celibacy, and the
native “housekeeper" was an established institution. From such
unions, and from the marriages of European soldiers, sprang the class
known first as East Indians, then as Indo-Britons, then as Eurasians,
Carey, op. cit. I, 236–43.
· Buckle, Bengal Artillery, pp. 33, 34.
3 Williamson, op. cit. 1, 453.
CHIVI
11
## p. 162 (#198) ############################################
162 THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
and now, officially but inaccurately, as “Anglo-Indians”. These
irregular unions were recognised not only by the officers' comrades
and superiors, but by the court of directors, who perceived that a
body of officers living with native mistresses would cost them less than
officers married to ladies of their own class and nation, and requiring
provision for their families. After the introduction of the furlough
rules, and as India became more accessible, the standard of morals
gradually improved, and, though it was long before the native mistress
ceased to be an institution, she retired 1, y degrees into the background,
and finally disappeared.
In 1824 the armies of the three presidencies, having grown greatly
in numbers during the third Maratha, the Pindari, and the Nepal
wars, were again reorganised. The two-battalion regiments of native
infantry were divided into single-battalion regiments, of which Bengal
now had sixty-eight, Madras fifty-two, and Bombay twenty-four. The
artillery was more than doubled in strength, and was divided into
brigades and batteries of horse, and battalions and companies of foot,
artillery. Bengal and Madras each had eight, and Bombay three
regiments of regular native cavalry, and Bengal had, in addition, five,
and Bombay three regiments of irregular cavalry. 1
In the same year the first Burmese War broke out, and three regiments
of Bengal infantry, ordered to march overland to Arakan, providing
their own transport, mutinied. Whether or not transport, as was urged
on their behalf, was unprocurable, there is no doubt that it was most
difficult to obtain, and most costly, and the men suspected that the
order was a device to compel them to cross the “black water”, and
thus to break their caste. Their petitions were disregarded, they broke
into mutiny, and they were““shot down and sabred on parade”. The
commander-in-chief protested against the finding of the court of
enquiry that the mutiny was “an ebullition of despair against being
compelled to march without the means of doing so”, but it was
certainly just.
The Company's behaviour to its military forces was too obviously
that of a group of traders towards their servants ever to command
from them that unquestioning loyalty and obedience with which the
royal troops served the king, and the record of disaffection and
mutinies in its armies is a long one. In 1674 and 1679 the European
force in Bombay mutinied in consequence of reductions in its pay, 4
and in 1683 Captain Richard Keigwin, commanding that force,
having been deprived of his seat in council, and the allowances
attached to it, rebelled against the Company, and declared that he
held the fort and island of Bombay on behalf of the king. Vice-
Admiral Sir Thomas Grantham eventually persuaded him, on the
1 Imperial Gazetteer of India, iv, 336.
2 Idem, iv, 336.
• Malcolm, Political History, p. 484.
• Malabari, op. cit. pp. 189, 190.
## p. 163 (#199) ############################################
MUTINIES
163
promise of a free pardon, to surrender in accordance with the royal
command, and he left for England. 1
In 1758 nine captains of the Bengal European Regiment, resenting
their supersession by officers of the Madras and Bombay detachments,
which were incorporated with the regiment, resigned their com-
missions together, but Clive dealt firmly with them. Six were dismissed
the service, and the other three were restored, with loss of seniority,
on expressing their contrition. In 1764 a mutiny in the Bengal Euro-
pean Regiment, fomented by the large numbers of foreigners who
had been enlisted, was suppressed, but was followed by a mutiny of
the sepoys, who were discontented with their share of the prize-money,
and with a new code of regulations and system of manquvres intro-
duced by Major Hector Munro, then commanding the Bengal army.
Munro quelled this mutiny with great, but not unnecessary severity,
the leading mutineers being blown from guns in the presence of their
disaffected comrades. "
The mutiny of the British officers of the Bengal army caused by the
reduction of batta, or field allowance, has been described in volume v. 5
In 1806 a mutiny broke out in the native ranks of the Madras army.
Orders had been issued that the sepoys were to wear shakos instead
of turbans, that they were to shave their beards, and that caste-marks
and ear-rings were not to be worn on parade. The men regarded these
orders as an attack on their religion, and the garrison of Vellore,
where some of the Mysore princes were interned, hoisted the Mysore
flag, and murdered their British officers and some of the European
soldiers, but the remnant of these, under Sergeant Brodie, held out
against them until a small force under Colonel Gillespie arrived from
Arcot, blew open the gates of the fortress, cut down 400 mutineers,
and captured nearly all the rest. There had also been trouble at
Hyderabad, but Gillespie's prompt action crushed the mutiny.
In 1809 a "white mutiny” broke out in the Madras army. Some
of its senior officers had personal grievances, some allowances had
been reduced, and the pay of the officers generally was less than that
of those on the Bengal establishment, but their chief complaint was
that the officers of the king's service monopolised the favours of the
local government, and held most of the staff appointments and
“situations of active trust, respectability, and emolument”, as they
were described by Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Arthur St Leger, one
of the leaders of the movement. The relative status of the officers of
the king's and the Company's services had long been a thorny ques-
tion, and the case for the Company's officers was thus moderately
>
1 Vol. v, p. 102, supra.
· Inncs, op. cit. pp. 71, 72.
• Idem, pp. 179-84.
• Broome, op. cit. pp. 458-61.
Pp. 178-80, and Broome, op. cit. chap. vi.
• Wilson, op. cit. in, chap. xviii.
5
## p. 164 (#200) ############################################
164 THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
stated by Colonel (afterwards Major-General Sir John) Malcolm,
writing in 1811:
If it (the British Empire in India] cannot afford to give high pecuniary rewards,
it should purchase the services of men of birth and education; and remunerate the
great sacrifices which they make in entering the native army of India by approba-
tion, rank, and honours; and, instead of leaving them in a state of comparative
obscurity, depressed by the consideration that they are an inferior service, and that
military fame, and the applause of their King and country, are objects placed
almost beyond their hopes; their minds should be studiously elevated to these
objects; and they should be put upon a footing which would make them have an
honourable pride in the service to which they belong. This they never can have
(such is the nature of military feeling), while they consider themselves one shade
even below another, with which they are constantly associated. "
The officers of the Madras army had long been discontented, and
the commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General Hay Macdowell, who
sympathised with them, had done nothing to allay their discontent,
and had left for England before it reached its climax. Sir George
Barlow, the governor, at first acted injudiciously, and at Masulipatam
the officers of the European Regiment openly defied the orders of
government. The mutiny spread to Gooty, Secunderabad, Jalna,
Bellary, Cumbum, Trichinopoly, Dindigul, Madras, Pallamcottah,
Cannanore, Quilon and Seringapatam, the troops in the last-named
place rising in arms against the government. Treasure was seized,
acts of violence were committed, and the intention of the mutineers
appeared to be the subversion of the civil government. At length
vigorous action was taken. European troops were obtained from
Ceylon, and the officers who were in revolt were called upon to sign
a test, or declaration of obedience. The influence of the governor-
general, Lord Minto, and of such officers as Colonels Close and Conran,
of Colonel Montresor and Captain Sydenham at Secunderabad, and
Colonel Davis at Seringapatam, the fear lest the king's troops should
be employed against them, the lukewarm support of the sepoys when
they understood that the quarrel was not theirs, and the removal of
many officers from their regiments, when their places were taken by
king's officers, brought them to reason. Eventually no more than
twenty-one were selected for punishment, as examples to the rest. Of
these one died, four were cashiered, and sixteen dismissed the service;
but of those cashiered three, and of those dismissed twelve, were after-
wards restored. This leniency amounted to an admission that the
offence of the officers, grave though it was, was not unprovoked. ?
The growth of the presidency armies failed to keep pace with that
of the Company's territories and responsibilities, and it was found
necessary to raise local corps, “more rough and ready than the regular
army”,3 for the defence of new territories and the protection of native
ruling chiefs. In the Mysore and Maratha wars the Nizam, as the
1 Malcolm, Political History, pp. 482, 483.
2 Malcolm, Observations; Cardew, White Mutiny.
: Imperial Gazetteer of India, IV, 337:
) 3
## p. 165 (#201) ############################################
LOCAL AND IRREGULAR CORPS
165
Company's ally, had provided contingents of troops, and Arthur
Wellesley had found the contingent provided in 1803 inefficient and
useless. As the Company maintained by treaty a large subsidiary
force for the protection of the Nizam and his dominions, it was entitled
to demand that he should provide troops fit to take the field with it
and this demand led to the establishment of the Hyderabad con-
tingent, a force of four regiments of cavalry, four field batteries and
six battalions of infantry, officered, but not on the same scale as the
Company's regular troops, by “respectable Europeans”. ?
The fighting qualities of the Gurkhas were discovered in the Nepal
War (1814-16), and a few irregular battalions of Gurkhas were
raised. The first, the Malaon Regiment, was incorporated in the line,
in 1850, as the 66th Bengal Native Light Infantry, but in 1861, after
the Mutiny, it and four other Gurkha battalions were removed from
the line and numbered separately.
In 1838, when the Company foolishly undertook the restoration of
Shah Shuja to. the throne of Afghanistan,4 an irregular force was
raised in India for his service, and the 3rd Infantry, which had dis-
tinguished itself in the defence of Kalat-i-Ghilzai,5 was retained in
the Company's service, at first as an irregular regiment, but after the
Mutiny incorporated in the line as the 12th Bengal Native Infantry.
In 1846, after the first Sikh War, a brigade of irregular troops was
raised for police and general duties on the Satlej frontier, and to it was
added the Corps of Guides, a mixed regiment of cavalry and infantry,
which was incorporated in 1849, after the second Sikh War,” in an
irregular force, known later as the Panjab Frontier Force, raised and
formed for duty in the Panjab and on the North-West Frontier. It
consisted at first of three field batteries, five regiments of cavalry, five
of infantry, and the Corps of Guides, to which were added shortly
afterwards a company of garrison artillery, a sixth regiment of Panjab
infantry, five regiments of Sikh infantry, and two mountain batteries,
and in 1876 all its artillery was converted into mountain batteries.
This force, which did excellent service against the mutineers in 1857
and 1858, remained under the control of the local government of the
Panjab for many years before it was placed under that of the com-
mander-in-chief.
A local force was raised after the annexation of Nagpur in 1854,
and the Oudh Irregular Force after the annexation of Oudh in 1856,
but the former disappeared in the Mutiny, and the latter was broken
up shortly after it.
The history of the great Mutiny of the Bengal army, which raged
for nearly two years, is recorded in the following chapter. The in-
eptitude of senile and incompetent officers, and the pathetic con-
1 Burton, History of the Hyderabad Contingent, chap. iv.
• See vol. v, pp. 377-9.
Vol. v, pp. 495-521.
• Idem, pp. 548–53.
? Idem, pp. 555-7.
2 Idem.
5 Idem, p. 515
## p. 166 (#202) ############################################
166 THE ARMIES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
fidence of old colonels, in whom esprit de corps was so strong that even
while regiments lying beside their own were butchering their officers
they refused to believe in the possibility of treason in their own men,
made the tragedy more ghastly than it need have been. The de-
moralisation of the Bengal army was due to more than one cause. The
great additions recently made to the Company's dominions demanded
for the administration of the newly acquired territory, and for the
irregular troops and police required for its defence and for the main-
tenance of peace and order, a far larger number of British officers
than the civil service could provide, and the principal source of
supply was the Bengal army. Those to whom the government of the
new territories was entrusted refused to be satisfied with any but the
most active and zealous officers whom the army could supply, and
the army was thus deprived of the services of a large number of its
best officers, the insufficient number left for regimental duty con-
sisting, to some extent, of the Company's bad bargains. Another
reason for the decay of discipline was the system of promotion, which
was regulated solely by seniority, so that many failed to reach com-
missioned rank before the time when, in the interests of the service,
they should have been superannuated, and were inclined to regard
their promotion rather as a reward for long service than as admission
to a sphere of more important duties. In the Madras and Bombay
armies seniority, as a qualification for promotion, was tempered by
selection, and the British officers refused to pander to the caste
prejudices of their men to the same extent as the British officers in
Bengal. Partly for these reasons, and partly owing to their dislike of
the Bengal army and its airs of superiority, these armies remained
faithful; and the irregular forces of the Panjab joined with glee in
crushing the “Pandies”, as the mutineers were called, from Pande,
one of the commonest surnames among the Oudh Brahmans, which
had been borne by a sepoy who had shot the adjutant of his regiment
at Barrackpore, a few months before the Mutiny broke out.
## p. 167 (#203) ############################################
CHAPTER X
>
>
THE MUTINY
“I WISH”, wrote the late Lord Cromer, “the younger generation
',
of Englishmen would read, mark, learn and inwardly digest the
history of the Indian Mutiny; it abounds in lessons and warnings.
During the generation that preceded the Mutiny various influences
were weakening the discipline of the sepoy army in the presidency of
Bengal, and awakening discontent, here and there provoking thoughts
of rebellion, in certain
groups of the civil population. In considering
the measures that produced these results it should be borne in mind
that the mere fact of their having caused discontent does not condemn
them. While some were injudicious, others were beneficial, and some
helped also to minimise the disturbances to which discontent gave
rise.
In the settlement of the North-Western Provinces, by which
arrangements were made for the collection of the revenue, the re-
sponsible officers, anxious to promote the greatest happiness of the
greatest number, decided that the agreement should be concluded,
not with middlemen, but with the actual occupants of the land, who
were generally either single families or village communities. Ac-
cordingly they deprived the talukdars, through whom the native
government had collected the revenue, and who were really the
territorial aristocracy, of the right of settling for any land to which
they could not establish a clear proprietary title. At the same time
holders of rent-free tenures, many of which had been fraudulently
acquired before the Company's government was established, were
required to prove the original validity of their titles; and since even
those whose estates had been obtained honestly were unable to pro-
duce documentary evidence, the tenures were for the most part
abolished, and the revenue was augmented for the benefit of the
government. The sale law, under which the estates of proprietors
were bought by speculators who were strangers to their new tenants,
aroused no less bitterness; and under Dalhousie the policy of re-
sumption was developed. In Bombay, for instance, the Inam Com-
mission enquired into a large number of titles to land and resumed
a large number of estates. 2
In 1853 an event occurred which provoked resentment that was
not immediately manifested. Baji Rao, the ex-Peshwa with whom
Wellesley had concluded the Treaty of Bassein, died, and his adopted
son, Nana Sahib, demanded that his pension should be continued to
1 Cf. pp. 80-4, supra.
· Cf. Baden Powell, Land Systems of British India, II, 302 sqq.
## p. 168 (#204) ############################################
168
THE MUTINY
a
him. In accordance with the terms of the original agreement the
demand was rejected, although the Nana was allowed to retain rent
free the Peshwa's landed estate.
The annexations which Dalhousie carried out under the title of
lapse, and by which he not only consolidated the empire, strengthened
its military communications, and increased its resources, but also
benefited millions who had suffered from misgovernment, caused
uneasiness to many who had submitted without any sense of injustice
to annexation that had followed conquest, and in one case provoked
passionate indignation. Under this right, Dalhousie annexed Satara,
Nagpur, Jhansi, and several minor principalities. The annexation of
Oudh was of a different kind. Misgovernment so scandalous that
even Colonel Sleeman and Henry Lawrence, those sympathetic
champions of native rulers, urged that the paramount power should
assume the administration, impelled the Board of Control and the
court of directors to insist upon a peremptory course which Dalhousie,
remembering the fidelity of the king of Oudh, was reluctant to adopt.
He urged that merely to withdraw'the British troops by whose support
the king had been maintained upon the throne, on the ground that
he had not fulfilled the conditions of the treaty concluded by Wellesley,
would compel him to accept a new treaty which should provide for
the administration by British officers in his name; the directors
decided that he should be required to accept such a treaty with the
alternative of submitting to annexation. As he rejected the proffered
treaty, which, while it vested the government in the Company,
guaranteed to him the royal title, an adequate pension, and main-
tenance for all collateral branches of his family, Oudh was forthwith
annexed. Though Muhammadan pride was doubtless offended, such
discontent as the annexation aroused mattered little in comparison
with the manner in which it was carried into effect. Perhaps it was
of no great moment that the revenues of the province were not
exclusively appropriated, as Sleeman and Lawrence had recom-
mended, to the benefit of the people and the royal family; nor would
it be just to blame Dalhousie because he decided that the provisional
settlement of the revenue should be made with the actual occupants
of the soil, and because the talukdars, although their claims were for
the most part examined with scrupulous fairness, resented the de-
cisions that compelled them to surrender their villages, and the
restraint that forced them to cease from controlling their neighbours.
What did cause indignation was that after the departure of Dalhousie,
orders which he had given were disregarded. For more than a year
no allowances were paid to the king's stipendiaries, among whom
were some of his relations; the officiating chief commissioner took
possession of a palace which had been expressly reserved for the royal
family; the officials employed by the late court were excluded from
pensions; the disbandment of the king's army had thrown professional
>
## p. 169 (#205) ############################################
DALHOUSIE'S ADMINISTRATION
169
1
soldiers upon the world with inadequate means of support; and in
many cases the demands of the settlement officers were excessive.
Nothing was done to guard against the disturbances which adminis-
trative changes might produce. Although Dalhousie had resolved to
disarm the country and raze every fort, his successor did nothing,
and supposed that one weak regiment of infantry and one battery of
artillery would be sufficient to keep the peace.
More provocative than settlements and annexations were other
measures by which Dalhousie endeavoured to confer upon India the
benefits of Western civilisation. In the railways which he began to
construct, the telegraph wires by which he connected Calcutta with
Peshawar and Bombay, and Bombay with Madras, the canal which
he linked to the sacred stream of the Ganges, Brahmans fancied that'
sorcery was at work. The more conservative elements of native society
suspected the European education by which he hoped to enlarge the
minds of the young, but by which the priests felt that their power was
endangered; and laws such as that permitting the remarriage of Hindu
widows, which he contemplated and which his successor passed, gave
deep offence.
Since it is impossible to describe by any comprehensive generalisa-
tion the sentiments of a vast heterogeneous population, divided into
numerous groups, the respective characteristics of which were more
dissimilar than those of the peoples of Europe, let us approach the
subject from different points of view. The Hindus, except in so far as
they had been offended by the measures of Dalhousie, were not
antagonistic to the government on the score of religion. While some
Muhammadans admired the strength and the justice of British rule,
others—notably the Wahabis—resented the loss of the supremacy
which their forefathers had enjoyed, and hoped to destroy as enemies
of Islam the aliens who had seized it. The mercantile and shop-
keeping classes, indeed all who knew that their position and pros-
perity were staked upon the continuance of orderly rule, were dis-
posed to support the British Government so long as it could keep the
upper hand and secure to them the enjoyment of their gains. The
magnates who had lost their lands were naturally resentful. The
countless millions who lived by tilling the soil did not care what
government might be in power, if it protected them and did not tax
them too heavily; but in some districts, especially in Bengal, they had
suffered so much from the venality of the police and the harpies who
infested the courts of justice that they were ill-disposed. In some parts
of the peninsula, notably in the Panjab and Rajputana, the people
were aware that they had profited by British rule. Ponder these words
of Sir John Strachey:
The duty was once imposed upon me of transferring a number of villages which
had long been included in a British district to one of the best governed of the native
1 Lee-Warner, Dalhousie, 11, 338–9; Baird, Private Letters of Dalhousie, pp. 401-3.
## p. 170 (#206) ############################################
170
THE MUTINY
states. I shall not forget the loud and universal protests of the people against the
cruel injustice with which they considered they were being treated. Everyone who
has had experience of similar cases tells the same story. Nevertheless I cannot say
that our government is loved; it is too good for that.
Reforms which interfered with native usages were resented as meddle-
some. Differences of colour, of religion, of custom, and of sympathies
separated the masses, which differed so widely among themselves,
from the ruling class. It is true that the more thoughtful acknowledged
that the British government was juster, more merciful, and more
efficient than any that had preceded it: but still many thought regret-
fully of the good old times, when, if there had been less peace, there
had been more stir, more excitement, and a wider field for adventure;
a
when, if there had been less security for life and property, there had
been more opportunities for gratifying personal animosities and
making money; when, if taxation had been heavier, there had been
some chance of evading it; when, if justice had been more uncertain,
there had been more room for chicanery and intrigue. The rulers
did not conceal their sense of racial superiority, and the French critic
who described their administration as "just, but not amiable” probed
a weak spot. Though the examples of Henry Lawrence, and John
Nicholson, and Meadows Taylor, prove that individuals could win
personal loyalty and even devotion, there was no real loyalty, except
in the rare instances of such men as the illustrious Muhammadan,
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, towards the alien government. For efficiency
was not enough to keep India contented; and since, as Lord Cromer
wrote, the Englishman is
always striving to attain two ideals, which are apt to be mutually destructive—the
ideal of good government, which connotes the continuance of his own supremacy,
and the ideal of self-government, which connotes the whole or partial abdication
of his supreme position-
there were Anglo-Indian statesmen, even before the Mutiny, who
desired to associate Indians with British rule. As early as 1818 Lord
Hastings looked forward to a
time not very remote when England will. . . wish to relinquish the domination
which she has gradually and unintentionally assurned over this country, and from
which she cannot at present recede;1
a few years later Sir Thomas Munro declared that eventually it would
“probably be best for both countries that the British control over
India should be gradually withdrawn";' and Dalhousie, the most
autocratic of governors-general, urged in vain that parliament should
authorise him to nominate an Indian member to his legislative council. 3
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, one of the wisest of Muhammadans, after-
wards declared that the absence of such members, who would have
kept their colleagues in touch with popular sentiment, prevented the
i Private Journal, 11, 326. 2 Gleig, Life of Munro, II, 388.
• Lee-Warner, op.
