Therefore
original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.
Summa Theologica
But the actual sins of our
nearer ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely
personal, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The first sin infects nature with a human
corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a
corruption pertaining only to the person.
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Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to
all men?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not
transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a
punishment consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are
born of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still
living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be
gathered from 1 Thess. 4:14: "We who are alive . . . unto the coming of
the Lord, shall not prevent them who have slept. " Therefore they do not
contract original sin.
Objection 2: Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now
a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he does not
transmit it to his children.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of
Adam, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 5:15, seqq). But the gift of Christ
is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "Death passed upon all
men in whom all have sinned. "
I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe
that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract
original sin from him; else all would not need redemption [*Cf.
Translator's note inserted before TP, Q[27]] which is through Christ;
and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what
has been stated [1822](A[1]), viz. that original sin, in virtue of the
sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his posterity, just as, from
the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body,
through their being moved by the will. Now it is evident that actual
sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude
to be moved by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all
those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation.
Reply to Objection 1: It is held with greater probability and more
commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will
die, and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the TP
([1823]XP, Q[78], A[1], OBJ[1]). If, however, it be true, as others
hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among
others in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body---Ep.
cxix), then we must say in reply to the objection, that although they
are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in them, and that
the punishment of death will be remitted by God, since He can also
forgive the punishment due for actual sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the
guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind.
Nevertheless original sin remains in its effect as regards the "fomes,"
which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the body
itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his
power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized transmit
original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism, but
as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are
born of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all
that are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this,
not only unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but also unto
the removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously
from human flesh?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a
person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on Gn. 4:1
says that "Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because
they were not severed from him in the place of life, before he sinned,
but in the place of exile after he had sinned. " But if a man were to be
formed in the aforesaid manner, his flesh would be severed in the place
of exile. Therefore it would contract original sin.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being
infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted.
Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin,
from whatever part of the flesh it was formed.
Objection 3: Further, original sin comes upon all from our first
parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who
might be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore
they would contract original sin.
On the contrary, They would not have been in Adam "according to seminal
virtue," which alone is the cause of the transmission of original sin,
as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq. ).
I answer that, As stated above ([1824]AA[1],3), original sin is
transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they
are moved by him through generation, even as the members are moved by
the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except
by the active power of generation: so that those alone contract
original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of
generation originally derived from Adam, i. e. who are descended from
him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than
the active power of generation. But if anyone were to be formed by God
out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be
derived from Adam. Consequently he would not contract original sin:
even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not
by the man's will, but by some external power.
Reply to Objection 1: Adam was not in the place of exile until after
his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but
on account of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to
whom his active generation extends.
Reply to Objection 2: The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so
far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated.
Reply to Objection 3: If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he
would have been in Adam, "by way of bodily substance" [*The expression
is St. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica [1825]TP,
Q[31], A[6], Reply to OBJ[1]], but not according to seminal virtue, as
stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have
contracted original sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their
children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract
original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them,
according to the word of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): "In whom all have
sinned. " Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father.
Therefore a man would have contracted original sin from his mother's
sin as well as from his father's.
Objection 2: Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children
would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is "the
mother" that "provides the matter in generation" as the Philosopher
states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and liability to
suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to
suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin.
Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would
contract original sin.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that "the
Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born
without original sin) "purifying her. " But this purification would not
have been necessary, if the infection of original sin were not
contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is
contracted from the mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her children
would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin entered
into this world. " Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin
to her children, he should have said that it entered by two, since both
of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned
first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by
the mother, but by the father.
I answer that, The solution of this question is made clear by what has
been said. For it has been stated [1826](A[1]) that original sin is
transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the
begetting of his children: wherefore it has been said [1827](A[4]) that
if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not
contract original sin. Now it is evident that in the opinion of
philosophers, the active principle of generation is from the father,
while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is
contracted, not from the mother, but from the father: so that,
accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not
contract original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they
would contract it.
Reply to Objection 1: The child pre-exists in its father as in its
active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive
principle. Consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned,
their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been
subject to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that
are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the mother,
not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems
unreasonable. Because, as stated in the [1828]FP, Q[97], AA[1], 2, ad
4, immortality and impassibility, in the original state, were a result,
not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the
body was subjected to the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to
God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore,
supposing Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been
transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that
the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and
consequently they would not have been liable to suffer and subject to
the necessity of dying.
Reply to Objection 3: This prevenient purification in the Blessed
Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but
because it behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest
purity" [*Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii. ]. For nothing is worthy
to receive God unless it be pure, according to Ps. 92:5: "Holiness
becometh Thy House, O Lord. "
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OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether original sin is a habit?
(2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?
(3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?
(4) Whether original sin is equally in all?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether original sin is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For
original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De
Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But
privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin is not a habit.
Objection 2: Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than
original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of
actual sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a
man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit
has the nature of a fault.
Objection 3: Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because
evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is not
preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants
(De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin
little children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not
the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore original
sin is a habit.
I answer that, As stated above ([1829]Q[49], A[4];[1830] Q[50], A[1]),
habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an
act: thus science and virtue are called habits. In this way original
sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a
complex nature, whereby that nature is well or ill disposed to
something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second
nature, as in the case of sickness or health. In this sense original
sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the
destruction of the harmony which was essential to original justice,
even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, by
reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to
health. Hence it is that original sin is called the "languor of nature"
[*Cf. Augustine, In Ps. 118, serm. iii].
Reply to Objection 1: As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so
far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and
partly something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately
disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original
justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of
the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt habit.
Reply to Objection 2: Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act:
whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate
disposition of nature, and has the character of fault through being
transmitted from our first parent, as stated above ([1831]Q[81], A[1]).
Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas
the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and for this reason
original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers the habit which inclines
a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit.
Nevertheless a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow
from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal of
the obstacle, i. e. original justice, which hindered inordinate
movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements
results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to says
that original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except
by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): but it is a
habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are several original sins in one man?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are many original sins in one
man. For it is written (Ps. 1:7): "Behold I was conceived in
iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me. " But the sin in
which a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several
original sins in man.
Objection 2: Further, one and the same habit does not incline its
subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of
nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man,
inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not
one habit; but several.
Objection 3: Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now
the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as shown
above ([1832]Q[74]). Since then one sin cannot be in different
subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God,
behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for
the employment of the singular is that the "sin of the world" is
original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage.
I answer that, In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be
assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original
sin. For it has been stated ([1833]Q[81], A[2]), that the first sin
alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore
in one man original sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in
proportion, i. e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason
may be taken from the very essence of original sin. Because in every
inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while
the unity of number is derived from the subject. For example, take
bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different
causes, e. g. from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung
or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in number.
Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin,
is one only, viz. the privation of original justice, removing the
subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is
specifically one, and, in one man, can be only one in number; while, in
different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is
numerically many.
Reply to Objection 1: The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be
explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of
the plural for the singular, e. g. "They are dead that sought the life
of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist
in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by
the fact of there being many deformities in the sin of our first
parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so forth; or by several
parts of the soul being infected by original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Of itself and directly, i. e. by its own form, one
habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason
why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i. e. by the
removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is
destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner,
when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, the various powers
of the soul have various opposite tendencies.
Reply to Objection 3: Original sin infects the different parts of the
soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original
justice held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there
is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one man,
although the various parts of the body are affected.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether original sin is concupiscence?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For
every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is
the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power.
Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.
Objection 2: Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are
in us, according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:5). Now there are several other
passions besides concupiscence, as stated above ([1834]Q[23], A[4]).
Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another
passion.
Objection 3: Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are
disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is the
highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7).
Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the
guilt of original sin. "
I answer that, Everything takes its species from its form: and it has
been stated [1835](A[2]) that the species of original sin is taken from
its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be
considered in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have
contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be considered
with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it.
Now the whole order of original justice consists in man's will being
subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will,
whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated
above (Q[9], A[1] ), so that the will being turned away from God, all
the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the
privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject to
God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder
of the soul's powers, is a kind of material element in respect of
original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul
consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good; which
inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence.
Hence original sin is concupiscence, materially, but privation of
original justice, formally.
Reply to Objection 1: Since, in man, the concupiscible power is
naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far
natural to man, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in
so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man,
contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1836]Q[25], A[1]), all the
irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding
the principle place: and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous
in moving, and is felt most, as stated above ([1837]Q[25], A[2], ad 1).
Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief
passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion.
Reply to Objection 3: As, in good things, the intellect and reason
stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul
is found to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as
stated above ([1838]Q[77], AA[1],2;[1839] Q[80], A[2]). Hence original
sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance
is comprised among the material defects of original sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether original sin is equally in all?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not equally in all.
Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above
[1840](A[3]). Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence.
Therefore original sin is not equally in all.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the
soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But
sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to
degrees.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that
"lust transmits original sin to the child. " But the act of generation
may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may
be greater in one than in another.
On the contrary, Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above
([1841]Q[81], A[1]). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original
sin is too.
I answer that, There are two things in original sin: one is the
privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this
privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted
to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has no
degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and
privations that remove something entirely, such as death and darkness,
cannot be more or less, as stated above ([1842]Q[73], A[2]). In like
manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are
related equally to the first principle of our corrupt origin, from
which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations
cannot be more or less. Consequently it is evident that original sin
cannot be more in one than in another.
Reply to Objection 1: Through the bond of original justice being
broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain
order, each power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the
more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the
soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of
the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one man is more
prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to
original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in
all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to themselves
equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as
stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same
species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be
caused by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or
less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the cause
of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not the actual lust that transmits original
sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate
lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we
must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive
appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original
justice. This lust is equally in all.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the
soul?
(2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through
its powers?
(3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of
original sin?
(4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the
generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than
in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises
from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is
seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another
law in my members fighting against the law of my mind. " Therefore
original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect:
thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the
soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal
semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, we contract original sin from our first parent,
in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our souls
were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not
in the soul, but in the flesh.
Objection 4: Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into
the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it
would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus
God would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's
creation and fusion.
Objection 5: Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a
vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the
rational soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul,
by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of
original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul
into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by the
flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh.
On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or
sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of
virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "I know that there dwelleth
not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good. " Therefore
the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul.
I answer that, One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in
its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its
subject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as
in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom.
5:12): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as
in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen
that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the
child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but
only in the soul.
The reason for this is that, as stated above ([1843]Q[81], A[1]),
original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this
posterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as
actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now
in this transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from
the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can
in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its
instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to
gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty,
and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so
far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin.
But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the
internal members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the
will, does not bear the character of guilt.
Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the
flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to
the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of
guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of
guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of
original sin, and not the flesh.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man
already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to
punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh. "
Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt,
but of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Original sin is caused by the semen as
instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the
instrumental cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause:
and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it
had the nature of actual sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in
respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle,
but as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is
transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational
soul, but disposes the matter for it.
Reply to Objection 4: The corruption of original sin is nowise caused
by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal
generation. And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to
God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being
created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God
infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with
regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained
through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it
is infused.
Reply to Objection 5: The common good takes precedence of private good.
Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general
order of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a
body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more that
the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its
infusion into the body, as stated in the [1844]FP, Q[90], A[4];
[1845]FP, Q[118], A[3]. And it is better for the soul to be thus,
according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can
avoid damnation, by means of grace.
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Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the
powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of
the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to be
the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the
will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only
as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according
to its essence, but only according to the powers.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now
original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the
subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the
soul, rather than in its essence.
Objection 3: Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as
from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But
original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is
more in the powers than in the essence of the soul.
Objection 4: Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as
stated ([1846]Q[82], A[3]). But concupiscence is in the powers of the
soul. Therefore original sin is also.
On the contrary, Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated
above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body,
in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated
in the [1847]FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul is the subject of
original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.
I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to
which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the
motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the
concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that
the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is
evident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently
that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the
primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the
term of generation, according as it is the form of the body: and this
belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the
[1848]FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence,
is the primary subject of original sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As the motion of the will of an individual
reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of
the will of the first generator, through the channel of generation,
reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Even original justice pertained radically to the
essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to
which the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the
powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the principles
of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins,
which are the sins of the person.
Reply to Objection 3: The body is related to the soul as matter to
form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless
comes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of
the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper
accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation
and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds
the position of matter and effect, as stated above ([1849]Q[82], A[3]).
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Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin does not infect the will
before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power by
whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the
generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative power
more than to the others.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal
semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than
the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers,
which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than
in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object
of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin
infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all
infect the intellect, as preceding the others.
On the contrary, Original justice has a prior relation to the will,
because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep.
Virg. iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a
prior relation to the will.
I answer that, Two things must be considered in the infection of
original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect
it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above [1850](A[2]).
In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in
this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore regard
first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to
commit a sin, and this is the will, as stated above (Q[74], AA[1],2).
Therefore original sin regards first of all the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in man, is not caused by the
generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental
generative power. Consequently, it does not follow that the child's
generative power is the subject of original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh
to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former
follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of
perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers,
are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher
power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of
original sin reaches it first.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by
proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the
intellect, in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin.
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Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more
infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to
pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of
sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore
that power is most infected by original sin.
Objection 2: Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except
in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey
reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is
not the most infected by original sin.
Objection 3: Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual
and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number of
things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all
in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq. , 24) that
the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the
members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those
members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, wherein
there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive
to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin regards these
three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and
the sense of touch.
I answer that, Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious,
which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to
another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the
like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is
transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above ([1851]Q[81],
A[1]). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said
to be infected. Now this act serves the generative power, in as much as
it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch,
which is the most powerful object of the concupiscible faculty.
Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted
by original sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and
infected.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual
sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above [1852](A[3]). But in
so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the
aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely.
Reply to Objection 2: The infection of actual sin belongs only to the
powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of
original sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but
through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power.
Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Sight is not related to the act of generation
except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible
species is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in
the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch
rather than to the sight.
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OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the
cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
(2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
(3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides
pride and covetousness?
(4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?
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Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all
sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is
opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of
all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins.
Objection 2: Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for
the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are
not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i,
5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins, but proceeds
from some deeper root.
nearer ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely
personal, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: The first sin infects nature with a human
corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a
corruption pertaining only to the person.
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Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to
all men?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not
transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a
punishment consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are
born of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still
living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be
gathered from 1 Thess. 4:14: "We who are alive . . . unto the coming of
the Lord, shall not prevent them who have slept. " Therefore they do not
contract original sin.
Objection 2: Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now
a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he does not
transmit it to his children.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of
Adam, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 5:15, seqq). But the gift of Christ
is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "Death passed upon all
men in whom all have sinned. "
I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe
that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract
original sin from him; else all would not need redemption [*Cf.
Translator's note inserted before TP, Q[27]] which is through Christ;
and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what
has been stated [1822](A[1]), viz. that original sin, in virtue of the
sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his posterity, just as, from
the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body,
through their being moved by the will. Now it is evident that actual
sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude
to be moved by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all
those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation.
Reply to Objection 1: It is held with greater probability and more
commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will
die, and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the TP
([1823]XP, Q[78], A[1], OBJ[1]). If, however, it be true, as others
hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among
others in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body---Ep.
cxix), then we must say in reply to the objection, that although they
are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in them, and that
the punishment of death will be remitted by God, since He can also
forgive the punishment due for actual sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the
guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind.
Nevertheless original sin remains in its effect as regards the "fomes,"
which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the body
itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his
power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized transmit
original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism, but
as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are
born of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all
that are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this,
not only unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but also unto
the removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory.
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Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously
from human flesh?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a
person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on Gn. 4:1
says that "Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because
they were not severed from him in the place of life, before he sinned,
but in the place of exile after he had sinned. " But if a man were to be
formed in the aforesaid manner, his flesh would be severed in the place
of exile. Therefore it would contract original sin.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being
infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted.
Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin,
from whatever part of the flesh it was formed.
Objection 3: Further, original sin comes upon all from our first
parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who
might be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore
they would contract original sin.
On the contrary, They would not have been in Adam "according to seminal
virtue," which alone is the cause of the transmission of original sin,
as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq. ).
I answer that, As stated above ([1824]AA[1],3), original sin is
transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they
are moved by him through generation, even as the members are moved by
the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except
by the active power of generation: so that those alone contract
original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of
generation originally derived from Adam, i. e. who are descended from
him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than
the active power of generation. But if anyone were to be formed by God
out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be
derived from Adam. Consequently he would not contract original sin:
even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not
by the man's will, but by some external power.
Reply to Objection 1: Adam was not in the place of exile until after
his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but
on account of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to
whom his active generation extends.
Reply to Objection 2: The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so
far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated.
Reply to Objection 3: If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he
would have been in Adam, "by way of bodily substance" [*The expression
is St. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica [1825]TP,
Q[31], A[6], Reply to OBJ[1]], but not according to seminal virtue, as
stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have
contracted original sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their
children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract
original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them,
according to the word of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): "In whom all have
sinned. " Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father.
Therefore a man would have contracted original sin from his mother's
sin as well as from his father's.
Objection 2: Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children
would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is "the
mother" that "provides the matter in generation" as the Philosopher
states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and liability to
suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to
suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin.
Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would
contract original sin.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that "the
Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born
without original sin) "purifying her. " But this purification would not
have been necessary, if the infection of original sin were not
contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is
contracted from the mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her children
would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin entered
into this world. " Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin
to her children, he should have said that it entered by two, since both
of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned
first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by
the mother, but by the father.
I answer that, The solution of this question is made clear by what has
been said. For it has been stated [1826](A[1]) that original sin is
transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the
begetting of his children: wherefore it has been said [1827](A[4]) that
if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not
contract original sin. Now it is evident that in the opinion of
philosophers, the active principle of generation is from the father,
while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is
contracted, not from the mother, but from the father: so that,
accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not
contract original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they
would contract it.
Reply to Objection 1: The child pre-exists in its father as in its
active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive
principle. Consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned,
their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been
subject to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that
are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the mother,
not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems
unreasonable. Because, as stated in the [1828]FP, Q[97], AA[1], 2, ad
4, immortality and impassibility, in the original state, were a result,
not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the
body was subjected to the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to
God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore,
supposing Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been
transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that
the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and
consequently they would not have been liable to suffer and subject to
the necessity of dying.
Reply to Objection 3: This prevenient purification in the Blessed
Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but
because it behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest
purity" [*Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii. ]. For nothing is worthy
to receive God unless it be pure, according to Ps. 92:5: "Holiness
becometh Thy House, O Lord. "
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OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether original sin is a habit?
(2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?
(3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?
(4) Whether original sin is equally in all?
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Whether original sin is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For
original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De
Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But
privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin is not a habit.
Objection 2: Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than
original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of
actual sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a
man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit
has the nature of a fault.
Objection 3: Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because
evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is not
preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants
(De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin
little children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not
the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore original
sin is a habit.
I answer that, As stated above ([1829]Q[49], A[4];[1830] Q[50], A[1]),
habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an
act: thus science and virtue are called habits. In this way original
sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a
complex nature, whereby that nature is well or ill disposed to
something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second
nature, as in the case of sickness or health. In this sense original
sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the
destruction of the harmony which was essential to original justice,
even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, by
reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to
health. Hence it is that original sin is called the "languor of nature"
[*Cf. Augustine, In Ps. 118, serm. iii].
Reply to Objection 1: As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so
far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and
partly something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately
disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original
justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of
the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt habit.
Reply to Objection 2: Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act:
whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate
disposition of nature, and has the character of fault through being
transmitted from our first parent, as stated above ([1831]Q[81], A[1]).
Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas
the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and for this reason
original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers the habit which inclines
a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit.
Nevertheless a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow
from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal of
the obstacle, i. e. original justice, which hindered inordinate
movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements
results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to says
that original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except
by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): but it is a
habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin.
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Whether there are several original sins in one man?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are many original sins in one
man. For it is written (Ps. 1:7): "Behold I was conceived in
iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me. " But the sin in
which a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several
original sins in man.
Objection 2: Further, one and the same habit does not incline its
subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of
nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man,
inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not
one habit; but several.
Objection 3: Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now
the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as shown
above ([1832]Q[74]). Since then one sin cannot be in different
subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God,
behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for
the employment of the singular is that the "sin of the world" is
original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage.
I answer that, In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be
assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original
sin. For it has been stated ([1833]Q[81], A[2]), that the first sin
alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore
in one man original sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in
proportion, i. e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason
may be taken from the very essence of original sin. Because in every
inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while
the unity of number is derived from the subject. For example, take
bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different
causes, e. g. from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung
or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in number.
Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin,
is one only, viz. the privation of original justice, removing the
subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is
specifically one, and, in one man, can be only one in number; while, in
different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is
numerically many.
Reply to Objection 1: The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be
explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of
the plural for the singular, e. g. "They are dead that sought the life
of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist
in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by
the fact of there being many deformities in the sin of our first
parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so forth; or by several
parts of the soul being infected by original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Of itself and directly, i. e. by its own form, one
habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason
why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i. e. by the
removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is
destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner,
when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, the various powers
of the soul have various opposite tendencies.
Reply to Objection 3: Original sin infects the different parts of the
soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original
justice held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there
is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one man,
although the various parts of the body are affected.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether original sin is concupiscence?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For
every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is
the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power.
Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.
Objection 2: Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are
in us, according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:5). Now there are several other
passions besides concupiscence, as stated above ([1834]Q[23], A[4]).
Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another
passion.
Objection 3: Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are
disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is the
highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7).
Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the
guilt of original sin. "
I answer that, Everything takes its species from its form: and it has
been stated [1835](A[2]) that the species of original sin is taken from
its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be
considered in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have
contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be considered
with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it.
Now the whole order of original justice consists in man's will being
subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will,
whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated
above (Q[9], A[1] ), so that the will being turned away from God, all
the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the
privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject to
God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder
of the soul's powers, is a kind of material element in respect of
original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul
consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good; which
inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence.
Hence original sin is concupiscence, materially, but privation of
original justice, formally.
Reply to Objection 1: Since, in man, the concupiscible power is
naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far
natural to man, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in
so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man,
contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1836]Q[25], A[1]), all the
irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding
the principle place: and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous
in moving, and is felt most, as stated above ([1837]Q[25], A[2], ad 1).
Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief
passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion.
Reply to Objection 3: As, in good things, the intellect and reason
stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul
is found to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as
stated above ([1838]Q[77], AA[1],2;[1839] Q[80], A[2]). Hence original
sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance
is comprised among the material defects of original sin.
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Whether original sin is equally in all?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not equally in all.
Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above
[1840](A[3]). Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence.
Therefore original sin is not equally in all.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the
soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But
sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to
degrees.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that
"lust transmits original sin to the child. " But the act of generation
may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may
be greater in one than in another.
On the contrary, Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above
([1841]Q[81], A[1]). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original
sin is too.
I answer that, There are two things in original sin: one is the
privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this
privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted
to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has no
degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and
privations that remove something entirely, such as death and darkness,
cannot be more or less, as stated above ([1842]Q[73], A[2]). In like
manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are
related equally to the first principle of our corrupt origin, from
which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations
cannot be more or less. Consequently it is evident that original sin
cannot be more in one than in another.
Reply to Objection 1: Through the bond of original justice being
broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain
order, each power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the
more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the
soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of
the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one man is more
prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to
original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in
all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to themselves
equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as
stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same
species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be
caused by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or
less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the cause
of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not the actual lust that transmits original
sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate
lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we
must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive
appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original
justice. This lust is equally in all.
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OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the
soul?
(2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through
its powers?
(3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of
original sin?
(4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the
generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch?
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Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than
in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises
from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is
seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another
law in my members fighting against the law of my mind. " Therefore
original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect:
thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the
soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal
semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, we contract original sin from our first parent,
in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our souls
were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not
in the soul, but in the flesh.
Objection 4: Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into
the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it
would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus
God would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's
creation and fusion.
Objection 5: Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a
vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the
rational soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul,
by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of
original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul
into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by the
flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh.
On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or
sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of
virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "I know that there dwelleth
not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good. " Therefore
the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul.
I answer that, One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in
its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its
subject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as
in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom.
5:12): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as
in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen
that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the
child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but
only in the soul.
The reason for this is that, as stated above ([1843]Q[81], A[1]),
original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this
posterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as
actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now
in this transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from
the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can
in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its
instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to
gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty,
and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so
far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin.
But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the
internal members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the
will, does not bear the character of guilt.
Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the
flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to
the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of
guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of
guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of
original sin, and not the flesh.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man
already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to
punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh. "
Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt,
but of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Original sin is caused by the semen as
instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the
instrumental cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause:
and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it
had the nature of actual sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in
respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle,
but as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is
transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational
soul, but disposes the matter for it.
Reply to Objection 4: The corruption of original sin is nowise caused
by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal
generation. And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to
God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being
created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God
infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with
regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained
through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it
is infused.
Reply to Objection 5: The common good takes precedence of private good.
Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general
order of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a
body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more that
the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its
infusion into the body, as stated in the [1844]FP, Q[90], A[4];
[1845]FP, Q[118], A[3]. And it is better for the soul to be thus,
according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can
avoid damnation, by means of grace.
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Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the
powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of
the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to be
the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the
will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only
as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according
to its essence, but only according to the powers.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now
original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the
subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the
soul, rather than in its essence.
Objection 3: Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as
from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But
original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is
more in the powers than in the essence of the soul.
Objection 4: Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as
stated ([1846]Q[82], A[3]). But concupiscence is in the powers of the
soul. Therefore original sin is also.
On the contrary, Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated
above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body,
in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated
in the [1847]FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul is the subject of
original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.
I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to
which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the
motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the
concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that
the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is
evident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently
that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the
primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the
term of generation, according as it is the form of the body: and this
belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the
[1848]FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence,
is the primary subject of original sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As the motion of the will of an individual
reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of
the will of the first generator, through the channel of generation,
reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Even original justice pertained radically to the
essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to
which the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the
powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the principles
of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins,
which are the sins of the person.
Reply to Objection 3: The body is related to the soul as matter to
form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless
comes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of
the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper
accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation
and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds
the position of matter and effect, as stated above ([1849]Q[82], A[3]).
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Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin does not infect the will
before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power by
whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the
generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative power
more than to the others.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal
semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than
the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers,
which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than
in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object
of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin
infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all
infect the intellect, as preceding the others.
On the contrary, Original justice has a prior relation to the will,
because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep.
Virg. iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a
prior relation to the will.
I answer that, Two things must be considered in the infection of
original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect
it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above [1850](A[2]).
In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in
this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore regard
first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to
commit a sin, and this is the will, as stated above (Q[74], AA[1],2).
Therefore original sin regards first of all the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in man, is not caused by the
generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental
generative power. Consequently, it does not follow that the child's
generative power is the subject of original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh
to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former
follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of
perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers,
are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher
power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of
original sin reaches it first.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by
proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the
intellect, in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more
infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to
pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of
sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore
that power is most infected by original sin.
Objection 2: Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except
in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey
reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is
not the most infected by original sin.
Objection 3: Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual
and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number of
things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all
in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq. , 24) that
the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the
members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those
members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, wherein
there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive
to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin regards these
three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and
the sense of touch.
I answer that, Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious,
which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to
another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the
like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is
transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above ([1851]Q[81],
A[1]). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said
to be infected. Now this act serves the generative power, in as much as
it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch,
which is the most powerful object of the concupiscible faculty.
Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted
by original sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and
infected.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual
sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above [1852](A[3]). But in
so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the
aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely.
Reply to Objection 2: The infection of actual sin belongs only to the
powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of
original sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but
through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power.
Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Sight is not related to the act of generation
except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible
species is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in
the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch
rather than to the sight.
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OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the
cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
(2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
(3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides
pride and covetousness?
(4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all
sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is
opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of
all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins.
Objection 2: Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for
the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are
not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i,
5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins, but proceeds
from some deeper root.
