No More Learning

as already stated, the three parts of which the Lectures are organized according to Hegel's idea of the concept, as laid down (mainly) in the Sci- ence of logic (Wissenschaft der Logik, 3 Vols. 1812/1813/1816) and the Ency- clopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enzyklopa? die der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, 1e ed. 1817, 2 ed. 1827, 3 ed. 1830). according to Hegel, the gap between subject and object and between epistemology and meta- physics can and needs to be bridged. the task of philosophy in general and the logic in particular is to show that there is an inherent connection between thought and reality, and that reality is reasonable in itself and that reason is something real. 4 the various domains of human thought and experience, including religion, ethics, morality, politics, law and his- tory, show an intrinsic 'deep structure' which can be brought to philo- sophical understanding by the categorical scheme of Hegel's logic. 5 not only does it make the claim to ground theoretical knowledge (reflection on the conditions of the possibility for empirical knowledge) and practi- cal knowledge (reflection on the conditions of the possibility for moral- practical action), but also to interrelate the theoretical and the practical
4 See the preface to the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, (1821) Werke Band 7, edited by Eva Moldenhauer en Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1970, 1986, p. 24: "Was vernu? nftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernu? nftig. "
5 Peter c. Hodgson, 'Editorial introduction', in: G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philoso- phy of Religion, one-volume edition, the lectures of 1827, edited by Peter c. Hodgson, oxford: clarendon Press 2006, p. 11.
? editorial introduction xvii
in ways that Kant failed to do. the method by which Hegel proceeds, is by reflecting on reflection itself: this is what Hegel call 'speculative thought', in order to distinguish this thought from the merely 'reflective' philosophy of Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers. this speculative philosophy not only grounds ethical, aesthetical, legal and historical experience, but also religious experience, man's experience of God. Hegel's God is not a supersensible entity, but rather the ultimate condition of the possibility for the totality of experience and for religious experience in particular. in this sense, the philosophical first principle and the theological first prin- ciple are one and the same: God is the absolute idea. this is not to say, however, that God is not actual (wirklich). God is actual, actual being in and for itself, but only in and through worldly reality, not as a separated, supersensible entity. When taken apart from the world, God's actuality remains abstract, unfulfilled, unrealized. in and through the world, of which God is the condition par excellence of its possibility, God becomes a concrete, living, true actuality--that is: absolute spirit. 6 and what we can come to terms with, is the way in which God has worked through human history and in the history of religions, in order to manifest himself finally in the consummate religion.
the deep, logical structure, that is grounded in the dialectic of specula- tive thought, consists of three moments or figures, and can be described as follows: (1) universality (Allgemeinheit), which is the most universal sub- stance or principle of a statement that can be discerned. this substance or principle is taken as such, an sich, in its most general and universal being. (2) Particularity (Besonderheid), the particular quality, determinate modification or application of the universal in the case at hand, which can be seen here for itself, fu? r sich. We take it as something particular, separate, as something being on its own, in its own right, but as a concrete manifestation and particularization of the general substance. (3) individu- ality or singularity (Einzelheit), where the former two come together in an adequate shape, wherein the universal is realized and embodied in an absolute way, that is: an und fu? r sich. the realization or embodiment is something that is adequate to its concept, wherein the concept finds its most perfect expression and can be regarded as being with itself or at home with itself in its otherness. this very triadic (or maybe: trinitarian) structure is mirrored in every aspect of Hegel's philosophical system. in the system as a whole (logical idea, nature, spirit), in the science of logic
6 Hodgson, op. cit. p. 12.
? xviii bart labuschagne and timo slootweg
(being / immediacy, essence / reflection, concept / subjectivity) and its subdivisions; the dialectics of consciousness (immediacy, differentiation, return; or identity, cleavage, reunification); and for example even in the doctrine of the trinity (Father, Son, Holy Spirit).
the threefold division of the philosophy of religion in the Lectures reflects this logical structure as well (1. concept of religion, 2. determi- nate religion, 3. consummate religion), as do the subdivisions of each of these main parts. 7 the first part is concerned with the concept of religion, that is: with religion in its most general and universal aspects: as it is an sich. abstraction is made of what particular form of religion whatsoever, and attention is focused only on the most general and universal charac- teristics of the religious phenomenon. themes such as the 'abstract' con- cept of God, the knowledge of God (the 'theoretical' relationship) and the cultus (the 'practical' relationship) are discussed. We will dwell on this first part of the Lectures below. the second part deals with the realisa- tion, the actual being of religion: the determinate religions. these are the religions that are dealt with in the volume that the reader has in hand now: the actual, historical religions that humankind has developed and known, and of which Hegel takes deep and serious account in the sec- ond part of his lectures. He treats (what he calls) immediate religion, or nature religion, the religion of Magic, Buddhism, Hindu religion, Persian religion, Egyptian religion, the religion of the Greeks, the religion of the Jews and finally the roman religion. the lectures exhibit a great variety in categorization and labelling of these religions, which shows that Hegel had difficulties with allotting them a proper place in his system. and the third part is devoted to the culmination of all the previous religion in the religion that is alone adequate to the concept of God: the consummate religion--that is revealed religion: christianity.
the first part of the Lectures is titled The Concept of Religion. it may be useful to expound the content of this part a little more, so that the reader, when studying the contributions on the several determinate religions in this volume, can understand in what way these determinate religions form a particularization of, or embody the concept into concrete, histori- cal religions. 8 Hegel starts with an exposition of the abstract (and not yet concrete) realization of the concept in its three constitutive, inner, logical
7 Hodgson, op. cit. p. 13.
8 For the sake of clarity and brevity, the one-volume edition of the lectures of 1827, edited by Peter c. Hodgson, op. cit. is used, especially the excellent Editorial introduction, pp. 27-39.
? editorial introduction xix
moments: (1) the 'abstract' concept of God, (2) the knowledge of God (the 'theoretical' religious relationship), and (3) the cultus (the 'practical' reli- gious relationship). these three moments correspond with the moments of the self-explication of the idea of God itself. in this first sphere of sheer immediacy and universality, the first thing that can and should be said, is that God is of course the absolute truth and that religion alone is the absolutely true knowledge. this content that stands at the beginning of the philosophy of religion, however, appears to be at the same time the result of the whole of philosophy. the three major disciplines of philoso- phy (logic, nature and spirit) lead up to God as their final result. Philoso- phy of religion is at once the final science within the philosophical system, presupposing all the other branches, starting from the (already in the Phe- nomenology obvious) premise, that man is a homo religiosus. Since this 'result' (and premise) is the absolute truth, it cannot be merely a result or just a premise. it must also be a philosophical presupposition, the first one, as well as the last one, that which results from itself. as such, God is the absolute substance, yet at the same time (in order to avoid the charge of pantheism or Spinozism) subject: God is being-with-itself and abiding- with-itself, in other words, God is spirit, absolute spirit. and we have this content in thought, not yet primarily in feeling, willing, imagination etc. Human beings think, and they alone have religion. thus religion has its inmost seat in thought, though no doubt it can also be felt, believed, imag- ined, represented, and practiced. 9
Knowledge of God, in faith, feeling, representation and thought, in short: the theoretical religious relationship, is dealt with in the second section. 10 in it, a large body of material treating the various forms of reli- gious consciousness is incorporated, such as immediate knowledge, faith, feeling, representation, thought etc. this theme of religious knowledge corresponds to the second, logical moment of religion, that is differentia- tion, distinction and concrete embodiment, which form the preconditions of relationship. this relationship can be seen from the point of God and from the view of consciousness. the God who can be known and rep- resented in the world, is a concrete, differentiated and self-manifesting subject. He is no longer an abstract, self-identical, universal substance. He enters into a relationship with man by manifesting himself in history.
9 Hodgson, op. cit. pp. 27-28. Hegel's treatment of this section can be found on the pages 114-128.
10 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. pp. 128-189.
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From the point of view of man's consciousness, a number of different forms of religious consciousness can be discerned. the first one is that of immediate knowledge--that is: the immediate certainty (Gewissheit) that God is, and that God indeed is this universality having being in and for itself, outside of me and independent of me. certainty is the most imme- diate relation between this content and myself. and the first and most basic form of this certainty is that of faith (Glaube), which can and should not be placed in opposition to knowledge (Wissen) but is in fact a form of knowledge in its own right. instead of using 'faith', Hegel prefers the term used in his general epistemology, 'intuition' (Anschauung), thereby stressing that this form of knowledge is not of a sensible nature--since God is not an object of sense-experience. the second element is 'feeling' (Gefu? hl), which connotes the subjective aspect of the immediate certainty, namely its relevance for our own, particular existence. We have at once the feeling of a content (for example, a hard object) and the feeling of ourselves (the feeling 'hardness'), which we feel that we feel. Feeling is something fashionable, says Hegel, because when we feel something, we are personally and subjectively involved with it, thereby attributing value to the thing in question, as well as to ourselves. However, feeling does not make us able to judge the validity of its contents. Feelings of the heart must be purified and cultivated, and this is exactly why 'thought' becomes indispensable. Before reaching 'thought' however, we encounter first the form of knowledge known as 'representation' (Vorstellung). if feeling con- stitutes the subjective aspect, then representation attends to the objec- tive aspect, the content, of whatever it is that we are immediately certain about. Yet it does not penetrate this content in any rational or cognitive way. representation has two basic forms, or configurations: sensible and non-sensible. the first are considered 'images' (Bilder), they are sym- bolic, allegorical, metaphorical and mythical. non-sensible configurations (nichtsinnliche Gestaltungen) have to do with spiritual contents, activities, relationships. 11
and finally in this section, 'thought' is treated, in a quite long chapter,12 where Hegel discusses the relationship of thought and representation and the question whether religious knowledge is immediate or mediated. the point is, that representation apprehends its various contents in their deter- minate isolation, whereas thought seeks for relationships and universality.
11 Hodgson, op. cit. pp. 29-32. 12 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. pp. 151-189.
? editorial introduction xxi
thought raises representational configurations to a conceptual form. a concept (Begriff ) precisely grasps or holds together (be-greifen) exactly those elements that remain disparate in the simple placing-before (vor- stellen) the mind of various sensible or non-sensible images. By develop- ing arguments and hypotheses that elucidate the unity of representational features, it arrives at a 'conviction' (U? berzeugung), which is certainty in the form of thought. in a last chapter in this section on the theoretical reli- gious relationship, Hegel discusses the proofs of the existence of God. 13
the concluding section, The Cultus, demonstrates that the theoretical religious relationship is still unaccomplished. in the case of the knowledge of God, i am immersed in my object and know nothing about myself. But actually, the true situation is that i am in a relationship with this object; i should know myself as being filled with it. What accomplishes this unity is in fact action, that is: the activity of the cultus, which constitutes the prac- tical religious relationship. cultus is "the including, within my own self, of myself with God, the knowing of myself within God and of God within me. "14 this is accomplished through the act of 'enjoyment', 'partaking', or 'communion' (Genuss), which is the cultic act par excellence. it does not so much bring about the reconciliation of God with mankind, but it pre- supposes it, participates in is as something already accomplished by God's grace, either implicitly or explicitly. Hegel distinguishes three basic forms of the cultus. the first one is devotion (Andacht), which is "not the mere faith that God is, but is present when the faith becomes vivid, when the subject prays and is occupied with this content not merely in objective fashion but becomes immersed therein. "15 next, there are two external cultic forms, sacraments on the one hand (reconciliation brought into feeling, into present sensible consciousness) and sacrifice on the other (the negation involved in elevation sensibly accomplished). the third and highest form is repentance, whereby one not only renounces external things but also offers one's heart or innermost self to God. When purity of heart is properly cultivated, it results in ethical life, which is accord- ing to Hegel "the most genuine cultus. "16 actually, social and political eth- ics represent an extension and further realization of the religious cultus,
13 For an analysis of this, see Hodgson op. cit. pp. 34-38. discussion here would take us too far from the purpose of this introduction.
14 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. p. 191.
15 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. p. 193.
16 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. p. 194. Hodgson, op. cit. p. 39.
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something which is treated by Hegel only at the end the lectures, in his treatment of the christian cultus.
the treatment of the cultus constitutes the final section of the first part of the Lectures. according to the logic of the concept, it is now time to develop the concept in the dimension of its particularity, that is: to show how the concept is embodied in concrete, actual and historical religions. these concrete manifestations of religion in the determinate religions are considered to be not yet fully adequate in relation to its concept. in the second part of his Lectures, Hegel discusses extensively practically all known major world religions, whereby he distinguishes between the deter- minate religions (all non-christian religions) and the consummate, revealed religion (christianity, in both its catholic and Protestant varieties).
4. Purpose of the Book
the present volume brings together a collection of critical essays that discuss Hegel's relation to each of these determinate, historical forms of religion; including the consummate, revealed religion of christianity. a discussion of islam is also included, although it does not figure promi- nently among Hegel's determinate religions. all contributions aim to shed light on the intriguing development of Hegel's conception of the history of these actual religions. they not only offer a text-immanent analyti- cal approach, but they also take a (more or less) critical stance in which Hegel's perception is confronted with a critique developed from the (point of view of the) religion in question. Moreover, important to observe here, is that the determinate religions are considered by Hegel to be less perfect religions; religious forms that are less adequate to the concept of religion. only christianity turns out to be in this sense a true religion. However, seen from these religions themselves, truth is involved as well; of course, at least for the believers in question. this poses (undeniably) a deep ten- sion between the self-understanding of these non-christian believers and how they view their religion (namely: as true religion) and Hegel's under- standing of these religions as less true than christianity.
it has been our aim not only to develop a comprehensive view of Hegel's philosophy of the historical religions, but also of its broader, con- temporary importance. We did not want to bundle separate, stand-alone contributions, but to offer an integral outline of Hegel's philosophy of the religions in general. the construction and structure of the book follow (for
editorial introduction xxiii
the most part) the dialectics that Hegel himself employed in his Lectures, with the exception of islam that Hegel finds difficult to rubricate.
apart from text-immanent exegesis and the critical appraisal, the further aim of this book is as indicated, to contribute to the discussion between (on the one hand) Hegel's daring, far-reaching philosophical treatment of the great historical religions, and (on the other hand) the current approach, prevailing in religious studies, that seems to be con- strained (more and more) to the merely empirical appreciation of the religious material. We could say that, in some sense, Hegel himself has been responsible for this self-imposed restriction. after his death, Hegel's philosophy of religion was severely criticized. it was presumed to be too speculative and too little empirical in order to be able to do justice to the actual, historical religions. For many scholars 19th century Hegelianism constituted a reason to withdraw and distance themselves from philoso- phy, and to a retreat into a non-reflexive religiosity and a mere descrip- tive science thereof. neo-Kantianism succeeded more or less in regaining some of the long lost trustworthiness of the idealistic approach. But there still remained a great deal of suspicion towards philosophy.
on the other hand, one might ask the question whether empiricism does not condemn itself to intellectual blindness. Philosophers in gen- eral and Hegel in particular, have been reproached many times (and not always without reason) for their generalisations and idealisations. How- ever, positive empiricist science can be blamed for a lack of syntheses, for remaining steeped in details and for over-accentuating the many nuances of reality. While society nowadays is in deep search for these broader per- spectives and meanings, their analyses tenaciously refrain and 'abstract' completely from taking a critical, philosophical or normative stance.
in our view Hegel's philosophy of religion can serve as an example in (at least) two ways. Surely, 'Hegel' serves as a warning against the (some- times) presumptuous pretentions of philosophy to be able to understand in a nutshell, just about everything. However in addition to this, Hegel could serve as an example for those who do not want to restrict them- selves to the empirical approach of the contemporary 'religious studies', but who want seriously to engage, with all possible dangers, in thinking about God, and about the relation between God and man.
leiden, december 2011
Religion of natuRe Heinz Kimmerle
1. introduction
in his Lectures on the philosophy of religion (1821), Hegel departs from the idea of a 'religion of spirit', which has the same content as his philosophy, that is: a 'philosophy of spirit'.
in this context, he cannot give an adequate explanation of the 'religion of nature'. especially he cannot do justice to the african form of a 'religion of nature'. in his writings of 1800-1802 he defends a 'religion of life', which corresponds to the central meaning of the concepts of life and nature in his 'system of philosophy' of that time. this forms a more adequate presupposition to explain the 'religion of nature'. although there is no direct relation possible between Hegel's 'religion of life' and the animist religious representations and practices in sub-Saharan african tradition, the outlines of a philosophical discussion is sketched in the following contribution, in which this relation becomes meaningful.
'Philosophy of Spirit' and 'Religion of Spirit'
'god is Spirit and those who worship Him must worship Him in Spirit and in truth'; 'this same Spirit testifies together with our spirit that we are god's children'. these two quotations from the new testament ( John 4; 24 and Romans 8; 16) are the key-texts upon which Hegel's 'philosophy of religion' is founded. this is especially true with regard to the claim that Christianity is the highest form of religion. Philosophy, as it is worked out as the last stage of Hegel's 'system of philosophy', has the same contents as this religion. His 'system of philosophy' is philosophy of spirit in all its parts: in the 'Science of logic', spirit is presented as idea, in the 'Philoso- phy of nature', spirit exists as its other and in the 'Philosophy of Spirit', we encounter spirit as spirit. according to Hegel--and he uses among other arguments the two above given quotations for that--the Christian religion is religion of spirit, which is testified both by god's Spirit and by our human spirit. therefore the dispute whether (Christian) religion is
2 heinz kimmerle
sublated and thus surpassed by philosophy or not, is of no use. 1 Both of them express the 'absolute spirit', and that means the absolute truth, in an adequate way: religion in the medium of representations and philoso- phy in the medium of concepts.
of course, philosophy is paramount to religion, but religion is broader than philosophy. Religion enables the absolute truth to become acces- sible to people who are not familiar with philosophical thought and the language of concepts. in addition, philosophy, if it is true philosophy-- that means: self-development of spirit (Hegel speaks in this connection of 'speculative' philosophy)--is in itself religious. the self-development of spirit covers the following stages: first of all, it knows itself, in a next step it observes itself in nature, then it puts its elements beside and oppo- site to each other by means of reflection, and finally it unites them in the wholeness of perceiving itself. Moreover, this happens also, in a way, which is accessible for everybody, in religion and its history. therefore is 'religion . . . the truth for all human beings'. 2
Systematic Explanation and History of Religion
these elements of true religion are present in the 'revealed religion' of Christianity as absolute religion. for this religion is a 'religion of spirit'. this can be summarized, with Hegel, also in a more religious language: (1) 'god is only god insofar as He knows Himself '; (2) 'His knowledge of Himself is also a self-consciousness in the human being' who is aware of the outside nature and perceives himself as spirit. thus self-consciousness is reached, in which knowledge is attained that the finite human being has of god, how imperfect that may be. (3) the human knowledge of god transforms itself finally into 'the self-knowledge of the human being within god'. 3 in the Encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences these three ele- ments of true religion are explained systematically. these will be left aside
1 Karl lo? with, 'Hegels aufhebung der christlichen Religion? , in: Hans-georg gadamer (ed. ), Heidelberger Hegel-Tage 1962, Bonn: Bouvier 1964, pp. 193-236; albert Chapelle, Hegel et la religion, Paris: editions universitaires 1963; Heinz Kimmerle, ? Zur theologischen Hegelinterpretation', in: Hegel-Studien 3 1965, pp. 356-369.
2 georg Wilhelm friedrich Hegel, Enzyklopa? die der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), ed. friedhelm nicolin & otto Po? ggeler, Hamburg: Meiner 1959, pp. 451-452 (? 573). i am quoting here and in the following text from this german edition and give my own translation. Reference to the paragraphs (? ? ) makes it possible to find the quotations in any other edition of this work.
3 Hegel, Enzyklopda? die, p. 447 (? 564).
? religion of nature 3
in this contribution. However, the systematic steps can also be traced in the history of religion, which Hegel has worked out in his Lectures on the philosophy of religion. in this history the finite human knowledge of god presents itself in different forms of 'determinate religion'. the 'religion of nature' is the first of these historical forms.
the 'religion of nature' originates when natural things are observed in a spiritual way in the self-consciousness of the human being. insofar as this is a spiritual observation of natural things, nature is conceived as god. Hegel gives several examples of this religion, namely the religion of the eskimos, the Mongolians, but first of all, the africans. the Chinese 'religion of the state' is also part of the 'religion of nature' in certain years when Hegel has given these Lectures, but not in all of them.
'Religion of Nature'
for the reading of the main passages of the 'religion of nature', which will follow here, the edition of Jaeschke provides us with the most reliable and most detailed texts. 4 However, i will not just reproduce the contents of these passages or retell them. a deconstructive reading is carried out, which will lead to somehow unexpected and also unaccustomed results. the general introduction is especially taken into consideration, as well as the explanation of the first form of the 'immediate religion or religion of nature', which is called by Hegel 'religion of sorcery'. in the general intro- duction and in the first chapter of the first form of the 'religion of nature': 'a) the metaphysical concept' of god, we find the conceptual basis of this form of religion. these passages will be read with precision and some formulations will be examined critically, which deal with the concept of nature and the concept of life. this way of reading will make clear that there are some cracks and clean breaks in Hegel's conception of a 'reli- gion of spirit'. the description of the african form of a 'religion of nature' turns out to be especially inadequate. earlier conceptions of nature, life and the human world in Hegel's thought would have enabled a different explanation of the 'religion of nature' as a 'religion of life'. in support of this allegation i will--after a short glimpse at the chapter on 'the reli- gion' in the Phenomenology of Spirit from 1807 and some passages of the
4 VPhR 2, 1-29, 139-219, 411-445, 611-614. Quotations from this edition are my transla- tion (HK).
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Systematic Drafts (Systementwu? rfe) from 1802/03 until 1806--refer to the systematic conception of the years 1800 to 1802.
therefore, the later conception of religion as 'religion of spirit' is con- fronted with a philosophy of religion that departs from the concept of life that is essential for Hegel's 'system of philosophy' as a whole in the years of his transition from frankfurt to Jena. in this connection one could speak of a 'religion of life' or even of an animistic conception of religion. However, the notion of 'animism', to be used to denote a religion based on the concept of life, is not yet in use in Hegel's time. according to the lemma 'animism' in the Encyclopaedia of Ghosts and Spirits, edited by R. e. guiley, this notion is introduced by the anthropologist edward B. tylor in his book Religion in Primitive Cultures, that was published in 1871. 5
'Religion of Spirit' and 'Religion of Life' in Hegel and Animist Representations in Traditional African Religion
in his Lectures from 1821 on, in the context of a 'religion of spirit' Hegel calls the first form of the 'religion of nature', as we have said before: 'reli- gion of sorcery'. on several occasions, he remarks that we cannot speak of religion in a proper sense of the word on this level. a closer examina- tion of the way in which Hegel is using his sources here, especially about traditional african religion and of the whole presentation of this form of religion, leads us to the conclusion that he is hampered by his universal concept of spirit to give an adequate explanation of the 'religion of nature'. earlier conceptions of his 'system of philosophy', which depart from the concept of life, are quite different in this respect. they are akin to ani- mism as we find it in traditional african religion, if we look at it from the knowledge we have of it today. this religion can be called a 'religion of spirits', because the belief that a soul can be found in all things--also in natural things--means that spirits can dwell in them. in this connection, a new appreciation of animism is necessary in order to correct the devalu- ation of this religion, which has occurred in the period of enlightenment and of colonialism. the later Hegel has contributed considerably to the devaluation of this religion. the correction can take place in the context of a philosophical discussion, which takes seriously the 'absent-present' or 'present-absent'--dimension of reality, as it becomes possible since Derrida's suggestion of a new 'spectrology'.
5 edward B. tylor, Religion in Primitive Cultures, new York/oxford: facts on file 1992, pp. 11-13.
? religion of nature 5 2. 'Religion of nature' in Hegel's 'System of Philosophy' Since 1817
Logical Foundations of the 'Religion of Nature'
the explanation of the history of religion in Hegel's Lectures on the phi- losophy of religion from 1821 on, as it is founded in his Encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences (1st edition in 1817), relies more in particular on the first part of this philosophical system: the 'Science of logic'. that means: the 'Religion of nature', corresponding to the first chapter of the 'logic', consists in the religion of 'Being'. We have to take into consideration that the correspondences between systematic and historical elements with Hegel are generally, and also in this particular context, not very strict. the coincidences that occur in history make this impossible.
in the General introduction to the 'immediate religion or Religion of nature', in the first paragraph 'a) the Metaphysical Concept' of god, and in the first passages of the second paragraph 'b) the Concrete Represen- tation' of god, Hegel works with the concept of 'Being' of his 'Science of logic'. 'Being' is presented in the 'logic' as 'immediateness'. the first form of religion therefore is described as 'immediate religion'. this form of religion is characterised by the 'sensual awareness of god in all things without distinction'. this characterisation seems to amount to panthe- ism, as it has been worked out in modern philosophy since Descartes by Spinoza. Hegel, however, denies this similarity explicitly. according to his explanation, 'immediate religion' or 'Religion of nature' is on the 'lowest and most imperfect level' of religion, as can be found with 'wild peoples'. the pantheism of Spinoza is, in opposition to that, the first form of the 'true' philosophy of religion, and is as such the foundation of 'absolute' or 'Revealed religion'.
at the beginning of the 'logic' the notion of 'Being' as the first one, also has a double meaning like the first form of the 'true' philosophy of religion in Spinoza. in connection with 'nothingness' and 'becoming', the notion of 'Being' is the foundation of all the following notions of 'pure thought', as they are developed in the 'logic'. the specific value, which is thus attrib- uted to the 'first' notion, is given also to pantheism as the first form of the 'true' philosophy of religion, but not to the 'Religion of nature' as the first form of all religions.
notwithstanding this negative appreciation of the 'immediate religion' or 'Religion of nature', Hegel tries to do justice to it. although 'Being' is the foundation of the 'religion of nature' only in its restricted meaning, it is nevertheless a spiritual determination, which shows that god is in all natural things. therefore, Hegel can say: 'god is the being in . . . all finite
6 heinz kimmerle
things'. When god or the infinite is related in this way to the being of all finite things, this means a first proof of the existence of god. Hegel formu- lates this proof as a syllogism:
the finite (of all things) presupposes the infinite However, the finite is.
then is also the infinite.
like the way in which the notion of 'Being' is used in the determination of the 'Religion of nature', this proof of the existence of god is also defi- cient; it is abstract and restricted in its validity. What happens here, is not that god is given 'being', but that 'being' is given god. individual, finite things are made general by giving them a spiritual meaning. But the idea of god, which is expressed in this statement, is not 'adequate' to a 'more profound' explanation. the 'Religion of nature' as a whole cannot really be regarded as a religion at all, at the most as a 'heathen religion' or--Hegel is using a term of goethe here--an 'ethnic religion'.
Because Hegel is uncertain about the 'Religion of nature' as a real reli- gion, the german theologian R. leuze, in his study on 'the non-Christian religions in Hegel's philosophy of religion'--a study which is called a standard work on this subject matter by Jaeschke6--, completely leaves out this form of religion. in contrast to what Hegel himself does, leuze decides, on account of its uncertain status as a religion, not to deal with the 'Religion of nature'. He starts with the religion of the Chinese empire, which comes under the 'Religions of nature' in some years of Hegel's Lec- tures, in others not. 7
The Concept of Nature in the 'Religion of Spirit'
We have seen, that the sentence: 'there is a sensual awareness of nature . . . as god' may not be understood as an expression of pantheism in the sense of Spinoza. Moreover, 'being' as it is used in the explanation of the 'Religion of nature' is not 'being' in the full, concrete meaning of this notion. Both of these critical statements by Hegel about the 'Religion of nature' can be traced back to the concept of nature in the 'Religion of spirit'. for
6 Cf. Walter Jaeschke in: Hegel, Vorlesungen. Ausgewa? hlte Nachschriften und Manu- skripte. vol. 4b, Hamburg: Meiner 1985, p. 653.
7 R. leuze, Die ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel, go? ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht 1975, pp. 9-10.
? religion of nature 7
in this concept, nature is restricted to 'fixed', finite things. in the 'religion of nature' as part of the 'religion of spirit', to worship the 'sun . . . stars, river, sea', the 'sky in general' has to do with an 'undetermined conscious- ness of a mighty being, something mighty, a benevolent spirit'. Such rep- resentations miss clear determinations, which in modern pantheism are applied e. g. to the sun. it is thought of as a ball of a certain kind and mat- ter, surrounded by planets, circling around it according to firm rules. in modern pantheism, in contrast to the 'Religion of nature', finite things are therefore made into something general in a determined way.
in a more developed form of the 'Religion of nature', the power of nature is present in subjective natural beings in a more intensive way than in things. in this connection, animals are mentioned; and on an even higher level human beings. But no firm ontological status is given to those ani- mals or human beings that can make use of the power of nature. they are 'purely immediate, natural' beings, and as such thought of in an 'inadequate' way. their generality is only one of representation or will, not of thinking.
Spirit cannot recognise itself adequately in this concept of nature. Because of the undetermined 'dark' character of the power of nature in the 'religion of nature', the mind is filled with fear, with unclear desires and feelings of scare. 'Coincidental and arbitrary connections' are made. nature is somehow independent, on its own, and ducks out of the uni- versal functions of spirit, which give structure to everything. 'the unity of man and nature', a saying that is often used, is wrong according to Hegel. it should be: the unity of man and 'his nature'. and the nature of man is 'freedom, being spirit'. Due to the presupposed universal determina- tion of all that is by spirit, Hegel cannot understand nature as a meaning- ful whole in itself in which specific natural things have their determined place. in this conception, the attitude of man is not primarily a receiving one with regard to nature as an independent whole.
3. 'Religion of nature' in an earlier Period of Hegel's Writings
The Concepts of Life and Nature in Hegel's Conception of Religion in 1800-1802
it is amazing that in an earlier phase of his thought Hegel defends a con- cept of nature, which is clearly understood as an independent whole that is on the same level as the human world or even can claim priority with regard to the latter. When he started to build up a 'system of philosophy'
8 heinz kimmerle
of his own in the years 1800-1802, philosophy of nature methodologically formed the main part of it. the concept of life was the basic concept of this system. the contents and the structure of this system of philosophy is examined in my earlier research and published in my book: Das Prob- lem der Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens. Hegels 'System der Philosophie' in den Jahren 1800 bis 1804. 8 in the meantime, it is generally recognised that Hegel's systematic drafts of his early Jena period (including some texts of his last year in frankfurt) have a specific meaning, which is different from his later systematic conceptions. 9 this is also documented in the Hegel- Lexikon, which has recently become available. 10
Traces of Earlier Concepts of Life and of Nature in the Explanation of Religion in the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807 and in the Systematic Drafts from 1802/03 until 1806
Before going into details about the concepts of life and nature and their meaning for the explanation of religion in the systematic conception of the years 1800-1802, i will show which traces of these conceptions still can be found in the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807 and in the Systematic Drafts from 1802/03 until 1806. in a certain sense traces like these can also be identified in the later work of Hegel.
the path, which is followed in the Phenomenology of Spirit from cer- tainty on the basis of sense data through all forms of knowledge to the 'certainty of the spirit of itself' finally results in the 'consciousness of the absolute being', which means: the phenomenon of religion. But this way through the forms of knowledge is different from the development of spirit in general. 'With reference to religion' this development cannot 'be represented in time'. Consequently, we find in the Phenomenology of Spirit a sequence of religions, which precede the 'revealed religion', that differs from the sequence in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. the sequence in the latter starts also with the 'natural religion'. But this form of religion is obviously related to the structure of the 'philosophy of nature' and not to that of the 'science of logic'. the first form of 'natural
8 Bonn: Bouvier 19822 (Hegel-Studien. Beiheft 8), see pp. 135-146.
9 H. Kimmerle (ed. ), Die Eigenbedeutung von Hegels Jenaer Systemkonzeptionen, Berlin: akademie Verlag 2004.
10 P. Cobben (ed. ), Hegel-Lexikon, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2006, pp. 44-50.
? religion of nature 9
religion' is the 'religion of light'. Pure light is characterised by differentia- tions within itself. it contains the same structure as the 'system of the sun' in the philosophies of nature from 1801 to 1804. then follow, similar to the historical sequence in the Lectures, the religions of plants and animals. in contrast to the historical explanations, the indian 'religion of flowers' gets a specifically positive place here. in 'conscious animal life' we encounter in the text of 1807, like in the Lectures, the first subjective form of religion.