Do all beings attain to
Nirvana?
AbhidharmakosabhasyamVol-4VasubandhuPoussinPruden1991
" The Sanskrit edition has: upddatta iti ph dig una na v ad ami / aharh ced evarh vadeyam upddatta iti atra te kalpah sydd vac an ay a ko nu bhadanta upddatta iti.
Note nevertheless that the Bhagavat speaks of the man "who casts off this body and takes up another body," tarn ca kdyam nikkhipati annarh ca kdyam upddiyati {Samyutta, iv. 60). (In the way that the flame which goes far without fuel has for the mind its support (updddna) so too the being who casts off this body and has not (yet) taken up another body has thirst for his support, ibid. 400). We have seen above, note 41, the etymology of pudgala: punah punar. . .
84. Saeki quotes the Sammitiyanikdya Sdstra, i. 7 (fol. 2b).
85. Parinantum means to transform oneself, anyathdtvamdpattum.
On parindma, iii. 43a, lOOa-b, v. 26, p. 809; the samtatiparindma of the Sautrantikas is
very different, ii. 36c, iv. 4a.
86. On the relationship between the primary elements {mahdbhuta) and secondary matter
{updddyarupa, bhautika rupa), see i. 35, ii. 22,65.
87. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 66lcl4: "Buddhadeva maintains that rupa is solely mahdbhutas, that mental states {caittas) are solely mind {citta)\ he says: updddyarupa is solely a type {viiesa) of the mahdbhutas; the mental states are solely a type of mind . . . The mahdbhutas see (when they form the organ of the e y e ) . . . There is no upddayasabda apart from the primary elements (that is to say: sound, iabda, is not a separate thing existing independently of the primary elements). It is the primary elements which are called upaddyafabda. "
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 730b26: Buddhadeva says: Twenty-two names {mahdbhumikas, etc. ), but solely one real thing, the mana-indriya. . . The conditioned dharmas are of two natures, mahdbhutas and citta. Apart from the mahdbhutas, there is no updddyarupa: apart from citta, there are no caittas.
Compare i, note 146; ii, p. 188.
Saeki: "Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of Buddhadeva, etc. , that the primary elements and secondary matter do not differ; but, as this is not the "correct meaning" {ch'eng # ? ? ) ? * t r i e Sarvastivadins, he says that it is dosa, an "error. "
88. The Sutra of Vatsagotra, Sarhyukta, TD 2, p. 245cl0. The Bhagavat said to the monk
Footnotes 1369
? 1370 Chapter Nine
Vatsagotra, "If one is of this opinion (drsti), The world is eternal; this is true; any other theory is false,' this is drspiviparydsa (v. 9d), this is kuan-ts'a chien jjjjjjf? , (drspipardmarla, v. p. 778). 'The world is not eternal. . . the Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death': this is drspiviparydsa"
89. On the "questions to be rejected," Kosa, v. 22, Nirvana, 1925, p. 108, where we see that Malebranche reasons quite closely to Vasubandhu.
90. We have Divya, 358: bahubollaka idkyaputriya.
91. The present passage of the Ko? a has been pointed out by S. Levi, AIBL. , 1893, 232. Chavannes has translated a very similar recension in Cinq Cents Contes, iii. 120 (according to Nanjio 1329, Ratnakaranda Sutra (? ), Tokyo, xiv. 10, fol. 39), the same recension in Takakusu, "Chinese translations of the Milindapanho," JRAS, 1896, p. 7. See Pelliot, "Les noms propres du Milinda,"JAS, 1914, ii. 380-381. (It appears indeed that the "Milindra" of the Tibetan text of the Avaddnakalpalatd is a rash correction by the editor). Finally, Paul Demieville, in a fine article on the Chinese versions of the Milinda, BEFEO, 1924, p. 64, completes our information.
92. Compare Samyutta, iv. 400. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 245? 1: Vatsagotra asks, "Gotama, is there an dtman? " The Bhagavat does not answer. He asks a second, a third time; and the Bhagavat, a second, a third time does not answer . . . And the monk Vatsagotra, in his evil (pdpikd), false view, says, "The Sramana does not know how to answer my question. " The Bhagavat says to Ananda, "If I were to answer him that there is an dtman, then I would increase the false view that he already has; if I were to answer him that there is no dtman, would his first folly-doubt not increase? Infatuated, he would say, 'The dtman, which existed, is now annihilated. ' The opinion that he has of the existence of an dtman is the opinion of permanence; to think that this dtman is annihilated is the opinion of annihilation. The Tathagata, avoiding these two extremes, teaches the Dharma of the middle: if this is, then that exists . . . if ignorance exists, then the samskdras exist. . . "
93. Missing in Paramartha.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 38al9: In the Brahmajdlasutra, it is said that the 62 drstigatas have
satkdyadrsti for their root; in the Sutra of the Lion's Roar, it is said all the diverse opinions of the Brahmins and monks rest on two opinions, the opinion of existence and the opinion of non-existence (bhavadrsti, vibhavadrsti,yu-chien ^ M and wu-yu-chien $&^|"? ); what is the difference between the declarations of these two Sutras? From the point of view of arising (samutpdda), it is said that all the drstigatas have satkdyadrsti for their root; from the point of view "t'ui-ch'iu ? ? " (to thrust-search out), it is said that the diverse opinions rest on the opinions of existence and non-existence. See above, p. 1336.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 1002b6: Bhavadrsti is sd/vatadrsti, and vibhavadrsti is ucchedadrsti, that is, the view of existence is the view of permanence or eternity, and the view of non-existence is the view of annihilation. Although bad opinions (kudrspigata) are of numerous types, they are all included by these two opinions.
94. Vydkhyd: Bhadantakumdraldbhah. On Kumaralabha, see PeVi, Date de Vasubandhu, p. 22.
95. Vydkhyd: drspir eva damstrd / taydvabhedham apeksya desayanti buddhd dharmam nairatmyarh tatpratipaksena / bhramsam ca karmandm apeksya krtaviprandsam apeksya pudgaldstitvam iva darsayanto'nyathd defayanti / vydghripotdpahdravad iti /yathd vydghri natinisphurena dantagrahanena svapotam apaharati / nayati mdsya damsprayd sarira [ ] krtam bhud iti / ? ? ? ? atisithilena dantagrahanena tarn apaharati / mdsya bhram/ah pdto'smin visaye bhud itiyuktenaiva grahanendpaharatity arthah / tathdrthadarsane kdranam darsayann aha / dtmastitvam iti vistarah /
? 96. For the second stanza, the Vydkhyd is less clear: dtmdstitvam pratipannas cet kascid drspidamsprayd satkdyadrstilaksanayd bhinnah sa vineyajanah sydd aprdpya samvrtiti (? ) (samvrtinitim? ) dharmasamketam ajdndnah kusalapotasya kuialakarmano vydghripotabh- utasya bhramUm kurydn ndsti karmanah phalam iti.
97. Vydkhyd: prdjuaptika iti prdjnaptau bhavah prdjnaptikah samvrtisann api pudgalo ndstiti kascid grhniydd ity ato ndstiti ndvocat.
98. The Vydkhyd has the last pdda: omitted by Hsiian-tsang.
Paramartha: 3. This person is not capable of understanding the correct teaching of real
emptiness; thus, when he asked if, yes or no, there is a soul, the Buddha did not say there was no soul. 4. And since he takes into consideration the intention of the questioner, if the soul existed, why did he not say that it existed? So too, on the question of his non-existence after Nirvana, he said nothing because then the questioner would have fallen into difficulties.
99. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 246b2: Vatsa asks, "By reason of the consciousness of which dharma are you not of the opinion, you do not say that the world is eternal. . . that the Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death? " "By reason of the consciousness of ? ? ? ? , vedand, etc. "
100. Vydkhyd: nirgranthasrdvakacatakavad iti / nirgranthasrdvakena catakam jivantam grhitvd bhagavdn prspah kim ayam catako jivati na veti / tasydyam abhiprdyah /yadi /ramano gautama ddisej jivatiti sa tam nipidanena mdrayitvd darsayet / yadi punar bhagavdn evam ddisen mrta iti sa tam jivantam eva darsayet / katham namdyam ajna iti loko jdniydd iti tasydbhinivesah / bhagavatd tv asydsayam jrtdtvd na vydkrtam / tvaccittapratibaddham evaitaj jivati vd na veti. . . ndbhihitam / tadvad etan na vydkrtam. Perhaps according to Tokyo, xxiv, 9, J. As. 1925, i. 38.
101. The catuska (group of four questions): "Is the world infinite (anantavdn)? etc. " has the same meaning as the catuska: "Is the world eternal (sdsvata)? . . . "
If this is the case, how are there fourteen separate points, namely three catuskas and one dvika (Is the vital principle the body? . . . )? To this question the Vydkhyd answers: parydyarupatvavyavasthdne'pi caturdasatvam bhavatity adosah.
102. kun tu rgyu smra byed kyis. Chinese transcription: U-ti-chia ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Stcher- batski: Vatsa. The Tibetan version guarantees Uktika.
This is the Paribbajaka Uttiya of the Anguttara, v. 193-195 (perhaps different from the Uttiya of the Samyutta, v. 22,166) who interrogates the Bhagavat on fourteen points (beginning with the eternity of the world); the Bhagavat answers, "This is not explained by me . . . "; Uttiya asks, "What do you explain? "; the Bhagavat answers, "I explain the Dhamma . . . for Nirvana". Thereupon Uttiya asks, "Does the whole world, half the world, or a third of the world attain to Nirvana through this Dhamma? " The Bhagavat keeps silent. Ananda then intervenes and explains to Uttiya that he is asking that which has already been asked (To ask if the whole world attains to Nirvana is to ask if the world is eternal). The Bhagavat teaches how one attains to Nirvana: all those who have attained to it, are now attaining to it, and who shall attain to it, do so by the Path.
In Samyukta, TD 2, p. 247cl8, Uktika's first question concerns the infinity of the world.
Do all beings attain to Nirvana? Digha, ii. 147 (yes), Mahdvastu, i. 126 (yes), Milinda, 69 (no). Here we have the correct answer.
The redactor of the Brahmajdla understands the "infinity of the world" in the sense of "infinite in space" (Digha, i. 23: horizontal infinity, not towards the zenith or the nadir; on this point Kosa, iii. 3d, to the end); it varies its formulas: it examines whether the self and the world are eternal, whether the world is infinite.
Footnotes 1371
? 1372 Chapter Nine
103. Uktika asks: kim tu sarvo loko'nena mdrgena nirydsyati / dhosvid ekadeio lokasya.
In the Pali recension: sabbo ca tena (dhammena) loko niyyissati upaddho vd tibhdgo vd.
104. On Maitreya, see Peri,BEFEO; xi. 455, Przyluski,/4*o/k*, 169,171,332. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 510? 9 (66th Sutra: he will come at a period when human life is 80,000 years long), Dirgha, 6th Sutra, TD 1, p. 4lc29 and Digha, iii. 76, SdlistambasMra (see Koia, iii. 28a-b). We are reminded of Ajita and Tissametteya of the Suttanipdta, 1032, 1040. Milinda, 159; Andgatavamsa in Warren, 482; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Hastings, i. 414. Ajita Maitreya and Mithra Invictus?
105. Saeki quotes the Samyukta, TD 2, p. 244al4, "Gautama, is the vital principal the body? This has not been explained. Is the vital principal something else? Is the body something else? This has not been explained. It is strange that the monk Gautama explains, on the subject of a deceased disciple, that 'Such a one is reborn in such a place . . . ' and that the monk Gautama does not explain that the vital principle is something else, and that the body something else again. "
Samyukta, TD 2, p. 213a27, sermon to Nanda: The disciple endowed with an unmoveable faith who desires long life and beautiful rilpa, shall obtain them. The disciple endowed with the avetyaprasddas, is, at the end of his life, reborn among the devas and obtains ten qualities {Samyukta, TD 2, p. 2, p. 215? ? , c9 and following, Madhyama, TD 1, p. 545bl5 and following).
106. satyatah sthititah. Hsiian-tsang: ti ku chu ku . Gloss of the Japanese editor: chu ku- neng chu ku ? &. ? : "capable of lasting. " Paramartha: i-shih i-chu $ c | | $ c t t
107. astfty apt drstisthdnam uktam. Hstian-tsang: ? chien ch'u ? ? ? ? -kudrstisthdna. This discussion is based on the Sdmmitiyanikdyas'dstra.
108. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 255cl3: The Bhagavat says, "You say that there is cause: I say so also; you say that there is no fruit: this is a foolish doctrine. " There are two doctrines, in all two extremes: the Bhagavat avoids the extreme of annihilation and the extreme of permanence, and he teaches the Middle Way. He also says, "I am not in contradiction with the world; but the world is in contradiction with me. "
Vibhdsd,77. 17". . . hewhosaysthat(thejiva) isdifferentfromthebody,isnotthebody, enters into the opinion of permanence. He is not of non-Buddhist doctrines (bdhya mdrga), he is not of evil opinions (kudrstigata) who does not enter into the opinions of annihilation or of permanence. All the Tathagatas, in order to oppose this, teach the path between the two, namely: rupa and the mind are not annihilated, are not permanent. " See above note 93.
109. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 42b3. Only Paramartha quotes the Sutra in full; Hstian-tsang and the Tibetan do not have the first phrase. Compare Samyutta, ii. 78, iii. 149: anamataggdyam samsdro pubbakopi na pannayati avijjdnivarandnam sat tan am tanhdsamyojandnam samdhdvatam samsaratam.
The same argument in the Sdmmitiyanikdyas'dstra.
From the point of view of the Madhyamikas, neither the permanent nor the impermanent can transmigrate: nityasya samsrtir ndsti naivdnityasya samsrtih / svapnavat samsrtir proktd tvaya tattvaviddm vara (Catustava, quoting Bodhicarydvatdrapafijikd, ix. 108).
110. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 424cl5. Sunetro ndma idsteti saptasuryodayasutre'yam eva bhagavdn fsih sunetro ndma babhuveti.
The Saptasuryasutra of the Anguttara, iv. 103, does not identify Sunetra with the Bhagavat: bhutapubbam bhikkhave Sunetto ndma satthd ahosi titthakaro kdmesu vitardgo . .
. (Compare Anguttara, iii. 371,373). We also find some details in the Vibhdsd on the rebirth of Sunetra's disciples and on the rebirth of Sunetra (TD 27, p. 424cl5 and following). There is no mention of Sunetra in the fragments of the Saptasurya of the Siksdsamuccaya, p. 247 and the Karmaprajnapti, Mdo. 62, fol. 66a. In the Saundarananda, xi. 57, we only see that Sunetra is the Bhagavat.
? 111. Vydkbyd: ? a ekesdm pudgalagrdha iti vdtsiputriydndm / ekesdm sarvandstigrdba iti madbyamakacittdndm. This is the only reference to the Madhyamaka system that the work of Vasubandhu contains.
The translation is according to Hsuan-tsang. Paramartha: "Thus, without cause or reason, one introduces the malady of opinion into the Good Law of the Tathagatas: there are some scholars who deny nairdtmya and produce a belief in the existence of an atman; there are, furthermore, some masters who deny the existence and affirm the non-existence of everything; the non-Buddhists believe in an dtman conceived as a separate thing. In the Good Law, some masters produce a belief in an dtman and a belief in universal non-existence. None of these masters obtain deliverance, because they do not differ from one another. "
112. Saeki quotes a Vijnaptimatra commentary: If the self is not real, who remembers, who recognizes things, who recites and retains books, who repeats texts, who loves some and hates others, who loves what is good and hates the rest? . . . The Vatsiputrlyas have a reasoning: "(In the system of our adversaries) beings (sattvas) do not remember because they are not selves, like space. "
For eight different explanations of the cause of memory, see Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 55al8: There are some masters who maintain that the self is by its nature real, namely the Vatsiputrlyas who say, "We say that there is a self that remembers what has been done; first oneself experiences, and then it is oneself that remembers. If there were no self, how could one remember what has been done? . . . " Again there are some masters who say, "The previous mind goes and says to the later mind: I did this; you, retain it and remember i t . . . It is thus that one remembers what has been done. "
Vibhdsd, p. 56a7, teaches the "right" doctrine of the Sarvastivadins.
For an explanation of memory in the Madhyamaka school, see notably Bodhicarydvatdra, ix. 24 (against the Vijfianavada), 73 (against the Pudgalavada), 101.
Milinda, 78-80; Demieville, 161, Compendium, Introduction, p. 42 (according to the Patthdna).
On memory, see Kosa, i. 33 (p. 97), ii. 24 (p. 190), 24a (p. 194), vi. 15, p. 927.
113. Vydkbyd: smrtivisayasamjndnvaydc cittaviiesdd iti / smrtivisayo'nubhuto'rthah / tatra samjUa sdnvayo hetur asyeti smrtivisayasamjndnvayah / cittavisesah kimcid eva cittam na sarvam ity art bah / tasmdt smaranam bhavati pratyabhijHdnam vd / / evam ubh ayavis e sane kfte prcchati kidrsdc cittaviiesdd iti / aha / taddbhoga iti vistarab / yasmin smartavya dbhogas taddbbogah / sa ca tena sadridh sambandhinaf ca sarnjfiddayo ye te vidyante 'syeti taddbhogasadrsasambandhisamjtiddimdmi cittavifesah / ddigrahanena pranidhdnaniband- bdbhydsddigrabanam / dfrayavifesaf ca /okas ca vydksepai cddir esdm iti dfrayavifesafoka- vydksepddini / tair anupahataprabbdvaf cittaviiesah sa evam anena pradarfito bhavati / tasmdd tdfidc cittavihsdt smrtir bhavati /
tad idam uktam bhavati / taddbhogavatab : yadi tatrdbhogab kriyate / sadrfasamjnddi- matah : yatra sddrfydt smrtir bhavati / sambandhisamjnddimatab : yatrdntarendpi sddrfyam dhUmddidarsandt smrtir bhavati / pranidbdnanibandbdbbydsddimata/ ca : yatra pranidhdnam atra kale smartavyam abhydso vdsya smarane / / dsrayavisesddibhir anupahataprabhavad iti / vyddhilaksanena dSrayaviiesena fokena vydksepena anyatra kdye / ddisabdagrhitais ca karmavidyddibhih /
tddrso 'piti vistarab / taddbbogavdn (tatsadrsa) samjn~ddimdn anupahataprabhdvo'pity arthah / atadanvaya ity asmrtivisayasamjndnvaya ity arthab / bhdvayitum utpddayitum // anyadrsa ity ataddbhogaydvatsamjnddimdn upahataprabhdvo vd.
The commentators on Hsuan-tsang debate this. P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 447a22-bl0) has three explanations of smrtivisayasamjfianvaya, three explanations of resemblance (sadr/a) (that Fa-pao rejects, TD 41, p. 809al 1 and following), two of necessary conjunction (sambandkin), etc. (see Saeki, xxx, fol. 7a, 8b-9a).
Footnotes 1373
? 1374 Chapter Nine
114. The Vydkhyd explains (below p. 1342) the discussion relative to the question, "In the absence of a soul, what knows? " evarh ko- vijdndtiti vistarah. It suffices to replace vijdndti with smarati, vijndna with smarana.
115. Paramartha, "Not different from memory, for the memory grasps"; Hsuan-tsang, "No difference of memory, only (grasping) comes from the agent,"
116. According to the commentators of Hsiian-tsang, these masters are the Samkhyas; according to the Vydkhyd, this formula is that of the Grammarians; for Stcherbatski, Vasubandhu here continues his controversy with the Vatsiputriyas: and in fact the Vydkhyd says that this argument tends to prove the existence of the pudgala. See Kos'a, iiiJ28a, for a discussion of pratityasamutpdda, and a refutation of the vaiydkaranacodya (objection of the Grammarians), "There is no action (kriyd) without an agent (akartrkd). " The bhuti is not different from the bhavitar.
117. Vydkhyd: gacchatigamandbhidhdnavad iti / yathd jv did gacchati sabdo gacchatiti gacchatiiabddbhidhdnam / yathd jvdldydlp iabdasya vd gamanam evarh devadatto gacchati devadattasya gamanam / anena drstdntena vijdndti devadatta iti sidhyati.
It is the opinion of the Sarvastivadins that gati (or gamana) is impossible, iv. 2b, English trans, p. 552-4.
118. Vydkhyd: parispandam akurvad aptty arthah /
119. Vydkhyd: kdranasddrsyena kdrydtmaldbhdt.
"Response to a seed," "to reproduce the seed," Hsuan-tsang: ch'ou ? =to make
parallel, respond to.
The Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 480al4, explains that one cannot attribute the action of
samyoga, samanvdgama {ch 'eng chiu ffljjjt ), Rosenberg, 204; see above, p. 1346, samyoga (= ho -Q* ) neither to a pudgala nor to the dharmas: the first does not exist, the second are bare of any activity. No dharma is either the agent or the object of an action of samyoga. But, as there is cause-result, defilement-purity, bond-deliverence, process-ceas- ing, so too the quality of being sarhyukta or asamyukta exists.
120. The consciousness of blue has a blue "aspect. "
121. Vydkhyd: kdranam kartfbhutam iti krtvd / tad yathd nddasya kdranam ghanta iti
ghanto rautity ucyate.
122. Vydkhyd:yathdcabhaviturilpasyabhdvdjjaniturjdteh sthdtuhsthiteranarathdntarat- vam evarh vijh"dne'pi sydd vijHdtur vijHdnasya vijHdndd bhdvdd anarthdntaratvam. (See the opinion of the Sarvastivadins on jdti, ii, English trans, p. 242).
"Theexistent,"Paramartha,neng-yu ? ^ ;Hsuan-tsang,yu. . . che. ""? ? ? ^
Paramartha: As the world says, "physical matter exists, arises, lasts. " Now the existing thing (bhavitr), etc. , does not differ from existence (bhdva), and yet nevertheless one employs two words. So too one employs two words for vijndna.
123. According to Saeki. The VaiSesikas, according to the Vydkhyd: vaisesikamatdnusdrdd vd
124. Why does one successively have gobuddhi, stribuddhi, mahisabuddhi, the idea of cow, woman, and buffalo? Why does not the mahisabuddhi follow gobuddhi?
The Japanese editor understands, "Why is not the latter mind parallel to the former mind, good, defiled, etc.
Note nevertheless that the Bhagavat speaks of the man "who casts off this body and takes up another body," tarn ca kdyam nikkhipati annarh ca kdyam upddiyati {Samyutta, iv. 60). (In the way that the flame which goes far without fuel has for the mind its support (updddna) so too the being who casts off this body and has not (yet) taken up another body has thirst for his support, ibid. 400). We have seen above, note 41, the etymology of pudgala: punah punar. . .
84. Saeki quotes the Sammitiyanikdya Sdstra, i. 7 (fol. 2b).
85. Parinantum means to transform oneself, anyathdtvamdpattum.
On parindma, iii. 43a, lOOa-b, v. 26, p. 809; the samtatiparindma of the Sautrantikas is
very different, ii. 36c, iv. 4a.
86. On the relationship between the primary elements {mahdbhuta) and secondary matter
{updddyarupa, bhautika rupa), see i. 35, ii. 22,65.
87. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 66lcl4: "Buddhadeva maintains that rupa is solely mahdbhutas, that mental states {caittas) are solely mind {citta)\ he says: updddyarupa is solely a type {viiesa) of the mahdbhutas; the mental states are solely a type of mind . . . The mahdbhutas see (when they form the organ of the e y e ) . . . There is no upddayasabda apart from the primary elements (that is to say: sound, iabda, is not a separate thing existing independently of the primary elements). It is the primary elements which are called upaddyafabda. "
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 730b26: Buddhadeva says: Twenty-two names {mahdbhumikas, etc. ), but solely one real thing, the mana-indriya. . . The conditioned dharmas are of two natures, mahdbhutas and citta. Apart from the mahdbhutas, there is no updddyarupa: apart from citta, there are no caittas.
Compare i, note 146; ii, p. 188.
Saeki: "Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of Buddhadeva, etc. , that the primary elements and secondary matter do not differ; but, as this is not the "correct meaning" {ch'eng # ? ? ) ? * t r i e Sarvastivadins, he says that it is dosa, an "error. "
88. The Sutra of Vatsagotra, Sarhyukta, TD 2, p. 245cl0. The Bhagavat said to the monk
Footnotes 1369
? 1370 Chapter Nine
Vatsagotra, "If one is of this opinion (drsti), The world is eternal; this is true; any other theory is false,' this is drspiviparydsa (v. 9d), this is kuan-ts'a chien jjjjjjf? , (drspipardmarla, v. p. 778). 'The world is not eternal. . . the Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death': this is drspiviparydsa"
89. On the "questions to be rejected," Kosa, v. 22, Nirvana, 1925, p. 108, where we see that Malebranche reasons quite closely to Vasubandhu.
90. We have Divya, 358: bahubollaka idkyaputriya.
91. The present passage of the Ko? a has been pointed out by S. Levi, AIBL. , 1893, 232. Chavannes has translated a very similar recension in Cinq Cents Contes, iii. 120 (according to Nanjio 1329, Ratnakaranda Sutra (? ), Tokyo, xiv. 10, fol. 39), the same recension in Takakusu, "Chinese translations of the Milindapanho," JRAS, 1896, p. 7. See Pelliot, "Les noms propres du Milinda,"JAS, 1914, ii. 380-381. (It appears indeed that the "Milindra" of the Tibetan text of the Avaddnakalpalatd is a rash correction by the editor). Finally, Paul Demieville, in a fine article on the Chinese versions of the Milinda, BEFEO, 1924, p. 64, completes our information.
92. Compare Samyutta, iv. 400. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 245? 1: Vatsagotra asks, "Gotama, is there an dtman? " The Bhagavat does not answer. He asks a second, a third time; and the Bhagavat, a second, a third time does not answer . . . And the monk Vatsagotra, in his evil (pdpikd), false view, says, "The Sramana does not know how to answer my question. " The Bhagavat says to Ananda, "If I were to answer him that there is an dtman, then I would increase the false view that he already has; if I were to answer him that there is no dtman, would his first folly-doubt not increase? Infatuated, he would say, 'The dtman, which existed, is now annihilated. ' The opinion that he has of the existence of an dtman is the opinion of permanence; to think that this dtman is annihilated is the opinion of annihilation. The Tathagata, avoiding these two extremes, teaches the Dharma of the middle: if this is, then that exists . . . if ignorance exists, then the samskdras exist. . . "
93. Missing in Paramartha.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 38al9: In the Brahmajdlasutra, it is said that the 62 drstigatas have
satkdyadrsti for their root; in the Sutra of the Lion's Roar, it is said all the diverse opinions of the Brahmins and monks rest on two opinions, the opinion of existence and the opinion of non-existence (bhavadrsti, vibhavadrsti,yu-chien ^ M and wu-yu-chien $&^|"? ); what is the difference between the declarations of these two Sutras? From the point of view of arising (samutpdda), it is said that all the drstigatas have satkdyadrsti for their root; from the point of view "t'ui-ch'iu ? ? " (to thrust-search out), it is said that the diverse opinions rest on the opinions of existence and non-existence. See above, p. 1336.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 1002b6: Bhavadrsti is sd/vatadrsti, and vibhavadrsti is ucchedadrsti, that is, the view of existence is the view of permanence or eternity, and the view of non-existence is the view of annihilation. Although bad opinions (kudrspigata) are of numerous types, they are all included by these two opinions.
94. Vydkhyd: Bhadantakumdraldbhah. On Kumaralabha, see PeVi, Date de Vasubandhu, p. 22.
95. Vydkhyd: drspir eva damstrd / taydvabhedham apeksya desayanti buddhd dharmam nairatmyarh tatpratipaksena / bhramsam ca karmandm apeksya krtaviprandsam apeksya pudgaldstitvam iva darsayanto'nyathd defayanti / vydghripotdpahdravad iti /yathd vydghri natinisphurena dantagrahanena svapotam apaharati / nayati mdsya damsprayd sarira [ ] krtam bhud iti / ? ? ? ? atisithilena dantagrahanena tarn apaharati / mdsya bhram/ah pdto'smin visaye bhud itiyuktenaiva grahanendpaharatity arthah / tathdrthadarsane kdranam darsayann aha / dtmastitvam iti vistarah /
? 96. For the second stanza, the Vydkhyd is less clear: dtmdstitvam pratipannas cet kascid drspidamsprayd satkdyadrstilaksanayd bhinnah sa vineyajanah sydd aprdpya samvrtiti (? ) (samvrtinitim? ) dharmasamketam ajdndnah kusalapotasya kuialakarmano vydghripotabh- utasya bhramUm kurydn ndsti karmanah phalam iti.
97. Vydkhyd: prdjuaptika iti prdjnaptau bhavah prdjnaptikah samvrtisann api pudgalo ndstiti kascid grhniydd ity ato ndstiti ndvocat.
98. The Vydkhyd has the last pdda: omitted by Hsiian-tsang.
Paramartha: 3. This person is not capable of understanding the correct teaching of real
emptiness; thus, when he asked if, yes or no, there is a soul, the Buddha did not say there was no soul. 4. And since he takes into consideration the intention of the questioner, if the soul existed, why did he not say that it existed? So too, on the question of his non-existence after Nirvana, he said nothing because then the questioner would have fallen into difficulties.
99. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 246b2: Vatsa asks, "By reason of the consciousness of which dharma are you not of the opinion, you do not say that the world is eternal. . . that the Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death? " "By reason of the consciousness of ? ? ? ? , vedand, etc. "
100. Vydkhyd: nirgranthasrdvakacatakavad iti / nirgranthasrdvakena catakam jivantam grhitvd bhagavdn prspah kim ayam catako jivati na veti / tasydyam abhiprdyah /yadi /ramano gautama ddisej jivatiti sa tam nipidanena mdrayitvd darsayet / yadi punar bhagavdn evam ddisen mrta iti sa tam jivantam eva darsayet / katham namdyam ajna iti loko jdniydd iti tasydbhinivesah / bhagavatd tv asydsayam jrtdtvd na vydkrtam / tvaccittapratibaddham evaitaj jivati vd na veti. . . ndbhihitam / tadvad etan na vydkrtam. Perhaps according to Tokyo, xxiv, 9, J. As. 1925, i. 38.
101. The catuska (group of four questions): "Is the world infinite (anantavdn)? etc. " has the same meaning as the catuska: "Is the world eternal (sdsvata)? . . . "
If this is the case, how are there fourteen separate points, namely three catuskas and one dvika (Is the vital principle the body? . . . )? To this question the Vydkhyd answers: parydyarupatvavyavasthdne'pi caturdasatvam bhavatity adosah.
102. kun tu rgyu smra byed kyis. Chinese transcription: U-ti-chia ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Stcher- batski: Vatsa. The Tibetan version guarantees Uktika.
This is the Paribbajaka Uttiya of the Anguttara, v. 193-195 (perhaps different from the Uttiya of the Samyutta, v. 22,166) who interrogates the Bhagavat on fourteen points (beginning with the eternity of the world); the Bhagavat answers, "This is not explained by me . . . "; Uttiya asks, "What do you explain? "; the Bhagavat answers, "I explain the Dhamma . . . for Nirvana". Thereupon Uttiya asks, "Does the whole world, half the world, or a third of the world attain to Nirvana through this Dhamma? " The Bhagavat keeps silent. Ananda then intervenes and explains to Uttiya that he is asking that which has already been asked (To ask if the whole world attains to Nirvana is to ask if the world is eternal). The Bhagavat teaches how one attains to Nirvana: all those who have attained to it, are now attaining to it, and who shall attain to it, do so by the Path.
In Samyukta, TD 2, p. 247cl8, Uktika's first question concerns the infinity of the world.
Do all beings attain to Nirvana? Digha, ii. 147 (yes), Mahdvastu, i. 126 (yes), Milinda, 69 (no). Here we have the correct answer.
The redactor of the Brahmajdla understands the "infinity of the world" in the sense of "infinite in space" (Digha, i. 23: horizontal infinity, not towards the zenith or the nadir; on this point Kosa, iii. 3d, to the end); it varies its formulas: it examines whether the self and the world are eternal, whether the world is infinite.
Footnotes 1371
? 1372 Chapter Nine
103. Uktika asks: kim tu sarvo loko'nena mdrgena nirydsyati / dhosvid ekadeio lokasya.
In the Pali recension: sabbo ca tena (dhammena) loko niyyissati upaddho vd tibhdgo vd.
104. On Maitreya, see Peri,BEFEO; xi. 455, Przyluski,/4*o/k*, 169,171,332. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 510? 9 (66th Sutra: he will come at a period when human life is 80,000 years long), Dirgha, 6th Sutra, TD 1, p. 4lc29 and Digha, iii. 76, SdlistambasMra (see Koia, iii. 28a-b). We are reminded of Ajita and Tissametteya of the Suttanipdta, 1032, 1040. Milinda, 159; Andgatavamsa in Warren, 482; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Hastings, i. 414. Ajita Maitreya and Mithra Invictus?
105. Saeki quotes the Samyukta, TD 2, p. 244al4, "Gautama, is the vital principal the body? This has not been explained. Is the vital principal something else? Is the body something else? This has not been explained. It is strange that the monk Gautama explains, on the subject of a deceased disciple, that 'Such a one is reborn in such a place . . . ' and that the monk Gautama does not explain that the vital principle is something else, and that the body something else again. "
Samyukta, TD 2, p. 213a27, sermon to Nanda: The disciple endowed with an unmoveable faith who desires long life and beautiful rilpa, shall obtain them. The disciple endowed with the avetyaprasddas, is, at the end of his life, reborn among the devas and obtains ten qualities {Samyukta, TD 2, p. 2, p. 215? ? , c9 and following, Madhyama, TD 1, p. 545bl5 and following).
106. satyatah sthititah. Hsiian-tsang: ti ku chu ku . Gloss of the Japanese editor: chu ku- neng chu ku ? &. ? : "capable of lasting. " Paramartha: i-shih i-chu $ c | | $ c t t
107. astfty apt drstisthdnam uktam. Hstian-tsang: ? chien ch'u ? ? ? ? -kudrstisthdna. This discussion is based on the Sdmmitiyanikdyas'dstra.
108. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 255cl3: The Bhagavat says, "You say that there is cause: I say so also; you say that there is no fruit: this is a foolish doctrine. " There are two doctrines, in all two extremes: the Bhagavat avoids the extreme of annihilation and the extreme of permanence, and he teaches the Middle Way. He also says, "I am not in contradiction with the world; but the world is in contradiction with me. "
Vibhdsd,77. 17". . . hewhosaysthat(thejiva) isdifferentfromthebody,isnotthebody, enters into the opinion of permanence. He is not of non-Buddhist doctrines (bdhya mdrga), he is not of evil opinions (kudrstigata) who does not enter into the opinions of annihilation or of permanence. All the Tathagatas, in order to oppose this, teach the path between the two, namely: rupa and the mind are not annihilated, are not permanent. " See above note 93.
109. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 42b3. Only Paramartha quotes the Sutra in full; Hstian-tsang and the Tibetan do not have the first phrase. Compare Samyutta, ii. 78, iii. 149: anamataggdyam samsdro pubbakopi na pannayati avijjdnivarandnam sat tan am tanhdsamyojandnam samdhdvatam samsaratam.
The same argument in the Sdmmitiyanikdyas'dstra.
From the point of view of the Madhyamikas, neither the permanent nor the impermanent can transmigrate: nityasya samsrtir ndsti naivdnityasya samsrtih / svapnavat samsrtir proktd tvaya tattvaviddm vara (Catustava, quoting Bodhicarydvatdrapafijikd, ix. 108).
110. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 424cl5. Sunetro ndma idsteti saptasuryodayasutre'yam eva bhagavdn fsih sunetro ndma babhuveti.
The Saptasuryasutra of the Anguttara, iv. 103, does not identify Sunetra with the Bhagavat: bhutapubbam bhikkhave Sunetto ndma satthd ahosi titthakaro kdmesu vitardgo . .
. (Compare Anguttara, iii. 371,373). We also find some details in the Vibhdsd on the rebirth of Sunetra's disciples and on the rebirth of Sunetra (TD 27, p. 424cl5 and following). There is no mention of Sunetra in the fragments of the Saptasurya of the Siksdsamuccaya, p. 247 and the Karmaprajnapti, Mdo. 62, fol. 66a. In the Saundarananda, xi. 57, we only see that Sunetra is the Bhagavat.
? 111. Vydkbyd: ? a ekesdm pudgalagrdha iti vdtsiputriydndm / ekesdm sarvandstigrdba iti madbyamakacittdndm. This is the only reference to the Madhyamaka system that the work of Vasubandhu contains.
The translation is according to Hsuan-tsang. Paramartha: "Thus, without cause or reason, one introduces the malady of opinion into the Good Law of the Tathagatas: there are some scholars who deny nairdtmya and produce a belief in the existence of an atman; there are, furthermore, some masters who deny the existence and affirm the non-existence of everything; the non-Buddhists believe in an dtman conceived as a separate thing. In the Good Law, some masters produce a belief in an dtman and a belief in universal non-existence. None of these masters obtain deliverance, because they do not differ from one another. "
112. Saeki quotes a Vijnaptimatra commentary: If the self is not real, who remembers, who recognizes things, who recites and retains books, who repeats texts, who loves some and hates others, who loves what is good and hates the rest? . . . The Vatsiputrlyas have a reasoning: "(In the system of our adversaries) beings (sattvas) do not remember because they are not selves, like space. "
For eight different explanations of the cause of memory, see Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 55al8: There are some masters who maintain that the self is by its nature real, namely the Vatsiputrlyas who say, "We say that there is a self that remembers what has been done; first oneself experiences, and then it is oneself that remembers. If there were no self, how could one remember what has been done? . . . " Again there are some masters who say, "The previous mind goes and says to the later mind: I did this; you, retain it and remember i t . . . It is thus that one remembers what has been done. "
Vibhdsd, p. 56a7, teaches the "right" doctrine of the Sarvastivadins.
For an explanation of memory in the Madhyamaka school, see notably Bodhicarydvatdra, ix. 24 (against the Vijfianavada), 73 (against the Pudgalavada), 101.
Milinda, 78-80; Demieville, 161, Compendium, Introduction, p. 42 (according to the Patthdna).
On memory, see Kosa, i. 33 (p. 97), ii. 24 (p. 190), 24a (p. 194), vi. 15, p. 927.
113. Vydkbyd: smrtivisayasamjndnvaydc cittaviiesdd iti / smrtivisayo'nubhuto'rthah / tatra samjUa sdnvayo hetur asyeti smrtivisayasamjndnvayah / cittavisesah kimcid eva cittam na sarvam ity art bah / tasmdt smaranam bhavati pratyabhijHdnam vd / / evam ubh ayavis e sane kfte prcchati kidrsdc cittaviiesdd iti / aha / taddbhoga iti vistarab / yasmin smartavya dbhogas taddbbogah / sa ca tena sadridh sambandhinaf ca sarnjfiddayo ye te vidyante 'syeti taddbhogasadrsasambandhisamjtiddimdmi cittavifesah / ddigrahanena pranidhdnaniband- bdbhydsddigrabanam / dfrayavifesaf ca /okas ca vydksepai cddir esdm iti dfrayavifesafoka- vydksepddini / tair anupahataprabbdvaf cittaviiesah sa evam anena pradarfito bhavati / tasmdd tdfidc cittavihsdt smrtir bhavati /
tad idam uktam bhavati / taddbhogavatab : yadi tatrdbhogab kriyate / sadrfasamjnddi- matah : yatra sddrfydt smrtir bhavati / sambandhisamjnddimatab : yatrdntarendpi sddrfyam dhUmddidarsandt smrtir bhavati / pranidbdnanibandbdbbydsddimata/ ca : yatra pranidhdnam atra kale smartavyam abhydso vdsya smarane / / dsrayavisesddibhir anupahataprabhavad iti / vyddhilaksanena dSrayaviiesena fokena vydksepena anyatra kdye / ddisabdagrhitais ca karmavidyddibhih /
tddrso 'piti vistarab / taddbbogavdn (tatsadrsa) samjn~ddimdn anupahataprabhdvo'pity arthah / atadanvaya ity asmrtivisayasamjndnvaya ity arthab / bhdvayitum utpddayitum // anyadrsa ity ataddbhogaydvatsamjnddimdn upahataprabhdvo vd.
The commentators on Hsuan-tsang debate this. P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 447a22-bl0) has three explanations of smrtivisayasamjfianvaya, three explanations of resemblance (sadr/a) (that Fa-pao rejects, TD 41, p. 809al 1 and following), two of necessary conjunction (sambandkin), etc. (see Saeki, xxx, fol. 7a, 8b-9a).
Footnotes 1373
? 1374 Chapter Nine
114. The Vydkhyd explains (below p. 1342) the discussion relative to the question, "In the absence of a soul, what knows? " evarh ko- vijdndtiti vistarah. It suffices to replace vijdndti with smarati, vijndna with smarana.
115. Paramartha, "Not different from memory, for the memory grasps"; Hsuan-tsang, "No difference of memory, only (grasping) comes from the agent,"
116. According to the commentators of Hsiian-tsang, these masters are the Samkhyas; according to the Vydkhyd, this formula is that of the Grammarians; for Stcherbatski, Vasubandhu here continues his controversy with the Vatsiputriyas: and in fact the Vydkhyd says that this argument tends to prove the existence of the pudgala. See Kos'a, iiiJ28a, for a discussion of pratityasamutpdda, and a refutation of the vaiydkaranacodya (objection of the Grammarians), "There is no action (kriyd) without an agent (akartrkd). " The bhuti is not different from the bhavitar.
117. Vydkhyd: gacchatigamandbhidhdnavad iti / yathd jv did gacchati sabdo gacchatiti gacchatiiabddbhidhdnam / yathd jvdldydlp iabdasya vd gamanam evarh devadatto gacchati devadattasya gamanam / anena drstdntena vijdndti devadatta iti sidhyati.
It is the opinion of the Sarvastivadins that gati (or gamana) is impossible, iv. 2b, English trans, p. 552-4.
118. Vydkhyd: parispandam akurvad aptty arthah /
119. Vydkhyd: kdranasddrsyena kdrydtmaldbhdt.
"Response to a seed," "to reproduce the seed," Hsuan-tsang: ch'ou ? =to make
parallel, respond to.
The Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 480al4, explains that one cannot attribute the action of
samyoga, samanvdgama {ch 'eng chiu ffljjjt ), Rosenberg, 204; see above, p. 1346, samyoga (= ho -Q* ) neither to a pudgala nor to the dharmas: the first does not exist, the second are bare of any activity. No dharma is either the agent or the object of an action of samyoga. But, as there is cause-result, defilement-purity, bond-deliverence, process-ceas- ing, so too the quality of being sarhyukta or asamyukta exists.
120. The consciousness of blue has a blue "aspect. "
121. Vydkhyd: kdranam kartfbhutam iti krtvd / tad yathd nddasya kdranam ghanta iti
ghanto rautity ucyate.
122. Vydkhyd:yathdcabhaviturilpasyabhdvdjjaniturjdteh sthdtuhsthiteranarathdntarat- vam evarh vijh"dne'pi sydd vijHdtur vijHdnasya vijHdndd bhdvdd anarthdntaratvam. (See the opinion of the Sarvastivadins on jdti, ii, English trans, p. 242).
"Theexistent,"Paramartha,neng-yu ? ^ ;Hsuan-tsang,yu. . . che. ""? ? ? ^
Paramartha: As the world says, "physical matter exists, arises, lasts. " Now the existing thing (bhavitr), etc. , does not differ from existence (bhdva), and yet nevertheless one employs two words. So too one employs two words for vijndna.
123. According to Saeki. The VaiSesikas, according to the Vydkhyd: vaisesikamatdnusdrdd vd
124. Why does one successively have gobuddhi, stribuddhi, mahisabuddhi, the idea of cow, woman, and buffalo? Why does not the mahisabuddhi follow gobuddhi?
The Japanese editor understands, "Why is not the latter mind parallel to the former mind, good, defiled, etc.
