In other words, the events of 198revolutionary
state.
Revolution and War_nodrm
The United States helped topple the Mossadegh regime in Iran in 1953 and the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954 and played a subordinate role in removing the Allende regime in Chile in 1968.
In 1983, a U.
S.
invasion ousted the New Jewel Movement in Grenada, and the U.
S-backed contras forced the Sandinista government in Nicaragua to agree to new elections (in which they were voted out of office) after a protracted and bloody civil war.
? ? ? Conclusion
there is a large disparity in power between the two states involved. Even in such cases, however, the effort often turns out to be greater than the inter- vening power anticipated.
In short, the perceptions of a mutual offensive advantage that accompany most revolutions are especially dangerous, because the combination of in- security and overconfidence that leads to the use of force is usually ill- founded. In fact, revolutions are hard to export and difficult to reverse, and in most cases, both sides are more secure than they think and would be bet- ter off remaining at peace.
The tendency for revolutions to foster perceptions of offense dominance is not universal, and the absence of this factor is the main reason why the American, Turkish, and Mexican revolutions did not lead to war. These rev- olutions altered the balance of power and generated both real conflicts of in- terest and spirals of suspicion. Yet in each case, key leaders were aware that the revolution was unlikely to ? pread and that war would be expensive. As a result, both sides ultimately refrained from the large-scale use of force.
UncertaintyandMisinformation. Ifrevolutionsarebothhardtoexportand difficult to reverse, then why do states worry about either possibility? Our cases provide part of the answer: it will be extremely difficult for states to gauge their situation accurately after a revolution, because relations be- tween revolutionary states and other powers will be afflicted by very high levels of uncertainty and misinformation. The problem arises from several different aspects of the revolutionary process, so it will usually be difficult to overcome.
For example, it is hardly surprising that both sides have trouble estimat- ing the balance of military power, because the military capacity of the new state will rest on novel institutions whose effects can only be discovered through battlefield experience. Foreign powers will usually have good rea- sons to discount a revolutionary state's capabilities, if only because the armed forces of the old regime usually deteriorate in the short term. Yet in almost every case examined here, the revolutionary regime managed to use new myths, symbols, and institutions to create an unexpectedly formidable military machine. 6
The political consequences of a revolution are even harder to calculate in advance, because the political appeal of a revolutionary model is virtually impossible to gauge with confidence. Neither the revolutionaries nor their foreign opponents know if the revolution will attract adherents abroad or if foreign intervention will spark a counterrevolutionary upheaval. Faced
6 The United States and Mexico are partial exceptions to this claim, because neither revo- lution faced a large-scale foreign invasion. The rapid mobilization of U. S. naval power dur- ing the Quasi-War and the Constitutionalists' unexpected success in the civil war against Villa are consistent with this argument, however.
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with this uncertainty, elites on both sides will tend to rely on ideology and recent experience and to assume that the initial revolutionary success was a harbinger of things to come. Even relatively modest signs of a sympathetic response elsewhere will be taken as evidence of a rising revolutionary tide, and testimony from foreign revolutionaries or counterrevolutionary exiles can reinforce these erroneous expectations.
Both sides overstate the likelihood of counterrevolution for much the same reason. The danger of an "aristocratic conspiracy" terrified the French from 1789 onward; the Bolsheviks feared their hold on power might lapse at any moment; the Islamic Republic has waged a brutal campaign against for- mer opponents as well. These fears reflect the intrinsic difficulty of accu- rately gauging the loyalty of the population at large. Although signs of dissent will always be present, neither the ruling authorities nor outside powers can know how strong the opposition really is.
To make matters worse, revolutions impede the acquisition of the infor- mation that might help correct these erroneous impressions. The revolution- ary states in France, Russia, and Iran were cut off from normal diplomatic contacts, intensifying their perceptions of threat and making subsequent ef- forts to reach a modus vivendi more difficult. Indeed, a striking feature of most of these cases is the extent to which states were forced. to conduct dipl9- macy through unofficial agents whose expertise and reliability usually left much to be desired.
Lastly, with all the uncertainty, other states will have trouble deciding how to respond to a revolution, and foreign powers will be hard-pressed to agree on a common course of action. 7 If the power of a revolutionary state is unclear, the danger of contagion uncertain, and the prospects for counter- revolution unknown, it will be difficult to obtain a consensus for interven- tion or abstention, and the other states will be more likely to respond in a haphazard and poorly coordinated manner. This problem arose in several of our cases: the European powers were often divided over how to respond to the revolution in France; the Entente could not adopt a unified policy to-
ward the Bolshevik or Turkish revolutions; Britain and the United States disagreed over the proper approach to take toward the revolutionary gov- ernments in Mexico and China; and there was little consensus on how to re- spond to Iran's revolution until its army had crossed into Iraqi soil. The result, unfortunately, may have been the worst of both worlds: other states did enough to antagonize the new regimes but not enough to eliminate them.
7 I identify some other reasons for this tendency in my chapter, "Collective Security and Revolutionary Change: Promoting Peace in the Former Soviet Empire," in Collective Secu- rity after the Cold War, ed. George W. Downs (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).
? ? ? ? ? Conclusion
Realism and Revolution
The cases examined in this book both confirm the basic explanatory power of realism and suggest which strands of realist thought are most useful. In particular, realism is most powerful when it goes beyond a nar- row focus on the gross distribution of power and instead examines the bal-
ance of threats. Although the balance of power is hardly irrelevant, the behavior of states is also affected by how national leaders assess the inten- tions of other states and how they perceive the relative advantage to of- fense or defense. The offense-defense balance is not merely a function of
geography or military doctrine, however, but may also be affected by the potential appeal of particular ideas (such as a new revolutionary ideology). Realism gains even more explanatory power by incorporating the possibil- ity that states will misread these factors, and as we have seen repeatedly, such misperceptions are especially common after revolutions. 8 Beliefs about the possibility of revolutionary contagion-which ultimately rest on beliefs about the persuasive power of revolutionary ideas-have been crit- ical in shaping perceptions of the offense-defense balance and help explain why some revolutions led to war and others did not. In short, by incorpo- rating domestic politics and ideas into the anarchic setting depicted by re-
alism, we obtain a more complete picture of the forces that shape state behavior.
This argument points to another insight: realism may tell us more about international behavior in postrevolutionary periods than in more "normal" periods. Some realists depict international politics as a relentless struggle for survival whell"e security is extremely scarce and states must constantly strive for any advantage. 9 Proponents of this perspective are likely to view
revolutionary states as exceptions to realist logic, because their foreign pol- icy objectives are heavily affected by ideology and their leaders are pre- sumed to be less familiar with the subtleties of international diplomacy. Yet in the three main cases examined here, each side saw the other as an immi- nent and intense threat and discounted the possibility of a lasting peace. In other words, relations between these revolutionary states and other powers were virtually identical to the relationships depicted by the more extreme versions of realism. The key point, however, is that the level of conflict is not
8 Stephen Van Evera refers to this as "Type IV Realism. " It differs from other strands of re- alist theory by focusing on what Van Evera calls the "fine-grained structure of power" and by explicating the factors that shape how states perceive that structure. Causes ofWar, vol. 1: The Structure ofPower and the Roots ofWar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. 1. On the impact of ideas on the offense-defense balance, see George Quester, Offense and De-
fense in the International System (New York: Wiley, 1977), 67.
9 This view is most clearly expressed in the writings of John J. Mearsheimer: "Back to the
Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (1990); and "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994-95).
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merely due to the state of anarchy and a particular distribution of capabili- ties (as a neorealist such as John Mearsheimer would have it) but is also heavily influenced by perceptions of intent and beliefs about the likelihood that the revolution will spread or be reversed.
With frhe passage of time, however, each side will acquire a more accurate estimate of the true threat that it faces. The security dilemma between them will ease and each will adopt a less vigilant posture. The relentless competi- tion depicted by some realists will abate, and prospects for cooperation will probably increase. By restricting themselves to examining the gross distri- bution of power, however, neorealists cannot explain why the level of con- flict varies even though the distribution of power is constant. This shortcoming is another reason to prefer balance-of-threat theory to the overly spare world of neorealist balance-of-power theory.
Finally, the neorealist claim that revolutionary states will be "socialized" to the system seems to be only partly correct. Although external pressures did lead all of these regimes to alter their behavior in significant ways, their tendency to cling to counterproductive strategies despite substantial costs was equally striking-especially in the Soviet, Chinese, and Iranian cases, where a commitment to avowedly revolutionary objectives kept these regimes isolated and beleaguered far longer than was necessary. One may speculate that such a tendency will be most severe when, first, the ideology in question is particularly extreme, and second, it has been formally instifru- tionalized within a hegemonic ruling party. Thus, the American, Mexican, and Turkish revolutionary leaders adapted quickly because they began with more moderate ideas, and the French were able to abandon the more utopian visions of the Girondins and Montagnards because those had not been enshrined in a formal party ideology and were not central to the legit- imacy of the postrevolutionary state.
Critical Theory, Identity, and Revolutionary Change
The cases examined here also shed light on the relative merits of critical- theory as an approach to international politics. Critical theory emphasizes the role of language and social processes in shaping actors' goals, identities, and collective self-understandings. 10 From this perspective, the interna- tional system is not an independent structure arising from the interactions of preexisting states; rather, it is the product of concrete social practices that reflect the purposes and perceptions of the actors themselves.
Revolutions are crucial cases for critical theorists, because in them state identities are rapidly and radically transformed through changes in the dis-
1? For important examples of critical theory approaches to international politics, see the ref- erences above in chap. 1, n. 10.
? ? ? Conclusion
cursive practices of a community. 11 A revolution transformed Britain's North American colonies into a "new republic"; the absolutist regime of Louis XVI reemerged as the French nation; the tsarist empire was recast as the world's first "workers' and peasants' state," the multinational Ottoman Empire be- came the secular Republic of Turkey, and the Peacock Throne of the Pahlavis was replaced by Khomeini's Islamic Republic. Because critical theory re- gards the identities of social actors as powerful determinants of behavior,
the behavior of revolutionary states would be expected to differ dramati- cally from the conduct of the old regime and from the practices of other states in the system. And since in this view the identity of a revolutionary state is closely linked to its ideology, foreign policy behavior should con- form closely to its ideological principles. Thus, where realism predicts that the constraining effects of anarchy will force revolutionary states to moder- ate or abandon their more radical objectives, critical theory anticipates both dramatic and enduring change, even in the face of strong external pressures.
Do our seven cases support this view? On the one hand, the evidence does support a limited version of the argument: in each case, the revolutionary elite saw the seizure of power as a decisive break with the past and adopted policies that departed sharply from those of the old regime. In this sense, therefore, one can say that the change in "identity" produced by the revolu- tion was associated with a change in behavior. But this is a very limited claim, roughly akin to arguing that actors with different preferences are likely to pursue different goals. One hardly needs critical theory to make that case.
On the other hand, the cases in this book offer little support for the more ambitious claim that shifts in discursive practices and collective under- standings could produce a far-reaching transformation in the international systemY Although each of these revolutions featured dramatic changes in discourse and each regime made idealistic claims about its own conduct, their utopian visions soon gave way to the familiar principles of realpolitik. Irrespective of their ideological pretensions, each of these states fought wars, formed alliances, made diplomatic compromises, signed treaties of commerce, and in general conformed to most (if not all) norms of interna- tional conduct, while continuing to espouse revolutionary doctrines of one sort or another. Indeed, it is striking how readily these states abandoned many of their initial objectives under pressure: the French repudiated the
11 Thus, Keith Michael Baker defines a revolution as a "transformation of the discursive practice of a community, a moment in which social relations are reconstituted and the dis- course defining the political relations between individuals and groups is radically recast. " In- venting the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 18.
12 Forexamplesofthissortofclaim,seeReyKoslowskiandFriedrichKratochwil,"Under- standing Changes in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," and Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Fail- ure of Realism," both in International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994).
? ? Revolution and War
Decree on Liberty, the Bolsheviks sought trade and investment from the in- ternational class enemy, and even revolutionary Iran was willing to deal with the "Great Satan" in order to wage war against Iraq. In short, these states were willing to do virtually anything that a "normal" state would do, which suggests that systemic pressures had at least as great an impact as their revolutionary identities or ideological underpinnings.
In response, critical theorists might argue that this book offers an unfair test of their perspective, because it focuses primarily on the short- to medium-term effects of a revolution and does not examine the indirect and! long-term impact of revolutions on attitudes, norms, and ideas. And if iso- lated revolutionary states are forced to adjust their behavior to the con- straints of the existing international system, it is still possible that a critical mass of like-minded states would have transformative effects resembling the Westphalian transition between the feudal period and the modem state system. One could also argue that even deradicalized revolutions affect pre- vailing notions of international legitimacy and gradually alter the ends tha? individuals and states deem worthy of pursuit and the means they regard as legitimate.
These are valid points, and this book should not be regarded as offering a definitive challenge to the critical theory approach to international politics. What it does show, however, is that such an approach does not tell us very much about relations between revolutionary states and other powers in the immediate aftermath of the seizure of power. If the question of the long- term transformation of the international systems remains open, these cases suggest that the modified realism of balance-of-threat theory offers a more useful way to think about the practical difficulties that ordinarily follow a revolution.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The evidence assembled here confirms that foreign leaders have ample reason to be worried when a revolution occurs, but it also suggests that the usual prescriptions for dealing with such an event are not very helpful. In particular, neither appeasement nor intervention is an especially promising approach. Appeasement is often recommended as a way to avoid spiraling and promote good relations over time, but this advice ignores the fact that revolutionary states do commit acts of aggression, and convincing them to stop may require the threat or use of force. The case for overt intervention is usually even weaker. Advocates of intervention believe that diplomatic, economic, or military pressure will exert a positive effect on the revolution- ary process, either by helping one faction consolidate its power or by con- vincing the revolutionary government to adopt policies that are consistent
? ? ? ? Conclusion
with foreign interests. But as we have seen, intervention is very often coun- terproductive. Emperor Leopold's attempts to manipulate French domestic politics in 1791? 2 further undermined Louis's position, and Woodrow Wil- son's efforts to shape the revolutionary process in Mexico alienated the var- ious revolutionary factions and reinforced the latent anti-Americanism of the Mexican government. Foreign attempts to guide the course of events in Russia, Iran, and China were equally unsuccessful: foreign powers lacked sufficient leverage or adequate information (or both), and their activities were regarded with suspicion in each case.
Advocates of intervention will usually argue that the revolutionary state is both extremely dangerous and highly vulnerable, justifying active efforts to overthrow it. But as we have seen, this combination of fear and optimism is usually misplacedY Revolutions are usually hard to export-reducing the need to remove the new regime-and intervention will reinforce the rev- olutionaries' own perceptions of threat and push the regime in a more radi- cal direction. Revolutions are also more difficult to reverse than outside p? wers generally expect, and because war is so unpredictable, intervention may actually facilitate the spread of revolution, thereby causing the very process it was intended to prevent. 14
A policy of containment is the best approach toward most revolutions, es- pecially for great powers facing a relatively weak revolutionary state. Such a strategy would aim to prevent the spread of revolution and deter expan- sionist policies by bolstering potential targets and punishing the revolution- ary state for overt acts of aggression, but its practitioners would otherwise eschew the use of force and would not attempt to overthrow the new regime. Foreign powers would also remain open to the idea of establishing normal relations when possible. Containment is not easy and may require patience, however,becauserevolutionarystatesusuallyinterpretthebehaviorofother states in an extremely biased fashion. For this reason, foreign powers should communicate the rationale behind their responses as clearly as possible, tak- ing pains to avoid appearing duplicitous or inconsistent They should also avoid premature or overly enthusiastic efforts to embrace a suspicious revo-
13 A possible exception to this stricture are cases-such as the U. S. invasion of Grenada in 1982-where the revolutionary state is so small and inconsequential that intervention is vir- tually certain to succeed. Under these conditions, however, the need to act will be even Jess compelling.
14 There is a paradox here: the greater the perceived danger from a revolution, the more likely other states are to take action to contain or eliminate the threat, thereby diminishing the chance that the danger will be realized. In other words, the fear of revolution is a self-defeat- ing prophecy: a revolution may fail to spread precisely because others are so worried that it will. But vigilance alone does not ensure success; indeed, efforts to overthrow a revolution- ary regime may unwittingly facilitate revolutionary expansion, as they did in the French case and (to a lesser extent) the Iran-Iraq war. As a result, potential victims should focus their ef- forts on containing the revolution instead of trying to overturn it.
? ? ? Revolution and War
lutionary state, as such well-intentioned efforts are likely to be seen as self- interested attempts to manipulate the new regime. A policy of ''benevolent neglect" may be most appropriate in such circumstances, allowing the new regime to set the pace for the resumption of more extensive relations.
How would such an approach have fared in the past? A policy of contain- ment would have prevented war in 1792 and averted the various interventions in Soviet Russia in 1918-21. Containment proved to be an effective long-term response to the Bolshevik Revolution, and Iraq would have been far better off had it refrained from attacking Iran in 19& and concentrated on building bar- riers to Iranian expansion in league with the other gulf states. Sino-American relations would almost certainly have been less acrimonious if the two states could have avoided a direct clash in Korea, and the absence of war after the American, Turkish, and Mexican revolutions undoubtedly facilitated their rapid reemergence as accepted members of international society.
Finally, the misperceptions found in virtually all of these cases highlight the importance of obtaining accurate information in postrevolutionary situ- ations, as well as the difficulty of doing so. For example, foreign powers need to know if they are dealing with a mass revolution from below, inspired and directed by a universalist ideology, or an elite revolution with more limited aims. Therefore, they should devote much effort to maintaining reliable channels of communication with the new regime, even in the face of consid- erable hostiRity or resistance. National leaders should also recognize that muCh of the information they obtain will be biased, especially when it comes from members of the old regime. Among other things, foreign governments should go to great lengths to avoid breaking relations so they retain some ca- pacity to monitor events and communicate with the new leaders.
THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989-1992 AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
What does balance-of-threat theory tell us about the international impli- cations of the revolutionary transformation of the former Soviet empire?
Let us begin by making an obvious distinction: the rapid collapse of the Communist governments in Eastern Europe demonstrates that contagion can occur, under certain circumstances. This exception to our rule is not as damning as nt first appears, however, for two reasons. First, the regimes that were overturned by the "velvet revolutions" were artificial creations to begin with, and the catalyst for their overthrow was the recognition that Moscow was no longer willing to enforce orthodoxy within the Warsaw Pact. 15 Second, the contagion observed in Eastern Europe did not arise from
15 Gorbachev's reforms in effect lowered the expected cost of resistance to the existing Communist governments, thereby facilitating collective mobilization against them.
? ? ? Conclusion
a revolutionary state's efforts to export its own universalist principles; rather, the revolutions were essentially nationalist revolts against the uni- versalist hegemony of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thus, where nationalism is ordinarily an obstacle to contagion, it facilitated the spread of revolution in this particular case. This nationalism, together with the unusual features of well-established social networks and relatively high levelsofcommunication, madepossiblearapidandnearlybloodlesstrans- formation. 16
As for its international implications, happily, the revolutions in the former Soviet empire are unlikely to spark intense security competition among the great powers, and certainly not to the degree observed after earlier revolu- tions. Like other revolutions, the collapse of the Soviet Union has caused a major shift in the global balance of power and led to the creation of a series of new regimes whose principles and objectives are dramatically different from those of their predecessors. Yet the other great powers have not tried to exploit or reverse these developments through the use of military power. The United States did take advantage of Russian weakness to obtain favor- able concessions on arms control and several other issues; Germany seized this opportunity to reunite; the various constituent republics took the occa- sion to obtain their independence; and a number of foreign powers have begun to compete for economic advantage in the former Soviet bloc. 17 In a sense, therefore, other states did see the Soviet collapse as a chance to en- hance their own positions. Unlike the other revolutions considered in this book, however, the collapse of Communism has not led to increased secu- rity competition either among the other great powers or between the new regimes and the outside world.
From the perspective of balance-of-threat theory, there are at least five reasons why the international consequences of the revolutions of 1989 have been comparatively benign. First, the collapse of the Soviet empire was not the result of a mass revolution. For the most part, it did not involve replac- ing the old elite with new leaders drawn from a different group or class. In- stead, the upheaval began with a "revolution" in the minds of key members of the Soviet elite, many of whom still (or again) hold influential positions in the new order. Like the Nationalistrevolution in Turkey, in short, the col- lapse of the Soviet Union began as an elite revolution intended to transform
16 For an intriguing theoretical analysis of these dynamics, see Susanne Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in East Leipzig, 1989-91," World Politics 47, no. 1 (1994). On the question whether these events were "true" revolutions, see Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), 2JJ-35 ?
17 By linking economic concessions to nuclear weapons policy, the United States was able to persuade Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to give up the weapons they had inherited when the Soviet Union broke up.
? [3451
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both the internal workings of the state and its relations with the outside world. 18 As discussed in chapters 2 and 6, elite revolutions tend to be less dangerous than mass revolutions, in part becaus? the ideologies that inform them rarely pose a direct threat to other states.
The second reason, which follows from the first, is that the revolution in the former Soviet Union and its satellites was conducted by elites who sought to abandon the existing revolutionary legacy of Marxism-Leninism in favor of the political and economic models that had proven so successful in the West.
In other words, the events of 198revolutionary
state.
Instead of bringing to power a movement whose founding principles were at odds with political institutions prevailing in the
? other great powers, the revolutions of 198<r92 created a set of states whose principles and intentions are for the most part compatible with the existing order. Though specific conflicts of interest do exist, the potential for spiral- ing is significantly reduced by the absence of a Manichean ideology that portrays others as intrinsically evil or aggressive. It is hardly surprising, then, that the level of conflict is low between the new regimes and the out- side world.
Third, relations between Russia and the rest of the world continue to be governed by a strong condition of defense dominance, which further re- duces the level of security competition. In addition to the presence of nu- clear weajpons on each side (which creates a powerfuH defensive advantage through deterrence and dampens the impact of shifts in the balance of power), the absence of significant ideological conflict enhances security by eliminating the fear of contagion or counterrevolution. Unlike in previous revolutions, neither side need fear that its rule will be undermined by the
spread of potentially corrosive ideas.
Fourth, access to information about events in Eastern Europe has been much more extensive than in the cases examined in this book. Rapid . changes inevitably introduce greater uncertainty, but foreign powers have maintained their diplomatic connections, and the collapse of the secretive Soviet regime has actually facilitated the ability of other states to monitol! ' events there. Thus, the danger of miscalculation is probably lower than in past revolutions.
Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet empire occurred in extremely favor- able international circumstances. If competition among the other great pow- ers is especially intense when a revolution occurs (as it was in the 1790s and
18 The predominant role of former members of the Communist elite is documented in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New Nations of Eurasia: The Politics of Up- heaval (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), app. B. On the "new thinking" that inspired these reforms, see Thomas Risse? Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994).
? ? ? Conclusion
in 1917, for example), they will be strongly inclined to seek gains for them- selves and to deny potential gains to others. By the time the Soviet Union disintegrated, however, most of the other great powers had been close po- litical and military allies for nearly four decades. Because these states did not regard each other as potential security threats, the normal concern with relative position was muted. Instead of debating whether or not to inter- vene-as great powers did after every revolution we have examined-the Western powers have tried to support the new regimes by providing aid and advice. In addition, because the Cold War inhibited the development of extensive economic or political ties between East and West, foreign powers did not have major interests in the Soviet Union (unlike Britain and France in 1917 Russia or the United States in Iran, for example) and could take a more detached view of events there.
For all of these reasons, therefore, postrevolutionary relations between the former Soviet Union and the other major powers have been unusually tranquil. Circumsftances continue to evolve rapidly, however, and relations could easily deteriorate if Russian elites become convinced that the West ei- ther is responsible for their plight or is taking excessive advantage of it. 19 This danger suggests that Western diplomacy must strike a balance between acknowledging tlh. e legitimate interests of the new Eurasian states (espe- cially Russia) and turning a blind eye to internal abuses or resurgent expan- sionism. To date, ! however, the international consequences of the revolutions of 1989-92 have been uncharacteristically benign.
Unfortunately, relations within the former Soviet Union have been more conflictive, and for reasons that are consistent with balance-of-threat theory. First, the collapse of the USSR created an unstable and uncertain balance of power among the constituent republics (or between competing ethnic or na- tional groups within them). As illustrated by the recent wars-between Ar- menia and Azerbaijan and between Russia and the breakaway province of Chechnya-uncertainties about the true balance of power can encourage both sides in such a dispute to go to war confident of success. 20
19 AttheDecember1994summitoftheConferenceonSecurityandCooperationinEurope, for example, Russian president Boris Yeltsin charged the West with "sowing the seeds of mis- trust" and complained of excessive U. S. influence, saying that "it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that the destinies of continents . . . can somehow be managed from some single cap- ital. " "Yeltsin Says NATO Is Trying to Split Continent Again," New York Times, December 6, 1994- At, A4.
20 Although Azerbaijan had reason to believe it was stronger (its gross national product was roughly 6o percent bigger than Armenia's and its population and armed forces more than twice as large), the Armenians turned out to be far more capable on the battlefield. See The Military Balance 1 9 93-94 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993). Sim- ilarly, the Chechens were extremely confident that they could defy Russian pressure despite the enormous odds against them, and their resistance was unexpectedly effective.
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Second, just as revolutionary states usually adopt policies that differ from those of the old regime, the newly independent republics of the former So- viet Union are now free to pursue interests that were forgotten, suppressed, or irrelevant under Soviet domination. Thus, Ukraine has sought to regain control of Crimea; Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought over ethnic en-
claves within their respective territories; and a number of ethnic and na- tional groups have advanced claims for independence from their respective republics. Disputes over how to divide the assets of the former USSR have been frequent as well, and the Soviet legacy of interdependence has compli- cated matters by making each government's situation dependent on policies adopted elsewhere. 21 In short, where Western perceptions of Russian inten- tions have improved since the collapse of Communism, a number of former Soviet republics now view each other with considerable suspicion.
Third, because the newly independent republics face the same problems of legitimacy and order that revolutionary states often confront, the tempta- tion to mobilize support by invoking nationalism has been difficult to resist. Unfortunately, such efforts often involve playing up both real and imagined grievances against others, and because different groups within the former Soviet Union are now free to teach their own versions of history, the danger has increas? d that past quarrels will fuel future conflicts. 22 Needless to say, these are ideal conditions for spiraling. When conflicts of interest arise, each side will be more likely to see its own actions as entirely justified while viewing the actions of others as unwarranted aggression.
These problems will be compounded by the intermingling of ethnic or na- tional groups within and across existing political boundaries, which creates the possibility that isolated ethnic minorities will see themselves as vulner- able to persecution by majorities who regard them as potentially disloyal "fifth columns. "23 When national or ethnic groups are scattered within dif- ferent political units, one community may worry that a nationalist resur- gence in another republic could trigger a sympathetic response from
conationals within its own borders. Thus, nationalist -Ideologies can create fears of contagion similar to those produced by a transnational revolution- ary ideology.
Afinal source of conflict is Russia's growing effort to reassert its influence within the "near abroad," either to protect ethnic Russian populationS, to re-
21 See Dawisha and Parrott, Russia and the New States ofEurasia, 197--98.
22 Onthisgeneralphenomenon,seeVanEvera,CausesofWar,vol. 2:NationalMisperceptions and the Roots oJWar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. 11; and E. H. Dance, History the Betrayer: A Study in Bias (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
23 See Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (1993); and Stephen Van Evera, "Managing the Eastern Crisis: Preventing War in the Former Soviet Empire," Security Studies 1, no. 1 (1992); and "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," Interna- tional Security 18, no. 4 (1994).
? ? ? Conclusion
tain access to valuable resources, or to stabilize the situation along its lengthy border. 24 Increased Russian influence might deter or dampen vio- lence in those areas in the long run, but its immediate impact has been to alarm its neighbors and to reawaken Western concerns. Relations within the former Soviet Union and relations with other powers are thus inextricably linked, and it will be much more difficult for Russia to maintain amicable re- lations with the rest of the world if the level of conflict within its former em- pire is on the rise.
In sum, relations among the newly independent states of Eurasia are characterized by uncertain balances of power, serious conflicts of interest, exaggerated perceptions of hostility, and fears of nationalist contagion. Not surprisingly, therefore, relations within the former Soviet Union have been (and are likely to remain) much less tranquil than relations between Russia and the other major powers.
Thus, balance-of-threat theory does shed light on the likely consquences of the Soviet collapse and helps identify where the probable axes of conflict will be found. These events also underscore the value of a systemic ap- proach, as the absence of great-power conflict in their aftermath is not due solely to the character of the new regimes: it is also due to the benign inter- national context in which the collapse of the Soviet empire took place and the fact the the "revolutions" of 1 989-92 brought these regimes into greater
ideological conformity with the West. Therefore, the events of 1989-92 rein- force a central contention of this entire book: one cannot understand the in- ternational implications of revolutionary change by looking solely at the revolutionary state; one must also consider the configurations of power and interest in the system as a whole.
THE FUTURE OF REVOLUTION
For some writers, the grand ideological struggles that have rent modern society for nearly four centuries are now fading away, to be replaced by more limited (and for the most part, peaceful) disputes over national inter- ests and an increasingly tranquil world order. This perspective sees mass revolution as inextricably linked to the process of modernization-to the spread of market forces and the transition from hierarchical forms of gov- ernment to political orders based m1 equality, mass participation, and indi- vidual rights. With the collapse of Communism and the apparent triumph of modem liberal capitalism, so the argument runs, the great ideological
24 See Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russian Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s," in Russian Secu- rity after the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow, ed. Teresa Pelton Johnson and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass. : Center for Science and International Affairs, 1994), 13-20; and Vladimir P. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," Foreign Policy 88 (fall 1992).
[3491
? Revolution and War
struggles of the past are behind us and humankind has reached the "end of histor. y"25 If this view is correct, then my theory explains a phenomenon that may not trouble us any longer. H might be correct but irrelevant, and the lessons drawn from this study of little enduring value.
Because revolutions are so dangerous and destructive, we might prefer a world in which Marx's "locomotive of history" no longer ran. Unfortu- nately, there are good reasons to question this optimistic expectation.
First, even if mass revolution were strictly a modern phenomenon, the process of modernization is not yet complete. A mass revolution may be un- likely in any of the advanced industrial powers, but it remains a possibility in many other parts of the world. The Iranian Revolution occurred less than two decades ago (a rather short period by historical standards), and it takes little imagination to see revolutionary potential in places such as Egypt, India, Pakistan, China, parts of Latin America, and much of sub-Saharan Africa. The collapse of Communism may have discredited Marxism, but other alternatives-ranging from liberalism to radical nationalism to reli- gious fundamentalism-are available to take its place.
Second, the belief that the current hegemony of liberal capitalism will bring an end to ideological conflicts and eliminate the allure of revolution- ary transformation overlooks several matters: the possibility of unintended consequences, the alienating effects of liberal capitalism itself, and the human capacity to create new and appealing visions of a preferable social order. As Kenneth Jowitt persuasively argues, all social orders alienate some of their members, and the amoral, acquisitive individualism of liberal capi- talist society will create space for new ideologies emphasizing transcendant moral values and communitarian ideals. Instead of ideological homogene- ity, therefore, Jowitt predicts that the end of the Cold War will foster a pe- riod of ideological ferment in which new ideologies arise to challenge the hegemony of liberal-capitalist individualism. 26
Thus, the liberal-capitalist order may not always be seen as universally or eternally preferable, and it is too soon to dismiss the possibility that pre- sent discontents will foster the emergence of new dissident ideologies. In- deed, these possibilities are already evident in the rise of religious fundamentalism (whose underlying principles challenge liberalism's no- tions of tolerance), the growing pressure for cultural diversity (where lib-
25 Exponents of this view include Francis Fukuyama, The End ofHistory and the Last Man (New York: Basic Books, 1992); Theodore S. Hamerow, From the Finland Station: The Grllying of Revolution in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and John Mueller, Retreat
from Doomsdlly: The Obsolescence ofMajor War (New York: Basic Books, HJB9); and Quiet Cata- clysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics (New York: HarperCollins, 199. 5).
26 See Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
? ? ? Conclusion
eralism's emphasis on individual rights confronts claims for the collective rights of particular groups}, and the emergence of the Greens, the militia movement in America, or neo-fascism in Europe. My point is not that any of these movements will spawn the next great revolutionary ideology, but simply that new challengers will emerge, maybe sooner than we think. If their adherents achieve political power in some existing state-especially if through violent means-the dynamics I have identified are likely to come into play. Indeed, the scope and speed of mass communications could make it easier for dissident social movements to spread their principles across existing borders and amplify the normal fear of contagion. Instead of a relatively stable world of well-ordered national states, in short, we may be entering a period of renewed ideological ferment and increased transna- tional turbulence. 27
If this argument is correct, then we are unlikely to enjoy the tranquility of a world in which violent revolution is a thing of the past. Armed with a bet- ter understanding of the connection between revolution and war, however, we may still avoid some of the tragic results of earlier revolutions. That hope is both the purpose and the paradox of social science: by gaining a bet- ter grasp of the causal forces that shape social phenomena, we may be able to manipulate them so as to render our own theories invalid. Given the re- grettable international consequences that accompany most revolutions, that would be a small price to pay.
27 See Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 193--98. Tarrow also suggests that the impact of these movements may "first be ferocious, uncontrolled, and widely diffused, but later ephemeral. "
? ? ? Abadan, 241
Abercrombie, Ralph, n6n
accommodation, 2, 204, 342; American revolu-
tion and, 281; by England of Soviet Union, 176, 178; Iraruian revolution and, 256, 259; Mexican revolution and, 296; Russian civil vvar and, 158-60, 163-64, 20)-4, 207
Acheson, Dean, )5, )1), )15-18, )22 Adams, John, 2710, 276-77, 285n, 329 Adams, John Quincy, 285n Afghanistan. See Soviet Union Africa, sub-Saharan, 350
Aland Islands, 167
Albania, 300
Algeria, Islamic Salvation Front in, 247, 248n.
See also Iranian revolution Algiers accord, 238
Allende, Salvador, 336n Alsace, 56, 6o, 63, 69, 120 Amal, 249
Amanullah, Emir, 18o-81
American Independence, War of, 269--71, 280, 283; France and, 47, 53
American revolution, 13n, 16, 26g-87, 3 10, 327, 330, 33;m, 344; Barbary states and, 28o, 284; comparison vvith other revolutions, 283, 287; Continental Congress of, 270; England and, 27r>-'J2, 280, 31. 7-28, 332; Founding Fathers and, 270, 2710, 281-83, 285-86; France and, 27r>-'JI, 280, 327-28, 332; Indian tribes and, 271, 284; Latin America and, 281; Model Treaty and, 270, 283; Spain and, 27o-71, 280. See also American Independence, War of; United States
Amiens, n7
Amiens, Peace of, 278 al-Amin, Sayyid Ibrahim, 245
Amur, 152
Anatolia, 299-303, 307
[3531
Anglo-French convention, 150
Anglo-Persian treaty (1919), 179-Bo Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, 179 Anglo-Soviet trade agreement (1921), 175-79,
188, 195, 204
Angola, 336n
Ankara, 3o6
Antoinette, Marie; 58, 96
Arbe02, Jacobo, 35, 336n
Archangel, 134, 136-37, 141, 146 Armenia, 166, 182, 301, 304, 329, 347-48 Armstrong, David, 7
Articles of Confederation, 271-'72, 283
Artois, comte d', 54, 58, 6m, 64. See also Louis XVIII
ai-Assad, Hafez, 249
Auckland, Lord. See William Eden
Austria: mobilization of forces (1792), 72; for- mal convention vvith Prussia (1791), 63, 65;
and War of the First Coalition, 72, 74-75, 77-7? 8o, 82, 89-91, 96-g7, 101, 104-B; and War of the Second Coalition, no-n, 1 1 3-14,
Baath regime, 237-39, 261
Babeuf, Fram;ois-Noel (Gracchus), 109n Baden, 89
Bahonar, Muhammed, 217
Bahrain, 244, 261
n7
Austria-Hungary, 154, 300
Austrian Netherlands, 71, 74-75, Bo, 119 Austro-Prussian alliance, 70, 73, 120 Avignon, 56, 6o, 70
Azerbaijan, 166, 180, 182, 304, 347-48 Aziz, Tariq, 239
.
See also specific revolutions
Index
? Bakmetev, Boris, 145n
Bakhtiar, Shahpour, 212, 235-36, 240 al-Bakr, Ahmad, 238n
balance of power, 19, 21-22, 32, 38 43-44, 46,
327, 333-34, 337; American revolution and, 270, 271n, 275, 283-84, 286, 333-34, 337; Chi- nese revolution and, 312, 323, 325-26, 333-34; Eastern European revolutions and, 345; former Soviet Union and, 347, 349; French revolution and, 73, 1 1S-2o, 122, 128, 312, 333; Iranian revolution and, 210, 25o-54, 267, 312, 333; Mexican revolution and, 2? -97, 333-34, 337; Russian revolution and, 129, 143, 152-53, 17? 1, 173? 2o2-o5, 2o8, 312, 333; theory of, vii-viii, 3-4, 6, 19, 339-40; Turkish revolution and, 333-34, 337
balance of threat, viii, 18, 43, 46, 1o8, 331, 333-40, 342, 344; Chinese revolution and, 312-19, 323, 326; Eastern European revolu- tions and, 344-45; former Soviet Union and, 347, 349; French revolution and, 11S-28; Iranian revolution and, 210, 25o-68; Russian revolution and, 17? 5, 179, 182, 201-9
Balfour, Arthur, 13? , 135n, 143n, 145n, 153n Balkanwars (1912-1913), 300
Baltic states, 159, 167, 169, 173, 185-{)1, 195, 197 Bani-Sadr, Abolhassan, 216--17, 224-26, 23o-31,
235, 256-5- 7, 263-64
Barbary pirates, 271-72, 283
Barere, Bertramd de, 9?
Barras, Paul, Vicomte de, 107
Barrett, David, 315n
Barthelemy, Frran,. ois, 1o8
Basel, Treaty of, 104
Bastille, storming of, 53
Bavaria, 48; Soviet government in, 165, 167,
187, 205, 335 .
Bavarian-Belgian exchange, 118
Bay of Pigs, U. S. invasion of, 41
Bazargan, Mefndi, 216, 223-26, 230, 238, 254,
256-5- 7, 263
Beethoven, Ludwig von, 58
Beheshti, Ayatollah Muhammed, 216--17, 259n Belarus, 345n
Belgium, 41n, 48, 69, 71-72, 83, 89, 90n, 91, 95n,
97, 101, 104-Q7, 111 Berlin, Treaty of, 105 Blake, William, 58
? Blanning,T. C. W. ,71
Boissy d'Anglas, Fran? ois-Antoine, 101 Bolivia, 24, 38n
Bolshevik party, 22n, 26, 129-37, 139-40, 142,
144, 146-5- 0, 152, 154? 156-5- 7? t6o, t62-66, 168, 170, 173-'J5, 178, 186, 201-3, 2o6, 284, 297? 309-10, 329-30, 335? 338, 342; Four- teenth Party Congress of, 191; Fifteenth Party Congress of, 200; coup d'etat by, 130, 138, 141; Decree of Peace, 131; intentions of, 156-5- 7. See also Russia; Russian revolution; Soviet Union
Bolshevism, 152-55, 159, 167, 171, 179, 190-91, 204, 208. Seealsoideology: of Russian revo- lution
"Bolshevization," 19?
Bonapart? Lucien, 117
Bonaparte, Napoleon, toon, 103, 105-7, 112-13,
117, 120, 278-80, z86; and beginning of
Napoleonic era, 117
Borodin, Michael, 197-98
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 300
Brandler, Heinrich, 189
Brest-Litvosk, Treaty of, 11, 135, 142, 144, 158,
t8on, 203, 205, 300
Brezhne? Leonid, 230, 252
Briand, Aristide, 189
Brissot de Warville, Jean-Pierre, 65-67, 75, 76n,
78n, 8o, 8?
Brown, Harold, 225
Brumaire coup, 116-1- 7
Brunswick, duke of, 72, 77 Brunswick Manifesto, 76, 120 Bryan, William Jennings, 295 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 216, 225, 25m Buchanan, George, 135
Buckler, William H. , 16o
Bukharin, Nikolai, 13m, 132, 189-91, 200 Bull, Hedley, 7
Bullitt, William, 161-63, 168n, 204 Bundy, William P. , 324n
Burgat, Fran? ois, 247
Burges, James, 59
Burke, Edmund, 8, 5S-59, 82, 117 Byelorussia, 173
Calvert, Peter, 7, 13
Cambaceres, Jean-Jacques, 101
Cambodia, Khmer Rouge in, 41n, 326
Campo Formio, Treaty of, 1o6, 109-11, 124, 128
Canton (Guangzhou), 197-98
Carden, Lionel (Sir), 292n
Cardenas, Lazaro, 292
Carnot, Lazar? 78n, 93n, 95, 101n, 1o8 Carranza, Venustiano, 288-{)8
Carrizal, 290, 296
Carter, Jimmy, 224-25, 228, 251, 254, 256
Carter doctrine, 251, 258n
Castro, Fidel, 9-10, 26-2- 7, 35 CatherineII,Empress(ofRussia),49,59,61-62,
71, 8? 11on, 119n, 121
Central Powers, 133-34, 137-38, 141, 143-47,
149, 153-54, 300, 310
Ceylon, 107, 117
Chanak, 305
Charles, Archduke, 115-16
Charles rv, King (of Spain), 121 Charles V, Emperor (of Austria), 105 Chauvelin, Bernard, 85-86, B9n Chechnya, 347
Chesapeake incident, 279
Index
? ? [3541
? ? Canada, 149, 271, 274-'J5, 28o
? Index
Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), 197? 9, 312-13, 316, 332
Chicherin, Gyorgy V. , 142, 157, 159, 162n, 164-65, 169, 1? ? n, 181, 183, 188, 196, 304
Chile, 41n, 336n
China, People's Republic of (PRC), 34-35, 37, 40, 350; civil war in, 313-14; Communist Party (CCP), 197--99, 31o-18, 32m, 322-23, 327; Cultural Revolution in, 324-25; detona- tion of nuclear weapons by, 324; Great Leap Forward in, 324; and India, war with, 326; and Japan, 325; neutrality of, 325; and Pak- istan, 326; populallion of, 329; Red Army of, 322; Socialist Youth Corps in, 198n; Soviet Union, alliance with, 318, 326; and the Third World, 325; and United States, rapproche- ment with, 326; and Vietnam, 326; and West- em Europe, 325. See also Chinese revolution; specific revolutions
China Hands, 37
China lobby, 322, 334
Chinese Eastern Railway, 140n, 141, 151-52,
183, 185
Chinese revolution, ? 4, 16, 269, 31o-3o; Cold War and, 310, 314, 318; compared with other revolutions, 310, 312, 327; deaths in, 2m; Great Britain and, 312, 31? n, 338; Japan and, 311-12, 316-17, 321; KoreanWarand, 310, 319-23, 325-29, 332, 344; Soviet Union and, 310, 312-15, 317-18, 326, 328-29; United States and, 2, 310, 312-26, 329, 336, 338, 344; Vietnam and, 324-25
Chongqing incident, 316
Christopher, Warren, 251n, 263
Churchill, Winston, 154-57, 179, 204, 2o6, 305
Cisalpine Republic, 112, 114, 117
Claviere, Etienne, 82n
Clay, Henry, 28on
revolution and, 262-63, 338; Korean War and, 322; Russian revolution and, 163, 204, 338; Turkish revolution and, 309
Communism, 35, 40, 193, 335; collapseof, 349-50 Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 347il
Congress of the Peoples of the East, 182 Congress of Toilers of the Far East, 182 Connolly, John, 251n
Constantine, King, 303
contagion, 30, 39-47, 269, 329, 333-36, 338-40, 343, 351; American revolution and, 281, 284--S5, 335n; Chinese revolution and, 318, 324-25, 334; Eastern European revolutions and, 344-46; former Soviet Union and, 348-49; French revolution and, 73--74, 81, 90, 94, 118, 121-27, 249, 334-35; French revolu- tionary, English fear of, 83, 85--S6, 8H9, 335; Iranian revolution and, 210, 240, 242-43, 246-49, 258-63, 265, 267-68, 334-35; Mexican revolution and, 297, 335n; Russian revolution and, 131-32, 144-45, 152, 154-55, 165, 174, 177, 183, 191, 205--S, 249, 334-35; Turkish revolution and, 309, 335n. See also export of revolution; offense-defense bal- ance; revolution: optimism of
containment, policy of, 343-44 contra war, 10, 336n Convention of Reichenbach, 59 Cordeliers club, 55
Cossacks, 133-34, 141, 14? 152, 184 Council of Action, 176-78 counterrevolution, 31-32, 42-47, 269, 334,
336-38, 340, 343; American revolution and, 270, 272, 27? 281, 285--S6; Chinese revolution and, 316-17, 334, 336; Eastern European revolutions and, 346; French revo- lution and, 55, 61-66, 68-69, 75, 78, 81, 9? 2, 94, 98-100, 104, 108, 115-16, 12o-21, 123-27, 333-34, 336, 338, 343n; Iranian revo- lution and, 210, 225, 255-56, 258, 261, 334, 336, 338, 343n; Mexican revolution and, 297; Russian revolution and, 166-67, 171, 197, 200, 2o6--S, 334, 336, 338. See also foreign in- tervention; offense-defense balance
Crimea, 348
critical theory, 4-5, 34o-42
Cuba, 9, 27, 35, 40, 250, 298
Cuban revolution, 14, 38n, 42, 336; deaths in,
2m; U. S. response to, 2, 42
Cuno, Wilhelm, 189
Curzon, Lord, 14? n, 149, 154, 179 Czechoslovakia, 155, 336n
Czechoslovak Legion, 137-42, 144-47, 15o-52
Danton, Georges, 76n, 79, 8? n, 93, 94n, 96, 9? 9
Dardanelles, 300
Al-Dawa al-Islamiya (Islamic Call), 238-39, 242, 200
Clemenceau, Georges, 137, 150, 155, 2o6 Clinton, George, 274ft
Clinton, William, 229
Cloots, Jean-Baptiste (Anacharsis), 57, 66, 94,
128
Clubb, Edmund, 315n
Cobenzl, Louis, 110
Cold War, vii, 2, 336, 350
collective action problems, in revolution, 23, 29 Collot d'Herbois, Jean Marie, 87il
Columbus, New Mexico, Mexican raid on, 290 Comintem, 164-65, 187, 191, 197, 208; First
Congress, 176n, 192; Second Congress, 170, 179, 192, 205; Third Congress, 188, 192, 194, 205; Fourth Congress, 193? 4; Fifth Con- gress, 193? 4; Executive Committee of (ECCI), 192? 4, 197, 199; transformation of, 192? 4, 201; Twenty-one Points of, 192? 3
communication 32, 45, 328, 344, 351; American revolution and, 270, 285; Chinese revolution and, 322; Eastern European revolutions and, 345-46; French revolution and, 338; Iranian
l355l
?
? Dawes plan, 195
Al-Dawlah, Vusuq, 179
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,
54, 56, 6o, 273n
Deforgues, FrM? ois, 96-9- 7 Delacroix, Charles, 107 Delessart, Antoine, 7f>-J? l Denikin, Anton, 148-49, 158, 166 Denmark, 96, 190
Desmoulins, Camille, 49n
Diaz, Porfirio, 287-88, 292
Dodecanese Islands, 300
domestic politics, of revolutionary states, 3,
! riO, to8, 122, 334, 339; American revolution and, 28o-82, 284, 286; Chinese revolution and, 323; French revolution and, 64, 72-73, 334; Iranian revolution and, 258-59, 266-67, 284, 334
Dorchester, LoKd, 274n
Ducos, Roger, u7
Dulles, John Foster, 324
Dumas, Roland, 236
Dumoriez, Charles-Fran? ois, 71-72, 76-'78, So,
83, 87, 90-91, 94n; and attempt to isolate
Austrians, 71--'72
Dundas, Henry. 84, 88
Eastern Europe: Communist governments in, 344-45; post-Cold War Western support of, 347
Eastern European revolutions (1989-1992), 344-49; Cold War and, 347; comparison with other revolutions, 345; former Soviet Union and, 344-47; Marxism-Leninism and, 346; nuclear weapons and, 346; Soviet Union, collapse of, and, 344-45, 347; and super- power competition, 346-47; United States and, 345; Warsaw Pact and, 344
East Germany, 336n
Eden, William (Lord Auckland), 59, 84, 88 Egypt, 223, 229n, 237, 246, 248, 350 Eisenhower, Dwight D. , 35
elite revolution, 12-13, 20, 21n, 2!
? ? ? Conclusion
there is a large disparity in power between the two states involved. Even in such cases, however, the effort often turns out to be greater than the inter- vening power anticipated.
In short, the perceptions of a mutual offensive advantage that accompany most revolutions are especially dangerous, because the combination of in- security and overconfidence that leads to the use of force is usually ill- founded. In fact, revolutions are hard to export and difficult to reverse, and in most cases, both sides are more secure than they think and would be bet- ter off remaining at peace.
The tendency for revolutions to foster perceptions of offense dominance is not universal, and the absence of this factor is the main reason why the American, Turkish, and Mexican revolutions did not lead to war. These rev- olutions altered the balance of power and generated both real conflicts of in- terest and spirals of suspicion. Yet in each case, key leaders were aware that the revolution was unlikely to ? pread and that war would be expensive. As a result, both sides ultimately refrained from the large-scale use of force.
UncertaintyandMisinformation. Ifrevolutionsarebothhardtoexportand difficult to reverse, then why do states worry about either possibility? Our cases provide part of the answer: it will be extremely difficult for states to gauge their situation accurately after a revolution, because relations be- tween revolutionary states and other powers will be afflicted by very high levels of uncertainty and misinformation. The problem arises from several different aspects of the revolutionary process, so it will usually be difficult to overcome.
For example, it is hardly surprising that both sides have trouble estimat- ing the balance of military power, because the military capacity of the new state will rest on novel institutions whose effects can only be discovered through battlefield experience. Foreign powers will usually have good rea- sons to discount a revolutionary state's capabilities, if only because the armed forces of the old regime usually deteriorate in the short term. Yet in almost every case examined here, the revolutionary regime managed to use new myths, symbols, and institutions to create an unexpectedly formidable military machine. 6
The political consequences of a revolution are even harder to calculate in advance, because the political appeal of a revolutionary model is virtually impossible to gauge with confidence. Neither the revolutionaries nor their foreign opponents know if the revolution will attract adherents abroad or if foreign intervention will spark a counterrevolutionary upheaval. Faced
6 The United States and Mexico are partial exceptions to this claim, because neither revo- lution faced a large-scale foreign invasion. The rapid mobilization of U. S. naval power dur- ing the Quasi-War and the Constitutionalists' unexpected success in the civil war against Villa are consistent with this argument, however.
[3371
? Revolution and War
with this uncertainty, elites on both sides will tend to rely on ideology and recent experience and to assume that the initial revolutionary success was a harbinger of things to come. Even relatively modest signs of a sympathetic response elsewhere will be taken as evidence of a rising revolutionary tide, and testimony from foreign revolutionaries or counterrevolutionary exiles can reinforce these erroneous expectations.
Both sides overstate the likelihood of counterrevolution for much the same reason. The danger of an "aristocratic conspiracy" terrified the French from 1789 onward; the Bolsheviks feared their hold on power might lapse at any moment; the Islamic Republic has waged a brutal campaign against for- mer opponents as well. These fears reflect the intrinsic difficulty of accu- rately gauging the loyalty of the population at large. Although signs of dissent will always be present, neither the ruling authorities nor outside powers can know how strong the opposition really is.
To make matters worse, revolutions impede the acquisition of the infor- mation that might help correct these erroneous impressions. The revolution- ary states in France, Russia, and Iran were cut off from normal diplomatic contacts, intensifying their perceptions of threat and making subsequent ef- forts to reach a modus vivendi more difficult. Indeed, a striking feature of most of these cases is the extent to which states were forced. to conduct dipl9- macy through unofficial agents whose expertise and reliability usually left much to be desired.
Lastly, with all the uncertainty, other states will have trouble deciding how to respond to a revolution, and foreign powers will be hard-pressed to agree on a common course of action. 7 If the power of a revolutionary state is unclear, the danger of contagion uncertain, and the prospects for counter- revolution unknown, it will be difficult to obtain a consensus for interven- tion or abstention, and the other states will be more likely to respond in a haphazard and poorly coordinated manner. This problem arose in several of our cases: the European powers were often divided over how to respond to the revolution in France; the Entente could not adopt a unified policy to-
ward the Bolshevik or Turkish revolutions; Britain and the United States disagreed over the proper approach to take toward the revolutionary gov- ernments in Mexico and China; and there was little consensus on how to re- spond to Iran's revolution until its army had crossed into Iraqi soil. The result, unfortunately, may have been the worst of both worlds: other states did enough to antagonize the new regimes but not enough to eliminate them.
7 I identify some other reasons for this tendency in my chapter, "Collective Security and Revolutionary Change: Promoting Peace in the Former Soviet Empire," in Collective Secu- rity after the Cold War, ed. George W. Downs (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).
? ? ? ? ? Conclusion
Realism and Revolution
The cases examined in this book both confirm the basic explanatory power of realism and suggest which strands of realist thought are most useful. In particular, realism is most powerful when it goes beyond a nar- row focus on the gross distribution of power and instead examines the bal-
ance of threats. Although the balance of power is hardly irrelevant, the behavior of states is also affected by how national leaders assess the inten- tions of other states and how they perceive the relative advantage to of- fense or defense. The offense-defense balance is not merely a function of
geography or military doctrine, however, but may also be affected by the potential appeal of particular ideas (such as a new revolutionary ideology). Realism gains even more explanatory power by incorporating the possibil- ity that states will misread these factors, and as we have seen repeatedly, such misperceptions are especially common after revolutions. 8 Beliefs about the possibility of revolutionary contagion-which ultimately rest on beliefs about the persuasive power of revolutionary ideas-have been crit- ical in shaping perceptions of the offense-defense balance and help explain why some revolutions led to war and others did not. In short, by incorpo- rating domestic politics and ideas into the anarchic setting depicted by re-
alism, we obtain a more complete picture of the forces that shape state behavior.
This argument points to another insight: realism may tell us more about international behavior in postrevolutionary periods than in more "normal" periods. Some realists depict international politics as a relentless struggle for survival whell"e security is extremely scarce and states must constantly strive for any advantage. 9 Proponents of this perspective are likely to view
revolutionary states as exceptions to realist logic, because their foreign pol- icy objectives are heavily affected by ideology and their leaders are pre- sumed to be less familiar with the subtleties of international diplomacy. Yet in the three main cases examined here, each side saw the other as an immi- nent and intense threat and discounted the possibility of a lasting peace. In other words, relations between these revolutionary states and other powers were virtually identical to the relationships depicted by the more extreme versions of realism. The key point, however, is that the level of conflict is not
8 Stephen Van Evera refers to this as "Type IV Realism. " It differs from other strands of re- alist theory by focusing on what Van Evera calls the "fine-grained structure of power" and by explicating the factors that shape how states perceive that structure. Causes ofWar, vol. 1: The Structure ofPower and the Roots ofWar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. 1. On the impact of ideas on the offense-defense balance, see George Quester, Offense and De-
fense in the International System (New York: Wiley, 1977), 67.
9 This view is most clearly expressed in the writings of John J. Mearsheimer: "Back to the
Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (1990); and "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994-95).
[3391
? Revolution and War
merely due to the state of anarchy and a particular distribution of capabili- ties (as a neorealist such as John Mearsheimer would have it) but is also heavily influenced by perceptions of intent and beliefs about the likelihood that the revolution will spread or be reversed.
With frhe passage of time, however, each side will acquire a more accurate estimate of the true threat that it faces. The security dilemma between them will ease and each will adopt a less vigilant posture. The relentless competi- tion depicted by some realists will abate, and prospects for cooperation will probably increase. By restricting themselves to examining the gross distri- bution of power, however, neorealists cannot explain why the level of con- flict varies even though the distribution of power is constant. This shortcoming is another reason to prefer balance-of-threat theory to the overly spare world of neorealist balance-of-power theory.
Finally, the neorealist claim that revolutionary states will be "socialized" to the system seems to be only partly correct. Although external pressures did lead all of these regimes to alter their behavior in significant ways, their tendency to cling to counterproductive strategies despite substantial costs was equally striking-especially in the Soviet, Chinese, and Iranian cases, where a commitment to avowedly revolutionary objectives kept these regimes isolated and beleaguered far longer than was necessary. One may speculate that such a tendency will be most severe when, first, the ideology in question is particularly extreme, and second, it has been formally instifru- tionalized within a hegemonic ruling party. Thus, the American, Mexican, and Turkish revolutionary leaders adapted quickly because they began with more moderate ideas, and the French were able to abandon the more utopian visions of the Girondins and Montagnards because those had not been enshrined in a formal party ideology and were not central to the legit- imacy of the postrevolutionary state.
Critical Theory, Identity, and Revolutionary Change
The cases examined here also shed light on the relative merits of critical- theory as an approach to international politics. Critical theory emphasizes the role of language and social processes in shaping actors' goals, identities, and collective self-understandings. 10 From this perspective, the interna- tional system is not an independent structure arising from the interactions of preexisting states; rather, it is the product of concrete social practices that reflect the purposes and perceptions of the actors themselves.
Revolutions are crucial cases for critical theorists, because in them state identities are rapidly and radically transformed through changes in the dis-
1? For important examples of critical theory approaches to international politics, see the ref- erences above in chap. 1, n. 10.
? ? ? Conclusion
cursive practices of a community. 11 A revolution transformed Britain's North American colonies into a "new republic"; the absolutist regime of Louis XVI reemerged as the French nation; the tsarist empire was recast as the world's first "workers' and peasants' state," the multinational Ottoman Empire be- came the secular Republic of Turkey, and the Peacock Throne of the Pahlavis was replaced by Khomeini's Islamic Republic. Because critical theory re- gards the identities of social actors as powerful determinants of behavior,
the behavior of revolutionary states would be expected to differ dramati- cally from the conduct of the old regime and from the practices of other states in the system. And since in this view the identity of a revolutionary state is closely linked to its ideology, foreign policy behavior should con- form closely to its ideological principles. Thus, where realism predicts that the constraining effects of anarchy will force revolutionary states to moder- ate or abandon their more radical objectives, critical theory anticipates both dramatic and enduring change, even in the face of strong external pressures.
Do our seven cases support this view? On the one hand, the evidence does support a limited version of the argument: in each case, the revolutionary elite saw the seizure of power as a decisive break with the past and adopted policies that departed sharply from those of the old regime. In this sense, therefore, one can say that the change in "identity" produced by the revolu- tion was associated with a change in behavior. But this is a very limited claim, roughly akin to arguing that actors with different preferences are likely to pursue different goals. One hardly needs critical theory to make that case.
On the other hand, the cases in this book offer little support for the more ambitious claim that shifts in discursive practices and collective under- standings could produce a far-reaching transformation in the international systemY Although each of these revolutions featured dramatic changes in discourse and each regime made idealistic claims about its own conduct, their utopian visions soon gave way to the familiar principles of realpolitik. Irrespective of their ideological pretensions, each of these states fought wars, formed alliances, made diplomatic compromises, signed treaties of commerce, and in general conformed to most (if not all) norms of interna- tional conduct, while continuing to espouse revolutionary doctrines of one sort or another. Indeed, it is striking how readily these states abandoned many of their initial objectives under pressure: the French repudiated the
11 Thus, Keith Michael Baker defines a revolution as a "transformation of the discursive practice of a community, a moment in which social relations are reconstituted and the dis- course defining the political relations between individuals and groups is radically recast. " In- venting the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 18.
12 Forexamplesofthissortofclaim,seeReyKoslowskiandFriedrichKratochwil,"Under- standing Changes in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," and Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Fail- ure of Realism," both in International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994).
? ? Revolution and War
Decree on Liberty, the Bolsheviks sought trade and investment from the in- ternational class enemy, and even revolutionary Iran was willing to deal with the "Great Satan" in order to wage war against Iraq. In short, these states were willing to do virtually anything that a "normal" state would do, which suggests that systemic pressures had at least as great an impact as their revolutionary identities or ideological underpinnings.
In response, critical theorists might argue that this book offers an unfair test of their perspective, because it focuses primarily on the short- to medium-term effects of a revolution and does not examine the indirect and! long-term impact of revolutions on attitudes, norms, and ideas. And if iso- lated revolutionary states are forced to adjust their behavior to the con- straints of the existing international system, it is still possible that a critical mass of like-minded states would have transformative effects resembling the Westphalian transition between the feudal period and the modem state system. One could also argue that even deradicalized revolutions affect pre- vailing notions of international legitimacy and gradually alter the ends tha? individuals and states deem worthy of pursuit and the means they regard as legitimate.
These are valid points, and this book should not be regarded as offering a definitive challenge to the critical theory approach to international politics. What it does show, however, is that such an approach does not tell us very much about relations between revolutionary states and other powers in the immediate aftermath of the seizure of power. If the question of the long- term transformation of the international systems remains open, these cases suggest that the modified realism of balance-of-threat theory offers a more useful way to think about the practical difficulties that ordinarily follow a revolution.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The evidence assembled here confirms that foreign leaders have ample reason to be worried when a revolution occurs, but it also suggests that the usual prescriptions for dealing with such an event are not very helpful. In particular, neither appeasement nor intervention is an especially promising approach. Appeasement is often recommended as a way to avoid spiraling and promote good relations over time, but this advice ignores the fact that revolutionary states do commit acts of aggression, and convincing them to stop may require the threat or use of force. The case for overt intervention is usually even weaker. Advocates of intervention believe that diplomatic, economic, or military pressure will exert a positive effect on the revolution- ary process, either by helping one faction consolidate its power or by con- vincing the revolutionary government to adopt policies that are consistent
? ? ? ? Conclusion
with foreign interests. But as we have seen, intervention is very often coun- terproductive. Emperor Leopold's attempts to manipulate French domestic politics in 1791? 2 further undermined Louis's position, and Woodrow Wil- son's efforts to shape the revolutionary process in Mexico alienated the var- ious revolutionary factions and reinforced the latent anti-Americanism of the Mexican government. Foreign attempts to guide the course of events in Russia, Iran, and China were equally unsuccessful: foreign powers lacked sufficient leverage or adequate information (or both), and their activities were regarded with suspicion in each case.
Advocates of intervention will usually argue that the revolutionary state is both extremely dangerous and highly vulnerable, justifying active efforts to overthrow it. But as we have seen, this combination of fear and optimism is usually misplacedY Revolutions are usually hard to export-reducing the need to remove the new regime-and intervention will reinforce the rev- olutionaries' own perceptions of threat and push the regime in a more radi- cal direction. Revolutions are also more difficult to reverse than outside p? wers generally expect, and because war is so unpredictable, intervention may actually facilitate the spread of revolution, thereby causing the very process it was intended to prevent. 14
A policy of containment is the best approach toward most revolutions, es- pecially for great powers facing a relatively weak revolutionary state. Such a strategy would aim to prevent the spread of revolution and deter expan- sionist policies by bolstering potential targets and punishing the revolution- ary state for overt acts of aggression, but its practitioners would otherwise eschew the use of force and would not attempt to overthrow the new regime. Foreign powers would also remain open to the idea of establishing normal relations when possible. Containment is not easy and may require patience, however,becauserevolutionarystatesusuallyinterpretthebehaviorofother states in an extremely biased fashion. For this reason, foreign powers should communicate the rationale behind their responses as clearly as possible, tak- ing pains to avoid appearing duplicitous or inconsistent They should also avoid premature or overly enthusiastic efforts to embrace a suspicious revo-
13 A possible exception to this stricture are cases-such as the U. S. invasion of Grenada in 1982-where the revolutionary state is so small and inconsequential that intervention is vir- tually certain to succeed. Under these conditions, however, the need to act will be even Jess compelling.
14 There is a paradox here: the greater the perceived danger from a revolution, the more likely other states are to take action to contain or eliminate the threat, thereby diminishing the chance that the danger will be realized. In other words, the fear of revolution is a self-defeat- ing prophecy: a revolution may fail to spread precisely because others are so worried that it will. But vigilance alone does not ensure success; indeed, efforts to overthrow a revolution- ary regime may unwittingly facilitate revolutionary expansion, as they did in the French case and (to a lesser extent) the Iran-Iraq war. As a result, potential victims should focus their ef- forts on containing the revolution instead of trying to overturn it.
? ? ? Revolution and War
lutionary state, as such well-intentioned efforts are likely to be seen as self- interested attempts to manipulate the new regime. A policy of ''benevolent neglect" may be most appropriate in such circumstances, allowing the new regime to set the pace for the resumption of more extensive relations.
How would such an approach have fared in the past? A policy of contain- ment would have prevented war in 1792 and averted the various interventions in Soviet Russia in 1918-21. Containment proved to be an effective long-term response to the Bolshevik Revolution, and Iraq would have been far better off had it refrained from attacking Iran in 19& and concentrated on building bar- riers to Iranian expansion in league with the other gulf states. Sino-American relations would almost certainly have been less acrimonious if the two states could have avoided a direct clash in Korea, and the absence of war after the American, Turkish, and Mexican revolutions undoubtedly facilitated their rapid reemergence as accepted members of international society.
Finally, the misperceptions found in virtually all of these cases highlight the importance of obtaining accurate information in postrevolutionary situ- ations, as well as the difficulty of doing so. For example, foreign powers need to know if they are dealing with a mass revolution from below, inspired and directed by a universalist ideology, or an elite revolution with more limited aims. Therefore, they should devote much effort to maintaining reliable channels of communication with the new regime, even in the face of consid- erable hostiRity or resistance. National leaders should also recognize that muCh of the information they obtain will be biased, especially when it comes from members of the old regime. Among other things, foreign governments should go to great lengths to avoid breaking relations so they retain some ca- pacity to monitor events and communicate with the new leaders.
THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989-1992 AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
What does balance-of-threat theory tell us about the international impli- cations of the revolutionary transformation of the former Soviet empire?
Let us begin by making an obvious distinction: the rapid collapse of the Communist governments in Eastern Europe demonstrates that contagion can occur, under certain circumstances. This exception to our rule is not as damning as nt first appears, however, for two reasons. First, the regimes that were overturned by the "velvet revolutions" were artificial creations to begin with, and the catalyst for their overthrow was the recognition that Moscow was no longer willing to enforce orthodoxy within the Warsaw Pact. 15 Second, the contagion observed in Eastern Europe did not arise from
15 Gorbachev's reforms in effect lowered the expected cost of resistance to the existing Communist governments, thereby facilitating collective mobilization against them.
? ? ? Conclusion
a revolutionary state's efforts to export its own universalist principles; rather, the revolutions were essentially nationalist revolts against the uni- versalist hegemony of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thus, where nationalism is ordinarily an obstacle to contagion, it facilitated the spread of revolution in this particular case. This nationalism, together with the unusual features of well-established social networks and relatively high levelsofcommunication, madepossiblearapidandnearlybloodlesstrans- formation. 16
As for its international implications, happily, the revolutions in the former Soviet empire are unlikely to spark intense security competition among the great powers, and certainly not to the degree observed after earlier revolu- tions. Like other revolutions, the collapse of the Soviet Union has caused a major shift in the global balance of power and led to the creation of a series of new regimes whose principles and objectives are dramatically different from those of their predecessors. Yet the other great powers have not tried to exploit or reverse these developments through the use of military power. The United States did take advantage of Russian weakness to obtain favor- able concessions on arms control and several other issues; Germany seized this opportunity to reunite; the various constituent republics took the occa- sion to obtain their independence; and a number of foreign powers have begun to compete for economic advantage in the former Soviet bloc. 17 In a sense, therefore, other states did see the Soviet collapse as a chance to en- hance their own positions. Unlike the other revolutions considered in this book, however, the collapse of Communism has not led to increased secu- rity competition either among the other great powers or between the new regimes and the outside world.
From the perspective of balance-of-threat theory, there are at least five reasons why the international consequences of the revolutions of 1989 have been comparatively benign. First, the collapse of the Soviet empire was not the result of a mass revolution. For the most part, it did not involve replac- ing the old elite with new leaders drawn from a different group or class. In- stead, the upheaval began with a "revolution" in the minds of key members of the Soviet elite, many of whom still (or again) hold influential positions in the new order. Like the Nationalistrevolution in Turkey, in short, the col- lapse of the Soviet Union began as an elite revolution intended to transform
16 For an intriguing theoretical analysis of these dynamics, see Susanne Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in East Leipzig, 1989-91," World Politics 47, no. 1 (1994). On the question whether these events were "true" revolutions, see Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), 2JJ-35 ?
17 By linking economic concessions to nuclear weapons policy, the United States was able to persuade Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to give up the weapons they had inherited when the Soviet Union broke up.
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both the internal workings of the state and its relations with the outside world. 18 As discussed in chapters 2 and 6, elite revolutions tend to be less dangerous than mass revolutions, in part becaus? the ideologies that inform them rarely pose a direct threat to other states.
The second reason, which follows from the first, is that the revolution in the former Soviet Union and its satellites was conducted by elites who sought to abandon the existing revolutionary legacy of Marxism-Leninism in favor of the political and economic models that had proven so successful in the West.
In other words, the events of 198
? other great powers, the revolutions of 198<r92 created a set of states whose principles and intentions are for the most part compatible with the existing order. Though specific conflicts of interest do exist, the potential for spiral- ing is significantly reduced by the absence of a Manichean ideology that portrays others as intrinsically evil or aggressive. It is hardly surprising, then, that the level of conflict is low between the new regimes and the out- side world.
Third, relations between Russia and the rest of the world continue to be governed by a strong condition of defense dominance, which further re- duces the level of security competition. In addition to the presence of nu- clear weajpons on each side (which creates a powerfuH defensive advantage through deterrence and dampens the impact of shifts in the balance of power), the absence of significant ideological conflict enhances security by eliminating the fear of contagion or counterrevolution. Unlike in previous revolutions, neither side need fear that its rule will be undermined by the
spread of potentially corrosive ideas.
Fourth, access to information about events in Eastern Europe has been much more extensive than in the cases examined in this book. Rapid . changes inevitably introduce greater uncertainty, but foreign powers have maintained their diplomatic connections, and the collapse of the secretive Soviet regime has actually facilitated the ability of other states to monitol! ' events there. Thus, the danger of miscalculation is probably lower than in past revolutions.
Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet empire occurred in extremely favor- able international circumstances. If competition among the other great pow- ers is especially intense when a revolution occurs (as it was in the 1790s and
18 The predominant role of former members of the Communist elite is documented in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New Nations of Eurasia: The Politics of Up- heaval (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), app. B. On the "new thinking" that inspired these reforms, see Thomas Risse? Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994).
? ? ? Conclusion
in 1917, for example), they will be strongly inclined to seek gains for them- selves and to deny potential gains to others. By the time the Soviet Union disintegrated, however, most of the other great powers had been close po- litical and military allies for nearly four decades. Because these states did not regard each other as potential security threats, the normal concern with relative position was muted. Instead of debating whether or not to inter- vene-as great powers did after every revolution we have examined-the Western powers have tried to support the new regimes by providing aid and advice. In addition, because the Cold War inhibited the development of extensive economic or political ties between East and West, foreign powers did not have major interests in the Soviet Union (unlike Britain and France in 1917 Russia or the United States in Iran, for example) and could take a more detached view of events there.
For all of these reasons, therefore, postrevolutionary relations between the former Soviet Union and the other major powers have been unusually tranquil. Circumsftances continue to evolve rapidly, however, and relations could easily deteriorate if Russian elites become convinced that the West ei- ther is responsible for their plight or is taking excessive advantage of it. 19 This danger suggests that Western diplomacy must strike a balance between acknowledging tlh. e legitimate interests of the new Eurasian states (espe- cially Russia) and turning a blind eye to internal abuses or resurgent expan- sionism. To date, ! however, the international consequences of the revolutions of 1989-92 have been uncharacteristically benign.
Unfortunately, relations within the former Soviet Union have been more conflictive, and for reasons that are consistent with balance-of-threat theory. First, the collapse of the USSR created an unstable and uncertain balance of power among the constituent republics (or between competing ethnic or na- tional groups within them). As illustrated by the recent wars-between Ar- menia and Azerbaijan and between Russia and the breakaway province of Chechnya-uncertainties about the true balance of power can encourage both sides in such a dispute to go to war confident of success. 20
19 AttheDecember1994summitoftheConferenceonSecurityandCooperationinEurope, for example, Russian president Boris Yeltsin charged the West with "sowing the seeds of mis- trust" and complained of excessive U. S. influence, saying that "it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that the destinies of continents . . . can somehow be managed from some single cap- ital. " "Yeltsin Says NATO Is Trying to Split Continent Again," New York Times, December 6, 1994- At, A4.
20 Although Azerbaijan had reason to believe it was stronger (its gross national product was roughly 6o percent bigger than Armenia's and its population and armed forces more than twice as large), the Armenians turned out to be far more capable on the battlefield. See The Military Balance 1 9 93-94 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993). Sim- ilarly, the Chechens were extremely confident that they could defy Russian pressure despite the enormous odds against them, and their resistance was unexpectedly effective.
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Second, just as revolutionary states usually adopt policies that differ from those of the old regime, the newly independent republics of the former So- viet Union are now free to pursue interests that were forgotten, suppressed, or irrelevant under Soviet domination. Thus, Ukraine has sought to regain control of Crimea; Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought over ethnic en-
claves within their respective territories; and a number of ethnic and na- tional groups have advanced claims for independence from their respective republics. Disputes over how to divide the assets of the former USSR have been frequent as well, and the Soviet legacy of interdependence has compli- cated matters by making each government's situation dependent on policies adopted elsewhere. 21 In short, where Western perceptions of Russian inten- tions have improved since the collapse of Communism, a number of former Soviet republics now view each other with considerable suspicion.
Third, because the newly independent republics face the same problems of legitimacy and order that revolutionary states often confront, the tempta- tion to mobilize support by invoking nationalism has been difficult to resist. Unfortunately, such efforts often involve playing up both real and imagined grievances against others, and because different groups within the former Soviet Union are now free to teach their own versions of history, the danger has increas? d that past quarrels will fuel future conflicts. 22 Needless to say, these are ideal conditions for spiraling. When conflicts of interest arise, each side will be more likely to see its own actions as entirely justified while viewing the actions of others as unwarranted aggression.
These problems will be compounded by the intermingling of ethnic or na- tional groups within and across existing political boundaries, which creates the possibility that isolated ethnic minorities will see themselves as vulner- able to persecution by majorities who regard them as potentially disloyal "fifth columns. "23 When national or ethnic groups are scattered within dif- ferent political units, one community may worry that a nationalist resur- gence in another republic could trigger a sympathetic response from
conationals within its own borders. Thus, nationalist -Ideologies can create fears of contagion similar to those produced by a transnational revolution- ary ideology.
Afinal source of conflict is Russia's growing effort to reassert its influence within the "near abroad," either to protect ethnic Russian populationS, to re-
21 See Dawisha and Parrott, Russia and the New States ofEurasia, 197--98.
22 Onthisgeneralphenomenon,seeVanEvera,CausesofWar,vol. 2:NationalMisperceptions and the Roots oJWar (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. 11; and E. H. Dance, History the Betrayer: A Study in Bias (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
23 See Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (1993); and Stephen Van Evera, "Managing the Eastern Crisis: Preventing War in the Former Soviet Empire," Security Studies 1, no. 1 (1992); and "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," Interna- tional Security 18, no. 4 (1994).
? ? ? Conclusion
tain access to valuable resources, or to stabilize the situation along its lengthy border. 24 Increased Russian influence might deter or dampen vio- lence in those areas in the long run, but its immediate impact has been to alarm its neighbors and to reawaken Western concerns. Relations within the former Soviet Union and relations with other powers are thus inextricably linked, and it will be much more difficult for Russia to maintain amicable re- lations with the rest of the world if the level of conflict within its former em- pire is on the rise.
In sum, relations among the newly independent states of Eurasia are characterized by uncertain balances of power, serious conflicts of interest, exaggerated perceptions of hostility, and fears of nationalist contagion. Not surprisingly, therefore, relations within the former Soviet Union have been (and are likely to remain) much less tranquil than relations between Russia and the other major powers.
Thus, balance-of-threat theory does shed light on the likely consquences of the Soviet collapse and helps identify where the probable axes of conflict will be found. These events also underscore the value of a systemic ap- proach, as the absence of great-power conflict in their aftermath is not due solely to the character of the new regimes: it is also due to the benign inter- national context in which the collapse of the Soviet empire took place and the fact the the "revolutions" of 1 989-92 brought these regimes into greater
ideological conformity with the West. Therefore, the events of 1989-92 rein- force a central contention of this entire book: one cannot understand the in- ternational implications of revolutionary change by looking solely at the revolutionary state; one must also consider the configurations of power and interest in the system as a whole.
THE FUTURE OF REVOLUTION
For some writers, the grand ideological struggles that have rent modern society for nearly four centuries are now fading away, to be replaced by more limited (and for the most part, peaceful) disputes over national inter- ests and an increasingly tranquil world order. This perspective sees mass revolution as inextricably linked to the process of modernization-to the spread of market forces and the transition from hierarchical forms of gov- ernment to political orders based m1 equality, mass participation, and indi- vidual rights. With the collapse of Communism and the apparent triumph of modem liberal capitalism, so the argument runs, the great ideological
24 See Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russian Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s," in Russian Secu- rity after the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow, ed. Teresa Pelton Johnson and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass. : Center for Science and International Affairs, 1994), 13-20; and Vladimir P. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," Foreign Policy 88 (fall 1992).
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struggles of the past are behind us and humankind has reached the "end of histor. y"25 If this view is correct, then my theory explains a phenomenon that may not trouble us any longer. H might be correct but irrelevant, and the lessons drawn from this study of little enduring value.
Because revolutions are so dangerous and destructive, we might prefer a world in which Marx's "locomotive of history" no longer ran. Unfortu- nately, there are good reasons to question this optimistic expectation.
First, even if mass revolution were strictly a modern phenomenon, the process of modernization is not yet complete. A mass revolution may be un- likely in any of the advanced industrial powers, but it remains a possibility in many other parts of the world. The Iranian Revolution occurred less than two decades ago (a rather short period by historical standards), and it takes little imagination to see revolutionary potential in places such as Egypt, India, Pakistan, China, parts of Latin America, and much of sub-Saharan Africa. The collapse of Communism may have discredited Marxism, but other alternatives-ranging from liberalism to radical nationalism to reli- gious fundamentalism-are available to take its place.
Second, the belief that the current hegemony of liberal capitalism will bring an end to ideological conflicts and eliminate the allure of revolution- ary transformation overlooks several matters: the possibility of unintended consequences, the alienating effects of liberal capitalism itself, and the human capacity to create new and appealing visions of a preferable social order. As Kenneth Jowitt persuasively argues, all social orders alienate some of their members, and the amoral, acquisitive individualism of liberal capi- talist society will create space for new ideologies emphasizing transcendant moral values and communitarian ideals. Instead of ideological homogene- ity, therefore, Jowitt predicts that the end of the Cold War will foster a pe- riod of ideological ferment in which new ideologies arise to challenge the hegemony of liberal-capitalist individualism. 26
Thus, the liberal-capitalist order may not always be seen as universally or eternally preferable, and it is too soon to dismiss the possibility that pre- sent discontents will foster the emergence of new dissident ideologies. In- deed, these possibilities are already evident in the rise of religious fundamentalism (whose underlying principles challenge liberalism's no- tions of tolerance), the growing pressure for cultural diversity (where lib-
25 Exponents of this view include Francis Fukuyama, The End ofHistory and the Last Man (New York: Basic Books, 1992); Theodore S. Hamerow, From the Finland Station: The Grllying of Revolution in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and John Mueller, Retreat
from Doomsdlly: The Obsolescence ofMajor War (New York: Basic Books, HJB9); and Quiet Cata- clysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics (New York: HarperCollins, 199. 5).
26 See Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
? ? ? Conclusion
eralism's emphasis on individual rights confronts claims for the collective rights of particular groups}, and the emergence of the Greens, the militia movement in America, or neo-fascism in Europe. My point is not that any of these movements will spawn the next great revolutionary ideology, but simply that new challengers will emerge, maybe sooner than we think. If their adherents achieve political power in some existing state-especially if through violent means-the dynamics I have identified are likely to come into play. Indeed, the scope and speed of mass communications could make it easier for dissident social movements to spread their principles across existing borders and amplify the normal fear of contagion. Instead of a relatively stable world of well-ordered national states, in short, we may be entering a period of renewed ideological ferment and increased transna- tional turbulence. 27
If this argument is correct, then we are unlikely to enjoy the tranquility of a world in which violent revolution is a thing of the past. Armed with a bet- ter understanding of the connection between revolution and war, however, we may still avoid some of the tragic results of earlier revolutions. That hope is both the purpose and the paradox of social science: by gaining a bet- ter grasp of the causal forces that shape social phenomena, we may be able to manipulate them so as to render our own theories invalid. Given the re- grettable international consequences that accompany most revolutions, that would be a small price to pay.
27 See Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 193--98. Tarrow also suggests that the impact of these movements may "first be ferocious, uncontrolled, and widely diffused, but later ephemeral. "
? ? ? Abadan, 241
Abercrombie, Ralph, n6n
accommodation, 2, 204, 342; American revolu-
tion and, 281; by England of Soviet Union, 176, 178; Iraruian revolution and, 256, 259; Mexican revolution and, 296; Russian civil vvar and, 158-60, 163-64, 20)-4, 207
Acheson, Dean, )5, )1), )15-18, )22 Adams, John, 2710, 276-77, 285n, 329 Adams, John Quincy, 285n Afghanistan. See Soviet Union Africa, sub-Saharan, 350
Aland Islands, 167
Albania, 300
Algeria, Islamic Salvation Front in, 247, 248n.
See also Iranian revolution Algiers accord, 238
Allende, Salvador, 336n Alsace, 56, 6o, 63, 69, 120 Amal, 249
Amanullah, Emir, 18o-81
American Independence, War of, 269--71, 280, 283; France and, 47, 53
American revolution, 13n, 16, 26g-87, 3 10, 327, 330, 33;m, 344; Barbary states and, 28o, 284; comparison vvith other revolutions, 283, 287; Continental Congress of, 270; England and, 27r>-'J2, 280, 31. 7-28, 332; Founding Fathers and, 270, 2710, 281-83, 285-86; France and, 27r>-'JI, 280, 327-28, 332; Indian tribes and, 271, 284; Latin America and, 281; Model Treaty and, 270, 283; Spain and, 27o-71, 280. See also American Independence, War of; United States
Amiens, n7
Amiens, Peace of, 278 al-Amin, Sayyid Ibrahim, 245
Amur, 152
Anatolia, 299-303, 307
[3531
Anglo-French convention, 150
Anglo-Persian treaty (1919), 179-Bo Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, 179 Anglo-Soviet trade agreement (1921), 175-79,
188, 195, 204
Angola, 336n
Ankara, 3o6
Antoinette, Marie; 58, 96
Arbe02, Jacobo, 35, 336n
Archangel, 134, 136-37, 141, 146 Armenia, 166, 182, 301, 304, 329, 347-48 Armstrong, David, 7
Articles of Confederation, 271-'72, 283
Artois, comte d', 54, 58, 6m, 64. See also Louis XVIII
ai-Assad, Hafez, 249
Auckland, Lord. See William Eden
Austria: mobilization of forces (1792), 72; for- mal convention vvith Prussia (1791), 63, 65;
and War of the First Coalition, 72, 74-75, 77-7? 8o, 82, 89-91, 96-g7, 101, 104-B; and War of the Second Coalition, no-n, 1 1 3-14,
Baath regime, 237-39, 261
Babeuf, Fram;ois-Noel (Gracchus), 109n Baden, 89
Bahonar, Muhammed, 217
Bahrain, 244, 261
n7
Austria-Hungary, 154, 300
Austrian Netherlands, 71, 74-75, Bo, 119 Austro-Prussian alliance, 70, 73, 120 Avignon, 56, 6o, 70
Azerbaijan, 166, 180, 182, 304, 347-48 Aziz, Tariq, 239
.
See also specific revolutions
Index
? Bakmetev, Boris, 145n
Bakhtiar, Shahpour, 212, 235-36, 240 al-Bakr, Ahmad, 238n
balance of power, 19, 21-22, 32, 38 43-44, 46,
327, 333-34, 337; American revolution and, 270, 271n, 275, 283-84, 286, 333-34, 337; Chi- nese revolution and, 312, 323, 325-26, 333-34; Eastern European revolutions and, 345; former Soviet Union and, 347, 349; French revolution and, 73, 1 1S-2o, 122, 128, 312, 333; Iranian revolution and, 210, 25o-54, 267, 312, 333; Mexican revolution and, 2? -97, 333-34, 337; Russian revolution and, 129, 143, 152-53, 17? 1, 173? 2o2-o5, 2o8, 312, 333; theory of, vii-viii, 3-4, 6, 19, 339-40; Turkish revolution and, 333-34, 337
balance of threat, viii, 18, 43, 46, 1o8, 331, 333-40, 342, 344; Chinese revolution and, 312-19, 323, 326; Eastern European revolu- tions and, 344-45; former Soviet Union and, 347, 349; French revolution and, 11S-28; Iranian revolution and, 210, 25o-68; Russian revolution and, 17? 5, 179, 182, 201-9
Balfour, Arthur, 13? , 135n, 143n, 145n, 153n Balkanwars (1912-1913), 300
Baltic states, 159, 167, 169, 173, 185-{)1, 195, 197 Bani-Sadr, Abolhassan, 216--17, 224-26, 23o-31,
235, 256-5- 7, 263-64
Barbary pirates, 271-72, 283
Barere, Bertramd de, 9?
Barras, Paul, Vicomte de, 107
Barrett, David, 315n
Barthelemy, Frran,. ois, 1o8
Basel, Treaty of, 104
Bastille, storming of, 53
Bavaria, 48; Soviet government in, 165, 167,
187, 205, 335 .
Bavarian-Belgian exchange, 118
Bay of Pigs, U. S. invasion of, 41
Bazargan, Mefndi, 216, 223-26, 230, 238, 254,
256-5- 7, 263
Beethoven, Ludwig von, 58
Beheshti, Ayatollah Muhammed, 216--17, 259n Belarus, 345n
Belgium, 41n, 48, 69, 71-72, 83, 89, 90n, 91, 95n,
97, 101, 104-Q7, 111 Berlin, Treaty of, 105 Blake, William, 58
? Blanning,T. C. W. ,71
Boissy d'Anglas, Fran? ois-Antoine, 101 Bolivia, 24, 38n
Bolshevik party, 22n, 26, 129-37, 139-40, 142,
144, 146-5- 0, 152, 154? 156-5- 7? t6o, t62-66, 168, 170, 173-'J5, 178, 186, 201-3, 2o6, 284, 297? 309-10, 329-30, 335? 338, 342; Four- teenth Party Congress of, 191; Fifteenth Party Congress of, 200; coup d'etat by, 130, 138, 141; Decree of Peace, 131; intentions of, 156-5- 7. See also Russia; Russian revolution; Soviet Union
Bolshevism, 152-55, 159, 167, 171, 179, 190-91, 204, 208. Seealsoideology: of Russian revo- lution
"Bolshevization," 19?
Bonapart? Lucien, 117
Bonaparte, Napoleon, toon, 103, 105-7, 112-13,
117, 120, 278-80, z86; and beginning of
Napoleonic era, 117
Borodin, Michael, 197-98
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 300
Brandler, Heinrich, 189
Brest-Litvosk, Treaty of, 11, 135, 142, 144, 158,
t8on, 203, 205, 300
Brezhne? Leonid, 230, 252
Briand, Aristide, 189
Brissot de Warville, Jean-Pierre, 65-67, 75, 76n,
78n, 8o, 8?
Brown, Harold, 225
Brumaire coup, 116-1- 7
Brunswick, duke of, 72, 77 Brunswick Manifesto, 76, 120 Bryan, William Jennings, 295 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 216, 225, 25m Buchanan, George, 135
Buckler, William H. , 16o
Bukharin, Nikolai, 13m, 132, 189-91, 200 Bull, Hedley, 7
Bullitt, William, 161-63, 168n, 204 Bundy, William P. , 324n
Burgat, Fran? ois, 247
Burges, James, 59
Burke, Edmund, 8, 5S-59, 82, 117 Byelorussia, 173
Calvert, Peter, 7, 13
Cambaceres, Jean-Jacques, 101
Cambodia, Khmer Rouge in, 41n, 326
Campo Formio, Treaty of, 1o6, 109-11, 124, 128
Canton (Guangzhou), 197-98
Carden, Lionel (Sir), 292n
Cardenas, Lazaro, 292
Carnot, Lazar? 78n, 93n, 95, 101n, 1o8 Carranza, Venustiano, 288-{)8
Carrizal, 290, 296
Carter, Jimmy, 224-25, 228, 251, 254, 256
Carter doctrine, 251, 258n
Castro, Fidel, 9-10, 26-2- 7, 35 CatherineII,Empress(ofRussia),49,59,61-62,
71, 8? 11on, 119n, 121
Central Powers, 133-34, 137-38, 141, 143-47,
149, 153-54, 300, 310
Ceylon, 107, 117
Chanak, 305
Charles, Archduke, 115-16
Charles rv, King (of Spain), 121 Charles V, Emperor (of Austria), 105 Chauvelin, Bernard, 85-86, B9n Chechnya, 347
Chesapeake incident, 279
Index
? ? [3541
? ? Canada, 149, 271, 274-'J5, 28o
? Index
Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), 197? 9, 312-13, 316, 332
Chicherin, Gyorgy V. , 142, 157, 159, 162n, 164-65, 169, 1? ? n, 181, 183, 188, 196, 304
Chile, 41n, 336n
China, People's Republic of (PRC), 34-35, 37, 40, 350; civil war in, 313-14; Communist Party (CCP), 197--99, 31o-18, 32m, 322-23, 327; Cultural Revolution in, 324-25; detona- tion of nuclear weapons by, 324; Great Leap Forward in, 324; and India, war with, 326; and Japan, 325; neutrality of, 325; and Pak- istan, 326; populallion of, 329; Red Army of, 322; Socialist Youth Corps in, 198n; Soviet Union, alliance with, 318, 326; and the Third World, 325; and United States, rapproche- ment with, 326; and Vietnam, 326; and West- em Europe, 325. See also Chinese revolution; specific revolutions
China Hands, 37
China lobby, 322, 334
Chinese Eastern Railway, 140n, 141, 151-52,
183, 185
Chinese revolution, ? 4, 16, 269, 31o-3o; Cold War and, 310, 314, 318; compared with other revolutions, 310, 312, 327; deaths in, 2m; Great Britain and, 312, 31? n, 338; Japan and, 311-12, 316-17, 321; KoreanWarand, 310, 319-23, 325-29, 332, 344; Soviet Union and, 310, 312-15, 317-18, 326, 328-29; United States and, 2, 310, 312-26, 329, 336, 338, 344; Vietnam and, 324-25
Chongqing incident, 316
Christopher, Warren, 251n, 263
Churchill, Winston, 154-57, 179, 204, 2o6, 305
Cisalpine Republic, 112, 114, 117
Claviere, Etienne, 82n
Clay, Henry, 28on
revolution and, 262-63, 338; Korean War and, 322; Russian revolution and, 163, 204, 338; Turkish revolution and, 309
Communism, 35, 40, 193, 335; collapseof, 349-50 Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 347il
Congress of the Peoples of the East, 182 Congress of Toilers of the Far East, 182 Connolly, John, 251n
Constantine, King, 303
contagion, 30, 39-47, 269, 329, 333-36, 338-40, 343, 351; American revolution and, 281, 284--S5, 335n; Chinese revolution and, 318, 324-25, 334; Eastern European revolutions and, 344-46; former Soviet Union and, 348-49; French revolution and, 73--74, 81, 90, 94, 118, 121-27, 249, 334-35; French revolu- tionary, English fear of, 83, 85--S6, 8H9, 335; Iranian revolution and, 210, 240, 242-43, 246-49, 258-63, 265, 267-68, 334-35; Mexican revolution and, 297, 335n; Russian revolution and, 131-32, 144-45, 152, 154-55, 165, 174, 177, 183, 191, 205--S, 249, 334-35; Turkish revolution and, 309, 335n. See also export of revolution; offense-defense bal- ance; revolution: optimism of
containment, policy of, 343-44 contra war, 10, 336n Convention of Reichenbach, 59 Cordeliers club, 55
Cossacks, 133-34, 141, 14? 152, 184 Council of Action, 176-78 counterrevolution, 31-32, 42-47, 269, 334,
336-38, 340, 343; American revolution and, 270, 272, 27? 281, 285--S6; Chinese revolution and, 316-17, 334, 336; Eastern European revolutions and, 346; French revo- lution and, 55, 61-66, 68-69, 75, 78, 81, 9? 2, 94, 98-100, 104, 108, 115-16, 12o-21, 123-27, 333-34, 336, 338, 343n; Iranian revo- lution and, 210, 225, 255-56, 258, 261, 334, 336, 338, 343n; Mexican revolution and, 297; Russian revolution and, 166-67, 171, 197, 200, 2o6--S, 334, 336, 338. See also foreign in- tervention; offense-defense balance
Crimea, 348
critical theory, 4-5, 34o-42
Cuba, 9, 27, 35, 40, 250, 298
Cuban revolution, 14, 38n, 42, 336; deaths in,
2m; U. S. response to, 2, 42
Cuno, Wilhelm, 189
Curzon, Lord, 14? n, 149, 154, 179 Czechoslovakia, 155, 336n
Czechoslovak Legion, 137-42, 144-47, 15o-52
Danton, Georges, 76n, 79, 8? n, 93, 94n, 96, 9? 9
Dardanelles, 300
Al-Dawa al-Islamiya (Islamic Call), 238-39, 242, 200
Clemenceau, Georges, 137, 150, 155, 2o6 Clinton, George, 274ft
Clinton, William, 229
Cloots, Jean-Baptiste (Anacharsis), 57, 66, 94,
128
Clubb, Edmund, 315n
Cobenzl, Louis, 110
Cold War, vii, 2, 336, 350
collective action problems, in revolution, 23, 29 Collot d'Herbois, Jean Marie, 87il
Columbus, New Mexico, Mexican raid on, 290 Comintem, 164-65, 187, 191, 197, 208; First
Congress, 176n, 192; Second Congress, 170, 179, 192, 205; Third Congress, 188, 192, 194, 205; Fourth Congress, 193? 4; Fifth Con- gress, 193? 4; Executive Committee of (ECCI), 192? 4, 197, 199; transformation of, 192? 4, 201; Twenty-one Points of, 192? 3
communication 32, 45, 328, 344, 351; American revolution and, 270, 285; Chinese revolution and, 322; Eastern European revolutions and, 345-46; French revolution and, 338; Iranian
l355l
?
? Dawes plan, 195
Al-Dawlah, Vusuq, 179
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,
54, 56, 6o, 273n
Deforgues, FrM? ois, 96-9- 7 Delacroix, Charles, 107 Delessart, Antoine, 7f>-J? l Denikin, Anton, 148-49, 158, 166 Denmark, 96, 190
Desmoulins, Camille, 49n
Diaz, Porfirio, 287-88, 292
Dodecanese Islands, 300
domestic politics, of revolutionary states, 3,
! riO, to8, 122, 334, 339; American revolution and, 28o-82, 284, 286; Chinese revolution and, 323; French revolution and, 64, 72-73, 334; Iranian revolution and, 258-59, 266-67, 284, 334
Dorchester, LoKd, 274n
Ducos, Roger, u7
Dulles, John Foster, 324
Dumas, Roland, 236
Dumoriez, Charles-Fran? ois, 71-72, 76-'78, So,
83, 87, 90-91, 94n; and attempt to isolate
Austrians, 71--'72
Dundas, Henry. 84, 88
Eastern Europe: Communist governments in, 344-45; post-Cold War Western support of, 347
Eastern European revolutions (1989-1992), 344-49; Cold War and, 347; comparison with other revolutions, 345; former Soviet Union and, 344-47; Marxism-Leninism and, 346; nuclear weapons and, 346; Soviet Union, collapse of, and, 344-45, 347; and super- power competition, 346-47; United States and, 345; Warsaw Pact and, 344
East Germany, 336n
Eden, William (Lord Auckland), 59, 84, 88 Egypt, 223, 229n, 237, 246, 248, 350 Eisenhower, Dwight D. , 35
elite revolution, 12-13, 20, 21n, 2!
