mind the
perception
of-the Truth, but mean Ar o/.
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
Yousaywell, Socrates^repliesSimmias;sinceit
is so, I'll propose m y Doubts first, and then Cebes
shall give in his. I agree with you, that it is im
possible, or at least very difficult, to k n o w the truth
inthisLife;andthatitisthepropertyofalazy
and a dull Head, not to weigh exactly what he
fays, or to supersede the Examination before he has
made all his Efforts, and be oblig'd to give over by unsurmountableDifficulties. Foroneoftwothings? fallh"r
mustbedone:We musteitherlearntheTruthfromH $ U ?
others,orfinditoutourselves. IfbothwaysMl/7,0>>idpick u s , a m i d s t a l l h u m a n e R e a s o n s , w e m u t t p i t c h u p - <>>><? t h e b e s t s
on the strongest and most forcible, and trust to that""^ *>>AE astoaShip,while wepassthroughthisstormy'ZdJhinm Sea,and endeavour to avoid its Tempests and/d/e,-? tUs Shelves5tillwe find out onemorefirmand sure,>wjiSea. such as (a) Promise or Revelation, upon which we
may
(a)ThisisaveryremarkablePassage. HerethePhiloso phers acknowledge that we should endeavour to make out theImmortalityoftheSoulbyourownReason;andthatas this Reason isvery weai and narrow, so it will always be aslaulted by Doubts and Uncertainty ; and that nothing but a Divine Promjse or Revelation can disperse the Clouds of
Ignorance
? ? I28 , Phedon : Or, A Via
7l>ePromisemay happily accomplish the Voyage of this Life striaib'"asina ^elthat^earsn0danger. Ifazttthere- fJirsIT f? renotbeasham'dtoputQuestionstoyou,now
Danger, thatyouallowme;andshallavoidtheReproachI might one day cast upon my self, of not having told you my Thoughts upon this occasion. When Isurveywhatyouspoketome andtoCebes,Imust
ownI donotthinkyourProofssufficient.
,Perhapsyouhaver. eason,my dearSimmias;but v wheredoestheitinsufficiencyappear>
Simmias'^ *nx^s'? >tnattne^ame thingsmightbe aliened firstobjetii-oftheHarmonyofaHarp. Foronemayreasona- <<>>j*Wt/;ebly fay that the Harmony of a Harp, well string'd
fatofiLr anc* w tun'd, ^ invisible, immaterial, excellent m m y o f t h e a n ^ d i v i n e ? , a n d t h a t t h e I n s t r u m e n t a n d i t s S t r i n g s
fame date are the Body, the compounded earthy and mortal A>>dsta>>d-Matter. AndiftheInstrumentwerecutinpieces,
'faBd' or *ts Strings broken, might not one with equal 3' reason affirm, that this Harmony remains after, the breaking of the Harp, and has no end ? For,, since
itisevident, thattheHarpremainsaftertheStrings are broken, or that the Strings, which are likewise mortal, continue after the Harp is broken or dis mounted ; it must needs be impossible, might one fay, that this immortal and divine Harmony should perish before that which is mortal and earthy ; nay, it is necessary that this Harmony should continue to be without the least damage, when the Body of theHarpanditsStringsaregonetonothing. For, without doubt Socrates, you are sensible that we holdtheSoultobesomethingthatresemblesa Har
mony;andthatasourBodyisaBeingcomposed
IgnoranceandInfidelity. NowtheChristianReligionisthe only thing that fnrniihes us, not only with Divine Promise* >>nd Revelations, but likewise with the accomplishment of 'em by the Renirrection of Christ, who became the first-fruits tfthemthat/left,1Cor. 1j. 10. Andthusaccordingtothe Philosophers themselves, the Church is the only Vessel that fearsnoDanger,inwhichwemayhappilyaccomplish"the Voyage of Shis Life,
Of
? ? bs the Immortality of the Soul. u p
"hotandcold,dryandrnoist*soourSoulisno-
ing else but the Harmony resulting from the just . oportionofthese mix'd Qualities. Now,ifourJ^ *r'e
>ulisonlyafortofHarmony*'tisevident,tbat^,^'* hen our Body is over-stretch'd or unbended by resulting iseales, or any other Disorder, of necessity our Soul from ^
ith all its Divinity must come to an end, as well*"? gfg"- . the otherHarmonieswhichconsistinSounds,or/^ oL'!
e theeffectofIustruments;and thattheRemainstitiu. ? every Body continue for a considerable time, till
ey be burnt or moulder'd away. This you fee, vrates, might be alledg'd in opposition to your rgumeBts, that ifthe Soul be only a mixture of e Qualities of our Body, it perishes first in what e call Death.
Then Socrateslook'duponusall,oneafterano- er, as he did often, and began to smile. Simmias eaks with reason, fays he, His Question is well it,and if any of you has a greater dexterity in an gering his Objections than I have, why do you >tdo it? For he seems thoroughly to understand >th m y Arguments and the Exceptions they are lia- e to. But before we answer him, 'tis proper to :ar what Cebes has to object, that white he speaks e may have time to think upon what we are to, y ? , a n d a f t e r w e h a v e h e a r d ' e m b o t h , t h a t w e m a y
eld if their Reasons are uniform and valid, and if herwise, may stand by our Principles to the out- ost. Tell us then, Cebes, what itis that hinders >utoagreewithwhat Ihavelaiddown. _,
I'll tellyou, fays Cebesh your Demonstration^J f ^ emstobelameandimperfect? ,itisfaulty upontho'lbeSoui efameHeadthatwe tooknoticeofbefore. That>>*o*<<<<<>>>? << e Soul has a Being before its entrance into the i^'>>sthaa
>dy, is admirably well saidh and, Ithink, suffici-ZhS'a. itlymade out; butIcanneverbepersuaded thatmmatefi-
haslikewiseanExistenceafterDeath. Atthew<</Bo rne time, I cannot subscribe to Simmias's Allega- *"> %' on, that the Soul is neither stronger nor moredu-^/,,-^, ;blethantheBody* fortome itappears tobein-1><<bemir-
t i finitely * * *?
? ? jjo
- Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
finitely more excellent. But why then, (says the Objection) do you refuse to believe -it? Since you seewithyourEyes,thatwhena Man isdead,his weakestPartremainsstill;isitnottherefore abso lutely necessary that the more durable Part should last yet longer ? Pray, take notice if I answer this Objectionright. Fortoletyouintomymeaning,I mult use Resemblance or Comparison as well as
Simmias. . Your Allegation,tomy mind,isjustthe fame, as if upon the death of an old Taylor, one should say this Taylor isnot dead ; he has a Being still somewhere or other ; and for Proof of that, here'sthe Suit of Clothes he wore, which he made forhimself-,sothatheisstillinbeing. Ifanyone should not be convinces by this Proof, he would not failtoaskhim, whether theMan or the Clothes he wears is most durable ? To which of necessity
he must answer, that the Man is: And upon thi3 foot, your Philosopher would pretend to demon strate, that since the less durable possession of the Taylor is still in being, by a stronger Consequence hehimselfissotoo. Now,mydearSimmias^the P a r a l l e l i s n o t j u s t -, p r a y h e a r w h a t I h a v e t o a n swer to it.
5Tis evident at firstview, that the Objection isri diculous. FortheTaylor,havingus'dseveralSuits of Clothes, died after them, -and only before the lastSuit,whichhehadnottime towear$andtho' thisSuitfurviv'dtheMan,ifImay sospeak,yet we cannot say that the Man is weaker or less du rable than the Suit of Clothes. This Simile is nearenough,forastheMan istohisSuitofClothes, soistheSoultotheBody;andwhoeverappliesto theSoulandBodywhatissaidoftheManandhis SuitofClothes,willspeaktothepurpose. For he'll make the Soul more durable, and the Body a
weaker Being, and less capable to hold out for a long time. He'll add, that every Soul wears seve ralBodies,especiallyifitlivesseveralYears. For the Body wastes while the Man isyet alive, and
the
? ? ofthetmmmatity oftheSoul. 131
theSoulstillformstoitselfanewhabitofBody
out of the former that decays ; but when the lastJ*eW<<: comes todieithas thenitslastHabit on, anddiesa">mates*
beforeitsconsumption;andwhen theSoulis? ^"^_ dead,theBody quicklybetraystheweaknessofits^ Nature, since itcorruptsand mouldersaway very speedily. Sothatwecannotputsuchconfidencein
your Demonstration as to hold it for a standing Truth, that our Souls continues in being after Death. Forsupposing'tweregrantedthatourSoul has not only a Being antecedent to our Birth, but that,foranythingweknow,theSoulsofsomecon tinue in being after Death $ and that 'tis very pos sible they may return again to the World, and be born again, so to speak, several times, and die at last-, for the Strength and Advantage of the Soul beyond the Body consists in this, that itcan undergo several Births, and wear several Bodies one after ano ther, as a Man does Suits ofClothes : Supposing, I fay, that all this were granted, still it cannot be deniedbutthatinallthose repeatedBirthsitdecays and wastes,andatlastcomestoanendinoneof
theDeaths. However,'tisimpossibleforanyMan to discern in which of the Deaths 'tis totally funk :
Since Things stand thus, whoever does not fear
D e a t h , m u s t b e s e n f l e l s ? , u n l e s s h e c a n d e m o n s t r a t e r i m f e w i n ,
that the Soul is altogether Immortal and Incorrupti- iMtheSoul ble. For otherwise every dying Man must of tiers''"">? ?
cessitybe afraidforhisSoul, forfearlestthe Body -^'fST it is a quitting be its last Body, and lest it perish u;o>>. without any hopes of return.
Having heard 'em propose these Objections we Phedonr<<- were very much troubled, as we afterwards told^" th* sem? ,thatat atimewhenwe werejustconvinc'dJjj^J?
by Socrates's Arguments, they should come to amuse drefts him-
us with their Objections, and throw us into a fit of/ty" << ? - Unbelief and Jealousie, not only of all that had been checr4t^'
said to us by Socrates, but likewise of what he might say for the futurej for w e would always be apt to Believe that fither we' were hot proper Judges of
I i i the'
? ? ip
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
the Points in debate, or else that his Propositions were in themselves incredible.
Ecbec. Indeed Pbedon, Ican easilypardon your troubleuponthataccount. ForImy self,whileI heard you relate the Matter, was a saying to m y
self,whatshallwe believehereafter,sinceSocrates's Arguments, which seem'd so valid and convincing, are become doubtful and uncertain > In effect, that ObjectionofSimmias\ that theSoulisonlyaHar
mony, moves me wonderfully, and always did so. Itawakesinme thememoryofmybeingformerly
of the fame Opinion. So that my belief is un- hing'd? ,andIwant new Proofstoconvinceme that
theSouldoesnotdiewiththeBody. Wherefore,
prithe tell me Pbedon, in the Name ofGod, how
Socrates came off; whether he seem'd to be asmuch
n e t t l e d a s y o u -, o r , i f h e m a i n t a i n s h i s O p i n i o n w i t h h i s w o n t e d T e m p e r ? , a n d i n f i n e , w h e t h e r h i s
Demonstration gave you full satisfaction, orseem'd chargeable with Imperfections. Pray tell me the whole Story , without omitting the minutest Cir cumstance.
Phed. I protest to you, Ecbecrates, I admii'd So cratesallmy life-time,anduponthisoccasionad- mir'dhimmorethanever. . ThatsuchaMan ashe
had his Answers in a readiness, is no great surprisal;
butmy greatestadmirationwas tofeeinthefirst Socrates'* place with what Calmness, Patience and good Hu
Temper,
mour he receiv'd the Objections of these Young
Sweetness'stersjand thenhow dexterouslyheperceiv'dthe and Tati-
. Impression they had made upon us, and cur'd us ffutes. ofthefame. HerallieduslikeMenputroflight after a Defeat, and inlpir'd us with a fresh Ardor
to turn our Heads and renew the Charge. Ecbec. Howwasthat>
Phed. Iam abouttotellyou. AsIfateathis
Right-hand upon a little Stool lower than his, he drew his Hand over my Head, and taking hold of my Hair that hung down upon my Shoulders, as he was wont to do for his Diversion ; Pbedony fays
erncinDi
he
? ? osthe ImmortalityoftheSoul. 135
he, will not you cut this pretty Hair to morrow > Tis probableIshall,saidI. Ifyou takemy Ad vice, said he, you will not stay so long.
How do youmean? laidI. Bothyou 'Twasacustomamong
and I,continueshe,oughttocutour theGreekstocutofftheir
HairifourOpinionbesofardeadthat fwVfthe,defhof. thelr _ r. r ? r. friendsandthrowitinto
we cannotraiseitagain;wereIin,theTombs.
yourplaceanddefeated,Iwouldmake
aVow,(a)astheMen ofArgosdid,
nevertowearmyHairtillIconquers
I*fa ^ co- ? i^->>r theseArgumentsofSimmiasandCebes.
But, said I, Socrates you have forgot
the old Proverb, that Hercules himself isnotabletoengagetwo. Andwhy, Iolast0*&fihim"><<? >>?
fayshe,donotyoucallonmetoassist
youasyourlo/aswhile'tisyettime? AndaccordinglyIdocallonyou,said
I, not as Hercules did Iotas, but as lolas didHercules. Tisnomatterforthat,fayshe,'tis all one. Above all, let us be cautious to avoid one great Fault. What Fault, sard I > That, said b. e, of being Reason-haters ; for such
there are as well as Man-haters. The r? hate ^ T is,the
formeristhegreatestEvilintheWorld, *~* ? ? #'? ? and arises from the fame Source with #<<*<<.
the hatred of Man. For the latter
comes from one Man's plighting his m Manhatinggrows FaithforanotherMan,withoutanyPre- ) S s? *""*afin' cautionorEnquiry,whomhealways *mg'
took for a true-hearted, solid and trusty Man, but findshim at lasttobe afalse,faithlessCheat :And thus being cheated in several such Instances, by those whomhelook'duponashisbestFriends,andat last weary of being so often noos'd , he equally
{a) The Argiyes being routed by the Spartans, with w h o m they wag'd W a r for seising the City of Thyre3cnt their Hair, and swore solemnly never to suffer itto grow, till they hadre-takenthe Townthatbelong'dto'em;whichhap pensinthe57thOlympiad,whenCraefmwasbesieg'dat^r- dis, Htrodet. lib. u
-
.
Ii3 hates
The beliefoftheim-
TMon<<lity<<fthew,,i
{"Jr*Ff"&thatTM
oughttocutoffourHair whenitdies,
-<* Hercules called
5*frtheHjdra'
Le-mu ,_ afire.
? ? . j:j4 Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
hatesallMen, andisconvince! thereisnot onethat isnotWickedandPerfidious. Arenotyousensible, that this Man-hating is form'd at this rate by de grees > Yes, sure, said I. Is it not a great scandal
Bew1*> then,continuedhe,andasuperlativeCrimeto woM con- conversewith Men, without being acquainted with
wishMen3trieArt? ^tryingthemandknowing them? Forif
mghttobe one . were acquainted with this Arr, he would fee acquainted how Things stand,? and would find that the Good
vithtixartin& the wicked are very rare, but those in the tbeZ? m"S m^dle Region swarm ininfiniteNumbers. . -
How do you fay,Socrates?
The Ex- I fay, Pbedort, the Case of the good and bad is treamsofas. much thefamewith thatofverylargeorverylittle
Inclmmo" Men- ^o ^ot y? u ^ tnatthere's nothingmore andtixml-uncommon thana verybig oraverylittleMan ? d i u r n w r e - T h e C a s e is t h e f a m e w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o D o g s , H o r s e s , rycommon. amj a^ otj,er Things . anci mav likewise be apply'd
? ew Men
to swiftness and slowness, handsomnels and defor
mity, whiteness and blacknese. Are not you con-
vine'd^ that in all these Matters the two Extreams
are very uncommon, and the medium isvery com mon I . . -. :? '
I perceive it very plainly, Socrates.
jf a \iateh were propos'd for Wickedness, would
tZ'laft nottherebeveryfewthatcouldpretendtothe pitches firstRank> ? :. ''"'. ;- -V
wickedness. That's^very likely,Socrates. 'Tiscertainlyso,replieshe. Butuponthisscore,
the Case of Reason and Men is not exactly the V*protest&m& pn followyoustepbystep. Theonlyre-
fJinV"' fem? lanceofthetwoliesinthis,thatwhenaMan unskill'd in the Art of Examination, entertains a Heason as true, and afterwards finds it to be- false, whether it be so in it self or not ; and when the fame thing happens to him often, as indeed itdoes to those who amuse themselves in disputing with
the Sophisters that contradict every thing -, he at last believes himself to be extraordinary well skill'd, and fansies he's the only Man that has perceiv'd
that
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. 13 j
that there's nothing true or certain ei therinThingsorReasons,butthat ThosewhosansethatSo- all is like Eurypus , in a continual "ateyw . J? r? ,ttUfft
flux and reflux, and that nothing cor* . ZklSdZry'Thing Z
tinues so much as one Minute in the fame state.
That isthepureTruth,Socrates, \
Is it not then a very deplorable mis-
fortune, my dear Pbedon, that while therearetrue,certain,andverycom- prehensible Reasons , there should be
M e n found, w h o after they have suffer'd
call 'em again in question upon hearing these fri
volousDisputes,where sometimesTruthandsome
times Fahhood comes uppermost ? ,and instead of charging themselves with these Doubts, or blaming TbeFate? f
theirwant ofArt,casttheblameatlastuponthe^f^o Reasons themselves ; and being of a sowre Tern- difiJe'witb
per, pass their life in hating and calumniating allcrosand Reason, and by that means rob themselves -both cont<-aduto- o f T r u t h a n d K n o w l e d g e . ', r > M e n -
That's certainly a most deplorable thing,siid"I?
W e ought to be very cautious, continues he, that thismisfortunebenotourlot;andthatwearenot ? prepossess'd by this Thought, that, there's nothing. '. solid or true in all Arguments whatsoever. W e
should rather be persuaded that 'tis our selves w h o
arewantinginSolidityandTruth;and useourut-forthebe- mostEffortsto recoverthatSolidityandjustnessofl>4? fthe Thought. ThisisaDutyincumbentuponyou,wholntTMnfl? 1 ? . ;? 'i1. 1 ? r- 1oftheSoul
. havetimeyettolive;and likewise uponme whoi,>>stfiu
am about todie:AndIam much afraid,thatuponbothsorii- thisoccasion Ihave been so far from acting they'nSaml
Part of a true Philosopher, that I have behav'd m y ^ / - ^
self like a Disputant overborn with Prejudice; as"""
all those lgnorants do, who in their Disputes do ri,echara-
not.
mind the perception of-the Truth, but mean Ar o/. ,w onlytodraw theirHearersovertotheirOpinions. 'smrant
The only difference between them and me, is,that*"j^! ? '' convincing my Audience of the Truth ofwhat Ita>>t.
I i 4 advance
certain, may. undeceive themselves by reading this pw- ,
fe
cettZ\aU LyUpi- henfheseasons.
'em to pass,
? ? 136 Phedons Or, A Dialogue
advanceisnotmyonlyaim? ,Indeed,Ishallbein
finitely glad if that come to pals-, but m y chief scopeistopersuademy selfotthetruthofthese things;forIarguethus,my dearPkedon,andyou'll
Tinadvan-findthatthisway ofarguingishighlyuseful. If tapsre- ^ my Propositionsprovetrue,itiswelldone to
frlmthfbe-believethem;andifaftermy deaththeybefound luf of the false, I still reap that Advantage in this Life, that I immortalityhavebeenlessaffectedby theEvilswhichcommon- %mfa*L? ^ accomPany it- But I shall not remain long un-
tYbefaJfaderthisIgnorance. IfIwere,Ishouldreckonita great misfortune : But, by good luck, it will quick lybedispell'd. BeingfortifiedbytheseThoughts, mydearSimmiasandCebes,Imakeaccounttoan s w e r y o u r O b j e c t i o n s -, a n d i f y o u t a k e m y A d v i c e , you'll relie less upon the Authority of Socrates, than'thatoftheTruth. IfwhatIamaboutto a d v a n c e a p p e a r t r u e , e m b r a c e i t -y i f o t h e r w i s e , a t tack it with' all your force. Thus I shall neither deceive my self, nor impose upon you by the influ ence of 2eal and Goqd-will, or quit you like a Wasp that leaves its Sting in the Wound it has made.
jtshortk? - Tobeginthen,prayseeifIrememberrightwhat capitulationwasobjected. Simmias,asItakeit,rejectsourbe-
"obth*TM" *'e^> on'v because he fears our Souls, notwithstand- '. """' ing their being Divine and more Excellent , will
die before our Bodies, as being only a fort of Har mony. And Cebes, if I mistake not, granted that the Soul is more durable than the Body, but thinks it possible that the Soul, after having us'd several
(a) Ifthesearetrue, Iam agreatGainerwith littleTrou ble j if false, I lose nothing : O n the contrary, I have gain'd agreatdeal:ForbesidestheHopethatsupportedme through my Afflictions,Infirmitiesand Weaknesses, Ihavebeen faith ful, honest, humble , thankful, charitable, sincere and true,
and have only quitted false and contagious Pleasures in ex change for real. -nd solid ones. M. Tafcal in his\Art. 7. h^s enlarg'd upon this Truth, and back'd it wit! ) << Demonstra tionofinEr. it;force. ' \
Bodies*
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul t
i jj
Bodies,may dieatlastwhenitquitsthelastBody, ind that this death of the Soul is a true Death. Arenotthese the two PointsIam toexamine, my learSimmias and Cebes?
When they had all agteed that the Objections vere justly summ'd up ; he/ continued thus : D o rou absolutely rejectall that I have said, or do you icknowledgepartofittobetrue>They answer'd, Thattheydidnotrejectthewhole. Butwhat,says l e , i s y o u r O p i n i o n o f w h a t I t o l d y o u >? v i s . t h a t learning,isonlyRemembrance,andthatbyaneceC iry Consequence the Soul must have an Existence efbre itsconjunction with the Body.
As for me, replies Cebes, I perceiv'd the evidence fitatfirstview;and donotknow anyPrinciples f more certainty and-Truth. Iam of the fame 4ind, fays Simmias, and should think itvery strange :' e v e r I c h a n g ' d m y O p i n i o n .
.
But, my dear Tbeban, continuesSo- ? ates,youmustneedschangeit,if Somtesmakeso^ttie
onretainyourOpinionthatHarmony ggj %s ^
compounded, and that the Soul is Thoughts.
ilyafortofHarmony arisingfromthe leUnionoftheQualitiesoftheBo- ,^mmy cannotexist
r:For 'tispresum'dyouwouldnot g? * **--*** :lieveyourself,ifyousaidthatHar- * ?
ony has a Being before those Things of which it composU
Sure enough, repliesSimmias,Iwould notbelieve
7 self if I did.
D o not you see then, continues Socrates, that you
inotofapiecewithyourself,whenyousaythe
ulhadaBeingbeforeitcametoanimatetheBo-
,and at thefame time,thatitiscompounded ofForthere's
ings that had not then an Existence ? D o not you d'fi? rdin
nparetheSoultoaHarmony? Andisitnotevi-&J^'
it that the Harp, the Strings, 'and the very dis- 23s! Zd
dant Sounds exist before the Harmony, whichP>theyare
m Effectthatresultsfromallthese<<Things, and^-"^^ ishessooner thanthey? Does thislatterpartof"J, r"
irDiscoursesuitwiththefirst? * Not
? ? j38
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
Not atall,replies Simmias.
And yet,continuesSocrates,ifeveraDiscourse beallofapiece,itoughttobesuchwhenHarmo ny isitsSubject.
That's right, fays Simmias.
But yours is not so,continues Socrates. Let's hear then which of these two Opinions you side with : Whether is Learning only Remembrance, or istheSoulafortofHarmony?
I fide with the first, replies Simmias.
tcmfarifom (a)AndthatOpinionIhaveexplain'dtoyou, and similes without having any recourse to Demonstrations full ftfJsKU~ of Similes and Examples, which are rather colours
dml*' oftheTruth,andthereforepleasethePeoplebest; but as for me ,I am of Opinion that all Di scourses proving their Point by Similes, are full of vanity, and apt to seduce and deceive, unless one be very cautious, whether it relate to Geometry or any other Science : Whereas the Discourse I made for proving that Knowledge is Remembrance, isground ed upon a very creditable Hypothesis :For I told you that the Soul exists as well as its Essence before
itcomestoanimatetheBody. ByEssence1mean
(a) Marfilius Vicinal and de Serrts have strangely misunder stood this Passage, not only in making Simmiat speak all this ;
. -bnt what is more considerable, in putting a favourable Con struction on those words, v&ni <<xoV(C)- tivU x) 'eurpzWnf, which the one. renders, veristmitittantum-venustiqueexempli in-
*dicatione;andtheOther,txveristmiliquadam convenientiajand in separating the words Ivch Sro/^'/fsa*;whereas they are joyn'd;for'Socratesfays,/made thisDiscourse,withouthaving recourse to Demonfirations cramm'd with Similes and Colours' that t. dn:somuchwiththeTevfle. IneffectScordusdidnotibmuch as make life of one Comparison in makiroe good the Opinion
? ofRemembrance, WhereasSimmiashadbroughtintheCom parisonofa Harp to prove that theSoil}isa Harmony. N o w there's nothing misleads the Ignorant more than Simi litudes, for the Imagination is so feduc'd by the representa tion, that it blindly embraces all that presents it self to it. And by thatmeansthisOpinionofSimmias'sdidalwaysmeet withafavourablereception,anddoestothisdayamongthe Ignorant. ThisisaveryimportantPassage,anddefery'da larger Explication.
the
? ? of the Immortality os the Soul. 139
the Principle from which it derives its Being, which has no other name, but that whichts. And this Proof I take to be good and sufficient,
By that reason, lays Simmias, I must not listen ei therto my selfor others, who assertthe Soulto be a fort'of Harmony.
? In earnest Simmias, replies Socrates, do you think #***<<>>> that a Harmony, or any other Composure, can be %fijfij*j^ any thing different from the Parts of which it issratien? ilt
compounded ? fa composi- By no means, Socrates'. **>>>>j <<*?
Or can it do or suffer, what those Parts do not ? *jfcl"' not.
Simmias answefd, It could not. Then, says So
crates, a Harmony does not precede, but follows Harmmy "
theThings itiscomposedof. AnditcannothaveTMZ7y"Tits Sounds, Motions, or any thing else contrary tovans? ,hut itsParts. '? ' theSouiu
No sure, replies Simmias. But what, continuest0the* ^
Socrates, is not all Harmony only such in propor tion to the Concord of itsParts ?
I do not well understand you, fays Simmias.
I mean, according as the Parts have more or less ofConcord,theHarmonyismoreorleftaHarmo ny. Isitnot?
Yes, sure.
CanwelayoftheSoul,atthesamerate,thataj-st smalldifference makes aSoul tobemore orlessasJb,lmT Soul ? capableof
No, sure,Socrates. receiving Howisitthen,intheNameofGod? Do notleI'ormr''
w e fay, for Example, that such a Soul endow'd with Understanding and Vertue, is good -, and another filFd with Folly and Mischief, is wicked ? Is not thistight? .
Yes, sure, cjuoth Simmias.
But those who hokl. the Soul to be a Harmony, what willtheycalltheseQpalitiesoftheSoul,that Vice and that Vertue? Will they fay, the one's Harmony, and the other Discord ? That a vertuous
and good Soul,being Harmony initsNature, isen- ;' "- titled
? ? v.
titled to another Harmony ; and that a vicious wick ed Soul wants that additional Harmony.
I c a n n o t b e p o s i t i v e , r e p l i e s S i m m i a s t, b u t i n d e e d 'sisveryprobablethePatronsofthatOpinion may advancesome such thing.
But we concluded, that one Soul is not more or less a Soul than another ; that is, that it is not more or less a Harmony, than another Harmony.
I o w n it, fays Simmias.
Andsinceitisnotmore orlessaHarmonythen, ithasnotmoreorlessConcord. Isitnotso?
Yes, sure, Socrates.
And since it has not more or less of Concord ;
can one have more Harmony than another, or must
theHarmony of'emallbeequal? Questionless it must be equal.
s}nce one soui cannot be more or less a Soul
149
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
1 ? 'M Souls
^">>m? t*iananother,bythelamereasonitcannothave w t h is * >> r << P r e ? r l e f t o f C o n c o r d t h a n a n o t h e r .
absurdity. "That'strue.
Then it follows necessarily that one Soul cannot have' either more Harmony or more Discord than another ?
I agree to it.
And by consequence, since the Soul is of that Nature, it cannot have more Vertue or Vice than another -,if so be that Vice is Discord, and Vertue Harmony ?
That's a standing Truth, faysSimmias.
ifAtSoul Or,wouldnotrightReasonrathersaythatVice w e r e a H a r - c o u $ & f i n d n o p l a c e i n t h e S o u l , i f s o b e t h e S o u l is
ZZulZl Harmony ; for Harmony, continuing in its perfect, suchthmg'Nature, isnotcapableofDiscord?
asaVuious There'snoquestionofthat.
w- InlikemannertheSoul,whileperfectlya Soul,
is not capable of Vice.
According to the Principles we agreed upon, i
cannot fee how itfhou'd.
Froir
? ? of she Immortality of the Soil. 14 i
From the same very Principles, it will follow Tj*s<nd,0f that the Souls of all Animals are equally good, since *r*m
theyareequallySouls. J * ^
So I think, fays SimnHas. tJe ? it1* But do you think that it stands with right Rea- those <</?
son, if the Hypothesis of the Souls being a Harmo- Mn>
nybetrue?
No, sure, Socrates. ThenIaskyou,Simmias,ifofallthePartsof/? m**the
aMan, the Soulisnot bestentitledtoCommand,So>>icam- eipeciallywhen (heisPrudentandWise>>> m4ndsthe
There's no other Part can pretend to it. ? ? ? r
DoesitCommandby givingwaytothePassionsy^/^^ of the Body; or by resisting them > As for Exam- commands
pie, when the Body is seiz'd with Thirst in the cold tbe Har- Fit of a Fever, does not the Soul restrain it from mm>
drinking ? Or, when 'tis hungry, does it not re strain it from eating ? As well as in a thousand other Instances,which manifestly shew that the Soul curbsthePassionsoftheBody. Isitnotso?
Without question.
ButweagreedabovethattheSoulbeing asortofTi>eSoul Harmony , can never found contrary to the sound th^ts th'
ofthosethings which raise,orlower,ormoveitj^bX- nor have other Passions, different from those of its^uid, it
Parts-,and thatitisnecessarilyoblig'dtofollowcouldnot them, as being uncapable to guide them. do, ifit
'Tis certain we agreed upon that, fays Simmias :^ * How couldwe avoidit?
But,faysSocrate. iyisitnot evidentthattheCon duct of the Soul is the downright contrary ? That it governs and rules those very Things which are alledg'd for Ingredients in its Composition ; that it thwarts and attack's 'em almost all its life-time ;that is every way their Mistress, punishing and repres sing some by the harder measures of Pain, School- Exercises and Physick-, and treating others more gently, as contenting it-self with threatning or in filltingoveritsLusts,PassionandFear. In aword, w e iee the Soul speaks to the Body as something
of
? ? 14,2 Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
ofadifferent Nature from itself;which Homer was sensible of, when, in his Odyjses he HomerlTMwthatthe tellsthatUlyssesbeatinghisBreastsre-
HatureoftheSoulisdis- fatfj fa Hgart and said to z>, sup-
19thB>>okofhisOdyS- gainst harder and more difficultthings than these.
Do you think the Poet spoke that, under the
apprehensions of the Souls being a Harmony to be managed and conducted by the Body ? Or, do not
you rather believe that he knew, 'twas the Souls partto Command, andthatitisofa more Divine Nature than Harmony ?
Yes,Socrates;IswearIam persuadedHomer knew that Truth.
And by Consequence, my dear Simmias,continues
Socrates, there isnot the least Colour of Reason for t h e S o u l s b e i n g a H a r m o n y ? , s h o u l d w e a s s e r t i t t o
besuch,we shouldcontradictboth Homer,thatdi vinePoet,andlikewiseourselves. Simmiasyielded; and Socrates proceeded thus.
I think w e have sufficiently tempet'd and m o d e
rated this (a) Theban Harmony, so that itwill do
IvhyCebesusnoharm- ButCebes,howshallwedotoap- wascall'dpeafeand disarmthis(b)Cadmm? How shallwe
fieitem. hitonaDiscourse,dulyqualifiedwithapersuasive 1force ?
If you'll be at the pains, Socrates, you can easily ( find such a Discourse. The last you had against' the Harmony of the Soul, mov'd me mightily, and
(a)HecallsSimmias'sOpinionaTheban Harmony,alluding to the Fable of ^imfhion, who by the Harmony ot"his Harp built the Walls of Thebes. In like manner Simmias with his pretended Harmony rear'd up the humane Body.
(b) H e calls Cebes another Cadmus, because as Cadmus b y s o w ing the Teeth of the Dragon he had kill'd, fetch'd out of the Bosom or the Earth a Race of fierce Men that liv'd but one Minute : So Cebes by the Opinion os the Mortality of the Soul, a thing more poysonous than the Teeth of a Dragon, made allMen earthly and beastly,and left'embut a very short Life.
indeed
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. 145
indeed beyond my expectation :For when Simmlas propos'd his Doubts, I thought nothing short of a Prodigy or Miracle could solve 'em :And I was mightily surpris'd when I saw he could not stand yourfirstAttack. Sothatnowitwillbenosur- prisal to me to see Cadmus undergo the same fate.
M y dear Cebes, replies Socrates? 0 not you speak too big upon the matter, lest Envy should overturn all I have said, and render it useless and ineffectual* Butthat'sintheHandsofGod. Asforus,letus approach one another, as Homer fays, and try our StrengthandArms. Whatyouwantcomesallto this Point ; you would have the Immortality and Incorruptibility of the Soul demonstrated, to the end that a Philosopher, w h o dies bravely in the hopes of being infinitelymore happy in the other World than inthis,maynothopeinvain. Youfay,theSoul's being a durable and divine Substance, existing before
its joyning with the Body, does not conclude its Immortality-, and the only Inference that it will bear,is,thatitlastsagreat whilelonger,andwas inbeingmany Agesbeforeus,duringwhichitknew
and did several things ; but without Immortality :
For on the contrary, the first Minute of its descent intotheBody,istheCommencementofitsDeath;
or, as it were a Disease to it : For it passes this Life
in Anguish and Trouble, and at last is quite swal- low'dupandannihilatedby whatwecallDeath. You
add, that 'tis the fame thing, whether itanimatesThorewlii a Body only once, or returns to itseveral times,bdieyethe since that does not alter the occasion of our Fears, Mortality forasmuchasallwifeMen oughtstilltofearDeath,*? ***Smi>
while they are uncertain of the Immortality of|"fr'^? t/j
theirSouls. This,Itakeit,istheSummofwhatitsannibi-
you saidjand Irepeat itsooften,onpurpose,'<<*'*>><*<* that nothing may escape my view, and that yovlutikJ"*
,'7_? cjj- -? ? canstoffeat m a y h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y o r a d d i n g , o r i m p a i r i n g t0 Jal l 'w\rt
as you please. Mi>>. At present, says Cebes, I have nothing to alter :
That
? ? |44
Phedoft : 0ry A Dthlogm
That is the just Summ of all I have yet . said.
Socrates was silent, a pretty while , as being
drown'd in profound Meditation : At last, Cebes,
lays he, 'tis truly not a small matter that you de>
mand ; for in order to a just satisfaction, there's a
. necessityof making a narrow Enquiryintothecause
of Generation and Corruption. If you please I'l
tellyouwhat happen'dtomeuponthislamevery matter ? and if what I fay seem useful to you, you
shall be at liberty to make use of it to support your Sentiments.
With allmy heart,faysSimmias. <Praygweearthen,faysSocrates:InmyyouthI
SocratesinhaeLan insatiable desire to learn that Science, which tisyouth, iS caii'd Natural. Historyh for I thought it was
iWe/ *somethingGreatandDivinetoknowtheCausesof vhysicks. everything,oftheirGeneration,Death,andExistence. And I fpar'd no Pains, nor omitted any Means, for trying in the first place, if (a) a certain corruption ofhotand cold,will,assome pretend,,giveBeing and Nourishmentto Animals;ifthe. Bloodmakes
theThought;ifAiror Fire,,orthe Brain alone is
the cause of our Senses, of Seeing, Hearing, Smel
ling, &c. ifMemory and Opinion take their rise
from these Senses, and if Knowledge be the result
ofMemoryandOpinion.
