" Of such there are some dozen to
eighteen
in the country (I myself lean to the first figure).
Lundberg - The-Rich-and-the-Super-Rich-by-Ferdinand-Lundberg
When there finally came a call for a termination of debate, by the Establishment this time, on the showdown vote there would not be the necessary two-thirds.
The hardy thirty-five (or more) would stand adamant.
So the filibuster would go on, if necessary for weeks, and Senate business would grind to a halt.
Appropriation bills would not get passed and the government would need to resort to financing through the banks in a large way.
As the price of ending the filibuster all the opposition would do is to demand the end of Rule XXII. If the rule stayed, the filibuster would continue.
It is highly doubtful if thirty-five senators, or even fifteen, are this resolutely determined to end Rule XXII. They have, it is true, no mandate for such action from their constituencies. The latter for the most part do not even know of Rule XXII. The non-Establishmentarians are not so determined to abolish it as the Establishment is to keep it, nor are they sufficiently numerous. It follows that the Establishment rules completely, with no sign of an early break in its grip. Such a break--when, as and if it comes--is not likely to develop on the basis of a Clarkian appeal for fair dealing. It can come only as a consequence of some profound upheaval in American society.
The discarding of Rule XXII would not in itself break the power of the Establishment, although the alignment of forces within it would no doubt shift. One sees this by looking at the House, which is run by full-time self-centered intrigants without resort to unlimited debate as a threatening weapon. Rule XXII, while convenient, is not really needed.
The remedy for all this, some will say, is in the electoral process before the people. How inadequate a refuge this is one can see by noting that most of the members of Congress occupy "safe" seats, are always virtually sure of election. In the House, supposed paladin of the people, hardly more than a hundred seats are ever in doubt, as Senator Clark admits. More than three-quarters of the occupants know they will invariably be re-elected. An even larger proportion of the Senate holds completely safe seats. Under the impact of a social cataclysm as awesome as the Depression, seats change hands slowly, and after the cataclysm the new incumbent is usually in for the rest of his life.
Such exceptions as there are can be cited from only a few highly competitive, transitional and variegated regions, mainly California and New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, etc. Inertia in the stuporous electorate is a large factor in holding seats. Not only do the voters usually dislike change but they see no reason for it, can discern no more merit in new contenders than in incumbents. All promise heaven. Unless one can
raise the strong suspicion that an officeholder is a Communist, a homosexual, a freethinker, a dabbler in science, a sexual athlete, a practitioner of divorce, a reader of prohibited books or something equally esoteric, he will be hard to dislodge if he has conducted himself according to the established routines of the electoral game.
Senator Clark, like others who feel as he does, lays great stress on public opinion, the need to mobilize it in order to put the government on a course conducive (as he sees it) to the long-term interests of the people and the very safety of the Republic. Such stress on the need for an informed public opinion is an indirect confession of the inadequacy of representative government. If everyone must be fully informed on every question and press insistently for government action, it means we simply now have a more cumbersome form of the New England town meeting when the populace as a whole was the legislative body. If public opinion must be so rampant, and at variance with its own standards, what is the need of representatives? Why not submit all proposals to direct popular vote?
The Establishment in Action
Devoted conscientiously to blocking adjustments in the ramshackle status quo, the Establishment can be cooperative and quick-moving when it wishes. It is most cooperative and retiring, Senator Clark points out, in time of war. Then it endorses anything asked for remotely likely to help in crushing the enemy. War, in fact, seems most effective in unlocking its springs of action, in quickening its pulse, in arousing its ardor. It is as bellicose as any Prussian Junkerverein. It equates patriotism with war.
Bills affecting its special pets among the finpols also get rush-order treatment. Thus, the emergency bill to exempt Du Pont stockholders from the capital gains tax in the distribution under Supreme Court mandate of General Motors stock held by E. I. du Pont de Nemours was galloped through prestissimo, as Senator Clark notes, It was as though the Establishmentarians knew that now they were being watched by the gentry and were anxious to show what really fine work they could do--all of which was no doubt very reassuring to Wilmington, Delaware.
How the Establishment works to ensnare the country in something the electorate finds distasteful is more interesting and more revealing of Establishment ways and is best shown in the matter of taxes.
Congressmen in general are not well informed on taxes--or on much else, for that matter. They are, to put it bluntly, conveniently ignorant and depend on the word of floor leaders, whips and committee chairmen.
Needless to say [as the infinitely expert Eisenstein remarks] members of Congress are not as well versed in taxation as they should be. Of course, they are also inadequately informed on other matters which are entrusted to their care. It is no secret that votes are commonly cast without a firm grasp of the issues involved. In taxation, however, knowledge comes with unusual pain and suffering. The statutes are enveloped in a peculiar verbal fog of their own. The Internal Revenue Code, indeed, is a remarkable essay in sustained obscurity. It has all the earmarks of a conspiracy in restraint of understanding. The conspiracy never ends because amendments never cease. Year after year many minds combine anew against the grave danger of being understood. . . . Surely, the nimblest member of Congress can hardly hope to perceive in a day what the alleged experts are unable to understand over the years. Most members are soon lost and bewildered when they move beyond the rates and personal exemptions. As Representative Patman gently understated the ignorance of Congress, "the tax laws are passed with the Members not knowing exactly what they mean. " 33
Rank and file Republicans and Democrats, right and left, complained at its submission that they did not understand the tax law of 1954, 34 which still provides the main base.
A vote on a tax bill, then [says the legist Eisenstein] is an act of faith. With few exceptions the members of Congress helplessly approve whatever the tax committees may choose to offer. They "must take the word" of the committees. While the committees usually provide reports for each bill, the reports hardly qualify as guides for the perplexed. As a rule, they merely fortify the sense of organized confusion. If the members look for enlightenment during debate, they rarely learn much more. Complex tax bills are poorly discussed and hastily enacted. At times there is no discussion at all. . . .
The House, in fact, proceeds on the theory that individual members should generally abstain from thinking for themselves. This principle of parliamentary behavior is known as the "gag rule. " The members are discreetly denied the right to offer any amendments or to vote on separate sections of a bill. They can only accept or reject the bill as a whole. Since their function is so limited, they have little incentive to be enlightened. In any event, too many questions cannot be asked because debate is carefully curtailed . . . too often the explanations on the floor sound as if the halt were leading the blind. 35
Within the tax committees and among their technical staff writers--the people who compose taxese or tax prose--there is a clearer view of affairs. Among them, Republicans and Democrats alike, there is full understanding of the workings of special dispensations or "loopholes. " 36
"The story is always the same," Hubert Humphrey admitted when he was a senator. "Higher rates are imposed and at the same time loopholes are carefully framed which permit the wealthy to get out from under the higher taxes. " 37
Says a leading tax expert: ". . . the average congressman does not believe in the present high rates of income tax, especially those applicable in the upper brackets. When he sees these rates applied in individual cases he thinks the rates are too high and therefore unfair. . . . True believers in these rates would long ago have torn down the tax shelters and resisted all pressures for special relief. Instead, the reverse is true. " 38
Astronomic rates, headlined hysterically by newspapers, impress the general public. The rich , it is presumed, are being made to bleed and disgorge by a stern socialistic or at least fanatically liberal government. Rightists fulminate. With the left hand, however, a trucksize loophole is chopped that cancels the high rate, in some cases allows no tax at all to be paid.
For one oil and gas virtuoso, for example, on a total income of $14. 3 million in five years, all subject prima facie to a 91 per cent tax, the total taxes were only $80,000 or 3/5 of 1 per cent. Still another artist in oil did even better. He tenderly groomed properties that brought in nearly $5 million one year--on which there was no tax due. "In escaping tax on his oil income, he also escaped tax on most of his other income. His total taxes for the period were less than $100,000, but his income from sources other than oil averaged about $1 million a year. " 39 At the same time the lowest rates for ordinary taxpayers, the fevered patriots in the streets--rates they could not escape-- ranged from 19 to 23 per cent. Theirs not to reason why. . . . Some ultra-large oil companies find the tax at times so infinitesimal that they do not even list it as a separate item in reports to stockholders. 40
The politically illiterate common man pays what others do not. The government always gets all the money it says it needs. It never permits a "raid" on the Treasury.
The committee process by which the rambling Internal Revenue Code is amended is childishly simple, yet difficult and fatiguing to follow, much like a long-drawn
tournament between chessmasters. Like a chess game, too, it is tedious to describe in its inwardness for noninitiates owing to the ramifying effects of simple little moves.
It is in committee hearings that one sees men of C. Wright Mills's executive "power elite"--all figures of distinctly secondary rank, many of them subject to the pleasure of the president as temporary appointees in the Executive Branch. If committee chairmen or members feel like it, they rake them with sarcasm, challenge them point blank, give them the lie direct.
Before these committees a good deal of careful deference is shown by visiting executives and lawyers. It doesn't all run one way because there is a good deal of reciprocal respect and there is the knowledge among committee members that the witnesses are, after all, connected as underlings with big distributors of pecuniary patronage. Such knowledge is not always controlling because, as the front men in well- entrenched one-party state political factions, the committee members already have plenty "going for them" both politically and financially. If he felt sufficiently irked, one of these committee chairmen could tell the Du Ponts, Rockefellers and Mellons combined precisely where to head in and never feel even slightly threatened by the possibility of any successful electoral reprisal. It has been done, simply as a bravura finger-exercise.
Critics charge that the major tax forces represent narrow and selfish private interests as against public and presumably broad and generous interests, But as Eisenstein points out, it is not possible to isolate public and private interests as separate determinate essences.
In the eyes of these critics, "The taxing process emerges as an unceasing struggle between good and evil. The 'general taxpayer,' the 'general public,' the 'People' are on one side; 'organized groups,' 'special groups,' 'pressure groups,' on the other. " But "The 'public' or the 'people' necessarily consist of individuals, and individuals fall into various groups. Not even the adherents of ability insist that all taxpayers should be similarly treated. If they are not to be treated alike, they must be treated as distinctive groups. " 41
Some groups, each of the tax proponents feels, are more vital to the public interest than others, and are entitled to special consideration. This, basically, is the point. Some people count, most do not.
How it plays out is well shown by Eisenstein:
The same generalities are perennially repeated because they are vacant expressions. Everyone may freely put into them whatever he wishes to take out. That is why they are beyond dispute. For the same reason they are also very useful. Dispensations may be broadly condemned and then selectively approved without fear of engaging in any contradictions. Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, for instance, declares that taxes "should be as fair and equitable as possible. " They should be "based primarily on ability to pay," and they should not discriminate "as between different groups. " But at the same time the senator also maintains that taxes should, "as a matter of principle," provide a "reasonable incentive to earn, to grow, to expand. " Therefore, he warmly recommends such special dispensations as a credit for dividends and a reduced rate for income from foreign investments. Apparently dispensations which remove barriers and deterrents do not discriminate "between different groups. " The public interest similarly enables Congressman Mills to distinguish between one dispensation and another. Our income tax, he charges, is "riddled with preferential benefits. " The statutes are "full of special provisions through which a shrewd or lucky taxpayer can often escape paying anywhere near his full share. " But having said all this, Congressman Mills indicates that it would not be "desirable to eliminate all the special provisions that we now permit. " Those who fail to pay their "full share" may also serve the public interest. 42
Whatever is said at these tax hearings, and whatever one may think about what is said, the result (whether explicitly intended or not) is clear: Most of the tax burden is shouldered over, directly and indirectly, on the nonpropertied, free-spending labor force, which constitutes the main body of patriots upon which the future of the Republic depends.
After protracted hearings the tax committees go into "executive session," excluding the profane. Staff writers get their instructions. Whatever is not of sentimental appeal is put into the customary opaque language, but what is of sentimental appeal such as high rates on the big incomes and baited deductions for blindness, medicine, children and superannuation is left crystal clear.
When ready the bill is reported out on the floor near the end of the session, when a great many other bills, equally suspect under careful analysis, are also awaiting passage. There is here the usual "logjam" of important legislation, with members impatient to get home to sweet-talk low-IQ voters. The "heat is on" for swift passage.
If anyone wishes, he may suggest amendments, which may or may not be voted down. The votes are there, the floor managers know, to pass the bill. The word is passed to the stalwarts, all ready to act. At the signal, the bill is easily pushed through.
The Senate Finance Committee in 1966, of which Russell Long, an Establishment stalwart, was chairman, consisted of 17 members. Six were identified by Senator Clark as of the Establishment core, 6 were from the South, 8 were from one-party states and 12 were from outside Metropolia. Only 7 were clearly non-Establishmentarians and only 6 would ordinarily be classified as liberals or rationalists.
The House Ways and Means Committee under the redoubtable Wilbur Mills of Arkansas had 11 members out of 25 from one-party states, many more from one-party districts, 8 from the South and 13 from outside Metropolia. The back country was clearly in the saddle. As the committee is under the mesmeric control of Mr. Mills, much like the New York Philharmonic under Leonard Bernstein, it is not necessary to carry the analysis further. It is all an Establishment affair.
Oddly, what radicals call Wall Street tax laws are largely put into final form by men from the swamps, bayous, tundra, bogs, crossroads, pastures, plains, bills, ravines, badlands and backwoods of the country. These men with some exceptions have not attended fancy law schools or studied at the leading universities; there is about few of them any taint of sickly intellectuality. They are, one might say, as common as any drug-store loafer. Nor did any of them, so far as I can ascertain, ever have to meet a flabbergasting payroll in private business. None was ever a super-salesman, a super- lawyer or a big-time entrepreneur. One can safely say that none has had either firsthand or theoretical knowledge of economics, finance or business affairs. As far as taxes are concerned they only know what they may have alertly picked up by hearsay in their committee rooms from visiting monetary sophists.
Yet, when all is said and done, they are well able to distinguish campaign contributors from unsound, unkempt and uncouth, not to say openly literate, ivory-tower theorists.
The Pay-Off
Contrary to common supposition a majority of those in the House and Senate enjoy incomes vaulting far beyond their relatively modest salaries of $30,000 a year plus office expenses, travel allowances and other extras. Merely at this salaried minimal they are already in the upper 1 per cent of income receivers. 43 Income-wise they make members of the Mafia look like bashful Boy Scouts.
Much of this congressional income--by all signs probably most--is obtained in ways that, although technically legal, would be condemned by almost any citizen having ordinary claims to respectability and even by many of the more high-toned swindlers who comb the bistros for hard-to-get victims.
So many, indeed, are the ways on record congressmen have of funneling furtive lucre into their pockets that they defy description at any seemly length. Some attempt must be made, however, to comprehend what goes on among political entrepreneurs in order to understand the weltaunschauung of the men who confect our tax laws.
Congress is largely but not exclusively staffed by assiduous off-the-soil moneymakers who use government as a tool in their profit-seeking operations with the gusto of a pack of hypertonic pickpockets assailing a convention of paralytics. In so doing, manifestly, its members are engaging in wholly unfair competition with the business and professional classes, especially with the small and medium-sized portions. Most business people, high or low, and even Mafians, do not have such ready toll-free access to the inner valves and spigots of government.
I am far from contending that money-making congressmen (who must be distinguished from a civilized minority genuinely concerned about the fate of the Republic) are primarily athirst for lucre. So to say would involve me in a bootless squabble with degree-flaunting sages about the tenuous and wholly irrelevant question of primacy in motivation--of possible interest only to psychologists. Whether congressional absorption in money-making is first or last in order of emphasis it is patently materially the largest and most assiduously pursued of all congressional interests.
These possibly truistic prefatory remarks are inspired not by some hostile, foreign, pagan and blasphemous un-American influences such as the godless writings of Karl Marx, Nicolai Bakunin, V. I. Lenin or Leon Trotsky but by first-hand, on-the-scene, carefully put together reports in such solidly established, churchly bourgeois publications as the New York Herald Tribune and the Wall Street Journal. On the score of method it would be difficult to find sources more homey and comfy unless one had it all in the form of a unanimous opinion of the United States Supreme Court certified in blood by the National Association of Manufacturers.
A bastion of old-line conservatism that yearned for the return of the mansard roof and the Stutz Bearcat, the Herald Tribune was until its demise the nonpareil Republican organ of the country. * (* The discontinuance of the valued Herald Tribune was announced as the consequence of a prolonged, complicated strike involving ten labor unions and two other newspapers. New York Times, August 13, 1966; 1: 6-7. ) The Journal is to Wall Street what Pravda and Izvestia are to the Kremlin, although it is a tremendously better paper professionally. None of this, of course, is a guarantee of pinpoint accuracy. But neither publication could be suspected of unorthodox or vagrant leanings in politics or social conceptions. If there was error in the political facts it sprung from inadvertence rather than ignorance or un-American, pro-intellectual bias. Although ornaments of the corporate press (the Tribune was owned by John Hay Whitney, a vintage super-millionaire), they are not to be confused with the "mass media," the chief task of which is to portray the world as a never-ending sideshow while fostering mass illusions about the great day that is just around the corner, due to dawn right after the election of John ("The Louse") Outhouse.
Such publications belong to what sociologists modishly dub "the elite press.
" Of such there are some dozen to eighteen in the country (I myself lean to the first figure). Among hundreds this is not many but it represents the level of press seriousness. Although sections of this elite have been accused from time to time of editing news in favor of their own point of view, it has never been so much as whispered that they are
"un-American" or anything but wholeheartedly committed to the Constitution, profits and godliness. Error, yes; heresy, never.
Even though these elite papers are corporate entities, and as such are subject to the usual reservations, in recent years their owners, who once felt safe under Mark Hanna and Calvin Coolidge, have become dimly but increasingly aware that they are insidiously threatened simply as flesh-and-blood by much that is taking place--by events internal, external and technical. As a screwball society of demoralized citizens gradually comes unglued under ideologically justified neglect by its repeatedly sworn dung-hill guardians, the wealthy and their family members are also affected. Long unable to trot their horses through Central Park owing to the descent upon it of hordes of the demented, they, too, in or near the vicinity of their homes now are increasingly robbed, assaulted, raped, kidnapped, blackmailed, swindled, intimidated by servants and plug- ugly labor leaders, assassinated, run down by unregulated cars, poisoned by offbeat drugs and foods full of additives, overcharged, misled, misdirected, engulfed in half- shot planes and the like. One could compile imposing lists of wealthy victims within just the past five years, some with prolonged pedigrees and valuable Roman numerals after their names.
Again, this isn't the half of it. They are now, wealth or no wealth, subject to common industrial hazards of the population as a whole: air pollution, smoke inhalation, water pollution, unpleasant regional odors, public-service strikes, gratuitous noise, equipment failures right and left, chemical leakages, explosions, water shortages, area "blackouts," public crowding, riots, radiation poisoning, possible atomic warfare and the like.
And if elected government officials are conveniently purchasable, it is always possible, even probable, that they will be purchased by adversely hostile interests burrowing under established cushy positions.
As there is no Stock Exchange quoting officials' prices (which would be a great convenience) one never knows for sure at what figures the political bidding begins and ends. Nor does one ever know when one has a firm acceptance. Bought men sell out again at higher figures--which makes sense. All of which promotes much displeasing uncertainty and anxiety even among general beneficiaries.
Established wealth, in order to realize its potentialities to the maximum, needs orderly, intelligent and principled government. It does not have that now, but is caught in something of a more efficient continuation of the catch-as-catch-can nineteenth century; government is now more systematically and organizedly wayward than it once was. Although after the Civil War the rising magnates engaged in plenty of funny business with the politicians, the latter had not yet organized on a rational semi-corporate basis to put the vacuum cleaner systematically on rich and poor alike. Hence, in part, the rising concern in what are, seen from the street, high places.
If government is thoroughly unprincipled and is at the same time pretty much out of control, if the butler and the rest of the help are freely helping themselves to the vintage stuff and giving their lip to their betters, established wealth is itself in some danger of being clipped. As the Herald Tribune somewhat primly observed, "An anarchistic moral climate prevails in Congress. " The complaint is not, then, that the congressmen are Bolsheviks but that they are dedicated anarchists, which is surely just as bad or worse. If government men kick up their heels in wild abandon, the rule of the jungle, using government as a handy bludgeon, has returned and, as Thomas Hobbes said, life for everyone tends to become "nasty, brutish and short. " If, as it turns out, government officials are surreptitiously enmeshed in a tangle of distractingly profitable involvements, where anyone comes out in the ensuing mele? e is chancy. Here the
problem of government takes on particularly seamy hues, as much--in some ways, more--for the rich as for anyone else.
But if the elite press expected a public uprising on the heels of these probing exposures, recalling the best efforts of the old-time "muckrakers" such as the famed Lincoln Steffens, the editors showed little knowledge of the political system or the public. Proved money-grabbing by elected officials in the atomic age piques a disoriented public far less than the latest amours of the Hollywood set, ax murders in Brooklyn or the birth of two-headed quintuplets. As long as there seemed some possibility of sandwiching "call girls" into l'affaire Bobby Baker a few years ago, public interest momentarily stirred. It faded as soon as the impresarios failed to produce the cash-minded damsels in undress. Tabloid readers sulked at being deprived of an American Profumo Affair.
In what follows it should always be remembered that there is no question of illegality involved, Everything reported is strictly legal, just as Hitler's extermination of the Jews was legal--a little point I mention merely to suggest how much weight one may attach to the notion. And until further notice everything that follows is taken from the unreservedly patriotic Herald Tribune of June 9 through June 15, 1965.
"Anyone who wants any legislation, buys it with cold, cold cash. I don't mean you go up to a Senator and ask him if he'd like to make $5,000 by voting for your bill. That's out today. So are broads and booze. "
The words were those of a well-known veteran Washington lobbyist who was explaining his modus operandi.
"What you do is arrange to meet him alone somewhere--but not at his office. I almost never go up on the Hill, except maybe to show friends or relatives around.
"You don't tell him what you want. He knows. You tell him you understand he has a tough campaign coming up--or he has had a tough campaign--and you'd like to help cover the costs. Then you leave an envelope with cash in it. The real reason you are giving the money is never mentioned.
"Of course, you can't do this with all Congressmen. But generally it takes only a couple of votes in subcommittee to swing a bill one way or another. After you've been here awhile you know who to deal with. " 44
As there are more than 4,000 registered lobbyists in Washington, nearly eight to a congressman, it is evident that there are plenty of paymasters. While bribes are illegal, random gifts are not; but to be fully legal they should be reported on income-tax returns. Presumably they are not. And presumably they come out of capacious expense accounts provided lobbyists by their principals, whoever they may be. "Campaign" contributions are legal but should be reported; many are not.
An al fresco way of receiving gifts was disclosed by T. Lamar Caudle, an assistant attorney general who was convicted in 1956 of tax-fraud conspiracy. Caudle told the FBI that he customarily parked his car with the window open and was always pleasantly surprised that "somebody kept putting presents" in the back seat. The Herald Tribune doubted that congressmen use this method, which seems overly conspiratorial; the congressional deals are more apt to be right over the counter, thus disarming untutored observers.
Lobbyists stand so high in Washington that they constitute an informal branch of government. Thus, Dale Miller, long a successful lobbyist, "is one of President Johnson's closest friends. The president accorded Mr. Miller, a fellow Texan, a signal honor by naming him chairman of the 1965 inauguration committee. Myron Weiner,
lobbyist for the ocean freight forwarding industry, shared his Washington apartment for a while with Sen. Harrison Williams, D. , N. J. During the Bobby Baker investigation it was disclosed that Mr. Weiner split a fee with Mr. Baker, even though the former Senate majority secretary reportedly performed no special service for it. "
And so it goes. The Herald Tribune continued:
The relationship between Congressmen and lobbyists is based on reciprocity.
Lobby organizations are the big campaign contributors and the buyers of most seats at political fund-raising banquets. In an age of skyrocketting campaign expenses, Congressmen need the financial handouts which lobby groups offer. ["Campaign expenses," while real, are in part a euphemism. As Frank R. Kent mordantly noted long ago, campaign-fund collectors have "sticky fingers"--that is, they pocket part of the money and divide it with cronies. Frank R. Kent, The Great Game of Politics, Doubleday, Page & Co. , N. Y. , 1923, pp. 131-33--F. L. ]
On their part, lobbyists require the support and votes of the lawmakers if their clients are to prosper in the fiercely competitive business world. [What happens when face-to- face competitors each bid for lawmakers' support was not inquired into. --F. L. ]
Generally, lobbyists solicit aid through "persuasive education," stressing the merits of their position; by wining and dining lawmakers and their aides, and by subtly offering rewards.
The era of the outright bribe, when the little black bag stuffed with greenbacks was left on the desk, is fading with age.
Few lobbyists try brazenly to buy votes with cash across the table. Instead, the lobbyist seeks to make the Congressman beholden to him. Should the lawmaker be on the fence, uninformed or indifferent concerning a measure, it is presumed he will feel obliged to favor the stand promoted by his lobbyist friend.
One lobbyist said the latest ruse among his colleagues was to work through lawyers.
"The lawyer-client relationship keeps everything confidential. The lawyer, who is never registered as a lobbyist, simply calls up the Congressman and says he represents a client on a matter in which the Congressman might be interested. " 45
Corporation lobbyists have two main objectives: to influence legislation and to dampen enforcement of existing laws by federal corporate regulatory agencies such as the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Communications Commission and a long string of others the average rank-and-file nitwit believes to be standing vigilantly on guard. Simple inquiries by congressmen have the effect of deflecting the hand of law enforcement, because all these agencies are financed through appropriations voted by congressmen. The hostility of even one congressman can lead to severe reduction of an agency's needed funds, can even cause official heads to roll. In consequence, virtually all regulations on the books are only selectively applied.
As to legislation, it was brought out in 1963 that John R. O'Donnell, a promoter of Philippine sugar interests, had bankrolled more than twenty congressmen in 1960 to insure passage of a dubious $73-milhon Philippine war claims bill for which he expected a fat commission. (Cases cited are only typical examples from among many offered; this text does not profess to be an exhaustive treatise, which would fill volumes if it went back over more than two or three years. )
O. Roy Chalk, president of Trans Caribbean Airways, the D. C. Transit System and other projects, is a chum of Representative Abraham Multer, Democrat of New York, the Herald Tribune asserted. Multer achieved a certain amount of notoriety as an echo of Chalk's views, so much so that when a subway system to which Mr. Chalk is piously
opposed in Washington was suggested Mr. Multer owlishly warned all and sundry that building it would surely increase the capital's crime rate.
Stanley L. Sommer, a Washington public relations man associated with Morris Forgash, head of U. S. Freight Forwarders, admitted, said the Herald Tribune, that "many Senators" have been entertained on board the Forgash yacht "Natamor. " Among other tidbits which the paper said Mr. Sommer related, he had picked up the tab for Senator Everett M. Dirksen, Mrs. Dirksen and her sister for a frolicsome Labor Day weekend in 1963 at the Carousel Motel, Ocean City, Maryland. The hotel was owned by Bobby Baker, ousted former secretary to the Senate Democratic Majority of which Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson was a free-wheeling ringmaster.
It is noticeable throughout that it is mainly Establishment and fellow-traveling Legislators who are enmeshed in this sort of far-ranging entrepreneurial activity. The Establishment forms the spiderweb out of which operations are conducted and to which the operator returns for protection. Men banding together for protection are one source of Establishment power.
Members of the House and Senate are of several economic categories. They are, first, of independent, partly or wholly hereditary means, well educated, who have acquired a general rational interest in government; some of the best ones, intellectually and morally, can be found in this group. In their various outlooks many of these recall the Founding Fathers, nearly all men of property. Unfortunately, they are greatly outnumbered by the dung-hill climbers whose political task it is to gyp their dung-hill constituents. There are, too, moderate-sized business and professional entrepreneurs, most of them unable to distinguish between their business and governmental duties; they use government as a tool of their businesses, a practice openly defended by the late Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, an oil man who was often referred to as "The King of the Senate. " There are, finally, those without means or firm business connections. Most of these, excepting only the conspicuously educated, are "on the make," looking upon the government much as brokers look upon the Stock Exchange: an opportunity to feather their nests and thus gain witless public esteem, status. A difference, however, is that brokers do not function under oath.
And it is because congressmen have taken an ostentatious oath that one is entitled, without listening to any sophomoric mush about "human failings" as the orchestra plays "Hearts and Flowers," to subject them to sharp scrutiny and judgment. What one might be inclined to overlook in a broker, or even a banker, one cannot sensibly treat as "just one of those things" in a legislator or other official if one values reasonable civil security.
In the passing of loaded legislation, many instances of which were cited by the staid Herald Tribune, the lawmakers manifestly act either for their own account or, as brokers, for the account of others. As the record shows, they function in both roles.
Apart from direct gifts of money, which perhaps are what give most Establishment congressmen their financial starts, the prime way outsiders, mainly corporations, mobilize their zeal is by means of retainers through their law firms. Of 435 representatives and 100 senators, the Herald Tribune noted, 305 are lawyers. The firms of nearly all are under lucrative multicorporate retainer.
While one cannot show in every case that a lawyer-congressman is supporting a client of his firm on the floor or in committees, it can be shown in many cases. In some instances one would be hard put to show a one-one connection between a client and a legislative beneficiary. The client-attorney relationships of the congressmen, however, show that both client and attorney are running out of the same corporate stables, flying the same battle flags. The congressmen, if not full-fledged corporate men, are so close
to it in their thinking that they are indistinguishable from the officials of the United States Chamber of Commerce. Nobody has to tell the congressmen how to think, for example, on the subject of taxes if they think about them at all; they think that way spontaneously.
The law-retainer racket, often combined with threatened extortion, is very old and is touched upon by Charles Francis Adams II, one-time president of the Union Pacific Railroad, in his Autobiography (1916). In Washington on business for the railroad Adams at once encountered "a prominent member of the U. S. Senate" who was still alive, retired, when Adams wrote: ". . . he has a great reputation for ability, and a certain reputation, somewhat fly-blown, it is true, for rugged honesty. I can only say that I found him an ill-mannered bully, and by all odds the most covertly and dangerously corrupt man I ever had opportunity and occasion carefully to observe in public life. His grudge against the Union Pacific was that it had not retained him--he was not, as counsel, in its pay. While he took excellent care of those competing concerns which had been wiser in this respect, he never lost an opportunity of posing as the fearless antagonist of corporations when the Union Pacific came to the front. For that man, on good and sufficient grounds, I entertained a deep dislike. He was distinctly dishonest--a senatorial bribe-taker. "
This sort of thing is virtually standard legislative practice in the United States and was the thought in the mind of the The Nation (June 26, 1967) when it charged that the nature of the case made against Senator Thomas Dodd before he was censured by the Senate had been largely a cover-up. John Stennis, chairman of the Ethics Committee, The Nation charged, had steered the Senate away from considering the more serious charges against Dodd: "that he had (1) threatened to investigate the movie industry but, after taking a political contribution from the Motion Picture Association, dropped the probe; (2) threatened to investigate the television industry, but dropped the matter after taking money from a major member of the industry; (3) taken money from insurance companies while supposedly investigating them; (4) taken money from the firearms industry, and thereafter cooled in his ardor to control interstate shipments of guns; (5) used an airplane belonging to McKesson & Robbins, the drug makers, while sitting on an antitrust subcommittee investigating the drug industry; (6) taken a gift from Westinghouse's lobbyist while sitting on a judiciary subcommittee probing price fixing in the electrical industry; (7) sought favors and jobs for a number of groups and individuals who had contributed to his seemingly bottomless need for money. "
Dodd, in fact, was a fairly typical legislator, fitting right into the history of the American congressional system.
Apart from the incentives of surreptitious gifts, campaign contributions and law retainers, congressmen ferret out independent legislative and bureaucratic incentives strictly for their own account. Not only brokers, they are entrepreneurs and promoters as well. They are especially concentrated in the building-and-loan, television, insurance, local banking and credit fields, all subject to regulation and franchising by governmental agencies. Some are also personally interested in a variety of other government-regulated business activities, including the juggling of oil lands. They are, not to put too fine a point on it, estate builders. Estate building represents their philosophic horizon.
First a word about law firms.
Aware that some question of propriety might arise, some congressmen are related to two-name law firms. There is, first, their original firm. There is, also, a newer firm listing all partners' names except their own but occupying the same office, employing
the same personnel, using the same telephone number and the two sets of names on the same door. The Herald Tribune photographed some of these novelties.
It is presumably through the newer firm that business about which there might be some question is siphoned. The congressman does not participate on the books in such business. But, also presumably, his partners in the old firm are grateful. Presumably he is given a compensatory share in the old firm, doing business with nongovernment- connected clients, and is excluded from direct participation in the juicy second firm. Thus appearances are preserved.
But, even so, the single-name law firm prevails. Most congressmen don't care about appearances.
As the Herald Tribune noted, Senator Everett Dirksen, a big Establishmentarian and like his close friend Lyndon B. Johnson an ardent public partisan of prayer and God, is a member of the obscure Peoria, Illinois, law firm of Davis, Morgan and Witherell. This little firm numbers among its clients the formidable International Harvester Company, Pabst Brewing Company, the National Lock Company and the Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company, a sprawling giant.
"During a 1959 Senate debate on pending legislation to bar pressures on Federal regulatory agencies, Sen. Dirksen said he would continue contacting them for constituents until such time the law provided he could be 'put in jail for doing it. '" 46
"In addition to his public chores, he is a . . . director of the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Chicago. . . .
"Sen. Dirksen's business ties meshed neatly with his politics, earlier this year, with the appointment of Carl E. Bagge, a Chicago railroad attorney, as an industry-oriented member of the Federal Power Commission. It was on the Senator's recommendation that President Johnson appointed Mr. Bagge. " 47
The Herald Tribune then recalled that the Dirksen law firm represented Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line, which "falls within the jurisdiction of the FPC. " Dirksen, therefore, is seen to play a variety of roles. Everybody--legislator, president, law firm, corporations, commissions and lobbyists--is rolled together in the same capacious bed.
Dirksen, although nominally a Republican, bobbed up in several parts of the Herald Tribune inquest. In 1962 he received, according to this rockribbed Republican newspaper, concentrated campaign contributions from members of the pharmaceutical industry: officials of the Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Company, the Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation (Squibb) and G. D. Searle and Company, drug manufacturers.
"During this period," said the Herald Tribune, "Sen. Dirksen was leading the opposition against Sen. Estes Kefauver's campaign to regulate the cost and safety of consumer drugs.
As the price of ending the filibuster all the opposition would do is to demand the end of Rule XXII. If the rule stayed, the filibuster would continue.
It is highly doubtful if thirty-five senators, or even fifteen, are this resolutely determined to end Rule XXII. They have, it is true, no mandate for such action from their constituencies. The latter for the most part do not even know of Rule XXII. The non-Establishmentarians are not so determined to abolish it as the Establishment is to keep it, nor are they sufficiently numerous. It follows that the Establishment rules completely, with no sign of an early break in its grip. Such a break--when, as and if it comes--is not likely to develop on the basis of a Clarkian appeal for fair dealing. It can come only as a consequence of some profound upheaval in American society.
The discarding of Rule XXII would not in itself break the power of the Establishment, although the alignment of forces within it would no doubt shift. One sees this by looking at the House, which is run by full-time self-centered intrigants without resort to unlimited debate as a threatening weapon. Rule XXII, while convenient, is not really needed.
The remedy for all this, some will say, is in the electoral process before the people. How inadequate a refuge this is one can see by noting that most of the members of Congress occupy "safe" seats, are always virtually sure of election. In the House, supposed paladin of the people, hardly more than a hundred seats are ever in doubt, as Senator Clark admits. More than three-quarters of the occupants know they will invariably be re-elected. An even larger proportion of the Senate holds completely safe seats. Under the impact of a social cataclysm as awesome as the Depression, seats change hands slowly, and after the cataclysm the new incumbent is usually in for the rest of his life.
Such exceptions as there are can be cited from only a few highly competitive, transitional and variegated regions, mainly California and New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, etc. Inertia in the stuporous electorate is a large factor in holding seats. Not only do the voters usually dislike change but they see no reason for it, can discern no more merit in new contenders than in incumbents. All promise heaven. Unless one can
raise the strong suspicion that an officeholder is a Communist, a homosexual, a freethinker, a dabbler in science, a sexual athlete, a practitioner of divorce, a reader of prohibited books or something equally esoteric, he will be hard to dislodge if he has conducted himself according to the established routines of the electoral game.
Senator Clark, like others who feel as he does, lays great stress on public opinion, the need to mobilize it in order to put the government on a course conducive (as he sees it) to the long-term interests of the people and the very safety of the Republic. Such stress on the need for an informed public opinion is an indirect confession of the inadequacy of representative government. If everyone must be fully informed on every question and press insistently for government action, it means we simply now have a more cumbersome form of the New England town meeting when the populace as a whole was the legislative body. If public opinion must be so rampant, and at variance with its own standards, what is the need of representatives? Why not submit all proposals to direct popular vote?
The Establishment in Action
Devoted conscientiously to blocking adjustments in the ramshackle status quo, the Establishment can be cooperative and quick-moving when it wishes. It is most cooperative and retiring, Senator Clark points out, in time of war. Then it endorses anything asked for remotely likely to help in crushing the enemy. War, in fact, seems most effective in unlocking its springs of action, in quickening its pulse, in arousing its ardor. It is as bellicose as any Prussian Junkerverein. It equates patriotism with war.
Bills affecting its special pets among the finpols also get rush-order treatment. Thus, the emergency bill to exempt Du Pont stockholders from the capital gains tax in the distribution under Supreme Court mandate of General Motors stock held by E. I. du Pont de Nemours was galloped through prestissimo, as Senator Clark notes, It was as though the Establishmentarians knew that now they were being watched by the gentry and were anxious to show what really fine work they could do--all of which was no doubt very reassuring to Wilmington, Delaware.
How the Establishment works to ensnare the country in something the electorate finds distasteful is more interesting and more revealing of Establishment ways and is best shown in the matter of taxes.
Congressmen in general are not well informed on taxes--or on much else, for that matter. They are, to put it bluntly, conveniently ignorant and depend on the word of floor leaders, whips and committee chairmen.
Needless to say [as the infinitely expert Eisenstein remarks] members of Congress are not as well versed in taxation as they should be. Of course, they are also inadequately informed on other matters which are entrusted to their care. It is no secret that votes are commonly cast without a firm grasp of the issues involved. In taxation, however, knowledge comes with unusual pain and suffering. The statutes are enveloped in a peculiar verbal fog of their own. The Internal Revenue Code, indeed, is a remarkable essay in sustained obscurity. It has all the earmarks of a conspiracy in restraint of understanding. The conspiracy never ends because amendments never cease. Year after year many minds combine anew against the grave danger of being understood. . . . Surely, the nimblest member of Congress can hardly hope to perceive in a day what the alleged experts are unable to understand over the years. Most members are soon lost and bewildered when they move beyond the rates and personal exemptions. As Representative Patman gently understated the ignorance of Congress, "the tax laws are passed with the Members not knowing exactly what they mean. " 33
Rank and file Republicans and Democrats, right and left, complained at its submission that they did not understand the tax law of 1954, 34 which still provides the main base.
A vote on a tax bill, then [says the legist Eisenstein] is an act of faith. With few exceptions the members of Congress helplessly approve whatever the tax committees may choose to offer. They "must take the word" of the committees. While the committees usually provide reports for each bill, the reports hardly qualify as guides for the perplexed. As a rule, they merely fortify the sense of organized confusion. If the members look for enlightenment during debate, they rarely learn much more. Complex tax bills are poorly discussed and hastily enacted. At times there is no discussion at all. . . .
The House, in fact, proceeds on the theory that individual members should generally abstain from thinking for themselves. This principle of parliamentary behavior is known as the "gag rule. " The members are discreetly denied the right to offer any amendments or to vote on separate sections of a bill. They can only accept or reject the bill as a whole. Since their function is so limited, they have little incentive to be enlightened. In any event, too many questions cannot be asked because debate is carefully curtailed . . . too often the explanations on the floor sound as if the halt were leading the blind. 35
Within the tax committees and among their technical staff writers--the people who compose taxese or tax prose--there is a clearer view of affairs. Among them, Republicans and Democrats alike, there is full understanding of the workings of special dispensations or "loopholes. " 36
"The story is always the same," Hubert Humphrey admitted when he was a senator. "Higher rates are imposed and at the same time loopholes are carefully framed which permit the wealthy to get out from under the higher taxes. " 37
Says a leading tax expert: ". . . the average congressman does not believe in the present high rates of income tax, especially those applicable in the upper brackets. When he sees these rates applied in individual cases he thinks the rates are too high and therefore unfair. . . . True believers in these rates would long ago have torn down the tax shelters and resisted all pressures for special relief. Instead, the reverse is true. " 38
Astronomic rates, headlined hysterically by newspapers, impress the general public. The rich , it is presumed, are being made to bleed and disgorge by a stern socialistic or at least fanatically liberal government. Rightists fulminate. With the left hand, however, a trucksize loophole is chopped that cancels the high rate, in some cases allows no tax at all to be paid.
For one oil and gas virtuoso, for example, on a total income of $14. 3 million in five years, all subject prima facie to a 91 per cent tax, the total taxes were only $80,000 or 3/5 of 1 per cent. Still another artist in oil did even better. He tenderly groomed properties that brought in nearly $5 million one year--on which there was no tax due. "In escaping tax on his oil income, he also escaped tax on most of his other income. His total taxes for the period were less than $100,000, but his income from sources other than oil averaged about $1 million a year. " 39 At the same time the lowest rates for ordinary taxpayers, the fevered patriots in the streets--rates they could not escape-- ranged from 19 to 23 per cent. Theirs not to reason why. . . . Some ultra-large oil companies find the tax at times so infinitesimal that they do not even list it as a separate item in reports to stockholders. 40
The politically illiterate common man pays what others do not. The government always gets all the money it says it needs. It never permits a "raid" on the Treasury.
The committee process by which the rambling Internal Revenue Code is amended is childishly simple, yet difficult and fatiguing to follow, much like a long-drawn
tournament between chessmasters. Like a chess game, too, it is tedious to describe in its inwardness for noninitiates owing to the ramifying effects of simple little moves.
It is in committee hearings that one sees men of C. Wright Mills's executive "power elite"--all figures of distinctly secondary rank, many of them subject to the pleasure of the president as temporary appointees in the Executive Branch. If committee chairmen or members feel like it, they rake them with sarcasm, challenge them point blank, give them the lie direct.
Before these committees a good deal of careful deference is shown by visiting executives and lawyers. It doesn't all run one way because there is a good deal of reciprocal respect and there is the knowledge among committee members that the witnesses are, after all, connected as underlings with big distributors of pecuniary patronage. Such knowledge is not always controlling because, as the front men in well- entrenched one-party state political factions, the committee members already have plenty "going for them" both politically and financially. If he felt sufficiently irked, one of these committee chairmen could tell the Du Ponts, Rockefellers and Mellons combined precisely where to head in and never feel even slightly threatened by the possibility of any successful electoral reprisal. It has been done, simply as a bravura finger-exercise.
Critics charge that the major tax forces represent narrow and selfish private interests as against public and presumably broad and generous interests, But as Eisenstein points out, it is not possible to isolate public and private interests as separate determinate essences.
In the eyes of these critics, "The taxing process emerges as an unceasing struggle between good and evil. The 'general taxpayer,' the 'general public,' the 'People' are on one side; 'organized groups,' 'special groups,' 'pressure groups,' on the other. " But "The 'public' or the 'people' necessarily consist of individuals, and individuals fall into various groups. Not even the adherents of ability insist that all taxpayers should be similarly treated. If they are not to be treated alike, they must be treated as distinctive groups. " 41
Some groups, each of the tax proponents feels, are more vital to the public interest than others, and are entitled to special consideration. This, basically, is the point. Some people count, most do not.
How it plays out is well shown by Eisenstein:
The same generalities are perennially repeated because they are vacant expressions. Everyone may freely put into them whatever he wishes to take out. That is why they are beyond dispute. For the same reason they are also very useful. Dispensations may be broadly condemned and then selectively approved without fear of engaging in any contradictions. Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, for instance, declares that taxes "should be as fair and equitable as possible. " They should be "based primarily on ability to pay," and they should not discriminate "as between different groups. " But at the same time the senator also maintains that taxes should, "as a matter of principle," provide a "reasonable incentive to earn, to grow, to expand. " Therefore, he warmly recommends such special dispensations as a credit for dividends and a reduced rate for income from foreign investments. Apparently dispensations which remove barriers and deterrents do not discriminate "between different groups. " The public interest similarly enables Congressman Mills to distinguish between one dispensation and another. Our income tax, he charges, is "riddled with preferential benefits. " The statutes are "full of special provisions through which a shrewd or lucky taxpayer can often escape paying anywhere near his full share. " But having said all this, Congressman Mills indicates that it would not be "desirable to eliminate all the special provisions that we now permit. " Those who fail to pay their "full share" may also serve the public interest. 42
Whatever is said at these tax hearings, and whatever one may think about what is said, the result (whether explicitly intended or not) is clear: Most of the tax burden is shouldered over, directly and indirectly, on the nonpropertied, free-spending labor force, which constitutes the main body of patriots upon which the future of the Republic depends.
After protracted hearings the tax committees go into "executive session," excluding the profane. Staff writers get their instructions. Whatever is not of sentimental appeal is put into the customary opaque language, but what is of sentimental appeal such as high rates on the big incomes and baited deductions for blindness, medicine, children and superannuation is left crystal clear.
When ready the bill is reported out on the floor near the end of the session, when a great many other bills, equally suspect under careful analysis, are also awaiting passage. There is here the usual "logjam" of important legislation, with members impatient to get home to sweet-talk low-IQ voters. The "heat is on" for swift passage.
If anyone wishes, he may suggest amendments, which may or may not be voted down. The votes are there, the floor managers know, to pass the bill. The word is passed to the stalwarts, all ready to act. At the signal, the bill is easily pushed through.
The Senate Finance Committee in 1966, of which Russell Long, an Establishment stalwart, was chairman, consisted of 17 members. Six were identified by Senator Clark as of the Establishment core, 6 were from the South, 8 were from one-party states and 12 were from outside Metropolia. Only 7 were clearly non-Establishmentarians and only 6 would ordinarily be classified as liberals or rationalists.
The House Ways and Means Committee under the redoubtable Wilbur Mills of Arkansas had 11 members out of 25 from one-party states, many more from one-party districts, 8 from the South and 13 from outside Metropolia. The back country was clearly in the saddle. As the committee is under the mesmeric control of Mr. Mills, much like the New York Philharmonic under Leonard Bernstein, it is not necessary to carry the analysis further. It is all an Establishment affair.
Oddly, what radicals call Wall Street tax laws are largely put into final form by men from the swamps, bayous, tundra, bogs, crossroads, pastures, plains, bills, ravines, badlands and backwoods of the country. These men with some exceptions have not attended fancy law schools or studied at the leading universities; there is about few of them any taint of sickly intellectuality. They are, one might say, as common as any drug-store loafer. Nor did any of them, so far as I can ascertain, ever have to meet a flabbergasting payroll in private business. None was ever a super-salesman, a super- lawyer or a big-time entrepreneur. One can safely say that none has had either firsthand or theoretical knowledge of economics, finance or business affairs. As far as taxes are concerned they only know what they may have alertly picked up by hearsay in their committee rooms from visiting monetary sophists.
Yet, when all is said and done, they are well able to distinguish campaign contributors from unsound, unkempt and uncouth, not to say openly literate, ivory-tower theorists.
The Pay-Off
Contrary to common supposition a majority of those in the House and Senate enjoy incomes vaulting far beyond their relatively modest salaries of $30,000 a year plus office expenses, travel allowances and other extras. Merely at this salaried minimal they are already in the upper 1 per cent of income receivers. 43 Income-wise they make members of the Mafia look like bashful Boy Scouts.
Much of this congressional income--by all signs probably most--is obtained in ways that, although technically legal, would be condemned by almost any citizen having ordinary claims to respectability and even by many of the more high-toned swindlers who comb the bistros for hard-to-get victims.
So many, indeed, are the ways on record congressmen have of funneling furtive lucre into their pockets that they defy description at any seemly length. Some attempt must be made, however, to comprehend what goes on among political entrepreneurs in order to understand the weltaunschauung of the men who confect our tax laws.
Congress is largely but not exclusively staffed by assiduous off-the-soil moneymakers who use government as a tool in their profit-seeking operations with the gusto of a pack of hypertonic pickpockets assailing a convention of paralytics. In so doing, manifestly, its members are engaging in wholly unfair competition with the business and professional classes, especially with the small and medium-sized portions. Most business people, high or low, and even Mafians, do not have such ready toll-free access to the inner valves and spigots of government.
I am far from contending that money-making congressmen (who must be distinguished from a civilized minority genuinely concerned about the fate of the Republic) are primarily athirst for lucre. So to say would involve me in a bootless squabble with degree-flaunting sages about the tenuous and wholly irrelevant question of primacy in motivation--of possible interest only to psychologists. Whether congressional absorption in money-making is first or last in order of emphasis it is patently materially the largest and most assiduously pursued of all congressional interests.
These possibly truistic prefatory remarks are inspired not by some hostile, foreign, pagan and blasphemous un-American influences such as the godless writings of Karl Marx, Nicolai Bakunin, V. I. Lenin or Leon Trotsky but by first-hand, on-the-scene, carefully put together reports in such solidly established, churchly bourgeois publications as the New York Herald Tribune and the Wall Street Journal. On the score of method it would be difficult to find sources more homey and comfy unless one had it all in the form of a unanimous opinion of the United States Supreme Court certified in blood by the National Association of Manufacturers.
A bastion of old-line conservatism that yearned for the return of the mansard roof and the Stutz Bearcat, the Herald Tribune was until its demise the nonpareil Republican organ of the country. * (* The discontinuance of the valued Herald Tribune was announced as the consequence of a prolonged, complicated strike involving ten labor unions and two other newspapers. New York Times, August 13, 1966; 1: 6-7. ) The Journal is to Wall Street what Pravda and Izvestia are to the Kremlin, although it is a tremendously better paper professionally. None of this, of course, is a guarantee of pinpoint accuracy. But neither publication could be suspected of unorthodox or vagrant leanings in politics or social conceptions. If there was error in the political facts it sprung from inadvertence rather than ignorance or un-American, pro-intellectual bias. Although ornaments of the corporate press (the Tribune was owned by John Hay Whitney, a vintage super-millionaire), they are not to be confused with the "mass media," the chief task of which is to portray the world as a never-ending sideshow while fostering mass illusions about the great day that is just around the corner, due to dawn right after the election of John ("The Louse") Outhouse.
Such publications belong to what sociologists modishly dub "the elite press.
" Of such there are some dozen to eighteen in the country (I myself lean to the first figure). Among hundreds this is not many but it represents the level of press seriousness. Although sections of this elite have been accused from time to time of editing news in favor of their own point of view, it has never been so much as whispered that they are
"un-American" or anything but wholeheartedly committed to the Constitution, profits and godliness. Error, yes; heresy, never.
Even though these elite papers are corporate entities, and as such are subject to the usual reservations, in recent years their owners, who once felt safe under Mark Hanna and Calvin Coolidge, have become dimly but increasingly aware that they are insidiously threatened simply as flesh-and-blood by much that is taking place--by events internal, external and technical. As a screwball society of demoralized citizens gradually comes unglued under ideologically justified neglect by its repeatedly sworn dung-hill guardians, the wealthy and their family members are also affected. Long unable to trot their horses through Central Park owing to the descent upon it of hordes of the demented, they, too, in or near the vicinity of their homes now are increasingly robbed, assaulted, raped, kidnapped, blackmailed, swindled, intimidated by servants and plug- ugly labor leaders, assassinated, run down by unregulated cars, poisoned by offbeat drugs and foods full of additives, overcharged, misled, misdirected, engulfed in half- shot planes and the like. One could compile imposing lists of wealthy victims within just the past five years, some with prolonged pedigrees and valuable Roman numerals after their names.
Again, this isn't the half of it. They are now, wealth or no wealth, subject to common industrial hazards of the population as a whole: air pollution, smoke inhalation, water pollution, unpleasant regional odors, public-service strikes, gratuitous noise, equipment failures right and left, chemical leakages, explosions, water shortages, area "blackouts," public crowding, riots, radiation poisoning, possible atomic warfare and the like.
And if elected government officials are conveniently purchasable, it is always possible, even probable, that they will be purchased by adversely hostile interests burrowing under established cushy positions.
As there is no Stock Exchange quoting officials' prices (which would be a great convenience) one never knows for sure at what figures the political bidding begins and ends. Nor does one ever know when one has a firm acceptance. Bought men sell out again at higher figures--which makes sense. All of which promotes much displeasing uncertainty and anxiety even among general beneficiaries.
Established wealth, in order to realize its potentialities to the maximum, needs orderly, intelligent and principled government. It does not have that now, but is caught in something of a more efficient continuation of the catch-as-catch-can nineteenth century; government is now more systematically and organizedly wayward than it once was. Although after the Civil War the rising magnates engaged in plenty of funny business with the politicians, the latter had not yet organized on a rational semi-corporate basis to put the vacuum cleaner systematically on rich and poor alike. Hence, in part, the rising concern in what are, seen from the street, high places.
If government is thoroughly unprincipled and is at the same time pretty much out of control, if the butler and the rest of the help are freely helping themselves to the vintage stuff and giving their lip to their betters, established wealth is itself in some danger of being clipped. As the Herald Tribune somewhat primly observed, "An anarchistic moral climate prevails in Congress. " The complaint is not, then, that the congressmen are Bolsheviks but that they are dedicated anarchists, which is surely just as bad or worse. If government men kick up their heels in wild abandon, the rule of the jungle, using government as a handy bludgeon, has returned and, as Thomas Hobbes said, life for everyone tends to become "nasty, brutish and short. " If, as it turns out, government officials are surreptitiously enmeshed in a tangle of distractingly profitable involvements, where anyone comes out in the ensuing mele? e is chancy. Here the
problem of government takes on particularly seamy hues, as much--in some ways, more--for the rich as for anyone else.
But if the elite press expected a public uprising on the heels of these probing exposures, recalling the best efforts of the old-time "muckrakers" such as the famed Lincoln Steffens, the editors showed little knowledge of the political system or the public. Proved money-grabbing by elected officials in the atomic age piques a disoriented public far less than the latest amours of the Hollywood set, ax murders in Brooklyn or the birth of two-headed quintuplets. As long as there seemed some possibility of sandwiching "call girls" into l'affaire Bobby Baker a few years ago, public interest momentarily stirred. It faded as soon as the impresarios failed to produce the cash-minded damsels in undress. Tabloid readers sulked at being deprived of an American Profumo Affair.
In what follows it should always be remembered that there is no question of illegality involved, Everything reported is strictly legal, just as Hitler's extermination of the Jews was legal--a little point I mention merely to suggest how much weight one may attach to the notion. And until further notice everything that follows is taken from the unreservedly patriotic Herald Tribune of June 9 through June 15, 1965.
"Anyone who wants any legislation, buys it with cold, cold cash. I don't mean you go up to a Senator and ask him if he'd like to make $5,000 by voting for your bill. That's out today. So are broads and booze. "
The words were those of a well-known veteran Washington lobbyist who was explaining his modus operandi.
"What you do is arrange to meet him alone somewhere--but not at his office. I almost never go up on the Hill, except maybe to show friends or relatives around.
"You don't tell him what you want. He knows. You tell him you understand he has a tough campaign coming up--or he has had a tough campaign--and you'd like to help cover the costs. Then you leave an envelope with cash in it. The real reason you are giving the money is never mentioned.
"Of course, you can't do this with all Congressmen. But generally it takes only a couple of votes in subcommittee to swing a bill one way or another. After you've been here awhile you know who to deal with. " 44
As there are more than 4,000 registered lobbyists in Washington, nearly eight to a congressman, it is evident that there are plenty of paymasters. While bribes are illegal, random gifts are not; but to be fully legal they should be reported on income-tax returns. Presumably they are not. And presumably they come out of capacious expense accounts provided lobbyists by their principals, whoever they may be. "Campaign" contributions are legal but should be reported; many are not.
An al fresco way of receiving gifts was disclosed by T. Lamar Caudle, an assistant attorney general who was convicted in 1956 of tax-fraud conspiracy. Caudle told the FBI that he customarily parked his car with the window open and was always pleasantly surprised that "somebody kept putting presents" in the back seat. The Herald Tribune doubted that congressmen use this method, which seems overly conspiratorial; the congressional deals are more apt to be right over the counter, thus disarming untutored observers.
Lobbyists stand so high in Washington that they constitute an informal branch of government. Thus, Dale Miller, long a successful lobbyist, "is one of President Johnson's closest friends. The president accorded Mr. Miller, a fellow Texan, a signal honor by naming him chairman of the 1965 inauguration committee. Myron Weiner,
lobbyist for the ocean freight forwarding industry, shared his Washington apartment for a while with Sen. Harrison Williams, D. , N. J. During the Bobby Baker investigation it was disclosed that Mr. Weiner split a fee with Mr. Baker, even though the former Senate majority secretary reportedly performed no special service for it. "
And so it goes. The Herald Tribune continued:
The relationship between Congressmen and lobbyists is based on reciprocity.
Lobby organizations are the big campaign contributors and the buyers of most seats at political fund-raising banquets. In an age of skyrocketting campaign expenses, Congressmen need the financial handouts which lobby groups offer. ["Campaign expenses," while real, are in part a euphemism. As Frank R. Kent mordantly noted long ago, campaign-fund collectors have "sticky fingers"--that is, they pocket part of the money and divide it with cronies. Frank R. Kent, The Great Game of Politics, Doubleday, Page & Co. , N. Y. , 1923, pp. 131-33--F. L. ]
On their part, lobbyists require the support and votes of the lawmakers if their clients are to prosper in the fiercely competitive business world. [What happens when face-to- face competitors each bid for lawmakers' support was not inquired into. --F. L. ]
Generally, lobbyists solicit aid through "persuasive education," stressing the merits of their position; by wining and dining lawmakers and their aides, and by subtly offering rewards.
The era of the outright bribe, when the little black bag stuffed with greenbacks was left on the desk, is fading with age.
Few lobbyists try brazenly to buy votes with cash across the table. Instead, the lobbyist seeks to make the Congressman beholden to him. Should the lawmaker be on the fence, uninformed or indifferent concerning a measure, it is presumed he will feel obliged to favor the stand promoted by his lobbyist friend.
One lobbyist said the latest ruse among his colleagues was to work through lawyers.
"The lawyer-client relationship keeps everything confidential. The lawyer, who is never registered as a lobbyist, simply calls up the Congressman and says he represents a client on a matter in which the Congressman might be interested. " 45
Corporation lobbyists have two main objectives: to influence legislation and to dampen enforcement of existing laws by federal corporate regulatory agencies such as the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Communications Commission and a long string of others the average rank-and-file nitwit believes to be standing vigilantly on guard. Simple inquiries by congressmen have the effect of deflecting the hand of law enforcement, because all these agencies are financed through appropriations voted by congressmen. The hostility of even one congressman can lead to severe reduction of an agency's needed funds, can even cause official heads to roll. In consequence, virtually all regulations on the books are only selectively applied.
As to legislation, it was brought out in 1963 that John R. O'Donnell, a promoter of Philippine sugar interests, had bankrolled more than twenty congressmen in 1960 to insure passage of a dubious $73-milhon Philippine war claims bill for which he expected a fat commission. (Cases cited are only typical examples from among many offered; this text does not profess to be an exhaustive treatise, which would fill volumes if it went back over more than two or three years. )
O. Roy Chalk, president of Trans Caribbean Airways, the D. C. Transit System and other projects, is a chum of Representative Abraham Multer, Democrat of New York, the Herald Tribune asserted. Multer achieved a certain amount of notoriety as an echo of Chalk's views, so much so that when a subway system to which Mr. Chalk is piously
opposed in Washington was suggested Mr. Multer owlishly warned all and sundry that building it would surely increase the capital's crime rate.
Stanley L. Sommer, a Washington public relations man associated with Morris Forgash, head of U. S. Freight Forwarders, admitted, said the Herald Tribune, that "many Senators" have been entertained on board the Forgash yacht "Natamor. " Among other tidbits which the paper said Mr. Sommer related, he had picked up the tab for Senator Everett M. Dirksen, Mrs. Dirksen and her sister for a frolicsome Labor Day weekend in 1963 at the Carousel Motel, Ocean City, Maryland. The hotel was owned by Bobby Baker, ousted former secretary to the Senate Democratic Majority of which Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson was a free-wheeling ringmaster.
It is noticeable throughout that it is mainly Establishment and fellow-traveling Legislators who are enmeshed in this sort of far-ranging entrepreneurial activity. The Establishment forms the spiderweb out of which operations are conducted and to which the operator returns for protection. Men banding together for protection are one source of Establishment power.
Members of the House and Senate are of several economic categories. They are, first, of independent, partly or wholly hereditary means, well educated, who have acquired a general rational interest in government; some of the best ones, intellectually and morally, can be found in this group. In their various outlooks many of these recall the Founding Fathers, nearly all men of property. Unfortunately, they are greatly outnumbered by the dung-hill climbers whose political task it is to gyp their dung-hill constituents. There are, too, moderate-sized business and professional entrepreneurs, most of them unable to distinguish between their business and governmental duties; they use government as a tool of their businesses, a practice openly defended by the late Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, an oil man who was often referred to as "The King of the Senate. " There are, finally, those without means or firm business connections. Most of these, excepting only the conspicuously educated, are "on the make," looking upon the government much as brokers look upon the Stock Exchange: an opportunity to feather their nests and thus gain witless public esteem, status. A difference, however, is that brokers do not function under oath.
And it is because congressmen have taken an ostentatious oath that one is entitled, without listening to any sophomoric mush about "human failings" as the orchestra plays "Hearts and Flowers," to subject them to sharp scrutiny and judgment. What one might be inclined to overlook in a broker, or even a banker, one cannot sensibly treat as "just one of those things" in a legislator or other official if one values reasonable civil security.
In the passing of loaded legislation, many instances of which were cited by the staid Herald Tribune, the lawmakers manifestly act either for their own account or, as brokers, for the account of others. As the record shows, they function in both roles.
Apart from direct gifts of money, which perhaps are what give most Establishment congressmen their financial starts, the prime way outsiders, mainly corporations, mobilize their zeal is by means of retainers through their law firms. Of 435 representatives and 100 senators, the Herald Tribune noted, 305 are lawyers. The firms of nearly all are under lucrative multicorporate retainer.
While one cannot show in every case that a lawyer-congressman is supporting a client of his firm on the floor or in committees, it can be shown in many cases. In some instances one would be hard put to show a one-one connection between a client and a legislative beneficiary. The client-attorney relationships of the congressmen, however, show that both client and attorney are running out of the same corporate stables, flying the same battle flags. The congressmen, if not full-fledged corporate men, are so close
to it in their thinking that they are indistinguishable from the officials of the United States Chamber of Commerce. Nobody has to tell the congressmen how to think, for example, on the subject of taxes if they think about them at all; they think that way spontaneously.
The law-retainer racket, often combined with threatened extortion, is very old and is touched upon by Charles Francis Adams II, one-time president of the Union Pacific Railroad, in his Autobiography (1916). In Washington on business for the railroad Adams at once encountered "a prominent member of the U. S. Senate" who was still alive, retired, when Adams wrote: ". . . he has a great reputation for ability, and a certain reputation, somewhat fly-blown, it is true, for rugged honesty. I can only say that I found him an ill-mannered bully, and by all odds the most covertly and dangerously corrupt man I ever had opportunity and occasion carefully to observe in public life. His grudge against the Union Pacific was that it had not retained him--he was not, as counsel, in its pay. While he took excellent care of those competing concerns which had been wiser in this respect, he never lost an opportunity of posing as the fearless antagonist of corporations when the Union Pacific came to the front. For that man, on good and sufficient grounds, I entertained a deep dislike. He was distinctly dishonest--a senatorial bribe-taker. "
This sort of thing is virtually standard legislative practice in the United States and was the thought in the mind of the The Nation (June 26, 1967) when it charged that the nature of the case made against Senator Thomas Dodd before he was censured by the Senate had been largely a cover-up. John Stennis, chairman of the Ethics Committee, The Nation charged, had steered the Senate away from considering the more serious charges against Dodd: "that he had (1) threatened to investigate the movie industry but, after taking a political contribution from the Motion Picture Association, dropped the probe; (2) threatened to investigate the television industry, but dropped the matter after taking money from a major member of the industry; (3) taken money from insurance companies while supposedly investigating them; (4) taken money from the firearms industry, and thereafter cooled in his ardor to control interstate shipments of guns; (5) used an airplane belonging to McKesson & Robbins, the drug makers, while sitting on an antitrust subcommittee investigating the drug industry; (6) taken a gift from Westinghouse's lobbyist while sitting on a judiciary subcommittee probing price fixing in the electrical industry; (7) sought favors and jobs for a number of groups and individuals who had contributed to his seemingly bottomless need for money. "
Dodd, in fact, was a fairly typical legislator, fitting right into the history of the American congressional system.
Apart from the incentives of surreptitious gifts, campaign contributions and law retainers, congressmen ferret out independent legislative and bureaucratic incentives strictly for their own account. Not only brokers, they are entrepreneurs and promoters as well. They are especially concentrated in the building-and-loan, television, insurance, local banking and credit fields, all subject to regulation and franchising by governmental agencies. Some are also personally interested in a variety of other government-regulated business activities, including the juggling of oil lands. They are, not to put too fine a point on it, estate builders. Estate building represents their philosophic horizon.
First a word about law firms.
Aware that some question of propriety might arise, some congressmen are related to two-name law firms. There is, first, their original firm. There is, also, a newer firm listing all partners' names except their own but occupying the same office, employing
the same personnel, using the same telephone number and the two sets of names on the same door. The Herald Tribune photographed some of these novelties.
It is presumably through the newer firm that business about which there might be some question is siphoned. The congressman does not participate on the books in such business. But, also presumably, his partners in the old firm are grateful. Presumably he is given a compensatory share in the old firm, doing business with nongovernment- connected clients, and is excluded from direct participation in the juicy second firm. Thus appearances are preserved.
But, even so, the single-name law firm prevails. Most congressmen don't care about appearances.
As the Herald Tribune noted, Senator Everett Dirksen, a big Establishmentarian and like his close friend Lyndon B. Johnson an ardent public partisan of prayer and God, is a member of the obscure Peoria, Illinois, law firm of Davis, Morgan and Witherell. This little firm numbers among its clients the formidable International Harvester Company, Pabst Brewing Company, the National Lock Company and the Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company, a sprawling giant.
"During a 1959 Senate debate on pending legislation to bar pressures on Federal regulatory agencies, Sen. Dirksen said he would continue contacting them for constituents until such time the law provided he could be 'put in jail for doing it. '" 46
"In addition to his public chores, he is a . . . director of the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Chicago. . . .
"Sen. Dirksen's business ties meshed neatly with his politics, earlier this year, with the appointment of Carl E. Bagge, a Chicago railroad attorney, as an industry-oriented member of the Federal Power Commission. It was on the Senator's recommendation that President Johnson appointed Mr. Bagge. " 47
The Herald Tribune then recalled that the Dirksen law firm represented Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line, which "falls within the jurisdiction of the FPC. " Dirksen, therefore, is seen to play a variety of roles. Everybody--legislator, president, law firm, corporations, commissions and lobbyists--is rolled together in the same capacious bed.
Dirksen, although nominally a Republican, bobbed up in several parts of the Herald Tribune inquest. In 1962 he received, according to this rockribbed Republican newspaper, concentrated campaign contributions from members of the pharmaceutical industry: officials of the Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Company, the Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation (Squibb) and G. D. Searle and Company, drug manufacturers.
"During this period," said the Herald Tribune, "Sen. Dirksen was leading the opposition against Sen. Estes Kefauver's campaign to regulate the cost and safety of consumer drugs.
