Second, the level of
conflict
will be greatest when the revolution creates a new state whose characteristics and ideological foundations depart sharply from the domestic orders of the other great powers.
Revolution and War_nodrm
H.
Dance, History the Be- trayer: A Study in Bias (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
50 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 205-16; and Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 7o-'J2. 51 Richard Welch, Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution,
1959-1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 41.
? ? Revolution and War
relations campaign that formed the backdrop for the U. S. -led coup that overthrew him. 52
To make matters worse, revolutions alter international relations in ways that exacerbate perceptions of hostility. First, each side is likely to underes- timate the other's sense of vulnerability, leading it to discount the role of de- fensive motivations in explaining the other side's conduct. In addition to the burdens of organizing a government and rebuilding a damaged society, rev- olutionary states usually face continued domestic opposition. Fearful of having only a precarious hold on power, they are more likely to overreact to threats. 53 Yet revolutionary states also try to portray themselves as firmly in control, in order to discourage counterrevolution at home and to attract recognition abroad. If this public relations effort is successful, however, other states will underestimate the extent to which the revolutionary state's actions are driven by insecurity, interpreting its defensive actions as a sign of aggressive intent rather than as a reaction to legitimate fears. Further- more, the other states may not recognize, first, that a new regime must build a reputation for defending its interests in order to deter future challenges and, second, that this will motivate it to respond vigorously when conflicts of interest arise.
The same tendency can occur in reverse as well. Fully aware of its own weaknesses, a revolutionary state may find it hard to understand why it is considered dangerous. If so, it may view the opposition of other states as ev- idence of their intrinsic hostility rather than as a response to its own actions. Foreign powers will be concerned with building a reputation as well, in order to teach the new regime that they cannot be exploited. Thus, both sides will be prone to see even purely defensive policies as signs of aggres- sive intent, especially when real conflicts of interest are also present.
A second exacerbating factor is the pernicious influence of exiles and rev- olutionary sympathizers. As suggested above, exiles from the revolutionary state have an incentive to portray the new regime as especially hostile, in order to convince other states to support their counterrevolutionary ambi- tions. Similarly, revolutionary sympathizers from other countries are likely to reinforce the new regime's own suspicions by portraying foreign govern- ments as deeply hostile. The more vocal and visible these groups are, the
52 On Cuba, see Richard Moss, "The Limits of Policy: An Investigation of the Spiral Model, The Deterrence Model, and Miscalculations in U. S. -Third World Relations" (Ph. D. diss. , Princeton University, 1987), t6o-64, 193-94. On Guatemala, see Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy ofIntervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); and Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold? Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, N. Y. : Anchor Books, 1983).
53 According fto George Pettee, "revolutionists enter the limelight, not like men on horse- back, as victorious conspirators appearing in the forum, but like fearful children, exploring an empty house, not sure that it is empty. " The Process ofRevolution (New York: Harper Broth- ers, 1938), 1oo-101.
? ? A Theory ofRevolution and War
greater the tendency for both sides to conclude that the host country sup- ports their aims. A large and vocal population of exiles will be seen as a sign that the host country is hostile to the revolution, just as a large and vocal group of foreign sympathizers will be taken as evidence that the new regime is actively seeking to spread its ideals elsewhere. Taken together, the parallel migration of exiles and sympathizers and the testimony they pro- vide to their hosts will strongly reinforce each side's beliefs that the other is inherently dangerous.
A third factor inflating the perception of hostility is the loss of expertise that accompanies a revolution, particularly when revolutionary govern- ments purge people with ties to perceived or potential enemies. The Iranian revolutionaries removed officials with close links to the United States, and Communist China persecuted its own "America Hands" in the 1950s. Ironi- cally, as the treatment of the State Department's "China Hands" suggests, the same process may occur within the nonrevolutionary states as well. 54 By re- moving experienced individuals, each side further reduces its capacity to un- derstand the other. Thus, the personnel changes set in motion by a revolution will exacerbate the prevailing uncertainty and reinforce mutual suspicion.
Because revolutions unleash a variety of forces that make it more difficult for the revolutionary state and its neighbors to assess each others' intentions accurately, each is likely to view the other as more hostile than it really is. Such a conclusion hampers their ability to reach a satisfactory modus vivendi and strengthens the position of those who favor direct action to eliminate the threat.
Each side's tendency to exaggerate the other's hostility helps explain why security competition increases after a revolution, but it does not explain why war occurs. After all, the United States and the Soviet Union were ex- tremely hostile for much of the Cold War, but neither saw actual war as an attractive option for dealing with the situation. Thus, the next question is why war is often seen as a reasonable response.
Revolution, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War
All else being equal, war is more likely when national leaders believe that offense is easier than defense. When offense is easy, states are less secure yet simultaneously have greater incentives to try to improve their relative posi- tions. At the same time, using force promises greater benefits because it will be simpler to gain a decisive victory over the opponents. Thus, offense dom- inance both raises the perceived level of threat and suggests that it will be
54 The "China Hands" were a group of China experts accused of disloyalty and purged from the State Department during the McCarthy era. See E. J. Kahn, The China Hands: Amer- ica's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York: Viking, 1975).
? ? Revolution and War
easy to reduce. The result is more international competition and a higher risk of war. 55
RevolutioltlS are a powerful source of this danger. In addition to creating distorted perceptions of hostility, revolutions also encourage both sides to exaggerate their own vulnerability and also the vulnerability of their oppo- nents. This tendency is partly due to the inherent difficulty of estimating the balance of power after a revolution, which makes it more likely that each will exaggerate its military prospects. In addition, the belief that the revolu- tion will either spread to other countries or readily succumb to counterrev- olutionary pressure magnifies this sense of vulnerability. Unable to estimate with high confidence the likelihood of either possibility, all sides will tend to assume the worst. For both military and political reasons, therefore, a rev- olution heightens each side's sense of threats and opportunities.
Taken together, these factors encourage both parties to believe that the other presents a grave threat, yet they also encourage the belief that the threat can be eliminated fairly easily. Furthermore, these perceptions may encourage third parties to intervene either to eliminate a potential revolu- tionary threat or to prevent other powers from gaining an advantage by doing it themselves. Once again, we can best understand these dynamics by examining revolutionary states and foreign powers separately.
Why are revolutionary states simultaneously insecure and overconfident?
To begin with, the inherent optimism of most revolutionary ideologies en- courages the new leaders to overstate the odds of victory, so they become more willing to contemplate the use of force. Arguments of this sort are dif- ficult to counter without appearing disloyal; if victory is inevitable and op- ponents are destined for the dustbin of history, then expressing doubts about the certainty of victory betrays a lack of confidence in the revolution and could easily undermine one's political position at home.
Second, the optimism of revolutionary states rests on the belief that op- ponents will be undermined by the irresistible spread of revolutionary ideas. This hope reflects the universalism common to many revolutionary ideologies and the assumption that their opponents will be unable to fight effectively owing to lack of popular support. Mao's claim that "a single spark can ignite a prairie fire" nicely conveys this faith in the catalytic ef- fects of revolutionary action, as does the so-called foco theory of guerrilla warfare developed by Che Guevara. 56 This view is also fueled by the ten-
55 See the references in n. 2 above.
56 On the basis of his experience in the Cuban revolution, Guevara argued that acts of vio- lence by a small revolutionary band (the foco) could spark a successful revolution even if strong indigenous support were Jacking. The strategy was a dismal failure, and Guevara was killed trying to implement it in Bolivia. See Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961); and also Regis Debray, "Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America," Monthly Review 19, no. 3 (1967).
? ? ? ? A Theory ofRevolution and War
dency for rebellious collective action to occur in distinct waves or cycles. Al- though most dissident social movements do not lead to a revolution, the leaders of a revolutionary state are likely to interpret signs of turbulence in other societies as evidence that their own victory is merely the first of many. 57
Revolutionary states can be further misled if they give too much credence to the testimony of foreign sympathizers, whose desire for external support inspires them to exaggerate the prospects for revolution back home. Such testimony will encourage active efforts to export the revolution (which will exacerbate tensions with other states) and fortify the new regime's confi- dence when it contemplates war. Moreover, their own success in gaining power against seemingly impossible odds may convince the revolutionary leaders that they can triumph over more powerful international opponents (this tendency will be compounded if other societies show signs of a similar level of discontent, even if rebellious action elsewhere does not lead to a full- fledged revolution). Furthermore, divisions within the revolutionary elite may encourage overly ambitious objectives, particularly if a willingness to export the revolution becomes a litmus test of revolutionary convictions. 58
Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, a revolutionary state's own vulner- ability may cause its interest in expansion to grow, at least in ideological terms. Fearing that their hold on power is fragile, revolutionary leaders are likely to view domestic opponents as potential fifth columns for their exter- nal foes. Exporting the revolution becomes the only way to preserve their positions at home: unless opposing states are swiftly overthrown, the argu- ment runs, they will eventually join forces with domestic counterrevolu- tionaries in order to crush the revolutionary state. To avoid this fate, the revolutionaries may conclude their only hope is to strike first.
Meanwhile, foreign powers are also both insecure and overconfident after a revolution. Why them as well?
Other states fear the spread of revolutionary ideas, especially when the ideas challenge their own form of government directly. But they also think this threat an easy problem to solve. Because of the disorder that accompa- nies a revolution, other states view the new regime as weak and vulnerable, especially because of the inherent difficulty of estimating a new state's abil- ity to fight. (By definition, revolutionary states rest on novel forms of social organization; revolutionary movements succeed because they exploit new
57 Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cy- cles ofProtest, Occasional Paper 21, Western Studies Program (Ithaca: Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1989).
58 This is one variant of the domestic politics approach discussed in chapter 1. When a rev- olutionary movement is deeply divided, extremists may advocate an aggressive foreign pol- icy as a means of undermining the revolutionary credentials of their more moderate opponents.
? ? Revolution and War
ways to mobilize previously untapped sources of social power. Unfortu- nately, the novelty of these institutions renders any meaningful evaluation of their impact on national capabilities nearly impossible. ) Ideological bi- ases may amplify this tendency, because states based on different political principles have trouble acknowledging that a revolutionary government could be popular or effective. (This problem affected U. S. perceptions of revolutionary states such as China, Cuba, and Nicaragua, for instance; be- cause U. S. leaders believed that Communism was illegitimate and immoral, they had difficulty recognizing these regimes as independent states com- manding substantial popular support. 59) And if they believe that a revolu- tionary state is inherently unpopular, the other states will exaggerate their own ability to confront it successfully.
The uncertainty surrounding a revolution contributes to the problem; as discussed above, foreign powers will exaggerate the threat of subversion. Having witnessed an unexpected revolutionary upheaval, mindful of the confident proclamations of the revolutionary forces, and aware that some members of their own society might harbor similar ideas (especially when there are clear signs of unrest), other states are likely to see contagion as more likely than it really is. The universalism of most revolutionary ideolo- gies compounds these worries, because the other states fear that an alliance of like-minded revolutionary powers could leave them adrift in a hostile ideological sea.
Even in the absence of clear evidence of the revolution spreading, other states cannot be completely confident that subversive movements do not lurk beneath the surface. European fears of a Jacobin conspiracy and the U. S. "Red scares" of the 1920s and the 1950s illustrate the tendency for for- eign powers to misread the ideological appeal (and therefore the offensive power) of revolutionary states. Because the threat these states pose is not simply a function of material capabilities, revolutions will seem even more dangerous than they are. And a similar logic applies to counterrevolutions: the inevitable signs of internal discord will encourage other states to try to reverse the revolution, even when it is impossible to determine the chances of success.
Once again, the perception of the threat from a revolutionary state and its susceptibility to outside pressure will be exacerbated by testimony from self-interested exiles and revolutionary sympathizers. The former portrays the revolutionary state as both a dangerous adversary and a disorganized, unpopular, and vulnerable target, while the latter depicts foreign powers as
59 Thus, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk claimed that the Communist regime in China was "a colonial Russian government . . . it is not Chinese. " Quoted in Michael J. Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 125.
? ? ? ? A Theory ofRevolution and War
both hostile and ripe for revolution. And if their respective hosts do not dis- count this testimony accordingly, they are more likely to fall into a precari- ous web of fear and overconfidence.
Thus, in addition to altering the balance of power, revolutions also shape perceptions of intent and estimates of the offense-defense balance in espe- cially dangerous ways. Both the revolutionary regime and the leaders of outside states view the other's existence as a serious challenge, yet neither can estimate the danger accurately. Lacking reliable information about the magnitude of the threat or their ability to overcome it, both will rely on ide- ology to fill in the gaps in their understanding, and will be susceptible to self-interested testimony from emigres or itinerant revolutionaries, particu- larly when this advice confirms preexisting beliefs. Therefore, although each side fears the other, it is also likely to conclude that the threat can be elimi- nated at relatively low cost. In short, the beliefs that opponents are hostile, dangerous, and vulnerable readily combine to support preventive and pre- emptive wars.
When a revolution topples an apparently viable regime, it is not surpris- ing that other states fear that they might be next. Similarly, if the revolu- tionary state has suffered extensive damage and faces continued internal opposition, its leaders have reason to worry that their success will be short lived. As subsequent chapters will show, however, both sides are usually wrong.
Revolutions are a relatively poor export commodity, and although coun- terrevolutionary efforts face somewhat better prospects, reversing a revolu- tion from outside usually proves more difficult than its advocates expect. 60 If each side's hopes and fears were accurate, the struggle between them would be a swift and decisive triumph for one side or the other. But instead of a wave of revolutionary upheavals or the swift collapse of the new regime, the normal result is either a brief, inconclusive clash (such as the Al- lied intervention in Russia or the Bay of Pigs invasion) or a protracted, bloody struggle (such as the Iran-Iraq war or the contra war in Nicaragua). The final irony, therefore, is that each side's perceptions of threats and vul- nerabilities are usually mistaken.
Why are revolutions hard to export, and why do foreign interventions fail? First, the universalist ideological rhetoric notwithstanding, a revolution
60 Examples of successful counterrevolutions include the Austro-Prussian intervention in Belgium in 1790, the Russian and Austrian interventions in Italy and Greece in the 1830s, the U. S. -backed coups in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, the U. S. invasion of Grenada in 1983- and the Vietnamese overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1979. With the exception of Cambodia, however, none of these regimes carne to power through a prolonged revolution- ary struggle, and none attempted (let alone accomplished) a thorough social transformation. Moreover, these are all cases where the intervening powers were overwhelmingly larger and stronger than the governments they overthrew.
? ? ? Revolution and War
is, above all, a national phenomenon. A campaign to export a revolution to other countries will immediately bring it into conflict with the national loy- alties of the intended recipients. And the principle that people who conceive of themselves as a nation are entitled to their own independent state has proven to be a far more powerful social force in modem history than any notion of universal revolutionary solidarity. 61 Foreign populations are likely to view efforts to export the revolution as unwarranted acts of aggression, in tum making it easier for the ruling elites to resist the revolutionary forces. Even if conditions in other countries resemble those that produced one rev-
olution in a general way, the special circumstances that enabled that one revolution to succeed are unlikely to exist elsewhere. Even if social unrest does transcend national boundaries and the success of one movement does inspire like-minded individuals abroad, actually causing a revolution to occur in a foreign country is another matter altogether.
Second, until a revolution actually occurs, other states may not have taken the possibility seriously, but once the danger is demonstrated, poten- tial victims will take steps to avoid a similar fate (for example, through de-
. fensive alliances, internal reforms, or more extensive repression). Thus, the Cuban Revolution inspired the U. S. "Alliance for Progress" in Latin Amer- ica (intended to forestall additional "Cubas" by promoting economic and political development) and encouraged Latin American oligarchies to sup- press their domestic opponents more vigorously. Again, the point is not that revolutions pose no danger, but rather that other states can usually take a number of steps to contain the threat.
Efforts to support a counterrevolution fail for somewhat different reasons.
Revolutionary leaders are usually dedicated, highly motivated individuals who have been successful precisely because they are good at organizing support in the face of impressive obstacles. They are likely to be formidable adversaries, because the same skills will aid their efforts to mobilize the na- tion for war. 62 Foreign interventions also fail, because they provide the do- mestic legitimacy that a revolutionary regime needs: the same nationalist convictions that prevent a revolution from adapting smoothly to other states will also complicate foreign intervention against a revolutionary regime. And there is an inherent paradox in trying to use exiles as the core of the counterrevolutionary movement: if these groups require extensive foreign assistance in order to challenge the new regime, their ability to com- mand indigenous support is probably limited and their prospects for suc- cess comparatively low.
? 61 See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, t9f! J), 1-7; and Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cam- ? ridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9-12.
62 Skocpol, "Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization. "
? ? A Theory of Revolution and War
To summarize: the pressure for war produced by a revolution results from two parallel myths: the belief that the revolution will spread rapidly if it is not "strangled in its crib," and the belief that such a reversal will be easy to accomplish. Among other things, this argument implies that war would be most likely when the revolutionary state espouses a universalist ideology, because such ideologies can easily be regarded as a potent (though unmeasurable) source of threat by other states. Contrary to these expectations, however, the normal result is neither a swift tide of revolu- tionary contagion nor the quick and easy ouster of the new regime. In- stead, the more frequent result is a prolonged struggle between the unexpectedly resilient revolutionary regime and its surprisingly impervi- ous opponents.
The explanation outlined in this chapter may also provide a more com- plete explanation of why revolutionary states tend to alter their behavior over time. Many of the problems caused by a revolution arise from mis- judging the balance of power, the intentions of others, and the probability of contagion or counterrevolution. From this perspective, "socialization" is simply the process by which both sides acquire greater information about each of these factors. As evidence accumulates, the uncertainty that permits exaggerated perceptions of threat to flourish declines proportion- ately. Even if the new regime does not abandon its ultimate objectives, it is likely to modify its short-term behavior in accordance with this new in-
formation. Relations between the revolutionary states and the rest of the system will become increasingly "normal," assuming, of course, that each side is capable of evaluating and revising its policies in light of experi- ence. 63
Two caveats should be noted at this point. First, because elite revolutions feature less extreme ideological visions and exert less dramatic internal ef- fects than mass revolutions, they will have less effect on the balance of threats, and so the risk of war will be lower than it is after a mass revolution.
Second, the level of conflict will be greatest when the revolution creates a new state whose characteristics and ideological foundations depart sharply from the domestic orders of the other great powers. By contrast, if a revolu- tion brings a state into conformity with prevailing sociopolitical forms, then the new regime will be seen as less hostile and the danger of contagion may be slim to nonexistent. One cannot understand the international impact of a revolution by looking solely at the revolutionary state; one must also con-
sider the external environment in which the revolution occurred.
63 David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International So- ciety (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), esp. 302-304. For a useful survey of the literature on how states learn, see Jack Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Mine- field," International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994).
? ? Revolution and War
TESTING THE THEORY
As shown in figure 1, the theory outlined above identifies several inde- pendent, mutually reinforcing mechanisms linking revolution and war. It predicts that revolutions will lead to sharper security competition between states and increase the probability of war. Indeed, the theory suggests that strong pressures for war will be present even when other factors intervene to prevent it.
In each of the case studies that follow, I explore whether the different mechanisms identified in this chapter were present and, if so, whether they had the predicted effects. In general, the theory can be considered sup- ported if, first, the revolution was followed by increased security competi- tion or war; second, conflict and war occurred for the reasons identified in the theory; third, one or more of the causal mechanisms identified in the theory was absent or muted and war did not occur; fourth, the predicted pressures for war were present but other factors intervened to prevent it; and fifth, these effects would have been unlikely to occur had the revolution not taken place.
More specifically, the theory is supported either if other states saw the rev- olution as altering the balance of power, and sought to take advantage of this window of opportunity, or if they were inclined to use force in order to pre- vent other states from doing the same thing. By contrast, if other states did not view the revolution as a potential opportunity (owing to a perceived shift in the balance of power), that would count against this part of the theory.
? ? ? Figure 1.
Revolution
Effects on the Revolutionary State
Change in preferences
Perceptions of external environment shaped by revolutionary ideology (Other states are hostile; victory is inevitable; the revolution has universal relevance)
Increased uncertainty and misinformation
Effects on Relations between States
Spirals of suspicion
Perceptions of offensive advantage
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? A Theory ofRevolution and War
The theory is also supported if the new regime and other states consis- tently exaggerated each other's hostility, especially if these spirals reflected ideological predispositions. The occurrence of a serious dispute does not necessarily mean that a spiral of suspicion occurred; rather, one or both sides must have also misinterpreted the other's actions and exaggerated its hostility. 64 The theory gains further credence if these errors were fueled by uncertainty or problems of communication arising from the revolution, or by the transnational activities of counterrevolutionary exiles or revolution-
ary sympathizers. Again, this element of the theory is undermined if the revolution in question caused little change in either side's perceptions of in- tent or if a subsequent dispute was based solely on a legitimate clash of in- terest that both sides evaluated more or less accurately.
Evidence that the possible spread of revolution (or counterrevolution) magnified each side's perceptions of insecurity or overconfidence supports the theory, especially if these beliefs were central to the decision for war. By contrast, the theory loses credibility if war occurred when the possibility of exporting the revolution was either absent or dismissed, or if both sides be- lieved that the revolution was likely to spread but were able to establish good relations nonetheless.
The theory I have set forth in this chapter explains why revolutions in- tensify security competition between states and increase the probability of war. I do not mean to imply that revolutions are a unique cause of war or that the dynamics that link revolutions and international conflict do not apply in other situations. However, I do regard revolutions as an especially powerful source of these dangers and consider war to be very likely in the aftermath of a successful revolution. In other words, a revolution is a suffi- cient but not necessary cause of security competition and war. The question is whether the effects of major revolutions support this general argument. To provide an answer, I begin by examining the international consequences of the French Revolution.
64 Itcanalsobedifficulttodetermineifstatementsindicatingsuspicionorhostilityareev- idence of genuine fears or merely propapanda intended for other purposes. Even if it is pro- paganda, it is unlikely to be effective when there is not some basis for it, and such campaigns can take on a life of their own if elites begin to believe their own rhetoric or become trapped by public opinion.
? ? ? ? The French Revolution
"Not until statesmen had at last grasped the nature of the forces that had emerged in France and had grasped that new political conditions now obtained in Europe, could they foresee the broad effects alJ this would have on war. "
-Carl von Clausewitz
In this chapter I explore relations between revolutionary France and the other European powers from 1789 to 1799, with particular emphasis on the wars of the First and Second Coalitions. The period illustrates the link be- tween revolution and war in an especially vivid way and provides strong support for the arguments advanced in the previous chapter.
First, as balance-of-threat theory would suggest, the French Revolution made war more likely by altering the balance of power. France's apparenR weakness invited other states to seek gains either at French expense or in other areas, because they believed France could not oppose them effectively. Although neither Prussia nor Austria was strongly committed to over- throwing the new French leaders, the two states' desire to exploit the power vacuum created by the revolution helped place them both on a collision course with the new regime.
Second, the drive to war was fueled by the effects of the revolution on each state's intentions and by the ways that these intentions were perceived! by others. The revolution altered French foreign policy objectives (both for ideological reasons and because competing factions within France used for- eign policy to challenge their internal opponents), and it also distorted other states' perceptions of French intentions in especially dangerous ways.
Third, these fears were exacerbated by each side's belief that its oppo- nents might be able to impose their will with relatively little effort, either through subversion, propaganda, or a rapid military campaign. French leaders were preoccupied with the danger of counterrevolution-based on suspicions of treason, rumors of aristocratic plots, and the possibility of for- eign interference-while foreign leaders came to worry that the revolution in France would spread to their own societies. As we shall see, both sides'
? ? ? The French Revolution
fears were overstated: the French were able to spread their revolution only through direct military conquest, and foreign efforts to reverse the revolu- tion in France were never very effective. Nonetheless, each side's belief in its own vulnerability intensifed its perceptions of threat and encouraged efforts to eliminate the danger before it became irresistible. Instead of the swift and bloodless victories that both sides anticipated, however, the result of these
decisions was a quarter-century of recurring warfare.
And fourth, these problems were exacerbated by the poor information available to national leaders. Throughout this period, political leaders re- peatedly miscalculated the balance of power, misread each other's inten- tions, and exaggerated the prospects for revolution and counterrevolution. Such problems are hardly unusual in international politics, but the revolu- tion aggravated them by severing the normal channels of information be- tween governments, by encouraging a variety of unofficial representatives (such as the French emigres) to purvey a host of self-serving myths, and by forcing statesmen to base policy decisions on estimates of probabilities that were inherently unknowable (such as the revolutionary potential of a given society ) .
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first describes the origins and ideological foundations of the revolution and the causes of the war of 1792. In the second I examine the expansion of the war in 1793 and the subse- quent struggle between France and the First Coalition. I tum in the third part to the War of the Second Coalition. Finally I consider the arguments ad- vanced in chapter 2 in light of these events.
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF 1792
Avant le Deluge: France and Europe under the Old Regime
French prestige and influence declined steadily after 1750, a trend under- scored by its defeat in the Seven Years War (175? 3), its paralysis during the Polish succession of 1764 and the first partition of Poland in 1772, and the various reverses suffered by its Swedish and Ottoman allies. An appar- ent French triumph in the War of American Independence proved to be a hollow victory, as it did little to damage England and contributed to the growing fiscal crisis in France.
England was France's traditional rival, owing to a combination of geo- graphic proximity, colonial competition, and conflicting security interests. An attempt to improve relations through a commercial treaty in 1785 failed to overcome English suspicions, and the growth of French influence in the Low Countries (culminating in the Franco-Dutch alliance of 1785) eventu- ally led England and Prussia to invade Holland in 1787. The invaders
? ? Revolution and War
ousted the pro-French Patriot Party and restored the pro-English Stad- holder, William of Orange, in yet another demonstration of French impo- tence. 1
Austria amd France had been formally allied since 1756, but the tie was in- creasingly seen as a burden by both countries. Yet it endured, because France wanted to keep Austria from allying itself with England, and Austria wanted to keep France away from Prussia. 2 France was also allied to Spain via the Family Compact of 1761, an agreement based on dynastic solidarity between the two Bourbon houses and mutual hostility to England. These as- sets did not outweigh France's many liabilities, however, and France's in- ternational position on the eve of the revolution was not auspicious. 3
Conflicts among the other great powers, endemic in this period, would play an important role in shaping foreign responses to events in France. Austria and Prussia had been rivals since the 1740s, with each one primar- ily concerned with enhancing its position at the expense of the other. Em- peror Joseph II of Austria also hoped to exchange his Belgian possessions for Bavaria (thereby ridding himself of some unruly subjects and consoli- dating Austria's position in Central Europe), but his efforts to do so were re- peatedly thwarted by foreign opposition. Austria did manage to isolate Prussia by allying with Russia in 1781, but Joseph was eventually forced to enter the Russo-Turkish war in 1788 in order to maintain the connection and
to prevent Russia from monopolizing the fruits of victory. The Hapsburgs also faced considerable internal unrest during this period (partly a reaction to Joseph's reform program), including a conservative revolt in the Nether- lands in 1789. 4
Prussia's small size and relative weakness encouraged an expansionist foreign policy, and King Frederick William made several unsuccessful at-
1 On A n g l o - F re n c h r e l a t i o n s p r i o r t o t h e r e v o l u t i o n , se e T . C . W . B l a n n i n g , T h e O r i g i n s of t h e French Revolutionary Wars (New York: Longman, 1986), 45-51; M. S. Anderson, "European Diplpmatic History," in New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 8: The American and French Revo- lutions, 1763-93, ed. Albert Goodwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 267-68; and J. H. Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," in Cambridge History ofBritish Foreign Policy, ed. A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (New York: Macmillan, 1922), 1:159-70. The Patriot revolt in Holland is described by Simon Schama, Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 178o-1813 (New York: Random House, 1977), chap. 3; and Alfred Cobban, Ambassadors and Secret Agents: The Diplomacy of the First Earl of Malmesbury at the Hague (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954).
2 See Blannlng, French Revolutionary Wars, 4o-45; J. H. Clapham, The Causes ofthe War of 1792 (1892; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1969), 5-8; and Paul W. Schroeder, The Trans-
fo r m a t i o n of E u r o p ? a n P o l i t i c s , 1 7 6 3 - 1 8 4 8 ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1 9 9 4 ) , 4 2 - 4 3 .
3 See Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815 (New York:
Longman, 1983), 215-16.
.
4 On the Belgium-Bavaria exchange, see Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 26-35. On Joseph's reforms and the Belgian revolt, see Robert R. Palmer, The Age of the Demo- cratic Revolution: A Political History ofEurope and America, 1760-1800, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 1964), 1:341-57, 374-83.
? ? The French Revolution
tempts to acquire additional territory; Prussia was allied with England and Holland, but the alliance was strictly defensive and England refused to back most of Frederick William's diplomatic gambits, including his pro- posal for an attack on Austria in 1790. As events in France began to cast a shadow over the European system, Frederick William was already contem- plating several new ploys for territorial aggrandizement, ranging from an alliance with France to an attack upon France or an additional partition of Poland. 5
Relations among the great powers were complicated further by the growth of Russian power and the unstable situation in Poland. Catherine II had used the Austro-Prussian rivalry to win concessions from both, while seizing territory from the Ottoman Empire and establishing de facto control of Poland after the first partition in 1772. When Russia was distracted by the war with Turkey and an opportunistic invasion by Sweden in 1788, a group of Polish reformers convened a new Diet and proclaimed a new constitu- tion. Although the effort temporarily succeeded, it was only a matter of time before Catherine would attempt to reassert Russian primacy. 6
Thus the European system was in a state of considerable fluidity when the revolution in France began. France was formally allied with Austria and Spain (though the relationship with Austria was strained) and openly hos- tile to England. England was equally suspicious of France, formally allied to Prussia and Holland, and wary of Russia. Austria was allied with France and Russia and bogged down in a war against the Ottoman Empire while keeping a watchful eye on Prussia. Both Austria and Prussia were interested in territorial revisions, and the internal turmoil in Poland and the Low
Countries added to the endemic instability of the system.
Ideological Underpinnings
Identifying the ideological roots of the French Revolution is especially challenging because none of the leading participants began with a blueprint for the future political order that was well thought out? Without being able to consult an explicit revolutionary program, therefore, students of the pe- riod must try to identify the central ideas that informed political debate and drove political action, while recognizing that this vocabulary shifted in re-
5 See Robert Howard Lord, The Second Partition of Poland: A Study in Diplomatic History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915), 75-82; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 51-55; and Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 190-97?
6 See Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 1:422-29; Lord, Second Partition, chaps. 1, 5-{i,
7 As the Jacobin Camille Desmoulins later recalled: "In all France there were not ten of us who were republicans prior to 1789. " Quoted in Henri Peyre, "The Influence of Eighteenth Century Ideas on the French Revolution," in his Historical and Critical Essays (Lincoln: Uni- versity of Nebraska Press, 1968), 72.
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sponse to the revolutionary process itsel? . 8 The concepts that shaped the rev- olution were not fixed, but they did provide the intellectual arsenal that rival groups employed both to understand the events in which they were immersed and to rally support and discredit opposition. And while these ideological underpinnings did not determine the course or outcome of the revolution, they did form the elements from which it was built. 9
What are the main ideas that shaped the revolution in France? At the risk of oversimplifying, I have identified four interrelated themes in prerevolu- tionary political discourse that merit particular attention.
The first key theme was a commitment to reason and natural law, to- gether with the concomitant belief that political action could correct existing social ills. In addition to undermining support for the Church, the notion that human affairs could be ordered according to the dictates of reason was a potent solvent to a conception of society based on privileged orders and monarchical authority. 10 This discourse implied that departures from tradi-
tion were permissible, provided they were based on reason, and faith in the power of reason helped created a new faith in politics and its unlimited ca- pacity for action. 11
A second theme was a broad ideological assault on the legitimacy of the absolutist state. This discourse contained several distinct but mutually rein- forcing strands: one focusing on "justice" (defined as restraint on monarchi- cal will}, another extolling liberty and equality and attacking the institutions of aristocratic privilege, and a third challenging the image of the king as
8 This war of ideas took place in a society that was experiencing an explosion in publishing. making it possible to disseminate contending opinions more rapidly and widely than ever be- fore. See Robert Damton and Daniel Roche, eds. , Revolution in Print: The Press in France, 1775-1800(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress, 1989);JeremyPopkin,RevolutionaryNews: The Press in France 1 789-1799 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and Colin Jones, ed. , The Longman Companion to the French Revolution (New York: Longman, 1988), 26o-62.
9 "The ideology embraced by the National Assembly . . . was . . . less a blueprint than a set of architectural principles that could be applied to the construction of quite different so- ciopolitical orders. " William Sewell, "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case," Journal ofModern History 57, no. 1 (1985), 71. See also Daniel Momet, Les Ori- gines intellectuelles de Ia revolutionfran? aise (1715-1787) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1933), esp. 477; Peyre, "Influence of Eighteenth Century Ideas"; and Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolu tion, trans. L. G. Cochrane (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989). :
10 "The Enlightenment insisted on the universal applicability of reason to human affairs It had scorn for all privilege no matter how ancient or venerable. " Sewell, "Ideologies and So- cial Revolutions," 65.
11 Fran. ;ois Furet argues that "the very bedrock of revolutionary consciousness" is the be- lief that "there is no human misfortune not amenable to a political solution. " Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 25. As products of the En! ightenment, the revolutionaries "believed in the absolute efficacy of politics-which they thought capable of recasting the body social and regenerating the indi- vidual. " Bronislaw Baczko, "Enlightenment," in A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, ed. Fran. ;ois Furet and Mona Ozouf, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 1989), 662-64; and see Chartier, Cultural Origins, 198.
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God's chosen representative. If not revolutionary by themselves, each of these strands nourished doubts about the existing order and cleared the way for a fundamental change. 12
Third, the wide-ranging challenge to absolutism featured a continuing debate on the nature of the political community. Over time, the image of France as the personal possession of a sovereign king was supplanted by the idea that sovereignty was held by a single people united by language, terri- tory, blood, and other "natural" characteristics. This transformation from subjects to citizens was already evident in 1788, when Abbe Sieyes declared that the Third Estate was "everything appertaining to the nation. "13 The rev- olution completed this process by replacing an abstract notion of the king as the sovereign authority with a concept of "popular sovereignty" in which the nation was the embodiment of the "general will. "14
Finally, under the influence of Rousseau, Montesquieu, and others, the ideological foundations of the French Revolution also contained a powerful moral dimension, centered on the concept of virtue. The importance at- tached to virtue helped discredit the old regime (which was seen as corrupt) and legitimated efforts to inculcate proper conduct as part of creating a new political order. Abelief in reason and in the limitless possibilities of politics also implied that "human action no longer encounters obstacles or limits, only adversaries, preferably traitors. "15 This tendency reached its peak dur- ing the Reign of Terror, when the Jacobins used the machinery of the state to promote virtue among the citizens, while seeking to eliminate any individ- uals whose opposition to the general will exposed their evil natures. 16
12 See Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), esp. 25-27; Jeffrey Merrick, The Desacralization of the French Monarchy in the Eighteenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990); and Robert Damton, The Literary Underground of the Old Regime (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
13 Sieyes added that "the Nation is prior to everything, it is the source of everything. .
50 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 205-16; and Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 7o-'J2. 51 Richard Welch, Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution,
1959-1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 41.
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relations campaign that formed the backdrop for the U. S. -led coup that overthrew him. 52
To make matters worse, revolutions alter international relations in ways that exacerbate perceptions of hostility. First, each side is likely to underes- timate the other's sense of vulnerability, leading it to discount the role of de- fensive motivations in explaining the other side's conduct. In addition to the burdens of organizing a government and rebuilding a damaged society, rev- olutionary states usually face continued domestic opposition. Fearful of having only a precarious hold on power, they are more likely to overreact to threats. 53 Yet revolutionary states also try to portray themselves as firmly in control, in order to discourage counterrevolution at home and to attract recognition abroad. If this public relations effort is successful, however, other states will underestimate the extent to which the revolutionary state's actions are driven by insecurity, interpreting its defensive actions as a sign of aggressive intent rather than as a reaction to legitimate fears. Further- more, the other states may not recognize, first, that a new regime must build a reputation for defending its interests in order to deter future challenges and, second, that this will motivate it to respond vigorously when conflicts of interest arise.
The same tendency can occur in reverse as well. Fully aware of its own weaknesses, a revolutionary state may find it hard to understand why it is considered dangerous. If so, it may view the opposition of other states as ev- idence of their intrinsic hostility rather than as a response to its own actions. Foreign powers will be concerned with building a reputation as well, in order to teach the new regime that they cannot be exploited. Thus, both sides will be prone to see even purely defensive policies as signs of aggres- sive intent, especially when real conflicts of interest are also present.
A second exacerbating factor is the pernicious influence of exiles and rev- olutionary sympathizers. As suggested above, exiles from the revolutionary state have an incentive to portray the new regime as especially hostile, in order to convince other states to support their counterrevolutionary ambi- tions. Similarly, revolutionary sympathizers from other countries are likely to reinforce the new regime's own suspicions by portraying foreign govern- ments as deeply hostile. The more vocal and visible these groups are, the
52 On Cuba, see Richard Moss, "The Limits of Policy: An Investigation of the Spiral Model, The Deterrence Model, and Miscalculations in U. S. -Third World Relations" (Ph. D. diss. , Princeton University, 1987), t6o-64, 193-94. On Guatemala, see Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy ofIntervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); and Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold? Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, N. Y. : Anchor Books, 1983).
53 According fto George Pettee, "revolutionists enter the limelight, not like men on horse- back, as victorious conspirators appearing in the forum, but like fearful children, exploring an empty house, not sure that it is empty. " The Process ofRevolution (New York: Harper Broth- ers, 1938), 1oo-101.
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greater the tendency for both sides to conclude that the host country sup- ports their aims. A large and vocal population of exiles will be seen as a sign that the host country is hostile to the revolution, just as a large and vocal group of foreign sympathizers will be taken as evidence that the new regime is actively seeking to spread its ideals elsewhere. Taken together, the parallel migration of exiles and sympathizers and the testimony they pro- vide to their hosts will strongly reinforce each side's beliefs that the other is inherently dangerous.
A third factor inflating the perception of hostility is the loss of expertise that accompanies a revolution, particularly when revolutionary govern- ments purge people with ties to perceived or potential enemies. The Iranian revolutionaries removed officials with close links to the United States, and Communist China persecuted its own "America Hands" in the 1950s. Ironi- cally, as the treatment of the State Department's "China Hands" suggests, the same process may occur within the nonrevolutionary states as well. 54 By re- moving experienced individuals, each side further reduces its capacity to un- derstand the other. Thus, the personnel changes set in motion by a revolution will exacerbate the prevailing uncertainty and reinforce mutual suspicion.
Because revolutions unleash a variety of forces that make it more difficult for the revolutionary state and its neighbors to assess each others' intentions accurately, each is likely to view the other as more hostile than it really is. Such a conclusion hampers their ability to reach a satisfactory modus vivendi and strengthens the position of those who favor direct action to eliminate the threat.
Each side's tendency to exaggerate the other's hostility helps explain why security competition increases after a revolution, but it does not explain why war occurs. After all, the United States and the Soviet Union were ex- tremely hostile for much of the Cold War, but neither saw actual war as an attractive option for dealing with the situation. Thus, the next question is why war is often seen as a reasonable response.
Revolution, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War
All else being equal, war is more likely when national leaders believe that offense is easier than defense. When offense is easy, states are less secure yet simultaneously have greater incentives to try to improve their relative posi- tions. At the same time, using force promises greater benefits because it will be simpler to gain a decisive victory over the opponents. Thus, offense dom- inance both raises the perceived level of threat and suggests that it will be
54 The "China Hands" were a group of China experts accused of disloyalty and purged from the State Department during the McCarthy era. See E. J. Kahn, The China Hands: Amer- ica's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York: Viking, 1975).
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easy to reduce. The result is more international competition and a higher risk of war. 55
RevolutioltlS are a powerful source of this danger. In addition to creating distorted perceptions of hostility, revolutions also encourage both sides to exaggerate their own vulnerability and also the vulnerability of their oppo- nents. This tendency is partly due to the inherent difficulty of estimating the balance of power after a revolution, which makes it more likely that each will exaggerate its military prospects. In addition, the belief that the revolu- tion will either spread to other countries or readily succumb to counterrev- olutionary pressure magnifies this sense of vulnerability. Unable to estimate with high confidence the likelihood of either possibility, all sides will tend to assume the worst. For both military and political reasons, therefore, a rev- olution heightens each side's sense of threats and opportunities.
Taken together, these factors encourage both parties to believe that the other presents a grave threat, yet they also encourage the belief that the threat can be eliminated fairly easily. Furthermore, these perceptions may encourage third parties to intervene either to eliminate a potential revolu- tionary threat or to prevent other powers from gaining an advantage by doing it themselves. Once again, we can best understand these dynamics by examining revolutionary states and foreign powers separately.
Why are revolutionary states simultaneously insecure and overconfident?
To begin with, the inherent optimism of most revolutionary ideologies en- courages the new leaders to overstate the odds of victory, so they become more willing to contemplate the use of force. Arguments of this sort are dif- ficult to counter without appearing disloyal; if victory is inevitable and op- ponents are destined for the dustbin of history, then expressing doubts about the certainty of victory betrays a lack of confidence in the revolution and could easily undermine one's political position at home.
Second, the optimism of revolutionary states rests on the belief that op- ponents will be undermined by the irresistible spread of revolutionary ideas. This hope reflects the universalism common to many revolutionary ideologies and the assumption that their opponents will be unable to fight effectively owing to lack of popular support. Mao's claim that "a single spark can ignite a prairie fire" nicely conveys this faith in the catalytic ef- fects of revolutionary action, as does the so-called foco theory of guerrilla warfare developed by Che Guevara. 56 This view is also fueled by the ten-
55 See the references in n. 2 above.
56 On the basis of his experience in the Cuban revolution, Guevara argued that acts of vio- lence by a small revolutionary band (the foco) could spark a successful revolution even if strong indigenous support were Jacking. The strategy was a dismal failure, and Guevara was killed trying to implement it in Bolivia. See Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961); and also Regis Debray, "Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America," Monthly Review 19, no. 3 (1967).
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dency for rebellious collective action to occur in distinct waves or cycles. Al- though most dissident social movements do not lead to a revolution, the leaders of a revolutionary state are likely to interpret signs of turbulence in other societies as evidence that their own victory is merely the first of many. 57
Revolutionary states can be further misled if they give too much credence to the testimony of foreign sympathizers, whose desire for external support inspires them to exaggerate the prospects for revolution back home. Such testimony will encourage active efforts to export the revolution (which will exacerbate tensions with other states) and fortify the new regime's confi- dence when it contemplates war. Moreover, their own success in gaining power against seemingly impossible odds may convince the revolutionary leaders that they can triumph over more powerful international opponents (this tendency will be compounded if other societies show signs of a similar level of discontent, even if rebellious action elsewhere does not lead to a full- fledged revolution). Furthermore, divisions within the revolutionary elite may encourage overly ambitious objectives, particularly if a willingness to export the revolution becomes a litmus test of revolutionary convictions. 58
Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, a revolutionary state's own vulner- ability may cause its interest in expansion to grow, at least in ideological terms. Fearing that their hold on power is fragile, revolutionary leaders are likely to view domestic opponents as potential fifth columns for their exter- nal foes. Exporting the revolution becomes the only way to preserve their positions at home: unless opposing states are swiftly overthrown, the argu- ment runs, they will eventually join forces with domestic counterrevolu- tionaries in order to crush the revolutionary state. To avoid this fate, the revolutionaries may conclude their only hope is to strike first.
Meanwhile, foreign powers are also both insecure and overconfident after a revolution. Why them as well?
Other states fear the spread of revolutionary ideas, especially when the ideas challenge their own form of government directly. But they also think this threat an easy problem to solve. Because of the disorder that accompa- nies a revolution, other states view the new regime as weak and vulnerable, especially because of the inherent difficulty of estimating a new state's abil- ity to fight. (By definition, revolutionary states rest on novel forms of social organization; revolutionary movements succeed because they exploit new
57 Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cy- cles ofProtest, Occasional Paper 21, Western Studies Program (Ithaca: Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 1989).
58 This is one variant of the domestic politics approach discussed in chapter 1. When a rev- olutionary movement is deeply divided, extremists may advocate an aggressive foreign pol- icy as a means of undermining the revolutionary credentials of their more moderate opponents.
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ways to mobilize previously untapped sources of social power. Unfortu- nately, the novelty of these institutions renders any meaningful evaluation of their impact on national capabilities nearly impossible. ) Ideological bi- ases may amplify this tendency, because states based on different political principles have trouble acknowledging that a revolutionary government could be popular or effective. (This problem affected U. S. perceptions of revolutionary states such as China, Cuba, and Nicaragua, for instance; be- cause U. S. leaders believed that Communism was illegitimate and immoral, they had difficulty recognizing these regimes as independent states com- manding substantial popular support. 59) And if they believe that a revolu- tionary state is inherently unpopular, the other states will exaggerate their own ability to confront it successfully.
The uncertainty surrounding a revolution contributes to the problem; as discussed above, foreign powers will exaggerate the threat of subversion. Having witnessed an unexpected revolutionary upheaval, mindful of the confident proclamations of the revolutionary forces, and aware that some members of their own society might harbor similar ideas (especially when there are clear signs of unrest), other states are likely to see contagion as more likely than it really is. The universalism of most revolutionary ideolo- gies compounds these worries, because the other states fear that an alliance of like-minded revolutionary powers could leave them adrift in a hostile ideological sea.
Even in the absence of clear evidence of the revolution spreading, other states cannot be completely confident that subversive movements do not lurk beneath the surface. European fears of a Jacobin conspiracy and the U. S. "Red scares" of the 1920s and the 1950s illustrate the tendency for for- eign powers to misread the ideological appeal (and therefore the offensive power) of revolutionary states. Because the threat these states pose is not simply a function of material capabilities, revolutions will seem even more dangerous than they are. And a similar logic applies to counterrevolutions: the inevitable signs of internal discord will encourage other states to try to reverse the revolution, even when it is impossible to determine the chances of success.
Once again, the perception of the threat from a revolutionary state and its susceptibility to outside pressure will be exacerbated by testimony from self-interested exiles and revolutionary sympathizers. The former portrays the revolutionary state as both a dangerous adversary and a disorganized, unpopular, and vulnerable target, while the latter depicts foreign powers as
59 Thus, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk claimed that the Communist regime in China was "a colonial Russian government . . . it is not Chinese. " Quoted in Michael J. Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 125.
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both hostile and ripe for revolution. And if their respective hosts do not dis- count this testimony accordingly, they are more likely to fall into a precari- ous web of fear and overconfidence.
Thus, in addition to altering the balance of power, revolutions also shape perceptions of intent and estimates of the offense-defense balance in espe- cially dangerous ways. Both the revolutionary regime and the leaders of outside states view the other's existence as a serious challenge, yet neither can estimate the danger accurately. Lacking reliable information about the magnitude of the threat or their ability to overcome it, both will rely on ide- ology to fill in the gaps in their understanding, and will be susceptible to self-interested testimony from emigres or itinerant revolutionaries, particu- larly when this advice confirms preexisting beliefs. Therefore, although each side fears the other, it is also likely to conclude that the threat can be elimi- nated at relatively low cost. In short, the beliefs that opponents are hostile, dangerous, and vulnerable readily combine to support preventive and pre- emptive wars.
When a revolution topples an apparently viable regime, it is not surpris- ing that other states fear that they might be next. Similarly, if the revolu- tionary state has suffered extensive damage and faces continued internal opposition, its leaders have reason to worry that their success will be short lived. As subsequent chapters will show, however, both sides are usually wrong.
Revolutions are a relatively poor export commodity, and although coun- terrevolutionary efforts face somewhat better prospects, reversing a revolu- tion from outside usually proves more difficult than its advocates expect. 60 If each side's hopes and fears were accurate, the struggle between them would be a swift and decisive triumph for one side or the other. But instead of a wave of revolutionary upheavals or the swift collapse of the new regime, the normal result is either a brief, inconclusive clash (such as the Al- lied intervention in Russia or the Bay of Pigs invasion) or a protracted, bloody struggle (such as the Iran-Iraq war or the contra war in Nicaragua). The final irony, therefore, is that each side's perceptions of threats and vul- nerabilities are usually mistaken.
Why are revolutions hard to export, and why do foreign interventions fail? First, the universalist ideological rhetoric notwithstanding, a revolution
60 Examples of successful counterrevolutions include the Austro-Prussian intervention in Belgium in 1790, the Russian and Austrian interventions in Italy and Greece in the 1830s, the U. S. -backed coups in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, the U. S. invasion of Grenada in 1983- and the Vietnamese overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1979. With the exception of Cambodia, however, none of these regimes carne to power through a prolonged revolution- ary struggle, and none attempted (let alone accomplished) a thorough social transformation. Moreover, these are all cases where the intervening powers were overwhelmingly larger and stronger than the governments they overthrew.
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is, above all, a national phenomenon. A campaign to export a revolution to other countries will immediately bring it into conflict with the national loy- alties of the intended recipients. And the principle that people who conceive of themselves as a nation are entitled to their own independent state has proven to be a far more powerful social force in modem history than any notion of universal revolutionary solidarity. 61 Foreign populations are likely to view efforts to export the revolution as unwarranted acts of aggression, in tum making it easier for the ruling elites to resist the revolutionary forces. Even if conditions in other countries resemble those that produced one rev-
olution in a general way, the special circumstances that enabled that one revolution to succeed are unlikely to exist elsewhere. Even if social unrest does transcend national boundaries and the success of one movement does inspire like-minded individuals abroad, actually causing a revolution to occur in a foreign country is another matter altogether.
Second, until a revolution actually occurs, other states may not have taken the possibility seriously, but once the danger is demonstrated, poten- tial victims will take steps to avoid a similar fate (for example, through de-
. fensive alliances, internal reforms, or more extensive repression). Thus, the Cuban Revolution inspired the U. S. "Alliance for Progress" in Latin Amer- ica (intended to forestall additional "Cubas" by promoting economic and political development) and encouraged Latin American oligarchies to sup- press their domestic opponents more vigorously. Again, the point is not that revolutions pose no danger, but rather that other states can usually take a number of steps to contain the threat.
Efforts to support a counterrevolution fail for somewhat different reasons.
Revolutionary leaders are usually dedicated, highly motivated individuals who have been successful precisely because they are good at organizing support in the face of impressive obstacles. They are likely to be formidable adversaries, because the same skills will aid their efforts to mobilize the na- tion for war. 62 Foreign interventions also fail, because they provide the do- mestic legitimacy that a revolutionary regime needs: the same nationalist convictions that prevent a revolution from adapting smoothly to other states will also complicate foreign intervention against a revolutionary regime. And there is an inherent paradox in trying to use exiles as the core of the counterrevolutionary movement: if these groups require extensive foreign assistance in order to challenge the new regime, their ability to com- mand indigenous support is probably limited and their prospects for suc- cess comparatively low.
? 61 See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, t9f! J), 1-7; and Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cam- ? ridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9-12.
62 Skocpol, "Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization. "
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To summarize: the pressure for war produced by a revolution results from two parallel myths: the belief that the revolution will spread rapidly if it is not "strangled in its crib," and the belief that such a reversal will be easy to accomplish. Among other things, this argument implies that war would be most likely when the revolutionary state espouses a universalist ideology, because such ideologies can easily be regarded as a potent (though unmeasurable) source of threat by other states. Contrary to these expectations, however, the normal result is neither a swift tide of revolu- tionary contagion nor the quick and easy ouster of the new regime. In- stead, the more frequent result is a prolonged struggle between the unexpectedly resilient revolutionary regime and its surprisingly impervi- ous opponents.
The explanation outlined in this chapter may also provide a more com- plete explanation of why revolutionary states tend to alter their behavior over time. Many of the problems caused by a revolution arise from mis- judging the balance of power, the intentions of others, and the probability of contagion or counterrevolution. From this perspective, "socialization" is simply the process by which both sides acquire greater information about each of these factors. As evidence accumulates, the uncertainty that permits exaggerated perceptions of threat to flourish declines proportion- ately. Even if the new regime does not abandon its ultimate objectives, it is likely to modify its short-term behavior in accordance with this new in-
formation. Relations between the revolutionary states and the rest of the system will become increasingly "normal," assuming, of course, that each side is capable of evaluating and revising its policies in light of experi- ence. 63
Two caveats should be noted at this point. First, because elite revolutions feature less extreme ideological visions and exert less dramatic internal ef- fects than mass revolutions, they will have less effect on the balance of threats, and so the risk of war will be lower than it is after a mass revolution.
Second, the level of conflict will be greatest when the revolution creates a new state whose characteristics and ideological foundations depart sharply from the domestic orders of the other great powers. By contrast, if a revolu- tion brings a state into conformity with prevailing sociopolitical forms, then the new regime will be seen as less hostile and the danger of contagion may be slim to nonexistent. One cannot understand the international impact of a revolution by looking solely at the revolutionary state; one must also con-
sider the external environment in which the revolution occurred.
63 David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International So- ciety (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), esp. 302-304. For a useful survey of the literature on how states learn, see Jack Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Mine- field," International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994).
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TESTING THE THEORY
As shown in figure 1, the theory outlined above identifies several inde- pendent, mutually reinforcing mechanisms linking revolution and war. It predicts that revolutions will lead to sharper security competition between states and increase the probability of war. Indeed, the theory suggests that strong pressures for war will be present even when other factors intervene to prevent it.
In each of the case studies that follow, I explore whether the different mechanisms identified in this chapter were present and, if so, whether they had the predicted effects. In general, the theory can be considered sup- ported if, first, the revolution was followed by increased security competi- tion or war; second, conflict and war occurred for the reasons identified in the theory; third, one or more of the causal mechanisms identified in the theory was absent or muted and war did not occur; fourth, the predicted pressures for war were present but other factors intervened to prevent it; and fifth, these effects would have been unlikely to occur had the revolution not taken place.
More specifically, the theory is supported either if other states saw the rev- olution as altering the balance of power, and sought to take advantage of this window of opportunity, or if they were inclined to use force in order to pre- vent other states from doing the same thing. By contrast, if other states did not view the revolution as a potential opportunity (owing to a perceived shift in the balance of power), that would count against this part of the theory.
? ? ? Figure 1.
Revolution
Effects on the Revolutionary State
Change in preferences
Perceptions of external environment shaped by revolutionary ideology (Other states are hostile; victory is inevitable; the revolution has universal relevance)
Increased uncertainty and misinformation
Effects on Relations between States
Spirals of suspicion
Perceptions of offensive advantage
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? A Theory ofRevolution and War
The theory is also supported if the new regime and other states consis- tently exaggerated each other's hostility, especially if these spirals reflected ideological predispositions. The occurrence of a serious dispute does not necessarily mean that a spiral of suspicion occurred; rather, one or both sides must have also misinterpreted the other's actions and exaggerated its hostility. 64 The theory gains further credence if these errors were fueled by uncertainty or problems of communication arising from the revolution, or by the transnational activities of counterrevolutionary exiles or revolution-
ary sympathizers. Again, this element of the theory is undermined if the revolution in question caused little change in either side's perceptions of in- tent or if a subsequent dispute was based solely on a legitimate clash of in- terest that both sides evaluated more or less accurately.
Evidence that the possible spread of revolution (or counterrevolution) magnified each side's perceptions of insecurity or overconfidence supports the theory, especially if these beliefs were central to the decision for war. By contrast, the theory loses credibility if war occurred when the possibility of exporting the revolution was either absent or dismissed, or if both sides be- lieved that the revolution was likely to spread but were able to establish good relations nonetheless.
The theory I have set forth in this chapter explains why revolutions in- tensify security competition between states and increase the probability of war. I do not mean to imply that revolutions are a unique cause of war or that the dynamics that link revolutions and international conflict do not apply in other situations. However, I do regard revolutions as an especially powerful source of these dangers and consider war to be very likely in the aftermath of a successful revolution. In other words, a revolution is a suffi- cient but not necessary cause of security competition and war. The question is whether the effects of major revolutions support this general argument. To provide an answer, I begin by examining the international consequences of the French Revolution.
64 Itcanalsobedifficulttodetermineifstatementsindicatingsuspicionorhostilityareev- idence of genuine fears or merely propapanda intended for other purposes. Even if it is pro- paganda, it is unlikely to be effective when there is not some basis for it, and such campaigns can take on a life of their own if elites begin to believe their own rhetoric or become trapped by public opinion.
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"Not until statesmen had at last grasped the nature of the forces that had emerged in France and had grasped that new political conditions now obtained in Europe, could they foresee the broad effects alJ this would have on war. "
-Carl von Clausewitz
In this chapter I explore relations between revolutionary France and the other European powers from 1789 to 1799, with particular emphasis on the wars of the First and Second Coalitions. The period illustrates the link be- tween revolution and war in an especially vivid way and provides strong support for the arguments advanced in the previous chapter.
First, as balance-of-threat theory would suggest, the French Revolution made war more likely by altering the balance of power. France's apparenR weakness invited other states to seek gains either at French expense or in other areas, because they believed France could not oppose them effectively. Although neither Prussia nor Austria was strongly committed to over- throwing the new French leaders, the two states' desire to exploit the power vacuum created by the revolution helped place them both on a collision course with the new regime.
Second, the drive to war was fueled by the effects of the revolution on each state's intentions and by the ways that these intentions were perceived! by others. The revolution altered French foreign policy objectives (both for ideological reasons and because competing factions within France used for- eign policy to challenge their internal opponents), and it also distorted other states' perceptions of French intentions in especially dangerous ways.
Third, these fears were exacerbated by each side's belief that its oppo- nents might be able to impose their will with relatively little effort, either through subversion, propaganda, or a rapid military campaign. French leaders were preoccupied with the danger of counterrevolution-based on suspicions of treason, rumors of aristocratic plots, and the possibility of for- eign interference-while foreign leaders came to worry that the revolution in France would spread to their own societies. As we shall see, both sides'
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fears were overstated: the French were able to spread their revolution only through direct military conquest, and foreign efforts to reverse the revolu- tion in France were never very effective. Nonetheless, each side's belief in its own vulnerability intensifed its perceptions of threat and encouraged efforts to eliminate the danger before it became irresistible. Instead of the swift and bloodless victories that both sides anticipated, however, the result of these
decisions was a quarter-century of recurring warfare.
And fourth, these problems were exacerbated by the poor information available to national leaders. Throughout this period, political leaders re- peatedly miscalculated the balance of power, misread each other's inten- tions, and exaggerated the prospects for revolution and counterrevolution. Such problems are hardly unusual in international politics, but the revolu- tion aggravated them by severing the normal channels of information be- tween governments, by encouraging a variety of unofficial representatives (such as the French emigres) to purvey a host of self-serving myths, and by forcing statesmen to base policy decisions on estimates of probabilities that were inherently unknowable (such as the revolutionary potential of a given society ) .
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first describes the origins and ideological foundations of the revolution and the causes of the war of 1792. In the second I examine the expansion of the war in 1793 and the subse- quent struggle between France and the First Coalition. I tum in the third part to the War of the Second Coalition. Finally I consider the arguments ad- vanced in chapter 2 in light of these events.
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF 1792
Avant le Deluge: France and Europe under the Old Regime
French prestige and influence declined steadily after 1750, a trend under- scored by its defeat in the Seven Years War (175? 3), its paralysis during the Polish succession of 1764 and the first partition of Poland in 1772, and the various reverses suffered by its Swedish and Ottoman allies. An appar- ent French triumph in the War of American Independence proved to be a hollow victory, as it did little to damage England and contributed to the growing fiscal crisis in France.
England was France's traditional rival, owing to a combination of geo- graphic proximity, colonial competition, and conflicting security interests. An attempt to improve relations through a commercial treaty in 1785 failed to overcome English suspicions, and the growth of French influence in the Low Countries (culminating in the Franco-Dutch alliance of 1785) eventu- ally led England and Prussia to invade Holland in 1787. The invaders
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ousted the pro-French Patriot Party and restored the pro-English Stad- holder, William of Orange, in yet another demonstration of French impo- tence. 1
Austria amd France had been formally allied since 1756, but the tie was in- creasingly seen as a burden by both countries. Yet it endured, because France wanted to keep Austria from allying itself with England, and Austria wanted to keep France away from Prussia. 2 France was also allied to Spain via the Family Compact of 1761, an agreement based on dynastic solidarity between the two Bourbon houses and mutual hostility to England. These as- sets did not outweigh France's many liabilities, however, and France's in- ternational position on the eve of the revolution was not auspicious. 3
Conflicts among the other great powers, endemic in this period, would play an important role in shaping foreign responses to events in France. Austria and Prussia had been rivals since the 1740s, with each one primar- ily concerned with enhancing its position at the expense of the other. Em- peror Joseph II of Austria also hoped to exchange his Belgian possessions for Bavaria (thereby ridding himself of some unruly subjects and consoli- dating Austria's position in Central Europe), but his efforts to do so were re- peatedly thwarted by foreign opposition. Austria did manage to isolate Prussia by allying with Russia in 1781, but Joseph was eventually forced to enter the Russo-Turkish war in 1788 in order to maintain the connection and
to prevent Russia from monopolizing the fruits of victory. The Hapsburgs also faced considerable internal unrest during this period (partly a reaction to Joseph's reform program), including a conservative revolt in the Nether- lands in 1789. 4
Prussia's small size and relative weakness encouraged an expansionist foreign policy, and King Frederick William made several unsuccessful at-
1 On A n g l o - F re n c h r e l a t i o n s p r i o r t o t h e r e v o l u t i o n , se e T . C . W . B l a n n i n g , T h e O r i g i n s of t h e French Revolutionary Wars (New York: Longman, 1986), 45-51; M. S. Anderson, "European Diplpmatic History," in New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 8: The American and French Revo- lutions, 1763-93, ed. Albert Goodwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 267-68; and J. H. Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," in Cambridge History ofBritish Foreign Policy, ed. A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (New York: Macmillan, 1922), 1:159-70. The Patriot revolt in Holland is described by Simon Schama, Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 178o-1813 (New York: Random House, 1977), chap. 3; and Alfred Cobban, Ambassadors and Secret Agents: The Diplomacy of the First Earl of Malmesbury at the Hague (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954).
2 See Blannlng, French Revolutionary Wars, 4o-45; J. H. Clapham, The Causes ofthe War of 1792 (1892; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1969), 5-8; and Paul W. Schroeder, The Trans-
fo r m a t i o n of E u r o p ? a n P o l i t i c s , 1 7 6 3 - 1 8 4 8 ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1 9 9 4 ) , 4 2 - 4 3 .
3 See Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815 (New York:
Longman, 1983), 215-16.
.
4 On the Belgium-Bavaria exchange, see Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 26-35. On Joseph's reforms and the Belgian revolt, see Robert R. Palmer, The Age of the Demo- cratic Revolution: A Political History ofEurope and America, 1760-1800, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 1964), 1:341-57, 374-83.
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tempts to acquire additional territory; Prussia was allied with England and Holland, but the alliance was strictly defensive and England refused to back most of Frederick William's diplomatic gambits, including his pro- posal for an attack on Austria in 1790. As events in France began to cast a shadow over the European system, Frederick William was already contem- plating several new ploys for territorial aggrandizement, ranging from an alliance with France to an attack upon France or an additional partition of Poland. 5
Relations among the great powers were complicated further by the growth of Russian power and the unstable situation in Poland. Catherine II had used the Austro-Prussian rivalry to win concessions from both, while seizing territory from the Ottoman Empire and establishing de facto control of Poland after the first partition in 1772. When Russia was distracted by the war with Turkey and an opportunistic invasion by Sweden in 1788, a group of Polish reformers convened a new Diet and proclaimed a new constitu- tion. Although the effort temporarily succeeded, it was only a matter of time before Catherine would attempt to reassert Russian primacy. 6
Thus the European system was in a state of considerable fluidity when the revolution in France began. France was formally allied with Austria and Spain (though the relationship with Austria was strained) and openly hos- tile to England. England was equally suspicious of France, formally allied to Prussia and Holland, and wary of Russia. Austria was allied with France and Russia and bogged down in a war against the Ottoman Empire while keeping a watchful eye on Prussia. Both Austria and Prussia were interested in territorial revisions, and the internal turmoil in Poland and the Low
Countries added to the endemic instability of the system.
Ideological Underpinnings
Identifying the ideological roots of the French Revolution is especially challenging because none of the leading participants began with a blueprint for the future political order that was well thought out? Without being able to consult an explicit revolutionary program, therefore, students of the pe- riod must try to identify the central ideas that informed political debate and drove political action, while recognizing that this vocabulary shifted in re-
5 See Robert Howard Lord, The Second Partition of Poland: A Study in Diplomatic History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915), 75-82; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 51-55; and Clapham, "Pitt's First Decade," 190-97?
6 See Palmer, Democratic Revolution, 1:422-29; Lord, Second Partition, chaps. 1, 5-{i,
7 As the Jacobin Camille Desmoulins later recalled: "In all France there were not ten of us who were republicans prior to 1789. " Quoted in Henri Peyre, "The Influence of Eighteenth Century Ideas on the French Revolution," in his Historical and Critical Essays (Lincoln: Uni- versity of Nebraska Press, 1968), 72.
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sponse to the revolutionary process itsel? . 8 The concepts that shaped the rev- olution were not fixed, but they did provide the intellectual arsenal that rival groups employed both to understand the events in which they were immersed and to rally support and discredit opposition. And while these ideological underpinnings did not determine the course or outcome of the revolution, they did form the elements from which it was built. 9
What are the main ideas that shaped the revolution in France? At the risk of oversimplifying, I have identified four interrelated themes in prerevolu- tionary political discourse that merit particular attention.
The first key theme was a commitment to reason and natural law, to- gether with the concomitant belief that political action could correct existing social ills. In addition to undermining support for the Church, the notion that human affairs could be ordered according to the dictates of reason was a potent solvent to a conception of society based on privileged orders and monarchical authority. 10 This discourse implied that departures from tradi-
tion were permissible, provided they were based on reason, and faith in the power of reason helped created a new faith in politics and its unlimited ca- pacity for action. 11
A second theme was a broad ideological assault on the legitimacy of the absolutist state. This discourse contained several distinct but mutually rein- forcing strands: one focusing on "justice" (defined as restraint on monarchi- cal will}, another extolling liberty and equality and attacking the institutions of aristocratic privilege, and a third challenging the image of the king as
8 This war of ideas took place in a society that was experiencing an explosion in publishing. making it possible to disseminate contending opinions more rapidly and widely than ever be- fore. See Robert Damton and Daniel Roche, eds. , Revolution in Print: The Press in France, 1775-1800(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress, 1989);JeremyPopkin,RevolutionaryNews: The Press in France 1 789-1799 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and Colin Jones, ed. , The Longman Companion to the French Revolution (New York: Longman, 1988), 26o-62.
9 "The ideology embraced by the National Assembly . . . was . . . less a blueprint than a set of architectural principles that could be applied to the construction of quite different so- ciopolitical orders. " William Sewell, "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case," Journal ofModern History 57, no. 1 (1985), 71. See also Daniel Momet, Les Ori- gines intellectuelles de Ia revolutionfran? aise (1715-1787) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1933), esp. 477; Peyre, "Influence of Eighteenth Century Ideas"; and Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolu tion, trans. L. G. Cochrane (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989). :
10 "The Enlightenment insisted on the universal applicability of reason to human affairs It had scorn for all privilege no matter how ancient or venerable. " Sewell, "Ideologies and So- cial Revolutions," 65.
11 Fran. ;ois Furet argues that "the very bedrock of revolutionary consciousness" is the be- lief that "there is no human misfortune not amenable to a political solution. " Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 25. As products of the En! ightenment, the revolutionaries "believed in the absolute efficacy of politics-which they thought capable of recasting the body social and regenerating the indi- vidual. " Bronislaw Baczko, "Enlightenment," in A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, ed. Fran. ;ois Furet and Mona Ozouf, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 1989), 662-64; and see Chartier, Cultural Origins, 198.
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God's chosen representative. If not revolutionary by themselves, each of these strands nourished doubts about the existing order and cleared the way for a fundamental change. 12
Third, the wide-ranging challenge to absolutism featured a continuing debate on the nature of the political community. Over time, the image of France as the personal possession of a sovereign king was supplanted by the idea that sovereignty was held by a single people united by language, terri- tory, blood, and other "natural" characteristics. This transformation from subjects to citizens was already evident in 1788, when Abbe Sieyes declared that the Third Estate was "everything appertaining to the nation. "13 The rev- olution completed this process by replacing an abstract notion of the king as the sovereign authority with a concept of "popular sovereignty" in which the nation was the embodiment of the "general will. "14
Finally, under the influence of Rousseau, Montesquieu, and others, the ideological foundations of the French Revolution also contained a powerful moral dimension, centered on the concept of virtue. The importance at- tached to virtue helped discredit the old regime (which was seen as corrupt) and legitimated efforts to inculcate proper conduct as part of creating a new political order. Abelief in reason and in the limitless possibilities of politics also implied that "human action no longer encounters obstacles or limits, only adversaries, preferably traitors. "15 This tendency reached its peak dur- ing the Reign of Terror, when the Jacobins used the machinery of the state to promote virtue among the citizens, while seeking to eliminate any individ- uals whose opposition to the general will exposed their evil natures. 16
12 See Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), esp. 25-27; Jeffrey Merrick, The Desacralization of the French Monarchy in the Eighteenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990); and Robert Damton, The Literary Underground of the Old Regime (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
13 Sieyes added that "the Nation is prior to everything, it is the source of everything. .
