No More Learning

Men of ambition.
266 MARCUS LEPIDUS AND 1100! ! v
squandering the first inheritance of the proscribed, were longing to succeed to a second—all these waited only the unfolding of the banner which invited them to fight against the existing order of things, whatever else might be inscribed on it. Froma like necessity all the aspiring men of talent, in search of popularity, attached themselves to the opposi tion ; not only those to whom the strictly closed circle of the Optimates denied admission or at least opportunities for rapid promotion, and who therefore attempted to force their way into the phalanx and to break through the laws of oligarchic exclusiveness and seniority by means of popular favour, but also the more dangerous men, whose ambition aimed at something higher than helping to determine the destinies of the world within the sphere of collegiate intrigues. On the advocates’ platform in par ticular—the only field of legal opposition left open by Sulla—even in the regent’s lifetime such aspirants waged lively war against the restoration with the weapons of formal jurisprudence and combative oratory: for instance, the adroit speaker Marcus Tullius Cicero (born 3rd Janu
Power of the opposi tion.
Such was the sort of opposition with which the oligarchic
106. ary 648), son of a landholder of Arpinum, speedily made himself a name by the mingled caution and boldness of his opposition to the dictator. Such efforts were not of much importance, if the opponent desired nothing farther than by their means to procure for himself a curule chair, and then to sit in it in contentment for the rest of his life. No doubt, if this chair should not satisfy a popular man and Gaius Gracchus should find a successor, a struggle for life or death was inevitable; but for the present at least no name could be mentioned, the bearer of which had pro posed to himself any such lofty aim.
instituted by Sulla had to contend, when it had, earlier than Sulla himself probably expected, been thrown by his death on its own resources. The task wal
government
can. )
a'
QUINTUS SERTORIUS 267
in itself far from easy, and it was rendered more difficult by the other social and political evils of this age—especially by the extraordinary double difficulty of keeping the military chiefs in the provinces in subjection to the supreme civil magistracy, and of. dealing with the masses'of the Italian and extra-Italian populace accumulating in the capital, and
of the slaves living there to a great extent in d: fado freedom, without having troops at disposal. The senate was placed, as it were, in a fortress exposed and threatened on all sides, and serious conflicts could not fail to ensue. But the means of resistance organized by Sulla were con siderable and lasting; and, although the majority of the nation was manifestly disinclined to the government which Sulla had installed, and even animated by hostile feelings towards that government might very well maintain itself for long time in its stronghold against the distracted and confused mass of an opposition which was not agreed either as to end or means, and, having no head, was broken up
into hundred fragments. Only was necessary that should be determined to maintain its position, and should bring at least spark of that energy, which had built the fortress, to its defence; for in the case of garrison which will not defend itself, the greatest master of fortification constructs his walls and moats in vain.
The more everything ultimately depended on the
Want of leaders.
was not till this epoch that they became all-powerful, for was only now (first in 690) that their influence was H.
attested rather than checked legal measures ofrepression.
of the leading men on both sides, was the
more unfortunate that both, strictly speaking, lacked leaders. The politics of this period were thoroughly under Coterie the sway of the coterie-system in its worst form. This, system. indeed, was nothing new; close unions of families and
clubs were inseparable from an aristocratic organization of
the state, and had for centuries prevailed in Rome. But
personality
by
it it
it
a
it a
a a
it
it,
268 MARCUS LEI’IDUS AND BOOK 7
All persons of quality, those of popular leanings no less than the oligarchy proper, met in Hetaeriae ; the mass of the burgesses likewise, so far as they took any regular part in political events at all, formed according to their voting districts close unions with an almost military organization, which found their natural captains and agents in the presidents of the districts, “tribe-distributors”
(dz'vzkorer With these political clubs everything was bought
tn'buum).
and sold; the vote of the elector especially, but also the
votes of the senator and the judge, the fists too which pro duced the street riot, and the ringleaders who directed it— the associations of the upper and of the lower ranks were distinguished merely in the matter of tariff. The Hetaeria decided the elections, the Hetaeria decreed the impeach ments, the Hetaeria conducted the defence ; it secured the distinguished advocate, and in case of need it contracted for an acquittal with one of the speculators who pursued on a great scale lucrative dealings in judges’ votes. The
Hetaeria commanded by its compact bands the streets of the capital, and with the capital but too often the state. All these things were done in accordance with a certain rule, and, so to speak, publicly; the system of Hetaeriae was better organized and managed than any branch of state administration ; although there was, as is usual among civilized swindlers, a tacit understanding that there should be no direct mention of the nefarious proceedings, nobody made a secret of them, and advocates of repute were not ashamed to give open and intelligible hints of their relation to the Hetaeriae of their clients. If an individual was to be found here or there who kept aloof from such doings and yet did not forgo public life, he was assuredly, like Marcus Cato, a political Don Quixote. Parties and party— strife were superseded by the clubs and their rivalry;
was superseded by intrigue. A more than character, Publius Cethegus, formerly one of the
government equivocal
‘\;—'-\\
cruiP. l QUINTUS SERTORIUS 269
most zealous Marians, afterwards as a deserter received into favour by Sulla (p. 78), acted a most influential part in the political doings of this period-—unrivalled as a cunning tale-bearer and mediator between the sections of the senate, and as having a statesman’s acquaintance with the secrets of all cabals: at times the appointment to the most im portant posts of command was decided by a word from his mistress Praecia. Such a plight was only possible where none of the men taking part in politics rose above medio crity: any man of more than ordinary talent would have swept away this system of factions like cobwebs ; but there was in reality the saddest lack of men of political or military capacity.
Of the older generation the civil wars had left not a single man of repute except the old shrewd and eloquent Lucius Philippus (consul in 663), who, formerly of popular 91. leanings (iii. 38o), thereafter leader of the capitalist party against the senate (iii. 484), and closely associated with
the Marians (p. 70), and lastly passing over to the victorious oligarchy in sufficient time to earn thanks and commendation 78), had managed to escape between
the parties. Among the men of the following generation
the most notable chiefs of the pure aristocracy were Quintus Metellus Pius (consul 674), Sulla’s comrade in dangers
and victories; Quintus Lutatius Catulus, consul in the
year of Sulla’s death, 676, the son of the victor of Ver
cellae and two younger officers, the brothers Lucius and Marcus Lucullus, of whom the former had fought with distinction under Sulla in Asia, the latter in Italy; not to ‘mention Optimates like Quintus Hortensius (640-704), 114-50
who had importance only as pleader, or men like Decimus Junius Brutus (consul in 677), Mamercus Aemilius Lepidus 77
Livianus (consul in 67 and other such nullities, whose 77. best quality was euphonious aristocratic name. But even those four men rose little above the average calibre of the
Phflippul.
Metellus Catulus,
Luculll. 80.
78.
a
(p. in
7),
a
;
:70
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
Optimates of this age. Catulus was like his father a man of refined culture and an honest aristocrat, but of moderate talents and, in particular, no soldier. Metellus was not merely estimable in his personal character, but an able and experienced oflicer ; and it was not so much on account of his close relations as a kinsman and colleague with the regent as because of his recognized ability that he was sent
19. in 67 5, after resigning the consulship, to Spain, where the
Lusitanians and the Roman emigrants under
Sertorius were bestirring themselves afresh. The two Luculli were also capable officers—particularly the elder, who combined very respectable military talents with thorough literary culture and leanings to authorship, and appeared honourable also as a man. But, as statesmen, even these better aristocrats were not much less remiss and shortsighted than the average senators of the time. In presence of an outward foe the more eminent among them, doubtless,
proved themselves useful and brave; but no one of them evinced the desire or the skill to solve the problems of politics proper, and to guide the vessel of the state through the stormy sea of intrigues and factions as a true pilot. Their political wisdom was limited to a sincere belief in the oligarchy as the sole means of salvation, and to a cordial hatred and courageous execration of demagogism as well as of every individual authority which sought to emancipate itself. Their petty ambition was contented with little. The stories told of Metellus in Spain—that he not only allowed himself to be delighted with the far from harmonious lyre of the Spanish occasional poets, but even I wherever he went had himself received like a god with libations of wine and odours of incense, and at table had
his head crowned by descending Victories amidst theatrical thunder with the golden laurel of the conqueror—are no better attested than most historical anecdotes; but even such gossip reflects the degenerate ambition of the genera
Quintus
can. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS z7t
tions of Epigoni. Even the better men were content when they had gained not power and influence, but the consul ship and a triumph and a place of honour in the senate; and at the very time when with right ambition they would have just begun to be truly useful to their country and their party, they retired from the political stage to be lost in princely luxury. Men like Metellus and Lucius Lucullus were, even as generals, not more attentive to the enlarge
ment of the Roman dominion by fresh conquests of kings and peoples than to the enlargement of the endless game, poultry, and dessert lists of Roman gastronomy by new delicacies from Africa and Asia Minor, and they wasted the best part of their lives in more or less ingenious idle ness. The traditional aptitude and the individual self denial, on which all oligarchic government is based, were lost in the decayed and artificially restored Roman aristo cracy of this age; in its judgment universally the spirit of clique was accounted as patriotism, vanity as ambition, and narrow-mindedness as consistency. Had the Sullan con
stitution passed into the guardianship of men such as have sat in the Roman College of Cardinals or the Venetian Council of Ten, we cannot tell whether the opposition would have been able to shake it so soon; with such de fend rs every attack involved, at all events, a serious peril.
f the men, who were neither unconditional adherents Pompeius. nor open opponents of the Sullan constitution, no one
attracted more the eyes of the multitude than the young
Gnaeus Pompeius, who was at the time of Sulla’s death twenty-eight years of age,. (born 29th September 648). 106. The fact was a misfortune for the admired as well as for
the admirers; but it was natural. Sound in body and mind, a capable athlete, who even when a superior oflicer vied with his soldiers in leaping, running, and lifting, a
and skilled rider and fencer, a bold leader of volunteer bands, the youth had become imperator and
vigorous
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND 800! v triumphator at an age which excluded him from every
272
magistracy and from the senate, and had
acquired the
firstplace nextutowwg§pll‘awgln'flblic opinion; nay, had ob tained from the indulgent regent himself—half in recogni
tion, half in irony—the surname of the Great. Unhappily, his mental endowml'e“nt'smbymrresponded with these unprecedented successes. flelainwejthgavbmor an incapable man, but a man thoroughly ordinary, created by nature to be a good sergeant, called by circumstances to be a general and a statesman. An intelligent, brave and experienced, thoroughly excellent soldier, he was still, even in his military capacity, without traceaufmany higher gifts. It was characteristic of him as a general, as we as in other respects, to set to work with a caution bordering on timidity, and, if possible, to give the decisive
blow only when he had established. an
over his opponent. His culture was the average culture of the time; although entirely a soldier, he did not neglect, when he went to Rhodes, dutifully to admire, and to make presents to, the rhetoricians there. His integrity was that of a rich man who manages with discretion his considerable property inherited and acquired. He did not disdain to make money in the usual senatorial way, but hemgw cold and too rich to incur special risks, or draw down on himself conspicuous disgrace, on that account. The vice l0 much in vogue among his contemporaries, rather than any virtue of his own, procured for him the reputation comparatively, no doubt, well warranted—of integrity and disinterestedness. His honest countenance” became almost proverbial, and even after'hisnd'e'atlithemwgsfitggngd vas worthy and moral man he was in fact good neigh
bour, who did not join in the revolting schemes by which the grandees of that age extended the bounds of their domains through forced sales or measures still worse at the expense of their humbler neighbours, and in domestic
a
v‘‘ 5
a
can. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS :73
life he displayed attachment to his wife and children: it
redounds moreover to his credit that he was ’tliigfiiirsgfito
magmas www.
depart from the bgrbarous custom of ppuittiiig’to ‘death the
of the enemy,vafter they had been exhibited in triumph. But this did not prevent him
beloved wife at the command pf
because she belonged to an outlawed'family, nornfr'oin ordering with great composure
that men wligwhad stoodby him and helped him in times of‘di-fh“cfvu-it'ywshggld be. executed before his eyes at the nod
qf tlié'salns ‘Bests! (o 9s)= hcwasxwt 231. 161, thaqgb be was reproached with being so, but—what perhaps was
worser-hslwasicjiléafiljngoéd as ‘in evil, unimpassioned.
In the tumult of battle he facedwthmfieefirlgmymtlemalleisly; in civillife he was a shy man, whose cheek flushed on the
slightest occasion; he spoke in public not without embar
rassment, and generally was angular, stifl‘, and awkward
in intercourse. Wgt' b all his haughtxpbstinacy he
indeed persons ordinarily are, who make a display of their iiidéperidé’r'ic’él-'a pliant tool in the hands” of men who knew how tomanag'c him‘f'é'éfiééiany of his freedmen . and clientsfby‘whpgi hehad. no fear. . of being controlled. For nothing was he less Qualified than for a statesman. Uncer tain as rb'h'is'aiiiié,“ unskilfulmirihevchoice of his means, alike invlittle and greatmatters shortsighted and helpless, he was ‘$011: to ‘conceal his irresolution and indecision under; a solemnmsilence, ‘and, when he thought to play a subtle g'ahiefsimply to deceive himself with the belief that he was deceiving others. By his military position and his territorial connections he acquired almost without any action of his own am considerable party personally
tojiyl withsvzfiishgthsu :éitestthinss might have been
iccomplished J'wgbw\v1vtwliompeiuswwas in every respect incap able of leading and keeping together a party, and, if it still kept together, it did so—in like manner without his action
' VOL IV :18
hishlord and master Sulla,
devoted
274
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
—through the sheer force of circumstances. In this, as in other things, he reminds us of Marius; but Marius, with his nature of boorish roughness and sensuous passion, was still less intolerable than this most tiresome and most starched of all artificial great men. His political position was utterly perverse. He was a Sullan officenand under
obligation to stand up for the restoredconstitiitipmiiiyet again in opposition to Sulla personally as well asgtvo the
whole senatorial government. The genrfofwthg ,Bgmpgji,
which had only been named for spume sixtywygavrsu in the
consular lists, had by no means acquired full standingjn
the ‘53%;? the aristocracy; even the father of thislfgmpgius
had‘occupied a very invidious equivocal positioaatowards
the senate (iii. 546, p. 61), and he himself had onceggegn ihwtqhgnranks of the Cinnans 85)-—recollect' us which
were suppressed perhaps, but not forgotten. “The promi nent position which Pompeius acquired for himself under Sulla set him at inward variance with the aristocracy, quite as much as brought him into outward connection with itmeak-headed as he was, Pompeius was seized with giddiness on the height of glory which he had climbed with such dangerous rapidity and ease. Just as he would himself ridicule his dry prosaic nature by the parallel with the most poetical of all heroic figures, he began to compare himself with Alexander the Great, and to account himself man of unique standing, whom did not beseem to be merely one of the five hundred senators of Rome: In reality, no one was more fitted to take his place as member of an aristocratic government than Pompeius. His dignified outward appearance, his solemn formality, his personal bravery, his decorous private life, his want of all initiative might have gained for him, had he been born two hundred years earlier, an honourable place the side of Quintus Maximus and Publius Decius: this mediocrity, so characteristic of the genuine Optimate and the genuine
by
a
a
it
if
it
(p.
can). I QUINTUS SERTORIUS 275
Roman, contributed not a little to the elective aflinity which subsisted at all times between Pompeius and the mass of the burgesses and the senate. Even in his own age he would have had a clearly defined and respectable
position, had he contented himself with being the general of the senate, for which he was from the outset destined. With
this he was not content, and so he fell into the fatal plight of wishing to be something else than he could be. He was constantly aspiring to a special position in the state, and, when it offered itself, he could not make up his mind to occupy it; he was deeply indignant when persons and laws did not bend unconditionally before him, and yet he everywhere bore himself with no mere affectation of modesty as one of many peers, and trembled at the mere thought of undertaking anything unconstitutional. Thus constantly at fundamental variance with, and yet at the same time the obedient servant of, the oligarchy, constantly tormented by an ambition which was frightened at its own aims, his much-agitated life passed joylessly away in a per petual inward contradiction.
Marcus Crassus cannot, any more than Pompeius, be Crassus reckoned among the unconditional adherents of the oli
garchy. He is a personage highly characteristic of this epoch.
Like Pompeius, whose senior he was by a few years, he belonged to the circle of the high Roman aristocracy, had obtained the usual education befitting his rank, and had
like Pompeius fought with distinction under Sulla in the Italian war. Far inferior to many of his peers in mental gifts, literary culture, and military talent, he outstripped them by his boundless activity, and by the perseverance with which he strove to possess everything and to become all-important. Above all, he threw himself into specula tion. Purchases of estates during the revolution formed the foundation of his wealth ; but he disdained no branch of gain; he carried on the business of building in the
his colleagues
account.
He was far from nice in the matter of making On occasion of the Sullan proscriptions a forgery
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND I00! V
on a great scale and with prudence; he entered
376
Rome, in person or by his agents; he advanced money to
capital
into partnership
undertakings; he acted as banker both in and out of
with his freedmen in the most varied
in the senate, and undertook—as it might happen—to execute works or to bribe the tribunals on their
profit.
in the lists had been proved against him, for which reason
Sulla made no more use of him thenceforward in the affairs
he did not refuse to accept an inheritance, because the testamentary document which contained his name was notoriously forged; he made no objection, when his bailifl‘s by force or by fraud dislodged the petty holders
of state:
his own. He avoided open collisions, however, with criminal justice, and lived himself like a genuine moneyed man in homely and simple style. In this way Crassus rose in the course of a few years from
a man of ordinary senatorial fortune to be the master of wealth which not long before his death, after defraying
from lands which adjoined
enormous
extraordinary expenses, sesterces (£r,7oo,ooo).
still amounted to He had become the
170,000,000
richest of Romans and thereby, at the same time, a great
If, according to his expression, no one might call himself rich who could not maintain an army from his revenues, one who could do this was hardly any
longer a mere citizen. In reality the views of Crassus aimed at a higher object than the possession of the best
political power.
in Rome. He grudged no pains to
filled money-chest
extend his connections.
every burgess of the capital.
his assistance in court. Nature, indeed, had not done
much for him as an orator: his speaking was dry, his delivery monotonous, he had difficulty of hearing; but his tenacity of purpose, which no wearisomeness deterred and
He knew how to salute by name He refused to no suppliant
can. t QUINTUS SERTORIUS 277
no enjoyment distracted, overcame such obstacles. He never appeared unprepared, he never extemporized, and so he became a pleader at all times in request and at all times ready; to whom it was no derogation that a cause was rarely too bad for him, and that he knew how to influence the judges not merely by his oratory, but also by his connections and, on occasion, by his gold. Half the senate was in debt to him; his habit of advancing to “friends” money without interest revocable at pleasure rendered a number of influential men dependent on him, and the more so that, like a genuine man of business, he made no distinction among the parties, maintained connec tions on all hands, and readily lent to every one who was able to pay or otherwise useful. The most daring party leaders, who made their attacks recklessly in all directions, were careful not to quarrel with Crassus; he was compared to the bull of the herd, whom it was advisable for none to provoke. That such a man, so disposed and so situated, could not strive after humble aims is clear; and, in a very different way from Pompeius, Crassus knew exactly like a banker the objects and the means of political speculation. From the origin of Rome capital was a political power
there; the age was of such a sort, that everything seemed accessible to gold as to iron. If in the time of revolution a capitalist aristocracy might have thought of overthrowing the oligarchy of the gem’er, a man like Crassus might raise
his eyes higher than to the farm‘ and embroidered mantle of the triumphators. For the moment he was a Sullan and adherent of the senate; but he was too much of a financier to devote himself to a definite political party, or to pursue aught else than his personal advantage. Why should Crassus, the wealthiest and most intriguing man in Rome, and no penurious miser but a speculator on the greatest scale, not speculate also on the crown? Alone,
he could not attain this object; but he had
perhaps,
Leaders
of the democrats.
already carried out various great transactions in partner ship; it was not impossible that for this also a suitable partner might present himself. It is a trait characteristic of the time, that a mediocre orator and oflicer, a politician who took his activity for energy and his covetousness for ambition, one who at bottom had nothing but a colossal fortune and the mercantile talent of forming connections— that such a man, relying on the omnipotence of coteries and intrigues, could deem himself on a level with the first generals and statesmen of his day, and could contend with them for the highest prize which allures political ambition.
In the opposition proper, both among the liberal con servatives and among the Populares, the storms of revolu tion had made fearful havoc. Among the former, the only
278
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
124-78. surviving man of note was Gaius Cotta (630-0. 681), the 91. friend and ally of Drusus, and as such banished in 663 (iii. 503), and then by Sulla’s victory brought back to his native land 112) he was shrewd man and a capable advocate, but not called, either by the weight of his party
62.
or by that of his personal standing, to act more than a respectable secondary part. In the democratic party, among the rising youth, Gaius Julius Caesar, who was
102. twenty-four years of age (born I2 July 52 ? 1), drew
100. It usual to set down the year 54 as that of Caesar's birth, because according to Suetonius (Cacr. 88), Plutarch (Cuer. 69), and Anpian (5. 6‘. 44. ii. 149) he was at his death March 710) in his 56th year with which also the statement that he was 18 years old at the time of the Sullan
82. prescription (672; Vell. ii. 4r) nearly accords. But this view utterly 65. inconsistent with the facts that Caesar filled the aedileship in 689, the 59. praetorship in 692, and the consulship in 695, and that these ofiices could,
according to the lager annular, be held at the very earliest in the 37th-38th, 4oth-4rst, and 43rd-44th years of a man's life respectively. We cannot conceive why Caesar should have filled all the curule ofl‘ices two years before the legal time, and still less why there should be no mention any where of his having done so. These facts rather suggest the conjecture
100. that, as his birthday fell undoubtedly on July 12, he was born not in 654,
102. 82.
but in 652 so that in 672 he was in his 2oth-zrst year, and he died not in his 56th year, but at the age of 57 years months. In favour of this latter view we may moreover adduce the circumstance, which has been
8
;
is
(I 5
1 is
6
a
6 ;
(p. ;
cHAr. ! QUINTUS SERTORIUS 279
towards him the eyes of friend and foe. His relationship with Marius and Cinna (his father’s sister had been the wife of Marius, he himself had married Cinna’s daughter); the courageous refusal of the youth who had scarce out grown the age of boyhood to send a divorce to his young wife Cornelia at the bidding of the dictator, as Pompeius had in the like case done; his bold persistence in the
conferred upon him by Marius, but revoked by Sulla; his wanderings during the proscription with which he was threatened, and which was with difficulty averted by the intercession of his relatives; his bravery in the conflicts before Mytilene and in Cilicia, a bravery which no one had expected from the tenderly reared and almost effeminately foppish boy; even the warnings of Sulla regarding the “boy in the petticoat ” in whom more than a
strangely brought forward in opposition to that Caesar "pane M"
was appointed by Marius and Cinna as Flamen of Jupiter (Vell. ii. 43);
for Marius died in January 668, when Caesar was, according to the usual 86. view, 13 years months old, and therefore not "almost," as Velleius
says, but actually still a boy, and most probably for this very reason not
at all capable of holding such a priesthood. If, again, he was born in
July 652, he was at the death of Marius in his sixteenth year and with 102. this the expression in Velleius agrees, as well as the general rule that
civil positions were not assumed before the expiry of the age of boyhood. Further, with this latter view alone accords the fact that the d:narii struck by Caesar about the outbreak of the civil war are marked with the number LIL, probably the year of his life; for when began, Caesar's
age was according to this view somewhat over 52 years. Nor so
rash as appears to us who are accustomed to regular and official lists of births, to charge our authorities with an error in this respect. Those four statements may very well be all traceable to common source nor can
they at all lay claim to any very high credibility, seeing that for the ealier period before the commencement of the Mid diuma the statements
as to the natal years of even the best known and most prominent Romans,
e. g. as to that of Pompeius, vary in the most surprising manner. (Comp. SIaaIsrec/zt, I. ‘ p. 570. )
In the Life of Caesar by Napoleon III.
this view, first, that the [ex annalir would point for Caesar’s birth-year
not to 652, but to 651; secondly and especially, that other cases are 102. known where was not attended to. But the first assertion rests on a mistake; for, as the example of Cicero shows, the lax annalir required
only that at the entering on oflice the 43rd year should be begun, not that
should be completed. None of the alleged exceptions to the rule, more over, are pertinent. When Tacitus (Ann. xi. 22) says that formerly in conferring magistracies no regard we: had to age, and that the wnaulate
priesthood
(B.
2, ch. objected to
I‘
it
it
1) it is
it
a
it,
;
it
is it
;
6
280 MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
Marius lay concealed—all these were precisely so many recommendations in the eyes of the democratic party. But Caesar could only be the object of hopes for the future; and the men who from their age and their public position would have been called now to seize the reins of
the party and the state, were all dead or in exile.
Thus the leadership of the democracy, in the absence
of a man with a true vocation for was to be had by any one who might please to give himself forth as the champion of oppressed popular freedom and in this way came to Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, Sullan, who from motives more than ambiguous deserted to the camp of the demo cracy. Once zealous Optimate, and large purchaser at the auctions of the proscribed estates, he had, as
of Sicily, so scandalously plundered the province
and dictatorship were entrusted to quite young men, he has in view, of course, as all commentators acknowledge, the earlier period before the issuing of the legrr annular-the consulship of M.
Valerius Corvus at twenty-three, and similar cases. The assertion that Lucullus received the supreme magistraey before the legal age erroneous; only stated
(Cicero, And. pr. that on the ground of an exceptional clause not more particularly known to us, in reward for some sort of act performed by him, he had a dispensation from the legal two years’ interval between the aedileship and praetorship-in reality he was aedile in 675, probably praetor in 677, consul in 680. That the case of Pompeius was a totally
the same thing should have been done with Caesar on his candidature for the minor magistracies, when he was of little more importance than other political beginners; and would be‘ possible, more surprising still, that, while there mention of that—in itself readily understood—excep tion, there should be no notice of this more than strange deviation, how ever naturally such notices would have suggested themselves, especially with reference to Octavianus consul at 21 (comp. , e. g. , Appian, iii. 88). When from these irrelevant examples the inference drawn, "that the lawwas little observed in Rome, where distinguished men were concerned,"
anything more erroneous than this sentence was never uttered regarding Rome and the Romans. The greatness of the Roman commonwealth. and not less that of its grmt generals and statesmen, depends above all things on the fact that the law held good in their case also.
governor
different one obvious: but even as to Pompeius,
occasions expressly stated (Cicero, de Imp. Porn). 21, 62
that the senate released him from the laws as to age.
have been done with Pompeius, who had solicited the consulship as a. cornmander-in-chief crowned with victory and a triumphator, at the head of an army and after his coalition with Crassus also of a powerful party, we can readily conceive. But would be in the highest degree surprising,
on several Appian, iii. 88) That this should
is
it
it
if
if
is
is i. a
; it is
it is
it
I)
is
it,
a
a
;
CHAP. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS 28!
that he was threatened with impeachment, and, to evade threw himself into opposition. It was gain of doubtful
value. No doubt the opposition thus acquired well known name, man of quality, vehement orator in the Forum; but Lepidus was an insignificant and indiscreet personage, who did not deserve to stand‘ at the head either
in council or in the field. Nevertheless the opposition welcomed him, and the new leader of the democrats succeeded not only in deterring his accusers from prose cuting the attack on him which they had begun, but also
in carrying his election to the consulship for 676 in which, 78. we may add, he was helped not only by the treasures exacted in Sicily, but also by the foolish endeavour of Pompeius to show Sulla and the pure Sullans on this occasion what he could do. Now that the opposition had,
on the death of Sulla, found head once more in Lepidus, and now that this their leader had become the supreme magistrate of the state, the speedy outbreak of new revolution in the capital might with certainty be foreseen.
But even before the democrats moved in the capital,
the democratic emigrants had again bestirred themselves in emigrants in Spain.
Spain. The soul of this movement was Quintus Sertorius. Sertorius. This excellent man, native of Nursia in the Sabine land,
was from the first of tender and even soft organization
as his almost enthusiastic love for his mother, Raia, shows
—and at the same time of the most chivalrous bravery, as was proved by the honourable scars which he brought home from the Cimbrian, Spanish, and Italian wars. Although wholly untrained as an orator, he excited the admiration of learned advocates the natural flow and the striking self-possession of his address. His remarkable
military and statesmanly talent had found opportunity of shining by contrast, more particularly in the revolutionary war which the democrats so wretchedly and stupidly mis managed; he was confessedly the only democratic oflicer
by
aa
a
a
a
;
a
a
it,
a
Renewed outbreak
enrrectlon
282
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK V
who knew how to prepare and to conduct war, and the only democratic statesman who opposed the insensate and
of his party with statesmanlike energy. soldiers called him the new Hannibal, and not merely because he had, like that hero, lost an eye in war. He in reality reminds us of the great Phoenician by cunning and courageous strategy, by his rare talent of organizing war by means of war, by his adroitness
furious doings His Spanish
his equally
nations to his interest and making them serviceable to his ends, by his prudence in success and misfortune, by the quickness of his ingenuity in turning
to good account his victories and averting the consequences of his defeats. It may be doubted whether any Roman statesman of the earlier period, or of the present, can be
in attracting foreign
in point of versatile talent to Sertorius. After
compared
Sulla’s generals had compelled him to quit Spain (p. 93), he had led a restless life of adventure along the Spanish and African coasts, sometimes in league, sometimes at war, with the Cilician pirates who haunted these seas, and with the chieftains of the roving tribes of Libya. The victorious
Roman restoration had pursued
he was besieging Tingis (Tangiers),
ciaecus from Roman Africa had come to the help of the prince of the town; but Pacciaecus was totally defeated, and Tingis was taken by Sertorius. On the report of such achievements by the. Roman refugee spreading abroad, the
their pretended sub mission to the Roman supremacy, practically maintained
Lusitanians, who, notwithstanding
their independence, and annually fought with the governors
sent envoys to Sertorius in Africa, to invite him to join them, and to commit to him the com
mand of their militia.
Sertorius, who twenty years before had served under
Titus Didius in Spain and knew the resources of the land,
of Further Spain,
of the with the invitation, and, leaving behind Spnishln- resolved to comply
him even thither: when
a corps under Pac
CHAP- t QUINTUS SERTORIUS 283
a small detachment on the Mauretanian coast, embarked for Spain (about 674). The straits separating Spain and Africa 80. were occupied by a Roman squadron commanded by Cotta ;
to steal through it was impossible; so Sertorius fought
his way through and succeeded in reaching the Lusitanians. There were not more than twenty Lusitanian communities that placed themselves under his orders; and even of
“ Romans ” he mustered only 2600 men, a considerable part of whom were deserters from the army of Pacciaecus
or Africans armed after the Roman style. Sertorius saw that everything depended on his associating with the loose
a strong nucleus of troops possessing Roman organization and discipline: for this end he reinforced the
band which he had brought with him by levying
infantry and 700 cavalry, and with this one legion and the swarms of Spanish volunteers advanced against the Romans.
The command in Further Spain was held by Lucius Fufidius,
who through his absolute devotion to Sulla—well tried
amidst the proscriptions—had risen from a subaltern to be propraetor; he was totally defeated on the Baetis; 2ooo Romans covered the field of battle. Messengers in all
haste summoned the governor of the adjoining province of
the Ebro, Marcus Domitius Calvinus, to check the farther advance of the Sertorians ; and there soon appeared (67 5) 79, also the experienced general Quintus Metellus, sent by Metellus Sulla to relieve the incapable Fufidius in southern Spain.
But they did not succeed in mastering the revolt. In the
Ebro province not only was the army of Calvinus destroyed
and he himself slain by the lieutenant of Sertorius, the quaestor Lucius Hirtuleius, but Lucius Manlius, the governor
of Transalpine Gaul, who had crossed the Pyrenees with
three legions to the help of his colleague, was totally defeated by the same brave leader. With difliculty Manlius escaped with a few men to Ilerda (Lerida) and thence to
his province, losing on the march his whole baggage through
guerilla-bands
4000
tions of Sertorius.
234
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
a sudden attack of the Aquitanian tribes. In Further Spain Metellus penetrated into the Lusitanian territory ; but Sertorius succeeded during the siege of Longobriga (not far from the mouth of the Tagus)v. in alluring a division under Aquinus into an ambush, and thereby compelling Metellus
himself to raise the siege and to evacuate the Lusitanian territory. Sertorius followed him, defeated on the Anas
the corps of Thorius, and inflicted vast damage by guerilla warfare on the army of the commander-in-chief himself. Metellus, a methodical and somewhat clumsy tactician, was in despair as to this opponent, who obstinately declined a decisive battle, but cut off his supplies and com munications and constantly hovered round him on all sides.
These extraordinary successes obtained by Sertorius in the two Spanish provinces were the more significant, that they were not achieved merely by arms and were not of a mere military nature. The emigrants as such were not formidable; nor were isolated successes of the Lusitanians under this or that foreign leader of much moment. But with the most decided political and patriotic tact Sertorius acted, whenever he could do so, not as condottiere of the Lusitanians in revolt against Rome, but as Roman general and governor of Spain, in which capacity he had in fact been sent thither . by the former rulers. He began 1 to form the heads of the
(Guadiana)
into a senate, which was to increase to members and to conduct affairs and to nominate magistrates in Roman form. He regarded his army as a Roman one, and filled the officers’ posts, without exception, with Romans. When facing the Spaniards, he was the governor, who by virtue of his office levied troops and other support from them; but he was a governor who, instead of exercising the usual despotic sway, endeavoured to attach the pro
emigration
300
1 At least the outline of these organlmtions must be assigned to the 80, 79, 78. years 674, 67 5, 676, although the execution of them doubtless belonged,
in great part, only to the subsequent years.
‘I’
CRAP. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS 285
vincials to Rome and to himself personally. His chivalrous character rendered it easy for him to enter into Spanish habits, and excited in the Spanish nobility the most ardent enthusiasm for the wonderful foreigner who had a spirit so kindred with their own. According to the warlike custom of personal following which subsisted in Spain as among the Celts and the Germans, thousands of the noblest Spaniards swore to stand faithfully by their Roman general unto death; and in them Sertorius found more trustworthy comrades than in his countrymen and party-associates. He did not disdain to turn to account the superstition of the ruder Spanish tribes, and to have his plans of war brought to him as commands of Diana by the white fawn of the goddess. Throughout he exercised a just and gentle rule.
His troops, at least so far as his eye and his arm reached, had to maintain the strictest discipline. Gentle as he generally was in punishing, he showed himself inexorable when any outrage was perpetrated by his soldiers on friendly soil. Nor was he inattentive to the permanent alleviation of the condition of the provincials; he reduced the tribute, and directed the soldiers to construct winter barracks for themselves, so that the oppressive burden of quartering the
‘ troops was done away and thus a source of unspeakable mischief and annoyance was stopped. For the children of Spaniards of quality an academy was erected at Osca (Huesca), in which they received the higher instruction usual in Rome, learning to speak Latin and Greek, and to wear the toga—a remarkable‘ measure, which was by no means designed merely to take from the allies in as gentle a form as possible the hostages that in Spain were inevitable, but was above all an emanation from, and an advance on, the great project of Gaius Gracchus and the democratic party for gradually Romanizing the provinces. It was the first attempt to accomplish their Romanization not by
extirpating
the old inhabitants and filling their places with
286 MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
Italian emigrants, but by Romanizing the provincials them selves. The Optimates in Rome sneered at the wretched emigrant, the runaway from the Italian army, the last of the robber-band of Carbo ; the sorry taunt recoiled upon its authors. The masses that had been brought into the field against Sertorius were reckoned, including the Spanish general levy, at 120,000 infantry, 2000 archers and slingers, and 6000 cavalry. Against this enormous superiority of force Sertorius had not only held his ground in a series of successful conflicts and victories, but had also reduced the greater part of Spain under his power. In the Further province Metellus found himself confined to the districts immediately occupied by his troops; here all the tribes, who could, had taken the side of Sertorius. In the Hither province, after the victories of Hirtuleius, there no longer existed a Roman army. Emissaries of Sertorius roamed
the whole territory of Gaul; there, too, the tribes began to stir, and bands gathering together began to make the Alpine passes insecure. Lastly the sea too belonged quite as much to the insurgents as to the legitimate govern ment, since the allies of the former—the pirates—were almost as powerful in the Spanish waters as the Roman ‘ships of war. At the promontory of Diana (now Denia, between Valencia and Alicante) Sertorius established for the corsairs a fixed station, where they partly lay in wait for such Roman ships as were conveying supplies to the Roman maritime towns and the army, partly carried away or delivered goods for the insurgents, and partly formed their medium of intercourse with Italy and Asia Minor. The constant readiness of these men moving to and fro to carry everywhere sparks from the scene of conflagration tended
in a high degree to excite apprehension, especially at a time when so much combustible matter was everywhere accumulated in the Roman empire.
Amidst this state of matters the sudden death of Sulla
through
CHAP- l QUINTUS SERTORIUS 287
took place (676). So long as the man lived, at whose Death [1: voice a trained and trustworthy army of veterans was ready
any moment to rise, the oligarchy might tolerate the conse almost (as it seemed) definite abandonment of the Spanish quences' provinces to the emigrants, and the election of the leader
of the opposition at home to be supreme magistrate, at all events as transient misfortunes; and in their shortsighted way, yet not wholly without reason, might cherish con fidenoe either that the opposition would not venture to proceed to open conflict, or that, if it did venture, he who
had twice saved the oligarchy would set it up a third time. Now the state of things was changed. The democratic Hotspurs in the capital, long impatient of the endless delay and inflamed by the brilliant news from Spain, urged that a blow should be struck; and Lepidus, with whom the decision for the moment lay, entered into the proposal with all the zeal of a renegade and with his own character istic frivolity. For a moment it seemed as if the torch which kindled the funeral pile of the regent would also kindle civil war; but the influence of Pompeius and the
temper of the Sullan veterans induced the opposition to let the obsequies of the regent pass over in peace.
Yet all the more openly were arrangements thenceforth
made to introduce a fresh revolution. Daily the Forum 32,31; resounded with accusations against the “mock Romulus”
and his executioners. Even before the great potentate
had closed his eyes, the overthrow of the Sullan constitu
tion, the re-establishment of the distributions of grain, the reinstating of the tribunes of the people in their former position, the recall of those who were banished contrary to
law, the restoration of the confiscated lands, were openly
indicated by Lepidus and his adherents as the objects at which they aimed. Now communications were entered into with the proscribed; Marcus Perpenna, governor of Sicily in the days of Cinna 92), arrived in the capital.
Insurrec
(p.
288 MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
The sons of those whom Sulla had declared guilty of treason*on whom the laws of the restoration bore with intolerable severity—and generally the more noted men of Marian views were invited to give their accession. Not a few, such as the young Lucius Cinna, joined the move ment; others, however, followed the example of Gaius Caesar, who had returned home from Asia on receiving the accounts of the death of Sulla and of the plans of Lepidus, but after becoming more accurately acquainted with the character of the leader and of the movement prudently withdrew. Carousing and recruiting went on in behalf of Lepidus in the taverns and brothels of the capital. At length a conspiracy against the new order of things was concocted among the Etruscan malcontents. 1
All this took place under the eyes of the government The consul Catulus as well as the more judicious Opti mates urged an immediate decisive interference and suppression of the revolt in the bud ; the indolent majority, however, could not make up their minds to begin the
struggle, but tried to deceive themselves as long as possible by a system of compromises and concessions. Lepidus also on his part at first entered into it. The suggestion, which proposed a restoration of the prerogatives taken away from the tribunes of the people, he as well as his col league Catulus repelled. On the other hand, the Gracchan distribution of grain was to a limited extent re-established. According to it not all (as according to the Sempronian law) but only a definite number-—presumably 4o,ooo— of the poorer burgesses appear to have received the earlier
as Gracchus had fixed them, of five moa'ii monthly at the price of 6% arrer (3d. )—a regulation which occasioned to the treasury an annual net loss of at least
1 The following narrative rests substantially on the account of Licini anus, which, fragmentary as it is at this very point, still givu important information as to the insurrection of Lepidus.
largesses,
CRAP. i QUINTUS SERTORIUS 289
£40,000. ‘ The opposition, naturally as little satisfied as it was decidedly emboldened by this partial concession, displayed all the more rudeness and violence in the capital; and in Etruria, the true centre of all insurrections of the Italian proletariate, civil war already broke out, the dispossessed Faesulans resumed possession of their lost estates by force of arms, and several of the veterans settled there by Sulla perished in the tumult. The senate on learning what had occurred resolved to send the two consuls thither, in order to raise troops and suppress the insurrection. ‘z It was impossible to adopt a more irra
1 Under the year 676 Licinianus states (p. 23, Pertz; p. 42, Bonn); 78, (Lepidu: f) [lelgem frummtarzIam] nullo rerirtant: )[argz'jtur :41, ut ann0n[ae] quinque modi popu[la da]rmtur. According to this account, therefore, the law of the consuls of 681 Marcus Terentius Lucullus and 73,
Gaius Cassius Varus, which Cicero mentions (in Verr. iii. 70, I36; v. 2:, 52), and to which also Sallust refers (Hirt. iii. 61, 19 Dietsch), did not first re-establish the five modii, but only secured the largesses of grain by regu lating the purchases of Sicilian corn, and perhaps made various alterations of detaiL That the Sempronian law (iii. 344) allowed every burgess domiciled in Rome to share in the largesses of grain, is certain. But the later distri bution of grain was not so extensive as this, for, seeing that the monthly corn of the Roman burgesses amounted to little more than 33,000 medimm'
=198,ooo modz'i (Cic. Verr. iii. 30, 72), only some 40,000 burgesses at that time received grain, whereas the number of burgesses domiciled in the capital was certainly far more considerable. This arrangement probably proceeded from the Octavian law, which introduced instead of the ex travagant Sempronian amount “a moderate largess, tolerable for the state and necessary for the common people" (Cic. d: 015 21, 72, Brut. 62, 222) and to all appearance this very law that the lexfrumen {aria mentioned by Licinianus. That Lepidus should have entered into such a proposal of compromise, accords with his attitude as regards the restoration of the tribunate. It likewise in keeping with the circum stances that the democracy should find itself not at all satisfied by the regulation, brought about in this way, of the distribution of grain (Sallust, 1. 0. The amount of loss calculated on the basis of the grain being worth at least double (iii. 344); when piracy or other causes drove up the price of grain, a far more considerable loss must have resulted.
From the fragments of ‘the account of Licinianus (p. 44, Bonn) plain that the decree of the senate, uti Lepidur :t Calulur decretir exer n'tibur maturrime proficz'rcerentur (Sallust, Hirt. 44 Dietsch), to be understood not of a despatch of the consuls before the expiry of their consulship to their proconsular provinces, for which there would have been no reason, but of their being sent to Etruria against the revolted Faesulans, just as in the Catilinarian war the consul Gaius Antonius was dapatched to the same quarter. The statement of Philippus in Sallust
110
(Hist.
VOL IV
48, that Lepidus ob . redz'lionem provinciam cum exercitu adtplus
i. 4)
;
i.
is
it is
’
is
is
it is
is
ii.
=90
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND aoorc v
tional course. The senate, in presence of the insurrec tion, evinced its pusillanimity and its fears by the re establishment of the com-law; in order to be relieved from a street-riot, it furnished the notorious head of the insurrection with an army; and, when the two consuls were bound by the most solemn oath which could be contrived not to turn the arms entrusted to them against each other, it must have required the superhuman obduracy of oligarchic consciences to think of erecting such a bulwark against the impending insurrection. Of course Lepidus armed in Etruria not for the senate, but for the insurrec tion—sarcastically declaring that the oath which he had taken bound him only for the current year. The senate put the oracular machinery in motion to induce him to return, and committed to him the conduct of the impend ing consular elections; but Lepidus evaded compliance, and, while messengers passed to and fro and the official year drew to an end amidst proposals of accommodation, his force swelled to an army. When at length, in the
77o beginning of the following year (677), the definite order of the senate was issued to Lepidus to return without delay, the proconsul haughtily refused obedience, and de manded in his turn the renewal of the former tribunician power, the reinstatement of those who had been forcibly ejected from their civic rights and their property, and, besides this, his own re-election as consul for the current year or, in other words, the zj’ranm'r in legal form.
Thus war was declared. The senatorial party could
Outbreak
of the war. reckon, in addition to the Sullan veterans whose civil exist
ence was threatened by Lepidus, upon the army assembled by the proconsul Catulus; and so, in compliance with the
urgent warnings
of the more sagacious, particularly of
at, is entirely in harmony with this view; for the extraordinary consular wmrnand in Etruria was just as much a prom‘rwia u the ordinary pra oonsular command in Narbonese Gaul.
can. i QUINTUS SERTORIUS 291
Philippus, Catulus was entrusted by the senate with the defence of the capital and the repelling of the main force of the democratic party stationed in Etruria. At the same time Gnaeus Pompeius was despatched with another corps
tgwsst from
his former protégé the valley of the Po, which was held by Lepidus’ lieutenant, Marcushlirutus.
While Pompeius speedily
and shut up the enemy’s general closely in Mutina, Lepidus_ appeared before the capital in order to conquer it for the revolution as Marius had formerly done by storm.
The “right bank of thewfl‘iberwfellwwhollyv into vhiswpower, and'he' was gEBTé’Eéen ‘to cross the river. The decisive
battle waswfdught on the Campus Martius, close under the
walls of the city. But Catulus conquered ;v and Lepidus Lepidus was compelled toretrggt to ‘Etruria, while another division, defeated. underhi's‘son Scipio, threw itself into the fortress of Alba. Thereupon the rising was substantially at an end. Mutina surwgmpgiji; and Brutus was, notwithstand
ing the safe-conduct promised to him, subsequently put
to death by order of that general. Alba too was, after a
long siege, reduced by famine, and the leader there was
likewise executed. Lepidus, pressed on two sides by
Catulus and Pompeius, fought another engagement on the
Etruria in order merely to procure the means of retreatfafi'd’theii embarked at the port of Cosa for Sardinia,
from which point he hoped to cut off the supplies of the
capital, and to obtain communication with the Spanish insurgents. But the governor of the island opposed to
him a vigorous resistance; and he himself died, not long Death of after his landing, of consumption (677), whereupon the Lepidus. war in Sardinia came to an end. A part of his soldiers dispersed; with the flower of the insurrectionary army
and with a well-filled chest the late praetor, Marcus Perpenna, proceeded to Liguria, and thence to Spain to
join the Seitorians.
c‘dagtbf
aCCOmpllSlledg_l'll§m commission
Pompeius mom
command in Spain.
The oligarchy was thus victorious over Lepidus; but it found itself compelled by the dangérbifsmr the SEELw torian wvarto concessions, which violated the letter as well as the “spirit of the Sullan constitution. It was absolutely
:92
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
‘mu-wu
necessary to send7 gawstfong army and an able generali to
Spain; and. Pompeius indicated, very plainly,v that he desired, or rather demanded, this cornmjgjon. The pre tensio‘rY‘wa's bold. Itgwas already had enough that they had allowed this secret‘ opponent agaiiiFattaimanmextra ordinary command in the pressuie of the hepidiaiivtr‘eivolu tion; but it was far more hazardous, in disregard of all the rules instituted by Sulla for the magisterial hieraifqhy, to invest a man who had hitherto filled no civil oflice with one of the most important ordinary proyincialgvqggrnworships, under'circumstances in which the observance of the legal term of a year was not to be thought of. The oligarchy had thus, even apart from the respect due to their general Metellus, good reason to oppose with all earnestness this new attempt of the ambitious youth to perpetuate his exceptional position. But this was not easy. In the first place, they had not a single man fitted for the diflicult post of general inSp’a‘Hin. ‘ 'mtfla'é'fgfiiié' consuls 6f1h€§é§r showed any desire to measure himself against Sertorius; and what Lucius Philippus said in a full meeting of the senate had to be admitted as too true—that, a‘nigpgaailihe senators of note, not one was able and willing to command in a seriousyyar. Yet they might, perhaps, have got over this, and after the manner of oligarchs, when they had no capable candidate, have filled the place with some sort of makeshift, if Pompeius had merely desired the command and had not demanded it at the head of angarrny. He had already rent a deaf ear to the injunctions of Catulus that he shouldwdismissmtglgguagm ; it was at least doubtful whethe'r'those of the senate would find a better reception, and the consequences of a breach no one could calculate
CHAP. l QUINTUS SERTORIUS 293
—the scale of aristocracy might very easily mount up, if the sword of a well-known general were thrown into the
scale. So the majority resolved on concession. Not from the people, which constitutionally ought to have been consulted in a case where a private man was to be invested with the supreme magisterial power, but from the séiia‘t'e, Pompeius received proconsular authority
chief v epfiirfiind‘in Hither Spain; and, forty days after he had 'received crossed the Alps in the summer of 677. 77.
First of all the new general found employment in Gaul, Pompeius where no formal insurrection had broken out, but serioushuGmL disturbances of the peace had occurred at several places;
in consequence of which Pompeius deprived the cantons of
the Volcae-Arecomici and the Helvii of their independence,
and placed them under Massilia. He also laid out new
road over the Cottian Alps (Mont Genevre, 258), and
so established a shorter communication between the valley
of the Po and Gaul. Amidst this work the best season of
the year passed away; was not till late in autumn that Pompeius crossed the Pyrenees.
Sertorius had meanwhile not been idle. He had de spatched Hirtuleius into the Further province to keep Metellus in check, and had himself endeavoured to follow up his complete victory in the Hither province, and to
for the reception of Pompeius. The isolated Celtiberian towns there, which still adhered to Rome, were attacked and reduced one after another; at last, in the very middle of winter, the strong Contrebia (south-east of Saragossa) had fallen. In vain the hard-pressed towns had sent message after message to Pompeius; would not be
opposite
prepare
any entreaties to depart from his wonted ,rut of slowly advancing. With the exception of the maritime towns, which were defended the Roman fleet, and the
induced
of the Indigetes and Laletani in the north-east corner of Spain, where Pompeius established himself after
Appear.
2:35;“, in Spain.
districts
andwthe
"
by
by
he
it
ii.
a
r)
\v
it,
294
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND 8001! v
he had at length crossed the Pyrenees, and made his raw troops bivouac throughout the winter to inure them to hardships, the whole of Hither Spain had at the end of
77. 677 become by treaty or force dependent on Sertorius, and the district on the upper and middle Ebro thenceforth continued the main stay of his power. Even the appre hension, which the fresh Roman force and the celebrated name of the general excited in the army of the insurgents, had a salutary effect on Marcus Perpenna, who hitherto as the equal of Sertorius in rank had claimed an inde
command over the force which he had brought with him from Liguria, was, on the news of the arrival of Pompeius in Spain, compelled by his soldiers to place himself under the orders of his ables colleague.
{Ear the campaign of 678 Sertorius again employed the corpslof Hirtuleius against Metellus, while Perpenna with strong army took up his position along the lower course
of the Ebro to prevent Pompeius from crossing the river, he should march, as was to be expected, in southerly
direction with the view of effecting junction with Metellus, and along the coast for the sake of procuring supplies for his troops‘; The corps of Gaius Herennius was destined to the immediate support of Perpenna farther inland on the upper Ebro, Sertorius in person prosecuted meanwhile the subjugation of several districts friendly to Rome, and held himself at the same time ready to hasten according to circumstances to the aid of Perpenna or Hirtuleius. It was still his intention to avoid any pitched battle, and to anno the enemy by petty conflicts and cutting off supplies.
Ebmpeius, however, forced the passageioifwthe Ebro against Perpenna and took up position on the river Pallantias, near Saguntum, whence, as we have already said, the Sertorians maintained their communications with Italy and the It was time that Sertorius should appear in persona, asn? throw the superiority of his numbers
pendent
Pompeius defeated.
76.
a;a
if
a
a
it.
CHAP. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS 295
and of his genius into the scale against the greater excellence of the soldiers of his opponent. For a considerable time the struggle was concentrated around the town of Lauro (on the ' Xucar, south of Valencia), which had declared for Pompeius and was on that account besieged by Sertorius.