No More Learning

But the Germans had not remained stationary at the Rhine. The march of the Cimbrian and Teutonic host, composed, as respects its flower, of German tribes, which had swept with such force fifty years before over Pannonia, Gaul, Italy, and Spain, seemed to have been nothing but a grand reconnaissance. Already different German tribes had formed permanent settlements to the west of the Rhine, especially of its lower course ; having intruded as conquerors, these settlers continued to demand hostages and to levy annual tribute from the Gallic inhabitants in their neigh bourhood, as if from subjects. Among these German tribes were the Aduatuci, who from a fragment of the Cimbrian horde (iii. 445) had grown into a considerable canton, and a number of other tribes afterwards comprehended under the name of the Tungri on the Maas in the region of Liege ; even the Treveri (about Treves) and the Nervii (in Hainault), two of the largest and most powerful peoples of this region, are directly designated by respectable author ities as Germans. The complete credibility of these accounts must certainly remain doubtful. since, as Tacitus remarks in reference to the two peoples last mentioned, it was subsequently, at least in these regions, reckoned an honour to be descended of German blood and not to belong to the little-esteemed Celtic nation; yet the population in the
chap, vh THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 33
region of the Scheldt, Maas, and Moselle seems certainly to have become, in one way or another, largely mingled with German elements, or at any rate to have come under German influences. The German settlements themselves were perhaps small ; they were not unimportant, for amidst the chaotic obscurity, through which we see the stream of peoples on the right bank of the Rhine ebbing and flowing about this period, we can well perceive that larger German hordes were preparing to cross the Rhine in the track of these advanced posts. Threatened on two sides by foreign domination and torn by internal dissension, it was scarcely to be expected that the unhappy Celtic nation would now rally and save itself by its own vigour. Dismemberment, and decay in virtue of dismemberment, had hitherto been its history ; how should a nation, which could name no day like those of Marathon and Salamis, of Aricia and the Raudine plain — a nation which, even in its time of vigour, had made no attempt to destroy Massilia by a united effort —now when evening had come, defend itself against so formidable foes ?
The less the Celts, left to themselves, were a match for
the Germans, the more reason had the Romans carefully to
watch over the complications in which the two nations
might be involved. Although the movements thence
arising had not up to the present time directly affected them, invasion, they and their most important interests were yet concerned
in the issue of those movements. As may readily be con
ceived, the internal demeanour of the Celtic nation had become speedily and permanently influenced by its outward relations. As in Greece the Lacedaemonian party combined
with Persia against the Athenians, so the Romans from their
first appearance beyond the Alps had found a support
against the Arverni, who were then the ruling power among
the southern Celts, in their rivals for the hegemony, the
Haedui : and with the aid of these new " brothers of the
vol. v
136
The
pojfcJlwi^ reference
0,0,^
34 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
Roman nation " they had not merely reduced to subjection the Allobroges and a great portion of the indirect territory of the Arverni, but had also, in the Gaul that remained free, occasioned by their influence the transference of the hege mony from the Arverni to these Haedui. But while the Greeks were threatened with danger to their nationality only from one side, the Celts found themselves hard pressed simultaneously by two national foes ; and it was natural that they should seek from the one protection against the other, and that, if the one Celtic party attached itself to the Romans, their opponents should on the contrary form alliance with the Germans. This course was most natural for the Belgae, who were brought by neighbourhood and manifold intermixture into closer relation to the Germans who had crossed the Rhine, and moreover, with their less- developed culture, probably felt themselves at least as much akin to the Suebian of alien race as to their cultivated Allobrogian or Helvetic countryman. But the southern Celts also, among whom now, as already mentioned, the considerable canton of the Sequani (about Besancpn) stood at the head of the party hostile to the Romans, had every reason at this very time to call in the Germans against the Romans who immediately threatened them; the remiss government of the senate and the signs of the revolution preparing in Rome, which had not remained unknown to the Celts, made this very moment seem suitable for ridding themselves of the Roman influence and primarily for humbling the Roman clients, the Haedui. A rupture had taken place between the two cantons respecting the tolls on the Saone, which separated the territory of the Haedui
71. from that of the Sequani, and about the year 683 the German prince Ariovistus with some 15,000 armed men had crossed the Rhine as condottiere of the Sequani.
The war was prolonged for some years with varying success ; on the whole the results were unfavourable to the
chap, vh THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 35
Haedui. Their leader Eporedorix at length called out their whole clients, and marched forth with an enormous superiority of force against the Germans. These obstinately refused battle, and kept themselves under cover of morasses and forests. It was not till the clans, weary of waiting, began to break up and disperse, that the Germans appeared in the open field, and then Ariovistus compelled a battle at Admagetobriga, in which the flower of the cavalry of the Haedui were left on the field. The Haedui, forced by this defeat to conclude peace on the terms which the victor proposed, were obliged to renounce the hegemony, and to consent with their whole adherents to become clients of the Sequani ; they had to bind themselves to pay tribute to the Sequani or rather to Ariovistus, and to furnish the children of their principal nobles as hostages ; and lastly they had to swear that they would never demand back these hostages nor invoke the intervention of the Romans.
Ariovistus
TMddlg Rhine,
This peace was concluded apparently about 693. 1 61. Honour and advantage enjoined the Romans to come ^^°a
ing was the insurrection of the Allobroges in 693 (p. 8)— 61. the neighbours of the Sequani — which was beyond doubt connected with these events. In reality orders were issued
to the Gallic governors to assist the Haedui ; they talked of sending consuls and consular armies over the Alps ; but the senate, to whose decision these affairs primarily fell, at length here also crowned great words with little deeds. The insurrection of the Allobroges was suppressed by arms,
1 The arrival of Ariovistus in Gaul has been placed, according to Caesar, i. 36, In 683, and the battle of Admagetobriga (for such was the 71. name of the place now usually, in accordance with a false inscription, called Magetobriga), according to Caesar i. 35 and Cicero Ad. Alt. i. 19,
in 693. 61.
forward in opposition to it ; the noble Haeduan Divitiacus,
Romans, the head of the Roman party in his clan, and for that
reason now banished by his countrymen, went in person to
Rome to solicit their intervention. A still more seriouswarn-
Founda tion of a German empire in Gaul.
friendly with the Romans. 1
The German warrior- prince naturally took this as a
renunciation by the Romans of the Celtic land which they had not occupied ; he accordingly took up his abode there, and began to establish a German principality on Gallic soil. It was his intention that the numerous bands which he had brought with him, and the still more numerous bands that afterwards followed at his call from home—it
36 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
but nothing was done for the Haedui; on the contrary, 69. Ariovistus was even enrolled in 695 in the list of kings
68. was reckoned that up to 696 some 120,000 Germans had crossed the Rhine — this whole mighty immigration of the German nation, which poured through the once opened sluices like a stream over the beautiful west, should become settled there and form a basis on which he might build his dominion over Gaul. The extent of the German settle ments which he called into existence on the left bank of the Rhine cannot be determined; beyond doubt it was great, and his projects were far greater still. The Celts were treated by him as a wholly subjugated nation, and no distinction was made between the several cantons. Even the Sequani, as whose hired commander-in-chief he had crossed the Rhine, were obliged, as if they were van quished enemies, to cede to him for his people a third of their territory — presumably upper Alsace afterwards in habited by the Triboci — where Ariovistus permanently settled with his followers ; nay, as if this were not enough, a second third was afterwards demanded of them for the
Harudes who arrived subsequently. Ariovistus seemed as if he wished to take up in Gaul the part of Philip of Macedonia, and to play the master over the Celts who were
1 That we may not deem this course of things incredible, or even impute to it deeper motives than ignorance and laziness in statesmen, we shall do well to realize the frivolous tone in which a distinguished senator like Cicero expresses himself in his correspondence respecting these important Transalpine affairs.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 37
friendly to the Germans no less than over those who ad hered to the Romans.
The appearance of the energetic German prince in so The dangerous proximity, which could not but in itself excite Germans the most serious apprehension in the Romans, appeared Lower
Rhine-
M.
The Ge""an»
Upper Rhine'
still more threatening, inasmuch as it stood by no means alone. The Usipetes and Tencteri settled on the right bank of the Rhine, weary of the incessant devastation of their territory by the overbearing Suebian tribes, had, the year before Caesar arrived in Gaul (695), set out from their previous abodes to seek others at the mouth of the Rhine. They had already taken away from the Menapii there the portion of their territory situated on the right bank, and it might be foreseen that they would make the attempt to establish themselves also on the left. Suebian bands, moreover, assembled between Cologne and Mayence, and threatened to appear as uninvited guests in the opposite Celtic canton of the Treveri. Lastly, the terri- tory of the most easterly clan of the Celts, the warlike and numerous Helvetii, was visited with growing frequency by the Germans, so that the Helvetii, who perhaps even apart from this were suffering from over-population through the
reflux of their settlers from the territory which they had
lost to the north of the Rhine, and besides were liable to
be completely isolated from their kinsmen by the settle
ment of Ariovistus in the territory of the Sequani, conceived
the desperate resolution of voluntarily evacuating the territory hitherto in their possession to the Germans, and Spread
jr. Tura, along with, if possible, the hegemony in the interior invasion
acquiring larger and more fertile abodes to the west of the
of Gaul —a plan which some of their districts had already l^tl^OI of
formed and attempted to execute during the Cimbrian invasion (iii. 435). The Rauraci whose territory (Basle and southern Alsace) was similarly threatened, the remains, moreover, of the Boii who had already at an earlier period
Gaul,
Caesar proceed
GauL
61.
38 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
been compelled by the Germans to forsake their homes and were now unsettled wanderers, and other smaller tribes, made common cause with the Helvetii. As early as 693 their flying parties came over the Jura and even as far as the Roman province; their departure itself could not be much longer delayed; inevitably German settlers would then advance into the important region between the lakes of Constance and Geneva forsaken by its defenders. From the sources of the Rhine to the Atlantic Ocean the German tribes were in motion ; the whole line of the Rhine was threatened by them ; it was a moment like that when the Alamanni and the Franks threw themselves on the falling empire of the Caesars ; and even now there seemed on the eve of being carried into effect against the Celts that very movement which was successful five hundred years after wards against the Romans.
Under these circumstances the new governor Gaius Caesar arrived in the spring of 696 in Narbonese Gaul, which had been added by decree of the senate to his original province embracing Cisalpine Gaul along with Istria and Dalmatia. His office, which was committed to
64. 66. him first for five years (to the end of 700), then in 699 49. for five more (to the end of 705), gave him the right to nominate ten lieutenants of propraetorian rank, and (at least according to his own interpretation) to fill up his
legions, or even to form new ones at his discretion out of
the burgess-population —who were especially numerous in Caesars Cisalpine Gaul — of the territory under his sway. The army, which he received in the two provinces, consisted, as regards infantry of the line, of four legions trained and inured to war, the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth, or at
the utmost 24,000 men, to which fell to be added, as usual, the contingents of the subjects. The cavalry and light-armed troops, moreover, were represented by horse men from Spain, and by Numidian, Cretan, aid Balearic
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 39
archers and slingers. The staff of Caesar—the tUte of the democracy of the capital—contained, along with not a few useless young men of rank, some able officers, such as Publius Crassus the younger son of the old political ally of Caesar, and Titus Labienus, who followed the chief of the democracy as a faithful adjutant from the Forum to the battle-field. Caesar had not received definite instructions ; to one who was discerning and courageous these were jnplied in the circumstances with which he had to deal. Here too the negligence of the senate had to be retrieved, and first of all the stream of migration of the German peoples had to be checked.
at this time the Helvetic invasion, which was Repulse closely interwoven with the German and had been in pre- fr. fjln paration for years, began. That they might not make a
grant of their abandoned huts to the Germans and might
render their own return impossible, the Helvetii had burnt
their towns and villages ; and their long trains of waggons,
laden with women, children, and the best part of their moveables, arrived from all sides at the Leman lake near Genava (Geneva), where they and their comrades had
fixed their rendezvous for the 28th of March1 of this year. According to their own reckoning the whole body consisted
of 368,000 persons, of whom about a fourth part were able
to bear arms. As the mountain chain of the Jura, stretch
ing from the Rhine to the Rhone, almost completely closed
in the Helvetic country towards the west, and its narrow
denies were as ill adapted for the passage of such a caravan
as they were well adapted for defence, the leaders had resolved to go round in a southerly direction, and to open
up for themselves a way to the west at the point, where
the Rhone has broken through the mountain-chain between
1 According to the uncorrected calendar. According to the current rectification, which however here by no means rests on sufficiently trust worthy data, this day corresponds to the 16th of April of the Julian calendar.
Just
4o THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
the south-western and highest part of the Jura and the Savoy mountains, near the modern Fort de l'Eclnse. But on the right bank here the rocks and precipices come so close to the river that there remained only a narrow path which could easily be blocked up, and the Sequani, to whom this bank belonged, could with ease intercept the route of the HelvetiL They preferred therefore to pass over, above the point where the Rhone breaks through, to the left Allobrogian bank, with the view of regaining the
bank further down the stream where the Rhone enters the plain, and then marching on towards the level west of Gaul ; there the fertile canton of the Santones (Saintonge, the valley of the Charente) on the Atlantic Ocean was selected by the wanderers for their new abode. This march led, where it touched the left bank of the Rhone, through Roman territory; and Caesar, otherwise
not disposed to acquiesce in the establishment of the Helvetii in western Gaul, was firmly resolved not to permit their passage. But of his four legions three were stationed far off at Aquileia ; although he called out in haste the militia of the Transalpine province, it seemed scarcely possible with so small a force to hinder the innumerable Celtic host from crossing the Rhone, between its exit from the Leman lake at Geneva and the point of its breaking through the mountains, over a distance of more than fourteen miles. Caesar, however, by negotiations with the Helvetii, who would gladly have effected by peaceable means the crossing of the river and the march through the Allobrogian territory, gained a respite of fifteen days, which was employed in breaking down the bridge over the
Rhone at Genava, and barring the southern bank of the
Rhone against the enemy by an entrenchment nineteen miles long : it was the first application of the system —afterwards carried out on so immense a scale by the Romans —of guarding the frontier of the empire in a
right
nearly
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 41
military point of view by a chain of forts placed in connec tion with each other by ramparts and ditches. The a, tempts of the Helvetii to gain the other bank at different places in boats or by means of fords were successfully frustrated by the Romans in these lines, and the Helvetii were compelled to desist from the passage of the Rhone.
On the other hand, the party in Gaul hostile to the The
Romans, which hoped to obtain a powerful reinforcement Hdveta
in the Helvetii, more especially the Haeduan Dumnorix towards
brother of Divitiacus, and at the head of the national party G",,1.
in his canton as the latter was at the head of the Romans,
procured for them a passage through the passes of the Jura
and the territory of the Sequani. The Romans had no
legal title to forbid this ; but other and higher interests
were at stake for them in the Helvetic expedition than the
question of the formal integrity of the Roman territory—
interests which could only be guarded, if Caesar, instead of
confining himself, as all the governors of the senate and
even Marius (iii. 444) had done, to the modest task of
watching the frontier, should cross what had hitherto been
the frontier at the head of a considerable army. Caesar
was general not of the senate, but of the state ; he showed
no hesitation. He had immediately proceeded from
Genava in person to Italy, and with characteristic speed
brought up the three legions cantoned there as well as two
newly-formed legions of recruits.
These troops he united with the corps stationed at The
war.
Genava, and crossed the Rhone with his whole force. His Helvetian
'
unexpected appearance in the territory of the Haedui naturally at once restored the Roman party there to power, which was not unimportant as regarded supplies. He found the Helvetii employed in crossing the Saone, and moving from the territory of the Sequani into that of the Haedui ; those of them that were still on the left bank of the Saone, especially the corps of the Tigorini, were
42 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
caught and destroyed by the Romans rapidly advancing. The bulk of the expedition, however, had already crossed to the right bank of the river ; Caesar followed them and in twenty-four hours effected the passage, which the unwieldy host of the Helvetii had not been able to accomplish in twenty days. The Helvetii, prevented by this passage of the river on the part of the Roman army from continuing their march westward, turned in a northerly direction, doubtless under the supposition that Caesar would not venture to follow them far into the interior of Gaul, and with the intention, if he should desist from following them, of turning again toward their proper destination. For fifteen days the Roman army marched behind that of the enemy at a distance of about four miles, clinging to its rear, and hoping for an advantageous opportunity of assailing the Helvetic host under conditions favourable to victory, and destroying But this moment came not unwieldy as was the march of the Helvetic caravan, the leaders knew
how to guard against surprise, and appeared to be copiously provided with supplies as well as most accurately informed their spies of every event in the Roman camp. On the other hand the Romans began to suffer from want of necessaries, especially when the Helvetii removed from the Saone and the means of river-transport ceased. The non-arrival of the supplies promised the Haedui, from which this embarrassment primarily arose, excited the more suspicion, as both armies were still moving about in their territory. Moreover the considerable Roman cavalry, numbering almost 4000 horse, proved utterly untrustworthy —which doubtless admitted of explanation, for they consisted almost wholly of Celtic horsemen, especially of the mounted retainers of the Haedui, under the command of Dumnorix the well-known enemy of the Romans, and Caesar himself had taken them over still more as hostages than as soldiers. There was good reason to believe that defeat which they
a
by
by
it.
a
:
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 43
suffered at the hands of the far weaker Helvetic cavalry was occasioned by themselves, and that the enemy was informed by them of all occurrences in the Roman camp. The position of Caesar grew critical ; it was becoming disagree ably evident, how much the Celtic patriot party could effect even with the Haedui in spite of their official alliance with Rome, and of the distinctive interests of this canton . "nclining it towards the Romans ; what was to be the issue, if they ventured deeper and deeper into a country full of excitement, and if they removed daily farther from their means of communication ? The armies were just marching
Bibracte (Autun), the capital of the Haedui, at a moderate distance ; Caesar resolved to seize this important place by force before he continued his march into the interior ; and it is very possible, that he intended to desist altogether from farther pursuit and to establish himself in Bibracte. But when he ceased from the pursuit and turned against Bibracte, the Helvetii thought that the Romans were making preparations for flight, and now attacked in their turn.
Caesar desired nothing better. The two armies posted Battle at
' rac
past
themselves on two parallel chains of hills ; the Celts began the engagement, broke up the Roman cavalry which had advanced into the plain, and rushed on against the Roman legions posted on the slope of the hill, but were there obliged to give way before Caesar's veterans. When the Romans thereupon, following up their advantage, descended in their turn to the plain, the Celts again advanced against them, and a reserved Celtic corps took them at the same time in flank. The reserve of the Roman attacking column was pushed forward against the latter; it forced it away from the main body towards the baggage and the barricade of waggons, where it was destroyed. The bulk of the
Helvetic host was at length brought to give way, and com pelled to beat a retreat in an easterly direction-^the
The Helvetil lent back to their original abodes.
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
opposite of that towards which their expedition led them. This day had frustrated the scheme of the Helvetii to establish for themselves new settlements on the Atlantic Ocean, and handed them over to the pleasure of the victor ; but it had been a hot day also for the conquerors. Caesar, who had reason for not altogether trusting his staff of officers, had at the very outset sent away all the officers' horses, so as to make the necessity of holding their ground thoroughly clear to his troops ; in fact the battle, had the Romans lost would have probably brought about the annihilation of the Roman army. The Roman troops were too much exhausted to pursue the conquered with vigour but in consequence of the proclamation of Caesar that he would treat all who should support the Helvetii as like the Helvetii themselves enemies of the Romans, all support was refused to the beaten army whithersoever went—in the first instance, in the canton of the Lingones (about Langres) —and, deprived of all supplies and of their baggage and burdened by the mass of camp-followers incapable of fighting, they were under the necessity of submitting to the Roman general.
The lot of the vanquished was comparatively mild one. The Haedui were directed to concede settlements in their territory to the homeless Boii and this settlement of the conquered foe the midst of the most powerful Celtic cantons rendered almost the services of Roman colony. The survivors of the Helvetii and Rauraci, some thing more than third of the men that had marched forth, were naturally sent back to their former territory. was incorporated with the Roman province, but the inhabitants were admitted to alliance with Rome under favourable conditions, order to defend, under Roman supremacy, the frontier along the upper Rhine against the Germans. Only the south-western point of the Helvetic canton was directly taken into the possession of the Romans, and there
in
a
it,
a It
it
in
;
a
;
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 45
subsequently, on the charming shore of the Leman lake, the old Celtic town Noviodunum (now Nyon) was converted into a Roman frontier-fortress, the "Julian equestrian colony. " 1
Thus the threatening invasion of the Germans on the upper Rhine was obviated, and, at the same time, the party hostile to the Romans among the Celts was humbled. On
the middle Rhine also, where the Germans had already crossed years ago, and where the power of Ariovistus which
vied with that of Rome in Gaul was daily spreading, there
was need of similar action, and the occasion for a rupture
was easily found. In comparison with the yoke threatened
or already imposed on them by Ariovistus, the Roman tlo1a' supremacy probably now appeared to the greater part of
the Celts in this quarter the lesser evil ; the minority, who retained their hatred of the Romans, had at least to keep silence. A diet of the Celtic tribes of central Gaul, held under Roman influence, requested the Roman general in name of the Celtic nation for aid against the Germans.
Caesar consented. At his suggestion the Haedui stopped the payment of the tribute stipulated to be paid to Ariovistus, and demanded back the hostages furnished; and when Ariovistus on account of this breach of treaty attacked the clients of Rome, Caesar took occasion thereby to enter into direct negotiation with him and specially to demand, in addition to the return of the hostages and a promise to keep peace with the Haedui, that Ariovistus should bind himself to allure no more Germans over the Rhine. The German general replied to the Roman, in the full consciousness of equality of rights, that northern Gaul had become subject to him by right of war as fairly as
1 Julia Eq1ustris, where the last surname is to be taken as in other colonies of Caesar the surnames of stxtanorum, decimanorum, etc. It was Celtic or German horsemen of Caesar, who, of course with the bestowal of the Roman or, at any rate, Latin franchise, received land -allotments there.
Caesar and °
Negotia-
Arioristus attacked,
46 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
southern Gaul to the Romans ; and that, as he did not hinder the Romans from taking tribute from the Allobroges, so they should not prevent him from taxing his subjects. In later secret overtures it appeared that the prince was well aware of the circumstances of the Romans ; he men tioned the invitations which had been addressed to him from Rome to put Caesar out of the way, and offered, if Caesar would leave to him northern Gaul, to assist him in turn to obtain the sovereignty of Italy—as the party-quarrels of the Celtic nation had opened up an entrance for him into Gaul, he seemed to expect from the party-quarrels of the Italian nation the consolidation of his rule there. For centuries no such language of power completely on a footing of equality and bluntly and carelessly expressing its inde pendence had been held in presence of the Romans, as was now heard from the king of the German host ; he summarily refused to come, when the Roman general
that he should appear personally before him according to the usual practice with client-princes.
It was the more necessary not to delay ; Caesar imme diately set out against Ariovistus. A panic seized his troops, especially his officers, when they were to measure their strength with the flower of the German troops that for four teen years had not come under shelter of a roof: it seemed as if the deep decay of Roman moral and military discipline would assert itself and provoke desertion and mutiny even in Caesar's camp. But the general, while declaring that in case of need he would march with the tenth legion alone against the enemy, knew not merely how to influence these by such an appeal to honour, but also how to bind the other regiments to their eagles by warlike emulation, and to inspire the troops with something of his own energy. Without leaving them time for reflection, he led them onward in rapid marches, and fortunately anticipated
Ariovistus in the occupation of Vesontio (Besancon), the
suggested
chap, vm THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 47
capital of the Sequani. A personal conference between the two generals, which took place at the request of Ariovistus, seemed as if solely meant to cover an attempt against the person of Caesar; arms alone could decide between the two oppressors of GauL The war came temporarily to a stand. In lower Alsace somewhere in the region of Muhlhausen, five miles from the Rhine,1 the two armies lay at a little distance from each other, till Ariovistus with his very superior force succeeded in marching past the Roman camp, placing himself in its rear, and cutting off the Romans from their base and their supplies. Caesar
attempted to free himself from his painful situation by a battle ; but Ariovistus did not accept it Nothing remained for the Roman general but, in spite of his inferior strength, to imitate the movement of the Germans, and to recover his communications by making two legions march past the enemy and take up a position beyond the camp of the Germans, while four legions remained behind in the former camp. Ariovistus, when he saw the Romans divided, attempted an assault on their lesser camp ; but the Romans
1 Goler (Caesars gall. Krieg, p. 45, etc. ) thinks that he has found the field of battle at Cernay not far from Muhlhausen, which, on the whole, agrees with Napoleon's (Prtcis, p. 35) placing of the battle-field in the district of Belfort This hypothesis, although not certain, suits the circumstances of the case ; for the fact that Caesar required seven days' march for the short space from Besancon to that point, is explained by his own remark 41) that he had taken a circuit of lifty miles to avoid the mountain paths and the whole description of the pursuit continued as far as the Rhine, and evidently not lasting for several days but ending on the very day of the battle, decides — the authority of tradition being equally balanced—in favour of the view that the battle was fought five, not fifty, miles from the Rhine. The proposal of RUstow (Einleitung tu Caesars Comm. p. 117) to transfer the field of battle to the upper Saar rests on a misunderstanding. The com expected from the Sequani, I. euci, Lingonea was not to come to the Roman army in the course of their march against Ariovistus, but to be delivered at Besancon before their departure, and taken by the troops along with them as clearly apparent from the fact that Caesar, while pointing his troops to those supplies, comforts them at the same time with the hope of corn to be brought in on the route. From Besancon Caesar commanded the region of Langres and Eplnal, and, as may be well conceived, preferred to levy his requisitions there rather than in the exhausted districts from which he came.
;
is
(i. ;
■ad
repulsed it Under the impression made by this success, the whole Roman army was brought forward to the attack ; and the Germans also placed themselves in battle array, in a long line, each tribe for itself, the cars of the army with the baggage and women being placed behind them to render flight more difficult The right wing of the Romans, led by Caesar himself, threw itself rapidly on the enemy, and drove them before it ; the right wing of the Germans was in like manner successful. The balance still stood equal ; but the tactics of the reserve, which had decided so many other conflicts with barbarians, decided the conflict with the Germans also in favour of the Romans; their third line, which Publius Crassus seasonably sent to render help, restored the battle on the left wing and thereby decided the victory. The pursuit was continued to the Rhine; only a few, including the king, succeeded in
German
48
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
68. escaping to the other bank (696).
Thus brilliantly the Roman rule announced its advent
letuemenu t0 ^e mighty stream, which the Italian soldiers here saw on the left , .
bank of the for the first time; by a single fortunate battle the line of the Rhine was won. The fate of the German settlements on the left bank of the Rhine lay in the hands of Caesar ; the victor could destroy them, but he did not do so. The neighbouring Celtic cantons —the Sequani, Leuci, Medio- matrici—were neither capable of self-defence nor trust worthy; the transplanted Germans promised to become not merely brave guardians of the frontier but also better subjects of Rome, for their nationality severed them from the Celts, and their own interest in the preservation of their newly-won settlements severed them from their
across the Rhine, so that in their isolated position they could not avoid adhering to the central power. Caesar here, as everywhere, preferred conquered foes to doubtful friends; he left the Germans settled by Ariovistus along the left bank of the Rhine—the Triboci
countrymen
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST
49
about Strassburg, the Nemetes about Spires, the Vangiones about Worms—in possession of their new abodes, and entrusted them with the guarding of the Rhine-frontier against their countrymen. 1
The Suebi, who threatened the territory of the Treveri on the middle Rhine, on receiving news of the defeat of Ariovistus, again retreated into the interior of Germany; on which occasion they sustained considerable loss by the way at the hands of the adjoining tribes.
The consequences of this one campaign were immense ; TheRMae they were felt for many centuries after. The Rhine had
become the boundary of the Roman empire against the
Germans. In Gaul, which was no longer able to govern
itself, the Romans had hitherto ruled on the south coast, while lately the Germans had attempted to establish them selves farther up. The recent events had decided that Gaul was to succumb not merely in part but wholly to the Roman supremacy, and that the natural boundary presented by the mighty river was also to become the political boundary. The senate in its better times had not rested, till the dominion of Rome had reached the natural bounds of Italy — the Alps and the Mediterranean — and its adjacent islands. The enlarged empire also needed a similar military rounding off; but the present government left the matter to accident, and sought at most to see, not that the frontiers were capable of defence, but that they
should not need to be defended directly by itself. People
1 This seems the simplest hypothesis regarding the origin of these Germanic settlements. That Ariovistus settled those peoples on the middle Rhine is probable, because they fight in his army {Caes. i. 51) and do not appear earlier ; that Caesar left them in possession of their settlements is probable, because he in presence of Ariovistus declared himself ready to tolerate the Germans already settled in Gaul (Cues. i. 35, 43), and because we find them afterwards in these abodes. Caesar doe* not mention the directions given after the battle concerning these Germanic settlements, because he keeps silence on principle regarding all the organic arrangements made by him in Gaul.
vou v
»37
Subjuga- tion of Gaui.
SO THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
felt that now another spirit and another arm began to guide the destinies of Rome.
The foundations of the future edifice were laid ; but in order to finish the building and completely to secure the recognition of the Roman rule by the Gauls, and that of the Rhine-frontier by the Germans, very much still remained to be done. All central Gaul indeed from the Roman frontier as far up as Chartres and Treves submitted without objection to the new ruler ; and on the upper and middle Rhine also no attack was for the present to be apprehended from the Germans. But the northern provinces — as well the Aremorican cantons in Brittany and Normandy as the more powerful confederation of the Belgae — were not affected by the blows directed against central Gaul, and found no occasion to submit to the conqueror of Ariovistus. Moreover, as was already remarked, very close relations subsisted between the
and the Germans over the Rhine, and at the mouth of the Rhine also Germanic tribes made themselves ready to cross the stream. In consequence of this Caesar set out with his army, now increased to eight legions, in
Beigic expedition.
Belgae
67. the spring of 697 against the Beigic cantons. Mindful of the brave and successful resistance which fifty years before they had with united strength presented to the Cimbri on the borders of their land (iii. 444), and stimulated by the patriots who had fled to them in numbers from central Gaul, the confederacy of the Belgae sent their whole first levy — 300,000 armed men under the leadership of Galba the king of the Suessiones — to their southern frontier to receive Caesar there. A single canton alone, that of the
Remi (about Rheims) discerned in this invasion of the foreigners an opportunity to shake off the rule which their neighbours the Suessiones exercised over them, and prepared to take up in the north the part which the Haedui had played in central GauL The Roman and the
powerful
chap, Vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEaT 51
Belgic armies arrived in their territory almost at the same time.
Caesar did not venture to give battle to the brave Conflicts enemy six times as strong ; to the north of the Aisne, not ^^ far from the modern Pontavert between Rheims and Laon,
he pitched his camp on a plateau rendered almost unas
sailable on all sides partly by the river and by morasses,
partly by fosses and redoubts, and contented himself with thwarting by defensive measures the attempts of the Belgae
to cross the Aisne and thereby to cut him off from his communications. When he counted on the likelihood
that the coalition would speedily collapse under its own
weight, he had reckoned rightly. King Galba was an
honest man, held in universal respect ; but he was not
equal to the management of an army of 300,000 men on
hostile soil. No progress was made, and provisions began
to fail ; discontent and dissension began to insinuate themselves into the camp of the confederates. The Bellovaci in particular, equal to the Suessiones in power,
and already dissatisfied that the supreme command of the confederate army had not fallen to them, could no longer
be detained after news had arrived that the Haedui as
allies of the Romans were making preparations to enter the Bellovacic territory. They determined to break up and go home ; though for honour's sake all the cantons at the same time bound themselves to hasten with their united strength to the help of the one first attacked, the miserable dispersion of the confederacy was but miserably palliated by such impracticable stipulations. It was a catastrophe which vividly reminds us of that which occurred almost on the same spot in 1792 ; and, just as with the campaign in Champagne, the defeat was all the more severe that it took place without a battle. The bad leadership of the retreat ing army allowed the Roman general to pursue it as if it were beaten, and to destroy a portion of the contingents
Submission ofthe western cantons,
that had remained to the last But the consequences of , . the victory were not confined to this. As Caesar ad-
vanced into the western cantons of the Belgae, one after another gave themselves up as lost almost without resist ance ; the powerful Suessiones (about Soissons), as well as their rivals, the Bellovaci (about Beauvais) and the Ambiani (about Amiens). The towns opened their gates when they saw the strange besieging machines, the towers rolling up to their walls ; those who would not submit to the foreign masters sought a refuge beyond the sea in Britain.
But in the eastern cantons the national feeling was more energetically roused. The Viromandui (about Arras), the Atrebates (about St Quentin), the German Aduatuci (about Namur), but above all the Nervii (in Hainault) with their not inconsiderable body of clients, little inferior in number to the Suessiones and Bellovaci, far superior to them in valour and vigorous patriotic spirit, concluded a second and closer league, and assembled their forces on the upper Sambre. Celtic spies informed them most accurately of the movements of the Roman army ; their own local knowledge, and the high tree -barricades which were formed everywhere in these districts to obstruct the bands of mounted robbers who often visited them, allowed the allies to conceal their own operations for the most part from the view of the Romans.
When these arrived on the Sambre not far from Bavay, and the legions were occupied in pitching their camp on the crest of the left bank, while the cavalry and light infantry were exploring the opposite heights, the latter were all at once assailed by the whole mass of the enemy's forces and driven down the hill into the river. In a moment the enemy had crossed this also, and stormed the heights of the left bank with a determina tion that braved death. Scarcely was there time left for the entrenching legionaries to exchange the mattock for the
sword ; the soldiers, many without helmets, had to fight
The
with the NervU.
52
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST $3
just as they stood, without line of battle, without plan, without proper command ; for, owing to the suddenness of the attack and the intersection of the ground by tall hedges, the several divisions had wholly lost their com munications. Instead of a battle there arose a number of unconnected conflicts. Labienus with the left wing over threw the Atrebates and pursued them even across the river. The Roman central division forced the Viromandui down the declivity. But the right wing, where the general himself was present, was outflanked by the far more numerous Nervii the more easily, as the central division carried away by its own success had evacuated the ground alongside of and even the half-ready camp was occupied by the Nervii; the two legions, each separately rolled together into dense mass and assailed in front and on both flanks, deprived of most of their officers and their best soldiers, appeared on the point of being broken and cut to pieces. The Roman camp-followers and the allied troops were already fleeing in all directions of the Celtic cavalry whole divisions, like the contingent of the Treveri, galloped off at full speed, that from the battle-field itself they might announce at home the welcome news of the defeat which had been sustained. Everything was at stake. The general himself seized his shield and fought among the foremost; his example, his call even now inspiring enthusiasm, induced the wavering ranks to rally. They had already in some measure extricated themselves and had at least restored the connection between the two legions of this wing, when help came up—partly down from the crest of the bank, where in the interval the Roman rearguard with the baggage had arrived, partly from the other bank of the river, where Labienus had meanwhile penetrated to the enemy's camp and taken possession of and now, perceiving at length the danger that menaced the right wing, despatched the victorious
it,
a
it,
;
Subjection of the
54 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
tenth legion to the aid of his general. The Nervii, separated from their confederates and simultaneously assailed on all sides, now showed, when fortune turned, the same heroic courage as when they believed themselves victors; still over the pile of corpses of their fallen comrades they fought to the last man. According to their own statement, of their six hundred senators only three survived this day.
After this annihilating defeat the Nervii, Atrebates, and Viromandui could not but recognize the Roman supremacy. The Aduatuci, who arrived too late to take part in the fight on the Sambre, attempted still to hold their ground in the strongest of their towns (on the mount Falhize near the Maas not far from Huy), but they too soon submitted. A nocturnal attack on the Roman camp in front of the town, which they ventured after the surrender, miscarried ; and the perfidy was avenged by the Romans with fearful severity. The clients of the Aduatuci, consisting of the Eburones between the Maas and Rhine and other small adjoining tribes, were declared independent by the Romans, while the Aduatuci taken prisoners were sold under the hammer en masse for the benefit of the Roman treasury. It seemed as if the fate which had befallen the Cimbri still pursued even this last Cimbrian fragment. Caesar con tented himself with imposing on the other subdued tribes a general disarmament and furnishing of hostages. The Remi became naturally the leading canton in Belgic, like the Haedui in central Gaul ; even in the latter several clans
at enmity with the Haedui preferred to rank among the
clients of the Remi. Only the remote maritime cantons of
the Morini (Artois) and the Menapii (Flanders and Brabant), and the country between the Scheldt and the Rhine inhabited in great part by Germans, remained still for the present exempt from Roman invasion and in possession of their hereditary freedom.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 55
The turn of the Aremorican cantons came. In the Expedl- autumn of 697 Publius Crassus was sent thither with a ^SnstSe Roman corps ; he induced the Veneti —who as masters of maritime the ports of the modern Morbihan and of a respectable fleet can,ons- occupied the first place among all the Celtic cantons in navigation and commerce —and generally the coast-districts
between the Loire and Seine, to submit to the Romans and
give them hostages. But they soon repented. When in
the following winter (697-698) Roman officers came to these 67-66. legions to levy requisitions of grain there, they were
detained by the Veneti as counter-hostages. The example
thus set was quickly followed not only by the Aremorican
cantons, but also by the maritime cantons of the Belgae
that still remained free ; where, as in some cantons of Normandy, the common council refused to join the insurrection, the multitude put them to death and attached
itself with redoubled zeal to the national cause. The whole Venetian coast from the mouth of the Loire to that of the Rhine war-
rose against Rome ; the most resolute patriots from all the
Celtic cantons hastened thither to co-operate in the great
work of liberation ; they already calculated on the rising of
the whole Belgic confederacy, on aid from Britain, on the
arrival of Germans from beyond the Rhine.
Caesar sent Labienus with all the cavalry to the Rhine, with a view to hold in check the agitation in the Belgic province, and in case of need to prevent the Germans from
the river; another of his lieutenants,
Titurius Sabinus, went with three legions to Normandy, where the main body of the insurgents assembled. But the powerful and intelligent Veneti were the true centre of the insurrection ; the chief attack by land and sea was directed against them. Caesar's lieutenant, Decimus Brutus, brought up the fleet formed partly of the ships of the subject Celtic cartons, partly of a number of Roman galleys hastily built on the Loire and manned with rowers from the Narbonese
crossing
Quintus
56 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
province ; Caesar himself advanced with the flower of his infantry into the territory of the Veneti. But these were prepared beforehand, and had with equal skill and resolu tion availed themselves of the favourable circumstances which the nature of the ground in Brittany and the possession of a considerable naval power presented. The country was much intersected and poorly furnished with grain, the towns were situated for the most part on cliffs and tongues of land, and were accessible from the mainland only by shallows which it was difficult to cross ; the provi sion of supplies and the conducting of sieges were equally difficult for the army attacking by land, while the Celts by means of their vessels could furnish the towns easily with everything needful, and in the event of the worst could accomplish their evacuation. The legions expended their time and strength in the sieges of the Venetian townships, only to see the substantial fruits of victory ultimately carried off in the vessels of the enemy.
Naval Accordingly when the Roman fleet, long detained by r*TM* storms at the mouth of the Loire, arrived at length on the the coast of Brittany, it was left to decide the struggle by a
naval battle. The Celts, conscious of their superiority on Veneti. this element, brought forth their fleet against that of the Romans commanded by Brutus. Not only did it number 2 20 sail, far more than the Romans had been able to brinr;
up, but their high-decked strong sailing-vessels with flat bottoms were also far better adapted for the high-running waves of the Atlantic Ocean than the low, lightly-built oared galleys of the Romans with their sharp keels. Neither the missiles nor the boarding-bridges of the Romans could reach the high deck of the enemy's vessels, and the iron beaks recoiled powerless from the strong oaken plank*. But the Roman mariners cut the ropes, by which the yards were fastened to the masts, by means of sickles fastened t<1 long poles ; the yards and sails fell down, and, as they did
j^jrij?
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 57
not know how to repair the damage speedily, the ship ras thus rendered a wreck just as it is at the present day by the falling of the masts, and the Roman boats easily succeeded by a joint attack in mastering the maimed vessel of the enemy. When the Gauls perceived this manoeuvre, they attempted to move from the coast on which they had taken up the combat with the Romans, and to gain the high seas, whither the Roman galleys could not follow them; but unhappily for them there suddenly set in a dead calm, and the immense fleet, towards the equipment of which the maritime cantons had applied all their energies, was almost wholly destroyed by the Romans. Thus was this naval battle—so far as historical knowledge reaches, the earliest fought on the Atlantic Ocean—just like the engagement at Mylae two hundred years before 175), notwithstanding
the most unfavourable circumstances, decided in favour of the Romans by lucky invention suggested by necessity.
The consequence of the victory achieved by Brutus was the of the surrender of the Veneti and of all Brittany. More with maritime view to impress the Celtic nation, after so manifold evidences of clemency towards the vanquished, an example
of fearful severity now against those whose resistance had been obstinate, than with the view of punishing the breach of treaty and the arrest of the Roman officers, Caesar caused the whole common council to be executed and the people of the Venetian canton to the last man to be sold into slavery. By this dreadful fate, as well as by their intelligence and their patriotism, the Veneti have more than any other Celtic clan acquired title to the sympathy of posterity.
Sabinus meanwhile opposed to the levy of the coast- states assembled on the Channel the same tactics by which Caesar had in the previous year conquered the Belgic general levy on the Aisne he stood on the defensive till impatience and want invaded the ranks of the enemy, and
;
a
(ii.
by
a
a
58 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
then managed by deceiving them as to the temper and strength of his troops, and above all by means of their own impatience, to allure them to an imprudent assault upon the Roman camp, in which they were defeated ; whereupon the militia dispersed and the country as far as the Seine submitted-
The Morini and Menapii alone persevered in withhold-
ExpeAU
agajnst the 'nS tne'r recognition of the Roman supremacy. To compel
Morini and
them to this, Caesar appeared on their borders ; but,
rendered wiser by the experiences of their
they avoided accepting battle on the borders of their land, and retired into the forests which then stretched almost without interruption from the Ardennes towards the German Ocean. The Romans attempted to make a road through the forest with the axe, ranging the felled trees on each side as a barricade against the enemy's attacks ; but even Caesar, daring as he was, found it advisable after some days of most laborious marching, especially as it was verg ing towards winter, to order a retreat, although but a small portion of the Morini had submitted and the powerful Menapii had not been reached at all. In the following
B6. year (699), while Caesar himself was employed in Britain, the greater part of the army was sent afresh against these tribes ; but this expedition also remained in the main un successful. Nevertheless the result of the last campaigns was the almost complete reduction of Gaul under the dominion of the Romans. While central Gaul had sub-
67. mitted to it without resistance, during the campaign of 697 the Belgic, and during that of the following year the mari time, cantons had been compelled by force of arms to acknowledge the Roman rule. The lofty hopes, with which the Celtic patriots had begun the last campaign, had nowhere been fulfilled. Neither Germans nor Britons had come to their aid ; and in Belgica the presence of Labienus had sufficed to prevent the renewal of the con flicts of the previous year.
countrymen,
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 59
While Caesar was thus forming the Roman domain in Establish-
the west by force of arms into a compact whole, he did TMent .
not neglect to open up for the newly-conquered country — cations which was destined in fact to fill up the wide gap in that J" the domain between Italy and Spain — communications both Valais, with the Italian home and with the Spanish provinces.
The communication between Gaul and Italy had certainly been materially facilitated by the military road laid out by Pompeius in 677 over Mont Genevre (iv. 293); but since the 77. whole of Gaul had been subdued by the Romans, there was need of a route crossing the ridge of the Alps from the valley
of the Po, not in a westerly but in a northerly direction,
and furnishing a shorter communication between Italy and central Gaul. The way which leads over the Great St. Bernard into the Valais and along the lake of Geneva had long served the merchant for this purpose ; to get this road into his power, Caesar as early as the autumn of 697 caused 67. Octodurum (Martigny) to be occupied by Servius Galba, and the inhabitants of the Valais to be reduced to subjec
tion — a result which was, of course, merely postponed,
not prevented, by the brave resistance of these mountain-
peoples.
To gain communication with Spain, moreover, Publius and with
Crassus was sent in the following year (698) to Aquitania JSrn* with instructions to compel the Iberian tribes dwelling
there to acknowledge the Roman rule. The task was not without difficulty; the Iberians held together more com
pactly than the Celts and knew better than these how to learn from their enemies. The tribes beyond the Pyrenees, especially the valiant Cantabri, sent a contingent to their threatened countrymen ; with this there came experienced officers trained under the leadership of Sertorius in the Roman fashion, who introduced as far as possible the principles of the Roman art of war, and especially of en campment, among the Aquitanian levy already respectable
y
Fnah violation! of the Rhine- boundary by the German*.
S6-66.
The Utlpetes and Tencteri.
6o THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST hook v
from its numbers and its valour. But the excellent officer who led the Romans knew how to surmount all difficulties, and after some hardly-contested but successful battles he induced the peoples from the Garonne to the vicinity of the Pyrenees to submit to the new masters.
One of the objects which Caesar had proposed to him self —the subjugation of Gaul—had been in substance, with exceptions scarcely worth mentioning, attained so far as it could be attained at all by the sword. But the other half of the work undertaken by Caesar was still far from being satisfactorily accomplished, and the Germans had by no means as yet been everywhere compelled to recognize the Rhine as their limit Even now, in the winter of 698-699, a fresh crossing of the boundary had taken place on the lower course of the river, whither the Romans had not yet penetrated. The German tribes of the Usipetes and Tencteri whose attempts to cross the Rhine in the territory of the Menapii have been already mentioned 37), had at length, eluding the vigilance of their opponents feigned retreat, crossed in the vessels belonging to the Menapii— an enormous host, which said, including women and children, to have amounted to 430,000 persons. They still lay, apparently, in the region of Nimeguen and Cleves but
was said that following the invitations of the Celtic patriot party, they intended to advance into the interior of Gaul and the rumour was confirmed by the fact that bands of their horsemen already roamed as far as the borders of the Treveri. But when Caesar with his legions arrived oppo site to them, the sorely-harassed emigrants seemed not desirous of fresh conflicts, but very ready to accept land from the Romans and to till in peace under their supremacy. While negotiations as to this were going on,
suspicion arose in the mind of the Roman general that the Germans only sought to gain time till the bands of horsemen sent out by them had returned. Whether this
a
it
it
; ;
is
by a
(p.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 61
suspicion was well founded or not, we cannot tell i but confirmed in it by an attack, which in spite of the de facto suspension of arms a troop of the enemy made on his van guard, and exasperated by the severe loss thereby sustained, Caesar believed himself entitled to disregard every consi deration of international law. When on the second morning the princes and elders of the Germans appeared in the Roman camp to apologize for the attack made without their knowledge, they were arrested, and the multitude* anticipating no assault and deprived of their leaders were suddenly fallen upon by the Roman army. It was rather a man-hunt than a battle ; those that did not fall under the swords of the Romans were drowned in the Rhine ; almost none but the divisions detached at the time of the attack escaped the massacre and succeeded in recrossing the Rhine, where the Sugambri gave them an asylum in their
on the Lippe. The behaviour of Caesar towards these German immigrants met with severe and just censure in the senate ; but, however little it can be excused, the German encroachments were emphatically
checked by the terror which it occasioned.
Caesar however found it advisable to take yet a further Caesar oa
step and to lead the legions over the Rhine. He was not b^^1 without connections beyond the river. The Germans at the RWn* the stage of culture which they had then reached, lacked
as yet any national coherence ; in political distraction they —though from other causes —fell nothing short of the
Celts. The Ubii (on the Sieg and Lahn), the most citil- ixed among the German tribes, had recently been made subject and tributary by a powerful Suebian canton of the interior, and had as early as 697 through their envoys en- 67. treated Caesar to free them like the Gauls from the Suebian rule. It was not Caesar's design seriously to respond to this suggestion, which would have involved him in endless enterprises ; but it seemed advisable, with the view of pre-
territory, apparently
Eipedi- Britain!
6* THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
venting the appearance of the Germanic arms on the south of the Rhine, at least to show the Roman arms beyond it. The protection which the fugitive Usipetes and Tencteri had found among the Sugambri afforded a suitable occa sion. In the region, apparently between Coblentz and Andernach, Caesar erected a bridge of piles over the Rhine and led his legions across from the Treverian to the Ubian territory. Some smaller cantons gave in their sub mission ; but the Sugambri, against whom the expedition was primarily directed, withdrew, on the approach of the Roman army, with those under their protection into the interior. In like manner the powerful Suebian canton which oppressed the Ubii — presumably the same which subsequently appears under the name of the Chatti— caused the districts immediately adjoining the Ubian terri tory to be evacuated and the non-combatant portion of the people to be placed in safety, while all the men capable of arms were directed to assemble at the centre of the canton. The Roman general had neither occasion nor desire to accept this challenge ; his object — partly to reconnoitre, partly to produce an impressive effect if possible upon the Germans, or at least on the Celts and his countrymen at home, by an expedition over the Rhine—was substantially attained ; after remaining eighteen days on the right bank
of the Rhine he again arrived in Gaul and broke down the 66. Rhine bridge behind him (699).
There remained the insular Celts. From the close connection between them and the Celts of the continent, especially the maritime cantons, it may readily be conceived that they had at least sympathized with the national resist ance, and that if they did not grant armed assistance to the patriots, they gave at any rate an honourable asylum in their sea-protected isle to every one who was no longer safe in his native land. This certainly involved a danger, if not for the present, at any rate for the future ; it seemed judi
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 63
cious —if not to undertake the conquest of the island itself —at any rate to conduct there also defensive operations by offensive means, and to show the islanders by a landing on
the coast that the arm of the Romans reached even across the Channel. The first Roman officer who entered Brittany, Publius Crassus, had already (697) crossed thence to the 67. "tin-islands" at the south-west point of England (Scilly
islands) ; in the summer of 699 Caesar himself with only 65. two legions crossed the Channel at its narrowest part1 He found the coast covered with masses of the enemy's troops and sailed onward with his vessels ; but the British war-chariots moved on quite as fast by land as the Roman galleys by sea, and it was only with the utmost difficulty that the Roman soldiers succeeded in gaining the shore in
the face of the enemy, partly by wading, partly in boats, under the protection of the ships of war, which swept the beach with missiles thrown from machines and by the hand. In the first alarm the nearest villages submitted; but the islanders soon perceived how weak the enemy was, and
1 The nature of the case as well as Caesar's express statement proves that the passages of Caesar to Britain were made from ports of the coast between Calais and Boulogne to the coast of Kent A more exact deter mination of the localities has often been attempted, but without success. All that is recorded is, that on the first voyage the infantry embarked at one port, the cavalry at another distant from the former eight miles in an easterly direction (iv. as, 23, a8), and that the second voyage was made from that one of those two ports which Caesar had found most convenient, tb« (otherwise not further mentioned) Portus Itius, distant from the British coast 30 (so according to the MSS. of Caesar v. 2) or 40 miles ( = 320 stadia, according to Strabo iv. 5, a, who doubtless drew his account from Caesar). From Caesar's words (iv. at) that he had chosen "the shortest crossing," we may doubtless reasonably infer that he crossed not the Channel but the Straits of Calais, but by no means that he crossed the latter by the mathematically shortest line. It requires the implicit faith of local topographers to proceed to the determination of the locality with such data in hand—data of which the best in itself becomes almost useless from the variation of the authorities as to the number ; but among the many possibilities most may perhaps be said in favour of the view that the Itian port (which Strabo I. e. is probably right in identifying with that from which the infantry crossed in the first voyage) is to be sought near Amble- teuse to the west of Cape Gris Nez, and the cavalry-harbour near Ecale (Wissant) to the east of the same promontory, and that the landing took place to the east of Dover near Walmer Castle.
Cusivd- knnus.
64 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
how he did not venture to move far from the shore. The natives disappeared into the interior and returned only to threaten the camp ; and the fleet, which had been left in the open roads, suffered very considerable damage from the first tempest that burst upon The Romans had to reckon themselves fortunate in repelling the attacks of the barbarians till they had bestowed the necessary repairs on the ships, and in regaining with these the Gallic coast before the bad season of the year came on.
Caesar himself was so dissatisfied with the results of this expedition undertaken inconsiderately and with inadequate M-64. means, that he immediately (in the winter of 699-700) ordered transport fleet of 800 sail to be fitted out,
M.
and in the spring of 700 sailed second time for the Kentish coast, on this occasion with five legions and 2000 cavalry. The forces of the Britons, assembled this time also on the shore, retired before the mighty armada without risking battle Caesar immediately set out on his march into the interior, and after some successful conflicts crossed the river Stour; but he was obliged to halt very much against his will, because the fleet in the open roads had been again half destroyed the storms of the Channel. Before they got the ships drawn up upon the beach and the extensive arrangements made for their repair, precious time was lost, which the Celts wisely turned to account.
The brave and cautious prince Cassivellaunus, who ruled in what now Middlesex and the surrounding district —formerly the terror of the Celts to the south of the Thames, but now the protector and champion of the whole nation —had headed the defence of the land. He soon saw that nothing at all could be done with the Celtic infantry against the Roman, and that the mass of the general levy—which was difficult to feed and difficult to control —was only hindrance to the defence he therefore dismissed and retained only the war-chariots, of which
it
a
it
;
is
by
a ;
a
a
it.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 65
he collected 4000, and in which the warriors, accustomed to leap down from their chariots and fight on foot, could be employed in a twofold manner like the burgess-cavalry of the earliest Rome. When Caesar was once more able to continue his march, he met with no interruption to it ; but the British war-chariots moved always in front and alongside of the Roman army, induced the evacuation of the country (which from the absence of towns proved no great difficulty), prevented the sending out of detachments, and threatened the communications. The Thames was crossed — apparently between Kingston and Brentford above London — by the Romans ; they moved forward, but made no real progress ; the general achieved no victory, the soldiers made no booty, and the only actual result, the submission of the Trinobantes in the modern Essex, was less the effect of a dread of the Romans than of the deep hostility between this canton and Cassivellaunus. The danger increased with every onward step, and the attack, which the princes of Kent by the orders of Cassivellaunus made on the Roman naval camp, although it was repulsed, was an urgent warning to turn back. The taking by storm of a great British tree-barricade, in which a multitude of cattle fell into the hands of the Romans, furnished a pass able conclusion to the aimless advance and a tolerable pretext for returning. Cassivellaunus was sagacious enough not to drive the dangerous enemy to extremities, and pro mised, as Caesar desired him, to abstain from disturbing the Trinobantes, to pay tribute and to furnish hostages;
nothing was said of delivering up arms or leaving behind a Roman garrison, and even those promises were, it may be presumed, so far as they concerned the future, neither given nor received in earnest. After receiving the hostages Caesar returned to the naval camp and thence to Gaul. If he, as it would certainly seem, had hoped on this occasion to conquer Britain, the scheme was totally thwarted partly by
voi- v 138 f
The
of'the patriot*.
66 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
the wise defensive system of Cassivellaunus, partly and chiefly by the unserviceableness of the Italian oared fleet in the waters of the North Sea; for it is certain that the stipulated tribute was never paid. But the immediate object — of rousing the islanders out of their haughty security and inducing them in their own interest no longer to allow their island to be a rendezvous for continental emigrants—seems certainly to have been attained ; at least no complaints are afterwards heard as to the bestowal of such protection.
The work of repelling the Germanic invasion and of subduing the continental Celts was completed. But it is often easier to subdue a free nation than to keep a subdued one in subjection. The rivalry for the hegemony, by which more even than by the attacks of Rome the Celtic nation had been ruined, was in some measure set aside by the conquest, inasmuch as the conqueror took the hegemony to himself. Separate interests were silent ; under the com mon oppression at any rate they felt themselves again as one people ; and the infinite value of that which they had with indifference gambled away when they possessed it— freedom and nationality —was now, when it was too late, fully appreciated by their infinite longing. But was then, too late With indignant shame they confessed to themselves that nation, which numbered at least million of men capable of arms, nation of ancient and well-founded warlike renown, had allowed the yoke to be imposed upon
by, at the most, 50,000 Romans. The submission of the confederacy of central Gaul without having struck even blow the submission of the Belgic confederacy without having done more than merely shown wish to strike the heroic fall on the other hand of the Nervii and the Veneti,
the sagacious and successful resistance of the Morini, and of the Britons under Cassivellaunus —all that in each case had been done or neglected, had failed or had succeeded—
;
a
it,
a
a ;
it
a
? a
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 67
spurred the minds of the patriots to new attempts, if possible, more united and more successful. Especially among the Celtic nobility there prevailed an excitement, which seemed every moment as if it must break out into a general insur rection. Even before the second expedition to Britain in
the spring of 700 Caesar had found it necessary to go in 64. person to the Treveri, who, since they had compromised themselves in the Nervian conflict in 697, had no longer 57. appeared at the general diets and had formed more than suspicious connections with the Germans beyond the Rhine.
At that time Caesar had contented himself with carrying the men of most note among the patriot party, particularly Indutiomarus, along with him to Britain in the ranks of the Treverian cavalry-contingent ; he did his utmost to over look the conspiracy, that he might not by strict measures ripen it into insurrection. But when the Haeduan Dum- norix, who likewise was present in the army destined
for Britain, nominally as a cavalry officer, but really as a hostage, peremptorily refused to embark and rode home instead, Caesar could not do otherwise than have him pursued as a deserter ; he was accordingly overtaken by the division sent after him and, when he stood on his defence,
was cut down (700). That the most esteemed knight of the 64. most powerful and still the least dependent of the Celtic cantons should have been put to death by the Romans, was
a thunder-clap for the whole Celtic nobility ; every one who was conscious of similar sentiments—and they formed the great majority — saw in that catastrophe the picture of what was in store for himself.
If patriotism and despair had induced the heads of the Insurrec-
""
Celtic nobility to conspire, fear and self-defence now drove
the conspirators to strike. In the winter of 700—701, with 54-53. the exception of a legion stationed in Brittany and a second
in the very unsettled canton of the Carnutes (near Chartres),
the whole Roman army numbering six legions was en-
68 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
camped in the Belgic territory. The scantiness of the supplies of grain had induced Caesar to station his troops farther apart than he was otherwise wont to do — in six different camps constructed in the cantons of the Bellovaci, Ambiani, Morini, Nervii, Remi, and Eburones. The fixed camp placed farthest towards the east in the territory of the Eburones, probably not far from the later Aduatuca modern Tongern), the strongest of all, consisting of a legion under one of the most respected of Caesar's leaders of division, Quintus Titurius Sabinus, besides different detachments led by the brave Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta1 and amounting together to the strength of half a legion, found itself all of a sudden surrounded by the general levy of the Eburones under the kings Ambiorix and Catu- volcus. The attack came so unexpectedly, that the very men absent from the camp could not be recalled and were cut of by the enemy ; otherwise the immediate danger was not great, as there was no lack of provisions, and the assault, which the Eburones attempted, recoiled powerless from the Roman intrenchments. But king Ambiorix informed the Roman commander that all the Roman camps in Gaul were similarly assailed on the same day, and that the Romans would undoubtedly be lost if the several corps did not quickly set out and effect a junction ; that Sabinus had the more reason to make haste, as the
1 That Cotta, although not lieutenant-general of Sabinus, but like him legate, was yet the younger and less esteemed general and was probably directed in the event of a difference to yield, may be inferred both from the earlier services of Sabinus and from the fact that, where the two are named together (iv. as, 38 ; v. 24, a6, 52 ; vi. 32 j otherwise in vi. 37) Sabinu* regularly takes precedence, as also from the narrative of the cata strophe itself. Besides we cannot possibly suppose that Caesar should have placed over a camp two officers with equal authority, and have made no arrangement at all for the case of a difference of opinion. The five cohorts are not counted as part of a legion (comp. vi. 3a, 33) any more than the twelve cohorts at the Rhine bridge (vi. 29, comp. 3a, 33), and appear to have consisted of detachments of other portions of the army, which had
been assigned to reinforce this camp situated nearest to the Germans.
(the
chap, vu THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 69
Germans too from beyond the Rhine were already advanc ing against him ; that he himself out of friendship for the Romans would promise them a free retreat as far as the nearest Roman camp, only two days' march distant Some things in these statements seemed no fiction ; that the little canton of the Eburones specially favoured by the Romans 54) should have undertaken the attack of its own accord was in reality incredible, and, owing to the difficulty of effecting communication with the other far-distant camps, the danger of being attacked by the whole mass of the insurgents and destroyed detail was by no means to be esteemed slight nevertheless could not admit of the smallest doubt that both honour and prudence required them to reject the capitulation offered the enemy and to maintain the post entrusted to them. Yet, although in the council of war numerous voices and especially the
voice of Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta supported this view, the commandant determined to accept the pro posal of Ambiorix. The Roman troops accordingly marched off next morning; but when they had arrived at narrow valley about two miles from the camp they found themselves surrounded by the Eburones and every outlet blocked. They attempted to open way for them selves by force of arms but the Eburones would not enter into any close combat, and contented themselves with discharging their missiles from their unassailable posi tions into the dense mass of the Romans. Bewildered, as
seeking deliverance from treachery at the hands of the traitor, Sabinus requested conference with Ambiorix
was granted, and he and the officers accompanying him were first disarmed and then slain. After the fall of the commander the Eburones threw themselves from all sides at once on the exhausted and despairing Romans, and broke their ranks most of them, including Cotta who had already been wounded, met their death in this attack; a
weighty
;
a
;
; it
if
a
by
a
;
in it
(p. a
Cicero
To THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
small portion, who had succeeded in regaining the aban doned camp, flung themselves on their own swords during the following night The whole corps was annihilated.
This success, such as the insurgents themselves had hardly ventured to hope for, increased the ferment among the Celtic patriots so greatly that the Romans were no longer sure of a single district with the exception of the Haedui and Remi, and the insurrection broke out at the most diverse points. First of all the Eburones followed up their victory. Reinforced by the levy of the Aduatuci, who gladly embraced the opportunity of requiting the injury done to them by Caesar, and of the powerful and still unsubdued Menapii, they appeared in the territory of the Nervii, who immediately joined them, and the whole host thus swelled to 60,000 moved forward to confront the Roman camp formed in the Nervian canton.
Cicero, who commanded there, had with his weak corps a difficult position, especially as the besiegers, learning from the foe, constructed ramparts and trenches, testudines and moveable towers after the Roman fashion, and
showered fire - balls and burning spears over the straw- covered huts of the camp. The only hope of the besieged rested on Caesar, who lay not so very far off with three legions in his winter encampment in the region of Amiens. But — a significant proof of the feeling that prevailed in Gaul —for a considerable time not the slightest hint reached the general either of the disaster of Sabinus or of the peril ous situation of Cicero.
At length a Celtic horseman from Cicero's camp suc-
Caesar
hUreiiet10 cee(^ed in stealing through the enemy to Caesar. On
receiving the startling news Caesar immediately set out, although only with two weak legions, together numbering about 7000, and 400 horsemen ; nevertheless the an nouncement that Caesar was advancing sufficed to induce the insurgents to raise the siege. It was time ; not one
Quintus
CHAr. vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 5 1
tenth of the men in Cicero's camp remained unwounded.
Caesar, against whom the insurgent army had turned, The insur- deceived the enemy, in the way which he had already on Sleeked several occasions successfully applied, as to his strength ;
under the most unfavourable circumstances they ventured
an assault upon the Roman camp and in doing so suffered
a defeat It is singular, but characteristic of the Celtic
nation, that in consequence of this one lost battle, or
perhaps rather in consequence of Caesar's appearance in
person on the scene of conflict, the insurrection, which
had commenced so victoriously and extended so widely,
suddenly and pitiably broke off the war. The Nervii,
Menapii, Aduatuci, Eburones, returned to their homes.
The forces of the maritime cantons, who had made pre
parations for assailing the legion in Brittany, did the
same. The Treveri, through whose leader Indutiomarus
the Eburones, the clients of the powerful neighbouring
canton, had been chiefly induced to that so successful
attack, had taken arms on the news of the disaster of Aduatuca and advanced into the territory of the Remi
with the view of attacking the legion cantoned there under
the command of Labienus ; they too desisted for the present
from continuing the struggle. Caesar not unwillingly
farther measures against the revolted districts till the spring, in order not to expose his troops which had suffered much to the whole severity of the Gallic winter, and with the view of only reappearing in the field when the fifteen cohorts destroyed should have been re placed in an imposing manner by the levy of thirty new cohorts which he had ordered. The insurrection mean while pursued its course, although there was for the moment a suspension of arms. Its chief seats in central Gaul were, partly the districts of the Carnutes and the neighbouring Senones (about Sens), the latter of whom drove the king appointed by Caesar out of their country ;
postponed
and sup. pressed.
12 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
partly the region of the Treveri, who invited the whole Celtic emigrants and the Germans beyond the Rhine to take part in the impending national war, and called out their whole force, with a view to advance in the spring a second time into the territory of the Remi, to capture the corps of Labienus, and to seek a communication with the insurgents on the Seine and Loire. The deputies of these three cantons remained absent from the diet convoked by Caesar in central Gaul, and thereby declared war just as openly as a part of the Belgic cantons had done by the attacks on the camps of Sabinus and Cicero,
The winter was drawing to a close when Caesar set out with his army, which meanwhile had been considerably re inforced, against the insurgents. The attempts of the Treveri to concentrate the revolt had not succeeded ; the agitated districts were kept in check by the marching in of Roman troops, and those in open rebellion were attacked in detail. First the Nervii were routed by Caesar in person. The Senones and Carnutes met the same fate. The Menapii, the only canton which had never submitted to the Romans, were compelled by a grand attack simul taneously directed against them from three sides to re nounce their long-preserved freedom. Labienus meanwhile was preparing the same fate for the Treveri. Their first attack had been paralyzed, partly by the refusal of the adjoining German tribes to furnish them with mercenaries, partly by the fact that Indutiomarus, the soul of the whole movement, had fallen in a skirmish with the cavalry of Labienus. But they did not on this account abandon their projects.