52b), and their sphere of
existence
(their Dhatu).
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-3-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991-PDF-Search-Engine
8), Srotaapanna, Sakrdagamin, Anagamin; and on the other hand, the ascetic who, before entering the path of seeing, is already liberated by the worldly path from the lower categories of the klesas of Kamadhatu or of all of the categories of klesas of Kamadhatu (bhuyovttaraga, vitaraga or kamavitaraga).
Such an ascetic, when he has trodden the Path of Seeing, does not become a Srotaapanna; he becomes a Sakrdagamin or an Ana- gamin according to the case.
And he possesses, thanks to the Path of Seeing, the transworldly and worldly possession of the destruction of the klesas previously abandoned by the worldly path (vi.
29c, 55).
The Buddha gave a memorable example of this method: he was a Prthagjana when he came to the Bodhi Tree (iii. 41a), but a Prthagjana who had cultivated the worldly path to its extreme limit, who had no more attachment except to Bhavagra, the fourth state of Arupyadhatu. He thus obtained the quality of Arhat-- which for him was the quality of Samyaksambuddha-in thirty-two moments of thought (ii. 44a, vi. 24a): sixteen moments of "com-
? prehension of the Truths" {abhisamaya, see above Para. 6), which made him an Anagamin freed from all existence with the exception of Bhavagra; and eighteen moments (nine paths of abandoning, and nine of deliverance) of the path of meditation on the Truths, which destroy the klesas relating to Bhavagra.
11. It is normal for the ascetic, after having achieved the path of the Seeing of the Truths, to cultivate the worldly path of meditation.
Once he is a Srotaapanna, he frees himself from Kamadhatu through the worldly path: nevertheless his possession of the destruction of the klesas of Kamadhatu is a transworldly posses- sion (vi. 46, 53c). The worldly path immediately places him in possession of results superior to those of a Srotaapanna.
a. The ascetic who is detached from Kamadhatu through the worldly path can cultivate the "Path of Seeing" by entering into Dhyana; nothing is easier for him, since he "possesses" the Dhyanas and can "manifest" or actualize them (sammukhikartum) at will.
b. The ascetic who is not detached from Kamadhatu through
Path of Seeing. And he will be able, in this same anagamya, to cultivate to the end, as far as the acquisition of the result of Arhat, the pure path of the meditation of the Truths [Whereas the impure path of meditation is made up of the successive acquisition of the Dhyanas and Arupyas]. Nevertheless, it is in the Dhyanas, and notably in the Fourth Dhyana, that the path is most easily cultivated (v. 66a, vi. 24a, 47c).
c. The pure path is absent from Kamadhatu (ii. 12, viii. 5).
d. Every pure path of meditation is also absent from the Fourth Arupya; it is therefore in a lower sphere (notably, the Third Arupya) that the ascetic--when the ascetic is a god of a certain class--will be delivered from the klesas of the Fourth Arupya (viii. 20a).
the worldly path, will enter anagamya in order to cultivate the 1
Foreword xxi
? xxii Foreword
e. The types of beings who are capable of cultivating the path (vi. 55).
12. One can obtain the quality of Arhat without having cultivated the Dhyanas. Even more so the "absorption of the destruction of ideas and sensations" (samjndveditanirodhasamdo patti) (ii. 43,iv. 54,56,vi. 43,63,64,viii. 27c,33a)isnotindispensa- ble. However, it possesses great advantages, as do all the Dhyanas. The "qualities" {guna) consisting of knowledge (jndnamaya) and of absorption (samddhimaya), such as arand, pranidhijndna, the vimoksas, sunyatdsamddhi, sunyatdsunyatdsamddhi, etc. (Chapter VII and VIII), are accessories of the path.
13. Vasubandhu does not forget to refer his model of the path to the old mystical chart of Buddhism: the bodhipdksikas, the mdrgdngas, the bodhyangas, the three skandhas, etc. (vi. 67).
***
note 1. The first two results are obtained only by an andgamya. The third can be obtained in the six spheres (vi. English translation note 397).
? CHAPTER FIVE
The Latent Defilements
o m. Homage to the Buddha.
We said that the world, in all its variety, arises from action
(iv. l). Now it is by reason of the anusayas} or latent defilements, that 2
actions accumulate: in the absence of the anusayas, actions are not capable of producing a new existence. Consequently
la. The roots of existence, that is, of rebirth or of action, are the
1 anusayas
When a klesa* or defilement enters into action, it accomplishes ten operations: 1. it makes solid its root, its prdpti--the possession that a certain person already had of the kief a (ii. 36,38a)--preventing it from being broken; 2. it places itself in a series (that is, it continues to reproduce itself); 3. it accommodates its field, rendering the person (dsrava, ii. 5, 6,44d) fit for the arising of the klesa; 4. it engenders its offspring, that is, the upaklesas (v. 46): hatred engenders anger, etc. ; 5. it leads to action; 6. it aggregates its causes, namely, incorrect judgment; 7. it causes one to be mistaken with regard to the objea of consciousness; 8. it bends the mental series towards the object or towards rebirth (iii. 30); 9. it brings about a falling away of good; and
10. it becomes a bond (bandhana, v. 45d) and prevents surmounting of 5
the sphere of existence to which it belongs.
***
How many anusayas are there? There are, in all, six.
What are they?
? 768 Chapter Five
lc-d. Six: attachment, and then anger, pride, ignorance,
6 false views, and doubt.
The words "and then (tathd)" serve to show that it is by reason of attachment that the others "take up their abode" (anusayana, v. 17) in the object. We shall explain this point later.
ld-2a. These six make seven through the division of attachment.
There is the anusaya of attachment to pleasure or sensual 7
desire (kdmardgdnusaya); the anusaya of anger; the anusaya of attachment to existence; the anusaya of pride; the anusaya of ignorance; the anusaya of erroneous views; and the anusaya of doubt (vicikitsd)*
***
What does the expression kdmardganusaya signify? Is there an anusaya called kdmardgai Or is there an anusaya of kdmardga distinct from kdmardgai
If one says that kdmardga is an anusaya, one then contradicts
the Sutra which says, "The person who does not long dwell with
his mind in the prey of (paryavasthita) attachment to pleasure;
who, when the wrapping {paryavasthdna) of attachment is about
to be produced, knows well how to depart from it, for this person
the wrapping which is attachment, perfectly destroyed of its life
9
force, is abandoned along with its anusaya" To say that
attachment is abandoned at the same time as its anusaya is to say that attachment and its anusaya are two distinct things.
If one explains kamaraganusya as the anusaya of kdmardga, one must make the anusaya a thing not associated with the mind (ii. 35) (and consisting of the possession, prdpti, ii. 36, of the kdmardga). But such a theory is in contradiction to the Abhidharma (Jndna- prasthdna, TD 26, p. 946b25 and following) which teaches that "kdmardganusaya is associated with (i. e. , can be accompanied by) three sensations, that of pleasure, satisfaction, and indifference
(ii. 7). " Now a dharma not associated with the mind cannot be
accompanied by these sensations.
10
? According to the Vaibhasikas, kdmardgdnusaya is an anusaya called kdmaraga; it is the attachment itself which is anusaya; and the same for the other defilements: doubt {vicikitsd) is the anusaya of doubt.
But the Sutra which we have just quoted says that one abandons kdmaraga along with its anusaya. Hence the anusaya is
1 not kdmaraga}
The Vaibhasikas answer: The expression "with its anusaya* should be explained as "with its anubandha\ that is, "with its
12
consequences. " Or rather the Sutra uses the word anusaya in the
sense of "possession" because possession is the cause of the
13
anusaya (ii. 35, trans, p. 208).
expresses itself literally and not figuratively, says that the anusaya is the klesa or defilement itself. Consequently the anusayas are associated with the mind.
(Besides this argument from authority, there is an argument from inference:)
"Because they defile the mind, because they hinder, because they are in contradiction with good, and yet because good appears,
14
This means that because of the anusayas, the mind is defiled; good which has not arisen is hindered from arising, and one falls away from good already arisen; consequently the anusayas are not dharmas disassociated from the mind.
But, one would say, some dharmas disassociated from the mind can have a similar effect.
No, for if the anusayas were disassociated from the mind, they
would always be present; and, consequently, if we suppose that
they have a similar effect, then good would never be able to arise.
Now it is a fact that it does arise. Thus the anusayas are not 15
But again, the masters who consider the anusayas as disasso- ciated from the mind do not attribute this threefold activity
the anusayas are not disassociated from the mind. "
disassociated from the mind.
The Latent Defilements 769
But the Abhidharma, which always
? 770 Chapter Five
(defiling the mind, etc. ) to the anusayas, but to the klesa itself (that is, to the paryavasthdna, the active defilement; and this is not always present).
***
The Sautr&ntika theory is best.
Kamaraganusaya means "anufaya of kdmardga\ But the
anus ay a is neither associated with the mind, nor disassociated from
it: for it is not a separate thing (dravya). What is called anusaya is
the kleSa itself in a state of sleep, whereas the paryavasthdna is the
klesa in an awakened state. The sleeping klesa is the non-manif-
ested klesa, in the state of being a seed; the awakened klesa is the
manifested klesa, the klesa in action. And by "seed" one should
understand a certain capacity to produce the klesa, a power
belonging to the person engendered by the previous klesa. In this
same way there exists in a certain person the capacity of producing
a consciousness of memory, a capacity engendered by a conscious-
ness of preception; in this same way the capacity to produce rice,
which belongs to the plant, the shoot, the stalk, etc. , is engendered
16 by the rice seed.
17
The masters
dharma distinct from the klesa itself, disassocated from the mind and called an anusaya, must admit a dharma existing in and of itself, disassociated from the mind and the cause of memory. And the same would hold for the plant.
***
[The Sarvastivadins answer]. You do not have the right to explain "anusaya of kdmardga" for the Sutra clearly teaches that anusaya is kdmardga itself.
for whom the seed of the kleia is a certain
The Satsatkasutra says, "This person has agreeable sensation, 1
and rdgdnufaya" * [From all evidence, the Sutra understands that, at the moment of agreeable sensation, there is active desire (rdga): and it designates this active desire by the name of anufaya].
But the Sutra says, "He has rdgdnusaya\" it does not say, "He
? then has ragdnufaya. " [At the moment of agreeable sensation, the anuiaya of desire (rdga) is in the process of arising, utpadyate; it has not yet arisen, utpanna. In other words, at the moment of the agreeable sensation, there is active rdga, awakened desire;] when this sensation ends, desire becomes dormant: then there is only the anusaya of desire, dormant desire, the seed of future awakened desire.
Or rather, we would say, when the Sutra says rdgdnusaya, it means rdga: the first is the effect of the second, and the cause can be designated by the name of its effect.
The examination of this chance problem is finished. Let us return to our subject.
***
What is this division that the Sutra sets up, attachment to agreeable objects (kdmardga) and attachment to existence (bhavardga)? What is attachment to existence?
2b. Attachment to existence arises from the two Dhatus.
Attachment to Rupadhatu and to Arupyadhatu is called bhavardga, attachment to existence [in opposition to kdmardga, attachment to agreeable objects,--kdmas or kdmagunas,--which is attachment proper to Kamadhatu, iii. 3c-d].
Why is the name of attachment to existence (bhavardga) reserved for attachment to the two higher Dhatus?
2c-d. It is so called because it is turned within, and in order
19 to avoid the idea that these two Dhatus are deliverance.
The School explains: In general, the attachment of the beings in these two Dhatus is with regard to absorption (samdpatti), (or more precisely, to "enjoyable" dhyana, asvddanasamprayuktadhydna, viii. 6). One says "in general" because these beings also have attachments with regard to their palaces, vimdnas, etc.
The Latent Defilements 111
? 772 Chapter Five
This attachment, being an absorption, is turned within. This is why it alone receives the name of attachment to existence.
Further, certain persons imagine that the two Dhatus consti- tute deliverance: this is why the Blessed One gives the name "attachment to existence" to the attachment which has these two Dhatus for its object.
(According to us), existence (bhava) means the person. Beings in absorption enjoy both the absorption itself and their own persons. Being freed from attachment to pleasures, they only enjoy their own persons and not external objects. This is why attachment to the two higher Dhatus is called attachment to existence (bhavaraga).
***
According to the Abhidharma (Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 943a27), these six anusayas make ten. How is this?
3. There are five (erroneous) views: a belief in a self
(satkayadrsti), false views (mithyddrsti), a belief in the
extremes (antagrahadrsti), the esteeming of views (drstipa-
ramarsa), and the esteeming of morality and ascetic
practices (silavrataparamarsa): thus there are ten anus- 20
ayas.
By dividing views (drsfi) into five, there are six anusayas, for a total of ten anusayas\ five which are not views by nature, namely desire, anger, pride, ignorance and doubt; and five which are views, satkayadrsti, etc.
*#*
In addition the Abhidharma (Jnanaprasthana, ibid. ) teaches
that these ten anusayas make up thirty-six anusayas in Kamadhatu,
thirty-one anusayas in Rupadhatu, and thirty-one anusayas in 11
Arupyadhatu: in all ninety-eight anusayas.
Thirty-two of the thirty-six anusayas of Kamadhatu are abandoned by Seeing the Truths (see i. 40, iv. 11-12).
? 4. With the exception of three or two views, ten, seven,
seven, eight anusayas are abandoned in Kamadhatu by the 22
Seeing of Suffering and the three other Truths respectively.
All of the above mentioned anufayas are, in Kamadhatu, abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering.
Seven are abandoned through the Seeing of Arising and through the Seeing of Extinction, with the exception of a belief in a self, a belief in the extremes, and the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices.
Eight are abandoned through the Seeing of the Path, with the exception of satkdyadrsti and antagrdhadrsti
This makes thirty-two anusayas abandoned through Seeing, because the mere Seeing of the Truths suffices to abandon them.
23
Namely desire, anger, ignorance and pride: because one who has seen the Truths then abandons them through Meditation on the Path.
In this way satkdyadrsti, the view of self and of things pertaining to a self, is unique, being susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering; and the same for antagrdhadrsti, the belief in extremes.
False views is of four types, abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, Arising, Extinction, and the Path; the same for the esteeming of bad views and doubt.
The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is of two types, being susceptible of being abandoned through 1. ) the Seeing of Suffering and 2. ) the Path.
Desire, anger, pride, and ignorance are of five types, being abandoned through the Seeing of each of the Truths, and through Meditation.
5a. Four are abandoned through Meditation.
What is the characteristic or definition of the anusayas
The Latent Defilements lib
? 774 Chapter Five
susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering? . . What is the def initon of the anusayas susceptible of being
abandoned through Meditation?
When it is possible to abandon the object (dlambana) of an
anusaya through the Seeing of a certain Truth, it is said that this 24
anusaya can be abandoned through the Seeing of this Truth. The others are abandoned through Meditation.
There are thus twelve views, four doubts, five desires, five angers, five ignorances, and five prides: in all thirty-six anusayas in Kamadhatu.
5b-c. The same, with the exception of the angers, for Rupadhatu.
The same sorts of anusayas, with the exception of the five angers, make up the thirty-one anusayas of Rupadhatu.
5c. The same in Arupyadhatu.
The same thirty-one.
5d. In this way, there are ninety-eight.
The Abhidharmikas {Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 929c2) say that the six anusayas make ninety-eight through the differences of their aspect, their mode of expulsion (ii.
52b), and their sphere of existence (their Dhatu).
***
Among the ninety-eight anusayas, eighty-eight are abandoned through Seeing because they are struck, destroyed through the
? "patiences" (ksantis, vi. 25d), and ten are abandoned through Meditation because they are struck by the "knowledges" (jndnas)P Is this a strict rule with regard to abandoning through Seeing and Meditation?
6a-c. When they arise in Bhavagra (the highest state of Arupyadhatu), the anus ay as which are struck by the ksantis are abandoned through Seeing and through Meditation.
The word "ksantis" refers to the dharmajndnaksdntis and the anvayajndnaksdntis (vi. 26c).
Among the anusayas which are struck by the ksantis, those which are in Bhavagra are abandoned only by Seeing, for only anvayajndnak- sdntis causes them to be abandoned. [Only the Aryans, through the pure path, abandon these anusayas] (vi. 45c).
Those in the eight bhumis (i. e. , Kamadhatu, Rupadhatu and the first three stages of Arupyadhatu) are abandoned either through Seeing or through Meditation: Aryans abandon them solely through Seeing, and not through Meditation, by means of the dharmajndnaksdntis or the anvayajndnaksdntis accordingly as they belong to the anusayas of Kamadhatu or of the higher spheres, whereas Prthagjanas abandon them only through Meditation, and not though Seeing, for these anusayas can be abandoned through a worldly knowledge (lokasamvrtijndna, vii. 9).
6c-d. The anusayas which are not struck by the ksantis are only abandoned through Meditation.
The anuSayas which are struck by the "knowledges" (jndnas), at whichever stage they belong, are only abandoned through Meditation, whether they belong to an Aryan or to a Prthagjana. In fact, an Aryan abandons them through andsrava jnana meditation, or pure knowledge, whereas a Prthagjana abandons them through a worldly knowledge (lokasamvrtijndna).
The Latent Defilements 115
? 776 Chapter Five
Some other masters maintain that non-Buddhists (bdhyaka) cannot abandon the anusayas abandoned through Seeing. For the Mahdkarmavibhdgasutra teaches that erroneous views are active among the non-Buddhists in Kamadhatu, although they may be "detached" (vitardga, that is, having abandoned the attachments of Kamadhatu, attachments that one abandons through Meditati- on. )And the Brahmajalasutra says that some non-Buddhists are entirely detached from all sorts of views idrsti) of Kamadhatu: there are among them some persons who conjure up systems concerning the past, eternalists, partial eternalists, or followers of chance. (As one could object: "the 'views' of these persons detached from Kamadhatu are of the sphere of Rupadhatu," we would say that) Kamadhatu cannot be, with regard to that which concerns it, the object of defilements (klesa) of Rupadhatu, because such persons are detached from Kamadhatu. But they have not abandoned the views of Kamadhatu.
The Vaibhasikas explain this difficulty by saying that those who are detached lose (this detachement) when they produce a view, in the manner that Devadatta (Rockhill, p. 85) lost his rddhi (vii. 48a).
#*#
We have seen that view is divided into five categories by reason of its aspect. What are the five views?
7. The view of self and things pertaining to self, the view of eternity and annihilation, the view of negation, the view that holds as high that which is low, and that which holds for cause and Path that which is not cause and Path: these
? are the five views.
1. To believe in a self and in things pertaining to self
26
because it perishes, and kdya because it is an accumulation or
{dtmatmtyagrdha) is satkdyadrsti',
multiplicity. Satkdya means "an accumulation of perishing things,"
2S
that is, the five updddnaskandhas (i. 8a-b).
The expression satkdya is put forth in order to discard the idea of permanence--this is why one says sat--and in order to discard the notion of a unity--this is why one says kdya. In fact, if one believes that the skandhas are a self, this is because one first and foremost attributes a permanence and unity to them.
Satkdyadrsti means, then, "a view with regard to the satkdya"
By this, all the views whose object is an impure belief in
extremes (antagrdhadrsti), etc. , are views of the satkdya, that is, of
the five skandhas. But even though they are views of the satkdya, 28
they are not "views of the self or of things pertaining to self. "
Also it is only the belief in a self or in things pertaining to a
self that receives the name of satkdyadrsti, for according to a
declaration of the Blessed One, "Oh monk, any monk or Brahmin
who in this world believes in a self, what he considers to be a self is
29 only the five updddnaskandhas"
2. To believe in the eternity or in the annihiliation of what one believes to be a self, is antagrdhadrsti, "a view that grasps extremes," for this is to falsely believe in the extreme (anta) thesis of eternity or annihilation.
3. The view that consists of negating (apavdda) that which really exists, the Truth of Suffering, etc. and which consists of
30
saying ndsti, "that is not," is mithyddrsti or false view.
conceived views are "false views", but only mithyddrsti receives this name because it is the most false of all, as the worst odor is called the bad odor. It is a negation, whereas the other views are an
The Latent Defilements 111
it is termed sat ("existence")
All falsely
? 778 , Chapter Five
1 affirmation or erroneous attribution (samdropikd)?
4. The view which considers that which is bad, low, abandoned (hma, iv. 127) as good, or "high," is called drstipardmarsa, "the esteeming of bad views. "
What does hma mean? It refers to everything that is impure, because the Saints abandon it (prahma). And the view that consist of esteeming this is called simply "consideration" (pardmarsa).
It would be best to say drstyadiparamarsa, "esteeming that which is low, beginning with erroneous views. " But the word ddi is
32
5. The view which considers as cause that which is not cause, or as the path that which is not the Path, is called filavratapardmarsa: namely, to consider Mahesvara, Prajapati, or any other entity which is not a cause of the world as a cause of the world; to consider the rituals of suicide,--entering into fire or drowning--as a cause of a heavenly rebirth when they do not in fact procure heaven; or to consider morality and ascetic practices as the only path to deliverance when they are themselves not the only path to deliverance, nor the "knowledges" (Jnana) of the Saiiimkhyas and the Yogins which are not a path to deliverance; and so too the rest.
Here too, [according to the Vaibhasikas,] the word ddi is
33
omitted.
These are the five erroneous views.
[Objection:] You have said that the erroneous view that regards as a cause of the world that which is not a cause of the world is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices (stlavr- atapardmarsa). In this hypothesis, the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is abandoned through the Seeing of the Truth of Arising, since it admits of error with regard to cause (=arising).
omitted here.
We would answer that those who consider the Lord (Isvara) or
? Prajapati as a cause of the world regard the Lord and Prajapati as eternal beings, one, personal, and active {dtman, kartar). It then follows that:
8. If one clings to the idea that the Lord, etc. , is the cause of the world, this is by reason of false conceptions of permanence and personality. Thus this clinging is to be
34 abandoned through Seeing (the Truth) of Suffering.
The belief in the eternity or in the personality of the Lord or Prajapati is abandoned through Seeing the single Truth of Suffering; as a consequence the belief in their causality, which results from this first belief, is abandoned in the same way as this same first belief is abandoned.
[Objection:] The erroneous view that suicide through fire or drowning produces a heavenly rebirth, and the erroneous view that morality and ascetic practices produce by themselves purity, have nothing to do with the false conceptions of permanence and personality. Why do you say that one abandons them through Seeing the Truth of Suffering? It is through the Seeing of the Truth of Arising that one should abandon them.
The Mulasastra {Jfidnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 1029al2) says, "There are some non-Buddhists who give rise to this view, who posit this theory: a person who adopts the habits of bulls (gostla), the habits of deer, or the habits of dogs, shall obtain purity, deliverance, and escape; he shall obtain the absolute going beyond of the happiness and suffering (of the three spheres of existence), and he shall reach the place beyond happiness and suffering. One should know that all these types of considering as cause that which is not truly cause is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, which is abandoned through Seeing the Truth of Suffering. " The doctrine of the Vaibhasikas is thus that these two opinions are to be abandoned through the Seeing the Truth of Suffering, because they allow error with regard to suffering.
The Latent Defilements 779
? 780 Chapter Five
But his argument is carried too far! All the defilements (klesas) which have the impure for their object embrace error with regard to suffering. (In fact, all impurity is suffering).
Furthermore, we would ask what is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices which is abandoned through Seeing the Truth of the Path? If the Vaibhasikas answer, "The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices relative to the dharma which is abandoned through Seeing the Path, namely relative to one of the eight anusayas the first of which is wrong views," we would then answer that this esteeming of morality and ascetic practices also supposes error relative to suffering.
Moreover we do not see how the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices could be relative to a dharma to be abandoned through the Truth of the Path: 1. How could a person who entertains wrong views or doubt relative to the Path, thinking "There is no Path," or 'Is there, or is there not, a Path? ," imagine to obtain purification through this wrong view or through this doubt? 2. If this person, taking up the path of deliverance imagined by the Samkhyas, etc. , says, "This is the path; the Buddhist Path is not the path," then this non-Buddhist imagines that he obtains purification through the path of the Samkhyas, and not through wrong views relative to the Path. Furthermore, when a person imagines that he obtains purification through a wrong view abandoned through the Seeing of Arising or Extinction, why is his esteeming of morality and ascetic practices not abandoned through the Seeing of these same two Truths?
35 This point remains to be examined.
***
We have spoken (v. 8) of the two erroneous views of permanence (or eternity) and personality. Are there only two errors?
There are four errors: to hold that which is impermanent to be permanent, that which is suffering to be happiness, that which is
? impure to be pure, and that which is not a "soul" to be a soul or self.
What is the nature of these four errors?
9a-b. One distinguishes four errors within the three
36 views.
That part of the belief in extremes which is a view of permanence constitutes one error; two parts of the esteeming of bad views constitute the errors of happiness and purity; and that part of the belief in a self and of things pertaining to a self which is a view of self constitutes one error.
***
Some other masters maintain that all satkdyadrsti, that is, not simply the idea of self but also the idea of things pertaining to self, constitutes dtmavipatydsa, "error with regard to the self. "
[The Vaibhasikas say:] How could the idea of things pertaining to a self be part of error with regard to the self? In fact the Sutra of the Vipatydsas does not indicate this. (It says simply, "It is an error to say that andtman is dtman") and the following: "He who sees a self prevailing within the five updddnaskandhas sees 'mine"' [Thus the view of "mine" differs from the view of "self," a view from whence it derives. ]
But we think that the view of self has two parts: to say "I" and to say "mine. " If the idea of "mine" were a view different from the idea of "I," then the ideas expressed by other grammatical cases, such as mayd (by me) or mahyam (to me) would thus consititute so many new views. Thus all belief in a self and in things pertaining to a self is totally included in the error of self.
###
The Latent Defilements 781
? 782 Chapter Five
Are not the other defilements errors because, in order for there to be error, a combination of three characteristics is indispensable? What are these three characteristics?
9b-c. Reflective judgment and affirmation because they allow complete error.
The view of annihilation (ucchedadrsti, a part of the belief in extremes, (antagrdhadrsti) and false views are not affirmations or erroneous attributions (samdropa), since they are directed towards the absence of existence.
The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices affirms that morality and practices suffice for purification: there is no total error in this, since morality and practices do contribute to purification.
The other defilements do not admit of reflective judgment, and as a consequence are not complete errors (viparyasa).
***
But the Blessed One said, 'To consider the impermanent as
permanent is an error of idea (samjndviparydsa), an error of
thought (cittaviparyasa), and an error of view (drspiviparydsa)" 37
and thus following for happiness, purity, and the self. Now neither ideas nor thoughts admit of reflective judgment. Thus the definition proposed for error (viparyasa) is inexact.
9d. Thought and idea are termed "error" by reason of view.
Only view is error, but by virtue of the esteeming of bad views (drspiviparydsa), ideas and thoughts associated with view and having its same aspect are also termed "errors. "
? Why does not the same hold for sensation and the other mental states associated with view?
Because one says in worldly language "error of idea," and "error of thought," but not "error of sensation. "
A Srotaapanna abandons all these errors (Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 957a294); for the Seeing of the Truths which brings about the abandonment of views also brings about the abandoning of the ideas and thoughts associated with these views.
38
1. Another School says: The error which consists of holding
as permanent that which is impermanent contains three errors: error of idea, of thought and of view; and the rest. We then have twelve errors instead of four errors.
Among these twelve, eight are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths. Four, namely the errors of idea and thought relative to happiness and purity, are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths through Meditation.
In fact the Aryans, who by definition have abandoned all the anusayas that one abandons through Seeing the Truths, certainly possess ideas of happiness and purity, since, when they are not detached, they produce an attachment to pleasure.
2. The Vaibhasikas do not consider this reasoning as conclusive. From the fact that these Aryans have ideas of happiness and purity, you conclude that they have error relative to happiness and purity. You should say that they also have the error relative to self, since they certainly have the idea and thought of a living being: attachment to pleasure relative to a woman or relative to themselves evidently presupposses the idea and the thought of a being.
Moreover one reads in the Sutras, "The Aryan Sravaka teaches
39
true seeing and knowing:
moment the errors of idea, of thought and of view relative to the impermanent taken for the permanent, are abandoned by them," and the rest. As a consequence, only the ideas and thoughts provoked by erroneous views, or associated with erroneous views,
The Latent Defilements 783
this is the Truth of Suffering. . . At this
? 784 Chapter Five
are errors, and not the others, which are abandoned through Meditation.
In fact, it happens that the Aryan, through an illusion which lasts only as long as he first sees an object, produces attachment to pleasure, such as the illusion caused by the circle of a fire-brand or by a painted Yaksa. There is no error in the Aryan, but only a
40
mistaken idea and thought (samjnacittaviabhrama, vi. 60). 41
3. But the Sthavira Ananda said to the Aryan VaglSa, "Your
42
mind is burned by the error of your ideas. " How do we explain
these words if one admits the thesis of the Vaibhasikas?
43
4.
the eight errors of idea and thought. It is true that these errors are abandoned by means of correct knowledge of the Truths, and not without this knowledge.
The Sutra that the Vaibhasikas quote (p. 783, line 29) thus
As a consequence the Saiksa has not completely abandoned
indicates the means (upaya) of abandoning these said errors; there 44
is no contradiction here with the Sutra of VaglSa.
***
The anusaya of erroneous view is subdivided in this manner. Is it the same for the other anuiiayasi
It is the same for pride.
45 10a. There are seven types of pride (mana):
These are mana, adhimana, manatmana, asmimana, abhimana, unamana, and mithyamana.
In general, arrogance of the mind (ii. 33b) is called mana. Mana is subdivided on the basis of its different modes: 1. Mana: when the mind makes itself lofty or develops pride by thinking, "I am superior" or "I am equal"relative to an inferior or to an equal. 2.
? Adhimdna: to think, "I am superior," "I am equal," relative to an equal, or to a superior. 3. Mandtimdna: to think, "I am superior" relative to a superior. 4. Asmimdna: when the mind prides itself by taking the five updddnaskandhas for its "self" and "mine. " 5. Abhimdna to think that one possessess distinctions, that is, some dharmas, pure or impure, which abide in absorption, when one does not possess them (v. 27b-c). 6. Unamdna: to think, "I am slightly inferior" relative to that which is greatly superior. 7. Mithydmdna: to attribute to oneself spiritual qualities which one does not possess.
Abhimdna has a substantial basis: it is savastuka\ this is the pride of someone who has some qualities resembling the visesas. Mithydmdna has no substantial basis: this is the pride of someone who has no qualities whatsoever but who believes that he has some.
***
Yet the Sastra {Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 1028b26) teaches nine types of pride, mdnavidhd, or simply vidha, namely, 1. "I am superior;" 2. "I am equal;" 3. "I am less good;" 4. "Another is better than I;" 5. "He is equal to me;" 6. "He is worse than I;" 7. "Another is not better than I;" 8. "He is not my equal;" and 9. "He is not worse than I. "
Which of the seven types of pride make up these nine types?
lOa-b. Three make nine types.
These nine types come from three mdnas, namely mdna, adhimdna and unamdna.
The first three are the three mdnas which reside in the erroneous view of self. One first thinks "me. " Then there arises in order adhimdna, mana, and unamdna. One has a type of mana
The Latent Defilements 785
? 786 Chapter Five
which consists of saying, "I am better," adhimdna which resides in erroneous views, and the rest. The second three are, in their order, unamana, mana, and adhimdna. The third three are, in their order, mana, adhimdna, and unamana.
We see that although we think "I am a bit inferior" relative to some one greatly superior, this is indeed unamana, for the mind prides itself in this thought; but how can this type of mana "He is not worse that I" be a locus of pride?
The Buddha gave a memorable example of this method: he was a Prthagjana when he came to the Bodhi Tree (iii. 41a), but a Prthagjana who had cultivated the worldly path to its extreme limit, who had no more attachment except to Bhavagra, the fourth state of Arupyadhatu. He thus obtained the quality of Arhat-- which for him was the quality of Samyaksambuddha-in thirty-two moments of thought (ii. 44a, vi. 24a): sixteen moments of "com-
? prehension of the Truths" {abhisamaya, see above Para. 6), which made him an Anagamin freed from all existence with the exception of Bhavagra; and eighteen moments (nine paths of abandoning, and nine of deliverance) of the path of meditation on the Truths, which destroy the klesas relating to Bhavagra.
11. It is normal for the ascetic, after having achieved the path of the Seeing of the Truths, to cultivate the worldly path of meditation.
Once he is a Srotaapanna, he frees himself from Kamadhatu through the worldly path: nevertheless his possession of the destruction of the klesas of Kamadhatu is a transworldly posses- sion (vi. 46, 53c). The worldly path immediately places him in possession of results superior to those of a Srotaapanna.
a. The ascetic who is detached from Kamadhatu through the worldly path can cultivate the "Path of Seeing" by entering into Dhyana; nothing is easier for him, since he "possesses" the Dhyanas and can "manifest" or actualize them (sammukhikartum) at will.
b. The ascetic who is not detached from Kamadhatu through
Path of Seeing. And he will be able, in this same anagamya, to cultivate to the end, as far as the acquisition of the result of Arhat, the pure path of the meditation of the Truths [Whereas the impure path of meditation is made up of the successive acquisition of the Dhyanas and Arupyas]. Nevertheless, it is in the Dhyanas, and notably in the Fourth Dhyana, that the path is most easily cultivated (v. 66a, vi. 24a, 47c).
c. The pure path is absent from Kamadhatu (ii. 12, viii. 5).
d. Every pure path of meditation is also absent from the Fourth Arupya; it is therefore in a lower sphere (notably, the Third Arupya) that the ascetic--when the ascetic is a god of a certain class--will be delivered from the klesas of the Fourth Arupya (viii. 20a).
the worldly path, will enter anagamya in order to cultivate the 1
Foreword xxi
? xxii Foreword
e. The types of beings who are capable of cultivating the path (vi. 55).
12. One can obtain the quality of Arhat without having cultivated the Dhyanas. Even more so the "absorption of the destruction of ideas and sensations" (samjndveditanirodhasamdo patti) (ii. 43,iv. 54,56,vi. 43,63,64,viii. 27c,33a)isnotindispensa- ble. However, it possesses great advantages, as do all the Dhyanas. The "qualities" {guna) consisting of knowledge (jndnamaya) and of absorption (samddhimaya), such as arand, pranidhijndna, the vimoksas, sunyatdsamddhi, sunyatdsunyatdsamddhi, etc. (Chapter VII and VIII), are accessories of the path.
13. Vasubandhu does not forget to refer his model of the path to the old mystical chart of Buddhism: the bodhipdksikas, the mdrgdngas, the bodhyangas, the three skandhas, etc. (vi. 67).
***
note 1. The first two results are obtained only by an andgamya. The third can be obtained in the six spheres (vi. English translation note 397).
? CHAPTER FIVE
The Latent Defilements
o m. Homage to the Buddha.
We said that the world, in all its variety, arises from action
(iv. l). Now it is by reason of the anusayas} or latent defilements, that 2
actions accumulate: in the absence of the anusayas, actions are not capable of producing a new existence. Consequently
la. The roots of existence, that is, of rebirth or of action, are the
1 anusayas
When a klesa* or defilement enters into action, it accomplishes ten operations: 1. it makes solid its root, its prdpti--the possession that a certain person already had of the kief a (ii. 36,38a)--preventing it from being broken; 2. it places itself in a series (that is, it continues to reproduce itself); 3. it accommodates its field, rendering the person (dsrava, ii. 5, 6,44d) fit for the arising of the klesa; 4. it engenders its offspring, that is, the upaklesas (v. 46): hatred engenders anger, etc. ; 5. it leads to action; 6. it aggregates its causes, namely, incorrect judgment; 7. it causes one to be mistaken with regard to the objea of consciousness; 8. it bends the mental series towards the object or towards rebirth (iii. 30); 9. it brings about a falling away of good; and
10. it becomes a bond (bandhana, v. 45d) and prevents surmounting of 5
the sphere of existence to which it belongs.
***
How many anusayas are there? There are, in all, six.
What are they?
? 768 Chapter Five
lc-d. Six: attachment, and then anger, pride, ignorance,
6 false views, and doubt.
The words "and then (tathd)" serve to show that it is by reason of attachment that the others "take up their abode" (anusayana, v. 17) in the object. We shall explain this point later.
ld-2a. These six make seven through the division of attachment.
There is the anusaya of attachment to pleasure or sensual 7
desire (kdmardgdnusaya); the anusaya of anger; the anusaya of attachment to existence; the anusaya of pride; the anusaya of ignorance; the anusaya of erroneous views; and the anusaya of doubt (vicikitsd)*
***
What does the expression kdmardganusaya signify? Is there an anusaya called kdmardgai Or is there an anusaya of kdmardga distinct from kdmardgai
If one says that kdmardga is an anusaya, one then contradicts
the Sutra which says, "The person who does not long dwell with
his mind in the prey of (paryavasthita) attachment to pleasure;
who, when the wrapping {paryavasthdna) of attachment is about
to be produced, knows well how to depart from it, for this person
the wrapping which is attachment, perfectly destroyed of its life
9
force, is abandoned along with its anusaya" To say that
attachment is abandoned at the same time as its anusaya is to say that attachment and its anusaya are two distinct things.
If one explains kamaraganusya as the anusaya of kdmardga, one must make the anusaya a thing not associated with the mind (ii. 35) (and consisting of the possession, prdpti, ii. 36, of the kdmardga). But such a theory is in contradiction to the Abhidharma (Jndna- prasthdna, TD 26, p. 946b25 and following) which teaches that "kdmardganusaya is associated with (i. e. , can be accompanied by) three sensations, that of pleasure, satisfaction, and indifference
(ii. 7). " Now a dharma not associated with the mind cannot be
accompanied by these sensations.
10
? According to the Vaibhasikas, kdmardgdnusaya is an anusaya called kdmaraga; it is the attachment itself which is anusaya; and the same for the other defilements: doubt {vicikitsd) is the anusaya of doubt.
But the Sutra which we have just quoted says that one abandons kdmaraga along with its anusaya. Hence the anusaya is
1 not kdmaraga}
The Vaibhasikas answer: The expression "with its anusaya* should be explained as "with its anubandha\ that is, "with its
12
consequences. " Or rather the Sutra uses the word anusaya in the
sense of "possession" because possession is the cause of the
13
anusaya (ii. 35, trans, p. 208).
expresses itself literally and not figuratively, says that the anusaya is the klesa or defilement itself. Consequently the anusayas are associated with the mind.
(Besides this argument from authority, there is an argument from inference:)
"Because they defile the mind, because they hinder, because they are in contradiction with good, and yet because good appears,
14
This means that because of the anusayas, the mind is defiled; good which has not arisen is hindered from arising, and one falls away from good already arisen; consequently the anusayas are not dharmas disassociated from the mind.
But, one would say, some dharmas disassociated from the mind can have a similar effect.
No, for if the anusayas were disassociated from the mind, they
would always be present; and, consequently, if we suppose that
they have a similar effect, then good would never be able to arise.
Now it is a fact that it does arise. Thus the anusayas are not 15
But again, the masters who consider the anusayas as disasso- ciated from the mind do not attribute this threefold activity
the anusayas are not disassociated from the mind. "
disassociated from the mind.
The Latent Defilements 769
But the Abhidharma, which always
? 770 Chapter Five
(defiling the mind, etc. ) to the anusayas, but to the klesa itself (that is, to the paryavasthdna, the active defilement; and this is not always present).
***
The Sautr&ntika theory is best.
Kamaraganusaya means "anufaya of kdmardga\ But the
anus ay a is neither associated with the mind, nor disassociated from
it: for it is not a separate thing (dravya). What is called anusaya is
the kleSa itself in a state of sleep, whereas the paryavasthdna is the
klesa in an awakened state. The sleeping klesa is the non-manif-
ested klesa, in the state of being a seed; the awakened klesa is the
manifested klesa, the klesa in action. And by "seed" one should
understand a certain capacity to produce the klesa, a power
belonging to the person engendered by the previous klesa. In this
same way there exists in a certain person the capacity of producing
a consciousness of memory, a capacity engendered by a conscious-
ness of preception; in this same way the capacity to produce rice,
which belongs to the plant, the shoot, the stalk, etc. , is engendered
16 by the rice seed.
17
The masters
dharma distinct from the klesa itself, disassocated from the mind and called an anusaya, must admit a dharma existing in and of itself, disassociated from the mind and the cause of memory. And the same would hold for the plant.
***
[The Sarvastivadins answer]. You do not have the right to explain "anusaya of kdmardga" for the Sutra clearly teaches that anusaya is kdmardga itself.
for whom the seed of the kleia is a certain
The Satsatkasutra says, "This person has agreeable sensation, 1
and rdgdnufaya" * [From all evidence, the Sutra understands that, at the moment of agreeable sensation, there is active desire (rdga): and it designates this active desire by the name of anufaya].
But the Sutra says, "He has rdgdnusaya\" it does not say, "He
? then has ragdnufaya. " [At the moment of agreeable sensation, the anuiaya of desire (rdga) is in the process of arising, utpadyate; it has not yet arisen, utpanna. In other words, at the moment of the agreeable sensation, there is active rdga, awakened desire;] when this sensation ends, desire becomes dormant: then there is only the anusaya of desire, dormant desire, the seed of future awakened desire.
Or rather, we would say, when the Sutra says rdgdnusaya, it means rdga: the first is the effect of the second, and the cause can be designated by the name of its effect.
The examination of this chance problem is finished. Let us return to our subject.
***
What is this division that the Sutra sets up, attachment to agreeable objects (kdmardga) and attachment to existence (bhavardga)? What is attachment to existence?
2b. Attachment to existence arises from the two Dhatus.
Attachment to Rupadhatu and to Arupyadhatu is called bhavardga, attachment to existence [in opposition to kdmardga, attachment to agreeable objects,--kdmas or kdmagunas,--which is attachment proper to Kamadhatu, iii. 3c-d].
Why is the name of attachment to existence (bhavardga) reserved for attachment to the two higher Dhatus?
2c-d. It is so called because it is turned within, and in order
19 to avoid the idea that these two Dhatus are deliverance.
The School explains: In general, the attachment of the beings in these two Dhatus is with regard to absorption (samdpatti), (or more precisely, to "enjoyable" dhyana, asvddanasamprayuktadhydna, viii. 6). One says "in general" because these beings also have attachments with regard to their palaces, vimdnas, etc.
The Latent Defilements 111
? 772 Chapter Five
This attachment, being an absorption, is turned within. This is why it alone receives the name of attachment to existence.
Further, certain persons imagine that the two Dhatus consti- tute deliverance: this is why the Blessed One gives the name "attachment to existence" to the attachment which has these two Dhatus for its object.
(According to us), existence (bhava) means the person. Beings in absorption enjoy both the absorption itself and their own persons. Being freed from attachment to pleasures, they only enjoy their own persons and not external objects. This is why attachment to the two higher Dhatus is called attachment to existence (bhavaraga).
***
According to the Abhidharma (Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 943a27), these six anusayas make ten. How is this?
3. There are five (erroneous) views: a belief in a self
(satkayadrsti), false views (mithyddrsti), a belief in the
extremes (antagrahadrsti), the esteeming of views (drstipa-
ramarsa), and the esteeming of morality and ascetic
practices (silavrataparamarsa): thus there are ten anus- 20
ayas.
By dividing views (drsfi) into five, there are six anusayas, for a total of ten anusayas\ five which are not views by nature, namely desire, anger, pride, ignorance and doubt; and five which are views, satkayadrsti, etc.
*#*
In addition the Abhidharma (Jnanaprasthana, ibid. ) teaches
that these ten anusayas make up thirty-six anusayas in Kamadhatu,
thirty-one anusayas in Rupadhatu, and thirty-one anusayas in 11
Arupyadhatu: in all ninety-eight anusayas.
Thirty-two of the thirty-six anusayas of Kamadhatu are abandoned by Seeing the Truths (see i. 40, iv. 11-12).
? 4. With the exception of three or two views, ten, seven,
seven, eight anusayas are abandoned in Kamadhatu by the 22
Seeing of Suffering and the three other Truths respectively.
All of the above mentioned anufayas are, in Kamadhatu, abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering.
Seven are abandoned through the Seeing of Arising and through the Seeing of Extinction, with the exception of a belief in a self, a belief in the extremes, and the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices.
Eight are abandoned through the Seeing of the Path, with the exception of satkdyadrsti and antagrdhadrsti
This makes thirty-two anusayas abandoned through Seeing, because the mere Seeing of the Truths suffices to abandon them.
23
Namely desire, anger, ignorance and pride: because one who has seen the Truths then abandons them through Meditation on the Path.
In this way satkdyadrsti, the view of self and of things pertaining to a self, is unique, being susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering; and the same for antagrdhadrsti, the belief in extremes.
False views is of four types, abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, Arising, Extinction, and the Path; the same for the esteeming of bad views and doubt.
The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is of two types, being susceptible of being abandoned through 1. ) the Seeing of Suffering and 2. ) the Path.
Desire, anger, pride, and ignorance are of five types, being abandoned through the Seeing of each of the Truths, and through Meditation.
5a. Four are abandoned through Meditation.
What is the characteristic or definition of the anusayas
The Latent Defilements lib
? 774 Chapter Five
susceptible of being abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering? . . What is the def initon of the anusayas susceptible of being
abandoned through Meditation?
When it is possible to abandon the object (dlambana) of an
anusaya through the Seeing of a certain Truth, it is said that this 24
anusaya can be abandoned through the Seeing of this Truth. The others are abandoned through Meditation.
There are thus twelve views, four doubts, five desires, five angers, five ignorances, and five prides: in all thirty-six anusayas in Kamadhatu.
5b-c. The same, with the exception of the angers, for Rupadhatu.
The same sorts of anusayas, with the exception of the five angers, make up the thirty-one anusayas of Rupadhatu.
5c. The same in Arupyadhatu.
The same thirty-one.
5d. In this way, there are ninety-eight.
The Abhidharmikas {Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 929c2) say that the six anusayas make ninety-eight through the differences of their aspect, their mode of expulsion (ii.
52b), and their sphere of existence (their Dhatu).
***
Among the ninety-eight anusayas, eighty-eight are abandoned through Seeing because they are struck, destroyed through the
? "patiences" (ksantis, vi. 25d), and ten are abandoned through Meditation because they are struck by the "knowledges" (jndnas)P Is this a strict rule with regard to abandoning through Seeing and Meditation?
6a-c. When they arise in Bhavagra (the highest state of Arupyadhatu), the anus ay as which are struck by the ksantis are abandoned through Seeing and through Meditation.
The word "ksantis" refers to the dharmajndnaksdntis and the anvayajndnaksdntis (vi. 26c).
Among the anusayas which are struck by the ksantis, those which are in Bhavagra are abandoned only by Seeing, for only anvayajndnak- sdntis causes them to be abandoned. [Only the Aryans, through the pure path, abandon these anusayas] (vi. 45c).
Those in the eight bhumis (i. e. , Kamadhatu, Rupadhatu and the first three stages of Arupyadhatu) are abandoned either through Seeing or through Meditation: Aryans abandon them solely through Seeing, and not through Meditation, by means of the dharmajndnaksdntis or the anvayajndnaksdntis accordingly as they belong to the anusayas of Kamadhatu or of the higher spheres, whereas Prthagjanas abandon them only through Meditation, and not though Seeing, for these anusayas can be abandoned through a worldly knowledge (lokasamvrtijndna, vii. 9).
6c-d. The anusayas which are not struck by the ksantis are only abandoned through Meditation.
The anuSayas which are struck by the "knowledges" (jndnas), at whichever stage they belong, are only abandoned through Meditation, whether they belong to an Aryan or to a Prthagjana. In fact, an Aryan abandons them through andsrava jnana meditation, or pure knowledge, whereas a Prthagjana abandons them through a worldly knowledge (lokasamvrtijndna).
The Latent Defilements 115
? 776 Chapter Five
Some other masters maintain that non-Buddhists (bdhyaka) cannot abandon the anusayas abandoned through Seeing. For the Mahdkarmavibhdgasutra teaches that erroneous views are active among the non-Buddhists in Kamadhatu, although they may be "detached" (vitardga, that is, having abandoned the attachments of Kamadhatu, attachments that one abandons through Meditati- on. )And the Brahmajalasutra says that some non-Buddhists are entirely detached from all sorts of views idrsti) of Kamadhatu: there are among them some persons who conjure up systems concerning the past, eternalists, partial eternalists, or followers of chance. (As one could object: "the 'views' of these persons detached from Kamadhatu are of the sphere of Rupadhatu," we would say that) Kamadhatu cannot be, with regard to that which concerns it, the object of defilements (klesa) of Rupadhatu, because such persons are detached from Kamadhatu. But they have not abandoned the views of Kamadhatu.
The Vaibhasikas explain this difficulty by saying that those who are detached lose (this detachement) when they produce a view, in the manner that Devadatta (Rockhill, p. 85) lost his rddhi (vii. 48a).
#*#
We have seen that view is divided into five categories by reason of its aspect. What are the five views?
7. The view of self and things pertaining to self, the view of eternity and annihilation, the view of negation, the view that holds as high that which is low, and that which holds for cause and Path that which is not cause and Path: these
? are the five views.
1. To believe in a self and in things pertaining to self
26
because it perishes, and kdya because it is an accumulation or
{dtmatmtyagrdha) is satkdyadrsti',
multiplicity. Satkdya means "an accumulation of perishing things,"
2S
that is, the five updddnaskandhas (i. 8a-b).
The expression satkdya is put forth in order to discard the idea of permanence--this is why one says sat--and in order to discard the notion of a unity--this is why one says kdya. In fact, if one believes that the skandhas are a self, this is because one first and foremost attributes a permanence and unity to them.
Satkdyadrsti means, then, "a view with regard to the satkdya"
By this, all the views whose object is an impure belief in
extremes (antagrdhadrsti), etc. , are views of the satkdya, that is, of
the five skandhas. But even though they are views of the satkdya, 28
they are not "views of the self or of things pertaining to self. "
Also it is only the belief in a self or in things pertaining to a
self that receives the name of satkdyadrsti, for according to a
declaration of the Blessed One, "Oh monk, any monk or Brahmin
who in this world believes in a self, what he considers to be a self is
29 only the five updddnaskandhas"
2. To believe in the eternity or in the annihiliation of what one believes to be a self, is antagrdhadrsti, "a view that grasps extremes," for this is to falsely believe in the extreme (anta) thesis of eternity or annihilation.
3. The view that consists of negating (apavdda) that which really exists, the Truth of Suffering, etc. and which consists of
30
saying ndsti, "that is not," is mithyddrsti or false view.
conceived views are "false views", but only mithyddrsti receives this name because it is the most false of all, as the worst odor is called the bad odor. It is a negation, whereas the other views are an
The Latent Defilements 111
it is termed sat ("existence")
All falsely
? 778 , Chapter Five
1 affirmation or erroneous attribution (samdropikd)?
4. The view which considers that which is bad, low, abandoned (hma, iv. 127) as good, or "high," is called drstipardmarsa, "the esteeming of bad views. "
What does hma mean? It refers to everything that is impure, because the Saints abandon it (prahma). And the view that consist of esteeming this is called simply "consideration" (pardmarsa).
It would be best to say drstyadiparamarsa, "esteeming that which is low, beginning with erroneous views. " But the word ddi is
32
5. The view which considers as cause that which is not cause, or as the path that which is not the Path, is called filavratapardmarsa: namely, to consider Mahesvara, Prajapati, or any other entity which is not a cause of the world as a cause of the world; to consider the rituals of suicide,--entering into fire or drowning--as a cause of a heavenly rebirth when they do not in fact procure heaven; or to consider morality and ascetic practices as the only path to deliverance when they are themselves not the only path to deliverance, nor the "knowledges" (Jnana) of the Saiiimkhyas and the Yogins which are not a path to deliverance; and so too the rest.
Here too, [according to the Vaibhasikas,] the word ddi is
33
omitted.
These are the five erroneous views.
[Objection:] You have said that the erroneous view that regards as a cause of the world that which is not a cause of the world is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices (stlavr- atapardmarsa). In this hypothesis, the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices is abandoned through the Seeing of the Truth of Arising, since it admits of error with regard to cause (=arising).
omitted here.
We would answer that those who consider the Lord (Isvara) or
? Prajapati as a cause of the world regard the Lord and Prajapati as eternal beings, one, personal, and active {dtman, kartar). It then follows that:
8. If one clings to the idea that the Lord, etc. , is the cause of the world, this is by reason of false conceptions of permanence and personality. Thus this clinging is to be
34 abandoned through Seeing (the Truth) of Suffering.
The belief in the eternity or in the personality of the Lord or Prajapati is abandoned through Seeing the single Truth of Suffering; as a consequence the belief in their causality, which results from this first belief, is abandoned in the same way as this same first belief is abandoned.
[Objection:] The erroneous view that suicide through fire or drowning produces a heavenly rebirth, and the erroneous view that morality and ascetic practices produce by themselves purity, have nothing to do with the false conceptions of permanence and personality. Why do you say that one abandons them through Seeing the Truth of Suffering? It is through the Seeing of the Truth of Arising that one should abandon them.
The Mulasastra {Jfidnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 1029al2) says, "There are some non-Buddhists who give rise to this view, who posit this theory: a person who adopts the habits of bulls (gostla), the habits of deer, or the habits of dogs, shall obtain purity, deliverance, and escape; he shall obtain the absolute going beyond of the happiness and suffering (of the three spheres of existence), and he shall reach the place beyond happiness and suffering. One should know that all these types of considering as cause that which is not truly cause is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices, which is abandoned through Seeing the Truth of Suffering. " The doctrine of the Vaibhasikas is thus that these two opinions are to be abandoned through the Seeing the Truth of Suffering, because they allow error with regard to suffering.
The Latent Defilements 779
? 780 Chapter Five
But his argument is carried too far! All the defilements (klesas) which have the impure for their object embrace error with regard to suffering. (In fact, all impurity is suffering).
Furthermore, we would ask what is the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices which is abandoned through Seeing the Truth of the Path? If the Vaibhasikas answer, "The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices relative to the dharma which is abandoned through Seeing the Path, namely relative to one of the eight anusayas the first of which is wrong views," we would then answer that this esteeming of morality and ascetic practices also supposes error relative to suffering.
Moreover we do not see how the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices could be relative to a dharma to be abandoned through the Truth of the Path: 1. How could a person who entertains wrong views or doubt relative to the Path, thinking "There is no Path," or 'Is there, or is there not, a Path? ," imagine to obtain purification through this wrong view or through this doubt? 2. If this person, taking up the path of deliverance imagined by the Samkhyas, etc. , says, "This is the path; the Buddhist Path is not the path," then this non-Buddhist imagines that he obtains purification through the path of the Samkhyas, and not through wrong views relative to the Path. Furthermore, when a person imagines that he obtains purification through a wrong view abandoned through the Seeing of Arising or Extinction, why is his esteeming of morality and ascetic practices not abandoned through the Seeing of these same two Truths?
35 This point remains to be examined.
***
We have spoken (v. 8) of the two erroneous views of permanence (or eternity) and personality. Are there only two errors?
There are four errors: to hold that which is impermanent to be permanent, that which is suffering to be happiness, that which is
? impure to be pure, and that which is not a "soul" to be a soul or self.
What is the nature of these four errors?
9a-b. One distinguishes four errors within the three
36 views.
That part of the belief in extremes which is a view of permanence constitutes one error; two parts of the esteeming of bad views constitute the errors of happiness and purity; and that part of the belief in a self and of things pertaining to a self which is a view of self constitutes one error.
***
Some other masters maintain that all satkdyadrsti, that is, not simply the idea of self but also the idea of things pertaining to self, constitutes dtmavipatydsa, "error with regard to the self. "
[The Vaibhasikas say:] How could the idea of things pertaining to a self be part of error with regard to the self? In fact the Sutra of the Vipatydsas does not indicate this. (It says simply, "It is an error to say that andtman is dtman") and the following: "He who sees a self prevailing within the five updddnaskandhas sees 'mine"' [Thus the view of "mine" differs from the view of "self," a view from whence it derives. ]
But we think that the view of self has two parts: to say "I" and to say "mine. " If the idea of "mine" were a view different from the idea of "I," then the ideas expressed by other grammatical cases, such as mayd (by me) or mahyam (to me) would thus consititute so many new views. Thus all belief in a self and in things pertaining to a self is totally included in the error of self.
###
The Latent Defilements 781
? 782 Chapter Five
Are not the other defilements errors because, in order for there to be error, a combination of three characteristics is indispensable? What are these three characteristics?
9b-c. Reflective judgment and affirmation because they allow complete error.
The view of annihilation (ucchedadrsti, a part of the belief in extremes, (antagrdhadrsti) and false views are not affirmations or erroneous attributions (samdropa), since they are directed towards the absence of existence.
The esteeming of morality and ascetic practices affirms that morality and practices suffice for purification: there is no total error in this, since morality and practices do contribute to purification.
The other defilements do not admit of reflective judgment, and as a consequence are not complete errors (viparyasa).
***
But the Blessed One said, 'To consider the impermanent as
permanent is an error of idea (samjndviparydsa), an error of
thought (cittaviparyasa), and an error of view (drspiviparydsa)" 37
and thus following for happiness, purity, and the self. Now neither ideas nor thoughts admit of reflective judgment. Thus the definition proposed for error (viparyasa) is inexact.
9d. Thought and idea are termed "error" by reason of view.
Only view is error, but by virtue of the esteeming of bad views (drspiviparydsa), ideas and thoughts associated with view and having its same aspect are also termed "errors. "
? Why does not the same hold for sensation and the other mental states associated with view?
Because one says in worldly language "error of idea," and "error of thought," but not "error of sensation. "
A Srotaapanna abandons all these errors (Jnanaprasthana, TD 26, p. 957a294); for the Seeing of the Truths which brings about the abandonment of views also brings about the abandoning of the ideas and thoughts associated with these views.
38
1. Another School says: The error which consists of holding
as permanent that which is impermanent contains three errors: error of idea, of thought and of view; and the rest. We then have twelve errors instead of four errors.
Among these twelve, eight are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths. Four, namely the errors of idea and thought relative to happiness and purity, are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths through Meditation.
In fact the Aryans, who by definition have abandoned all the anusayas that one abandons through Seeing the Truths, certainly possess ideas of happiness and purity, since, when they are not detached, they produce an attachment to pleasure.
2. The Vaibhasikas do not consider this reasoning as conclusive. From the fact that these Aryans have ideas of happiness and purity, you conclude that they have error relative to happiness and purity. You should say that they also have the error relative to self, since they certainly have the idea and thought of a living being: attachment to pleasure relative to a woman or relative to themselves evidently presupposses the idea and the thought of a being.
Moreover one reads in the Sutras, "The Aryan Sravaka teaches
39
true seeing and knowing:
moment the errors of idea, of thought and of view relative to the impermanent taken for the permanent, are abandoned by them," and the rest. As a consequence, only the ideas and thoughts provoked by erroneous views, or associated with erroneous views,
The Latent Defilements 783
this is the Truth of Suffering. . . At this
? 784 Chapter Five
are errors, and not the others, which are abandoned through Meditation.
In fact, it happens that the Aryan, through an illusion which lasts only as long as he first sees an object, produces attachment to pleasure, such as the illusion caused by the circle of a fire-brand or by a painted Yaksa. There is no error in the Aryan, but only a
40
mistaken idea and thought (samjnacittaviabhrama, vi. 60). 41
3. But the Sthavira Ananda said to the Aryan VaglSa, "Your
42
mind is burned by the error of your ideas. " How do we explain
these words if one admits the thesis of the Vaibhasikas?
43
4.
the eight errors of idea and thought. It is true that these errors are abandoned by means of correct knowledge of the Truths, and not without this knowledge.
The Sutra that the Vaibhasikas quote (p. 783, line 29) thus
As a consequence the Saiksa has not completely abandoned
indicates the means (upaya) of abandoning these said errors; there 44
is no contradiction here with the Sutra of VaglSa.
***
The anusaya of erroneous view is subdivided in this manner. Is it the same for the other anuiiayasi
It is the same for pride.
45 10a. There are seven types of pride (mana):
These are mana, adhimana, manatmana, asmimana, abhimana, unamana, and mithyamana.
In general, arrogance of the mind (ii. 33b) is called mana. Mana is subdivided on the basis of its different modes: 1. Mana: when the mind makes itself lofty or develops pride by thinking, "I am superior" or "I am equal"relative to an inferior or to an equal. 2.
? Adhimdna: to think, "I am superior," "I am equal," relative to an equal, or to a superior. 3. Mandtimdna: to think, "I am superior" relative to a superior. 4. Asmimdna: when the mind prides itself by taking the five updddnaskandhas for its "self" and "mine. " 5. Abhimdna to think that one possessess distinctions, that is, some dharmas, pure or impure, which abide in absorption, when one does not possess them (v. 27b-c). 6. Unamdna: to think, "I am slightly inferior" relative to that which is greatly superior. 7. Mithydmdna: to attribute to oneself spiritual qualities which one does not possess.
Abhimdna has a substantial basis: it is savastuka\ this is the pride of someone who has some qualities resembling the visesas. Mithydmdna has no substantial basis: this is the pride of someone who has no qualities whatsoever but who believes that he has some.
***
Yet the Sastra {Jndnaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 1028b26) teaches nine types of pride, mdnavidhd, or simply vidha, namely, 1. "I am superior;" 2. "I am equal;" 3. "I am less good;" 4. "Another is better than I;" 5. "He is equal to me;" 6. "He is worse than I;" 7. "Another is not better than I;" 8. "He is not my equal;" and 9. "He is not worse than I. "
Which of the seven types of pride make up these nine types?
lOa-b. Three make nine types.
These nine types come from three mdnas, namely mdna, adhimdna and unamdna.
The first three are the three mdnas which reside in the erroneous view of self. One first thinks "me. " Then there arises in order adhimdna, mana, and unamdna. One has a type of mana
The Latent Defilements 785
? 786 Chapter Five
which consists of saying, "I am better," adhimdna which resides in erroneous views, and the rest. The second three are, in their order, unamana, mana, and adhimdna. The third three are, in their order, mana, adhimdna, and unamana.
We see that although we think "I am a bit inferior" relative to some one greatly superior, this is indeed unamana, for the mind prides itself in this thought; but how can this type of mana "He is not worse that I" be a locus of pride?
