No More Learning

Mainville therefore carried
the war into Tanjore and the Pudukottai country; but achieved no
more than fruitless raids, as the enemy declined action. Moreover, the
conduct of Mysore gave rise to grave anxiety. By failing to pay the
promised sums, Nandi Raja was exposing the French commander to
the danger of finding himself one pay-day deserted by his troops.
Mainville was thus busier soothing the discontent of his own men
than attacking the enemy. He could never rely on the morrow. The
coalition was evidently breaking up. Nandi Raja talked of returning
to Mysore; and in June Morari Rao quitted the French camp though
he did not positively break with them. Mainville met all these diffi-
culties with great firmness, and, like Dupleix, never despaired of
taking Trichinopoly, when news came that Godeheu had landed at
Pondichery on 1 August.
That meant the recall of Dupleix and the reversal of his policy.
Godeheu replaced Mainville, whom he thought over-anxious to
continue the war, by Maissin, less self-willed and more pacific. Soon
after he concluded a truce, followed by a provisional peace, which
ruined all French hopes in the Carnatic. But the whole of Dupleix's
policy was not condemned. As we shall see, in spite of their desire
for peace, neither the Company nor the ministry at Paris was willing
to sacrifice the decisive advantages that had been obtained in the
Deccan. But before turning to that region, in which the French
fortunes had shone with their greatest lustre, we will attempt to


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CAUSES OF DUPLEIX'S FAILURE
133
disengage in a few lines the causes of Dupleix's failure in the Carnatic.
It has been seen that Dupleix espoused the cause of Chanda Sahib
and Muzaffar Jang without consulting the Company, convinced
doubtless that it would not authorise him any more than his prede-
cessors to engage in the politics of the country. Swift success would
have relieved him from the necessity of embarrassing explanations.
And when he saw that event deferred, he concealed the facts by
saying that the war cost nothing and would leave plenty of money
free for the purposes of trade. The French Company, though with
some scepticism, accepted these roseate prophecies, and sent no money,
since Dupleix asked for none. But finance was his stumbling-block
from first to last. His reverses, which began in September, 1751,
prevented the collection of the revenues he had reckoned on; and he
was hard put to it to maintain his army. Each month he could only
just secure enough to prevent his troops from disbanding. To meet
these urgent needs he used over £350,000 of his own money and that
of his friends. It was not, however, lack of money alone that hind-
ered his success; in this respect the English were not much better off
than he. What ruined him was his excessive belief in the justice of
his cause. Full of the belief that, as Muhammad 'Ali was a rebel, the
English government could not support him, he really thought that
the English Company would disavow Saunders and leave him free
to carry out his policy. All his letters show a confidence that is almost
disconcerting. ' He should have remembered that men do not sacrifice
too much to theory and ideals, and that, in view of their threatened
trade, the English were justified in resisting his plans. Trusting too
much to legal formulas, he did not accommodate himself to the facts;
and, while he displayed marvellous skill in negotiating with Indian
princes, in his relations with the English he showed an unaccommo-
dating spirit which did much to provoke opposition in Europe quite
as much as in India.
Whether the Company ought to have supported him is quite
another matter. In truth it could not do so without understanding
his plans; but Dupleix, who at first had perhaps been uncertain of
being able to carry them through, began by half-concealing them,
and did not until 16 October, 1753, formally expound the advantages
of possessing extensive territories in India, yielding a fixed, constant
and abundant revenue that would relieve the Company from sending
funds. But when he was developing this doctrine, which till then he
had only sketched, Godeheu already was about to embark for India.
No doubt if the Company had entered into the ideas of Dupleix, it
could have established at the necessary cost in men and money the
empire which he hoped to found; but besides the hesitation always
felt before novel and daring ideas-ignoti nulla cupido—the Company,
1 Dupleix to Saunders, 16 February, 1752 (French Correspondence, 1752,
pp. 1-41).


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134
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
or rather the king, had other motives for caution. Disputes were
already arising between French and English on the Ohio and Missis-
sippi; the preservation of that region seemed more important than
hypothetical conquests in India, and this constituted another motive
for not endangering the peace for the sake of Asiatic domains which
after four years of war Dupleix had not succeeded in subduing. And
if a more distant future is taken into consideration, perhaps the king
and Company were right.
But in the Deccan affairs wore a different appearance. Peace is
usually discussed on the basis of accomplished facts, not of those hopes
which the war has either destroyed or realised. The French position
at Hyderabad was too strong in 1754 for the English to insist on the
ruin of Bussy's work, however much they might desire it. I have
already mentioned the terms on which Dupleix had lent his help to
Muzaffar Jang; by protecting the legitimate ruler of South India, he
hoped above all to secure the rights he had acquired in the Carnatic.
Bussy's activities did not lead to direct competition with the English;
but his achievements are too important to be neglected. When shortly.
after setting out a conspiracy of dissatisfied nawabs cost Muzaffar
Jang his life (14 February, 1751), Bussy's prompt action avoided any
break in the succession and danger to públic order; Salabat Jang,
uncle of the dead prince and brother of Nasir Jang, was recognised as
subahdar; but he needed even more than his predecessor the support
of French troops to establish his power, thus born of disorder, and
Bussy, who was to have gone only to Hyderabad, in the centre of the
Deccan, accompanied him to Aurangabad at its extremity. There he
was more than 900 miles from Pondichery. It was a magnificent raid,
accomplished with hardly a shot. From the first Bussy had under-
stood how to manage Indian princes, showing due deference and
doing nothing without permission. His manners gave no hint of his
power; he never seemed to despise the weak or the vanquished. In
his hand was armed force; but he always thought that gentleness was
better than severity, negotiation than battle, human life than the
laurel of victory. As he himself said, he was more of a statesman than
a soldier; he was a born diplomatist. But his resolutions were firm,
his action bold. When a decision had to be taken, Bussy saw straight
to the heart of things, and carried his purpose into effect though
without brutality or offence. More than anything else these rare and
happy talents established French supremacy at Hyderabad, which
reacted on the work of Dupleix by setting up a counterpoise to those
sometimes unlucky but always indecisive events of the Carnatic.
Dupleix could not sufficiently express his gratitude to his lieutenant.
Most of his letters to Bussy are full of thanks and admiration. In order
to cement the friendship and confidence between them, Dupleix had
hoped to marry Bussy to one of his wife's daughters familiarly known
as Chonchon; they were actually betrothed; but Bussy's remoteness
and Dupleix's sudden departure prevented the completion of the


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AFFAIRS IN THE DECCAN
135
· marriage. Thus the administration of affairs in the Deccan was pecu-
liar, being treated on both sides as a family business quite as much as
an affair of state. Bussy, however, was independent enough not to
approve blindly all the projects of Dupleix, and he could oppose them
when they sacrificed too much to ideals or conflicted too sharply
with facts.
After the French reached Aurangabad (18 June), Dupleix dreamt
for a moment of pushing his successes in the north, and planned by
Bussy's means to place Salabat Jang at the head of the subah of
Bengal. He would thus have dominated the greater part of India.
But, just when this bold plan was to have been put into action, the
Marathas attacked the Deccan, and Bussy had to march against them.
In less than a month he had driven them back; a night attack on
4 December, which threw the enemy into confusion, has become
famous. Balaji Rao, the Peshwa, at once entered into negotiations,
and peace was made at Ahmadnagar, 17 January, 1752. Dupleix then
thought of bringing a part of the subahdar's troops against Trichi-
nopoly, and Bussy was to co-operate by attacking Mysore in the rear.
But the diwan Ramdas Pandit, who was murdered at that time
(4 May), proved to have been in communication with Muhammad
'Ali and the English; and it was believed that the nobles, no longer
fearing the Marathas, were seeking the expulsion of the French. The
subahdar, whose influence was small, alone was interested in keeping
them. Bussy was inclined to recognise this state of things by aban-
doning the Deccan. What use could be made of people so ungrateful
and a prince so powerless? Dupleix thought otherwise. To him the
Deccan meant the protection of his rights and authority; and he
implored Bussy not to forsake the work which he had begun. At this
moment news arrived that Ghazi-ud-din, the eldest son of Nizam-
ul-mulk and holding high office at Delhi, was claiming his father's
territories and marching thither with a large army and the expecta-
tion of support from Balaji Rao. Bussy remained to encounter this
invasion; but had no need of fighting. Ghazi-ud-din was poisoned by
one of his father's wives, and Salabat Jang's throne was thus secured:
But that prince was always exposed to underhand attacks from his
nobles, who disliked his dependence on the French. The new diwan,
Saiyid Lashkar Khan, constantly intrigued against Bussy's influence,
and had agreed with Balaji Rao in some mysterious plan in which
the interests of his master can have had little part. Bussy, who
followed closely all these Indian intrigues, succeeded in avoiding a
new war which in November was on the point of breaking out with
the Marathas, and having, under the guise of mediator, come to terms
on his own account with Balaji Rao, he prepared to enter Mysore in
order to assist in Dupleix's plans against Trichinopoly; but now he
was checked by the refusal of the subahdar's troops to move; they
Duplex to Bussy, 4 August, 1751 (Archieves de Versailles; E 3738).


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136
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
were tired of fighting without pay; no advance was possible and the
army fell back on Aurangabad. Bussy then renewed his proposals to
quit the Deccan and offered his resignation. Ghazi-ud-din was dead,
the disputes with the Marathas settled, and the French could with-
draw with honour. Dupleix did not have time to answer these
proposals. Bussy had scarcely written before he fell seriously ill; and
decided to retire to Masulipatam to recover his health (February,
1753). He had not intended to return; but Dupleix's appeals to his
affections and his patriotism decided him to continue their common
work, and he came back in the following May.
During his absence affairs had gone grievously wrong. Goupil,
who had succeeded to the command, had been overpersuaded by
Saiyid Lashkar Khan to divide his troops, the smaller part remaining
with the subahdar at Aurangabad, and the rest being scattered over
the country, after the Muslim fashion, to collect the revenues. The
object was to make them hated; and then they were to be ordered
to leave the country. In this passive position the saiyid was encour-
aged by Saunders, who was prevented by the state of the Carnatic
from playing a more active part. On his arrival at Hyderabad Bussy
restored order, and, as the need of money was almost as great as in the
Carnatic, he skilfully arranged that each governor was to pay his
share towards the maintenance of the troops. He then secured an
invitation from the subahdar himself to proceed to Aurangabad,
where he arrived at the end of November. There he laid down his
terms, and obtained a personal grant of four sarkars—Mustafanagar,
Ellore, Rajahmundry, and Chicacole—for the payment of his troops,
so that he should have to make no more demands on the subahdar
or his officials. The revenues of these districts were reckoned at
thirty-one lakhs of rupees; whereas the cost of the army was twenty-
five and a half lakhs a year. This was a masterly stroke. Bussy ceased
to be at the mercy of the subahdar and his ministers and, having
secured the grant in his own name for a specific purpose, he was able
to tell the Dutch and English that nothing had been changed in that
part of India and that the French had no more than they had had
before, although through his control the sarkars had really passed into
the hands of the French Company. The English at Ingeram and
Vizagapatam did their best to annul the effects of these grants, by
making friends with discontented renters and governors, especially
with Ja'far 'Ali, governor of Rajahmundry; but they lacked the means
of offering a serious opposition.
Bussy consolidated his advantages by reforming the ministry.
Saiyid Lashkar Khan was replaced by Shah Nawaz Khan, and the
principal posts were filled by nobles friendly to the French. Trouble
with Raghuji Bhonsle in Berar (March-April, 1754) was quickly
settled, and then, feeling himself secure, he set out for the new pro-
a
1 Réfutation des faits imputés au sieur Godeheu, pp. 41-9.


## p. 137 (#165) ############################################

BUSSY'S SUCCESSES
137
vinces, of whose revenues he had never had greater need. He had to
maintain 900 Europeans and 4000 sepoys.
Arriving at Bezwada, 5 July, Bussy was about to start for Chica-
cole when he learnt of the arrival of Godeheu at Pondichery. He had
been expecting this for six weeks, and, although he felt a certain
anxiety, he was not unduly alarmed. Dupleix and Godeheu had been
very friendly of old, when in 1738 the latter had visited Chandernagore.
Let us pause to consider the affairs of the Deccan which till then
had developed in accordance with French interests, because Dupleix
had entrusted them to a man of consummate capacity and wisdom.
He himself declared that had he had another Bussy in the Carnatic,
affairs there would have gone quite differently. It was not, perhaps,
extraordinary that the little French army should have reached
Aurangabad without difficulty; but it was extraordinary that it should
have been able to maintain itself there. When the new régime,
resulting from the unexpected accession of Salabat Jang, had con-
solidated itself, a real national sentiment arose among the nobles of
the subah, aiming at the expulsion of the French. That called into
play all Bussy's skill. Not strong enough to impose his authority, he
maintained it nevertheless by his remarkable tact and his personal
prestige. Without seeming to notice the intrigues by which he was
surrounded, he contrived to turn them all to advantage. The greatest
source of anxiety was the weakness of Salabat Jang. How could he
trust a prince whose mind was like a child's? But for Dupleix's
gratitude for the grant of the Carnatic, and his need of a subahdar
to legitimate his rights, Salabat Jang would, perhaps, have been
replaced by one of his brothers, or even by Balaji Rao. Both solutions
were considered, and the second was not entirely laid aside. Without
previous concert, both Dupleix and Bussy independently recognised
that the French would be strengthened in their struggle with the
English by an alliance with a nation remote from their frontiers and
of proved power and solidity. Bussy was even instructed to lay the
foundation of an agreement which in the first case would be aimeci
only at Trichinopoly but which might be extended to the Deccan.
It is impossible to estimate the consequences had Dupleix sacrified
the point of honour and thrown over Salabat Jang.
However that may be, at the moment of his recall the position of
the French appeared impregnable; and it would have been so but
for the division of their forces, which had already hindered the capture
of Trichinopoly, and which might lose them the Deccan if some
necessity obliged them to recall their troops. Indeed, this division
of his forces was the weak point of Dupleix's policy; and although in
the Deccan he secured unrivalled glory and almost incredible terri-
torial possessions, he was disabled from securing the Carnatic, and
thus afforded the English both time and opportunity of making that
breach by which they were to overthrow the whole structure. It is,
indeed, unwise to pursue two objects at once and to. attempt more


## p. 138 (#166) ############################################

138
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
than one has the means of accomplishing. The French Company
shared this intoxication of success, for it did not condemn the policy
followed in the Deccan as it did that followed in the Carnatic. Instead
of repudiating the conquests of Dupleix and Bussy, it accepted them.
Godeheu himself did not wish to leave Salabat Jang without support,
for fear that the English would establish their influence with him,
and abandoned only conditionally part of the French possessions on
the Orissa Coast. The war which broke out two years later between
the French and the English prevented his agreement being carried
out, and at the end of 1756 the position of the French and English
in India was much the same as three years earlier. The French were
again threatening Trichinopoly, and the English were devising means
of driving Bussy out of the Deccan.
The latter, after some months' stay on the coast, where he reached
an agreement with Moracin, chief of Masulipatam, about the estab-
lishment of a regular administration, returned to Hyderabad in
January, 1755. He found that feelings had changed since his de-
parture. The recall of Dupleix had revealed the weakness of French
policy; and the subahdar talked of nothing but asking the English for
that military help which he could not do without. Bussy had great
difficulty in re-establishing his waning confidence without condemning
the policy of his country. An invasion of Mysore, under the plea of
arrears of tribute, at once raised French prestige and filled the
treasury. Bussy succeeded in obtaining a voluntary payment of fifty-
two lakhs of rupees on condition of preventing an invasion by the
Marathas, which would have completed the ruin of the country. Thus,
in the phrase of Duval de Leyrit, the heir of both Dupleix and
Godeheu, the position of Bussy was as brilliant as ever. He was in
correspondence with the wazir, and received flattering letters from
the Moghul. But the national sentiment was by no means extinst.
Like Ramdas Pandit and Saiyid Lashkar Khan, Shah Nawaz Khan
from the end of 1755 desired above all else to get rid of Bussy and
the French. An expedition against Savanur and Morari Rao gave
occasion for the rupture. Morari Rao had acquired extensive territory
round Gooty, whence he defied both Salabat Jang and Balaji Rao.
The two therefore united to suppress him. Bussy brought the expedi-
tion to a successful end, but by reason of the services Morari Rao
had formerly rendered to Dupleix was unwilling entirely to crush
him. But when he gave him easy terms, Shah Nawaz Khan cried
treason and dismissed Bussy.
His position was critical. Though Bussy had few troops, he dis-
liked retreating; and instead, therefore, of marching to the coast as
had been expected, he calmly made his way to Hyderabad, where he
entrenched himself in the Chahar Mahal, à garden on the outskirts
of the town belonging to the subahdar. There he awaited reinforce-
ments. Luckily Law, who was sent with 160 Europeans and 700
sepoys, besides five guns, showed more decision than before Trichi-


## p. 139 (#167) ############################################

BUSSY'S POLICY
189
nopoly. He overthrew the enemy barring his way, and about 15
August, 1756, joined Bussy. Thus Shah Nawaz Khan's plans were
upset. But it was not altogether his fault. Bussy's dismissal had
been concerted with the English, who were to have sent a detachment
to take the place of the French, but who were prevented from doing
so by news that on June 21, Calcutta had fallen into the hands of
Siraj-ud-daula. The victorious Bussy thus quietly resumed his place
in the subahdar's councils as if nothing had happened. He did not
even take the trouble to dismiss Shah Nawaz Khan; though he was
hostile, would another be more sincere and friendly? He therefore
did no more than keep an eye upon him. It was, indeed, a fixed
principle with him to avoid as much as possible all appearance of
interfering with internal matters and to leave to the subahdar all
the forms of independence. Not to labour the point, his ideas are
summarised in the following passage of a letter to Dupleix of 26
February, 1754;
What I can, and think I should, assure you, is that it is of the greatest import-
ance to manage these provinces [the sarkars) at first according to the Asiatic
manner and only to substitute a French government for that of the Moghuls
gradually and by degrees. We certainly must not begin on the first day of our
rule. Experience and practical acquaintance with the country, and with the
nature and manners of its inhabitants, show that we should not hasten the
assertion of absolute authority, but establish it gradually, instead of exposing
it to certain failure by claiming it at our first appearance. I attribute the
successes I have gained hitherto principally to my care on certain occasions to
observe Asiatic customs. 1
The remainder of 1756 passed without incident. It was at this
time that news arrived of the declaration of war with England; but
the war had begun six months or more earlier, if we take into
account the events that had occurred in America. Bussy returned to
the coast, less to look after the administration than to watch the
English, who had important factories at Ingeram, Madapollam, Ban-
darmalanka, and Vizagapatam. These he took one after the other.
For a moment he thought of sending Law up to Bengal to the
assistance of Chandernagore, attacked by Clive and Watson; but the
fall of the place (March, 1757) made such a plan useless.
All that year Bussy remained on the coast. He desired to accustom
the Deccan to his absence, in order one day to abandon it. It no
longer mattered, as in the time of Dupleix, that the subahdar was
the legitimate ruler of Southern India; circumstances had judged
that fiction of legality. But the subahdar could not yet be abandoned.
If he and his court were not secured, there was a danger of seeing
them fall into the arms of the English, and the war in progress bet-
ween the two powers would now enjoin the use of every weapon.
Bussy knew that the danger had grown during his absence. Shah
Nawaz Khan, who had never renounced his design of expelling the
1 Bib. Nat. , Nouvelles Acquisitions, 9158, f. 157.


## p. 140 (#168) ############################################

140
DUPLEIX AND BUSSY
French, had by degrees transferred the powers of government from
Salabat Jang to his brothers, Nizam 'Ali and Basalat Jang, and had
secured for himself a place of refuge in Daulatabad, while he was
negotiating with the Marathas for external help. The English, in
accordance with their interests, gave him good advice until such time
as they should be able to do more. All this disappeared with Bussy's
return. Without employing force, he found once more within himself
the patient powers of persuasion which enabled him to restore order.
He secured Daulatabad by surprise; and re-established Salabat Jang
in all his rights. But he needed more vigilance than of old. The
English successes in Bengal had their reaction in the Deccan. One day
his diwan, Haidar Jang, was murdered; and Shah Nawaz Khan was
killed in the tumult which followed. These were not propitious omens;
no one doubted that a crisis was at hand.
On the declaration of war, the king of France had sent Lally to
India to drive the English out. After taking Fort St David, Lally
prepared to attack Madras; for the success of this enterprise he con-
sidered he had need of all the national forces, even of those in the
Deccan. By a letter of 15 June, 1758, he recalled Bussy with his
detachment. Salabat Jang felt that this meant his own destruction,
as was indeed the case; but Lally's orders were formal; Bussy obeyed,
like a disciplined soldier, and set out at once to join him. This did not
necessarily signify the ruin of French hopes, even in the Deccan, if
Lally triumphed in the Cårnatic. In 1758 the position of the French
on the coast was as strong as in the best days of Dupleix, and the
Carnatic itself with Trichinopoly might have been secured, had
fortune favoured the new general. But the check before Madras,
then the battle of Wandiwash where Bussy was taken prisoner,
destroyed the work of the previous nine years, and left of the work
of Dupleix and Bussy only memories on the one side, and hopes on
the other. It was by learning from these two great Frenchmen that
Clive was enabled to lay the British Empire in India on secure
foundations. Their success showed him the weakness of the Indian
princes; that the walls of their power would fall at the first push.
Frenchmen will ever regret that Dupleix did not confine his efforts to
the Carnatic; with united forces he might have triumphed over Tri-
chinopoly before the patience of the Company was tired out, and
then, if it was resolved to go farther, the way was open. He lost
everything by wishing to hasten the work of time, and by forgetting
the certainty of English resistance in India and of public disapproval
in France, where men did not know his plans and were alarmed at
the endless wars into which he was leading them.


## p. 141 (#169) ############################################

CHAPTER VII
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
ON 9 April, 1756, died 'Ali Wardi Khan, subahdar of Bengal and
Bihar. He had established himself by force of arms as ruler of those
provinces after a severe struggle with the Marathas; and when his
position was no longer assailable, the Moghul emperor had recognised
him as his lieutenant on condition of his paying fifty-two lakhs nf
rupees a year.
Apparently this condition was never fulfilled; but he
went on ruling none the less, and in 1752 designated as his successor
his great-nephew, Siraj-ud-daula, then a young man of twenty-three.
Cf the latter neither his English nor his Indian contemporaries have
the least good to say; and his conduct confirms their words. Having
been proclaimed as nawab at the capital, Murshidabad, he marched
almost at once against his cousin, Shaukat Jang, the governor of
Purnia, whom he suspected rightly of intriguing against him. On
20 May, when he had reached Rajmahal on his march against Purnia,
he suddenly changed his mind, ordered an immediate return to
Murshidabad, and directed the English factory at Kasimbazar to be
seized. This was carried out on 4 June, three days after the nawab's
return to Murshidabad; and on the 5th his army began its march
against Calcutta. On the 20th he captured the place.
This extraordinary series of events took everyone by surprise; and
when they came to offer explanations to their friends and superiors,
personal feeling ran so high, and each member of the Calcutta Council
was so visibly anxious to throw the blame elsewhere than on himself
and his friends, that little weight can be attached to their evidence.
Some declared that Omichand had instigated this attack in revenge
for having been excluded from his former share in the Company's
business; others attributed it to the reception of a fugitive who was
alleged to have eloped with large sums of money, and to the expul-
sion of the messenger whom the nawab had sent to demand him.
Others again asserted that on his deathbed 'Ali Wardi Khan had
solemnly warned Siraj-ud-daula against the dangers of European
aggression. All these are vigorously asserted and as vigorously denied
in the letters describing that eventful twelvemonth which elapsed
between the capture of Calcutta and the battle of Plassey. But there
is reason to think that fear of European aggression was the main
predisposing cause of the attack. Holwell, to whom we owe a detailed
account of 'Ali Wardi's deathbed warning, may have been drawing
on his imagination or may have been indebted to mere rumour; but
1 Holwell to Company, 30 November, 1756; Watts to the same, 30 January,
1757.


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142
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
it is certain that those who like Watts, the head of the Kasimbazar
factory, dismissed the story on the ground that orientals were too
incurious and indolent to trouble about what happened in distant
provinces, had chosen to forget at least two incidents which should
have taught them better. We know that when the news of Nasir
Jang's death reached Bengal, 'Ali Wardi Khan had threatened to
seize the goods belonging to the French. We know, too, that a short
time before 'Ali Wardi's death Siraj-ud-daula had accused the English
of preparing to resist the government; the English had been repeatedly
questioned, and though they had convinced 'Ali Wardi of their inno-
cence they had not succeeded in convincing Siraj-ud-daula; he had
ordered his spies to keep a close watch on their doings, and it was
common talk at Murshidabad that the vast wealth of the English
might easily be captured. The day on which Siraj-ud-daula turned
back from his march against Purnia he had received a letter from
Drake, the English governor, explaining recent additions to the
defences of Calcutta as intended to protect the place against a French
attack. That letter has not been preserved in any form, and we
cannot tell whether in any other way it was calculated to irritate the
nawab; but there was certainly an uneasy feeling in his mind that
unless he took precautions the Europeans would turn Bengal upside
down as they had done the Carnatic and the Deccan. It is very
possible that this feeling was accentuated by other imprudences on
the part of Drake, who was at best but a short-sighted mortal. But
the main reason for the nawab's attack was the idea that the English
had taken advantage of 'Ali Wardi's illness to strengthen their mili-
tary position, and that he had better check them before they became
dangerous.
This idea, as the event was to prove, was ludicrously false. Drake
had indeed mounted some guns along the river front, in case French
vessels should sail up the river and attempt a landing when war broke
out again; but that was no protection against any attack which the
nawab might deliver, for that would come from the land, not from
the water. Nor, indeed, was any attack anticipated. The common
view held by Europeans in Bengal was that expressed in a letter of
4 June, 1743, written by Dupleix and his council at Pondichery to
his successor at Chandernagore. The latter, alarmed by the expul-
sion of Schonamille and his Ostenders, had planned a large and
powerful fortress. Dupleix rejoined : "So long as Europeans trade in
Bengal we do not believe that the Moors will directly attack them;
they have surer means of making them pay the unjust contributions
which they exact”. 3 Their river-borne commerce could be stopped at
any point; and no fortifications would enable them to carry on trade
1 Law, Mémoire, p. 52; Cultru, Dupleix, p. 353.
2 Forth to Drake. 16 December, 1756.
8 Correspondance. . . de Pondichéry à Bengale, a, 288.


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LOSS OF CALCUTTA
143
against the will of the nawab. That was also the view of the English.
At the beginning of the century they had built Fort William; but
they had been at no pains to make it defensible from the land, or to
maintain its original strength. So early as 1725 the timbers of the
bastions had become so rotten that they had had to be shored up. In
1729 the south curtain was rendered defenceless by the building of
outhouses which masked the fịanking fire of the bastions. They had
built a church close at hand which commanded the gorges of all four
bastions. Private persons had been allowed to build solid brick
houses almost adjoining. Then the fort had been found stuffy, and
so great windows had been cut in its walls. No soldier or engineer
who saw it but foretold that it could never be defended against attack.
A captain of artillery in 1755 reported that there was not an embra-
sure fit to hold a gun or a carriage fit to mount one; on which the
council reprimanded him for not sending his letter through the com-
mandant. 1 Nor even was the garrison at its full strength. During
those alarming years when Madras and Pondichery were at unautho-
rised war, many recruits intended for Bengal had been detained at
Madras; and this deficiency had not been made good. Finally the
officers who commanded the garrison were of the same poor quality,
with no more experience of war, and hardly more military spirit,
than had been displayed by their brothers-in-arms at Madras in 1746.
So far from being prepared to disturb the peace of Bengal, the place
was not even capable of defence. Few events have had a more
ironical conclusion than Siraj-ud-daula's attack upon Calcutta.
The short interval between the first warning and the appearance
of Siraj-ud-daula's troops served no better purpose than to display
the lack of military talent in the settlement. All the available Euro-
peans, Eurasians, and Armenians were embodied in the militia; a
body of Indian matchlockmen was taken into pay; and plans were
made for the defence of the town. But there was no leadership. The
projected line of defence was larger than could be held by the num-
bers present; and nothing was done to render the fort itself defensible.
On 16 June, the nawab's troops appeared before the place, and were
repulsed in an attack they made on the northern side of the town;
but on the 17th they entered the town limits from the east; on the
18th they drove the defenders from their outposts; and on the 19th
the fort was deserted by the governor, the commandant, and several
of the members of council, who took refuge with a number of women
on board the ships in the river. When their desertion was known,
the remainder placed the command in the hands of Holwell, the junior
member of council; and the defence was prolonged for one more
day. But the soldiers, exhausted with their efforts, got out of hand,
and broke open the liquor godowns, as had happened at Madras; the
1 Wilson, Old Fort William, 9, 25.
2 Bengal to Madras, 25 May, 1756 (Madras Letters received, 1756, no. 95).


## p. 144 (#172) ############################################

144
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
>
enemy's fire from the church and neighbouring houses rendered the
bastions untenable; and in the afternoon the place surrendered. After
anxious enquiries about the treasure which the fort was thought to
contain, the prisoners were shut up for the night in the military
prison generally known as the Black Hole. This was a room 18 feet
long by 14 feet 10 inches wide, from which only twenty-three survivors
emerged next morning. 1
The news of this disaster arrived piece-meal at Madras. First, on
14 July, came news of the seizure of Kasimbazar. It was decided to
send reinforcements at once; and on the 20th Killpatrick sailed with
230 men. He arrived on 2 August, and found a number of refugees
at Fulta, where he was obliged to encamp amidst the swamps of that
unhealthy place. Not till 16 August did news come of the fate of
Calcutta. At the moment the council was actively preparing an
expedition which was to have joined Salabat Jang in the Deccan and
replaced French influence there by English. Luckily it had not
marched. Admiral Watson, who had come out two years earlier with
a squadron and a King's regiment in case the French could not be
brought to terms, was called into council, and Clive was summoned
up from Fort St David where he was now deputy governor. There
was a strong and natural feeling in the council against the dispatch
of a large force to Bengal, based partly on the local advantage of
expelling the French from the Deccan, partly on the evident approach
of war with France with its consequent dangers to Madras. This was
overcome, mainly owing to the firm and prudent arguments of Robert
Orme, supported by the governor Pigot and by Clive. But there
still remained the problems of who was to command the expedition
and what were to be his powers. The command was claimed by
Colonel Adlercron, the commander of the royal regiment that had
come out with Watson. But he refused to agree to the division of the
prospective plunder in the shares laid down in the Company's in-
structions, or to promise to return on a summons from the Madras
Council; 3 and so the command was finally entrusted to Clive. As
regards his powers, there were obvious objections to entrusting the
direction of the Madras forces to persons who had proved themselves
so wanting in conduct and resolution as the council of Fort William.
At the same time it was contrary to the Company's practice to entrust.
uncontrolled power to a military officer. It was, therefore, first decided
to send two deputies with Clive, who were with him to constitute a
council with power to determine the political management of the
expedition. But then arived a member of the Calcutta Council who
protested so loudly against this supersession of the Calcutta authori-
ties that that plan was laid aside and Clive was invested with complete
1 See note at the end of the chapter.
2 Orme to Payne, 3 November, 1756 (Orme MSS, Various, 28, p. 58).
3 Madras Public Consultations, 21 September, 1756; Adlercron to Fox, 21
November, 1756 (India Office, Home Misc. 94, p. 210).


## p. 145 (#173) ############################################

RECOVERY OF CALCUTTA
145
military independence, while the funds—four lakhs of rupees-sent
with the expedition were consigned to him personally. In fine the
Madras council came to the best conclusion possible. In part this
was due to luck. It was a miracle of fortune that Colonel Adlercron
was so unaccommodating. But the decision to dispatch a large expe-
dition instead of a small one showed high qualities of courage and
insight.
These discussions took up a long time. The expedition did not
actually sail till 16 October, after the north-east monsoon had set
in. Their passage was therefore long and stormy. One of the vessels
was driven into Vizagapatam, whence she put back to Madras; so
that when Clive reached the Hugli a few days before Christmas and
was joined by Killpatrick and the remains of his detachment, he had
only about the same number of troops as he had 'set out with—800
Europeans and 1000 sepoys. He marched up the eastern bank of the
river, occupied Baj-baj, recovered Calcutta (2 January, 1757), and
plundered Hugli
. This brought Siraj-ud-daula. once more upon
Calcutta. He refused to listen to the embassy which Clive sent to
him; but a night attack, though far from a complete success, so
disquieted him that he retired and sent offers of terms. Within a
week the treaty had been completed and signed. It confirmed the
English privileges, promised the restoration of the Calcutta plunder
in the nawab's hands, and granted the power of fortifying Calcutta
and coining rupees.
This treaty came at a timely moment. News of the outbreak of
the Seven Years' War had arrived at almost the same time as Clive
had reached Calcutta, and the English were not strong enough to
fight the nawab and the French together. Indeed had the French
followed the English example, and thrown every available man into
Bengal, the immediate course of events must have been very diffe-
rent. But they were entangled in the Deccan. They had already sent
all the forces they could spare to assist Bussy in his crisis at the
Chahar Mahal; and now had no one to send for the crisis in Bengal.
Just as in 1751 the dispatch of Bussy to the Deccan had disabled
Dupleix from completing his designs in the Carnatic, so now in 1757
the need of maintaining Bussy's position prevented them from inter-
fering with effect in Bengal. Law, the French chief at Kasimbazar,
and the author of an illuminating memoir on the events of 1756-7,
had urged the directeur, Renault de St Germain, either to agree with
the English for a neutrality or at once to join Siraj-ud-daula. "If he
makes peace without having received any help from you, you cannot
expect help from him should you be attacked. " 2 Renault tried to
adopt the first alternative. On Watson's arrival he had sent deputies
to propose a neutrality; but Watson had replied that he would accept
1 Treaty of February, 1757.
2 Law, Mémoire (ed. Martineau), p. 93.
10


## p. 146 (#174) ############################################

146
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
nothing short of an alliance against the nawab. Then when the nawab
was marching on Calcutta, the English offered to relax this stipulation.
and Clive fully expected them to accede to his proposals, unless
indeed they "should not be vested with powers to enter into engage-
ments of such a nature, which I somewhat suspect”. 1 But. no answer
was returned to this offer until 21 February, when peace had been
made with Siraj-ud-daula. Then they sent deputies again, and a draft
treaty was drawn up. But when the question of their powers was
raised, it proved that they could bind neither the Pondichery council
nor any royal officers who might come out to India. Thus negotiations
were broken off on 4 March.
Meanwhile Watts, that "helpless, poor, and innocent man” as
Siraj-ud-daula had called him, had been sent up to Murshidabad
to act as English resident there and watch over the execution of the
treaty. There ensued a duel between him and Law, in which the latter
had the advantage of the nawab's sympathy. He was by no means
disposed to acquiesce in his defeat, and could not speak of the English
without blazing eyes. But the durbar was on the whole inclined to the
English and against the French. Then too came news that the Durani
Afghans, who had invaded Northern India, were likely to advance
on Bengal. Under the alarm caused by this, Siraj-ud-daula wrote to
offer the English a lakh a month if they would aid him against the
Afghans. This was on 4 March, the day on which the Anglo-French
negotiations were broken off and on which also Watson had written
to the nawab a very angry letter, demanding the complete execution
of the treaty within ten days, or else "I will kindle such a flame in
your country as all the water in the Ganges shall not be able to
extinguish". In these circumstances, on the 10th, a letter was written
by the nawab's secretary, bearing the nawab's seal, permitting the
attack on Chandernagore. Law asserts that this letter was not written
by the order of the nawab. However, it was enough to authorise
Watson to move. On the 14th Chandernagore was attacked, though
not closely, from the land; on the 23rd the ships appeared off the
place and after a day's severe fighting it surrendered.
This deprived the nawab of his natural allies against the English;
and nothing can extenuate his folly in allowing their destruction.
Indeed, after his reluctant consent had been given, he seems to have
changed his mind, and ordered Rai Durlabh to march with a con-
siderable force to relieve the town. But then, on hearing from
Nandakumar, the faujdar of Hugli, that the French would not be
able to resist the English, the nawab changed his mind again, and in
the end did nothing. No conduct could have been feebler or more
3
1 Clive to Secret Committee, 1 February, 1757.
2 Siraj-ud-daula to Pigot, 30 June, 1756.
8 Watson to the nawab, 4 March, 1757.
4 Law, op. cit. pp. 121-2.


## p. 147 (#175) ############################################

DISCONTENT IN BENGAL
147
1
unwise. He gave open display to his hostile feelings against the
English while allowing them unmolested to destroy the French. And
then as if to emphasise his errors he proceeded to protect Law at
Murshidabad together with the fugitives who joined him from
Chandernagore, and to write to Bussy to come to his help from the
Deccan. These facts are established by the evidence of Law as
well as by the assertions of the English.
Although then the English had recovered Calcutta, although they
had secured from the nawab promises of privileges which they had
long desired, and although they had succeeded in depriving the French
of their principal stronghold: in Bengal, they were still far from a
position of safety. At any time might come news that the French had
arrived in strength upon the coast, and then Clive would be obliged
to abandon either Madras to the French or Calcutta to the nawab.
It was also becoming apparent that many persons besides the English
had cause to fear Siraj-ud-daula, and desired a revolution in the
government. The chief people in this movement were Hindus. 'Ali
Wardi Khan had favoured them, and had promoted many of them
to high places in his administration. Siraj-ud-daula did not share his
predecessor's feelings, and he succeeded in alienating all the principal
men of the durbar. The great Hindu bankers, the Seths, who had
contributed largely to the establishment of 'Ali Wardi Khan, had
been threatened with circumcision; Rai Durlabh, who had held the
office of diwan, had been placed under the orders of a favourite called
Mohan La'l; Mir Ja'far, who had held the office of bakshi, had been
dismissed with insult, and cannon had been planted against his
palace. The first hint of intrigues against the nawab had come to the
English through Omichand, when they were still lying at Fulta
waiting the arrival of help from Madras. Warren Hastings, who was
employed in this first affair, thought poorly of it; and for the moment
it came to nothing, partly, it seems, because the English lacked forces
and a leader, partly because the Hindus had no suitable candidate
to propose. But after the fall of Chandernagore the idea was again
brought forward. . The nawab, having defeated and slain his only
dynastic rival, Shaukat Jang, in the previous October, had lost at
once all stimulus to self-restraint in his government and the pro-
tection afforded by the hope that he would be overthrown without
the trouble and danger of private action. The Seths were at once
the persons specially concerned and specially active. Law, who was
well placed to view the position with considerable accuracy, says
that without them the revolution of 1757 would never have been
accomplished. That view is probably correct. The English policy
had never been adventurous. They had rather supported existing
.
1 Law, op. cit. pp. 112, 131.
Iden, pp. 108 sqq. ; Gleig, Warren Hasiings, 1, 41; Elliott and Dowson,
VIA, 426.


## p. 148 (#176) ############################################

148
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
princes than replaced them by new. In Bengal they would not have
attempted a revolution without the certainty of a large Indian
backing; and the Seths' intrigues created the situation, bringing the
discontent to a head and the discontented into active contact with
one another, without which the English would never have stirred at
a time when a French war was visibly impending. The Select Com-
mittee declared no more than the truth when it recorded among its
other reasons for participating in the plot that
The Nabob is so universally hated by all sorts and degrees of men; the affection
of the army is so much alienated from him by his ill-usage of the officers; and
a revolution so generally wished for, that it is probable that the step will be
aitempted (and successfully too) whether we give our assistance or not. In
this case we think it would be a great error in politics to remain idle and
unconcerned spectators of an event, wherein by engaging as allies to the per-
són designed to be set up we may benefit our employers and the community very
considerably, do à general good, and effectually traverse the designs of the
French and possibly keep them entirely out of these dominions.
This matter first came to a definite form when on 20 April Scrafton
wrote to Clive that the Seths through Omichand had proposed to set
up Yar Lutf Khan as nawab. This man was a protégé of the Seths
who had employed him in command of a body of troops to protect
them against attacks from the nawab or anyone else. On the 23rd
Scrafton's letter was read in committee and Clive was authorised to
sound the principal people in Murshidabad about their willingness
to co-operate. On the 26th Watts wrote that Mir Ja'far had informed
him through Khwaja Petrus, an Armenian, that he and other im-
portant persons were willing to assist the English in overthrowing
the nawab. This proposal was obviously much more attractive than
engaging to support an unknown man such as Yar Lutf Khan. The
question was considered in committee on 1 May and at once accepted
on the following conditions : an alliance offensive and defensive; the
surrender of all French fugitives and factories; restitution of all
English losses, public and private, caused by the capture of Calcutta;
the admission of all farman rights; liberty to fortify Kasimbazar and
Dacca; no fortifications to be erected on the river below Hugli; the
recognition of English sovereignty within the bounds of Calcutta; the
grant of territories for the maintenance of a proper military force;
extraordinary expenses while the troops were on campaign for the
nawab to be paid by him; and the residence at the nawab's durbar
of one of the Company's servants. Four days later to these terms was
added the additional stipulation that "Omychund in consideration of
his services should have all his losses made good by an express article
in the treaty". But by the time that these proposals had reached
Murshidabad, Omichand had fallen into disfavour with the other
conspirators. Watts might write on 6 May, "I will conclude nothing
without consulting Omichand”, but on the 14th he had learnt that
1 Benga! Select Committee, 1 May, 1757.


## p. 149 (#177) ############################################

THE CONSPIRACY
149
the latter had procured from the nawab orders for the restoration of
his property, and, when he was shown the proposed articles, he not
only insisted on his receiving 5 per cent. on the nawab's treasure, but
also demanded many other alterations, "in which his own ambition,
cunning, and avaricious views were the chief motives". 1 In conse-
quence of these intrigues both the English and Mir Ja'far resolved to
have nothing more to do with the greedy Sikh; but the matter was
not so simple as that. Omichand had unwisely been let into the
secret and the immediate problem was to keep his mouth shut until
the preparations were more complete. For this purpose the Calcutta
council decided on the expedient of a double treaty, in one copy of
which Omichand's claims were to be inserted, but which was not
to be regarded as the valid copy. In order to make the trick pass,
Watson's signature was added by some person, probably Lushington,
to the false copy. .
Meanwhile, the final terms had been concerted with Mir Ja'far.
They were rather more favourable to the English than had been at
first put forward; and on 5 June, Watts visited Mir Ja'far in secret
and obtained his oath to the treaty. But already doubts had arisen
regarding the amount of assistance that might be expected from him
and his friends.