The only way
available
was struggle through blood; and God paved the way for such a course.
Revolution and War_nodrm
The Iranian Revolution
We have in reality, then, no choice but to . . . overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes.
-Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
Nobody is ever ready for a revolution.
-Gary Sick, White House aide for Iran, 1977-81
Like the French and Russian revolutions, the Islamic upheaval in Iran confirms that revolutions raise the level of security competition between states. By altering the regional balance of power, the revolution in Iran both threatened other states and created opportunities for them. It also triggered
spirals of hostility between the new regime and several other countries, which raised the level of threat even further. The fear that the revolution would spread made the danger seem greater, and lingering opposition within Iran fed the new regime's fears of foreign plots and gave its rivals the impression that it would be easy to overturn. Foreign responses to the revo- lution were also affected by uncertainty and misinformation, which exacer- bated each side's perceptions of threat.
The hopes and fears that accompanied the revolution turned out to be greatly exaggerated. Although the Iranian example did encourage funda- mentalists in other countries, it was not the sole (or even the most impor- tant) cause of the Islamic resurgence, and Iranian efforts to export the revolution to other countries have been largely unsuccessful. Foreign beliefs that the new regime would collapse turned out to be equally misguided; the Islamic Republic has survived diplomatic isolation, economic difficulties, a costly war, and internal conflicts that have endured for over fifteen years. Again we find that revolutions are both hard to spread and hard to reverse.
Finally, the Iranian Revolution offers only modest support for neorealist claims about the socializing effects of the international system. As in the So- viet case, key members of the revolutionary elite sought to moderate Iran- ian diplomacy in order to improve its international position. Their efforts were erratic and incomplete, however, for several reasons: the evidence in
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favor of moderation was ambiguous, the commitment to a radical foreign policy was central to the legitimacy of the clerical regime, and the revolu- tionary government was tom between competing factions and thus unable to sustain a consistent line.
This chapter consists of three main sections. First I describe the origins of the Islamic Republic and summarize its ideological foundations. After that, I examine the foreign policy of the new regime and describe how other states responded, focusing primarily on its first decade in power. Finally, i compare the evolution of Iran's foreign relations against the propositions developed in chapter 2.
THE ORIGINS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC The Fall of the Shah
In simple terms, the regime of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi fell be- cause the shah's reformist policies alienated a broad spectrum of Iranian so- ciety that he was unable to coopt yet unwilling to suppress by brute force. 1 Opposition to the shah arose from, first, the economic and social disloca- tions generated by his rapid modernization program; second, clerical resis- tance to the intrusion of alien values and the shah's attempt to reduce their influence; and third, the widespread perception that the shah was a U. S. puppet and the head of a corrupt and decadent elite. 2
The revolutionary crisis began late in 1977, after the shah's decision to relax police controls and judicial procedures had revived the liberal opposi- tion and sparked! several clashes between antigovernment demonstrators and the shah's internal police. The challenge grew in January 1978, after an insulting attack on the radical clergy in a government newspaper triggered a series of riots by theology students, in which seventy students were killed. The riots began an escalating cycle of popular demonstrations through the
1 Accounts of the lrar nian revolution include Said Amir Arjomand, The Turbanfor the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (London: Oxford University Press, 1988); Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); Shaul Bakhash, The Reign ofthe Ay- atollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984); John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981); Farideh Farhi, States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); and Misagh Parsa, Socia/ Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989).
2 Opposition to the shah included the liberal National Front, the pro-Communist Tudeh Party, the Liberation Movement (which advocated a synthesis of Islam with modem Western thought), left-wing guerrilla organizations such as the Sazman-i Mujahedin-i Khalq-i Iran (or Islamic Mujahedin) and the Sazaman-i Cherikha-yi Feda'i Khalq-i Iran (or Marxist Feda'i), and Muslim clerics such as Khomeini. See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), chap. 10, and The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, 42-56.
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spring and summer, and a mass demonstration in Tehran drew nearly five hundred thousand participants in September. The shah declared martial law and ordered the military to suppress the demonstrations, but these actions merely united the liberal opposition and the radlical clerics. By No- vember, a series of strikes had shut down the bazaars, universities, govern- ment offices, banks, and much of the oil industry.
The radicalization of the revolution was due in part to the shah's refusan either to make bold concessions or to order a massive crackdown. His inde-? cision was exacerbated by his deteriorating health and an inability to obtain clear and consistent advice from the United States, which did not appreciate the seriousness of the crisis until very late. 3 Strikes and demonstrations con- tinued through December, with the army rank and file becoming in- creasingly reluctant to use force against the opposition. Support from Washington was evaporating as well, as U. S. officials belatedly realized that the shah might be beyond saving. In desperation, the shah at last offered to negotiate with the opposition. After persuading Shahpour Bakhtiar, a prominent member of the liberal National Front, to lead a caretaker govern- ment, the shah agreed to leave the country for a "vacation" and to accept a greatly diminished role. It was a meaningless agreement, as the Pahlavi state was dissolving rapidly by this point and authority had already begun to pass into the hands of local governing bodies (or komitehs), many of which were controlled by clerics loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the
intellectual spiritual leader of the opposition. Khomeini returned to a tu- multuous welcome on February 1, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces declared itself neutral ten days later. Bakhtiar immediately resigned and went into hiding, marking the final end of the Pahlavi state.
Khomeini's Revolutionary Program
Many diverse groups participated in the anti-shah coalition, but Ayatol- lah Ruhollah Khomeini was clearly its dominant figure. Khomeini had op- posed the shah's regime since the early 196os, when his criticisms of Iran's dependence on the United States had led to his arrest and subsequent exile in Iraq. He began extolling a radical doctrine of Islamic government while in exile and built an extensive network of supporters among the clergy. This
3 Accounts of U. S. handling of the revolution vary in assigning blame, but all agree that American decision-makers were deeply divided and U. S. advice was inconsistent. See Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 191! 5); James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy ofAmerican-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19f! 8), chap. 7; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs ofthe National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), 354? ; William Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton, 19f! 1); and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Rev- olution, chap. 14. The shah's memoirs place the blame for his ouster on the United States; see Mohammad Reza Shah, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day, 19&).
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combination of ideology and organization would prove to be a potent revo- lutionary weapon. 4
The central element of Khomeini's revolutionary program was his insis-. tence that the shah's regime be replaced by a government based on Islamic law. Khomeini also argued that the clergy should play an active and direct role in the political system, to ensure that it conformed to Islamic princi- ples. 5 In the absence of direct guidance from the Prophet Muhammed or his chosen successors, he argued, Islamic government should be based on the
"guardianship of the jurisprudent" (velayet-e faqih). "Since the rule of Islam is the rule of law," he wrote, "only the jurists, and no one else, should be in charge of the government. They are the ones who can govern as God or- dered. "6 Thus, not only did Khomeini reject the separation of religion and politics, but his vision of Islamic government placed the clergy in a position of primacy?
Khomeini' s blueprint for Islamic government rested on several other core beliefs. First, he regarded all other forms of government as illegitimate, because they were not based on Islam, and believed that the major world powers were innately hostile and aggressive. Dividing the world into "op- pressors" (the superpowers, their allies, and their various puppets) and the "oppressed" (the victims of imperialist exploitation, such as Iran), Khomeini
accused the Western powers of deliberately seeking "to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so that they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our lands, and our human resources. " For this reason, he argued, the imperialist powers had "separated the various seg- ments of the Islamic ummah (community) from each other and artificially
4 See Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 35-44; Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 475-79, and Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 1o-12; and Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown, 94-102.
5 Khomeini declared that "Islam is political or it is nothing" and insisted that "this slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them. " Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations ofImam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley, Calif. : Mizan Press, 1981), 37-38.
6 Quoted in Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 477?
7 "If a worthy individual possessing [knowledge of the law and justice) arises and estab- lishes a government, he will possess the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger [the Prophet Mohammed) . . . and it will be the duty of all people to obey him. " Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 62. For summaries of Khomeini's theory of Islamic government, see Farhang Rajaee, Islamic Values and World View: Khomeini on Man, the State, and International Politics (Lan- ham, Md. : University Press of America, 1983); David Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision: Nation- alism or World Order? " in his edited Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1990); Marvin Zonis and Daniel Bromberg, Khomeini, the Islamic Republic ofIran, and the Arab World (Cambridge: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1987); and Greg- ory Rose, "Velayet-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ismfrom Quietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki Ked- die (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
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created separate nations. " In addition to "corrupting the minds and morals of the people," the oppressors had replaced the judicial process and poHti- cal laws of Islam with "European importations" and "installed their agents in power. " According to Khomeini, therefore, the only way to end foreign exploitation was to overthrow agents such as the shah and establish a gov- ernment based on Islamic principles. 8
This Manichean worldview precluded any compromise with the shah or his foreign patrons. Khomeini told his followers in November 1978, "If you give [the shah] a breathing spell, tomorrow neither Islam nor your country nor your family will be left for you. Do not give him a chance; squeeze his neck until he is strangled. " He was particularly suspicious of the United States, whose support for the shah qualified it as the "Great Satan," but the Soviet Union and the other major powers were seen as equally hostile. 9 For Khomeini, the superpowers were driven by an incor- rigible lust for power and were especially dangerous for Iran. Even after the shah was gone, Khomeini warned that the great powers sought "to break Iran into pieces, to stage a coup d'etat and pave the way for the . . . supervision of foreigners. " Neither patience nor conciliation could remove the danger, because the "Satans are making plans [against Islam] for a cen- tury from now. "10
Second, Khomeini rejected existing state boundaries as "the product of the deficient human mind" and emphasized that "Muslims are one family, even if they are subject to different governments and even if they live in re- gions remote from one another. " Accordingly, he called for active efforts to spread the revolution beyond Iran's borders, declaring that "we have in re- ality, then, no choice but to . . . overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppres- sive, and criminal regimes. " He also argued that his doctrine of Islamic government would end the artificial divisions imposed by the West al! 1ld
8 "It is the duty of all of us to overthrow the taghut, i. e. , the illegitimate political powers that ? now rule fthe entire Islamic world. The government apparatus of tyrannical and anti-popular regimes must be replaced by institutions serving the public good and administered accord- ing to Islamic law. In this way an Islamic government will gradually come into existence. " Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 34-35, 48-50, 136, 147. See also Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 37-41; . and Richard Cottam, "Iran-Motives behind Its Foreign Policy," Survival 28, no. 6
( 1 986).
9 In 1964, Khomeini had declared, "America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse than both of them. " For these quotations, see Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown, 102; and Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 185.
10 Khomeini also warned, "Neither the West nor the East will leave us alone. They will try everything in their power to prevent Iran from settling down. " Quoted in W. R. Campbell and Djamchid Darvich, "Global Implications of the Islamic Revolution for the Status Quo in the Persian Gulf," Journal ofSoutli Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 5, no. 1 (1981), 42; and see also Rajaee, Islamic Values, 75-78; and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, "Iran's Foreign Devils," For- eign Policy 38 (198o).
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recreate a unified Muslim ummah. And though the Muslim world was the
primary object of his revolutionary ambitions, Khomeini and his followers
occasionally suggested that the ultimate goal was the creation of a global
community that would transcend the existing state system altogether. 11 In
addition, Khomeini argued that failure to spread the revolution would leave
Iran vulnerable to the "oppressors" or their various puppets. Once in
power, he declared, "We should try to export our revolution to the world.
. . . If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. "
Thus, there were both offensive and defensive justifications for an expan-
sionist policy; although he repeatedly denied that it would involve the use
of force, spreading the revolution beyond Iran was both a means to ensure
Iran's security and an end in itself. 12
Third, like other revolutionary ideologies, Khomeini's worldview com- bined long-term optimism with an emphasis on sacrifice andl discipline. He preached, "The Quran says 'And hold fast . . . to the cable of Allah, and do not separate. . . . [All your] political social and economic problems will be solved. " Similarly, he exhorted his followers, "Know that it is your duty to es-
tablish an Islamic government. Have confidence in yourselves and know that you are capable of fulfilling this task. "13 Noting that "all the prophets began as lonely individuals, . . . but they persisted," he emphasized that "it is only through the active, intentional pursuit of martyrdom that unjust rulers can be toppled. "14 Indeed, he suggested, a single individual could spark a revo- lution: "Even if only one true human being appears, [the imperialists] fear
11 Quotations from Rouhallah K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 2o-21; Rajaee, Islamic Values, 77; Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 43; and Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 47-48, 5o-51. Khomeini also sftated, "We say w e want t o export our revolution t o a H Islamic countries as well as to the oppressed countries. . . . Export of our revolution means that all nations grow aware and save themselves. " Quoted in Maziar Behrooz, "Trends in the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic," in Neither East Nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 14-15.
?
? 12 Quoted in Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, 24-26, and "Khumayni's Islam in Iran's Foreign Policy," in Islam in Foreign Policy, ed. Adeed Dawisha (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 19-2. 0; Rajaee, Islamic Values, 82-85; and Campbell and Darvich, "Global Impli- cations," 44-46.
13 He also stressed the need for action, advising Iranians, "Rid yourselves of your depres- sion and apathy. . . . An Islamic government will definitely be established," and he stated that the "unity of truth and . . . the expression of God's oneness . . . will guarantee victory. " The quotations are from Rajaee, Islamic Values, 85; Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 37, 137; and Rose, "Velayet-efaqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity," 186-87.
14 Quoted in Rajaee, Islamic Values, 85; and Zonis and Bromberg, Khomeini, Iran, Arab World, 27-28; and Khomeini's speech in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, South Asia, July 15, 1983, I I 1-3. Ten years after the revolution, Khomeini recalleol, "Anyone who did not believe in struggle 100 percent would easily flee the arena under the pressure and threats of the pseudo-pious. . . .
The only way available was struggle through blood; and God paved the way for such a course. " See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East/South Asia, February 23, 1989, 45?
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him, because others will follow him and he will have an impact that can de- stroy the whole foundation of tyranny, imperialism, and government by puppets. "15
Not surprisingly, the ideology of the Iranian revolutionaries left them deeply suspicious of most foreign powers (especially the United States). Khomein. i and his followers also saw their revolution as a model for othe1r states-e- specially other Muslim countries-and favored active efforts to spread the revolution beyond Iran's borders. Finally, their own success re- inforced the growing belief that revolutionary Islam was an irresistible force that could overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles.
The Consolidation ofClerical Power
Clerical power was consolidated in three main phases. During the firsfr, from February to November 1979, the main institutions of the new state were established and the more moderate forces were checked by pressure from the dergy and the radical left. Khomeini selected a moderate politi- cian, Mehdi Bazargan, to head the Provisional Government, but Bazargan was forced to share power with the so-called Revolutionary Council, a se- cret group of mostly clerical advisors. Bazargan submitted a draft constitu- tion in June, but protests from the clergy and the left led to the convening of an "Assembly of Experts" that proceeded to transform the original docu- ment into a blueprint for a theocratic state. 16 The final blow against Bazargan came when the shah's entry into the United States for medical treatment ignited a wave of protests in Iran and demands that the shah be returned to Iran to stand trial. Bazargan met with U. S. national security ad- visor Zbigniew Brzezinski in an attempt to resolve the dlispute, and Kho- meini issued a statement urging Iranian students "to expand with all their
might their attacks against the United States and Israel" in order to compell the return of the shah. 17 When a group of students seized the U. S. embassy on November 4 and Khomeini endorsed their action, Bazargan had no choice but to resign.
The second phase, from November 1979 to June 1981, was dominated by . a prolonged struggle for power between the new president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, and the clerical forces of the Islamic Republic Party led by the Ay- atollah Muhammed Beheshti. Unlike Bazargan, Bani-Sadr favored a radical
15 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 39; and see also Mary Heglund, "Two Images of Husain: Accommodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village," in Keddie, Religion and Politics, esp. 228-30; and Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 99-100.
? 16 The text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is reprinted in Middle East Journal(hereafterME/)J4, no. 2 (198o), 181-204; and see also Bakhash, Reign oftheAyatollahs, 74-75 ?
17 See "Chronology," ME/ J4, no. 1 (198o), 50.
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transformation of Iran along Islamic lines. 18 He opposed direct clerical rule, however, and believed that government positions should be given to indi- viduals with technical expertise rather than religious qualifications. He also sought to improve Iran's international position by resolving the hostage cri- sis with the Uruted States. 19
These positions placed Bani-Sadr at odds with the radical clergy, which waged a relentless campaign to limit his power. The IRP dominated the par- liamentary elections in March 1980, and Bani-Sadr found himself in a pro- tracted struggle against the party's efforts to expand its control? 0 Although Khomeini impllored the two sides to resolve their differences and even formed a three-man commission to mediate between them in March 1981, disputes between the clergy and the president remained intense. 21 Bani-Sadr eventually sought support from liberals, moderate clerics, and the left-wing Islamic Mujahedin, and this step convinced Khomeini that Bani-Sadr had become a threat to the clerical regime. The ayatollah relieved him from his position as commander-in-chief in June and the Majlis (Parliament) soon or-
dered his arrest, forcing Bani-Sadr to flee into exile in July.
The third phase, from July 1981 to February 1983, featured a violent struggle between the IRP and the radical left. 22 The Mujahedin launched a bloody wave olf terrorism following Bani-Sadr's removal. Abomb blast at the headquarters of the IRP in June killed seventy-four IRP officials, in-
cluding the Ayatollah Beheshti. Bani-Sadr's successor,. Mohammed Rajai, was killed by another bomb on August 30 (along with Prime Minister Muhammed Bahonar). The clergy responded with a brutal campaign of re- pression. Official executions totaled over twenty-six hundred by Novem- ber 1981, and over twelve thousand dissidents were killed in clashes with the Revolutionary Guards or in official executions between 1981 and 1985. 23
18 The son. of an ayatollah, Bani-Sadr had studied sociology and law in Tehran and was jailed for opposition activities in the 196os. He became part of Khomeini's entourage during the latter's exile in France and returned with him to Tehran in February 1979.
19 See Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 114-17; Behrooz, "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Re- public," 18-19; and Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution, and Secret Deals with the United States, trans. William Ford (Washington, D. C. : Brassey's, 1991), 22-25.
20 See Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 6o-65; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, esp. 10o-110; and David Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990}, 1JJ-J5, 168-74, 181-83.
21 Khomeini asked the contestants to settle their differences and serve "the interest of the nation" in September and implored them to stop "biting one another like scorpions" in Feb- ruary. See "Chronology," ME/ 35, no. 1 (198o), 46; no. 2 (1981), 215; no. 3 (1981), 367.
22 The principal left-wing groups in Iran were the Islamic Mujahedin, the Marxist Feda'i, and the Communist Tudeh Party. All three groups favored radical domestic change and an end to imperialist exploitation but opposed the establishment of a theocratic state.
23 The chief prosecutor, Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, declared that "these deaths are not merely permissible, they are necessary. " See Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 68-69, 219-22.
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The threat from the Mujahedin was largely eliminated by the end of 1982, and in February 1983, the government moved to suppress the (Communist) Tudeh Party, removing the last independent political organization of any consequence. The presidency, prime ministry, and speakership of the Majlis were all in derical hands, the IRP dominated the Majlis, and the clergy had established effective control over the armed forces and Revolutionary Guards. Although low-level opposition continued throughout the rest of the decade and splits among the religious leaders became more and more ap- parent, the leaders of the Islamic Republic no longer faced a serious threat to their rule.
Conflict and Compromise in the Islamic Republic
The basic institutions of the Islamic Republic were in place by the end of 1983. The IRP dominated the Majlis and the ministries, and the army and Revolutionary Guards were all controlied by clerics loyal to Khomeini. The new regime had begun to reorder Iranian society along Islamic lines, bring- ing dramatic changes in law, education, and popular mores. 24 Opposition from within the senior clergy had been stilled as well, leaving Khomeini as the ultimate arbiter of Iran's Islamic future. 25
Despite these achievements, deep political differences soon began to di- vide Iran's new rulers. 26 In broad terms, the contest pitted a comparatively moderate group led by Majlis speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Pres- ident Said Alii Khamenei, and Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati against a more radical faction led by Prime Minister Mir-Husayn Musavi, Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri, and Ayatollah Ali Akbar Mohtashemi. The pragma- tists downplayed the importance of exporting the revolution, supported the private sector, and advocated enhancing Iran's international position by in- creasing its ties with other countries. By contrast, the radicals sought to maintain the ideological purity of the revolution, and they emphasized the
24 See Menashri, Iran, 137-38, 192-97, 225-28, 271-76.
25 Khomeini was the only grand ayatollah to endorse direct clerical rule, and several equally eminent clerics (most notably Kazem Shariatmadari) criticized Khomeini's position as contrary to Islam. Shariatmadari's personal prestige was no match for Khomeini's control over the main state institutions, however, and he was placed under house arrest and subse- quently discredited by his later involvement in an unsuccessful coup. See Menashri, Iran, 7o--n 129-30, 239-40; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 67? 8, Scr9o, 223; Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 139-43, 21s-19; and Shahrough Akhavi, "Clerical Politics in Iran since 1979,'' in The Iranian Revolution and Islamic Republic, ed. Nikki Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 5? 2, 8s-89.
26 In September 1984, Majlis speaker Rafsanjani admitted that the Islamic Republican Party's Central Council "does not enjoy a unity which is a sine qua non for its ability to be ac- tive and advance the [party's) goals," and he described "this very fundamental problem" as "a significant challenge. " See Menashri, Iran, 307-308; and Shahrough Akhavi, "Elite Fac- tionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran," MET 41, no. 2 (1987), 184.
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export of Islamic fundamentalism, the use of state power to aid the "op- pressed," the removal of Western influence, and steadfast opposition to the United States and its regional allies. 27
The pragmatists slowly gained the upper hand throughout the 198os, al- though the process was erratic and the basic divisions would remain intact after Khomeini's death in 1989. Khomeini called repeatedly for the "elimi- nation of differences," but he also shifted his own position in order to pre- vent either faction from gaining undisputed control. As a result, periods of deradicalization alternated with occasional outbursts of extremism. By 1985, Rafsanjani and his supporters had begun to curb the excesses of "Islamiza- tion" and Iranian officials were signaling their desire to restore Iran's con- tacts with the outside world. In addition to a detente with Saudi Arabia and several Western states, Iran began seeking advanced U. S. weaponry from a number of Israeli intermediaries. This policy was a direct response to the de- mands imposed by Iran's war with Iraq and marked a noteworthy depar- ture from its public antipathy toward! Israel and the "Great Satan. "28 The initiative came to an abrupt end when Rafsanjani's internal opponents leaked word of his negotiations with the United States. The news brought intense criticism from the radicals, but Khomeini condemned this new
threat to unity, and Rafsanjani and the moderates emerged in an even stronger position. Khomeini continued to back them, and the trial and sub- sequent execution of Mehdi Hashemi, former head of the bureau dealing with foreign revolutionaries, was a major setback for the radicals. 29
As Rafsanjani and the pragmatists continued to consolidate their posi- tion during 1988, evidence of a renewed drive toward moderation was ap- parent. The most obvious sign was the ceasefire with Iraq-which entailed abandoning the oft-repeated goal of toppling Saddam Hussein-but Khomeini also agreed to a series of administrative initiatives that curtailed the role of religious authorities. Both Khomeini and Rafsanjani made state- ments stressing that religious principles must "adapt to the requirements of time and place," and the speaker later declared that although "the law
27 The membership of each faction changed over time, and some individuals supported one side on certain issues but not on others. See Akhavi, "Elite Factionalism"; Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy"; Middle East Contemporary Survey (hereafter MECS), vol. 8: 1983-84 (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies/ Shiloah Center, 1986), 43(}-33; MECS 1988 (Boulde1; Colo. : Westview, 1990), 493-<)4; and Shireen T. Hunter, Iran after Kho- meini (New York: Praeger, 1992), 36-39.
28 See Menashri, Iran, 322-25, 374-75.
29 Hashemi was believed to be responsible for leaking word of the arms deals. Another sign of internal differences was the decision to disband the Islamic Revolution Party in 1987. Raf- sanjani admitted in 1986 that there were "two relatively powerful factions in our country. . . . They may in fact be regarded as two parties without names. " He termed the decision to dis- band the party "temporary" and said that it might be revived "if the consensus which Jed to its formation in 1979 is available again. " See Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 162.
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should follow Islamic doctrine . . . priority will be given to government de- cisions over doctrine. " Khomeini also issued a formal edict (orfatwa) de- claring that the authority of the Islamic state was the same as it had been in the time of Muhammed, implying that government decisions could super- sede Islamic law. "Our government," he declared, "has priority over all other Islamic tenets, even over prayer, fasting, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. " Thus, after having overthrown one regime in the name of Islamic law, Khomeini in effect declared that the Islamic Republic could disregard Islam if the interests of the state required it. Other signs of liberalization in- cluded the open endorsement of birth control by several prominent theolo- gians, the implementation of a law permitting the registration of new political parties, and public calls for greater freedom of expression in uni- versities and more flexibility in the veiling of women. These steps did not imply a new tolerance toward all domestic opponents, however, and sev- eral radical clerics and a large number of suspected leftists were reportedly executed later in the year. 30
As before, however, these acts of moderation were followed by a subse- quent tilt toward the revolutionary purists. The occasion for this shift was the publication of Salman Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses, whose satirical por- trayal of Muhammed had already sparked protests in other Muslim coun- tries. In February 1989, Khomeini stunned the world by sentencing Rushdie (who lived in England) to death and publicly exhorting "zealous Muslims" to carry out his order. Iran offered a $2. 6 million reward to Rushdie's execu- tioner, and Khomeini declared that the entire episode was divinely intended to warn Iran against an overly "pragmatic" foreign policy. 31
Khomeini's sudden reversal was meant to ensure that Iran's revolution- ary ideals were not entirely abandoned. If compromise and moderation had been necessary to save the revolution in 1988, Khomeini now saw a need to rekindle ideological purity and revolutionary commitment. According to David Menashri, "Rushdie's book served the revolution just as the Ameri- can hostages had in 1979; it unified the revolutionary forces against the ex- ternal demonical enemy and stirred up passions around an issue which all believers could . . . identify with. "32
30 In January 1989, Khomeini also approved a series of legislative reforms that further di- luted the authority of religious experts and gave greater priority to state (as opposed to the- ological) interests. For these quotations and events, see MECS I988, 472-73- 486--88; andl Wright, In the Name ofGod, 172-73-
31 This sudden return to a bellicose ideological posture forced the moderates to adopt more extreme rheftoric themselves, and Rafsanjani at one point suggested that the Palestinians should kill fllve U. S. , French, or British citizens for every Arab killed in the Israeli-occupied West Bank or Gaza Strip. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East/South Asia, February 23, 1989, 44-48; MECS 1988, 4% and Wright, In the Name of God, 201.
32 See MECS 1988, 495?
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The condemnation of Rushdie was Khorneini's last important political act. His health deteriorated in the spring and he died on June 3, 1989, at the age of eighty-six. His passing allowed Rafsanjani and the moderates to resume their efforts to adapt the principles of "Islamic government" to con- temporary political conditions. Not surprisingly, the transition to the post- Khorneini era began with new signs of moderation.
The first step was the selection of President Ali Kharnenei to succeed Khorneini as supreme jurisprudent. This decision was a further retreat from Khorneini's original blueprint for Islamic government, because Kharnenei was not an accomplished theologian. A sweeping series of constitutional amendments was approved by a national referendum in July. The new con- stitution dropped the requirement that the supreme jurisprudent be a senior religious leader (thereby legitimizing Kharnenei's selection as Khorneini's successor), abolished the position of prime minister, and strengthened the powers of the presidency. 33 Rafsanjani was elected president by an over- whelming margin in July, further cementing the moderates' hold on power. Rafsanjani emphasized that his main priority would be reconstruction and economic recovery, and his new cabinet was dominated by technocrats cho-
sen for their administrative competence rather than their ideological purity. Although the radicals were not silenced and the pragmatists had not wholly abandoned the principles of the Islamic revolution, the leaders of the regime seemed to be increasingly willing to sacrifice doctrinal purity for the sake of political stability, economic recovery, and international acceptance. 34
The radicals suffered yet another defeat in the 1991 elections, leading ? orne observers to conclude that Rafsanjani's position was more powerful than ever. 35 Yet tlhe scales quickly swung back when Kharnenei announced a crackdown on "Western culture" in the summer of 1992 and reaffirmed the death sentence on Salman Rushdie, Iran's hostility to the United States, and its commitment to spreading the revolution. 36 Kharnenei and the radicals began to strip Rafsanjani of many of the powers he had previously accumu- lated and forced him to abandon his efforts to establish better relations with the Wfst. The radical resurgence was partly a response to Rafsanjani's failed attempts to liberalize the economy, but it also reflected the incomplete insti-
33 See Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 25-26; MECS 1989 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1991), 344, 348-53; and Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 34-35.
34 See MECS 1989, 341-62.
35 See R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: North and South," ME/ 46, no. 3 (1992), 394-<)5; and Said Amir Arjomand, "A Victory for the Pragmatists: The Islamic Fundamental- ist Reaction in Iran," in Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis, ed. James Piscatori (Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991 ).
36 On July 29, 1992, Ayatollah Khamenei warned, "One must never believe that the United States, the everlasting enemy of Islam, has put an end to its antagonism. . . . The United States is the main enemy of Islam and will remain so. " Middle East International, no. 431 (August 7, 1992), 13.
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tutionalization of the revolutionary regime and the radicals' fear that fur- ther moves toward moderation would jeopardize their own claim to rule. 37
The Islamic revolution in Iran is still a work in progress. Although the revolution created a strong state apparatus, authority remains divided, and neither the moderates nor the radicals have been able to eliminate the other faction or reduce its base of support. It has thus been difficult for the Islamic Republic to sustain a coherent set of policies, and as we shall see, this en- demic inconsistency has had especially pernicious effects on Iran's foreign relations.
THE FoREIGN RELATIONS OF REvoLUTIONARY IRAN
Foreign Policy under the Shah
Under the shah, Iranian foreign policy was directed toward the long-term goal of becoming a major world power. The foundation of this policy was the shah's alliance with the United States, which had grown in importance after the Nixon administration decided to use Iran as one of its "twin pil- lars" in the Persian Gulf region. This policy fed the shah's own ambitions;
? Iran's oil wealth fueled a massive arms buildup; and the United States be- came inextricably identified with the shah's regime. 38
Predictably, prerevolutionary Iran's relations with the Soviet Union were less favorable. The shah was understandably wary of his large northern neighbor and! perennially worried about leftist subversion within Iran itself. Iran's role as the West's "regional policeman" irritated the Soviets, as did the shah's opposition to revolutionary movements and radical states else- where in the Middle East. 39 Yet despite these disagreements and Iran's close ties with the United States, the Soviet Union and Iran maintained cordial diplomatic and economic relations, and their 1921 treaty of friendship and ? cooperation Jremained in force. 40
37 On these events, see "Iran, the Sequel: New Actors, but the Same lines," New York Times, January 23, 1994, 4:4; and also Middle East International, no. 430 Ouly 24, 1992), 13; no. 432 (Au- gust 21, 1992), 1 1; no. 438 (November 6, 1992), 12; no. 439 (November 20, 1992), 3-5.
38 Useful surveys of the U. S. -Iranian relationship include Mark J. Gasiorowski, U. S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Bill, Eagle and Lion, chaps. 1?
We have in reality, then, no choice but to . . . overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes.
-Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
Nobody is ever ready for a revolution.
-Gary Sick, White House aide for Iran, 1977-81
Like the French and Russian revolutions, the Islamic upheaval in Iran confirms that revolutions raise the level of security competition between states. By altering the regional balance of power, the revolution in Iran both threatened other states and created opportunities for them. It also triggered
spirals of hostility between the new regime and several other countries, which raised the level of threat even further. The fear that the revolution would spread made the danger seem greater, and lingering opposition within Iran fed the new regime's fears of foreign plots and gave its rivals the impression that it would be easy to overturn. Foreign responses to the revo- lution were also affected by uncertainty and misinformation, which exacer- bated each side's perceptions of threat.
The hopes and fears that accompanied the revolution turned out to be greatly exaggerated. Although the Iranian example did encourage funda- mentalists in other countries, it was not the sole (or even the most impor- tant) cause of the Islamic resurgence, and Iranian efforts to export the revolution to other countries have been largely unsuccessful. Foreign beliefs that the new regime would collapse turned out to be equally misguided; the Islamic Republic has survived diplomatic isolation, economic difficulties, a costly war, and internal conflicts that have endured for over fifteen years. Again we find that revolutions are both hard to spread and hard to reverse.
Finally, the Iranian Revolution offers only modest support for neorealist claims about the socializing effects of the international system. As in the So- viet case, key members of the revolutionary elite sought to moderate Iran- ian diplomacy in order to improve its international position. Their efforts were erratic and incomplete, however, for several reasons: the evidence in
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? The Iranian Revolution
favor of moderation was ambiguous, the commitment to a radical foreign policy was central to the legitimacy of the clerical regime, and the revolu- tionary government was tom between competing factions and thus unable to sustain a consistent line.
This chapter consists of three main sections. First I describe the origins of the Islamic Republic and summarize its ideological foundations. After that, I examine the foreign policy of the new regime and describe how other states responded, focusing primarily on its first decade in power. Finally, i compare the evolution of Iran's foreign relations against the propositions developed in chapter 2.
THE ORIGINS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC The Fall of the Shah
In simple terms, the regime of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi fell be- cause the shah's reformist policies alienated a broad spectrum of Iranian so- ciety that he was unable to coopt yet unwilling to suppress by brute force. 1 Opposition to the shah arose from, first, the economic and social disloca- tions generated by his rapid modernization program; second, clerical resis- tance to the intrusion of alien values and the shah's attempt to reduce their influence; and third, the widespread perception that the shah was a U. S. puppet and the head of a corrupt and decadent elite. 2
The revolutionary crisis began late in 1977, after the shah's decision to relax police controls and judicial procedures had revived the liberal opposi- tion and sparked! several clashes between antigovernment demonstrators and the shah's internal police. The challenge grew in January 1978, after an insulting attack on the radical clergy in a government newspaper triggered a series of riots by theology students, in which seventy students were killed. The riots began an escalating cycle of popular demonstrations through the
1 Accounts of the lrar nian revolution include Said Amir Arjomand, The Turbanfor the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (London: Oxford University Press, 1988); Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); Shaul Bakhash, The Reign ofthe Ay- atollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984); John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981); Farideh Farhi, States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); and Misagh Parsa, Socia/ Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989).
2 Opposition to the shah included the liberal National Front, the pro-Communist Tudeh Party, the Liberation Movement (which advocated a synthesis of Islam with modem Western thought), left-wing guerrilla organizations such as the Sazman-i Mujahedin-i Khalq-i Iran (or Islamic Mujahedin) and the Sazaman-i Cherikha-yi Feda'i Khalq-i Iran (or Marxist Feda'i), and Muslim clerics such as Khomeini. See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), chap. 10, and The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, 42-56.
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spring and summer, and a mass demonstration in Tehran drew nearly five hundred thousand participants in September. The shah declared martial law and ordered the military to suppress the demonstrations, but these actions merely united the liberal opposition and the radlical clerics. By No- vember, a series of strikes had shut down the bazaars, universities, govern- ment offices, banks, and much of the oil industry.
The radicalization of the revolution was due in part to the shah's refusan either to make bold concessions or to order a massive crackdown. His inde-? cision was exacerbated by his deteriorating health and an inability to obtain clear and consistent advice from the United States, which did not appreciate the seriousness of the crisis until very late. 3 Strikes and demonstrations con- tinued through December, with the army rank and file becoming in- creasingly reluctant to use force against the opposition. Support from Washington was evaporating as well, as U. S. officials belatedly realized that the shah might be beyond saving. In desperation, the shah at last offered to negotiate with the opposition. After persuading Shahpour Bakhtiar, a prominent member of the liberal National Front, to lead a caretaker govern- ment, the shah agreed to leave the country for a "vacation" and to accept a greatly diminished role. It was a meaningless agreement, as the Pahlavi state was dissolving rapidly by this point and authority had already begun to pass into the hands of local governing bodies (or komitehs), many of which were controlled by clerics loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the
intellectual spiritual leader of the opposition. Khomeini returned to a tu- multuous welcome on February 1, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces declared itself neutral ten days later. Bakhtiar immediately resigned and went into hiding, marking the final end of the Pahlavi state.
Khomeini's Revolutionary Program
Many diverse groups participated in the anti-shah coalition, but Ayatol- lah Ruhollah Khomeini was clearly its dominant figure. Khomeini had op- posed the shah's regime since the early 196os, when his criticisms of Iran's dependence on the United States had led to his arrest and subsequent exile in Iraq. He began extolling a radical doctrine of Islamic government while in exile and built an extensive network of supporters among the clergy. This
3 Accounts of U. S. handling of the revolution vary in assigning blame, but all agree that American decision-makers were deeply divided and U. S. advice was inconsistent. See Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 191! 5); James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy ofAmerican-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19f! 8), chap. 7; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs ofthe National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), 354? ; William Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton, 19f! 1); and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Rev- olution, chap. 14. The shah's memoirs place the blame for his ouster on the United States; see Mohammad Reza Shah, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day, 19&).
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combination of ideology and organization would prove to be a potent revo- lutionary weapon. 4
The central element of Khomeini's revolutionary program was his insis-. tence that the shah's regime be replaced by a government based on Islamic law. Khomeini also argued that the clergy should play an active and direct role in the political system, to ensure that it conformed to Islamic princi- ples. 5 In the absence of direct guidance from the Prophet Muhammed or his chosen successors, he argued, Islamic government should be based on the
"guardianship of the jurisprudent" (velayet-e faqih). "Since the rule of Islam is the rule of law," he wrote, "only the jurists, and no one else, should be in charge of the government. They are the ones who can govern as God or- dered. "6 Thus, not only did Khomeini reject the separation of religion and politics, but his vision of Islamic government placed the clergy in a position of primacy?
Khomeini' s blueprint for Islamic government rested on several other core beliefs. First, he regarded all other forms of government as illegitimate, because they were not based on Islam, and believed that the major world powers were innately hostile and aggressive. Dividing the world into "op- pressors" (the superpowers, their allies, and their various puppets) and the "oppressed" (the victims of imperialist exploitation, such as Iran), Khomeini
accused the Western powers of deliberately seeking "to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so that they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our lands, and our human resources. " For this reason, he argued, the imperialist powers had "separated the various seg- ments of the Islamic ummah (community) from each other and artificially
4 See Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 35-44; Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 475-79, and Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 1o-12; and Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown, 94-102.
5 Khomeini declared that "Islam is political or it is nothing" and insisted that "this slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them. " Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations ofImam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley, Calif. : Mizan Press, 1981), 37-38.
6 Quoted in Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 477?
7 "If a worthy individual possessing [knowledge of the law and justice) arises and estab- lishes a government, he will possess the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger [the Prophet Mohammed) . . . and it will be the duty of all people to obey him. " Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 62. For summaries of Khomeini's theory of Islamic government, see Farhang Rajaee, Islamic Values and World View: Khomeini on Man, the State, and International Politics (Lan- ham, Md. : University Press of America, 1983); David Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision: Nation- alism or World Order? " in his edited Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1990); Marvin Zonis and Daniel Bromberg, Khomeini, the Islamic Republic ofIran, and the Arab World (Cambridge: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1987); and Greg- ory Rose, "Velayet-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ismfrom Quietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki Ked- die (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
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created separate nations. " In addition to "corrupting the minds and morals of the people," the oppressors had replaced the judicial process and poHti- cal laws of Islam with "European importations" and "installed their agents in power. " According to Khomeini, therefore, the only way to end foreign exploitation was to overthrow agents such as the shah and establish a gov- ernment based on Islamic principles. 8
This Manichean worldview precluded any compromise with the shah or his foreign patrons. Khomeini told his followers in November 1978, "If you give [the shah] a breathing spell, tomorrow neither Islam nor your country nor your family will be left for you. Do not give him a chance; squeeze his neck until he is strangled. " He was particularly suspicious of the United States, whose support for the shah qualified it as the "Great Satan," but the Soviet Union and the other major powers were seen as equally hostile. 9 For Khomeini, the superpowers were driven by an incor- rigible lust for power and were especially dangerous for Iran. Even after the shah was gone, Khomeini warned that the great powers sought "to break Iran into pieces, to stage a coup d'etat and pave the way for the . . . supervision of foreigners. " Neither patience nor conciliation could remove the danger, because the "Satans are making plans [against Islam] for a cen- tury from now. "10
Second, Khomeini rejected existing state boundaries as "the product of the deficient human mind" and emphasized that "Muslims are one family, even if they are subject to different governments and even if they live in re- gions remote from one another. " Accordingly, he called for active efforts to spread the revolution beyond Iran's borders, declaring that "we have in re- ality, then, no choice but to . . . overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppres- sive, and criminal regimes. " He also argued that his doctrine of Islamic government would end the artificial divisions imposed by the West al! 1ld
8 "It is the duty of all of us to overthrow the taghut, i. e. , the illegitimate political powers that ? now rule fthe entire Islamic world. The government apparatus of tyrannical and anti-popular regimes must be replaced by institutions serving the public good and administered accord- ing to Islamic law. In this way an Islamic government will gradually come into existence. " Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 34-35, 48-50, 136, 147. See also Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 37-41; . and Richard Cottam, "Iran-Motives behind Its Foreign Policy," Survival 28, no. 6
( 1 986).
9 In 1964, Khomeini had declared, "America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse than both of them. " For these quotations, see Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown, 102; and Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 185.
10 Khomeini also warned, "Neither the West nor the East will leave us alone. They will try everything in their power to prevent Iran from settling down. " Quoted in W. R. Campbell and Djamchid Darvich, "Global Implications of the Islamic Revolution for the Status Quo in the Persian Gulf," Journal ofSoutli Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 5, no. 1 (1981), 42; and see also Rajaee, Islamic Values, 75-78; and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, "Iran's Foreign Devils," For- eign Policy 38 (198o).
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
recreate a unified Muslim ummah. And though the Muslim world was the
primary object of his revolutionary ambitions, Khomeini and his followers
occasionally suggested that the ultimate goal was the creation of a global
community that would transcend the existing state system altogether. 11 In
addition, Khomeini argued that failure to spread the revolution would leave
Iran vulnerable to the "oppressors" or their various puppets. Once in
power, he declared, "We should try to export our revolution to the world.
. . . If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. "
Thus, there were both offensive and defensive justifications for an expan-
sionist policy; although he repeatedly denied that it would involve the use
of force, spreading the revolution beyond Iran was both a means to ensure
Iran's security and an end in itself. 12
Third, like other revolutionary ideologies, Khomeini's worldview com- bined long-term optimism with an emphasis on sacrifice andl discipline. He preached, "The Quran says 'And hold fast . . . to the cable of Allah, and do not separate. . . . [All your] political social and economic problems will be solved. " Similarly, he exhorted his followers, "Know that it is your duty to es-
tablish an Islamic government. Have confidence in yourselves and know that you are capable of fulfilling this task. "13 Noting that "all the prophets began as lonely individuals, . . . but they persisted," he emphasized that "it is only through the active, intentional pursuit of martyrdom that unjust rulers can be toppled. "14 Indeed, he suggested, a single individual could spark a revo- lution: "Even if only one true human being appears, [the imperialists] fear
11 Quotations from Rouhallah K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 2o-21; Rajaee, Islamic Values, 77; Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 43; and Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 47-48, 5o-51. Khomeini also sftated, "We say w e want t o export our revolution t o a H Islamic countries as well as to the oppressed countries. . . . Export of our revolution means that all nations grow aware and save themselves. " Quoted in Maziar Behrooz, "Trends in the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic," in Neither East Nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 14-15.
?
? 12 Quoted in Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, 24-26, and "Khumayni's Islam in Iran's Foreign Policy," in Islam in Foreign Policy, ed. Adeed Dawisha (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 19-2. 0; Rajaee, Islamic Values, 82-85; and Campbell and Darvich, "Global Impli- cations," 44-46.
13 He also stressed the need for action, advising Iranians, "Rid yourselves of your depres- sion and apathy. . . . An Islamic government will definitely be established," and he stated that the "unity of truth and . . . the expression of God's oneness . . . will guarantee victory. " The quotations are from Rajaee, Islamic Values, 85; Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 37, 137; and Rose, "Velayet-efaqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity," 186-87.
14 Quoted in Rajaee, Islamic Values, 85; and Zonis and Bromberg, Khomeini, Iran, Arab World, 27-28; and Khomeini's speech in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, South Asia, July 15, 1983, I I 1-3. Ten years after the revolution, Khomeini recalleol, "Anyone who did not believe in struggle 100 percent would easily flee the arena under the pressure and threats of the pseudo-pious. . . .
The only way available was struggle through blood; and God paved the way for such a course. " See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East/South Asia, February 23, 1989, 45?
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him, because others will follow him and he will have an impact that can de- stroy the whole foundation of tyranny, imperialism, and government by puppets. "15
Not surprisingly, the ideology of the Iranian revolutionaries left them deeply suspicious of most foreign powers (especially the United States). Khomein. i and his followers also saw their revolution as a model for othe1r states-e- specially other Muslim countries-and favored active efforts to spread the revolution beyond Iran's borders. Finally, their own success re- inforced the growing belief that revolutionary Islam was an irresistible force that could overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles.
The Consolidation ofClerical Power
Clerical power was consolidated in three main phases. During the firsfr, from February to November 1979, the main institutions of the new state were established and the more moderate forces were checked by pressure from the dergy and the radical left. Khomeini selected a moderate politi- cian, Mehdi Bazargan, to head the Provisional Government, but Bazargan was forced to share power with the so-called Revolutionary Council, a se- cret group of mostly clerical advisors. Bazargan submitted a draft constitu- tion in June, but protests from the clergy and the left led to the convening of an "Assembly of Experts" that proceeded to transform the original docu- ment into a blueprint for a theocratic state. 16 The final blow against Bazargan came when the shah's entry into the United States for medical treatment ignited a wave of protests in Iran and demands that the shah be returned to Iran to stand trial. Bazargan met with U. S. national security ad- visor Zbigniew Brzezinski in an attempt to resolve the dlispute, and Kho- meini issued a statement urging Iranian students "to expand with all their
might their attacks against the United States and Israel" in order to compell the return of the shah. 17 When a group of students seized the U. S. embassy on November 4 and Khomeini endorsed their action, Bazargan had no choice but to resign.
The second phase, from November 1979 to June 1981, was dominated by . a prolonged struggle for power between the new president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, and the clerical forces of the Islamic Republic Party led by the Ay- atollah Muhammed Beheshti. Unlike Bazargan, Bani-Sadr favored a radical
15 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 39; and see also Mary Heglund, "Two Images of Husain: Accommodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village," in Keddie, Religion and Politics, esp. 228-30; and Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 99-100.
? 16 The text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is reprinted in Middle East Journal(hereafterME/)J4, no. 2 (198o), 181-204; and see also Bakhash, Reign oftheAyatollahs, 74-75 ?
17 See "Chronology," ME/ J4, no. 1 (198o), 50.
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transformation of Iran along Islamic lines. 18 He opposed direct clerical rule, however, and believed that government positions should be given to indi- viduals with technical expertise rather than religious qualifications. He also sought to improve Iran's international position by resolving the hostage cri- sis with the Uruted States. 19
These positions placed Bani-Sadr at odds with the radical clergy, which waged a relentless campaign to limit his power. The IRP dominated the par- liamentary elections in March 1980, and Bani-Sadr found himself in a pro- tracted struggle against the party's efforts to expand its control? 0 Although Khomeini impllored the two sides to resolve their differences and even formed a three-man commission to mediate between them in March 1981, disputes between the clergy and the president remained intense. 21 Bani-Sadr eventually sought support from liberals, moderate clerics, and the left-wing Islamic Mujahedin, and this step convinced Khomeini that Bani-Sadr had become a threat to the clerical regime. The ayatollah relieved him from his position as commander-in-chief in June and the Majlis (Parliament) soon or-
dered his arrest, forcing Bani-Sadr to flee into exile in July.
The third phase, from July 1981 to February 1983, featured a violent struggle between the IRP and the radical left. 22 The Mujahedin launched a bloody wave olf terrorism following Bani-Sadr's removal. Abomb blast at the headquarters of the IRP in June killed seventy-four IRP officials, in-
cluding the Ayatollah Beheshti. Bani-Sadr's successor,. Mohammed Rajai, was killed by another bomb on August 30 (along with Prime Minister Muhammed Bahonar). The clergy responded with a brutal campaign of re- pression. Official executions totaled over twenty-six hundred by Novem- ber 1981, and over twelve thousand dissidents were killed in clashes with the Revolutionary Guards or in official executions between 1981 and 1985. 23
18 The son. of an ayatollah, Bani-Sadr had studied sociology and law in Tehran and was jailed for opposition activities in the 196os. He became part of Khomeini's entourage during the latter's exile in France and returned with him to Tehran in February 1979.
19 See Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 114-17; Behrooz, "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Re- public," 18-19; and Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution, and Secret Deals with the United States, trans. William Ford (Washington, D. C. : Brassey's, 1991), 22-25.
20 See Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 6o-65; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, esp. 10o-110; and David Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990}, 1JJ-J5, 168-74, 181-83.
21 Khomeini asked the contestants to settle their differences and serve "the interest of the nation" in September and implored them to stop "biting one another like scorpions" in Feb- ruary. See "Chronology," ME/ 35, no. 1 (198o), 46; no. 2 (1981), 215; no. 3 (1981), 367.
22 The principal left-wing groups in Iran were the Islamic Mujahedin, the Marxist Feda'i, and the Communist Tudeh Party. All three groups favored radical domestic change and an end to imperialist exploitation but opposed the establishment of a theocratic state.
23 The chief prosecutor, Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, declared that "these deaths are not merely permissible, they are necessary. " See Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 68-69, 219-22.
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The threat from the Mujahedin was largely eliminated by the end of 1982, and in February 1983, the government moved to suppress the (Communist) Tudeh Party, removing the last independent political organization of any consequence. The presidency, prime ministry, and speakership of the Majlis were all in derical hands, the IRP dominated the Majlis, and the clergy had established effective control over the armed forces and Revolutionary Guards. Although low-level opposition continued throughout the rest of the decade and splits among the religious leaders became more and more ap- parent, the leaders of the Islamic Republic no longer faced a serious threat to their rule.
Conflict and Compromise in the Islamic Republic
The basic institutions of the Islamic Republic were in place by the end of 1983. The IRP dominated the Majlis and the ministries, and the army and Revolutionary Guards were all controlied by clerics loyal to Khomeini. The new regime had begun to reorder Iranian society along Islamic lines, bring- ing dramatic changes in law, education, and popular mores. 24 Opposition from within the senior clergy had been stilled as well, leaving Khomeini as the ultimate arbiter of Iran's Islamic future. 25
Despite these achievements, deep political differences soon began to di- vide Iran's new rulers. 26 In broad terms, the contest pitted a comparatively moderate group led by Majlis speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Pres- ident Said Alii Khamenei, and Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati against a more radical faction led by Prime Minister Mir-Husayn Musavi, Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri, and Ayatollah Ali Akbar Mohtashemi. The pragma- tists downplayed the importance of exporting the revolution, supported the private sector, and advocated enhancing Iran's international position by in- creasing its ties with other countries. By contrast, the radicals sought to maintain the ideological purity of the revolution, and they emphasized the
24 See Menashri, Iran, 137-38, 192-97, 225-28, 271-76.
25 Khomeini was the only grand ayatollah to endorse direct clerical rule, and several equally eminent clerics (most notably Kazem Shariatmadari) criticized Khomeini's position as contrary to Islam. Shariatmadari's personal prestige was no match for Khomeini's control over the main state institutions, however, and he was placed under house arrest and subse- quently discredited by his later involvement in an unsuccessful coup. See Menashri, Iran, 7o--n 129-30, 239-40; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 67? 8, Scr9o, 223; Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 139-43, 21s-19; and Shahrough Akhavi, "Clerical Politics in Iran since 1979,'' in The Iranian Revolution and Islamic Republic, ed. Nikki Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 5? 2, 8s-89.
26 In September 1984, Majlis speaker Rafsanjani admitted that the Islamic Republican Party's Central Council "does not enjoy a unity which is a sine qua non for its ability to be ac- tive and advance the [party's) goals," and he described "this very fundamental problem" as "a significant challenge. " See Menashri, Iran, 307-308; and Shahrough Akhavi, "Elite Fac- tionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran," MET 41, no. 2 (1987), 184.
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export of Islamic fundamentalism, the use of state power to aid the "op- pressed," the removal of Western influence, and steadfast opposition to the United States and its regional allies. 27
The pragmatists slowly gained the upper hand throughout the 198os, al- though the process was erratic and the basic divisions would remain intact after Khomeini's death in 1989. Khomeini called repeatedly for the "elimi- nation of differences," but he also shifted his own position in order to pre- vent either faction from gaining undisputed control. As a result, periods of deradicalization alternated with occasional outbursts of extremism. By 1985, Rafsanjani and his supporters had begun to curb the excesses of "Islamiza- tion" and Iranian officials were signaling their desire to restore Iran's con- tacts with the outside world. In addition to a detente with Saudi Arabia and several Western states, Iran began seeking advanced U. S. weaponry from a number of Israeli intermediaries. This policy was a direct response to the de- mands imposed by Iran's war with Iraq and marked a noteworthy depar- ture from its public antipathy toward! Israel and the "Great Satan. "28 The initiative came to an abrupt end when Rafsanjani's internal opponents leaked word of his negotiations with the United States. The news brought intense criticism from the radicals, but Khomeini condemned this new
threat to unity, and Rafsanjani and the moderates emerged in an even stronger position. Khomeini continued to back them, and the trial and sub- sequent execution of Mehdi Hashemi, former head of the bureau dealing with foreign revolutionaries, was a major setback for the radicals. 29
As Rafsanjani and the pragmatists continued to consolidate their posi- tion during 1988, evidence of a renewed drive toward moderation was ap- parent. The most obvious sign was the ceasefire with Iraq-which entailed abandoning the oft-repeated goal of toppling Saddam Hussein-but Khomeini also agreed to a series of administrative initiatives that curtailed the role of religious authorities. Both Khomeini and Rafsanjani made state- ments stressing that religious principles must "adapt to the requirements of time and place," and the speaker later declared that although "the law
27 The membership of each faction changed over time, and some individuals supported one side on certain issues but not on others. See Akhavi, "Elite Factionalism"; Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy"; Middle East Contemporary Survey (hereafter MECS), vol. 8: 1983-84 (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies/ Shiloah Center, 1986), 43(}-33; MECS 1988 (Boulde1; Colo. : Westview, 1990), 493-<)4; and Shireen T. Hunter, Iran after Kho- meini (New York: Praeger, 1992), 36-39.
28 See Menashri, Iran, 322-25, 374-75.
29 Hashemi was believed to be responsible for leaking word of the arms deals. Another sign of internal differences was the decision to disband the Islamic Revolution Party in 1987. Raf- sanjani admitted in 1986 that there were "two relatively powerful factions in our country. . . . They may in fact be regarded as two parties without names. " He termed the decision to dis- band the party "temporary" and said that it might be revived "if the consensus which Jed to its formation in 1979 is available again. " See Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 162.
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should follow Islamic doctrine . . . priority will be given to government de- cisions over doctrine. " Khomeini also issued a formal edict (orfatwa) de- claring that the authority of the Islamic state was the same as it had been in the time of Muhammed, implying that government decisions could super- sede Islamic law. "Our government," he declared, "has priority over all other Islamic tenets, even over prayer, fasting, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. " Thus, after having overthrown one regime in the name of Islamic law, Khomeini in effect declared that the Islamic Republic could disregard Islam if the interests of the state required it. Other signs of liberalization in- cluded the open endorsement of birth control by several prominent theolo- gians, the implementation of a law permitting the registration of new political parties, and public calls for greater freedom of expression in uni- versities and more flexibility in the veiling of women. These steps did not imply a new tolerance toward all domestic opponents, however, and sev- eral radical clerics and a large number of suspected leftists were reportedly executed later in the year. 30
As before, however, these acts of moderation were followed by a subse- quent tilt toward the revolutionary purists. The occasion for this shift was the publication of Salman Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses, whose satirical por- trayal of Muhammed had already sparked protests in other Muslim coun- tries. In February 1989, Khomeini stunned the world by sentencing Rushdie (who lived in England) to death and publicly exhorting "zealous Muslims" to carry out his order. Iran offered a $2. 6 million reward to Rushdie's execu- tioner, and Khomeini declared that the entire episode was divinely intended to warn Iran against an overly "pragmatic" foreign policy. 31
Khomeini's sudden reversal was meant to ensure that Iran's revolution- ary ideals were not entirely abandoned. If compromise and moderation had been necessary to save the revolution in 1988, Khomeini now saw a need to rekindle ideological purity and revolutionary commitment. According to David Menashri, "Rushdie's book served the revolution just as the Ameri- can hostages had in 1979; it unified the revolutionary forces against the ex- ternal demonical enemy and stirred up passions around an issue which all believers could . . . identify with. "32
30 In January 1989, Khomeini also approved a series of legislative reforms that further di- luted the authority of religious experts and gave greater priority to state (as opposed to the- ological) interests. For these quotations and events, see MECS I988, 472-73- 486--88; andl Wright, In the Name ofGod, 172-73-
31 This sudden return to a bellicose ideological posture forced the moderates to adopt more extreme rheftoric themselves, and Rafsanjani at one point suggested that the Palestinians should kill fllve U. S. , French, or British citizens for every Arab killed in the Israeli-occupied West Bank or Gaza Strip. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East/South Asia, February 23, 1989, 44-48; MECS 1988, 4% and Wright, In the Name of God, 201.
32 See MECS 1988, 495?
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The condemnation of Rushdie was Khorneini's last important political act. His health deteriorated in the spring and he died on June 3, 1989, at the age of eighty-six. His passing allowed Rafsanjani and the moderates to resume their efforts to adapt the principles of "Islamic government" to con- temporary political conditions. Not surprisingly, the transition to the post- Khorneini era began with new signs of moderation.
The first step was the selection of President Ali Kharnenei to succeed Khorneini as supreme jurisprudent. This decision was a further retreat from Khorneini's original blueprint for Islamic government, because Kharnenei was not an accomplished theologian. A sweeping series of constitutional amendments was approved by a national referendum in July. The new con- stitution dropped the requirement that the supreme jurisprudent be a senior religious leader (thereby legitimizing Kharnenei's selection as Khorneini's successor), abolished the position of prime minister, and strengthened the powers of the presidency. 33 Rafsanjani was elected president by an over- whelming margin in July, further cementing the moderates' hold on power. Rafsanjani emphasized that his main priority would be reconstruction and economic recovery, and his new cabinet was dominated by technocrats cho-
sen for their administrative competence rather than their ideological purity. Although the radicals were not silenced and the pragmatists had not wholly abandoned the principles of the Islamic revolution, the leaders of the regime seemed to be increasingly willing to sacrifice doctrinal purity for the sake of political stability, economic recovery, and international acceptance. 34
The radicals suffered yet another defeat in the 1991 elections, leading ? orne observers to conclude that Rafsanjani's position was more powerful than ever. 35 Yet tlhe scales quickly swung back when Kharnenei announced a crackdown on "Western culture" in the summer of 1992 and reaffirmed the death sentence on Salman Rushdie, Iran's hostility to the United States, and its commitment to spreading the revolution. 36 Kharnenei and the radicals began to strip Rafsanjani of many of the powers he had previously accumu- lated and forced him to abandon his efforts to establish better relations with the Wfst. The radical resurgence was partly a response to Rafsanjani's failed attempts to liberalize the economy, but it also reflected the incomplete insti-
33 See Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 25-26; MECS 1989 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1991), 344, 348-53; and Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 34-35.
34 See MECS 1989, 341-62.
35 See R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: North and South," ME/ 46, no. 3 (1992), 394-<)5; and Said Amir Arjomand, "A Victory for the Pragmatists: The Islamic Fundamental- ist Reaction in Iran," in Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis, ed. James Piscatori (Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991 ).
36 On July 29, 1992, Ayatollah Khamenei warned, "One must never believe that the United States, the everlasting enemy of Islam, has put an end to its antagonism. . . . The United States is the main enemy of Islam and will remain so. " Middle East International, no. 431 (August 7, 1992), 13.
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tutionalization of the revolutionary regime and the radicals' fear that fur- ther moves toward moderation would jeopardize their own claim to rule. 37
The Islamic revolution in Iran is still a work in progress. Although the revolution created a strong state apparatus, authority remains divided, and neither the moderates nor the radicals have been able to eliminate the other faction or reduce its base of support. It has thus been difficult for the Islamic Republic to sustain a coherent set of policies, and as we shall see, this en- demic inconsistency has had especially pernicious effects on Iran's foreign relations.
THE FoREIGN RELATIONS OF REvoLUTIONARY IRAN
Foreign Policy under the Shah
Under the shah, Iranian foreign policy was directed toward the long-term goal of becoming a major world power. The foundation of this policy was the shah's alliance with the United States, which had grown in importance after the Nixon administration decided to use Iran as one of its "twin pil- lars" in the Persian Gulf region. This policy fed the shah's own ambitions;
? Iran's oil wealth fueled a massive arms buildup; and the United States be- came inextricably identified with the shah's regime. 38
Predictably, prerevolutionary Iran's relations with the Soviet Union were less favorable. The shah was understandably wary of his large northern neighbor and! perennially worried about leftist subversion within Iran itself. Iran's role as the West's "regional policeman" irritated the Soviets, as did the shah's opposition to revolutionary movements and radical states else- where in the Middle East. 39 Yet despite these disagreements and Iran's close ties with the United States, the Soviet Union and Iran maintained cordial diplomatic and economic relations, and their 1921 treaty of friendship and ? cooperation Jremained in force. 40
37 On these events, see "Iran, the Sequel: New Actors, but the Same lines," New York Times, January 23, 1994, 4:4; and also Middle East International, no. 430 Ouly 24, 1992), 13; no. 432 (Au- gust 21, 1992), 1 1; no. 438 (November 6, 1992), 12; no. 439 (November 20, 1992), 3-5.
38 Useful surveys of the U. S. -Iranian relationship include Mark J. Gasiorowski, U. S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Bill, Eagle and Lion, chaps. 1?
