By means of these writs, customs officers were to
receive power to search for contraband goods in any house
or shop, and, in case of resistance, to break open doors,
chests, etc.
receive power to search for contraband goods in any house
or shop, and, in case of resistance, to break open doors,
chests, etc.
Arthur Schlesinger - Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution
iv, p.
411.
1The dilatory course of the British government in this matter seems
scarcely excusable. The British merchants in the American trade, with
the backing of the colonial agents, worked for the repeal of the Cur-
rency Act of 1764, and proposed a plan by which colonial bills of credit
should be legal tender for everything except sterling debts payable in
Great Britain. The ministry refused in 1767 to listen to this plan,
partly because of irritation over New York's cavalier treatment of the
Quartering Act. Pa. Gas. , Apr. 9, 1767; Pa. Journ. , Apr. 23, July 30.
In the same year Grenville proposed in Parliament a plan for a gen-
eral paper currency which was intended as a means of increasing the
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? 90 THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS: 1763-1776
what relieved by the reopening of trade with the foreign
West Indies, was to become increasingly distressing in the
next three or four years as the redemption periods of the
outstanding paper money arrived and the volume of legal
tender thereby became greatly contracted. Thus, the real
trial in New York began with the redemption of its paper
money in November, 1768. 1 In these later years, com-
plaints of the scarcity of money came chiefly from the prov-
inces outside of New England, and were voiced by govern-
ors, newspaper writers and legislative petitions. 1 Many
sagacious men of the time believed that the British govern-
ment was guilty of grave injustice, particularly in the case
of those provinces where the power to issue legal-tender
money had never been abused. 1
American revenue. This did not receive serious consideration. 5 M.
H. S. Colls. , vol. ix, p. 231. New York was given relief from the severe
money stringency by a special act of 1770: 10 George III, c. 35. F1n-
ally, an act of 1773 (13 George III, c. 57) permitted colonial paper
money to be received as a legal tender for payment of colonial duties,
taxes, etc. Vide infra, pp. 243-244.
1 Becker, C. L. , The History of Political Parties in the Province of
New York, 1760-1776 (Univ. Wis. Bull. , no. 286), pp. 65-71, 77-79, 88,
95, and references.
1E. g. , N. Y. Col. Docs. , vol. viii, pp. 175-176; I N. J. Arch. , voL xviii,
p. 46; "Mercator" in Pa. Journ. , Sept. 14, 1769; Brit. Papers ("Sparks
Mss. "), vol. ii, pp. 184-186, 220-225, 263-267. Vide also Franklin, Writ-
ings (Smyth), vol. v, pp. 71-73.
* For a statement of the case of New York, vide 4 M. H. S. Colls. ,
vol. x, pp. 520-521; of Pennsylvania, Franklin, Writings (Smyth), vol.
v, pp. 1-14.
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? CHAPTER III
THE SECOND MOVEMENT FOR COMMERCIAL REFORM
(1767-1770)
Although the colonial merchants had won their chief de-
mands in their contest with Parliament, they had yet fallen
short, in several respects, of attaining their ultimate goal,
i. e. a restoration of the commercial system as it existed in
the days before 1764. This purpose was the objective of
the mercantile provinces in the subsequent years, and was
relinquished by them only when it became apparent that
their agitation for commercial redress was unloosing social
forces more destructive to business interests than the mis-
guided acts of Parliament. The typical merchant cared little
about academic controversies over theoretical right; but he
was vitally concerned in securing every practicable conces-
sion he could without endangering the stability of the
empire. Paul Wentworth, in writing his "Minutes re-
specting political Parties in America" in 1778, took care to
differentiate the merchant class from all other groups of
malcontents in the period leading to the Revolutionary War.
After showing their purpose, he made it clear that their
influence controlled a very large majority of the people
throughout the provinces at the outset. 1 The ultimate
success of the merchants depended upon their ability to
retain this position of leadership, to control public opinion
in America, and to direct the course of opposition.
The experience of the years 1764-1766 gave the merchant
class food for sober reflection. Intent on making out a
1 Stevens, Facsimiles, vol. v, no. 487.
91
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? 02 THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS: 1763-1776
complete case for themselves, they had, in their zeal, over-
reached themselves in calling to their aid the unruly elements
of the population. These unprivileged classes had never
before been awakened to a sense of their muscular influence
in community affairs; and, under the name of "Sons of
Liberty," they had instinctively stretched out for alliance
with their brethren in other cities. 1 Dimly the merchants
began to perceive the danger of an awakened self-conscious
group of the radical elements; well might they be apprehen-
sive, as Colden recorded, "whether the Men who excited
this seditious Spirit in the People have it in their power to
suppress it. " * Men of large propertied interests were un-
doubtedly more sensitive to the danger than were the smaller
merchants; some of the former had exhorted the people of
New York city against " mob government " while the Stamp
Act riots were still under way. *
The violence of the colonial propaganda had alienated
from the mercantile side such influential men as Governor
Bernard and Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson, of Massa-
chusetts,* and had cooled the ardor of such important fig-
ures as Dulany, of Maryland, and Joseph Galloway, of
1 Ramifications of the Sons of Liberty were to be found in New
York, Albany and other New York towns, in Philadelphia, Boston,
Providence, Portsmouth, several towns of Connecticut and New Jersey,
and in Baltimore and Annapolis. Becker, N. Y. Parties, pp. 46-48.
'Letter Books, vol. ii, p. 99. Vide also p. 111. Even Charles Thom-
son, the Philadelphia merchant, hoped that the whole people would not
be credited with the "acts of some individuals provoked to madness
and actuated by despair. " N. Y. Hist. Soc. Colls. , vol. xi, p. 16. The
merchants of Brunswick, N. J. , apologized to the Committee of Mer-
chants of London for the "riots or tumults" as being "the follies of
less considerate men" than themselves. I N. J. Arch. , vol. xxv, pp.
235-237.
* Becker, N. Y. Parties, chap. ii.
* An excellent modern example of the same type of mind may be
found by reading Peabody, A. P. , "Boston Mobs before the Revolu-
tion," Atl. Monthly, vol. Ixii, pp. 321-333.
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? COMMERCIAL REFORM 93
Pennsylvania. 1 For the future, the merchants as a class
were resolved to rely upon orderly methods of protest--
memorials and the boycott. A first step had been taken by
the merchants of New York and Boston, in accordance with
this new policy, by the sending of petitions to Parliament
for trade redress in the winter of 1766-17672
Such was the situation when Parliament made its next
attempt to reorganize British imperial policy. The new
plan found its justification in the fact that colonial theorists
had, as yet, discovered nothing "unconstitutional" or
"tyrannical " in revenue duties collected at American ports.
The recent molasses duty was the best, but not the only, ex-
ample of the willingness of Americans to pay an "external
tax " without protest. 8 Charles Townshend was, thus, act-
ing within the best traditions of British practical statesman-
ship, when he prnpr. <;fH tn, hnilH a revenue act based upon
the cnlrmkts' own views of the powers of Parliament.
Towr|shend's policy, enacted ag {ftp will of Parliament
about the middle of 1767, not only dealt with taxation, but
also nronosyd to s,trongrrhp? r the customs service where re-
cent experience had shown it to be inadequate. A third
measure, designed to meet a temporary emergency, was the
suspension of the legislative--functions_tif_ thp T^gyv Vnrtr
Assembly until that bodv should CQHIP! ^--utith_all thp r>rr>-
visions_iif_the Quartering Act. 4
1 Galloway's biographer analyzes the character of his propertied in-
terests and then adds: "He feared the tyranny of mob rule more than
the tyranny of Parliament. " Baldwin, E. H. , "Joseph Galloway," Pa.
Mag. , vol. xxvi, pp. 163-164, 289-294.
2 Vide supra, pp. 87-88.
* The colonists also paid revenue duties on enumerated goods im-
ported from another British colony (25 Charles II, c. 7), on coffee
and pimento imported from British possessions (6 George III, c. 52),
and on imported wines (4 George III, c. 15).
* It is not necessary to recount here this familiar episode. The mer-
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? 94 THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS: 1763-1776
The revenue feature of Townshend's policy was accom-
plished by adding a list of port duties to those already in
force. The following articles were to be taxed at the time
of their landing in America: five varieties of glass, red and
white lead, painters' colors, sixty-seven grades of paper, and
tea. 1 All these articles were British manufactures, except
tea, which was handled by the greatest British monopoly of
the times, the East India Company. The imposition of
the three-penny tea tax in America was accompanied by the
remission of the duty paid at the time that the tea was im-
ported into Great Britain, the object being to enable dutied
tea to undersell any tea that was smuggled into the colonies. 2
One portion of the revenue act was designed " for more
effectually preventing the clandestine running of goods. . . "
With this purpose in view, it was provided that the revenue-
produced by the duties should be used to free the judges and
civil officers in such colonies as " it shall be found neces-
sary" from financial dependence on the local legislatures.
More immediately to the point, express legalization was
given to the hitherto questionable practice of the colonial
supreme courts in issuing writs of assistance to customs
officials.
By means of these writs, customs officers were to
receive power to search for contraband goods in any house
or shop, and, in case of resistance, to break open doors,
chests, etc. , and seize the goods in question.
Other regulations were designed to strengthen the ad-
ministrative side of the customs service. 8 These made
chant class were not interested in this act of Parliament; and in the
various non-importation agreements adopted later, this law was not
once named for repeal. j_ ? ? . _? . yti "T"
1 7 George III, c. 46.
1 7 George III, c. 56. The East India Company was required to make
good any deficiency in the revenues which might result from the dis-
continuance of certain tea duties. Farrand, Max, "Taxation of Tea,.
1767-1773," Am. Hist. Rev. , vol. iii, pp. 266-269.
1 7 George III, c. 41.
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? COMMERCIAL REFORM 95.
possible the establishment of a board of commissioners of
the customs at Boston, with entire charge of the collection of
customs throughout the continent as well as at Bermuda and
the Bahamas. The commissioners were given power to
place the customs service on a basis of comparative effic-
iency. Disputes, which had hitherto been carried to the
Commissioners of the Customs at London for settlement,
were to be determined by this new American board with
much less trouble, delay and expense to the parties con-
cerned.
Certain changes in the interest of greater efficiency were
also made in the system of colonial courts of vice-admiralty. 1
In addition to the courts already existing in the several
provinces, vice-admiralty courts of large powers were es-
tablished at Boston, Philadelphia and Charleston with orig-
inal jurisdiction over the capture of vessels in their respec-
tive districts and with appellate jurisdiction over the
subordinate vice-admiralty courts.
TThe situation in which the merchants of the commercial
provinces found themselves in the latter months of 1767
was not unlike their situation in the latter part of 1764,
save that on this later occasion Philadelphia did not seem to
be as greatly affected as the other portsj Again, the mer-
chants were confronted with trade restrictions--some of
them hanging over from 1764--which reduced business
profits. Again, they faced new and rigorous regulations
against smuggling, regulations which betokened a serious-
ness of purpose on the part of the government which was
not open to misconstruction. And again, they perceived
that the burden of seeking redress must fall upon their own
shoulders, the planters of the South being- involved less
directly and l^ss nhvirmsly in the new legislation.
18 George III, c. 22. Vide also N. C. Col. Recs. , vol. vii, pp. 459-460.
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? THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS: 1763-1776
determination of the merchants to conduct their
campaign for redress along legal and peaceable lines was
at once made manifest. On November 20, 1767, the day
the Townshend acts became effective, James Otis, the lawyer
of the Boston merchants, presided over a town meeting;
and after telling the people that relief should be sought
"in a legal and constitutional way," he roundly denounced
mob riots, even to the extent of declaring that "no possi-
ble circumstances, though ever so oppressive, could be sup-
posed sufficient to justify private tumults and disorders/
. . . " The selectmen, most of whom were merchants by
trade, appealed to the people a few days later, in an article
over their signatures, to avoid " all outrage or lawless pro-
ceeding " and stand firm " in a prudent conduct and cautious
behaviour. " * In a similar spirit, John Dickinson, the
wealthy Pennsylvania lawyer, in his "Letters from a
Farmer in Pennsylvania," published serially during the sub-
sequent three months, took frequent and emphatic occasion
to condemn "turbulence and tumult" and to laud "con-
stitutional modes of obtaining relief. "2 This was the spirit
in which the second contest for commercial reform got
under way. Had the conflict been of shorter duration,
the desires of the leaders might have been realized. But the
length of the contest, with the increasing restlessness and
self-confidence of the radical elements, made the introduc-
tion of mob methods inevitable.
The course of opposition pursued by the merchants par-
1 Vide Bos. Post-Boy, Nov. 30, 1767, and. Frothingham, Rise of Re-
public, pp. 206-208, for these and other instances. Vide also Hutchin-
son, Mass. Bay, vol. iii, pp. 180-181.
1 The twelve articles appeared originally in issues of the Pa. Chronicle
from Dec. 2, 1767 to Feb. IS, 1768. For Dickinson's views on "hot,
rash, disorderly proceedings," vide in particular Letter III; Writings
(Ford), vol. i, pp. 322-328.
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? COMMERCIAL REFORM 97
took of a double character. Onjhe one hand, there were
the activities of the smuggling merchants, protected by
popular op1mon and bent upon the pursuit of gain in de-
fiance of parliamentary restrictions. On the other hand,
there stood the whole merchant class, confident oT their
power to coerce the nation of shopkeepers into concessions
through exercise of the boycott, and prepared to develop
this instrument beyond anything dreamed of during Stamp
Act times.
Smuggling proved to be the first channel through which
violence was injected into the struggle. There occurred
the usual vicious sequence: evasion of the law leading to
defiance of the law, and defiance of the law breeding vio-
lence. After the revision of the trade laws in 1 766 and the
passage of the new acts of 1767, the character of colonial
contraband trade changed greatly. The running of mo-
lasses, which had formerly formed the great bulk of illicit
traffic, had been rendered considerably less profitable by
the reduction of the duty. 1 The Townshend duties, with
a single exception, fell on articles manufactured in Great
Qi encouraging smuggl1ng' in these
g. >t-. r<<>^ oe Q gHfpnly^ tn their production in the
colonies.
The exception noted, the duty on tea, was so ingeniously
1 Since the duty has been reduced, "the whole, tho' grievous, has
been regularly paid. " Observations of tl1e Merchants at Boston upon
Several Acts of Parliament, etc. (1770), pp. 29-30. It should further
be noted that, beginning with the year 1768, a succession of temporary
acts removed the prohibition from the exportation of American meats
and butter to Great Britain, and sometimes from cereals and raw hides
as well. E. g. , vide 8 George III, c. 9; 9 George III, c. 39; 10 George
III, c. 1, c. 2; 11 George III, c. 8; 13 George III, c. 1, c. 2, c. 3, c. 4,
c. 5; 15 George III, c. 7. The passage of these acts made it less neces-
sary for colonial merchants to seek in foreign markets commodities
which might serve as remittances to England and thus reduce the
temptation to smuggling.
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? pg THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS: 1763-1776
contrived as to have the immediate effect of lowering the
price of customed tea in America below that of any that
could be smuggled from Holland or elsewhere. 1 This con-
dition lasted until 1769 when the East India Company,
hard pressed by creditors and seeking to recoup some of its
losses, advanced the upset price of tea at the public auctions
in Great Britain. This caused the exporting merchant, who
bid in the tea, to raise the price to the American merchant,
and the American merchant to raise the price to the colonial
retailer. So that the colonial consumer thereafter found
it advantageous to drink Dutch tea; and tea smuggling be-
gan to thrive. 2
Until that time, it would appear that the chief concern
of the smugglers was the running of wine from Madeira
and the Azores, a traffic vastly stimulated by the high duty
demanded for legal importation. * In view of the com-
motions that resulted, one might add in supplementation
of John Adams' remark concerning molasses that wine was
another essential ingredient of American independence.
The importation of Dutch, French and German manu-
factures without stoppage at Great Britain, as required by
1 Tea imported from Great Britain became nine-pence cheaper per
pound. Bos. Gas. , Aug. 15, 1768; Mass. Gas. & Post-Boy, Dec. 19, 1774.
1 Hutchinson to Hillsborough, Aug. 25, 1771, Bos. Gas. , Nov. 27, 1775.
Vide infra, p. 250.
1 This duty was no less than seven pounds per tun under the act of
1764. As Kelly, the New York merchant, told a committee of Parlia-
ment, "wherever there is a great difference of Price, there will be a
Daring Spirit to attempt [smuggling] notwithstanding all Preventions. "
Brit. Mus. Addl. Mss. , no. 33030 (L. C. Transcripts), f. 136. For ex-
ample, an official report, made evidently for the Customs Board, stated
that thirty vessels, entering at New York from Madeira and the Azores,
had not entered sufficient goods to load one vessel. Ibid. , no. 154^4, f. 6.
Golden said that few New York merchants were not engaged in con-
traband trade and that " Whole Cargoes from Holland and Ship Loads
of Wine" had been brought in without the payment of duties. Letter
Books, vol. ii, pp. 133-134.
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? COMMERCIAL REFORM 99
law, probably continued much as before; and there may
have been a slight increase in the volume of the illicit export
trade, due to the fact that after 1766 all American com-
modities, shipped for European ports north of Cape Finis-
terre, must first be entered at a British port.
The continuance of smuggling after 1767 should not be
made to argue the total failure of Townshend's endeavor
to reform the customs administration. The Board of Cus-
toms Commissioners at Boston performed a vastly creditable
service in reducing peculation and laziness on the part of
officials and in establishing a stricter system of coast con-
trol. The number of customs employees was greatly in-
creased--in the case of Philadelphia, trebled in the years
1767-1770. l Writs of assistance were more generally and
more effectively used than at any earlier period. Revenue
cutters were stationed at leading ports; and smaller vessels,
belonging to the navy and acting under deputation of the
commissioners, searched out suspected ships in the numer-
ous rivers and inlets. A representation of the Boston mer-
chants, made in 1770, declared that the Customs Board had
employed upwards of twenty vessels that year, and that
some of the captains had purchased small boats of their
own to search in shallow waters. 2 Undoubtedly the total
volume of illicit trade was smaller after 1767 than at any
period subsequent to the enactment of the Molasses Act in
1733;2 and this was due, in some degree, to the activities
of the Customs Board. 4
1 Channing, History of United States, vol. iii, pp. 88-89.
1 Observations of the Merchants at Boston, etc. , pp. 24-25.
2 On the other hand, Golden claimed, in November, 1767, and re-
peatedly in the following months, that at New York "a greater quan-
tity of Goods has been Run without paying Duties since the Repeal of
the Stamp Act than had been done in ten years before. " Letter Books,
vol. ii, pp. 133-134, 138, 148, 153, 163, 172.
* Note the table of penalties and seizures, quoted by Professor Chan-
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1The dilatory course of the British government in this matter seems
scarcely excusable. The British merchants in the American trade, with
the backing of the colonial agents, worked for the repeal of the Cur-
rency Act of 1764, and proposed a plan by which colonial bills of credit
should be legal tender for everything except sterling debts payable in
Great Britain. The ministry refused in 1767 to listen to this plan,
partly because of irritation over New York's cavalier treatment of the
Quartering Act. Pa. Gas. , Apr. 9, 1767; Pa. Journ. , Apr. 23, July 30.
In the same year Grenville proposed in Parliament a plan for a gen-
eral paper currency which was intended as a means of increasing the
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-19 01:35 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015011480665 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 90 THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS: 1763-1776
what relieved by the reopening of trade with the foreign
West Indies, was to become increasingly distressing in the
next three or four years as the redemption periods of the
outstanding paper money arrived and the volume of legal
tender thereby became greatly contracted. Thus, the real
trial in New York began with the redemption of its paper
money in November, 1768. 1 In these later years, com-
plaints of the scarcity of money came chiefly from the prov-
inces outside of New England, and were voiced by govern-
ors, newspaper writers and legislative petitions. 1 Many
sagacious men of the time believed that the British govern-
ment was guilty of grave injustice, particularly in the case
of those provinces where the power to issue legal-tender
money had never been abused. 1
American revenue. This did not receive serious consideration. 5 M.
H. S. Colls. , vol. ix, p. 231. New York was given relief from the severe
money stringency by a special act of 1770: 10 George III, c. 35. F1n-
ally, an act of 1773 (13 George III, c. 57) permitted colonial paper
money to be received as a legal tender for payment of colonial duties,
taxes, etc. Vide infra, pp. 243-244.
1 Becker, C. L. , The History of Political Parties in the Province of
New York, 1760-1776 (Univ. Wis. Bull. , no. 286), pp. 65-71, 77-79, 88,
95, and references.
1E. g. , N. Y. Col. Docs. , vol. viii, pp. 175-176; I N. J. Arch. , voL xviii,
p. 46; "Mercator" in Pa. Journ. , Sept. 14, 1769; Brit. Papers ("Sparks
Mss. "), vol. ii, pp. 184-186, 220-225, 263-267. Vide also Franklin, Writ-
ings (Smyth), vol. v, pp. 71-73.
* For a statement of the case of New York, vide 4 M. H. S. Colls. ,
vol. x, pp. 520-521; of Pennsylvania, Franklin, Writings (Smyth), vol.
v, pp. 1-14.
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? CHAPTER III
THE SECOND MOVEMENT FOR COMMERCIAL REFORM
(1767-1770)
Although the colonial merchants had won their chief de-
mands in their contest with Parliament, they had yet fallen
short, in several respects, of attaining their ultimate goal,
i. e. a restoration of the commercial system as it existed in
the days before 1764. This purpose was the objective of
the mercantile provinces in the subsequent years, and was
relinquished by them only when it became apparent that
their agitation for commercial redress was unloosing social
forces more destructive to business interests than the mis-
guided acts of Parliament. The typical merchant cared little
about academic controversies over theoretical right; but he
was vitally concerned in securing every practicable conces-
sion he could without endangering the stability of the
empire. Paul Wentworth, in writing his "Minutes re-
specting political Parties in America" in 1778, took care to
differentiate the merchant class from all other groups of
malcontents in the period leading to the Revolutionary War.
After showing their purpose, he made it clear that their
influence controlled a very large majority of the people
throughout the provinces at the outset. 1 The ultimate
success of the merchants depended upon their ability to
retain this position of leadership, to control public opinion
in America, and to direct the course of opposition.
The experience of the years 1764-1766 gave the merchant
class food for sober reflection. Intent on making out a
1 Stevens, Facsimiles, vol. v, no. 487.
91
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? 02 THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS: 1763-1776
complete case for themselves, they had, in their zeal, over-
reached themselves in calling to their aid the unruly elements
of the population. These unprivileged classes had never
before been awakened to a sense of their muscular influence
in community affairs; and, under the name of "Sons of
Liberty," they had instinctively stretched out for alliance
with their brethren in other cities. 1 Dimly the merchants
began to perceive the danger of an awakened self-conscious
group of the radical elements; well might they be apprehen-
sive, as Colden recorded, "whether the Men who excited
this seditious Spirit in the People have it in their power to
suppress it. " * Men of large propertied interests were un-
doubtedly more sensitive to the danger than were the smaller
merchants; some of the former had exhorted the people of
New York city against " mob government " while the Stamp
Act riots were still under way. *
The violence of the colonial propaganda had alienated
from the mercantile side such influential men as Governor
Bernard and Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson, of Massa-
chusetts,* and had cooled the ardor of such important fig-
ures as Dulany, of Maryland, and Joseph Galloway, of
1 Ramifications of the Sons of Liberty were to be found in New
York, Albany and other New York towns, in Philadelphia, Boston,
Providence, Portsmouth, several towns of Connecticut and New Jersey,
and in Baltimore and Annapolis. Becker, N. Y. Parties, pp. 46-48.
'Letter Books, vol. ii, p. 99. Vide also p. 111. Even Charles Thom-
son, the Philadelphia merchant, hoped that the whole people would not
be credited with the "acts of some individuals provoked to madness
and actuated by despair. " N. Y. Hist. Soc. Colls. , vol. xi, p. 16. The
merchants of Brunswick, N. J. , apologized to the Committee of Mer-
chants of London for the "riots or tumults" as being "the follies of
less considerate men" than themselves. I N. J. Arch. , vol. xxv, pp.
235-237.
* Becker, N. Y. Parties, chap. ii.
* An excellent modern example of the same type of mind may be
found by reading Peabody, A. P. , "Boston Mobs before the Revolu-
tion," Atl. Monthly, vol. Ixii, pp. 321-333.
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? COMMERCIAL REFORM 93
Pennsylvania. 1 For the future, the merchants as a class
were resolved to rely upon orderly methods of protest--
memorials and the boycott. A first step had been taken by
the merchants of New York and Boston, in accordance with
this new policy, by the sending of petitions to Parliament
for trade redress in the winter of 1766-17672
Such was the situation when Parliament made its next
attempt to reorganize British imperial policy. The new
plan found its justification in the fact that colonial theorists
had, as yet, discovered nothing "unconstitutional" or
"tyrannical " in revenue duties collected at American ports.
The recent molasses duty was the best, but not the only, ex-
ample of the willingness of Americans to pay an "external
tax " without protest. 8 Charles Townshend was, thus, act-
ing within the best traditions of British practical statesman-
ship, when he prnpr. <;fH tn, hnilH a revenue act based upon
the cnlrmkts' own views of the powers of Parliament.
Towr|shend's policy, enacted ag {ftp will of Parliament
about the middle of 1767, not only dealt with taxation, but
also nronosyd to s,trongrrhp? r the customs service where re-
cent experience had shown it to be inadequate. A third
measure, designed to meet a temporary emergency, was the
suspension of the legislative--functions_tif_ thp T^gyv Vnrtr
Assembly until that bodv should CQHIP! ^--utith_all thp r>rr>-
visions_iif_the Quartering Act. 4
1 Galloway's biographer analyzes the character of his propertied in-
terests and then adds: "He feared the tyranny of mob rule more than
the tyranny of Parliament. " Baldwin, E. H. , "Joseph Galloway," Pa.
Mag. , vol. xxvi, pp. 163-164, 289-294.
2 Vide supra, pp. 87-88.
* The colonists also paid revenue duties on enumerated goods im-
ported from another British colony (25 Charles II, c. 7), on coffee
and pimento imported from British possessions (6 George III, c. 52),
and on imported wines (4 George III, c. 15).
* It is not necessary to recount here this familiar episode. The mer-
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? 94 THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS: 1763-1776
The revenue feature of Townshend's policy was accom-
plished by adding a list of port duties to those already in
force. The following articles were to be taxed at the time
of their landing in America: five varieties of glass, red and
white lead, painters' colors, sixty-seven grades of paper, and
tea. 1 All these articles were British manufactures, except
tea, which was handled by the greatest British monopoly of
the times, the East India Company. The imposition of
the three-penny tea tax in America was accompanied by the
remission of the duty paid at the time that the tea was im-
ported into Great Britain, the object being to enable dutied
tea to undersell any tea that was smuggled into the colonies. 2
One portion of the revenue act was designed " for more
effectually preventing the clandestine running of goods. . . "
With this purpose in view, it was provided that the revenue-
produced by the duties should be used to free the judges and
civil officers in such colonies as " it shall be found neces-
sary" from financial dependence on the local legislatures.
More immediately to the point, express legalization was
given to the hitherto questionable practice of the colonial
supreme courts in issuing writs of assistance to customs
officials.
By means of these writs, customs officers were to
receive power to search for contraband goods in any house
or shop, and, in case of resistance, to break open doors,
chests, etc. , and seize the goods in question.
Other regulations were designed to strengthen the ad-
ministrative side of the customs service. 8 These made
chant class were not interested in this act of Parliament; and in the
various non-importation agreements adopted later, this law was not
once named for repeal. j_ ? ? . _? . yti "T"
1 7 George III, c. 46.
1 7 George III, c. 56. The East India Company was required to make
good any deficiency in the revenues which might result from the dis-
continuance of certain tea duties. Farrand, Max, "Taxation of Tea,.
1767-1773," Am. Hist. Rev. , vol. iii, pp. 266-269.
1 7 George III, c. 41.
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? COMMERCIAL REFORM 95.
possible the establishment of a board of commissioners of
the customs at Boston, with entire charge of the collection of
customs throughout the continent as well as at Bermuda and
the Bahamas. The commissioners were given power to
place the customs service on a basis of comparative effic-
iency. Disputes, which had hitherto been carried to the
Commissioners of the Customs at London for settlement,
were to be determined by this new American board with
much less trouble, delay and expense to the parties con-
cerned.
Certain changes in the interest of greater efficiency were
also made in the system of colonial courts of vice-admiralty. 1
In addition to the courts already existing in the several
provinces, vice-admiralty courts of large powers were es-
tablished at Boston, Philadelphia and Charleston with orig-
inal jurisdiction over the capture of vessels in their respec-
tive districts and with appellate jurisdiction over the
subordinate vice-admiralty courts.
TThe situation in which the merchants of the commercial
provinces found themselves in the latter months of 1767
was not unlike their situation in the latter part of 1764,
save that on this later occasion Philadelphia did not seem to
be as greatly affected as the other portsj Again, the mer-
chants were confronted with trade restrictions--some of
them hanging over from 1764--which reduced business
profits. Again, they faced new and rigorous regulations
against smuggling, regulations which betokened a serious-
ness of purpose on the part of the government which was
not open to misconstruction. And again, they perceived
that the burden of seeking redress must fall upon their own
shoulders, the planters of the South being- involved less
directly and l^ss nhvirmsly in the new legislation.
18 George III, c. 22. Vide also N. C. Col. Recs. , vol. vii, pp. 459-460.
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? THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS: 1763-1776
determination of the merchants to conduct their
campaign for redress along legal and peaceable lines was
at once made manifest. On November 20, 1767, the day
the Townshend acts became effective, James Otis, the lawyer
of the Boston merchants, presided over a town meeting;
and after telling the people that relief should be sought
"in a legal and constitutional way," he roundly denounced
mob riots, even to the extent of declaring that "no possi-
ble circumstances, though ever so oppressive, could be sup-
posed sufficient to justify private tumults and disorders/
. . . " The selectmen, most of whom were merchants by
trade, appealed to the people a few days later, in an article
over their signatures, to avoid " all outrage or lawless pro-
ceeding " and stand firm " in a prudent conduct and cautious
behaviour. " * In a similar spirit, John Dickinson, the
wealthy Pennsylvania lawyer, in his "Letters from a
Farmer in Pennsylvania," published serially during the sub-
sequent three months, took frequent and emphatic occasion
to condemn "turbulence and tumult" and to laud "con-
stitutional modes of obtaining relief. "2 This was the spirit
in which the second contest for commercial reform got
under way. Had the conflict been of shorter duration,
the desires of the leaders might have been realized. But the
length of the contest, with the increasing restlessness and
self-confidence of the radical elements, made the introduc-
tion of mob methods inevitable.
The course of opposition pursued by the merchants par-
1 Vide Bos. Post-Boy, Nov. 30, 1767, and. Frothingham, Rise of Re-
public, pp. 206-208, for these and other instances. Vide also Hutchin-
son, Mass. Bay, vol. iii, pp. 180-181.
1 The twelve articles appeared originally in issues of the Pa. Chronicle
from Dec. 2, 1767 to Feb. IS, 1768. For Dickinson's views on "hot,
rash, disorderly proceedings," vide in particular Letter III; Writings
(Ford), vol. i, pp. 322-328.
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? COMMERCIAL REFORM 97
took of a double character. Onjhe one hand, there were
the activities of the smuggling merchants, protected by
popular op1mon and bent upon the pursuit of gain in de-
fiance of parliamentary restrictions. On the other hand,
there stood the whole merchant class, confident oT their
power to coerce the nation of shopkeepers into concessions
through exercise of the boycott, and prepared to develop
this instrument beyond anything dreamed of during Stamp
Act times.
Smuggling proved to be the first channel through which
violence was injected into the struggle. There occurred
the usual vicious sequence: evasion of the law leading to
defiance of the law, and defiance of the law breeding vio-
lence. After the revision of the trade laws in 1 766 and the
passage of the new acts of 1767, the character of colonial
contraband trade changed greatly. The running of mo-
lasses, which had formerly formed the great bulk of illicit
traffic, had been rendered considerably less profitable by
the reduction of the duty. 1 The Townshend duties, with
a single exception, fell on articles manufactured in Great
Qi encouraging smuggl1ng' in these
g. >t-. r<<>^ oe Q gHfpnly^ tn their production in the
colonies.
The exception noted, the duty on tea, was so ingeniously
1 Since the duty has been reduced, "the whole, tho' grievous, has
been regularly paid. " Observations of tl1e Merchants at Boston upon
Several Acts of Parliament, etc. (1770), pp. 29-30. It should further
be noted that, beginning with the year 1768, a succession of temporary
acts removed the prohibition from the exportation of American meats
and butter to Great Britain, and sometimes from cereals and raw hides
as well. E. g. , vide 8 George III, c. 9; 9 George III, c. 39; 10 George
III, c. 1, c. 2; 11 George III, c. 8; 13 George III, c. 1, c. 2, c. 3, c. 4,
c. 5; 15 George III, c. 7. The passage of these acts made it less neces-
sary for colonial merchants to seek in foreign markets commodities
which might serve as remittances to England and thus reduce the
temptation to smuggling.
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? pg THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS: 1763-1776
contrived as to have the immediate effect of lowering the
price of customed tea in America below that of any that
could be smuggled from Holland or elsewhere. 1 This con-
dition lasted until 1769 when the East India Company,
hard pressed by creditors and seeking to recoup some of its
losses, advanced the upset price of tea at the public auctions
in Great Britain. This caused the exporting merchant, who
bid in the tea, to raise the price to the American merchant,
and the American merchant to raise the price to the colonial
retailer. So that the colonial consumer thereafter found
it advantageous to drink Dutch tea; and tea smuggling be-
gan to thrive. 2
Until that time, it would appear that the chief concern
of the smugglers was the running of wine from Madeira
and the Azores, a traffic vastly stimulated by the high duty
demanded for legal importation. * In view of the com-
motions that resulted, one might add in supplementation
of John Adams' remark concerning molasses that wine was
another essential ingredient of American independence.
The importation of Dutch, French and German manu-
factures without stoppage at Great Britain, as required by
1 Tea imported from Great Britain became nine-pence cheaper per
pound. Bos. Gas. , Aug. 15, 1768; Mass. Gas. & Post-Boy, Dec. 19, 1774.
1 Hutchinson to Hillsborough, Aug. 25, 1771, Bos. Gas. , Nov. 27, 1775.
Vide infra, p. 250.
1 This duty was no less than seven pounds per tun under the act of
1764. As Kelly, the New York merchant, told a committee of Parlia-
ment, "wherever there is a great difference of Price, there will be a
Daring Spirit to attempt [smuggling] notwithstanding all Preventions. "
Brit. Mus. Addl. Mss. , no. 33030 (L. C. Transcripts), f. 136. For ex-
ample, an official report, made evidently for the Customs Board, stated
that thirty vessels, entering at New York from Madeira and the Azores,
had not entered sufficient goods to load one vessel. Ibid. , no. 154^4, f. 6.
Golden said that few New York merchants were not engaged in con-
traband trade and that " Whole Cargoes from Holland and Ship Loads
of Wine" had been brought in without the payment of duties. Letter
Books, vol. ii, pp. 133-134.
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? COMMERCIAL REFORM 99
law, probably continued much as before; and there may
have been a slight increase in the volume of the illicit export
trade, due to the fact that after 1766 all American com-
modities, shipped for European ports north of Cape Finis-
terre, must first be entered at a British port.
The continuance of smuggling after 1767 should not be
made to argue the total failure of Townshend's endeavor
to reform the customs administration. The Board of Cus-
toms Commissioners at Boston performed a vastly creditable
service in reducing peculation and laziness on the part of
officials and in establishing a stricter system of coast con-
trol. The number of customs employees was greatly in-
creased--in the case of Philadelphia, trebled in the years
1767-1770. l Writs of assistance were more generally and
more effectively used than at any earlier period. Revenue
cutters were stationed at leading ports; and smaller vessels,
belonging to the navy and acting under deputation of the
commissioners, searched out suspected ships in the numer-
ous rivers and inlets. A representation of the Boston mer-
chants, made in 1770, declared that the Customs Board had
employed upwards of twenty vessels that year, and that
some of the captains had purchased small boats of their
own to search in shallow waters. 2 Undoubtedly the total
volume of illicit trade was smaller after 1767 than at any
period subsequent to the enactment of the Molasses Act in
1733;2 and this was due, in some degree, to the activities
of the Customs Board. 4
1 Channing, History of United States, vol. iii, pp. 88-89.
1 Observations of the Merchants at Boston, etc. , pp. 24-25.
2 On the other hand, Golden claimed, in November, 1767, and re-
peatedly in the following months, that at New York "a greater quan-
tity of Goods has been Run without paying Duties since the Repeal of
the Stamp Act than had been done in ten years before. " Letter Books,
vol. ii, pp. 133-134, 138, 148, 153, 163, 172.
* Note the table of penalties and seizures, quoted by Professor Chan-
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