She has edited sever- al volumes and is the
translator
of Jacques Derrida's Dissemination.
Paul-de-Man-Material-Events
Barely con- cealed by its peripheral function, the text here stages the textual machine of its own constitution and performance, its own textual allegory.
The threatening element in these incidents then becomes more apparent.
The text as body, with all its implications of substitutive tropes ultimately always retraceable to metaphor, is displaced by the text as machine and, in the process, it suffers the loss of the illusion of meaning.
(298)
This loss of the illusion of meaning is also sometimes, as passage from metaphor to metonymy and as fiction, the loss of the illusion of refer- ence: "In fiction thus conceived the 'necessary link' of the metaphor has been metonymized beyond the point of catachresis, and the fiction becomes the disruption of the narrative's referential illusion" (292).
2. The word machine is here singled out, apparently, in the text of Rousseau: "It is certain that neither my judgment, nor my will dictated my reply, but that it was the automatic result [l'effet machinal] of my embarrassment" (1034; quoted by de Man, 294). But the word and the concept of machine are found again, re-elaborated, and redistrib- uted everywhere: in Kleist, Pascal, and already in the Social Contract when Rousseau speaks of what there is "in the wheels of the State" [dans les ressorts de l'E? tat], namely an "equivalent of the principle of inertia in machines" (272). This word-concept machine is thus insepa- rable from motifs of suspended reference, repetition, the threat of mu- tilation, and so forth--and interpretation as the de Manian practice of deconstruction-dissemination.
3. This deconstruction implies a process of de-metaphorization and also, by the same token, of machine-like dis-figuration. Another ex- ample allows one to deduce a third motif of this concept of materiality, namely, a mechanical, machine-like, automatic independence in relation to any subject, any subject of desire and its unconscious, and therefore, de Man doubtless thinks, any psychology or psychoanalysis as such. (This point remains to be discussed: Where is one then to situate the af- fect of desire and especially of threat and cruelty? Is there not a force of
Typewriter Ribbon 355
356 Jacques Derrida
nondesire in desire, a law of desubjectivation in and as the subject itself? These are so many questions that I would have liked to deploy before this magnificent text, which I find sometimes too Lacanian, sometimes insufficiently Lacanian, in any case insufficiently "psychoanalytic. ")
The deconstruction of the figural dimension is a process that takes place independently of any desire; as such it is not unconscious but mechani- cal, systematic in its performance but arbitrary in its principle, like a grammar. This threatens the autobiographical subject not as the loss of something that once was present and that it once possessed, but as a radical estrangement between the meaning and the performance of any text. (298; emphasis added)
Once again, the term like in the phrase "like a grammar," the status of which phrase can be as difficult to pin down as Lacan's "like a lan- guage": "The unconscious is structured like a language. " As difficult and no doubt very close, even in its implicit protest against psychology-- or against psychoanalysis as psychology, be it that of desire.
Because this deconstruction should be, according to him, indepen- dent of any desire (which, although I can only say it quickly, seems to me both defensible and indefensible, depending on the concept of de- sire one puts to work), de Man goes beyond his first attempts at inter- pretation of the purloined ribbon (the logic of Rousseau's desire for Marion, substitution between Rousseau and Marion, symbolic circula- tion of the ribbon that, as "pure signifier," is substituted for a desire that is itself "desire for substitution," both desires being "governed by the same desire for specular symmetry" and so forth). But because this logic of desire seems to him to be, if not without pertinence, at least unable to account for the textual event, de Man wants to go further. On two occasions, within an interval of two pages, he declares: "This is not the only way, however, in which the text functions" (284) or "But the text offers further possibilities" (286). He then goes from the Confessions to the Re^veries, from the excuse for what happened to the excuse for the writing of the excuse, for the pleasure taken in writing what happened and thus for the pleasure taken in excusing himself. And in fact, Rousseau clearly suspects what he calls his "pleasure in writing" at the end of the Fourth Promenade.
4. Beyond this logic and this necessity of desire, materiality implies the effect of arbitrariness. The systematic recourse to this machine- like value of the arbitrary (which is relayed by a series of equivalents, notably the gratuitous, the contingent, the random, or the fortuitous),
whether one is talking about "the gratuitous product of a textual grammar" (299), the "random lie in the Marion episode" (291), the "absolute randomness of language," the "arbitrary power play of the signifier" (296), the "gratuitous improvisation, that of the implacable repetition of a preordained pattern. Like Kleist's marionettes . . . " (294), the fortuitous proximity of the ribbon and Marion (293), the "excuse of randomness in the Confessions" (291), the "total arbitrari- ness" (291) of "the sound 'Marion'" (289)--a name that, despite its alleged contingency and even though de Man makes no remark to this effect, we can now no longer separate from either Marie/Mary or mari- onette. The Marion of the ribbon will have been the instant, the blink of an eye of a fictive generation, just the time of a literary Passion and Pieta`, the intercessor in a marriage of reason between the Virgin Mary and all her marionettes. Or, if you prefer, Marion the intercessor re- mains also in the literary archives of Christian Europe like the sister- in-law of all the automatic virgins that still amble about between the Gospels and Kleist.
Even though de Man does not say it, at least not in this way, the eventness of the event requires, if one wants to think it, this insistence on the arbitrary, fortuitous, contingent, aleatory, unforeseeable. An event held to be necessary and thus programmed, foreseeable, and so forth, would that be an event? De Man associates this feeling of arbi- trariness with the experience of threat, cruelty, suffering in dismember- ment, decapitation, disfiguration, or castration (the abundance of whose figures he isolates in Rousseau). What conclusions should be drawn from this?
There is the conclusion that de Man himself draws, namely, that this suffering is in fact what happens and is lived, but "from the point of view of the subject": "This more than warrants the anxiety with which Rousseau acknowledges the lethal quality of writing. Writing al- ways includes the moment of dispossession in favor of the arbitrary power of the play of the signifier and from the point of view of the sub- ject [my emphasis], this can only be experienced as a dismemberment, a beheading, or a castration" (296).
De Man therefore wishes to describe what it is in deconstruction- dissemination (that which "disseminates," he says, as "textual event" and as anacoluthon "throughout the entire text" [300]) that operates independently of and beyond any desire. The materiality of this event as textual event is what is or makes itself independent of any subject or any desire.
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358 Jacques Derrida
It is a logic that has something irrefutable about it. If, on the one hand, the event supposes surprise, contingency, or the arbitrary, as I emphasized a moment ago, it also supposes, on the other hand, this ex- teriority or this irreducibility to desire. And therefore it supposes that which makes it radically inappropriable, nonreappropriable, radically resistant to the logic of the proper. Moreover, what elsewhere I have called exappropriation concerns this work of the inappropriable in de- sire and in the process of appropriation.
Without being able to develop it here, I would draw another conse- quence that no doubt goes beyond what de Man himself says or would say. It is this: By reason of this unforeseeability, this irreducible and inappropriable exteriority for the subject of experience, every event as such is traumatic. Even an event experienced as a "happy" one. This does, I concede, confer on the word trauma a generality that is as fear- some as it is extenuating. But perhaps we have here a double conse- quence that must be drawn in the face of the speculative inflation to which the word is today subject. Understood in this sense, trauma is that which makes precarious any distinction between the point of view of the subject and what is produced independently of desire. It makes precarious even the use and the sense of all these words. An event is traumatic or it does not happen. It injures desire, whether or not desire desires or does not desire what happens. It is that which, within desire, constitutes it as possible and insists there while resisting it, as the im- possible: some outside, irreducibly, as some nondesire, some death, and something inorganic, the becoming possible of the impossible as im-possible.
It is on this stage no doubt that arise the questions of the unforgiv- able, the unpardonable, the inexcusable--and of perjury.
There you are, pardon me for having spoken too long. I cut things off here, arbitrarily.
But not without saluting once again the spirit, I mean the ghost, of my friend. One day, de Man wrote this: "whatever happens in Derrida, it happens between him and his own text. He doesn't need Rousseau, he doesn't need anybody else. "29 As you have seen quite well, this is of course not true. De Man was wrong. I needed Paul de Man. But I need- ed him no doubt in order to show in my turn, many years later, that he, Paul de Man, perhaps had no need of Rousseau in order to show and to demonstrate, himself, what he thought he ought to confide in us. That is what I was suggesting by insisting on the exemplarity, and for
example, the exemplarity of de Man's autobiographico-political texts apropos of Rousseau, materiality, and other similar things.
I am so sad that Paul de Man is not here himself to answer me and to object. But I can hear him already--and sooner or later his text will answer for him. That is what we all call a machine. But a spectral ma- chine. By telling me I am right, it will tell him he is right. And sooner or later, our common innocence will not fail to appear to everyone's eyes, as the best intentioned of all our machinations. Sooner or later and vir- tually already, always, here now.
NOTES
1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions, trans. J. M. Cohen (New York: Penguin, 1953), 88; the translation, as here, will often be modified to remain closer to the literality of Rousseau's text. Page references to the French are to: Jean- Jacques Rousseau, Oeuvres comple`tes, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, vol. 1, Les confessions: Autres textes autobiographiques, Bibliothe`ques de la Ple? iade (Paris: Gallimard, 1959).
2. J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," in Philosophical Papers, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 175. Since delivering this lecture, I have published a text titled "Comme si c'e? tait possible--'within such limits,'" in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3 (1998).
3. The brief allusions de Man makes (pp. 10, 68, 101, 102) in The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), do not touch at all on this history.
4. The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. John K. Ryan (New York: Double- day, 1960), book 2, chapter 4, 70.
5. Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 287.
6. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Reveries of the Solitary Walker, trans. Peter France (London: Penguin, 1979), 44.
7. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Creed of a Priest of Savoy, trans. Arthur H. Beattie (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1956), 80.
8. If I had the time, I would have liked to demonstrate that where the two au- thors of Confessions speak the language of the excuse, the one of the "inexcusable" (inexcusabilis), the other of "excusing himself," they inscribe their utterances in the thickness of an immense Christian, and first of all Paulinian, archive, in a palimpsest of quotations and quasi quotations, which, moreover, Augustine ex- hibits as such, notably in his borrowings from the Epistle to the Romans (I, ii, 20).
9. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," 185.
10. Paul de Man, "Kant and Schiller," in Aesthetic Ideology, ed. Andrzej Warmin-
ski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 133.
11. See Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1996).
12. Derrida is exploiting here, as he has often done, the opposite meanings of
the homonymic expressions: plus de, no more, and plus de, more. --Trans.
Typewriter Ribbon 359
360 Jacques Derrida
13. It would be necessary, of course, to mobilize other readings de Man under- took around the motifs of the materiality of inscription and effacement (cf. "Shelley Disfigured," where it is a question of the materiality of inscription; and "Auto- biography as Defacement," both in The Rhetoric of Romanticism).
14. On arbitrariness and gratuitousness, see Allegories of Reading, 357.
15. De Man, Aesthetic Ideology, 89; "Aesthetic Formalization: Kleist's 'U? ber das Marionettentheater,'" in The Rhetoric of Romanticism.
16. Derrida is exploiting the homonymic possibilities of soie (silk), soi (self), and the expression en soi (in itself). --Trans.
17. Austin, Philosophical Papers, 274.
18. See Derrida, Adieu a` Emmanuel Le? vinas (Paris: Galile? e, 1997).
19. The term non-coupable, in addition to the meaning being adduced here,
commonly signifies: not guilty. --Trans.
20. When this lecture was delivered, I did not know, I confess, that Ortwin
de Graef had already pointed out what he calls in quotation marks "the 'mistake' in de Man's translation," or again "de Man's erratic anacoluthonic translation" ("Silence to Be Observed: A Trial for Paul de Man's Inexcusable Confessions," Yale Journal of Criticism 3: 2 [1990]: 214-15; also in Postmodern Studies 2 [1989]). I thank Erin Ferris for having brought this publication to my attention.
21. "The mutilation seems to be incurable and the prothesis [sic] only serves to mark this fact more strongly" (295-96).
22. The paragraph from the Geneva manuscript is not included in the transla- tion of the Confessions. --Trans.
23. Peggy Kamuf, Signature Pieces: On the Institution of Authorship (Ithaca, N. Y. : Cornell University Press, 1988).
24. Geoffrey Bennington, "Aberrations: De Man (and) the Machine," in Legisla- tions: The Politics of Deconstruction (London and New York: Verso, 1994).
25. These two common expressions, which use the same construction as "je m'excusai sur," mean "I took my revenge on . . . ," "I took it out on the first thing that presented itself. "--Trans.
26. Jacques Derrida, Me? moires for Paul de Man, trans. Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, and Eduardo Cadava (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 143. 27. "We must, in other words, disarticulate, mutilate the body in a way that is much closer to Kleist than to Winckelmann . . . material disarticulation not only of nature but of the body. . . . To the dismemberment of the body corresponds a dis- memberment of language, as meaning-producing tropes are replaced by the frag- mentation of sentences and propositions into discrete words, or the fragmentation of words into syllables or finally letters. In Kleist's text, one would isolate the dis-
semination of the word Fall . . . " (Aesthetic Ideology, 88-89).
28. In "Avances," preface to Serge Margel, Le Tombeau du dieu artisan (Paris:
Minuit, 1995).
29. "An Interview with Paul de Man," in Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 118.
Contributors
judith butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the departments of rhetoric and comparative literature at the University of California at Berkeley. She is the author of Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France; Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity; Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"; The Psychic Life of Power: Theories of Subjection; and Excitable Speech, as well as numerous articles and contributions on philosophy, feminist theory, and queer theory. Her most recent work on Antigone and the politics of kinship, Antigone's Claim: Kinship between Life and Death, is forthcoming.
t. j. clark is George C. and Helen N. Pardee Professor of art history at the University of California at Berkeley. He is the author of The Absolute Bourgeois: Artists and Politics in France, 1848-51; Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and the 1848 Revolution; The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and His Followers; and Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism.
barbara cohen is senior editor and director of HumaniTech,
a center for the application of technology to humanities research and teaching at the University of California, Irvine. She previously taught French and art and has written several articles on the dynamics of art education in the public schools.
tom cohen is the author of Anti-Mimesis (from Plato to Hitchcock) and Ideology and Inscription: "Cultural Studies" after Benjamin,
361
362 Contributors
de Man, and Bakhtin. He is currently completing Re-Marking Hitchcock, editing The Cambridge Companion to Derrida, and coediting a volume titled Technicity, "Life," the Animal. He is cur- rently chair of the English department at the University of Albany, SUNY.
jacques derrida is director of studies of the E? cole des Hautes E? tudes in France and professor of English at the University of California, Irvine. He has published numerous books, including Memoirs for Paul de Man, Specters of Marx, Politics of Friendship, Monolingualism of the Other, and Archive Fever.
barbara johnson teaches at Harvard University in the depart- ments of English and comparative literature, where she holds the title of Fredric Wertham Professor of Law and Psychiatry in Society. She is author of The Critical Difference; A World of Difference; The Wake of Deconstruction; and The Feminist Difference.
She has edited sever- al volumes and is the translator of Jacques Derrida's Dissemination.
ernesto laclau is professor of political theory and director of the doctoral program in Ideology and Discourse Analysis at the University of Essex. He is author of Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism; Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (with Chantal Mouffe); New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time; and Emancipation(s).
j. hillis miller is Distinguished Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Irvine. He previously taught at Johns Hopkins and Yale universities. He is the author of many books and articles on literature and literary theory, most recently Reading Narrative and Black Holes.
arkady plotnitsky is professor of English and the director of
the theory and cultural studies program at Purdue University. He has written extensively on English and European romanticism, critical theory, continental philosophy, and the relationships among literature, philosophy, and science. His books include In the Shadow of Hegel; Complementarity: Antiepistemology after Bohr and Derrida; a co- edited volume (with Barbara H. Smith), Mathematics, Science, and
Postclassical Theory; and a forthcoming study, The Invisible and the Unknowable: Modern Science and Nonclassical Thought.
laurence a. rickels, professor of German and comparative literature at the University of California, Santa Barbara, is the author of The Vampire Lectures (Minnesota, 1999); The Case of California; and Aberrations of Mourning; and editor of Acting Out in Groups (Minnesota, 1999). His three-volume study Nazi Psychoanalysis
is forthcoming (Minnesota). He also works as a psychotherapist in Los Angeles.
michael sprinker was a member of the editorial committee of New Left Review. His books include Imagining Relations: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Theory of Historical Materialism and History and Ideology in Proust.
andrzej warminski is professor of comparative literature at the University of California, Irvine. He is author of Readings in Interpreta- tion: Ho? lderlin, Hegel, Heidegger (Minnesota, 1987) and editor of Paul de Man's Aesthetic Ideology (Minnesota, 1996). His Material Inscriptions is forthcoming.
Contributors 363
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Index
Compiled by Geoffrey Manaugh, University of Chicago
Entries in boldface notate texts writ- ten by author indexed.
Abraham, Karl, 158, 171
Abram, David, 150 n. 27
Adorno, Theodor, 153-54, 156-57 Althusser, Louis, xviii, 32-33, 35- 45,
46 n. 7, 46 n. 8, 46-47 n. 12, 47 n. 16, 47-48 n. 18, 48 n. 19, 189, 202 n. 8, 204 n. 9
Aristotle, 37-38, 237
Augustine, Saint, 285-91, 310, 322,
359 n. 8
Austin, J. L. , xxiv n. 14, 14, 25,
283-84, 301-2, 307, 308, 312, 325, 327-29, 337
Badt, Kurt, 97
Bander, Peter, 159, 161
Bataille, Georges, 54, 86 n. 8 Baudelaire, Charles, xxiii n. 4, 6-11,
205, 207, 208-14, 224 n. 4 Benjamin, Walter, ix-x, xiv, xxiii n. 3, xxiii n. 4, xxiii n. 6, 115, 117-19, 120, 121, 122-26, 128, 129, 131, 133, 138, 146 n. 9, 147-48 n. 17,
148 n. 18, 148 n. 23, 149 n. 26, 151 n. 31, 153-54, 156-57, 165,
167-68, 201-2 n. 5, 271, 273
n. 7
Bennington, Geoffrey, 344 Berkeley, George, 186
Blake, William, xviii, 76
Blanchot, Maurice, 54, 243, 301-2 Bloch, Robert, 168
Bohr, Niels, 55-62, 69, 75, 86 n. 9,
86-87 n. 10, 87 n. 13, 87-88 n. 19 Booth, Wayne, 201-2 n. 5
Brecht, Bertolt, 38, 43-45, 47 n. 16,
48 n. 20
Burroughs, William S. , xii Butler, Judith, xx, 46-47 n. 12,
254 -74
Cadava, Eduardo, 123
Cage, John, 47 n. 13
Cavell, Stanley, 152 n. 38
Ce? zanne, Paul, xviii, 49, 58, 72, 77,
88 n. 24, 93-112
Clark, T. J. , xvii, xviii, 49, 72, 93-113 Cle? ment, Catherine, 172-73
Cohen, Barbara, xx-xxv
Cohen, Tom, vii-xv, xv-xvi, xvii,
xix, 114-52, 280, 285
Collins, George, 146 n. 4 Cremonini, Leonardo, 39-40, 42-43
365
366 Index
Deleuze, Gilles, 85 n. 1, 145 n. 4, 308-9
Derrida, Jacques, viii, xvi-xvii, xx-xxi, 25, 30 n. 8, 30 n. 10, 30 n. 13, 46-47 n. 12, 50, 54, 58-59, 68, 83, 85 n. 1, 86 n. 4, 86 n. 8, 88 n. 24, 123, 133, 149 n. 25, 153, 190, 197, 201 n. 3, 204
n. 12, 204 n. 15, 212, 224 n. 5, 258-59, 277-360
Descartes, Rene? , xx, 255, 258-68, 271-72, 272 n. 2, 272 n. 3, 272-73 n. 4, 273 n. 5
Dickinson, Emily, 111 Diderot, Denis, 82
Eagleton, Terry, 32 Einstein, Albert, 55, 80
Fehrenbacher, Douglas, 219 Felman, Shoshana, 225 n. 17
Fiore, Edith, 176-77 n. 13 Fontanier, Pierre, 238-39, 252 n. 11 Foucault, Michel, 255-56 Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth, 254 Freccero, Carla, xxi, 283
Freud, Sigmund, 37-38, 154, 156, 158-59, 165, 170, 177 n. 16, 177 n. 17, 212
Fry, Roger, 105-7, 109-10
Galilei, Galileo, 65, 87 n. 14, 87 n. 17
Gasche? , Rodolphe, 47 n. 14, 47 n. 15, 47-48 n. 18, 53-54, 79, 85 n. 1, 86 n. 6
Genette, Ge? rard, 204 n. 11, 237, 243, 252 n. 8, 252 n. 14
Geuss, Raymond, 193, 198, 199-200 Godard, Jean-Luc, 45, 145 n. 4 Goddard, Robert H. , 162
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 37 Graef, Ortwin de, 360 n. 20
Gramsci, Antonio, xvii, xix, 234, 239, 243
Greenberg, Clement, 105, 112-13 n. 13
Guattari, Fe? lix, 85 n. 1
Hegel, G. W. F. , x, xxiii n. 7, xxiv n. 12, xxiv n. 13, 3, 31 n. 23, 38-39, 54, 77, 100, 102, 123, 145 n. 4, 148 n. 21, 151 n. 34, 186-87, 193, 195-97, 198, 199, 201 n. 5, 333
Heidegger, Martin, 4, 123, 308 Heisenberg, Werner, 61, 69
Hillis Miller, J. , xv-xx, xxi, 85 n. 1,
183-204, 252 n. 10, 283, 285 Hitchcock, Alfred, xiii-xiv, xix,
114-52, 168-69 Ho? lderlin, Friedrich, 66 Howarth, David, 249-50 Hugo, Victor, 187, 197 Husserl, Edmund, 265
Ingres, Jean-Auguste, 93
Jameson, Fredric, 44, 47-48 n. 18, 129-30, 140, 150-51 n. 30 Johnson, Barbara, xix, 205-26
Johnson, Samuel, 186
Jung, Carl Gustav, 160-61, 163, 175
n. 5
Ju? rgenson, Friedrich, 159, 163
Kafka, Franz, 267
Kamuf, Peggy, 343
Kant, Immanuel, xi, xvii-xix,
xxii-xxiii n. 1, xxiii-xxiv n. 9, 3-9, 11-21, 24-25, 27-28, 28-29 n. 1, 29 n. 4, 30 n. 12, 30 n. 14, 31 n. 23, 38, 39-41, 46 n. 11, 46-47 n. 12, 47 n. 13, 49, 54, 62-64, 86 n. 4, 94, 101, 121, 124, 165-68, 184-85, 186, 187,
188-89, 191-95, 198, 200, 201
n. 3, 202-4 n. 9, 268-69, 350 Keats, John, 84-85, 205, 224 n. 3,
224 n. 8-9
Kellogg, Edward, 176 n. 12 Kierkegaard, Soren, 14, 201-2 n. 5 Kittler, Friedrich, 176 n. 12
Klein, Melanie, 171-72
Klein, Richard, 220-21
Kleist, Heinrich von, xviii, 49-50,
64, 66, 71-72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84-85, 194-95, 199, 307, 319, 355, 357
Knapp, Steven, 223 Kris, Ernst, 170
Lacan, Jacques, 54, 145 n. 4, 170-73, 211-12, 224-25 n. 12, 273 n. 6, 286, 308-9, 316, 356
Laclau, Ernesto, xix-xx, 47 n. 16,
229-53
Lang, Fritz, 116
Leigh, Mike, 45, 48 n. 23
Leites, Nathan, 172
Levinas, Emmanuel, 327
Loach, Ken, 38, 45, 48 n. 23 Locke, John, 34, 45 n. 4, 147 n. 11 Loewald, Hans, 177 n. 17
Lubar, Steven, 176 n. 12
Lucretius, 75
Luka? cs, Georg, 31 n. 23, 37 Lyotard, Jean-Franc? ois, 30 n. 12,
50
Mallarme? , Ste? phane, 4
Mandel, Henry, 176 n. 11
Marcuse, Herbert, 36-37
Marks, Gregory A. , 221-23
Marx, Karl, 22, 32, 37, 42, 186, 189,
240-41, 281, 320 Masaryk, Thomas, 239 Meek, George, 163
Me? re? , Chevalier de, 232-34
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 103, 105 Mondrian, Piet, 39, 93
Montag, Warren, 47-48 n. 18 Montaigne, Michel de, 71, 84 Mu? ller, Heiner, 44
Nancy, Jean-Luc, 50
Newton, Isaac, 80, 86 n. 17 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 85, 97, 110,
146 n. 4, 200, 201 n. 3, 206-8,
213, 214, 224 n. 9, 256, 333 Norval, Aletta, 249-50
O'Neil, William, 163
Pascal, Blaise, xix-xx, 12, 30 n. 9, 33-36, 59, 61-62, 127, 140, 231-35, 237-39, 251 n. 5, 344, 355
Paul, Saint, 34-35
Plato, 243
Plotnitsky, Arkady, xviii, 49-89 Pluhar, Werner S. , 28-29 n. 1 Proust, Marcel, 186, 197-98, 204
n. 11, 235-36, 242, 243, 354
Raudive, Konstantin, 159, 161-62, 163, 175 n. 4, 175 n. 6-7, 175 n. 9-10
Rickels, Laurence, xvii, xix, 153-79 Riffatere, Michael, 187, 193 Rivard, Michael, 218-19, 221 Rothman, William, 125, 128, 129 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, xx, 25-28,
76, 77-78, 197, 204 n. 15, 281, 282, 283, 285-359, 359 n. 8
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 4, 29 n. 3, 94, 234
Schiller, Friedrich von, xi-xii, xiii, xix, 6-7, 9, 21, 32, 36-37, 49, 79-81, 83, 121, 165-68, 177 n. 16, 185, 188-89
Index 367
368 Index
Schlegel, Friedrich, 27, 190, 198, 200, 201 n. 5
Shelley, Percy Bysshe, xviii, 49, 59-60, 66, 71, 72-73, 74, 75, 76-78, 81-85, 187, 199, 223, 278
Socrates, 301
Sorel, Georges, 239-51, 252 n. 13 Souter, David, 215-19, 225 n. 17 Sprinker, Michael, xviii, 32-48 Stoker, Bram, 164
Szondi, Peter, 201-2 n. 5
Tennyson, Alfred, Lord, 195 Thomas, Clarence, 216-19 Togliatti, Palmiro, 248-49
Trotsky, Leon, 247 Turner, Gordon, 161-62
Warhol, Andy, 173
Warminksi, Andrzej, xviii, 3-31,
41-42, 62-64, 85 n. 1, 86 n. 8,
186, 285, 350, 351 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 194 Wollheim, Richard, 96-97
Woods, Robin, 144
Wordsworth, William, 4-8, 29 n. 5,
29-30 n. 6, 134, 143, 205, 224 n. 2
Z? iz? ek, Slavoj, 145 n. 4, 150-51 n.
This loss of the illusion of meaning is also sometimes, as passage from metaphor to metonymy and as fiction, the loss of the illusion of refer- ence: "In fiction thus conceived the 'necessary link' of the metaphor has been metonymized beyond the point of catachresis, and the fiction becomes the disruption of the narrative's referential illusion" (292).
2. The word machine is here singled out, apparently, in the text of Rousseau: "It is certain that neither my judgment, nor my will dictated my reply, but that it was the automatic result [l'effet machinal] of my embarrassment" (1034; quoted by de Man, 294). But the word and the concept of machine are found again, re-elaborated, and redistrib- uted everywhere: in Kleist, Pascal, and already in the Social Contract when Rousseau speaks of what there is "in the wheels of the State" [dans les ressorts de l'E? tat], namely an "equivalent of the principle of inertia in machines" (272). This word-concept machine is thus insepa- rable from motifs of suspended reference, repetition, the threat of mu- tilation, and so forth--and interpretation as the de Manian practice of deconstruction-dissemination.
3. This deconstruction implies a process of de-metaphorization and also, by the same token, of machine-like dis-figuration. Another ex- ample allows one to deduce a third motif of this concept of materiality, namely, a mechanical, machine-like, automatic independence in relation to any subject, any subject of desire and its unconscious, and therefore, de Man doubtless thinks, any psychology or psychoanalysis as such. (This point remains to be discussed: Where is one then to situate the af- fect of desire and especially of threat and cruelty? Is there not a force of
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356 Jacques Derrida
nondesire in desire, a law of desubjectivation in and as the subject itself? These are so many questions that I would have liked to deploy before this magnificent text, which I find sometimes too Lacanian, sometimes insufficiently Lacanian, in any case insufficiently "psychoanalytic. ")
The deconstruction of the figural dimension is a process that takes place independently of any desire; as such it is not unconscious but mechani- cal, systematic in its performance but arbitrary in its principle, like a grammar. This threatens the autobiographical subject not as the loss of something that once was present and that it once possessed, but as a radical estrangement between the meaning and the performance of any text. (298; emphasis added)
Once again, the term like in the phrase "like a grammar," the status of which phrase can be as difficult to pin down as Lacan's "like a lan- guage": "The unconscious is structured like a language. " As difficult and no doubt very close, even in its implicit protest against psychology-- or against psychoanalysis as psychology, be it that of desire.
Because this deconstruction should be, according to him, indepen- dent of any desire (which, although I can only say it quickly, seems to me both defensible and indefensible, depending on the concept of de- sire one puts to work), de Man goes beyond his first attempts at inter- pretation of the purloined ribbon (the logic of Rousseau's desire for Marion, substitution between Rousseau and Marion, symbolic circula- tion of the ribbon that, as "pure signifier," is substituted for a desire that is itself "desire for substitution," both desires being "governed by the same desire for specular symmetry" and so forth). But because this logic of desire seems to him to be, if not without pertinence, at least unable to account for the textual event, de Man wants to go further. On two occasions, within an interval of two pages, he declares: "This is not the only way, however, in which the text functions" (284) or "But the text offers further possibilities" (286). He then goes from the Confessions to the Re^veries, from the excuse for what happened to the excuse for the writing of the excuse, for the pleasure taken in writing what happened and thus for the pleasure taken in excusing himself. And in fact, Rousseau clearly suspects what he calls his "pleasure in writing" at the end of the Fourth Promenade.
4. Beyond this logic and this necessity of desire, materiality implies the effect of arbitrariness. The systematic recourse to this machine- like value of the arbitrary (which is relayed by a series of equivalents, notably the gratuitous, the contingent, the random, or the fortuitous),
whether one is talking about "the gratuitous product of a textual grammar" (299), the "random lie in the Marion episode" (291), the "absolute randomness of language," the "arbitrary power play of the signifier" (296), the "gratuitous improvisation, that of the implacable repetition of a preordained pattern. Like Kleist's marionettes . . . " (294), the fortuitous proximity of the ribbon and Marion (293), the "excuse of randomness in the Confessions" (291), the "total arbitrari- ness" (291) of "the sound 'Marion'" (289)--a name that, despite its alleged contingency and even though de Man makes no remark to this effect, we can now no longer separate from either Marie/Mary or mari- onette. The Marion of the ribbon will have been the instant, the blink of an eye of a fictive generation, just the time of a literary Passion and Pieta`, the intercessor in a marriage of reason between the Virgin Mary and all her marionettes. Or, if you prefer, Marion the intercessor re- mains also in the literary archives of Christian Europe like the sister- in-law of all the automatic virgins that still amble about between the Gospels and Kleist.
Even though de Man does not say it, at least not in this way, the eventness of the event requires, if one wants to think it, this insistence on the arbitrary, fortuitous, contingent, aleatory, unforeseeable. An event held to be necessary and thus programmed, foreseeable, and so forth, would that be an event? De Man associates this feeling of arbi- trariness with the experience of threat, cruelty, suffering in dismember- ment, decapitation, disfiguration, or castration (the abundance of whose figures he isolates in Rousseau). What conclusions should be drawn from this?
There is the conclusion that de Man himself draws, namely, that this suffering is in fact what happens and is lived, but "from the point of view of the subject": "This more than warrants the anxiety with which Rousseau acknowledges the lethal quality of writing. Writing al- ways includes the moment of dispossession in favor of the arbitrary power of the play of the signifier and from the point of view of the sub- ject [my emphasis], this can only be experienced as a dismemberment, a beheading, or a castration" (296).
De Man therefore wishes to describe what it is in deconstruction- dissemination (that which "disseminates," he says, as "textual event" and as anacoluthon "throughout the entire text" [300]) that operates independently of and beyond any desire. The materiality of this event as textual event is what is or makes itself independent of any subject or any desire.
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358 Jacques Derrida
It is a logic that has something irrefutable about it. If, on the one hand, the event supposes surprise, contingency, or the arbitrary, as I emphasized a moment ago, it also supposes, on the other hand, this ex- teriority or this irreducibility to desire. And therefore it supposes that which makes it radically inappropriable, nonreappropriable, radically resistant to the logic of the proper. Moreover, what elsewhere I have called exappropriation concerns this work of the inappropriable in de- sire and in the process of appropriation.
Without being able to develop it here, I would draw another conse- quence that no doubt goes beyond what de Man himself says or would say. It is this: By reason of this unforeseeability, this irreducible and inappropriable exteriority for the subject of experience, every event as such is traumatic. Even an event experienced as a "happy" one. This does, I concede, confer on the word trauma a generality that is as fear- some as it is extenuating. But perhaps we have here a double conse- quence that must be drawn in the face of the speculative inflation to which the word is today subject. Understood in this sense, trauma is that which makes precarious any distinction between the point of view of the subject and what is produced independently of desire. It makes precarious even the use and the sense of all these words. An event is traumatic or it does not happen. It injures desire, whether or not desire desires or does not desire what happens. It is that which, within desire, constitutes it as possible and insists there while resisting it, as the im- possible: some outside, irreducibly, as some nondesire, some death, and something inorganic, the becoming possible of the impossible as im-possible.
It is on this stage no doubt that arise the questions of the unforgiv- able, the unpardonable, the inexcusable--and of perjury.
There you are, pardon me for having spoken too long. I cut things off here, arbitrarily.
But not without saluting once again the spirit, I mean the ghost, of my friend. One day, de Man wrote this: "whatever happens in Derrida, it happens between him and his own text. He doesn't need Rousseau, he doesn't need anybody else. "29 As you have seen quite well, this is of course not true. De Man was wrong. I needed Paul de Man. But I need- ed him no doubt in order to show in my turn, many years later, that he, Paul de Man, perhaps had no need of Rousseau in order to show and to demonstrate, himself, what he thought he ought to confide in us. That is what I was suggesting by insisting on the exemplarity, and for
example, the exemplarity of de Man's autobiographico-political texts apropos of Rousseau, materiality, and other similar things.
I am so sad that Paul de Man is not here himself to answer me and to object. But I can hear him already--and sooner or later his text will answer for him. That is what we all call a machine. But a spectral ma- chine. By telling me I am right, it will tell him he is right. And sooner or later, our common innocence will not fail to appear to everyone's eyes, as the best intentioned of all our machinations. Sooner or later and vir- tually already, always, here now.
NOTES
1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions, trans. J. M. Cohen (New York: Penguin, 1953), 88; the translation, as here, will often be modified to remain closer to the literality of Rousseau's text. Page references to the French are to: Jean- Jacques Rousseau, Oeuvres comple`tes, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, vol. 1, Les confessions: Autres textes autobiographiques, Bibliothe`ques de la Ple? iade (Paris: Gallimard, 1959).
2. J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," in Philosophical Papers, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 175. Since delivering this lecture, I have published a text titled "Comme si c'e? tait possible--'within such limits,'" in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3 (1998).
3. The brief allusions de Man makes (pp. 10, 68, 101, 102) in The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), do not touch at all on this history.
4. The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. John K. Ryan (New York: Double- day, 1960), book 2, chapter 4, 70.
5. Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 287.
6. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Reveries of the Solitary Walker, trans. Peter France (London: Penguin, 1979), 44.
7. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Creed of a Priest of Savoy, trans. Arthur H. Beattie (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1956), 80.
8. If I had the time, I would have liked to demonstrate that where the two au- thors of Confessions speak the language of the excuse, the one of the "inexcusable" (inexcusabilis), the other of "excusing himself," they inscribe their utterances in the thickness of an immense Christian, and first of all Paulinian, archive, in a palimpsest of quotations and quasi quotations, which, moreover, Augustine ex- hibits as such, notably in his borrowings from the Epistle to the Romans (I, ii, 20).
9. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," 185.
10. Paul de Man, "Kant and Schiller," in Aesthetic Ideology, ed. Andrzej Warmin-
ski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 133.
11. See Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1996).
12. Derrida is exploiting here, as he has often done, the opposite meanings of
the homonymic expressions: plus de, no more, and plus de, more. --Trans.
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360 Jacques Derrida
13. It would be necessary, of course, to mobilize other readings de Man under- took around the motifs of the materiality of inscription and effacement (cf. "Shelley Disfigured," where it is a question of the materiality of inscription; and "Auto- biography as Defacement," both in The Rhetoric of Romanticism).
14. On arbitrariness and gratuitousness, see Allegories of Reading, 357.
15. De Man, Aesthetic Ideology, 89; "Aesthetic Formalization: Kleist's 'U? ber das Marionettentheater,'" in The Rhetoric of Romanticism.
16. Derrida is exploiting the homonymic possibilities of soie (silk), soi (self), and the expression en soi (in itself). --Trans.
17. Austin, Philosophical Papers, 274.
18. See Derrida, Adieu a` Emmanuel Le? vinas (Paris: Galile? e, 1997).
19. The term non-coupable, in addition to the meaning being adduced here,
commonly signifies: not guilty. --Trans.
20. When this lecture was delivered, I did not know, I confess, that Ortwin
de Graef had already pointed out what he calls in quotation marks "the 'mistake' in de Man's translation," or again "de Man's erratic anacoluthonic translation" ("Silence to Be Observed: A Trial for Paul de Man's Inexcusable Confessions," Yale Journal of Criticism 3: 2 [1990]: 214-15; also in Postmodern Studies 2 [1989]). I thank Erin Ferris for having brought this publication to my attention.
21. "The mutilation seems to be incurable and the prothesis [sic] only serves to mark this fact more strongly" (295-96).
22. The paragraph from the Geneva manuscript is not included in the transla- tion of the Confessions. --Trans.
23. Peggy Kamuf, Signature Pieces: On the Institution of Authorship (Ithaca, N. Y. : Cornell University Press, 1988).
24. Geoffrey Bennington, "Aberrations: De Man (and) the Machine," in Legisla- tions: The Politics of Deconstruction (London and New York: Verso, 1994).
25. These two common expressions, which use the same construction as "je m'excusai sur," mean "I took my revenge on . . . ," "I took it out on the first thing that presented itself. "--Trans.
26. Jacques Derrida, Me? moires for Paul de Man, trans. Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, and Eduardo Cadava (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 143. 27. "We must, in other words, disarticulate, mutilate the body in a way that is much closer to Kleist than to Winckelmann . . . material disarticulation not only of nature but of the body. . . . To the dismemberment of the body corresponds a dis- memberment of language, as meaning-producing tropes are replaced by the frag- mentation of sentences and propositions into discrete words, or the fragmentation of words into syllables or finally letters. In Kleist's text, one would isolate the dis-
semination of the word Fall . . . " (Aesthetic Ideology, 88-89).
28. In "Avances," preface to Serge Margel, Le Tombeau du dieu artisan (Paris:
Minuit, 1995).
29. "An Interview with Paul de Man," in Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 118.
Contributors
judith butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the departments of rhetoric and comparative literature at the University of California at Berkeley. She is the author of Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France; Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity; Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"; The Psychic Life of Power: Theories of Subjection; and Excitable Speech, as well as numerous articles and contributions on philosophy, feminist theory, and queer theory. Her most recent work on Antigone and the politics of kinship, Antigone's Claim: Kinship between Life and Death, is forthcoming.
t. j. clark is George C. and Helen N. Pardee Professor of art history at the University of California at Berkeley. He is the author of The Absolute Bourgeois: Artists and Politics in France, 1848-51; Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and the 1848 Revolution; The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and His Followers; and Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism.
barbara cohen is senior editor and director of HumaniTech,
a center for the application of technology to humanities research and teaching at the University of California, Irvine. She previously taught French and art and has written several articles on the dynamics of art education in the public schools.
tom cohen is the author of Anti-Mimesis (from Plato to Hitchcock) and Ideology and Inscription: "Cultural Studies" after Benjamin,
361
362 Contributors
de Man, and Bakhtin. He is currently completing Re-Marking Hitchcock, editing The Cambridge Companion to Derrida, and coediting a volume titled Technicity, "Life," the Animal. He is cur- rently chair of the English department at the University of Albany, SUNY.
jacques derrida is director of studies of the E? cole des Hautes E? tudes in France and professor of English at the University of California, Irvine. He has published numerous books, including Memoirs for Paul de Man, Specters of Marx, Politics of Friendship, Monolingualism of the Other, and Archive Fever.
barbara johnson teaches at Harvard University in the depart- ments of English and comparative literature, where she holds the title of Fredric Wertham Professor of Law and Psychiatry in Society. She is author of The Critical Difference; A World of Difference; The Wake of Deconstruction; and The Feminist Difference.
She has edited sever- al volumes and is the translator of Jacques Derrida's Dissemination.
ernesto laclau is professor of political theory and director of the doctoral program in Ideology and Discourse Analysis at the University of Essex. He is author of Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism; Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (with Chantal Mouffe); New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time; and Emancipation(s).
j. hillis miller is Distinguished Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Irvine. He previously taught at Johns Hopkins and Yale universities. He is the author of many books and articles on literature and literary theory, most recently Reading Narrative and Black Holes.
arkady plotnitsky is professor of English and the director of
the theory and cultural studies program at Purdue University. He has written extensively on English and European romanticism, critical theory, continental philosophy, and the relationships among literature, philosophy, and science. His books include In the Shadow of Hegel; Complementarity: Antiepistemology after Bohr and Derrida; a co- edited volume (with Barbara H. Smith), Mathematics, Science, and
Postclassical Theory; and a forthcoming study, The Invisible and the Unknowable: Modern Science and Nonclassical Thought.
laurence a. rickels, professor of German and comparative literature at the University of California, Santa Barbara, is the author of The Vampire Lectures (Minnesota, 1999); The Case of California; and Aberrations of Mourning; and editor of Acting Out in Groups (Minnesota, 1999). His three-volume study Nazi Psychoanalysis
is forthcoming (Minnesota). He also works as a psychotherapist in Los Angeles.
michael sprinker was a member of the editorial committee of New Left Review. His books include Imagining Relations: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Theory of Historical Materialism and History and Ideology in Proust.
andrzej warminski is professor of comparative literature at the University of California, Irvine. He is author of Readings in Interpreta- tion: Ho? lderlin, Hegel, Heidegger (Minnesota, 1987) and editor of Paul de Man's Aesthetic Ideology (Minnesota, 1996). His Material Inscriptions is forthcoming.
Contributors 363
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Index
Compiled by Geoffrey Manaugh, University of Chicago
Entries in boldface notate texts writ- ten by author indexed.
Abraham, Karl, 158, 171
Abram, David, 150 n. 27
Adorno, Theodor, 153-54, 156-57 Althusser, Louis, xviii, 32-33, 35- 45,
46 n. 7, 46 n. 8, 46-47 n. 12, 47 n. 16, 47-48 n. 18, 48 n. 19, 189, 202 n. 8, 204 n. 9
Aristotle, 37-38, 237
Augustine, Saint, 285-91, 310, 322,
359 n. 8
Austin, J. L. , xxiv n. 14, 14, 25,
283-84, 301-2, 307, 308, 312, 325, 327-29, 337
Badt, Kurt, 97
Bander, Peter, 159, 161
Bataille, Georges, 54, 86 n. 8 Baudelaire, Charles, xxiii n. 4, 6-11,
205, 207, 208-14, 224 n. 4 Benjamin, Walter, ix-x, xiv, xxiii n. 3, xxiii n. 4, xxiii n. 6, 115, 117-19, 120, 121, 122-26, 128, 129, 131, 133, 138, 146 n. 9, 147-48 n. 17,
148 n. 18, 148 n. 23, 149 n. 26, 151 n. 31, 153-54, 156-57, 165,
167-68, 201-2 n. 5, 271, 273
n. 7
Bennington, Geoffrey, 344 Berkeley, George, 186
Blake, William, xviii, 76
Blanchot, Maurice, 54, 243, 301-2 Bloch, Robert, 168
Bohr, Niels, 55-62, 69, 75, 86 n. 9,
86-87 n. 10, 87 n. 13, 87-88 n. 19 Booth, Wayne, 201-2 n. 5
Brecht, Bertolt, 38, 43-45, 47 n. 16,
48 n. 20
Burroughs, William S. , xii Butler, Judith, xx, 46-47 n. 12,
254 -74
Cadava, Eduardo, 123
Cage, John, 47 n. 13
Cavell, Stanley, 152 n. 38
Ce? zanne, Paul, xviii, 49, 58, 72, 77,
88 n. 24, 93-112
Clark, T. J. , xvii, xviii, 49, 72, 93-113 Cle? ment, Catherine, 172-73
Cohen, Barbara, xx-xxv
Cohen, Tom, vii-xv, xv-xvi, xvii,
xix, 114-52, 280, 285
Collins, George, 146 n. 4 Cremonini, Leonardo, 39-40, 42-43
365
366 Index
Deleuze, Gilles, 85 n. 1, 145 n. 4, 308-9
Derrida, Jacques, viii, xvi-xvii, xx-xxi, 25, 30 n. 8, 30 n. 10, 30 n. 13, 46-47 n. 12, 50, 54, 58-59, 68, 83, 85 n. 1, 86 n. 4, 86 n. 8, 88 n. 24, 123, 133, 149 n. 25, 153, 190, 197, 201 n. 3, 204
n. 12, 204 n. 15, 212, 224 n. 5, 258-59, 277-360
Descartes, Rene? , xx, 255, 258-68, 271-72, 272 n. 2, 272 n. 3, 272-73 n. 4, 273 n. 5
Dickinson, Emily, 111 Diderot, Denis, 82
Eagleton, Terry, 32 Einstein, Albert, 55, 80
Fehrenbacher, Douglas, 219 Felman, Shoshana, 225 n. 17
Fiore, Edith, 176-77 n. 13 Fontanier, Pierre, 238-39, 252 n. 11 Foucault, Michel, 255-56 Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth, 254 Freccero, Carla, xxi, 283
Freud, Sigmund, 37-38, 154, 156, 158-59, 165, 170, 177 n. 16, 177 n. 17, 212
Fry, Roger, 105-7, 109-10
Galilei, Galileo, 65, 87 n. 14, 87 n. 17
Gasche? , Rodolphe, 47 n. 14, 47 n. 15, 47-48 n. 18, 53-54, 79, 85 n. 1, 86 n. 6
Genette, Ge? rard, 204 n. 11, 237, 243, 252 n. 8, 252 n. 14
Geuss, Raymond, 193, 198, 199-200 Godard, Jean-Luc, 45, 145 n. 4 Goddard, Robert H. , 162
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 37 Graef, Ortwin de, 360 n. 20
Gramsci, Antonio, xvii, xix, 234, 239, 243
Greenberg, Clement, 105, 112-13 n. 13
Guattari, Fe? lix, 85 n. 1
Hegel, G. W. F. , x, xxiii n. 7, xxiv n. 12, xxiv n. 13, 3, 31 n. 23, 38-39, 54, 77, 100, 102, 123, 145 n. 4, 148 n. 21, 151 n. 34, 186-87, 193, 195-97, 198, 199, 201 n. 5, 333
Heidegger, Martin, 4, 123, 308 Heisenberg, Werner, 61, 69
Hillis Miller, J. , xv-xx, xxi, 85 n. 1,
183-204, 252 n. 10, 283, 285 Hitchcock, Alfred, xiii-xiv, xix,
114-52, 168-69 Ho? lderlin, Friedrich, 66 Howarth, David, 249-50 Hugo, Victor, 187, 197 Husserl, Edmund, 265
Ingres, Jean-Auguste, 93
Jameson, Fredric, 44, 47-48 n. 18, 129-30, 140, 150-51 n. 30 Johnson, Barbara, xix, 205-26
Johnson, Samuel, 186
Jung, Carl Gustav, 160-61, 163, 175
n. 5
Ju? rgenson, Friedrich, 159, 163
Kafka, Franz, 267
Kamuf, Peggy, 343
Kant, Immanuel, xi, xvii-xix,
xxii-xxiii n. 1, xxiii-xxiv n. 9, 3-9, 11-21, 24-25, 27-28, 28-29 n. 1, 29 n. 4, 30 n. 12, 30 n. 14, 31 n. 23, 38, 39-41, 46 n. 11, 46-47 n. 12, 47 n. 13, 49, 54, 62-64, 86 n. 4, 94, 101, 121, 124, 165-68, 184-85, 186, 187,
188-89, 191-95, 198, 200, 201
n. 3, 202-4 n. 9, 268-69, 350 Keats, John, 84-85, 205, 224 n. 3,
224 n. 8-9
Kellogg, Edward, 176 n. 12 Kierkegaard, Soren, 14, 201-2 n. 5 Kittler, Friedrich, 176 n. 12
Klein, Melanie, 171-72
Klein, Richard, 220-21
Kleist, Heinrich von, xviii, 49-50,
64, 66, 71-72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84-85, 194-95, 199, 307, 319, 355, 357
Knapp, Steven, 223 Kris, Ernst, 170
Lacan, Jacques, 54, 145 n. 4, 170-73, 211-12, 224-25 n. 12, 273 n. 6, 286, 308-9, 316, 356
Laclau, Ernesto, xix-xx, 47 n. 16,
229-53
Lang, Fritz, 116
Leigh, Mike, 45, 48 n. 23
Leites, Nathan, 172
Levinas, Emmanuel, 327
Loach, Ken, 38, 45, 48 n. 23 Locke, John, 34, 45 n. 4, 147 n. 11 Loewald, Hans, 177 n. 17
Lubar, Steven, 176 n. 12
Lucretius, 75
Luka? cs, Georg, 31 n. 23, 37 Lyotard, Jean-Franc? ois, 30 n. 12,
50
Mallarme? , Ste? phane, 4
Mandel, Henry, 176 n. 11
Marcuse, Herbert, 36-37
Marks, Gregory A. , 221-23
Marx, Karl, 22, 32, 37, 42, 186, 189,
240-41, 281, 320 Masaryk, Thomas, 239 Meek, George, 163
Me? re? , Chevalier de, 232-34
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 103, 105 Mondrian, Piet, 39, 93
Montag, Warren, 47-48 n. 18 Montaigne, Michel de, 71, 84 Mu? ller, Heiner, 44
Nancy, Jean-Luc, 50
Newton, Isaac, 80, 86 n. 17 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 85, 97, 110,
146 n. 4, 200, 201 n. 3, 206-8,
213, 214, 224 n. 9, 256, 333 Norval, Aletta, 249-50
O'Neil, William, 163
Pascal, Blaise, xix-xx, 12, 30 n. 9, 33-36, 59, 61-62, 127, 140, 231-35, 237-39, 251 n. 5, 344, 355
Paul, Saint, 34-35
Plato, 243
Plotnitsky, Arkady, xviii, 49-89 Pluhar, Werner S. , 28-29 n. 1 Proust, Marcel, 186, 197-98, 204
n. 11, 235-36, 242, 243, 354
Raudive, Konstantin, 159, 161-62, 163, 175 n. 4, 175 n. 6-7, 175 n. 9-10
Rickels, Laurence, xvii, xix, 153-79 Riffatere, Michael, 187, 193 Rivard, Michael, 218-19, 221 Rothman, William, 125, 128, 129 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, xx, 25-28,
76, 77-78, 197, 204 n. 15, 281, 282, 283, 285-359, 359 n. 8
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 4, 29 n. 3, 94, 234
Schiller, Friedrich von, xi-xii, xiii, xix, 6-7, 9, 21, 32, 36-37, 49, 79-81, 83, 121, 165-68, 177 n. 16, 185, 188-89
Index 367
368 Index
Schlegel, Friedrich, 27, 190, 198, 200, 201 n. 5
Shelley, Percy Bysshe, xviii, 49, 59-60, 66, 71, 72-73, 74, 75, 76-78, 81-85, 187, 199, 223, 278
Socrates, 301
Sorel, Georges, 239-51, 252 n. 13 Souter, David, 215-19, 225 n. 17 Sprinker, Michael, xviii, 32-48 Stoker, Bram, 164
Szondi, Peter, 201-2 n. 5
Tennyson, Alfred, Lord, 195 Thomas, Clarence, 216-19 Togliatti, Palmiro, 248-49
Trotsky, Leon, 247 Turner, Gordon, 161-62
Warhol, Andy, 173
Warminksi, Andrzej, xviii, 3-31,
41-42, 62-64, 85 n. 1, 86 n. 8,
186, 285, 350, 351 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 194 Wollheim, Richard, 96-97
Woods, Robin, 144
Wordsworth, William, 4-8, 29 n. 5,
29-30 n. 6, 134, 143, 205, 224 n. 2
Z? iz? ek, Slavoj, 145 n. 4, 150-51 n.
