No More Learning

It follows that anything which has the nature of presently being produced does not have the nature of being in the process of production. It follows that whatever does not have the nature of presently being produced is also not in the process of production, because that which is not presently being produced is contrary to that which is. )
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L6: [b. Refuting the assertion that a thing existing between past and future is that which is in the process of being produced]
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\ ###
\ 368.
\ For anyone to whom the two are
\ Impossible without an intermediate,
\ There is nothing in the process of production,
\ For it too would have an intermediate.
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(i. e. So let's assume there is a step between the initial cause and the final effect along the process of production. This intermediate product also has its own production, its own "being in the process of production", and its own intermediate step. There would be infinite regress again, and it would explain nothing at all. )
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(-- Assertion: That which is in the process of production exists, since it is located between the past and future. These two times may be posited in relation to what is presently being produced.
-- Answer: In any opponent's system in which there is definitely an intermediate stage without which the past and future cannot exist, that which is presently being produced could not exist by way of its own entity, since there would be infinite regress, in that anything in the process of production would require another intermediate stage and that one yet another and so on. )
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L6: [c. Refuting the assertion that a thing before it is produced is what is in the process of being produced]
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\ ###
\ 369.
\ Since the process of production is the arising
\ of the produced through cessation,
\ That which is presently being produced
\ Appears to be a different entity.
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(i. e. An intermediary step, an object representing the half-produced final product, would be the cause of the final product. But, as shown previously, no inherently existing cause could be found anywhere. There is no absolute cause; it could always turn out to be something else because of an infinity of other causes and conditions. It is called a cause conventionally after the product is seen - and vice versa. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. )
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( -- Question: If the half-produced is not in the process of production, what is?
-- Assertion: "the 4 lines of this verse"
-- Since the process of production is, for example, the sprout's being produced through cessation of the seed, something in a state where its production has begun is said to be in the process of production. Thus what is presently being produced appears to be a different entity from that which is half produced and half unproduced.
-- Answer: If one could point to anything and say "This thing has been produced from this thing which is in the process of production," one could identify something in the process of production existent by way of its own entity in relation to the thing produced from it. )
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\ ###
\ 370.
\ When a thing is produced there cannot be
\ Anything in the process of production.
\ If the produced is in the process
\ of production, why is it being produced?
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(i. e. If it was sure that the final product was in the process of being produced then there would be no need to produce anything else from this step on. The intermediary step, as a cause of the final product would be useless because the final product would be sure to be produced because "in the process of being produced". )
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(-- ab: However when a thing has been produced, there cannot be anything in the process of production which exists by way of its own entity, for what was in the process of production has ceased. A produced thing which has arisen from such a process of production and which would permit its inference does not exist.
-- Assertion: The produced is in the process of production.
-- Answer: "lines cd" + If the produced is in the process of production, why is it being produced again? This is unfeasible because it has already been produced. )
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L6: [d. Refuting the assertion that the unproduced is what is in the process of being produced] L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
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\ ###
\ 371.
\ A thing in the process of production is said
\ To be the entirely unproduced arising.
\ Since there is no difference, why should the pot
\ Not be considered as non-existent?
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(i. e. The intermediary step, the object in the middle, as a cause of the final product, cannot be the same as the final product, nor different. It cannot be the same because it is not perceive as the same, and doesn't have the same characteristics and effect. Until it is totally produced it is not the same. Nothing stays the same even for an infinitesimal moment. Nothing exist and change. )
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(-- Assertion: A thing which is presently being produced is said to be produced, for although unproduced, it is approaching production.
-- Answer: If a thing that is in the process of being produced is said to be produced because, even though it is entirely unproduced, it is approaching production, why should a pot while performing its function not be considered a non- functional thing? It follows that this is a reasonable assertion, since there is no difference between the produced and the unproduced. )
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L7: [(2) Refuting the justification]
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\ ###
\ 372.
\ That which is presently being produced,
\ Though incomplete, is other than unproduced.
\ Yet also since other than produced,
\ The unproduced is being produced.
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(i. e. So there is no such thing as being produced, unproduced, half-produced, and so on . . . All of these are mere concepts attributed after the facts and based on mere conventions. There is no inherent production that can be directly observed. )
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(-- The opponent argues that if neither that which is already produced and therefore functional nor that which is unproduced and therefore non-functional is being produced, what is being produced must be that which is presently undergoing production. To demonstrate that this too is not produced in and of itself, that which is in the process of being produced is next investigated. Is it identifiable as half produced or half unproduced? Does it already have an identity or not? Is it findable as something between the past and the present? Can one find anything, when an attempt is made in this way to identify the process of production and that which is being produced?
-- Assertion: There is a difference between that which is in the process of being produced and the unproduced. That which is in the process of production is said to be associated with the activity of production, whereas the unproduced is not necessarily associated with the activity of production.
-- Answer: Since a thing in the process of being produced is associated with the activity of production, you assert that even though it has not completed that activity, it is other than unproduced and future. Yet in that case, since a thing in the process of being produced is other than something produced, you are saying that the unproduced is being produced. ) .
L7: [(3) Necessity of accepting that the unproduced is being produced, if that which is in the process of being produced is produced
by way of its own entity]
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\ ###
\ 373.
\ That which is presently being produced,
\ Though not yet existent, is later said to exist.
\ The unproduced is thus being produced --
\ But the non-existent does not arise.
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(i. e. Until a product is totally produce it is as good as non-existent, but it is certainly not half-produced. )
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(-- Since that which is presently being produced is other than something produced, you must accept that it is unproduced. You might claim that anything in the process of being produced exists as a thing, because, even though it did not exist previously, it has afterwards become associated with the activity of production. If on this account you say that an entirely unproduced thing associated with the activity of production is being produced, that too is incorrect. An unproduced thing, referred to as non-existent, has not attained its entity. It does not undergo production, because it is not engaged in that activity. )
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\ ###
\ 374.
\ The complete is called existent.
L5: [3. Summarized meaning]
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\ The uncompleted is called non-existent.
\ When there is nothing in the process of production
\ What is being referred to as such?
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(i. e. The product is either existent (conventionally) or non-existent (conventionally), but there is no such thing as half- produced (inherently). )
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(-- That which has completed the activity of production is said to exist as a thing, and that which has not performed the activity of production is said not to exist as a thing. If neither that which has nor that which has not completed the activity of production is in the process of being produced, what is being referred to as presently being produced? Anything in the process of being produced does not have the least existence by way of its own entity. )
L3: [II. Concluding summary of the refutations of inherent existence [of production / origination, duration, cessation] ]
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\ ###
\ 375.
\ Since without a cause
\ There is no effect,
\ BOTH STARTING AND STOPPING
\ ARE NOT FEASIBLE.
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(i. e. The Middle Way about production / dependent origination: there is no inherent production, no inherent origination, duration and cessation, because they are all dependent on other causes and conditions. Everything is empty of inherent existence because everything is dependently arisen - even production / dependent origination. Causes and effects cannot exist independently of each other. They are interdependent. They are co-dependently arisen concepts. There is no absolute (inherently existing) cause, effect, causality, production, origination, duration, cessation. But that doesn't mean that they are totally non-existent - or that we should drop right now the teaching of dependent origination completely. They exist as mere conventions, they are useful, they could be used as adapted skillful means. There is no absolute causality, but nothing is without a cause, and no cause is without an effect. They are dependent on the mind, but not totally from the mind. They are like illusions, but not totally illusions. They are like the figures seen on the clouds, or the swirls seen at the surface of the ocean. Everything is: not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither. Cause and effect, like the two poles of any duality, are not different or separate, not the same; not simultaneous, not sequential. )
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(-- Through this investigation it becomes clear that causes and effects are interdependent, and that neither the arising of an effect nor the cessation of a cause occurs in and of itself.
-- Investigation by reasoning shows that there is no effect without a cause. Since cause and effect, then, do not truly exist and since the bases therefore do not truly exist, the sprout's starting to be produced and the seed's stopping to exist are not feasible by way of their own entity. Sutra says:
~ "Sentient beings, humans, those born from power whoever they may be.
~ None that were born and died here were born [inherently].
~ The nature of all things is empty like magician's illusions,
~ But the Forders are unable to recognize it. "
For instance, the men and women conjured by an illusionist cause the spectators of the magic, who think of them as men and women, to feel attraction and aversion. Though they also appear to the magician, he does not think of them in this way. They do not even appear to those who are unaffected by the spell. You must understand that these analogies apply respectively to the perception of common beings who have not understood dependent arising's emptiness of inherent existence, to the wisdom of subsequent attainment of the Exalted, and to the mediative equipoise of the Exalted. You should learn how conventional phenomena are established by conventional valid cognition and ultimate truth by conceptual and non-conceptual reasoning consciousness from the presentation in [Gateway for Conqueror Children], Explanation of [Shantideva's] "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds" and so forth. )
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
\ PRODUCTION AND DISINTEGRATION OF COMPOSITE THINGS
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\ ###
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\ ARE LIKE DREAMS AND LIKE ILLUSION.
\ When they are mere terms and mere imputation,
\ How could non-products be truly existent?
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(i. e. There is no possible direct perception of origination, duration and cessation as taught in the Abhidharma; this cannot be used to prove the inherent existence of functional things, or the non-existence of others. This is merely another adapted skillful means. It is useful for beginners who do not have the requisites to be taught the subtle emptiness, but it should not be grasped on as if it was an absolute truth. Holding to this mistake would inhibit the full completion of the path and the attainment of complete Enlightenment. We need a gradual path composed of more and more subtle methods and wisdom; only then is it getting more and more in accord with the real non-dual nature of everything, and creating less and less cause for suffering. -- Things are not inherently produced, last, grow old, and then ceased and completely become non-existent. All of this is just like a magician's act. )
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\ ###
\ This is the fifteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of that which constitutes products.
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This concludes the commentary on the fifteenth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of that which constitutes products, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
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L1: [Section II - B : Showing how to meditate on settling [the procedure between] spiritual guides and students by way of [explaining] the purpose of the chapters and eliminating remaining counter-arguments by misguided opponents. ]
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-- Chapter 16 - Refuting Remaining Counter-Arguments - The dharma door of non-duality and the irrefutability of the Middle Way - P. 289
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L2: [Chapter 16 - Refuting Remaining Counter-Arguments -
The dharma door of non-duality and the irrefutability of the Middle Way - P. 289]
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(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON SETTLING [THE PROCEDURE BETWEEN] SPIRITUAL GUIDES AND STUDENTS BY WAY OF [EXPLAINING] THE PURPOSE OF THE CHAPTERS AND ELIMINATING REMAINING COUNTER-ARGUMENTS BY MISGUIDED OPPONENTS.
-- So the problem is seeing things as truly existent.
-- The opponents cannot prove their own theses; and cannot find arguments to refute Madhyamika.
-- Things are not inherently existing, but that doesn't mean that they are completely non-existing. They exist in dependence.
-- No thesis could be proven. All theses are flawed. -- Holding a thesis is believing something is absolutely right, absolutely truly existent, that in a polarity there is a right side and a wrong side. All thesis are based on inherent existence, polarity, one of the four lemmas.
-- You can show the absurdity of a thesis, but never prove a thesis. -- Emptiness is a negation (of inherent existence) without affirming anything (emptiness of emptiness).
-- No reasoning, or analogies, can prove a thesis. -- Like, the reasons are to the thesis, what the parts are to the whole, what origination duration and cessation are to the impermanent things. They are not one, they are not separate.
-- The four positions are flawed. the Tetralemma: Although things are empty, they are non absolutely non-existent either. Things do not exist and then are empty. Things exist in dependence. --
-- This is not a thesis: Madhyamika do not advances a thesis of their own; they do not hold thesis that things exist, do not, or do and do not exit . . . And because of that, no counter-arguments can be found.
-- Emptiness of emptiness: Even emptiness is empty of true existence, because its objects are not truly existent.
-- Emptiness of Dependent Origination: There is a flow but no chunks in it; no real cause, effect, causality. These are all concepts dependent on each others.
-- Beyond dualities: It is not about choosing the right side in a polarity. Both sides are dependent on each other; there is no right or wrong side. Taking side is choosing a thesis. All theses are flawed.
-- Beyond the Tetralemma: Since all four theses are seen to be flawed, one should not accept any thesis of true existence. Refuting those four positions is the position of the Madhyamikas. And because of that they cannot be refuted themselves.
-- Two skilful means / antidotes: Like: you can use "emptiness" to show the absurdity any theory based on the reality of something; and you can use "Dependent Origination" to disprove the theory that everything is non-existent at all. But none of them is by itself a final absolute theory. -- Seems like the idea is to use those tools (Emptiness and Dependent Origination) to destroy any positions based on the four possible theories (things exist, do not exist, exist then do not exist, something else).
-- The Union of both: Ultimately one realize directly that things are empty because the dependently originate, and vice versa.
-- No dualities, no differentiation, everything should be seen as pure: Since the polarity between existent and non- existent is flawed, in emptiness everything is equal, identical; there is no objective discrimination possible. There is no absolute right in opposition to an absolute wrong. Everything is relative, dependent. Everything could be used for the path. Obsession with right and wrong is the problem. But don't tell this to an unprepared mind.
-- Seeing the emptiness of one thing is seeing the emptiness of all things -- they are all equal, everything has the same ultimate nature, no absolute discrimination.
-- What good is it to perceive emptiness? : Thinking of things as truly existent causes one to accumulate actions and thereby wander in cyclic existence, but through fully understanding that all phenomena lack inherent existence, one gains release from worldly existence.
-- Only through a very gradual adapted path can one be lead to the realization of the true nature of the three: subject, object, action. It is not like acquiring ordinary knowledge, or building something through a precise absolute method. It is not something we can buy.
-- About the "mind only thesis" of Vijnapdivadins : They say that consciousness is truly existent, and that external objects do not even exist conventionally. This is shown to be wrong, for both are alike in existing conventionally but not
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ultimately. So this view is neither a conventional view, nor an ultimate view. ) .
L3: [I. Briefly explaining the purpose of writing these chapters]
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\ ###
\ 376.
\ For various reasons, that which is empty
\ Appears nonetheless as if not empty.
\ These are refuted individually
\ By all the chapters.
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(i. e. The previous chapters have refuted the various arguments sustaining the belief in inherent existence. )
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(-- These chapters were written so that trainees may enter the state of liberation through giving up attachment to cyclic existence. Without ascertaining the meaning of emptiness as it actually is, one cannot develop enthusiasm for omniscience or even for liberation through the giving up of attachment to cyclic existence. The emptiness of inherent existence of all phenomena frightens those who have not heard sufficient teaching and are bound by the noose of clinging to a self. As already described, the path leading to freedom from worldly existence should therefore only be explained after first making the mind ready, in the way that the death of a king's beloved queen was conveyed to him. -- Even though things are empty of inherent existence, they appear not to be empty and are thought of in this way for various reasons, such as considering them truly existent. All of the preceding fifteen chapters refute these reasons individually. )
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L3: [II. Eliminating remaining counter-arguments raised by misguided opponents] L4: [A. Refuting reasoning to negate emptiness]
L5: [1. Impossibility of refuting the thesis of emptiness]
L6: [a. Actual meaning]
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\ ###
\ 377.
\ When the author and subject also exist
\ It is incorrect to call them empty.
\ Also with regard to these three, whatever
\ Arises in dependence does not exist.
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(i. e. Even the three Gems are empty - even emptiness: All objects of the three realms are empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. There is no exception at all. Even the three gems are empty of inherent existence, even the body speech and mind of a Buddha is empty of inherent existence. But this doesn't mean they are completely non- existent, useless, meaningless. They exist conventionally, as adapted skillful means. )
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(-- Opponents support the contention of true existence by pointing out that both the author, his subject-matter and the words he uses exist. Of course they exist, but not inherently as is claimed, because they depend upon one another.
-- Assertion: ab. If the chapters were written for these purposes, things are established as not being empty, since the author and the subject matter explained by the fifteen chapters exist. "Also" indicates the words that express the meaning of emptiness. Therefore it is incorrect to speak of the emptiness of inherent existence of things.
-- Answer: cd According to us, the words, subject matter and author are imputations dependent on one another and do not exist independently. Whatever arises in dependence does not exist inherently. Since the author, subject matter and words are all dependently imputed, these three also do not have inherent existence. Thus emptiness is well established. ) .
L6: [b. Refutation by virtue of parity]
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\ ###
\ 378.
\ If through flaws concerning emptiness
\ [Things] were established as not empty,
\ Why would emptiness not be established
\ Through flaws concerning lack of emptiness?
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(i. e. The meaning of the emptiness of emptiness: It is not because the dharma of emptiness is also empty of inherent existence, as stated in the previous verse, that everything else is inherently existing. Emptiness is a conventional truth, an antidote, introduced to fight other illusions. But once all other illusions are seen for what they really are, there is no more need for the antidote, emptiness. )
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(-- One can only refute another's thesis by convincingly establishing one's own, but the arguments advanced by the opponents to establish their theses remain as unproven as the theses themselves.
-- Assertion: If all of these were empty, the senses and their objects would be like donkeys' horns! But since they exist, things do exist inherently.
-- Answer: If on account of the [presumed] flaws concerning proof of emptiness, the words and so forth were not empty because one has to accept their existence, why would emptiness not be established through flaws concerning your proof that things are not empty? It follows that you should certainly accept emptiness because you accept the interdependence of the words and so forth. )
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L5: [2. Impossibility of proving the thesis of non-emptiness] L6: [a. Actual meaning]
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\ ###
\ 379.
\ In refuting the thesis of others
\ And in proving your own thesis,
\ If on the one hand you like to disprove,
\ Why do you not like to prove?
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(i. e. All views are flawed: It is impossible to prove any view, any theory. Why? Because any view is necessarily based on the inherent existence of something, and this can be disproved. )
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(The opponents try to disprove the Madhyamika position without being able to prove their own positions.
-- You cannot establish your own thesis merely by dismissing the proponents of emptiness.
-- Opponents asserting that things exist truly must refute the others' thesis of emptiness as well as prove their own thesis that things are truly existent. You, however, are simply engaged in dismissing the proponents of emptiness. If on the one hand you like disproving the thesis of others, why do you not like proving your own? You should! To proponents of emptiness whatever proofs you adduce to validate your own thesis remain as unestablished as that which is to be proved. You should therefore give up adherence to the thesis that things are inherently existent. )
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L6: [b. Refuting the justification]
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\ ###
\ 380.
\ When thoroughly investigated,
\ The non-existent is not a thesis.
\ Then all three, such as oneness,
\ Also are not theses.
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(i. e. The Middle Way consist of staying away from all four extremes, from any absolute view, like thinking things are truly inherently existent (realism), completely non-existent (idealism or nihilism), both existent and non-existent (dualism), neither existent nor non-existent (something else than the two, monism or Oneness). None of those four philosophical position can be proven; none is the absolute truth. In other words: Emptiness is not it. Dependent origination is not it. Both together is not it. And it is not something else either. The real nature of everything is beyond any of those views, system, concepts, antidotes. To affirm an absolute truth is necessarily wrong; any system presenting itself as having the absolute truth is necessarily wrong, and can be disproved. )
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(All theses are flawed, the Tetralemma:
-- Assertion ab: The thesis put forward by proponents of emptiness is not feasible since when thoroughly investigated, it is illogical. Something which does not exist as a knowable object is not an assertable thesis. Therefore the thesis put forward by proponents of true existence is established.
-- Answer: No thesis is feasible when investigated by the reasoning that analyzes the ultimate.
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-- cd: Since negated by this reasoning, truly existent oneness, otherness and ineffability asserted by any opponent are also not theses. Therefore one should not assert even the slightest true existence. )
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L5: [3. Refuting other reasoning]
L6: [a. Invalidity of negating emptiness of true existence by reason of direct perception]
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\ ###
\ 381.
\ Where a pot is directly perceptible,
\ The argument of emptiness is meaningless.
\ Here reasons appearing in textual systems
\ Are not [acceptable]; elsewhere they are.
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(i. e. It is not because it is written in the Abhidharma that it is absolutely true: We have already shown that it is absurd to pretend that one can have a direct perception of an object. So the teachings on this subject in the Abhidharma should not be taken as absolute, but merely as adapted skillful means for those not ready for the subtle emptiness, as provisional truths requiring further interpretation. They are not definitive truths like taught in the Heart of Wisdom Sutras, or in the teachings of Nagarjuna and his disciples. )
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(-- Assertion ab: The reason proving the pot empty of true existence is meaningless and ineffectual, for wherever there is a directly perceptible pot, that truly existent pot is, according to us, established by direct perception.
-- Answer cd: In relation to the thesis of proponents establishing emptiness of true existence through reasoning, reasons appearing in their opponents' textual systems are unacceptable, because they are engaged in rejecting them.
-- Question: Then are reasons from these textual systems inappropriate in all cases?
-- Answer: Elsewhere there is no incompatibility, since they pertain where both protagonists' tenets are similar. )
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L6: [b. Since emptiness exists, its opposite, true existence, is not feasible]
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\ ###
\ 382.
\ When there is nothing that is not empty,
\ How can emptiness be so?
\ When the one does not exist,
\ Why should the antidote exist?
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(i. e. Even emptiness is a mere temporary adapted skillful means: Emptiness is the antidote to inherent existence (realism), like Dependent Origination is the antidote to complete non-existence (nihilism). But none of them is the final absolute truth. Once one has completely eradicated the belief in inherent existence, there is no more need for its antidote. The same for dependent origination. )
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(Emptiness is not a characteristic of something really existing:
-- As part of a final refutation of extreme views, the fact that even emptiness lacks true existence is emphasized. If Madhyamika asserted that emptiness were truly existent, the phenomena which act as its basis would necessarily also be truly existent. However since no such assertion is made, how can these phenomena have true existence?
-- Assertion: You proponents of emptiness accept the entity of emptiness, and since emptiness is not feasible unless it relies on non-emptiness, things are truly existent.
-- Answer: It follows that the existence of emptiness does not establish its opposite, that there is true existence.
-- If emptiness were truly existent, truly existent things as its basis would be feasible, but as there is nothing that is not empty of true existence, how can emptiness be truly existent? Its basis cannot possibly be truly existent. Why, when the basis does not have true existence, would the antidote negating it be truly existent? For emptiness to be truly existent, its basis would have to have a truly existent nature. Fundamental Wisdom says:
~ If the slightest thing were not empty
~ Emptiness would have some existence and so forth. The Two Truths says:
~ Since the object of negation is non-existent,
~ The negation clearly does not exist as [its own] reality. ) .
L4: [B. Refuting adherence to theses which fall into extremes]
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L5: [1. Actual refutation - [the dharma door of non-duality]] L6: [a. Refuting that the non-thesis is a thesis]
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\ ###
\ 383.
\ If there were a thesis, absence of the thesis
\ Would in entity be a thesis,
\ But where there is no thesis
\ What can be the counter-thesis?
.
(i. e.