" But this
apparently pertains to the circumstance of time.
apparently pertains to the circumstance of time.
Summa Theologica
As
to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to
approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby
we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by
removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man
self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly,
because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the
words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To be meek is not
to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn our
evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and
have a clearer insight of the truth. "
Reply to Objection 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God
and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the
virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
neighbor's evils.
Reply to Objection 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and
clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation
of our neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For
piety relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior, for
instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil,
because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon it
as affecting oneself, as stated above ([3568]Q[30], A[2]): and this
results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the
same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to
vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far
as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.
__________________________________________________________________
OF ANGER (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to
meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning anger
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?
(2) Whether anger is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
(5) Of its species;
(6) Whether anger is a capital vice?
(7) Of its daughters;
(8) Whether it has a contrary vice?
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Whether it is lawful to be angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For
Jerome in his exposition on Mat. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his
brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without cause. ' However, in the
genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden
altogether. " Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.
Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's
evil is to be without reason. " Now anger is always without reason: for
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen
perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "when anger
sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by
its riot"; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): "From whatever
cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the
mind. " Therefore it is always evil to be angry.
Objection 3: Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle,
Rhet. ii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, "Thou shalt not hate
thy brother in thy heart. " Now it would seem unlawful to desire
vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Dt. 32:35,
"Revenge is Mine. " Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always
an evil.
Objection 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is
evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since God
judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be angry
is always an evil.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry without cause,
shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in
danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments
unstable, crimes unchecked. " Therefore to be angry is not always an
evil.
I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive
appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above
([3569]FS, Q[46], A[1]) when we were treating of the passions. Now with
regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may
be found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion's very
species, which is derived from the passion's object. Thus envy, in
respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at
another's good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason:
wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention
of envy denotes something evil. " Now this does not apply to anger,
which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well
and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the
passion's quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and
thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or
less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with
right reason, one's anger is deserving of praise.
Reply to Objection 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other
passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly
they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above
([3570]FS, Q[24], A[2] ) when we were treating of the passions. It is
in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger
whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing him
a wrong. ---But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion
Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of
the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be
moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not
always evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason.
First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its
rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly,
consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is
directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is
good, and is called "zealous anger. " Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v,
45): "We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of
virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead
of following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey. "
This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason
in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason.
Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger troubles the eye
of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it. " Nor is it incompatible with
virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution
of what reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its
act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while having
to act.
Reply to Objection 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as
evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire
vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to
this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto
by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order
of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to punish "is
God's minister," as stated in Rom. 13:4.
Reply to Objection 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire
for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our
desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the
movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v,
45) that "anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows
to the command of reason. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by
sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do we
incur blame thereby," as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no
passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above ([3571]FS,
Q[46], A[1]) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a
sin.
Objection 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable
good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a
person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as
Augustine asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger,
for a gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "The movement
of anger is not in our power. " Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic.
vii, 6) that "the angry man acts with displeasure. " Now displeasure is
contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Objection 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene
[*De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature to be
angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible;
wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach. ] that "to
be angry is the property of man. " Therefore it is not a sin to be
angry.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): "Let all indignation and
anger [*Vulg. : 'Anger and indignation'] . . . be put away from you. "
I answer that, Anger, as stated above [3572](A[1]), is properly the
name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so
far as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the
order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may
be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the
appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore
if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of
reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called "zealous
anger" [*Cf. Greg. , Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire the
taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of
reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not
deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order
prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of
justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will
be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.
Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in
relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of anger
should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally;
and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, even
though just vengeance be desired.
Reply to Objection 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not
regulated by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely
does not include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame.
But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and
deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by
reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "it is he who is angry in a
certain way, that is praised or blamed. "
Reply to Objection 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not
for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his
appetite turns as to a mutable good.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment
of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that
judgment, it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i. e. so
that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each one,
if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not
in man's power, to the extent namely that no such movement arise. Yet
since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely
sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the Philosopher that "the
angry man acts with displeasure," means that he is displeased, not with
his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done to himself:
and through this displeasure he is moved to seek vengeance.
Reply to Objection 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject
to his reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is
in accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is
contrary to man's nature.
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Whether all anger is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is
written (Job 5:2): "Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg. : 'Anger
indeed killeth the foolish']," and he speaks of the spiritual killing,
whence mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal
condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord
said (Mat. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in
danger of the judgment": and a gloss on this passage says that "the
three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and hell-fire,
signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state of eternal
damnation corresponding to various sins. " Therefore anger is a mortal
sin.
Objection 3: Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal
sin. Now anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares in
his commentary on Mat. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his brother,"
etc. where he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor.
Therefore anger is a mortal sin.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says:
"Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action. "
I answer that, The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful in
two ways, as stated above [3573](A[2]). First, on the part of the
appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger is
a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to
charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a
venial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfection
is considered either in relation to the subject desirous of vengeance,
as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of his reason; or
in relation to the desired object, as when one desires to be avenged in
a trifling matter, which should be deemed of no account, so that even
if one proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for instance
by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some other like action.
Secondly, the movement of anger may be inordinate in the mode of being
angry, for instance, if one be too fiercely angry inwardly, or if one
exceed in the outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal
sin in the point of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin,
for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a man fall away
from the love of God and his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: It does not follow from the passage quoted that
all anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually
by anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their
reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God or
by doing injury to their neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition
to the words of the Law: "Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of
the judgment" (Mat. 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of
the movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave
injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to
this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: In the case where anger is contrary to charity,
it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we
have said.
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Whether anger is the most grievous sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For
Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan. ] that "nothing is more repulsive
than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a ruthless*
face, and most of all than a cruel soul. " [*'Severo'. The correct text
is 'Si vero. ' The translation would then run thus . . . 'and nothing
uglier. ' And if his 'face is ugly, how much uglier is his soul! '].
Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would
seem to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing
is said to be evil because it hurts. " Now anger is most hurtful,
because it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself;
for Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan. ) that "anger differs in no
way from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome
than one harassed by a demon. " Therefore anger is the most grievous
sin.
Objection 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their
outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most
grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.
On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the beam;
for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger grow into hatred
and a mote become a beam. " Therefore anger is not the most grievous
sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3574]AA[1],2), the inordinateness of
anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an
undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to
the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the least
of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some person,
under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the part of the
evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those sins which
desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred; but while
hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such, and the envious man
desires another's evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man
desires another's evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore it
is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and envy than anger:
since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, than as a good; and to
desire evil as an external good such as honor or glory, than under the
aspect of the rectitude of justice. On the part of the good, under the
aspect of which the angry man desires an evil, anger concurs with the
sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this respect again,
absolutely speaking. the sin of anger is apparently less grievous than
that of concupiscence, according as the good of justice, which the
angry man desires, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which
is desired by the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "the incontinent in desire is more
disgraceful than the incontinent in anger. "
On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of
being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on account
of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to Prov. 27:4,
"Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: and who can bear
the violence of one provoked? " Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "The
heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles,
the tongue entangles itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged
and fail utterly to recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes
sounds indeed, but there is no sense in its utterance. "
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of
the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement
of anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than
from anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the
aspect of justice, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably
assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some
angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered" or
"stern. " According to him, a person is said to be "sullen" whose anger
"is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time.
" But this
apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems
that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the
other circumstances.
Objection 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or
"stern" persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge,
or punishment. " Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of
anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He
says (Mat. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in
danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca,
shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his
brother, "Thou fool. " But these degrees are not referable to the
aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger
is not fitting.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi] says
"there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger which is
called wrath [*'Fellea,' i. e. like gall. But in [3575]FS, Q[46], A[8],
St. Thomas quoting the same authority has {Cholos} which we render
'wrath']," and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind, and
"rancour. " Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid.
For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning and movement," and the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to "choleric" persons:
"ill-will" he describes as "an anger that endures and grows old," and
this the Philosopher ascribes to "sullenness"; while he describes
"rancour" as "reckoning the time for vengeance," which tallies with the
Philosopher's description of the "ill-tempered. " The same division is
given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid
division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.
I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the
passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when
treating of the passions ([3576]FS, Q[46], A[8]) how it is to be
applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly
what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, however, we have
to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin
of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.
For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two
things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards
"choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause.
Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger endures
too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the
cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too long in a
man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting
displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to himself. In
another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks
with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or "stern"
people, who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted
punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger,
or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration
in the aforesaid species.
Reply to Objection 2: Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a
long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person
has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he
holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the
outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he
of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear away
with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger of
"ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense
desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be
quelled only by revenge.
Reply to Objection 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not
refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course
of the human act [*Cf. [3577]FS, Q[46], A[8], OBJ[3]]. For the first
degree is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says:
"Whosoever is angry with his brother. " The second degree is when the
anger is manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into
effect; and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his
brother, Raca! " which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is when
the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the effect of
anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of
hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to
this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou fool! "
Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first, and the
third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal sin, in the
case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A[3], ad 2), much more
so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is assigned as
corresponding to each one of them. In the first case "judgment" is
assigned, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine says [*Serm.
Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be delivered, there is an
opportunity for defense": in the second case "council" is assigned,
"whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be
inflicted": to the third case is assigned "hell-fire," i. e. "decisive
condemnation. "
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Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the
capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known
by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital
vice.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it
should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, "An angry [Douay:
'passionate'] man provoketh quarrels," says: "Anger is the door to all
vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the virtues; if
it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime. " Now no capital vice
is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore
anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the
capital vices.
I answer that, As stated above ([3578]FS, Q[84], A[3],4), a capital
vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two
reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on the
part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so
far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*, which is
attractive by its excellence, as stated above [3579](A[4]). [*Honesty
must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral
goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q[145], A[1]]. The
second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the
mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident that
anger is a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the
most part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results
from an injury inflicted.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[118], A[7]; Q[148], A[5];
Q[153], A[4]; [3580]FS, Q[84], A[4]), it belongs to the notion of a
capital vice to have a most desirable end, so that many sins are
committed through the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil
under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has,
since the latter desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger
is more a capital vice than hatred is.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices
accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the
judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however,
directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called its
daughters.
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Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned
to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor,
indignation and blasphemy. " For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore [*QQ.
in Deut. , qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride. Therefore it should not
be accounted a daughter of anger.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his
rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of
anger.
Objection 3: Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as
pride. Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of all
vices," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the
mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to
anger.
I answer that, Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as
consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. one is on
the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems
unworthy [indignum] of acting thus towards him, and this is called
"indignation. " The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so
far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like
thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, "Will a wise man . . .
fill his stomach with burning heat? " And thus we have "swelling of the
mind. "
Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a
twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his
anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A[5], ad 3) of the man
who says to his brother, "Raca": and this refers to "clamor," which
denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a
man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against God, it is
"blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely. "
Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger
gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand all manner of
injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.
Reply to Objection 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out
deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up
against God: since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the
pride of man is to fall off from God," i. e. to fall away from reverence
for Him is the first part of pride [*Cf. [3581] Q[162], A[7], ad 2]; and
this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks
out through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.
Reply to Objection 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it
has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely
displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now
through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to
hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from
sloth rather than from anger.
Reply to Objection 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as
identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to
take vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that there. is not a vice opposed to anger,
resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now by
being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges
"with tranquillity" (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice
to be altogether without anger.
Objection 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether
useless. But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca
proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq. ). Therefore it
seems that lack of anger is not a vice.
Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "man's
evil is to be without reason. " Now the judgment of reason remains
unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of
anger amounts to a vice.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who is
not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience
is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not
only the wicked but even the good to do wrong. "
I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a
simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not
through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus
without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger
is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth. ,
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom):
"Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger,
properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion": and when a man is
angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: wherefore he is
said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a
movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with passion resulting
from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in
man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily
follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an
obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot
be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether
lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a
vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment
by the judgment of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought
to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's
punishing by judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of
the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more
prompt execution [*Cf. [3582]FS, Q[24], A[3]] of reason's dictate:
else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas
"nature does nothing without purpose" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].
Reply to Objection 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his
reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of
the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just
as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so
the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CRUELTY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For
Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel who
exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is
reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): "They are cruel, and
will have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now
mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above ([3583]Q[157], A[4],
ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
Objection 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of
punishment, as stated above ([3584]Q[157], A[1]): whereas cruelty
applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17,
"But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred. " Therefore
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the opposite of
clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in
exacting punishment. "
I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from "cruditas"
[rawness]. Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have
an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and
bitter taste. Now it has been stated above ([3585]Q[157], A[3], ad 1;
A[4], ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of
soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. Hence cruelty is
directly opposed to clemency.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate
punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which
inclines one to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing,
as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards
the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment,
belongs to cruelty.
Reply to Objection 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun
and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For it
belongs to mercy [*Cf. [3586] Q[30], A[1]] to relieve another's
unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to
mitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And
since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more
directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the
mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for
mercilessness.
Reply to Objection 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which
is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of
beneficence is in itself a punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?
Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or
brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue.
Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess.
Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it
were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without
attending to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that
mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by
piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A[1], ad 1).
Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.
Objection 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by
way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency,
which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to
the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency
is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity.
For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there be love, but not that which
enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal
without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency. "
Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who is
angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not
said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage. "
I answer that, "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a
likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals
of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for
some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason
alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to
those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the
person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's
torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under
bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial, and
resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature,
as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only
regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of
punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as
human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.
Reply to Objection 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly
opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But
savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is
directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which
according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift
of piety.
Reply to Objection 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage,
because this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards
the truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is not
inclined to mitigate punishment.
to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to
approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby
we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by
removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man
self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly,
because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the
words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To be meek is not
to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn our
evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and
have a clearer insight of the truth. "
Reply to Objection 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God
and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the
virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
neighbor's evils.
Reply to Objection 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and
clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation
of our neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For
piety relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior, for
instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil,
because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon it
as affecting oneself, as stated above ([3568]Q[30], A[2]): and this
results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the
same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to
vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far
as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.
__________________________________________________________________
OF ANGER (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to
meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning anger
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?
(2) Whether anger is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
(5) Of its species;
(6) Whether anger is a capital vice?
(7) Of its daughters;
(8) Whether it has a contrary vice?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful to be angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For
Jerome in his exposition on Mat. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his
brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without cause. ' However, in the
genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden
altogether. " Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.
Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's
evil is to be without reason. " Now anger is always without reason: for
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen
perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "when anger
sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by
its riot"; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): "From whatever
cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the
mind. " Therefore it is always evil to be angry.
Objection 3: Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle,
Rhet. ii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, "Thou shalt not hate
thy brother in thy heart. " Now it would seem unlawful to desire
vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Dt. 32:35,
"Revenge is Mine. " Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always
an evil.
Objection 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is
evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since God
judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be angry
is always an evil.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry without cause,
shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in
danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments
unstable, crimes unchecked. " Therefore to be angry is not always an
evil.
I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive
appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above
([3569]FS, Q[46], A[1]) when we were treating of the passions. Now with
regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may
be found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion's very
species, which is derived from the passion's object. Thus envy, in
respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at
another's good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason:
wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention
of envy denotes something evil. " Now this does not apply to anger,
which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well
and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the
passion's quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and
thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or
less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with
right reason, one's anger is deserving of praise.
Reply to Objection 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other
passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly
they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above
([3570]FS, Q[24], A[2] ) when we were treating of the passions. It is
in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger
whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing him
a wrong. ---But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion
Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of
the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be
moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not
always evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason.
First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its
rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly,
consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is
directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is
good, and is called "zealous anger. " Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v,
45): "We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of
virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead
of following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey. "
This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason
in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason.
Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger troubles the eye
of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it. " Nor is it incompatible with
virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution
of what reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its
act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while having
to act.
Reply to Objection 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as
evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire
vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to
this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto
by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order
of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to punish "is
God's minister," as stated in Rom. 13:4.
Reply to Objection 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire
for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our
desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the
movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v,
45) that "anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows
to the command of reason. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by
sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do we
incur blame thereby," as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no
passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above ([3571]FS,
Q[46], A[1]) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a
sin.
Objection 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable
good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a
person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as
Augustine asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger,
for a gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "The movement
of anger is not in our power. " Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic.
vii, 6) that "the angry man acts with displeasure. " Now displeasure is
contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.
Objection 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene
[*De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature to be
angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible;
wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach. ] that "to
be angry is the property of man. " Therefore it is not a sin to be
angry.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): "Let all indignation and
anger [*Vulg. : 'Anger and indignation'] . . . be put away from you. "
I answer that, Anger, as stated above [3572](A[1]), is properly the
name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so
far as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the
order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may
be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the
appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore
if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of
reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called "zealous
anger" [*Cf. Greg. , Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire the
taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of
reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not
deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order
prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of
justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will
be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.
Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in
relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of anger
should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally;
and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, even
though just vengeance be desired.
Reply to Objection 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not
regulated by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely
does not include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame.
But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and
deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by
reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "it is he who is angry in a
certain way, that is praised or blamed. "
Reply to Objection 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not
for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his
appetite turns as to a mutable good.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment
of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that
judgment, it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i. e. so
that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each one,
if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not
in man's power, to the extent namely that no such movement arise. Yet
since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely
sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the Philosopher that "the
angry man acts with displeasure," means that he is displeased, not with
his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done to himself:
and through this displeasure he is moved to seek vengeance.
Reply to Objection 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject
to his reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is
in accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is
contrary to man's nature.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all anger is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is
written (Job 5:2): "Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg. : 'Anger
indeed killeth the foolish']," and he speaks of the spiritual killing,
whence mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal
condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord
said (Mat. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in
danger of the judgment": and a gloss on this passage says that "the
three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and hell-fire,
signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state of eternal
damnation corresponding to various sins. " Therefore anger is a mortal
sin.
Objection 3: Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal
sin. Now anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares in
his commentary on Mat. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his brother,"
etc. where he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor.
Therefore anger is a mortal sin.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says:
"Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action. "
I answer that, The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful in
two ways, as stated above [3573](A[2]). First, on the part of the
appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger is
a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to
charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a
venial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfection
is considered either in relation to the subject desirous of vengeance,
as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of his reason; or
in relation to the desired object, as when one desires to be avenged in
a trifling matter, which should be deemed of no account, so that even
if one proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for instance
by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some other like action.
Secondly, the movement of anger may be inordinate in the mode of being
angry, for instance, if one be too fiercely angry inwardly, or if one
exceed in the outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal
sin in the point of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin,
for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a man fall away
from the love of God and his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: It does not follow from the passage quoted that
all anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually
by anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their
reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God or
by doing injury to their neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition
to the words of the Law: "Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of
the judgment" (Mat. 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of
the movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave
injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to
this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: In the case where anger is contrary to charity,
it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we
have said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger is the most grievous sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For
Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan. ] that "nothing is more repulsive
than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a ruthless*
face, and most of all than a cruel soul. " [*'Severo'. The correct text
is 'Si vero. ' The translation would then run thus . . . 'and nothing
uglier. ' And if his 'face is ugly, how much uglier is his soul! '].
Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would
seem to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing
is said to be evil because it hurts. " Now anger is most hurtful,
because it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself;
for Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan. ) that "anger differs in no
way from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome
than one harassed by a demon. " Therefore anger is the most grievous
sin.
Objection 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their
outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most
grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.
On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the beam;
for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger grow into hatred
and a mote become a beam. " Therefore anger is not the most grievous
sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3574]AA[1],2), the inordinateness of
anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an
undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to
the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the least
of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some person,
under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the part of the
evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those sins which
desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred; but while
hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such, and the envious man
desires another's evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man
desires another's evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore it
is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and envy than anger:
since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, than as a good; and to
desire evil as an external good such as honor or glory, than under the
aspect of the rectitude of justice. On the part of the good, under the
aspect of which the angry man desires an evil, anger concurs with the
sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this respect again,
absolutely speaking. the sin of anger is apparently less grievous than
that of concupiscence, according as the good of justice, which the
angry man desires, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which
is desired by the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "the incontinent in desire is more
disgraceful than the incontinent in anger. "
On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of
being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on account
of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to Prov. 27:4,
"Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: and who can bear
the violence of one provoked? " Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "The
heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles,
the tongue entangles itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged
and fail utterly to recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes
sounds indeed, but there is no sense in its utterance. "
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of
the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement
of anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than
from anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the
aspect of justice, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably
assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some
angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered" or
"stern. " According to him, a person is said to be "sullen" whose anger
"is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time.
" But this
apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems
that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the
other circumstances.
Objection 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or
"stern" persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge,
or punishment. " Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of
anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He
says (Mat. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in
danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca,
shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his
brother, "Thou fool. " But these degrees are not referable to the
aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger
is not fitting.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi] says
"there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger which is
called wrath [*'Fellea,' i. e. like gall. But in [3575]FS, Q[46], A[8],
St. Thomas quoting the same authority has {Cholos} which we render
'wrath']," and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind, and
"rancour. " Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid.
For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning and movement," and the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to "choleric" persons:
"ill-will" he describes as "an anger that endures and grows old," and
this the Philosopher ascribes to "sullenness"; while he describes
"rancour" as "reckoning the time for vengeance," which tallies with the
Philosopher's description of the "ill-tempered. " The same division is
given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid
division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.
I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the
passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when
treating of the passions ([3576]FS, Q[46], A[8]) how it is to be
applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly
what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, however, we have
to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin
of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.
For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two
things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards
"choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause.
Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger endures
too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the
cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too long in a
man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting
displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to himself. In
another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks
with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or "stern"
people, who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted
punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger,
or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration
in the aforesaid species.
Reply to Objection 2: Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a
long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person
has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he
holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the
outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he
of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear away
with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger of
"ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense
desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be
quelled only by revenge.
Reply to Objection 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not
refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course
of the human act [*Cf. [3577]FS, Q[46], A[8], OBJ[3]]. For the first
degree is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says:
"Whosoever is angry with his brother. " The second degree is when the
anger is manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into
effect; and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his
brother, Raca! " which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is when
the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the effect of
anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of
hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to
this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou fool! "
Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first, and the
third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal sin, in the
case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A[3], ad 2), much more
so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is assigned as
corresponding to each one of them. In the first case "judgment" is
assigned, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine says [*Serm.
Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be delivered, there is an
opportunity for defense": in the second case "council" is assigned,
"whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be
inflicted": to the third case is assigned "hell-fire," i. e. "decisive
condemnation. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the
capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known
by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital
vice.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it
should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, "An angry [Douay:
'passionate'] man provoketh quarrels," says: "Anger is the door to all
vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the virtues; if
it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime. " Now no capital vice
is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore
anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the
capital vices.
I answer that, As stated above ([3578]FS, Q[84], A[3],4), a capital
vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two
reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on the
part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so
far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*, which is
attractive by its excellence, as stated above [3579](A[4]). [*Honesty
must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral
goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q[145], A[1]]. The
second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the
mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident that
anger is a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the
most part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results
from an injury inflicted.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[118], A[7]; Q[148], A[5];
Q[153], A[4]; [3580]FS, Q[84], A[4]), it belongs to the notion of a
capital vice to have a most desirable end, so that many sins are
committed through the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil
under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has,
since the latter desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger
is more a capital vice than hatred is.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices
accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the
judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however,
directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called its
daughters.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned
to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor,
indignation and blasphemy. " For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore [*QQ.
in Deut. , qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride. Therefore it should not
be accounted a daughter of anger.
Objection 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his
rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of
anger.
Objection 3: Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as
pride. Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of all
vices," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the
mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to
anger.
I answer that, Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as
consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. one is on
the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems
unworthy [indignum] of acting thus towards him, and this is called
"indignation. " The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so
far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like
thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, "Will a wise man . . .
fill his stomach with burning heat? " And thus we have "swelling of the
mind. "
Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a
twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his
anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A[5], ad 3) of the man
who says to his brother, "Raca": and this refers to "clamor," which
denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a
man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against God, it is
"blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely. "
Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger
gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand all manner of
injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.
Reply to Objection 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out
deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up
against God: since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the
pride of man is to fall off from God," i. e. to fall away from reverence
for Him is the first part of pride [*Cf. [3581] Q[162], A[7], ad 2]; and
this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks
out through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.
Reply to Objection 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it
has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely
displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now
through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to
hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from
sloth rather than from anger.
Reply to Objection 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as
identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to
take vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that there. is not a vice opposed to anger,
resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now by
being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges
"with tranquillity" (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice
to be altogether without anger.
Objection 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether
useless. But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca
proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq. ). Therefore it
seems that lack of anger is not a vice.
Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "man's
evil is to be without reason. " Now the judgment of reason remains
unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of
anger amounts to a vice.
On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who is
not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience
is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not
only the wicked but even the good to do wrong. "
I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a
simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not
through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus
without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger
is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth. ,
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom):
"Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger,
properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion": and when a man is
angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: wherefore he is
said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a
movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with passion resulting
from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in
man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily
follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an
obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot
be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether
lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a
vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment
by the judgment of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought
to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's
punishing by judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of
the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more
prompt execution [*Cf. [3582]FS, Q[24], A[3]] of reason's dictate:
else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas
"nature does nothing without purpose" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].
Reply to Objection 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his
reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of
the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just
as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so
the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CRUELTY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?
Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For
Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel who
exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is
reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): "They are cruel, and
will have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now
mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above ([3583]Q[157], A[4],
ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
Objection 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of
punishment, as stated above ([3584]Q[157], A[1]): whereas cruelty
applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17,
"But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred. " Therefore
cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the opposite of
clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in
exacting punishment. "
I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from "cruditas"
[rawness]. Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have
an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and
bitter taste. Now it has been stated above ([3585]Q[157], A[3], ad 1;
A[4], ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of
soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. Hence cruelty is
directly opposed to clemency.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate
punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which
inclines one to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing,
as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards
the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment,
belongs to cruelty.
Reply to Objection 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun
and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For it
belongs to mercy [*Cf. [3586] Q[30], A[1]] to relieve another's
unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to
mitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And
since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more
directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the
mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for
mercilessness.
Reply to Objection 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which
is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of
beneficence is in itself a punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?
Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or
brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue.
Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess.
Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it
were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without
attending to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that
mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by
piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A[1], ad 1).
Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.
Objection 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by
way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency,
which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to
the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency
is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity.
For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there be love, but not that which
enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal
without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency. "
Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.
On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who is
angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not
said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage. "
I answer that, "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a
likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals
of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for
some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason
alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to
those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the
person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's
torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under
bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial, and
resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature,
as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only
regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of
punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as
human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.
Reply to Objection 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly
opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But
savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is
directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which
according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift
of piety.
Reply to Objection 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage,
because this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards
the truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is not
inclined to mitigate punishment.
