No More Learning

Necessity.
This does not apply to federal government.
This may dissolve, and yet the order of the commu-
nity continue.
Anarchy not a necessary consequence.
III. Habitual sense of obligation.
This results from administration of private justice.
Demand of service or money odious.
IV. Force--of two kinds.
Coercion of laws--Coercion of arms.
First does not exist--and the last useless.
Attempt to use it, a war between the states.
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THE LIFE OF
Foreign aid.
Delinquency not confined to one.
V. Influence--
1. From municipal jurisdiction.
2. Appointment of officers.
3. Military jurisdiction.
4. Fiscal jurisdiction.
All these now reside in (the) particular states.
Their governments are the chief sources of hon-
our and emolument.
AMBITION AVARICE.
To effect any thing, passions must be turned towards
the general government.
Present confederation cannot be amended, unless the
most important powers be given to congress constituted
as they are.
This would be liable to all (the) objections against any
form of general government, with the addition of the want
of checks.
Perpetual effort in each member.
Influence of individuals in office to excite jealousy and
clamour--state leaders.
Experience corresponds.
Grecian republics.
Demosthenes says--Athens seventy-three years--Lace-
dsemon twenty-seven--Thebans after battle of Leuctra.
Phocions--consecrated ground--Philip, &c.
Germanic empire.
Charlemagne and his successors.
-Diet--recesses.
Electors now seven, excluding others.
Swiss Cantons.
Two diets.
Opposite alliances.
Berne--Lucerne.
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? HAMILTON. 485
To strengthen the federal government, powers too great
must be given to a single hand.
League offensive and defensive, &c.
Particular governments might exert themselves, &c.
But liable to usual vicissitudes. )
Internal peace affected.
Proximity of situation--natural enemies.
Partial confederacies from unequal extent.
Power inspires ambition.
Weakness begets jealousy.
Western territory.
Objn. --Genius of republics pacific.
Answer. Jealousy of commerce as well as jealousy of
power, begets war.
Sparta--Athens--Thebes--Rome--Carthage--Venice
--Hanseatic League.
England as many popular as royal wars.
Lewis the XIV. --Austria--Bourbons--William and
Anne.
Wars depend upon trifling circumstances.
Where--Dutchess of Marlborough's glove.
Foreign conquest.
Dismemberment--Poland.
Foreign influence.
Distractions set afloat vicious humours.
Standing armies by dissensions.
Domestic factions--Montesquieu.
Monarchy in southern states.
DCr* Federal rights--Fisheries.
Wars--destructive.
Loss of advantages.
Foreign nations would not respect our rights nor grant
us reciprocity.
Would reduce us to a passive commerce.
Fisheries--navigation of the lakes--Mississippi--Fleet.
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? 48G
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The general government must, in this case, not only have
a strong soul, but strong organs by which that soul is to
operate.
Here I shall give my sentiments of the best form of gov-
ernment--not as a thing attainable by us, but as a model
which we ought to approach as near as possible.
British constitution best form.
Aristotle--Cicero--Montesquieu--Neckar. *
Society naturally divides itself into two political di-
visions--the few and the many, who have distinct interests.
If government in the hands of the few, they will tyran-
nize over the many.
If (in) the hands of the many, they will tyrannize over
the few. It ought to be in the hands of both; and they
should be separated.
This separation must be permanent.
Representation a! one will not do.
Demagogues will generally prevail.
And if separated, they will need a mutual check.
This check is a monarch.
Each principle ought to exist in full force, or it will not
answer its end.
The democracy must be derived immediately from the
people.
The aristocracy ought to be entirely separated; their
power should be permanent, and they should have the
caritas liberorum.
* In Madison's very imperfect report of this speech, the authority of
Neckar is alone adduced. The opinion entertained of him at that time, is
seen in the eloquent commendation of Edmund Burke. "I behold a fabric
laid on the natural and solid foundation of trust and confidence among
men, and rising by fair gradation, order above order, according to the just
rules of symmetry and art--principle, method, regularity, economy, frugality,
justice to individuals and care of the people, are the resources with which
France makes war upon Great Britain. --The minister who does these things
is a great man. "
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? HAMILTON.
487
They should be so circumstanced that they can have no
interest in a change--as to have an effectual weight in the
constitution.
Their duration should be the earnest of wisdom and
stability.
'Tis essential there should be a permanent will in a com-
munity. ,
Vox populi, vox Dei.
Source of government--the unreasonableness of the
people--separate interests--debtors and creditors, &c.
There ought to be a principle in government capable
of resisting the popular current.
No periodical duration will come up to this.
This will always imply hopes and fears.
Creature and Creator.
Popular assemblies governed by a few individuals.
These individuals seeing their dissolution approach, will
sacrifice.
The principle of representation will influence.
The most popular branch will acquire an influence over
the other.
The other may check in ordinary cases, in which there
is no strong public passion; but it will not in cases where
there is--the cases in which such a principle is most ne-
cessary.
DCP Suppose duration seven years, and rotation.
One-seventh will have only one year to serve.
One-seventh two years.
One-seventh three years.
One-seventh four years.
A majority will look to a dissolution in four years by
instalments.
The monarch must have proportional strength. He
ought to be hereditary, and to have so much power, that it
will not be his interest to risk much to acquire more.
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? 488
THE IIFE OF
The advantage of a monarch is this--he is above cor-
ruption--he must always intend, in respect to foreign na-
tions, the true interest and glory of the people.
Republics liable to foreign corruption and intrigue--
Holland--Athens.
Effect of the British government.
, A vigorous execution of the laws--and a vigorous
defence of the people, will result.
Better chance for a good administration.
It is said a republican government does not admit a
vigorous execution.
It is therefore bad; for the goodness of a government
consists in a vigorous execution.
The principle chiefly intended to be established is this--
that there must be a permanent will.
Gentlemen say we need to be rescued from the democ-
racy. But what the means proposed?
A democratic assembly is to be checked by a democratic
senate, and both these by a democratic chief magistrate.
The end will not be answered--the means will not be
equal to the object.
It will, therefore, be feeble and inefficient.
RECAPITULATION.
I. Impossible to secure the union by any modification
of fcederal government.
II. League, offensive and defensive, full of certain evils
and greater dangers.
III. General government, very difficult, if not impracti-
cable, liable to various objections.
What is to be done?
Answer. Balance inconveniences and dangers, and
choose that which seems to have the fewest objections.
Expense admits of this answer. The expense of the
state governments will be proportionably diminished.
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? HAMILTON.
480
Interference of officers not so great, because the objects
of the general government and the particular ones will not
be the same--Finance--Administration of private justice.
Energy will not be wanting in essential points, because
the administration of private justice will be carried home
to men's doors by the particular governments.
And the revenues may be collected from imposts. , ex-
cises, &c.
If necessary to go further, the general gov-
ernment may make use of the particular governments.
The attendance of members near the seat of govern-
ment may be had in the lower branch.
And the upper branch may be so constructed as to in-
duce the attendance of members from any part.
But this proves that the government must be so consti-
tuted as to offer strong motives.
In short, to interest all the passions of individuals.
And turn them into that channel.
After having stated his theoretical opinion of govern-
ment, Hamilton declared "that the republican theory
ought to be adhered to in this country, as long as there
was any chance to its success--that the idea of a perfect
equality of political rights among the citizens, exclusive of
all permanent or hereditary distinctions, was of a nature to
engage the good wishes of every good man, whatever
might be his theoretic doubts; thajjt merited his best efforts
to give success to it in practi<g; that hitherto, from an in-
competent structure of the government, it had not had a
fair trial, and that the endeavour ought then to be to secure
to it a better chance of success by a government more
The speech of which this brief is given, occupied in the
delivery between five and six hours, and was pronounced
capable of energy and ordejv
* Hamilton to Washington, post
62
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? 490
THE LIFE OF
by a competent judge,* "the most able and impressive he
had ever heard. "f
In the course of this speech, he read his plan of govern-
ment, not the propositions which are found in the printed
* Gouvemeur Morris.
t On a comparison of this brief with Madison's report, it is not possible to
give credence to his statement, " that Hamilton happened to call upon him
when putting the last hand to it, who acknowledged its fidelity, without sug-
gesting more than a very few verbal alterations, which were made. "
Neither in the general outline, nor in the subdivisions, does it approach so
near to accuracy as by possibility to have received the sanction of its author.
A few of the discrepancies will be indicated.
In Madison's report of the preliminary remarks, to show that the states
may have had in view a reference to the people at large, he ascribes this ob-
servation to Hamilton:--" In the senate of New-York a proviso was moved,
that no act of the convention should be binding until it should be referred to the
people, and ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only; the rea-
son assigned being, that it might probably be found an inconvenient shackle. "
Had this proviso been moved, it must have been moved on the 28th of Feb-
ruary, 1787, upon a resolution introduced by Hamilton in the assembly on
the 26th, and proposed by Schuyler in the senate on that day. No such pro-
viso was moved.
The proviso actually moved was that of Yates, an adherent of Clinton,
who proposed to insert a declaration that" the alterations and provisions in the
articles of confederation should be not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the
constitution of the state," and it was lost by a single vote.
Thus Hamilton is represented as sanctioning the accuracy of a speech,
which contains a statement of an occurrence that did not take place, when
he was a principal actor in, and was familiar with all the particulars of what
had occurred at an interval of less than four months.
As the ground of the opposition of his colleagues, and that on which they
soon after withdrew from the convention, was, that it was exceeding its pow-
ers, it is obvious, if he had made such a statement, that it would have been
controverted by them, and shown to have been erroneous by referring to the
journals of New-York. As no such statement was made by Hamilton, no
contradiction of it is found in the notes of Yates; but his actual representa-
tion, and which corresponds with the fact, is there correctly given. "Nor
can we," he observed, in reply to Lansing,} "suppose an annihilation of our
powers by forming a national government, as many of the states have made
t Yalee' Debates. 130. New-York Journal* 1787. pp. 44, 45, February 28th.
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? HAMILTON.
491
journal, but "a full plan, so prepared that it might have
gone into immediate effect if it had been adopted. "
This plan consisted of ten articles, each article being
divided into sections.
in their constitutions no provisions for any alterations; and thus much / can
say for the state I have the honour to represent, that when our credentials
were under consideration in the senate, some members were for inserting a
restriction on the powers, to prevent an encroachment on the constitution.
It was answered by others; and, therefore, the resolve carried on the creden.
tials, that it might abridge some of the constitutional powers of the state, and
possibly, in the formation of a new union, it would be found necessary. This
appears reasonable, and therefore leaves us at liberty to form such a national
government as we think best adapted to the good of the whole. "
In the enumeration of the supports of government, Madison, 880, represents
Hamilton as stating the second to be " the love of power. Men love power.
The same remarks are applicable to this principle:--the states have con-
stantly shown a disposition rather to regain the powers delegated by them,
than to part with more, or to give effect to what they had parted with! The
ambition of their demagogues is known to hate the control of the general
government. " Could he have embraced "the love of power," producing
such consequences as are here enumerated, among " the supports of govern-
ment? "
Yates states the second support thus, "Utility and necessity," which
agrees with the brief, each confirming the accuracy of the other. And sub.
sequcntly, when he represents Hamilton as saying " men always love power,"
he represents him as adding the observation, "and states will prefer particu-
lar concerns to the general welfare. " In No. 15 of the Federalist, after
speaking of the perpetual effort "of the states, or inferior orbs, to fly off from
the common centre," Hamilton observes: "This tendency is not difficult to
be accounted for--it has its origin in the love of power. Power controlled, or
abridged, is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is
controlled or abridged. " The third support stated by Hamilton, Madison
says, was " an habitual attachment by the people. " Yates concurs with the
Juliet, in stating it to be " an habitual sense of obligation. "*
( A more remarkable feature in this report is, that Madison, in order to leave
the impression that Hamilton contemplated a monarchy, omits the declara-
tion ascribed to him by Yates. "/ despair that a republican form of gov-
ernment can remove the difficulties. Whatever may be my opinion, I would
* Yates, 191. If this should be called a verbal difference, it will be recollected that Hamiltoo
is said to have acknowledged *' the fidelity of his report, without suggesting more than a very
few verbal alterations. " Would he not have suggested an alteration of this error 1
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? 492 THE LIFE OF
The first of these declared that the "legislative power
should be vested in an assembly and senate, subject to a
negative; the executive power, with specified qualifica-
tions, in a president of the United States; and the supreme
judicial authority, with certain exceptions, in a supreme
court, to consist of not less than six, nor more than twelve,
judges.
The assembly of representatives were (by the second ar-
ticle) to be chosen by the free male citizens and inhabitants
of the several states in the union, all of whom, of the age
of twenty-one years and upwards, were to be entitled to
an equal vote. The first assembly was to consist of one
hundred members, which were distributed among the
states--the most populous state, Virginia, having sixteen,
and the least populous, Delaware, having two representa-
tives. The whole number was never to be less than one
hold it, however, unwise to change that form of government. "* Thus con.
curring with the declaration previously more accurately given, in his own
language, "that the republican theory ought to be adhered to in this country
as long as there was any chance of its success; that the idea of a perfect equal-
ity of all political rights among the citizens, exclusive of all permanent and
hereditary distinctions, was of a nature to engage the good wishes of every
good man, whatever might be his theoretic doubts; that it merited his best
l efforts to give success to it in practice; that hitherto, from an incompetent
structure of the government, it had not had a fair trial; and that the en-
deavour ought then to be, to secure to it a better chance of success, by a gov-
ernment more capable of energy and order. "
We-lrue friend of his fame can regret that ho entertained, and, entertain-
ing, expressed these theoretic doubts; and it is the sublimest aspect of his
character, that, in despite of these doubts, he devoted " the best efforts" of
his life to give this experiment of "a perfect equality of political rights, sue.
cess in practice. " J
* Madison, 893, says in a note: "The explanatory observations, which did not immediately
follow, were to have been furnishc J by Mr. H. . who did not find leisure at the lime to write them
out. and they wore not obtained. " It is not probable Hamilton, approving his report of the
speech, as he alleges, would have omitted such important explanatory observations. But if he
did so omit them, it was incumbent upon Madison to havo given the substance of them. On
reading them, the motive to this omission become* obvious.
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? HAMILTON.
493
hundred, nor more than a given number, which was not
fixed, to be apportioned among the states by a decennial
census of the whole number of free persons, except In-
dians not taxed, and three-fifths of all other persons: the
term of service was to be determined by the legislature, but
was not to exceed three years, and to commence and end
the same day. It was to choose its own officers, to judge
and decide on the qualifications and elections of its mem-
bers, and to have the exclusive power of impeachment;
but the concurrence of two-thirds was necessary to im-
peach a senator.
Revenue bills and appropriations for the support of
fleets and armies, and for the salaries of the officers of gov-
ernment, were to originate in this body, but might be al-
tered or amended by the senate. The acceptance of of-
fice under the United States, vacated a scat in it. Thus,
in the constituency of this branch of the government, (all
the citizens and inhabitants of the union,) the principle of
universal suffrage was recognised, and the democratic
interests were fully represented. Its power over the purse,
the sword, and over impeachments, gave it the means to
resist usurpation, and rendered it an efficient counterpoise
to the more durable members of the government, and the
natural guardian of the rights and liberties of the people.
The third article related to the second branch of the le-
gislature. The senate were also representatives of the
people, but under the modifications that the senators were
to be chosen by electors elected in districts of the states
for that purpose, and only by persons who had an estate
in land for life, or for an unexpired term of not less than
fourteen years. The first senate was to be apportioned
among the states as the convention should decide. For
the purpose of future elections, the states which had more
than one senator, were to be divided into convenient dis-
tricts, to which senators were to be apportioned. A state
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THE LIFE OF
having one senator, to be a district. In case of death, re-
signation, or the removal of a senator from office, his place
was to be supplied by a new election in the district from
which he came; and upon each election there were not to
be less than six nor more than twelve electors chosen in
a district. The senate was never to consist of less than
forty members, nor was any state to have a less number
than that originally allotted to it; but the number might
be increased in proportion to the whole number of repre-
sentatives in the ratio of forty to one hundred; the increase
to be apportioned among the states according to the re-
spective numbers of their representatives. The senators
were to hold during good behaviour, removable only by
conviction on impeachment for some crime or misdemea-
nor, and might vote by proxy, but no senator present was
to hold more than two proxies. To the senate, thus repre-
senting the numbers and property of the country, compo-
sing a not numerous body, and removed from immediate
popular influences and passions, were confided the sole
power of declaring war, and a control over the patronage
of the government, by requiring its consent to executive
appointments, which consent was also necessary to the
ratification of treaties.
By the fourth article, the president was to be elected by
electors chosen by electors chosen by the people in election
districts. The first electors of each state were to be equal
in number to the whole number of senators and represen-
tatives of such state in the national legislature. They were
to be chosen by its citizens having an estate of inheritance,
or for three lives in land, or a clear personal estate of the
value of a thousand Spanish dollars of the then standard.
These first electors of each state, meeting together, were
to vote for a president by ballot, not being one of their
own number. Then they were to nominate openly two
persons as second electors; and out of the nominees having
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? HAMILTON.
495
the four highest numbers, were to choose by ballot, by plu-
rality of votes, two who were to be the second electors of
each state. These second electors, neither of whom could
be voted for as president, were to meet on an appointed
day, and in the presence of the chief-justice, or of a senior
judge of the supreme court of the United States, were to
open the lists of the persons voted for by the first electors.
The person having a majority of the whole number, was
to be president. If there was not a majority, then the se-
cond electors were to vote for one of the three persons
having the highest number of the votes of the first electors;
and the person having a number of votes equal to a ma-
jority of the whole number of the second electors chosen,
was to be the president. But if no such second choice
should be made, then the person having the highest num-
ber of votes of the first electors, was to be president. By
this complicated process, it was hoped to obtain a correct-
ed expression of the public wishes in the choice of the
chief magistrate, who was still the representative of the
people. v
The president was to take an oath, " faithfully to exe-
cute his office, and to the utmost of his judgment and power
to protect the rights of the people, and preserve the con-
stitution inviolate. " He was to hold his office during good
behaviour, removable only by conviction upon impeach-
ment of some crime or misdemeanor. He was to have
power to convene and to prorogue the legislature; to have
a negative on the acts and resolutions of the assembly and
senate ; to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; to
be commander-in-chief of the army, navy, and militia; and
to have the direction of war when commenced, but not to
take the actual command in the field without the consent
of the senate and assembly; to have the absolute appoint-
ment of the chief officers of the four great executive de-
partments, and the nomination, and, with the advice of the
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THE LIFE OF
senate, the appointment of all other officers, except such
as were differently provided for by the constitution, re-
serving to the legislatures the power of appointing by name,
in their laws, persons to execute special trusts, and leaving
to ministerial officers the appointment of their deputies.
He might fill vacancies temporarily in the recess of the
senate, and could pardon all offences except treason, which
required the assent of the senate and assembly. He might
be impeached by two-thirds of the legislature, two-thirds
of each house concurring. If convicted, to be removed
from office, and then tried and punished in the ordinary
course of law. His impeachment was to operate as a sus-
pension, until determined. His compensation was to be
fixed, and not to be increased or diminished during his
term of service. If he departed the United States, his of-
fice was abdicated.
The president of the senate was to be vice-president;
to exercise all the powers of the president in case of his
death, resignation, impeachment, removal from office, or
absence from the United States, until another was chosen.
The chief-justice, and other judges of the supreme court,
were (by the fifth article) to hold during good behaviour,
removable by impeachment and conviction. They were
to have original jurisdiction in all causes in which the
United States shall be a party: in all controversies between
the United States and a particular state, or between two
or more states, except questions of territory; in all cases
affecting foreign ministers, consuls, and agents: and an ap-
pellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, in all cases
concerning the citizens of foreign nations; in all questions
between the citizens of different states, and in all others in
which the fundamental rights of the constitution were in-
volved, subject to specified exceptions, and to the regula-
tions of the legislature. The judges of all courts which
might be constituted by the legislature, were also to hold
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? HAMILTON.
497
during good behaviour, removable by impeachment, and
were to have competent salaries, to be paid at stated times,
and not to be diminished during their continuance in office;
but the legislatures might abolish the courts themselves.
All crimes, except on impeachment, were to be tried by
a jury of twelve men, in the state where committed; and
all civil causes arising under the constitution, before triable
by jury in the states, were also to be tried by jury, unless
two-thirds of the national legislature should, in special
cases, concur in a different provision.
When offices were of such duration as good behaviour,
it was felt to be highly important to provide an efficacious
and independent tribunal of impeachment; and as not only
the rights of the nation, but of the states, were to be guarded,
to have reference in its constitution to the general and par-
ticular governments.
With this view, a court of impeachment was to be insti-
tuted, by which the president, vice-president, the senators,
governors, and presidents of the states, the principal offi-
cers of the great executive departments, ambassadors and
public ministers, judges of the supreme court, generals and
admirals of the navy, were to be tried. This court was to
consist of the judges of the supreme court, and of the chief
justice, or first or senior judge, of the supreme court of law
of each state, of whom twelve were to compose a court,
and a majority might convict. All other persons, when
impeached, were to be tried by a court to consist of the
judges of the supreme court and six senators, drawn by
lot, a majority of whom might convict. Provisions were
made for conducting these impeachments. Such was to
have been the permanent structure of this government.
The danger of collisions between the states, arising out
of conflicting claims of territory, had been presented to
Hamilton, in the progress of the controversy between New-
York and Vermotit. Other claims were unsettled. He
68
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THE LIFE OF
proposed (in a sixth article) that a court should be formed,
when territorial controversies should arise, of persons to
be nominated by the controverting states, not their own
citizens, double the number of the judges of the supreme
court, one-half of whom, elected by the senate, should,
with the judges of that court, decide the appeal.
In the resolutions prepared by Hamilton in seventeen
hundred and eighty-three, it is seen that the leading defect of
the confederation proposed to be corrected by him was, its
"confining the federal government within too narrow limits;
withholding from it that efficacious authority and influence in
all matters of general concern, which are indispensable to
the harmony and welfare of the whole; embarrassing gen-
eral provisions by unnecessary details and inconvenient ex-
ceptions, incompatible with their nature, tending only to cre-
ate jealousies and disputes respecting the proper bounds of
the authority of the United States, and that of the particular
states, and a mutual interference of the one with the other. "
It was a settled maxim in his mind, " that a government
ought to contain within itself every power requisite to the
full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care,
and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is
responsible; free from every other control but a regard
for the public good, and to the sense of the people. "
Another maxim was," that every power ought to be
commensurate with its object; that there ought to be no
limitation of a power destined to affect a purpose which is
of itself incapable of limitation. " Applying these enlarged
and obvious principles, and having sought to guard, in the
structure of the government, against an abuse of its pow-
ers, he declared, in the seventh article of this constitution,
that " the legislature of the United States shall have power
to pass all laws which they shall judge necessary to the
common defence and general welfare of the union. "
As a check upon this power, every act, bill, or resolu-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-20 03:43 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uva. x000275492 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? HAMILTON.
499
tion, was to have the assent of the president, which, if not
given within ten days after such, act being presented to
him, was to become a law, of which the enacting style
was to be, that it was " enacted by the people of the Uni-
ted States of America;" thus recognising in every exer-
cise of legislative power the sovereignty and unity of the
American people. This general power was followed by
the declaration of a few general restrictions in the nature
of a bill of rights, either suggested by the experience of
this country, or having reference to the nature of the gov-
ernment.