These
accounts
have never been
contradicted.
contradicted.
Edmund Burke
That the standing policy of this kingdom ever has
been to watch over the external proceedings of France,
(whatever form the interior government of that kingdom might take,) and to prevent the extension of its dominion or its ruling influence over other states.
That there is nothing in the present internal state
of things in France which alters the national policy
with regard to the exterior relations of that country.
That there are, on the contrary, many things in
the internal circumstances of France (and perhaps of
this country, too) which tend to fortify the principles
of that fundamental policy, and which render the
active assertion of those principles more pressing at
this than at any former time.
That, by a change effected in about three weeks,
France has been able to penetrate into the heart of
Germany, to make an absolute conquest of Savoy,
to menace an immediate invasion of the Netherlands,
and to awe and overbear the whole Helvetic body,
which is in a most perilous situation: the great
aristocratic Cantons having, perhaps, as much or
more to dread from their own people, whom they
? ? ? ? 382 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION.
arm, but do not choose or dare to employ, as from
the foreign enemy, which against all public faith has
butchered their troops serving by treaty in France.
To this picture it is hardly necessary to add the
means by which France has been enabled to effect all
this, -namely, the apparently entire destruction of
one of the largest and certainly the highest disciplined and best appointed army ever seen, headed by
the first military sovereign in Europe, with a captain.
under him of the greatest refnown; and that without
a blow given or received on any side. This state of
things seems to me, even if it went no further, truly
serious.
Circumstances have enabled France to do all this
by land. On the other element she has begun to exert herself; and she must succeed in her designs, if
enemies very different from those she has hitherto
had to encounter do not resist her.
She has fitted out a naval force, now actually at
sea, by which she is enabled to give law to the whole
Mediterranean. It is known as a fact, (and if not so
known, it is in the nature of things highly probable,)
that she proposes the ravage of the Ecclesiastical
State and the pillage of Rome, as her first object;
that next she means to bombard Naples, -to awe, to
humble, and thus to command, all Italy, --to force
it to a nominal neutrality, but to a real dependence,
-- to compel the Italian princes and republics to admit the free entrance of the French commerce, an
open intercourse, and, the sure concomitant of that
intercourse, the affiliated societies, in a manner similar to those she has established at Avignon, the Comtat, Chambdry, London, Manchester, &c. , &c. , which are so many colonies planted in all these countries,
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 383
for extending the influence and securing the dominion of the French republic.
That there never has been hitherto a period in
which this kingdom would have suffered a French
fleet to domineer in the Mediterranean, and to force
Italy to submit to such terms as France would think
fit to impose, - to say nothing of what has been done
upon land in support of the same system. The great
object for which we preserved Minorca, whilst we
could keep it, and for which we still retain Gibraltar,
both at a great expense, was, and is, to prevent the
predominance of France over the Mediterranean.
Thus far as to the certain and immediate effect of
that armament upon the Italian States. The probable effect which that armament, and the other ar maments preparing at Toulon and other ports, may
have upon Spain, on the side of the Mediterranean, is
worthy of the serious attention of the British councils.
That it is most probable, we may say in a manner
certain, that, if there should be a rupture between
France and Spain, France will not confine her offensive piratical operations against Spain to her efforts in the Mediterranean; on which side, however, she
may grievously affect Spain, especially if she excites
Morocco and Algiers, which undoubtedly she will, to
fall upon that power.
That she will fit out armaments upon the ocean,
by which the flota itself may be intercepted, and thus
the treasures of all Europe, as well as the largest and
surest resources of the Spanish monarchy, may be
conveyed into France, and become powerful instruments for the annoyance of all her neighbors.
That she makes no secret of her designs.
? ? ? ? 384 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
That, if the inward and outward bound flota should
escape, still France has more and better means of dissevering many of the provinces in the West and East
Indies from the state of Spain than Holland had,
when she succeeded in the same attempt. The
French marine resembles not a little the old armaments of the Flibustiers, which about a century back,
in conjunction with pirates of our nation, brought
such calamities upon the Spanish colonies. They
differ only in this, - that the present piratical force
is out of all measure and comparison greater: one
hundred and fifty ships of the line and frigates
being ready-built, most of them in a manner new,
and all applicable in different ways to that service.
Privateers and Moorish corsairs possess not the best
seamanship, and very little discipline, and indeed
can make no figure in regular service; but in desperate adventures, and animated with a lust of plunder, they are truly formidable.
That the land forces of France are well adapted to
concur with their marine in conjunct expeditions of
this nature. In such expeditions, enterprise supplies
the want of discipline, and perhaps more than supplies it. Both for this, and for other service, (however contemptible their military is in other respects,) one arm is extremely good, the engineering and artillery branch. The old officer corps in both being
composed for the greater part of those who were not
gentlemen, or gentlemen newly such, few have abaildoned the service, and the men are veterans, well
enough disciplined, and very expert. In this piratical way they must make war with good advantage.
They must do so, even on the side of Flanders, either
offensively or defensively. This shows the difference
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 385
between the policy of Louis the Fourteenth, who
built a wall of brass about his kingdom, and that
of Joseph the Second, who premeditatedly uncovered
his whole frontier.
That Spain, from the actual and expected prevalence of French power, is in a most perilous situation, -perfectly dependent on the mercy of that republic. If Austria is broken, or even humbled,
she will not dare to dispute its mandates.
In the present state of things, we have nothing at
all to dread from the power of Spain by sea or by
land, or from any rivalry in commerce.
That we have much to dread from the connections
into which Spain may be forced.
From the circumstances of her territorial possessions, of her resources, and the whole of her civil
and political state, we may be authorized safely and
with undoubted confidence to affirm that
Spain is not a substantive power.
That she must lean on France or on England.
That it is as much for the interest of Great Britain
to prevent the predominancy of a French interest in
that kingdom as if Spain were a province of the
crown of Great Britain, or a state actually dependent
on it, --full as much so as ever Portugal was reputed
to be. This is a dependency of much greater value;
and its destruction, or its being carried to any other
dependency, of much more serious misfortune.
One of these two things must happen: either Spain
must submit to circumstances and take such conditions as France will impose, or she must engage in
hostilities along with the Emperor and the king of
Sardinia.
If Spain should be forced or awed into a treaty
VOL. IV. 25
? ? ? ? 386 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
with the republic of France, she must open her ports
and her commerce, as well as the land communication for the French laborers, who were accustomed
annually to gather in the harvest in Spain. Indeed,
she must grant a free communication for travellers
and traders through her whole country. In that
case it is not conjectural, it is certain, the clubs will
give law in the provinces; Bourgoing, or some such
miscreant, will give law at Madrid.
In this England may acquiesce, if she pleases; and
France will conclude a triumphant peace with Spain
under her absolute dependence, with a broad highway
into that, and into every state of Europe. She actually invites Great Britain to divide with her the
spoils of the New World, and to make a partition of
the Spanish monarchy. Clearly, it is better to do so
than to suffer France to possess those spoils and that
territory alone; which, without doubt, unresisted by
us, she is altogether as able as she is willing to do.
This plan is proposed by the French in the way in
which they propose all their plans,- and in the only
way in which, indeed, they can propose them, where
there is no regular communication between his Majesty and their republic.
What they propose is a plan. It is a plan also to
resist their predatory project. To remain quiet, and,to suffer them to make their own use of a naval power before our face, so as to awe and bully Spain into a submissive peace, or to drive them into a ruinous
war, without any measure on our part, I fear is no
plan at all.
However, if the plan of cooperation which France
desires, and which her affiliated societies here ardently wish and are constantly writing up, should not
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 387
be adopted, and the war between the Emperor and
France should continue, I think it not at all likely
that Spain should not be drawn into the quarrel. In
that case, the neutrality of England will be a thing
absolutely impossible. The time only is the subject
of deliberation.
Then the question will be, whether we are to defer
putting ourselves into a posture for the common defence, either by armament, or negotiation, or both,
until Spain is actually attacked, - that is, whether
our court will take a decided part for Spain, whilst
Spain, on her side, is yet in a condition to act with
whatever degree of vigor she may have, whilst that
vigor is yet unexhausted, - or whether we shall connIlect ourselves with her broken fortunes, after she shall
have received material blows, and when we shall have
the whole slow length of that always unwieldy and illconstructed, and then wounded and crippled body, to
drag after us, rather than to aid us. Whilst our disposition is uncertain, Spain will not dare to put herself in such a state of defence as will make her hostility formidable or her neutrality respectable. If the decision is such as the solution of this question (I take it to be the true question) conducts to,
no time is to be lost. But the measures, though
prompt, ought not to be rash and indigested. They
ought to be well chosen, well combined, and well
pursued. The system must be general; but it must
be executed, not successively, or with interruption,
but all together, uno flatu, in one melting, and one
mould.
For this purpose we must put Europe before us,
which plainly is, just now, in all its parts, in a state
of dismay, derangement, and confusion, and, very
? ? ? ? 388 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
possibly amongst all its sovereigns, full of secret heartburning, distrust, and mutual accusation. Perhaps
it may labor under worse evils. There is no vigor
anywhere, except the distempered vigor and energy
of France. That country has but too much life in it,
when everything around is so disposed to tameness
and languor. The very vices of the French system at
home tend to give force to foreign exertions. The
generals must join the armies. They must lead them
to enterprise, or they are likely to perish by their
hands. Thus, without law or government of her
own, France gives law to all the governments in Europe.
This great mass of political matter must have been
always under the view of thinkers for the public,
whether they act in office or not. Amongst events,
even the late calamitous events were in the book of
contingency. Of course they must have been in design, at least, provided for. A plan which takes in
as many as possible of the states concerned will rather tend to facilitate and simplify a rational scheme
for preserving Spain (if that were our sole, as I think
it ought to be our principal object) thai to delay and
perplex it.
If we should think that a provident policy (perlaps n1ow more than provident, urgent and necessary)
should lead us to act, we cannot take measures as
if hothing had been done. We must see the faults,
if any, which have conducted to the present misfortunes: not for the sake of criticism, military or political, or from the common motives of blaming persons and counsels which have not been successful; but in order, if we can, to administer some remedy
to these disasters, by the adoption of plans more bot
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 389
tomed in principle, and built on with more discretion.
Mistakes may be lessons.
There seem, indeed, to have been several mistakes
in the political principles on which the war was entered into, as well as in the plans upon which it was
conducted, -- some of them very fundamental, and not
only visibly, but I may say palpably erroneous; and
I think him to have less than the discernment of a
very ordinary statesman, who could not foresee, from
the very beginning, unpleasant consequences from
those plans, though not the unparalleled disgraces
and disasters which really did attend them: for they
were, both principles and measures, wholly new and
out of the common course, without anything apparently very grand in the conception to justify this total departure from all rule.
For, in the first place, the united sovereigns very
much injured their cause by admitting that they
had nothing to do with the interior arrangements of
France, - in contradiction to the whole tenor of the
public law of Europe, and to the correspondent practice of all its states, from the time we have any history of them. In this particular, the two German courts seem to have as little consulted the publicists
of Germany as their own true interests, and those of
all the sovereigns of Germany and Europe. This
admission of a false principle in the law of nations
brought them into an apparent contradiction, when
they insisted on the reestablishment of the royal atmthority in France. But this confused and contradictory proceeding gave rise to a practical error of worse consequence. It was derived from one and the same
root: namely, that the person of the monarch of France
was everything; and the monarchy, and the interme
? ? ? ? 390 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
diate orders of the state, by which the monarchy was
upheld, were nothing. So that, if the united potentates had succeeded so far as to reestablish the
authority of that king, and that he should be so illadvised as to confirm all the confiscations, and to recognize as a lawful body and to class himself with that rabble of murderers, (and there wanted not persons
who would so have advised him,) there was nothing
in the principle or in the proceeding of the united
powers to prevent such an arrangement.
An expedition to free a brother sovereign from
prison was undoubtedly a generous and chivalrous
undertaking. But the spirit and generosity would
not have been less, if the policy had been more profound and more comprehensive, -that is, if it had
taken in those considerations and those persons by
whom, and, in some measure, for whom, monarchy
exists. This would become a bottom for a system
of solid and permanent policy, and of operations conformable to that system.
The same fruitful error was the cause why nothing
was done to impress the people of France (so far as
we can at all consider the inhabitants of France as a
people) with an idea that the government was ever
to be really French, or indeed anything else than the
nominal government of a monarch, a monarch absolute as over them, but whose sole support was to arise
from foreign potentates, and who was to be kept on
his throne by German forces,- in short, that the
king of France was to be a viceroy to the Emrperor
and the king of Prussia.
It was the first time that foreign powers, interfering in the concerns of a nation divided into parties,
have thought proper to thrust wholly out of their
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 391
councils, to postpone, to discountenance, to reject,
and, in a manner, to disgrace, the party whom those
powers came to support. The single person of a
king cannot be a party. Woe to the king who is
himself his party! The royal party, with the king
or his representatives at its head, is the royal cause.
Foreign powers have hitherto chosen to give to such
wars as this the appearance of a civil contest, and not
that of an hostile invasion. When the Spaniards, in'
the sixteenth century, sent aids to the chiefs of the
League, they appeared as allies to that league, and to
the imprisoned king (the Cardinal de Bourbon) which
that league had set up. When the Germans came to
the aid of the Protestant princes, in the same series
of civil wars, they came as allies. When the English
came to the aid of Henry the Fourth, they appeared
as allies to that prince. So did the French always,
when they intermeddled in the affairs of Germany:
they came to aid a party there. When the English
and Dutch intermeddled in the succession of Spain,
they appeared as allies to the Emperor, Charles the
Sixth. In short, the policy has been as uniform as
its principles were. obvious to an ordinary eye.
According to all the old principles of law and policy, a regency ought to have been appointed by the
French princes of the blood, nobles, and parliaments,
and then recognized by the combined powers. Fundamental law and ancient usage, as well as the clear
reason of the thing, have always ordained it during
an imprisonment of the king of France: as in the
case of John, and of Francis the First. A monarchy
ought not to be left a moment without a representative having an interest in the -succession. The orders of the state ought also to have been recognized
? ? ? ? 392 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
in those amongst whom alone they existed in freedom, that is, in the emigrants.
Thus, laying down a firm foundation on the recognition of the authorities of the kingdom of France, according to Nature and to its fundamental laws, and
not according to the novel and inconsiderate principles of the usurpation which the united powers were come to extirpate, the king of Prussia and the Emperor, as allies of the ancient kingdom of France, would have proceeded with dignity, first, to free the
monarch, if possible,-if not, to secure tlhe monarchy
as principal in the design; and in order to avoid all
risks to that great object, (the object of other ages
than the present, and of other countries than that of
France,) they would of course avoid proceeding with
more haste or in a different manner than what the
nature of such an object required.
Adopting this, the only rational. system, the rational mode of proceeding upon it was to commence with an effective siege of Lisle, which the French generals
must have seen taken before their faces, or be forced
to fight. A plentiful country of friends, from whence
to draw supplies, would have been behind them; a
plentiful country of enemies, from whence to force
supplies, would have been before them. Good towns
were always within reach to deposit their hospitals
and magazines. The march from Lisle to Paris is
through a less defensible country, and the distance is
hardly so great as from Longwy to Paris.
If the old politic and military ideas had governed,
the advanced guard would have been formed of those
who best knew the country and had some interest in
it, supported by some of the best light troops and light
artillery, whilst the grand solid body of an army dis
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 6 93
ciplined to perfection proceeded leisurely, and in close
connection with all its stores, provisions, and heavy
cannon, to support the expedite body in case of misadventure, or to improve and complete its success.
The direct contrary of all this was put in practice.
In consequence of the original sin of this project, the
army of the French princes was everywhere thrown
into the rear, and no part of it brought forward to the
last moment, the time of the commencement of the
secret negotiation. This naturally made an ill impression on the people, and furnished an occasion for
the rebels at Paris to give out that the faithful subjects of the king were distrusted, despised, and abhorred by his allies. The march was directed through a skirt of Lorraine, and thence into a part of Champagne, the Duke of Brunswick leaving all the strongest places behind him, - leaving also behind him the strength of his artillery, -- and by this means giving
a superiority to the French, in theo nly way in which
the present France is able to oppose a German force.
In consequence of the adoption of those false politics, which turned everything on the king's sole and
single person, the whole plan of the war was reduced
to nothing but a coup de main, in order to set that
prince at liberty. If that failed, everything was to
be given up.
The scheme of a coup de main might (under favorable circumstances) be very fit for a partisan at the
head of a light corps, by whose failure nothing material would be deranged. But for a royal army of
eighty thousand men, headed by a king in person,
who was to march an hundred and fifty miles through
an enemy's country, - surely, this was a plan unheard of.
? ? ? ? 394 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
Although this plan was not well chosen, and pro.
ceeded upon principles altogether ill-judged and im.
politic, the superiority of the military force might
in a great degree have supplied the defects, and
furnished a corrective to the mistakes. The greater
probability was, that the Duke of Brunswick would
make his way to Paris over the bellies of the rabble
of drunkards, robbers, assassins, rioters, mutineers,
and half-grown boys, under the ill-obeyed command
of a theatrical, vaporing, reduced captain of cavalry,
who opposed that great commander and great army.
But -- Diis aliter visum. He began to treat, the
winds blew and the rains beat, -- the house fell, because it was built upon sand, - and great was the fall
thereof. This march was not an exact copy of either of the two marches made by the Duke of Parma
into France.
There is some secret. Sickness and weather may
defeat an army pursuing a wrong plan: not that I
believe the sickness to have been so great as it has
been reported; but there is a great deal of superfluous humiliation in this business, a perfect prodigality of disgrace. Some advantage, real or imaginary, must compensate to a great sovereign and to a great general for so immense a loss of reputation.
Longwy, situated as it is, might (one should think)
be evacuated without a capitulation' with a republic
just proclaimed by the king of Prussia as an usurping and rebellious body. He was not far from Luxembourg. He might have taken away the obnoxious
French in his flight. It does not appear to have
been necessary that those magistrates who declared
for their own king, on the faith and under the immediate protection of the king of Prussia, should be
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 395
delivered over to the gallows. It was not necessary that the emigrant nobility and gentry who served with the king of Prussia's army, under his immediate command, should be excluded from the cartel, and given up to be hanged as rebels. Never was
so gross and so cruel a breach of the public faith,
not with an enemy, but with a friend. Dumouriez
has dropped very singular hints. Custine has spoken
out more broadly.
These accounts have never been
contradicted. They tend to make an eternal rupture between the powers. The French have given out, that the Duke of Brunswick endeavored to negotiate some name and place for the captive king, amongst the murderers and proscribers of those who
have lost their all for his cause. Even this has not
been denied.
It is singular, and, indeed, a thing, under all its
circumstances, inconceivable, that everything should
by the Emperor be abandoned to the king of Prussia.
That monarch was considered as principal. In the
nature of things, as well as in his position with regard to the war, he was only an ally, and a new ally, with crossing interests in many particulars, and
of a policy rather uncertain. At best, and supposing him to act with the greatest fidelity, the Emperor and the Empire to him must be but secondary objects. Countries out of Germany must affect him in a still more remote manner. France, other than from
the fear of its doctrinal principles, can to him be no
object at all. Accordingly, the Rhine, Sardinia, and
the Swiss are left to their fate. The king of Prussia
has no direct and immediate concern with France;
consequentially, to be sure, a great deal: but the
Emperor touches France directly in many parts; he
? ? ? ? 396 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
is a near neighbor to Sardinia, by his Milanese territories; he borders on Switzerland; Cologne, possessed by his uncle, is between Mentz, Treves, and the king of Prussia's territories on the Lower Rhine.
The Emperor is the natural guardian of Italy and
Germany, - the natural balance against the ambition
of France, whether republican or monarchical. His
ministers and his generals, therefore, ought to have
had their full share in every material consultation,which I suspect they had not. If he has no minister capable of plans of policy which comprehend the superintendency of a war, or no general with the
least of a political head, things have been as they
must be. However, in all the parts of this strange
proceeding there must be a secret.
It is probably known to ministers. I do not mean
to penetrate into it. My speculations on this head
must be only conjectural. If the king of Prussia,
under the pretext or on the reality of some information relative to ill practice on the part of the court
of Vienna, takes advantage of his being admitted
into the heart of the Emperor's dominions in the
character of an ally, afterwards to join the common enemy, and to enable France to seize the Netherlands, and to reduce and humble the Empire, I cannot conceive, upon every principle, anything more
alarming for this country, separately, and as a part
of the general system. After all, we may be looking
in vain in the regions of politics for what is only
the operation of temper and character upon accidental circumstances. But I never knew accidents to
decide the whole of any great business; and I never
knew temper to act, but that some system of politics
agreeable to its peculiar spirit was blended with it,
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 397
strengthened it, and got strength from it. Therefore the politics can hardly be put out of the question. Great mistakes have been committed: at least I
hope so. If there have been none, the case in future
is desperate. I have endeavored to point out some
of those which have occurred to me, and most of them
very early.
Whatever may be the cause of the present state of
things, on a full and mature view and comparison of
the historical matter, of the transactions that have
passed before our eyes, and of the future prospect,
I think I am authorized to form an opinion without
the least hesitation.
That there never was, nor is, nor ever will be, nor
ever can be, the least rational hope of making an
impression on France by any Continental powers, if
England is not a part, is not the directing part, is
not the soul, of the whole confederacy against it.
This, so far as it is an anticipation of future, is
grounded on the whole tenor of former history. In
speculation it is to be accounted for on two plain
principles.
First, That Great Britain is likely to take a more
fair and equal part in the alliance than the other
powers, as having less of crossing interest or perplexed discussion with any of them.
Secondly, Because France cannot have to deal with
any of these Continental sovereigns, without their
feeling that nation, as a maritime power, greatly
superior to them all put together, - a force which is
only to be kept in check by England.
England, except during the eccentric aberration
of Charles the Second, has always considered it as
? ? ? ? 398 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
her duty and interest to take her place in such a
confederacy. Her chief disputes must ever be with
France; and if England shows herself indifferent and
unconcerned, when these powers are combined against
the enterprises of France, she is to look with certainty
for the same indifference on the part of these powers,
when she may be at war with that nation. This will
tend totally to disconnect this kingdom from the system of Europe, in which if she ought not rashly to
meddle, she ought never wholly to withdraw herself
from it.
If, then, England is put in motion, whether by a
consideration of the general safety, or of the influence of France upon Spain, or by the probable operations of this new system on the Netherlands, it must embrace in its project the whole as much as possible,
and the part it takes ought to be as much as possible
a leading and presiding part.
I therefore beg leave to suggest,
First, That a minister should forthwith be sent
to Spain, to encourage that court to persevere in
the measures they have adopted against France, --to
make a close alliance and guaranty of possessions,
as against France, with that power, - and, whilst the
formality of the treaty is pending, to assure them of
our protection, postponing any lesser disputes to another occasion.
Secondly, To assure the court of Vienna of our
desire to enter into our ancient connections with
her, and to support her effectually in the war which
France has declared against her.
Thirdly, To animate the Swiss and the king of
Sardinia to take a part, as the latter once did on the
principles of the Grand Alliance.
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 399
Fourthly, To put an end'to our disputes with Russia, and mutually to forget the past. I believe, if she is satisfied of this oblivion, she will return to her old
sentiments with regard to this court, and will take
a more forward part in this business than any other
power.
Fifthly, If what has happened to the king of Prussia is only in consequence of a sort of panic or of levity, and an indisposition to persevere long in one
design, the support and concurrence of Rtissia will
tend to steady him, and to give him resolution. If
he be ill-disposed, with that power on his back, and
without one ally in Europe, I conceive he will not be
easily led to derange the plan.
Sixthly, To use the joint influence of our court,
and of our then allied powers, with Holland, to arm
as fully as she can by sea, and to make some addition
by land.
Seventhly, To acknowledge the king of France's
next brother (assisted by such a council and such
representatives of the kingdom of France as shall
be thought proper) regent of France, and to send
that prince a small supply of money, arms, clothing,
and artillery.
Eighthly, To give force to these negotiations, an
instant naval armament ought to be adopted, -- one
squadron for the Mediterranean, another for the
Channel. The season is convenient, - most of our
trade being, as I take it, at home.
After speaking of a plan formed upon the ancient
policy and practice of Great Britain and of Europe,
to which this is exactly conformable in every respect, with no deviation whatsoever, and which is,
I conceive, much more strongly called for by the
? ? ? ? 400 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
present circumstances than by any former, I must
take notice of another, which I hear, but cannot persuade myself to believe, is in agitation. This plan
is grounded upon the very same view of things which
is here stated, -namely, the danger to all sovereigns,
and old republics, from the prevalence of French
power and influence.
It is, to form a congress of all the European powers for the purpose of a general defensive alliance,
the objects of which should be,First, The recognition of this new republic, (which
they well know is formed on the principles and for
the declared purpose of the destruction of all kings,)
and, whenever the heads of this new republic shall
consent to release the royal captives, to make peace
with them.
Secondly, To defend themselves with their joint
forces against the open aggressions, or the secret
practices, intrigues, and writings, which are used
to propagate the French principles.
It is easy to discover from whose shop this commodity comes. It is so perfectly absurd, that, if that
or anything like it meets with a serious entertainment in any cabinet, I should think it the effect of
what is called a judicial blindness, the certain forerunner of the destruction of all crowns and kingdoms.
An offensive alliance, in which union is preserved
by common efforts in common dangers against a
common active enemy, may preserve its consistenlcy, and may produce for a given time some considerable effect: though this is not easy, and for any very long period can hardly be expected. But a
defensive alliance, formed of long discordant inter
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 401
ests, with innumerable discussions existing, having
no one pointed object to which it is directed, which
is to be held together with an unremitted vigilance,
as watchfiul in peace as in war, is so evidently impossible, is such a chimera, is so contrary to human
nature and the course of human affairs, that I am
persuaded no person in his senses, except those
whose country, religion, and sovereign are deposited in the French funds, could dream of it. There
is not the slightest petty boundary suit, no difference
between a family arrangement, no sort of misunderstanding or cross purpose between the pride and etiquette of courts, that would not entirely disjoint this sort of alliance, and render it as futile in its effects
as it is feeble in its principle. But when we consider
that the main drift of that defensive alliance must be
to prevent the operation of intrigue, mischievous doctrine, and evil example, in the success of unprovoked
rebellion, regicide, and systematic assassination and
massacre, the absurdity of such a scheme becomes
quite lamentable. Open the communication with
France, and the rest follows of course.
How far the interior circumstances of this country
support what is said with regard to its foreign politics must be left to better judgments. I am sure
the French faction here is infinitely strengthened
by the success of the assassins on the other side of
the water. This evil in the heart of Europe must
be extirpated from that centre, or no part of the circumference can be free from the mischief which radiates from it, and which will spread, circle beyond circle, in spite of all the little defensive precautions
which can be employed against it.
I do not put my name to these hints submitted to
VOL. IV. 26
? ? ? ? 402 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION.
the consideration of reflecting men. It is of too lit
tie importance to suppose the name of the writer
could add any weight to the state of things coiftained
in this paper. That state of things presses irresistibly on my judgment, and it lies, and has long lain,
with a heavy weight upon my mind. I cannot think
that what is done in France is beneficial to the human race. If it were, the English Constitution ought
no more to stand against it than the ancient Constitution of the kingdom in which the new system prevails. I thought it the duty of a man not unconcerned for the public, and who is a faithllfl subject to the king, respectfully to submit this state of facts,
at this new step in the progress of the French arms
and politics, to his Majesty, to his confidential servants, and to those persons who, though not in office,
by their birth, their rank, their fortune, their character, and their reputation for wisdom, seem to me
to have a large stake in the stability of the ancient
order of things.
BATH, November 5, 1792.
? ? ? ? REMARKS
ON
THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES,WITH RESPECT TO FRANCE. BEGUN IN OCTOBER, 1793.
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
AS the proposed manifesto is, I understand, to
promulgate to the world the general idea of a
plan for the regulation of a great kingdom, and
through the regulation of that kingdom probably to
decide the fate of Europe forever, nothing requires a
more serious deliberation with regard to the time of
making it, the circumstances of those to whom it is
addressed, and the matter it is to contain.
As to the time, (with the due diffidence in my own
opinion,) I have some doubts whether it is not rather
unfavorable to the issuing any manifesto with regard
to the intended government of France, and for this
reason: that it is (upon the principal point of our
attack) a time of calamity and defeat. Manifestoes
of this nature are commonly made when the army
of some sovereign enters into the enemy's country in
great force, and under the imposing authority of that
force employs menaces towards those whom he desires
to awe, and makes promises to those whom he wishes
to engage in his favor.
As to a party, what has been done at Toulon
leaves no doubt that the party for which we declare
must be that which substantially declares for royalty
as the basis of the government.
As to menaces, nothing, in my opinion, can contribute more effectually to lower any sovereign in the
? ? ? ? 406 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
public estimation, and to turn his defeats into disgraces, than to threaten in a moment of impotence.
The second manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick appeared, therefore, to the world to be extremely illtimed. However, if his menaces in that manifesto had been seasonable, they were not without an object.
Great crimes then apprehended, and great evils then
impending, were to be prevented. At this time,
every act which early menaces might possibly have
prevented is done. Punishment and vengeance alone
remain, - and God forbid that they should ever be
forgotten! But the punishment of enormous offenders will not be the less severe, or the less exemplary,
when it is not threatened at a moment when we have
it not in our power to execute our threats. On the
other side, to pass by proceedings of such a nefarious
nature, in all kinds, as have been carried on in France,
without any signification of resentment, would be in
effect to ratify them, and thus to become accessaries
after the fact in all those enormities which it is impossible to repeat or think of without horror. An
absolute silence appears to me to be at this time the
only safe course.
The second usual matter of manifestoes is composed
of promises to those who cooperate with our designs.
These promises depend in a great measure, if not
wholly, on the apparent power of the person who
makes them to fulfil his engagements. A time of
disaster on the part of the promiser seems not to add
much to the dignity of his person or to the effect of
his offers. One would hardly wish to seduce any
unhappy persons to give the last provocation to a
merciless tyranny, without very effectual means of
protecting them.
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 407
The time, therefore, seems (as I said) not favorable to a general manifesto, on account of the unpleasant situation of our affairs. However, I write in a changing scene, when a measure very imprudent to-day may be very proper to-morrow. Some
great victory may alter the whole state of the question, so far as it regards our power of fulfilling any
engagement we may think fit to make.
But there is another consideration of far greater
importance for all the purposes of this manifesto.
The public, and the parties concerned, will look somewhat to the disposition of the promiser indicated by
his conduct, as well as to his power of fulfilling his
engagements.
Speaking of this nation as part of a general combination of powers, are we quite sure that others can
believe us to be sincere, or that we can be even fully
assured of our own sincerity, in the protection of
those who shall risk their lives for the restoration of
monarchy in France, when the world sees that those
who are-the natural, legal, constitutional representatives of that monarchy, if it has any, have not had
their names so much as mentioned in any one public act, that in no way whatever are their persons
brought forward, that their rights have not been
expressly or implicitly allowed, and that they have
not been in the least consulted on the important
interests they have at stake? On the contrary, they
are kept in a state of obscurity and contempt, and in
a degree of indigence at times bordering on beggary.
They are, in fact, little less prisoners in the village of
Hanau than the royal captives who are locked up in
the tower of the Temple. What is this, according to
the common indications which guide the judgment
? ? ? ? 408 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
of mankind, but, under the pretext of protecting the
crown of France, in reality to usurp it?
I am also very apprehensive that there are other
circumstances which must tend to weakenl the force
of our declarations. No partiality to the allied powers can prevent great doubts on the fairness of our
intentions as supporters of the crown of France, or
of the true principles of legitimate government in
opposition to Jacobinism, when it is visible that the
two leading orders of the state of France, who are
now the victims, and who must always be the true
and sole supports of monarchy ill that country, are,
at best, in some of their descriptions, considered only
as objects of charity, and others are, when. employed,
employed only as mercenary soldiers, - that they are
thrown back out of all reputable service, are in a
manner disowned, considered as nothinlg inl their
own cause, and never once consulted in the concerns of their king, their country, their laws, their
religion, and their property. We even affect to be
ashamed of them. In all our proceedings we carefully avoid the appearance of being of a party with
them. In all our ideas of treaty we do not regard
them as what they are, the two leading orders of the
kingdom. If we do not consider them in that light,
we must recognize the savages by whom they have
been ruined, and who have declared war upon Europe, whilst they disgrace and persecute human nature, and openly defy the God that made them, as real proprietors of France.
I am much afraid, too, that we shall scarcely be
believed fair supporters of lawful monarchy against
Jacobinism, so long as we continue to make and to
observe cartels with the Jacobins, and on fair terms
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 409
exchange prisoners with them, whilst the Royalists,
invited to our standard, and employed under our
public faith against the Jacobins, if taken by that
savage faction, are given up to the executioner with
out the least attempt whatsoever at reprisal. For this
we are to look at the king of Prussia's conduct, compared with his manifestoes about a twelvemonth ago. For this we are to look at the capitulations of Mentz
and Valenciennes, made in the course of the present
campaign. By these two capitulations the Cllristian
Royalists were excluded from any participation in the
cause of the combined powers. They were consid --
ered as the outlaws of Europe. Two armies were
in effect sent against them. One of those armies
(that which surrendered Mentz) was very near overpowering the Christians of Poitou, and the other
(that which surrendered at Valenciennes) has actually crushed the people whom oppression and despair had driven to resistance at Lyons, has massacred several thousands of them in cold blood, pillaged the whole substance of the place, and pursued their rage
to the very houses, condemning that noble city to
desolation, in the unheard-of manner we have seen
it devoted.
It is, then, plain, by a conduct which overturns a
thousand declarations, that we take the Royalists of
France only as an instrument of some convenience
in a temporary hostility with the Jacobins, but that
we regard those atheistic and murderous barbarians
as the bond fide possessors of the soil of France. It
appears, at least, that we consider them as a fair government defacto, if not de jure, a resistance to which,. in favor of the king of France, by any man who happened to be born within that country, might equita
? ? ? ? 410 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
bly be considered by other nations as the crime of
treason.
For my part, I would sooner put my hand into the
fire than sign an invitation to oppressed men to fight
under my standard, and then, on every sinister event
of war, cruelly give them up to be punished as the
basest of traitors, as long as I had one of the common
enemy in my hands to be put to death in order to secure those under my protection, and to vindicate the
common honor of sovereigns. We hear nothing of
this kind of security in favor of those whom we invite to the support of our cause. Without it, I am
not a little apprehensive that the proclamations of
the combined powers might (contrary to their intention, no doubt) be looked upon as frauds, and cruel
traps laid for their lives.
So far as to the correspondence between our declarations and our conduct: let the declaration be
worded as it will, the conduct is the practical comment by which, and which alone, it can be understood. This conduct, acting on the declaration, leaves a monarchy without a monarch, and without any representative or trustee for the monarch
and the monarchy. It supposes a kingdom without
states and orders, a territory without proprietors,
and faithful subjects who are to be left to the fate
of rebels and traitors.
The affair of the establishment of a government is
a very difficult undertaking for foreign powers to act
in as principals; though as auxiliaries and mediators
it has been not at all unusual, and may be a measure
full of policy and humanity and true dignity.
The first thing we ought to do, supposing us not
giving the law as conquerors, but acting as friendly
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 411
powers applied to for counsel and assistance in the
settlement of a distracted country, is well to consider
the composition, nature, and temper of its objects, and
particularly of those who actually do or who oulght to
exercise power in that state. It is material to know
who they are, and how constituted, whom we consider
as the people of France.
The next consideration is, through whom our arrangements are to be made, and on what principles
the government we propose is to be established.
The first question on the people is this: Whether we
are to consider the individuals now actually in France,
numerically taken and arranged into Jacobin clubs, as
the body politic, constituting the nation of France,or whether we consider the original individual proprietors of lands, expelled since the Revolution, and
the states and the bodies politic, such as the colleges of justice called Parliaments, the corporations,
noble and not noble, of bailliages and towns and cities, the bishops and the clergy, as the true constituent parts of the nation, and forming the legally organized parts of the people of France. In this serious concern it is very necessary that we
should have the most distinct ideas annexed to the
terms we employ; because it is evident that an abuse
of the term people has been the original, fundamental cause of those evils, the cure of which, by war and
policy, is the present object of all the states of Europe.
If we consider the acting power in France, in any
legal construction of public law, as the people, the
question is decided in favor of the republic one and
indivisible. But we have decided for monarchy. If
so, we have a king and subjects; and that king and
?
been to watch over the external proceedings of France,
(whatever form the interior government of that kingdom might take,) and to prevent the extension of its dominion or its ruling influence over other states.
That there is nothing in the present internal state
of things in France which alters the national policy
with regard to the exterior relations of that country.
That there are, on the contrary, many things in
the internal circumstances of France (and perhaps of
this country, too) which tend to fortify the principles
of that fundamental policy, and which render the
active assertion of those principles more pressing at
this than at any former time.
That, by a change effected in about three weeks,
France has been able to penetrate into the heart of
Germany, to make an absolute conquest of Savoy,
to menace an immediate invasion of the Netherlands,
and to awe and overbear the whole Helvetic body,
which is in a most perilous situation: the great
aristocratic Cantons having, perhaps, as much or
more to dread from their own people, whom they
? ? ? ? 382 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION.
arm, but do not choose or dare to employ, as from
the foreign enemy, which against all public faith has
butchered their troops serving by treaty in France.
To this picture it is hardly necessary to add the
means by which France has been enabled to effect all
this, -namely, the apparently entire destruction of
one of the largest and certainly the highest disciplined and best appointed army ever seen, headed by
the first military sovereign in Europe, with a captain.
under him of the greatest refnown; and that without
a blow given or received on any side. This state of
things seems to me, even if it went no further, truly
serious.
Circumstances have enabled France to do all this
by land. On the other element she has begun to exert herself; and she must succeed in her designs, if
enemies very different from those she has hitherto
had to encounter do not resist her.
She has fitted out a naval force, now actually at
sea, by which she is enabled to give law to the whole
Mediterranean. It is known as a fact, (and if not so
known, it is in the nature of things highly probable,)
that she proposes the ravage of the Ecclesiastical
State and the pillage of Rome, as her first object;
that next she means to bombard Naples, -to awe, to
humble, and thus to command, all Italy, --to force
it to a nominal neutrality, but to a real dependence,
-- to compel the Italian princes and republics to admit the free entrance of the French commerce, an
open intercourse, and, the sure concomitant of that
intercourse, the affiliated societies, in a manner similar to those she has established at Avignon, the Comtat, Chambdry, London, Manchester, &c. , &c. , which are so many colonies planted in all these countries,
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 383
for extending the influence and securing the dominion of the French republic.
That there never has been hitherto a period in
which this kingdom would have suffered a French
fleet to domineer in the Mediterranean, and to force
Italy to submit to such terms as France would think
fit to impose, - to say nothing of what has been done
upon land in support of the same system. The great
object for which we preserved Minorca, whilst we
could keep it, and for which we still retain Gibraltar,
both at a great expense, was, and is, to prevent the
predominance of France over the Mediterranean.
Thus far as to the certain and immediate effect of
that armament upon the Italian States. The probable effect which that armament, and the other ar maments preparing at Toulon and other ports, may
have upon Spain, on the side of the Mediterranean, is
worthy of the serious attention of the British councils.
That it is most probable, we may say in a manner
certain, that, if there should be a rupture between
France and Spain, France will not confine her offensive piratical operations against Spain to her efforts in the Mediterranean; on which side, however, she
may grievously affect Spain, especially if she excites
Morocco and Algiers, which undoubtedly she will, to
fall upon that power.
That she will fit out armaments upon the ocean,
by which the flota itself may be intercepted, and thus
the treasures of all Europe, as well as the largest and
surest resources of the Spanish monarchy, may be
conveyed into France, and become powerful instruments for the annoyance of all her neighbors.
That she makes no secret of her designs.
? ? ? ? 384 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
That, if the inward and outward bound flota should
escape, still France has more and better means of dissevering many of the provinces in the West and East
Indies from the state of Spain than Holland had,
when she succeeded in the same attempt. The
French marine resembles not a little the old armaments of the Flibustiers, which about a century back,
in conjunction with pirates of our nation, brought
such calamities upon the Spanish colonies. They
differ only in this, - that the present piratical force
is out of all measure and comparison greater: one
hundred and fifty ships of the line and frigates
being ready-built, most of them in a manner new,
and all applicable in different ways to that service.
Privateers and Moorish corsairs possess not the best
seamanship, and very little discipline, and indeed
can make no figure in regular service; but in desperate adventures, and animated with a lust of plunder, they are truly formidable.
That the land forces of France are well adapted to
concur with their marine in conjunct expeditions of
this nature. In such expeditions, enterprise supplies
the want of discipline, and perhaps more than supplies it. Both for this, and for other service, (however contemptible their military is in other respects,) one arm is extremely good, the engineering and artillery branch. The old officer corps in both being
composed for the greater part of those who were not
gentlemen, or gentlemen newly such, few have abaildoned the service, and the men are veterans, well
enough disciplined, and very expert. In this piratical way they must make war with good advantage.
They must do so, even on the side of Flanders, either
offensively or defensively. This shows the difference
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 385
between the policy of Louis the Fourteenth, who
built a wall of brass about his kingdom, and that
of Joseph the Second, who premeditatedly uncovered
his whole frontier.
That Spain, from the actual and expected prevalence of French power, is in a most perilous situation, -perfectly dependent on the mercy of that republic. If Austria is broken, or even humbled,
she will not dare to dispute its mandates.
In the present state of things, we have nothing at
all to dread from the power of Spain by sea or by
land, or from any rivalry in commerce.
That we have much to dread from the connections
into which Spain may be forced.
From the circumstances of her territorial possessions, of her resources, and the whole of her civil
and political state, we may be authorized safely and
with undoubted confidence to affirm that
Spain is not a substantive power.
That she must lean on France or on England.
That it is as much for the interest of Great Britain
to prevent the predominancy of a French interest in
that kingdom as if Spain were a province of the
crown of Great Britain, or a state actually dependent
on it, --full as much so as ever Portugal was reputed
to be. This is a dependency of much greater value;
and its destruction, or its being carried to any other
dependency, of much more serious misfortune.
One of these two things must happen: either Spain
must submit to circumstances and take such conditions as France will impose, or she must engage in
hostilities along with the Emperor and the king of
Sardinia.
If Spain should be forced or awed into a treaty
VOL. IV. 25
? ? ? ? 386 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
with the republic of France, she must open her ports
and her commerce, as well as the land communication for the French laborers, who were accustomed
annually to gather in the harvest in Spain. Indeed,
she must grant a free communication for travellers
and traders through her whole country. In that
case it is not conjectural, it is certain, the clubs will
give law in the provinces; Bourgoing, or some such
miscreant, will give law at Madrid.
In this England may acquiesce, if she pleases; and
France will conclude a triumphant peace with Spain
under her absolute dependence, with a broad highway
into that, and into every state of Europe. She actually invites Great Britain to divide with her the
spoils of the New World, and to make a partition of
the Spanish monarchy. Clearly, it is better to do so
than to suffer France to possess those spoils and that
territory alone; which, without doubt, unresisted by
us, she is altogether as able as she is willing to do.
This plan is proposed by the French in the way in
which they propose all their plans,- and in the only
way in which, indeed, they can propose them, where
there is no regular communication between his Majesty and their republic.
What they propose is a plan. It is a plan also to
resist their predatory project. To remain quiet, and,to suffer them to make their own use of a naval power before our face, so as to awe and bully Spain into a submissive peace, or to drive them into a ruinous
war, without any measure on our part, I fear is no
plan at all.
However, if the plan of cooperation which France
desires, and which her affiliated societies here ardently wish and are constantly writing up, should not
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 387
be adopted, and the war between the Emperor and
France should continue, I think it not at all likely
that Spain should not be drawn into the quarrel. In
that case, the neutrality of England will be a thing
absolutely impossible. The time only is the subject
of deliberation.
Then the question will be, whether we are to defer
putting ourselves into a posture for the common defence, either by armament, or negotiation, or both,
until Spain is actually attacked, - that is, whether
our court will take a decided part for Spain, whilst
Spain, on her side, is yet in a condition to act with
whatever degree of vigor she may have, whilst that
vigor is yet unexhausted, - or whether we shall connIlect ourselves with her broken fortunes, after she shall
have received material blows, and when we shall have
the whole slow length of that always unwieldy and illconstructed, and then wounded and crippled body, to
drag after us, rather than to aid us. Whilst our disposition is uncertain, Spain will not dare to put herself in such a state of defence as will make her hostility formidable or her neutrality respectable. If the decision is such as the solution of this question (I take it to be the true question) conducts to,
no time is to be lost. But the measures, though
prompt, ought not to be rash and indigested. They
ought to be well chosen, well combined, and well
pursued. The system must be general; but it must
be executed, not successively, or with interruption,
but all together, uno flatu, in one melting, and one
mould.
For this purpose we must put Europe before us,
which plainly is, just now, in all its parts, in a state
of dismay, derangement, and confusion, and, very
? ? ? ? 388 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
possibly amongst all its sovereigns, full of secret heartburning, distrust, and mutual accusation. Perhaps
it may labor under worse evils. There is no vigor
anywhere, except the distempered vigor and energy
of France. That country has but too much life in it,
when everything around is so disposed to tameness
and languor. The very vices of the French system at
home tend to give force to foreign exertions. The
generals must join the armies. They must lead them
to enterprise, or they are likely to perish by their
hands. Thus, without law or government of her
own, France gives law to all the governments in Europe.
This great mass of political matter must have been
always under the view of thinkers for the public,
whether they act in office or not. Amongst events,
even the late calamitous events were in the book of
contingency. Of course they must have been in design, at least, provided for. A plan which takes in
as many as possible of the states concerned will rather tend to facilitate and simplify a rational scheme
for preserving Spain (if that were our sole, as I think
it ought to be our principal object) thai to delay and
perplex it.
If we should think that a provident policy (perlaps n1ow more than provident, urgent and necessary)
should lead us to act, we cannot take measures as
if hothing had been done. We must see the faults,
if any, which have conducted to the present misfortunes: not for the sake of criticism, military or political, or from the common motives of blaming persons and counsels which have not been successful; but in order, if we can, to administer some remedy
to these disasters, by the adoption of plans more bot
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 389
tomed in principle, and built on with more discretion.
Mistakes may be lessons.
There seem, indeed, to have been several mistakes
in the political principles on which the war was entered into, as well as in the plans upon which it was
conducted, -- some of them very fundamental, and not
only visibly, but I may say palpably erroneous; and
I think him to have less than the discernment of a
very ordinary statesman, who could not foresee, from
the very beginning, unpleasant consequences from
those plans, though not the unparalleled disgraces
and disasters which really did attend them: for they
were, both principles and measures, wholly new and
out of the common course, without anything apparently very grand in the conception to justify this total departure from all rule.
For, in the first place, the united sovereigns very
much injured their cause by admitting that they
had nothing to do with the interior arrangements of
France, - in contradiction to the whole tenor of the
public law of Europe, and to the correspondent practice of all its states, from the time we have any history of them. In this particular, the two German courts seem to have as little consulted the publicists
of Germany as their own true interests, and those of
all the sovereigns of Germany and Europe. This
admission of a false principle in the law of nations
brought them into an apparent contradiction, when
they insisted on the reestablishment of the royal atmthority in France. But this confused and contradictory proceeding gave rise to a practical error of worse consequence. It was derived from one and the same
root: namely, that the person of the monarch of France
was everything; and the monarchy, and the interme
? ? ? ? 390 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
diate orders of the state, by which the monarchy was
upheld, were nothing. So that, if the united potentates had succeeded so far as to reestablish the
authority of that king, and that he should be so illadvised as to confirm all the confiscations, and to recognize as a lawful body and to class himself with that rabble of murderers, (and there wanted not persons
who would so have advised him,) there was nothing
in the principle or in the proceeding of the united
powers to prevent such an arrangement.
An expedition to free a brother sovereign from
prison was undoubtedly a generous and chivalrous
undertaking. But the spirit and generosity would
not have been less, if the policy had been more profound and more comprehensive, -that is, if it had
taken in those considerations and those persons by
whom, and, in some measure, for whom, monarchy
exists. This would become a bottom for a system
of solid and permanent policy, and of operations conformable to that system.
The same fruitful error was the cause why nothing
was done to impress the people of France (so far as
we can at all consider the inhabitants of France as a
people) with an idea that the government was ever
to be really French, or indeed anything else than the
nominal government of a monarch, a monarch absolute as over them, but whose sole support was to arise
from foreign potentates, and who was to be kept on
his throne by German forces,- in short, that the
king of France was to be a viceroy to the Emrperor
and the king of Prussia.
It was the first time that foreign powers, interfering in the concerns of a nation divided into parties,
have thought proper to thrust wholly out of their
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 391
councils, to postpone, to discountenance, to reject,
and, in a manner, to disgrace, the party whom those
powers came to support. The single person of a
king cannot be a party. Woe to the king who is
himself his party! The royal party, with the king
or his representatives at its head, is the royal cause.
Foreign powers have hitherto chosen to give to such
wars as this the appearance of a civil contest, and not
that of an hostile invasion. When the Spaniards, in'
the sixteenth century, sent aids to the chiefs of the
League, they appeared as allies to that league, and to
the imprisoned king (the Cardinal de Bourbon) which
that league had set up. When the Germans came to
the aid of the Protestant princes, in the same series
of civil wars, they came as allies. When the English
came to the aid of Henry the Fourth, they appeared
as allies to that prince. So did the French always,
when they intermeddled in the affairs of Germany:
they came to aid a party there. When the English
and Dutch intermeddled in the succession of Spain,
they appeared as allies to the Emperor, Charles the
Sixth. In short, the policy has been as uniform as
its principles were. obvious to an ordinary eye.
According to all the old principles of law and policy, a regency ought to have been appointed by the
French princes of the blood, nobles, and parliaments,
and then recognized by the combined powers. Fundamental law and ancient usage, as well as the clear
reason of the thing, have always ordained it during
an imprisonment of the king of France: as in the
case of John, and of Francis the First. A monarchy
ought not to be left a moment without a representative having an interest in the -succession. The orders of the state ought also to have been recognized
? ? ? ? 392 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
in those amongst whom alone they existed in freedom, that is, in the emigrants.
Thus, laying down a firm foundation on the recognition of the authorities of the kingdom of France, according to Nature and to its fundamental laws, and
not according to the novel and inconsiderate principles of the usurpation which the united powers were come to extirpate, the king of Prussia and the Emperor, as allies of the ancient kingdom of France, would have proceeded with dignity, first, to free the
monarch, if possible,-if not, to secure tlhe monarchy
as principal in the design; and in order to avoid all
risks to that great object, (the object of other ages
than the present, and of other countries than that of
France,) they would of course avoid proceeding with
more haste or in a different manner than what the
nature of such an object required.
Adopting this, the only rational. system, the rational mode of proceeding upon it was to commence with an effective siege of Lisle, which the French generals
must have seen taken before their faces, or be forced
to fight. A plentiful country of friends, from whence
to draw supplies, would have been behind them; a
plentiful country of enemies, from whence to force
supplies, would have been before them. Good towns
were always within reach to deposit their hospitals
and magazines. The march from Lisle to Paris is
through a less defensible country, and the distance is
hardly so great as from Longwy to Paris.
If the old politic and military ideas had governed,
the advanced guard would have been formed of those
who best knew the country and had some interest in
it, supported by some of the best light troops and light
artillery, whilst the grand solid body of an army dis
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 6 93
ciplined to perfection proceeded leisurely, and in close
connection with all its stores, provisions, and heavy
cannon, to support the expedite body in case of misadventure, or to improve and complete its success.
The direct contrary of all this was put in practice.
In consequence of the original sin of this project, the
army of the French princes was everywhere thrown
into the rear, and no part of it brought forward to the
last moment, the time of the commencement of the
secret negotiation. This naturally made an ill impression on the people, and furnished an occasion for
the rebels at Paris to give out that the faithful subjects of the king were distrusted, despised, and abhorred by his allies. The march was directed through a skirt of Lorraine, and thence into a part of Champagne, the Duke of Brunswick leaving all the strongest places behind him, - leaving also behind him the strength of his artillery, -- and by this means giving
a superiority to the French, in theo nly way in which
the present France is able to oppose a German force.
In consequence of the adoption of those false politics, which turned everything on the king's sole and
single person, the whole plan of the war was reduced
to nothing but a coup de main, in order to set that
prince at liberty. If that failed, everything was to
be given up.
The scheme of a coup de main might (under favorable circumstances) be very fit for a partisan at the
head of a light corps, by whose failure nothing material would be deranged. But for a royal army of
eighty thousand men, headed by a king in person,
who was to march an hundred and fifty miles through
an enemy's country, - surely, this was a plan unheard of.
? ? ? ? 394 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
Although this plan was not well chosen, and pro.
ceeded upon principles altogether ill-judged and im.
politic, the superiority of the military force might
in a great degree have supplied the defects, and
furnished a corrective to the mistakes. The greater
probability was, that the Duke of Brunswick would
make his way to Paris over the bellies of the rabble
of drunkards, robbers, assassins, rioters, mutineers,
and half-grown boys, under the ill-obeyed command
of a theatrical, vaporing, reduced captain of cavalry,
who opposed that great commander and great army.
But -- Diis aliter visum. He began to treat, the
winds blew and the rains beat, -- the house fell, because it was built upon sand, - and great was the fall
thereof. This march was not an exact copy of either of the two marches made by the Duke of Parma
into France.
There is some secret. Sickness and weather may
defeat an army pursuing a wrong plan: not that I
believe the sickness to have been so great as it has
been reported; but there is a great deal of superfluous humiliation in this business, a perfect prodigality of disgrace. Some advantage, real or imaginary, must compensate to a great sovereign and to a great general for so immense a loss of reputation.
Longwy, situated as it is, might (one should think)
be evacuated without a capitulation' with a republic
just proclaimed by the king of Prussia as an usurping and rebellious body. He was not far from Luxembourg. He might have taken away the obnoxious
French in his flight. It does not appear to have
been necessary that those magistrates who declared
for their own king, on the faith and under the immediate protection of the king of Prussia, should be
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 395
delivered over to the gallows. It was not necessary that the emigrant nobility and gentry who served with the king of Prussia's army, under his immediate command, should be excluded from the cartel, and given up to be hanged as rebels. Never was
so gross and so cruel a breach of the public faith,
not with an enemy, but with a friend. Dumouriez
has dropped very singular hints. Custine has spoken
out more broadly.
These accounts have never been
contradicted. They tend to make an eternal rupture between the powers. The French have given out, that the Duke of Brunswick endeavored to negotiate some name and place for the captive king, amongst the murderers and proscribers of those who
have lost their all for his cause. Even this has not
been denied.
It is singular, and, indeed, a thing, under all its
circumstances, inconceivable, that everything should
by the Emperor be abandoned to the king of Prussia.
That monarch was considered as principal. In the
nature of things, as well as in his position with regard to the war, he was only an ally, and a new ally, with crossing interests in many particulars, and
of a policy rather uncertain. At best, and supposing him to act with the greatest fidelity, the Emperor and the Empire to him must be but secondary objects. Countries out of Germany must affect him in a still more remote manner. France, other than from
the fear of its doctrinal principles, can to him be no
object at all. Accordingly, the Rhine, Sardinia, and
the Swiss are left to their fate. The king of Prussia
has no direct and immediate concern with France;
consequentially, to be sure, a great deal: but the
Emperor touches France directly in many parts; he
? ? ? ? 396 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
is a near neighbor to Sardinia, by his Milanese territories; he borders on Switzerland; Cologne, possessed by his uncle, is between Mentz, Treves, and the king of Prussia's territories on the Lower Rhine.
The Emperor is the natural guardian of Italy and
Germany, - the natural balance against the ambition
of France, whether republican or monarchical. His
ministers and his generals, therefore, ought to have
had their full share in every material consultation,which I suspect they had not. If he has no minister capable of plans of policy which comprehend the superintendency of a war, or no general with the
least of a political head, things have been as they
must be. However, in all the parts of this strange
proceeding there must be a secret.
It is probably known to ministers. I do not mean
to penetrate into it. My speculations on this head
must be only conjectural. If the king of Prussia,
under the pretext or on the reality of some information relative to ill practice on the part of the court
of Vienna, takes advantage of his being admitted
into the heart of the Emperor's dominions in the
character of an ally, afterwards to join the common enemy, and to enable France to seize the Netherlands, and to reduce and humble the Empire, I cannot conceive, upon every principle, anything more
alarming for this country, separately, and as a part
of the general system. After all, we may be looking
in vain in the regions of politics for what is only
the operation of temper and character upon accidental circumstances. But I never knew accidents to
decide the whole of any great business; and I never
knew temper to act, but that some system of politics
agreeable to its peculiar spirit was blended with it,
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 397
strengthened it, and got strength from it. Therefore the politics can hardly be put out of the question. Great mistakes have been committed: at least I
hope so. If there have been none, the case in future
is desperate. I have endeavored to point out some
of those which have occurred to me, and most of them
very early.
Whatever may be the cause of the present state of
things, on a full and mature view and comparison of
the historical matter, of the transactions that have
passed before our eyes, and of the future prospect,
I think I am authorized to form an opinion without
the least hesitation.
That there never was, nor is, nor ever will be, nor
ever can be, the least rational hope of making an
impression on France by any Continental powers, if
England is not a part, is not the directing part, is
not the soul, of the whole confederacy against it.
This, so far as it is an anticipation of future, is
grounded on the whole tenor of former history. In
speculation it is to be accounted for on two plain
principles.
First, That Great Britain is likely to take a more
fair and equal part in the alliance than the other
powers, as having less of crossing interest or perplexed discussion with any of them.
Secondly, Because France cannot have to deal with
any of these Continental sovereigns, without their
feeling that nation, as a maritime power, greatly
superior to them all put together, - a force which is
only to be kept in check by England.
England, except during the eccentric aberration
of Charles the Second, has always considered it as
? ? ? ? 398 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
her duty and interest to take her place in such a
confederacy. Her chief disputes must ever be with
France; and if England shows herself indifferent and
unconcerned, when these powers are combined against
the enterprises of France, she is to look with certainty
for the same indifference on the part of these powers,
when she may be at war with that nation. This will
tend totally to disconnect this kingdom from the system of Europe, in which if she ought not rashly to
meddle, she ought never wholly to withdraw herself
from it.
If, then, England is put in motion, whether by a
consideration of the general safety, or of the influence of France upon Spain, or by the probable operations of this new system on the Netherlands, it must embrace in its project the whole as much as possible,
and the part it takes ought to be as much as possible
a leading and presiding part.
I therefore beg leave to suggest,
First, That a minister should forthwith be sent
to Spain, to encourage that court to persevere in
the measures they have adopted against France, --to
make a close alliance and guaranty of possessions,
as against France, with that power, - and, whilst the
formality of the treaty is pending, to assure them of
our protection, postponing any lesser disputes to another occasion.
Secondly, To assure the court of Vienna of our
desire to enter into our ancient connections with
her, and to support her effectually in the war which
France has declared against her.
Thirdly, To animate the Swiss and the king of
Sardinia to take a part, as the latter once did on the
principles of the Grand Alliance.
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 399
Fourthly, To put an end'to our disputes with Russia, and mutually to forget the past. I believe, if she is satisfied of this oblivion, she will return to her old
sentiments with regard to this court, and will take
a more forward part in this business than any other
power.
Fifthly, If what has happened to the king of Prussia is only in consequence of a sort of panic or of levity, and an indisposition to persevere long in one
design, the support and concurrence of Rtissia will
tend to steady him, and to give him resolution. If
he be ill-disposed, with that power on his back, and
without one ally in Europe, I conceive he will not be
easily led to derange the plan.
Sixthly, To use the joint influence of our court,
and of our then allied powers, with Holland, to arm
as fully as she can by sea, and to make some addition
by land.
Seventhly, To acknowledge the king of France's
next brother (assisted by such a council and such
representatives of the kingdom of France as shall
be thought proper) regent of France, and to send
that prince a small supply of money, arms, clothing,
and artillery.
Eighthly, To give force to these negotiations, an
instant naval armament ought to be adopted, -- one
squadron for the Mediterranean, another for the
Channel. The season is convenient, - most of our
trade being, as I take it, at home.
After speaking of a plan formed upon the ancient
policy and practice of Great Britain and of Europe,
to which this is exactly conformable in every respect, with no deviation whatsoever, and which is,
I conceive, much more strongly called for by the
? ? ? ? 400 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION
present circumstances than by any former, I must
take notice of another, which I hear, but cannot persuade myself to believe, is in agitation. This plan
is grounded upon the very same view of things which
is here stated, -namely, the danger to all sovereigns,
and old republics, from the prevalence of French
power and influence.
It is, to form a congress of all the European powers for the purpose of a general defensive alliance,
the objects of which should be,First, The recognition of this new republic, (which
they well know is formed on the principles and for
the declared purpose of the destruction of all kings,)
and, whenever the heads of this new republic shall
consent to release the royal captives, to make peace
with them.
Secondly, To defend themselves with their joint
forces against the open aggressions, or the secret
practices, intrigues, and writings, which are used
to propagate the French principles.
It is easy to discover from whose shop this commodity comes. It is so perfectly absurd, that, if that
or anything like it meets with a serious entertainment in any cabinet, I should think it the effect of
what is called a judicial blindness, the certain forerunner of the destruction of all crowns and kingdoms.
An offensive alliance, in which union is preserved
by common efforts in common dangers against a
common active enemy, may preserve its consistenlcy, and may produce for a given time some considerable effect: though this is not easy, and for any very long period can hardly be expected. But a
defensive alliance, formed of long discordant inter
? ? ? ? ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. 401
ests, with innumerable discussions existing, having
no one pointed object to which it is directed, which
is to be held together with an unremitted vigilance,
as watchfiul in peace as in war, is so evidently impossible, is such a chimera, is so contrary to human
nature and the course of human affairs, that I am
persuaded no person in his senses, except those
whose country, religion, and sovereign are deposited in the French funds, could dream of it. There
is not the slightest petty boundary suit, no difference
between a family arrangement, no sort of misunderstanding or cross purpose between the pride and etiquette of courts, that would not entirely disjoint this sort of alliance, and render it as futile in its effects
as it is feeble in its principle. But when we consider
that the main drift of that defensive alliance must be
to prevent the operation of intrigue, mischievous doctrine, and evil example, in the success of unprovoked
rebellion, regicide, and systematic assassination and
massacre, the absurdity of such a scheme becomes
quite lamentable. Open the communication with
France, and the rest follows of course.
How far the interior circumstances of this country
support what is said with regard to its foreign politics must be left to better judgments. I am sure
the French faction here is infinitely strengthened
by the success of the assassins on the other side of
the water. This evil in the heart of Europe must
be extirpated from that centre, or no part of the circumference can be free from the mischief which radiates from it, and which will spread, circle beyond circle, in spite of all the little defensive precautions
which can be employed against it.
I do not put my name to these hints submitted to
VOL. IV. 26
? ? ? ? 402 HEADS FOR CONSIDERATION.
the consideration of reflecting men. It is of too lit
tie importance to suppose the name of the writer
could add any weight to the state of things coiftained
in this paper. That state of things presses irresistibly on my judgment, and it lies, and has long lain,
with a heavy weight upon my mind. I cannot think
that what is done in France is beneficial to the human race. If it were, the English Constitution ought
no more to stand against it than the ancient Constitution of the kingdom in which the new system prevails. I thought it the duty of a man not unconcerned for the public, and who is a faithllfl subject to the king, respectfully to submit this state of facts,
at this new step in the progress of the French arms
and politics, to his Majesty, to his confidential servants, and to those persons who, though not in office,
by their birth, their rank, their fortune, their character, and their reputation for wisdom, seem to me
to have a large stake in the stability of the ancient
order of things.
BATH, November 5, 1792.
? ? ? ? REMARKS
ON
THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES,WITH RESPECT TO FRANCE. BEGUN IN OCTOBER, 1793.
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
AS the proposed manifesto is, I understand, to
promulgate to the world the general idea of a
plan for the regulation of a great kingdom, and
through the regulation of that kingdom probably to
decide the fate of Europe forever, nothing requires a
more serious deliberation with regard to the time of
making it, the circumstances of those to whom it is
addressed, and the matter it is to contain.
As to the time, (with the due diffidence in my own
opinion,) I have some doubts whether it is not rather
unfavorable to the issuing any manifesto with regard
to the intended government of France, and for this
reason: that it is (upon the principal point of our
attack) a time of calamity and defeat. Manifestoes
of this nature are commonly made when the army
of some sovereign enters into the enemy's country in
great force, and under the imposing authority of that
force employs menaces towards those whom he desires
to awe, and makes promises to those whom he wishes
to engage in his favor.
As to a party, what has been done at Toulon
leaves no doubt that the party for which we declare
must be that which substantially declares for royalty
as the basis of the government.
As to menaces, nothing, in my opinion, can contribute more effectually to lower any sovereign in the
? ? ? ? 406 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
public estimation, and to turn his defeats into disgraces, than to threaten in a moment of impotence.
The second manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick appeared, therefore, to the world to be extremely illtimed. However, if his menaces in that manifesto had been seasonable, they were not without an object.
Great crimes then apprehended, and great evils then
impending, were to be prevented. At this time,
every act which early menaces might possibly have
prevented is done. Punishment and vengeance alone
remain, - and God forbid that they should ever be
forgotten! But the punishment of enormous offenders will not be the less severe, or the less exemplary,
when it is not threatened at a moment when we have
it not in our power to execute our threats. On the
other side, to pass by proceedings of such a nefarious
nature, in all kinds, as have been carried on in France,
without any signification of resentment, would be in
effect to ratify them, and thus to become accessaries
after the fact in all those enormities which it is impossible to repeat or think of without horror. An
absolute silence appears to me to be at this time the
only safe course.
The second usual matter of manifestoes is composed
of promises to those who cooperate with our designs.
These promises depend in a great measure, if not
wholly, on the apparent power of the person who
makes them to fulfil his engagements. A time of
disaster on the part of the promiser seems not to add
much to the dignity of his person or to the effect of
his offers. One would hardly wish to seduce any
unhappy persons to give the last provocation to a
merciless tyranny, without very effectual means of
protecting them.
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 407
The time, therefore, seems (as I said) not favorable to a general manifesto, on account of the unpleasant situation of our affairs. However, I write in a changing scene, when a measure very imprudent to-day may be very proper to-morrow. Some
great victory may alter the whole state of the question, so far as it regards our power of fulfilling any
engagement we may think fit to make.
But there is another consideration of far greater
importance for all the purposes of this manifesto.
The public, and the parties concerned, will look somewhat to the disposition of the promiser indicated by
his conduct, as well as to his power of fulfilling his
engagements.
Speaking of this nation as part of a general combination of powers, are we quite sure that others can
believe us to be sincere, or that we can be even fully
assured of our own sincerity, in the protection of
those who shall risk their lives for the restoration of
monarchy in France, when the world sees that those
who are-the natural, legal, constitutional representatives of that monarchy, if it has any, have not had
their names so much as mentioned in any one public act, that in no way whatever are their persons
brought forward, that their rights have not been
expressly or implicitly allowed, and that they have
not been in the least consulted on the important
interests they have at stake? On the contrary, they
are kept in a state of obscurity and contempt, and in
a degree of indigence at times bordering on beggary.
They are, in fact, little less prisoners in the village of
Hanau than the royal captives who are locked up in
the tower of the Temple. What is this, according to
the common indications which guide the judgment
? ? ? ? 408 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
of mankind, but, under the pretext of protecting the
crown of France, in reality to usurp it?
I am also very apprehensive that there are other
circumstances which must tend to weakenl the force
of our declarations. No partiality to the allied powers can prevent great doubts on the fairness of our
intentions as supporters of the crown of France, or
of the true principles of legitimate government in
opposition to Jacobinism, when it is visible that the
two leading orders of the state of France, who are
now the victims, and who must always be the true
and sole supports of monarchy ill that country, are,
at best, in some of their descriptions, considered only
as objects of charity, and others are, when. employed,
employed only as mercenary soldiers, - that they are
thrown back out of all reputable service, are in a
manner disowned, considered as nothinlg inl their
own cause, and never once consulted in the concerns of their king, their country, their laws, their
religion, and their property. We even affect to be
ashamed of them. In all our proceedings we carefully avoid the appearance of being of a party with
them. In all our ideas of treaty we do not regard
them as what they are, the two leading orders of the
kingdom. If we do not consider them in that light,
we must recognize the savages by whom they have
been ruined, and who have declared war upon Europe, whilst they disgrace and persecute human nature, and openly defy the God that made them, as real proprietors of France.
I am much afraid, too, that we shall scarcely be
believed fair supporters of lawful monarchy against
Jacobinism, so long as we continue to make and to
observe cartels with the Jacobins, and on fair terms
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 409
exchange prisoners with them, whilst the Royalists,
invited to our standard, and employed under our
public faith against the Jacobins, if taken by that
savage faction, are given up to the executioner with
out the least attempt whatsoever at reprisal. For this
we are to look at the king of Prussia's conduct, compared with his manifestoes about a twelvemonth ago. For this we are to look at the capitulations of Mentz
and Valenciennes, made in the course of the present
campaign. By these two capitulations the Cllristian
Royalists were excluded from any participation in the
cause of the combined powers. They were consid --
ered as the outlaws of Europe. Two armies were
in effect sent against them. One of those armies
(that which surrendered Mentz) was very near overpowering the Christians of Poitou, and the other
(that which surrendered at Valenciennes) has actually crushed the people whom oppression and despair had driven to resistance at Lyons, has massacred several thousands of them in cold blood, pillaged the whole substance of the place, and pursued their rage
to the very houses, condemning that noble city to
desolation, in the unheard-of manner we have seen
it devoted.
It is, then, plain, by a conduct which overturns a
thousand declarations, that we take the Royalists of
France only as an instrument of some convenience
in a temporary hostility with the Jacobins, but that
we regard those atheistic and murderous barbarians
as the bond fide possessors of the soil of France. It
appears, at least, that we consider them as a fair government defacto, if not de jure, a resistance to which,. in favor of the king of France, by any man who happened to be born within that country, might equita
? ? ? ? 410 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
bly be considered by other nations as the crime of
treason.
For my part, I would sooner put my hand into the
fire than sign an invitation to oppressed men to fight
under my standard, and then, on every sinister event
of war, cruelly give them up to be punished as the
basest of traitors, as long as I had one of the common
enemy in my hands to be put to death in order to secure those under my protection, and to vindicate the
common honor of sovereigns. We hear nothing of
this kind of security in favor of those whom we invite to the support of our cause. Without it, I am
not a little apprehensive that the proclamations of
the combined powers might (contrary to their intention, no doubt) be looked upon as frauds, and cruel
traps laid for their lives.
So far as to the correspondence between our declarations and our conduct: let the declaration be
worded as it will, the conduct is the practical comment by which, and which alone, it can be understood. This conduct, acting on the declaration, leaves a monarchy without a monarch, and without any representative or trustee for the monarch
and the monarchy. It supposes a kingdom without
states and orders, a territory without proprietors,
and faithful subjects who are to be left to the fate
of rebels and traitors.
The affair of the establishment of a government is
a very difficult undertaking for foreign powers to act
in as principals; though as auxiliaries and mediators
it has been not at all unusual, and may be a measure
full of policy and humanity and true dignity.
The first thing we ought to do, supposing us not
giving the law as conquerors, but acting as friendly
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 411
powers applied to for counsel and assistance in the
settlement of a distracted country, is well to consider
the composition, nature, and temper of its objects, and
particularly of those who actually do or who oulght to
exercise power in that state. It is material to know
who they are, and how constituted, whom we consider
as the people of France.
The next consideration is, through whom our arrangements are to be made, and on what principles
the government we propose is to be established.
The first question on the people is this: Whether we
are to consider the individuals now actually in France,
numerically taken and arranged into Jacobin clubs, as
the body politic, constituting the nation of France,or whether we consider the original individual proprietors of lands, expelled since the Revolution, and
the states and the bodies politic, such as the colleges of justice called Parliaments, the corporations,
noble and not noble, of bailliages and towns and cities, the bishops and the clergy, as the true constituent parts of the nation, and forming the legally organized parts of the people of France. In this serious concern it is very necessary that we
should have the most distinct ideas annexed to the
terms we employ; because it is evident that an abuse
of the term people has been the original, fundamental cause of those evils, the cure of which, by war and
policy, is the present object of all the states of Europe.
If we consider the acting power in France, in any
legal construction of public law, as the people, the
question is decided in favor of the republic one and
indivisible. But we have decided for monarchy. If
so, we have a king and subjects; and that king and
?
