No More Learning

Reply to Objection 1: These two wills do not diversify the power but
only the act, as we have said.

Reply to Objection 2: The intellect and the reason are not distinct
powers, as was said in the [4079]FP, Q[79], A[8].

Reply to Objection 3: The "will of piety" would not seem to be distinct
from the will considered as nature, inasmuch as it shrinks from
another's evil, absolutely considered.
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Whether there was free-will in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no free-will. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that {gnome}, i. e. opinion,
thinking or cogitation, and {proairesis}, i. e. choice, "cannot possibly
be attributed to our Lord, if we wish to speak with propriety. " But in
the things of faith especially we must speak with propriety. Therefore
there was no choice in Christ and consequently no free-will, of which
choice is the act.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice
is "a desire of something after taking counsel. " Now counsel does not
appear to be in Christ, because we do not take counsel concerning such
things as we are certain of. But Christ was certain of everything.
Hence there was no counsel and consequently no free-will in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, free-will is indifferent. But Christ's will was
determined to good, since He could not sin; as stated above
([4080]Q[15], AA[1] ,2). Hence there was no free-will in Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 7:15): "He shall eat butter and
honey, that He may know to refuse the evil and to choose the good,"
which is an act of the free-will. Therefore there was free-will in
Christ.

I answer that, As was said above [4081](A[3]), there was a twofold act
of the will in Christ; one whereby He was drawn to anything willed in
itself, which implies the nature of an end; the other whereby His will
was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordained to
another---which pertains to the nature of means. Now, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) choice differs from will in this, that
will of itself regards the end, while choice regards the means. And
thus simple will is the same as the "will as nature"; but choice is the
same as the "will as reason," and is the proper act of free-will, as
was said in the [4082]FP, Q[83], A[3]. Hence, since "will as reason" is
placed in Christ, we must also place choice, and consequently
free-will, whose act is choice, as was said in the [4083]FP, Q[83],
A[3]; [4084]FS, Q[13], A[1].

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene excludes choice from Christ, in so far
as he considers that doubt is implied in the word choice. Nevertheless
doubt is not necessary to choice, since it belongs even to God Himself
to choose, according to Eph. 1:4: "He chose us in Him before the
foundation of the world," although in God there is no doubt. Yet doubt
is accidental to choice when it is in an ignorant nature. We may also
say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the passage quoted.

Reply to Objection 2: Choice presupposes counsel; yet it follows
counsel only as determined by judgment. For what we judge to be done,
we choose, after the inquiry of counsel, as is stated (Ethic. iii,
2,3). Hence if anything is judged necessary to be done, without any
preceding doubt or inquiry, this suffices for choice. Therefore it is
plain that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not essentially, but only
when it is in an ignorant nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The will of Christ, though determined to good, is
not determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even
as to the blessed, to choose with a free-will confirmed in good.
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Whether the human will of Christ was altogether conformed to the Divine will
in the thing willed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human will in Christ did not will
anything except what God willed. For it is written (Ps. 39:9) in the
person of Christ: "That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have desired
it. " Now he who desires to do another's will, wills what the other
wills. Hence it seems that Christ's human will willed nothing but what
was willed by His Divine will.

Objection 2: Further, Christ's soul had most perfect charity, which,
indeed, surpasses the comprehension of all our knowledge, according to
Eph. 3:19, "the charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge. " Now
charity makes men will what God wills; hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ix, 4) that one mark of friendship is "to will and choose the
same. " Therefore the human will in Christ willed nothing else than was
willed by His Divine will.

Objection 3: Further, Christ was a true comprehensor. But the Saints
who are comprehensors in heaven will only what God wills, otherwise
they would not be happy, because they would not obtain whatever they
will, for "blessed is he who has what he wills, and wills nothing
amiss," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5). Hence in His human will
Christ wills nothing else than does the Divine will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "When Christ
says 'Not what I will, but what Thou wilt' He shows Himself to have
willed something else than did His Father; and this could only have
been by His human heart, since He did not transfigure our weakness into
His Divine but into His human will. "

I answer that, As was said ([4085]AA[2],3), in Christ according to His
human nature there is a twofold will, viz. the will of sensuality,
which is called will by participation, and the rational will, whether
considered after the manner of nature, or after the manner of reason.
Now it was said above (Q[13], A[3], ad 1; Q[14], A[1], ad 2) that by a
certain dispensation the Son of God before His Passion "allowed His
flesh to do and suffer what belonged to it. " And in like manner He
allowed all the powers of His soul to do what belonged to them. Now it
is clear that the will of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible
pains and bodily hurt. In like manner, the will as nature turns from
what is against nature and what is evil in itself, as death and the
like; yet the will as reason may at time choose these things in
relation to an end, as in a mere man the sensuality and the will
absolutely considered shrink from burning, which, nevertheless, the
will as reason may choose for the sake of health. Now it was the will
of God that Christ should undergo pain, suffering, and death, not that
these of themselves were willed by God, but for the sake of man's
salvation. Hence it is plain that in His will of sensuality and in His
rational will considered as nature, Christ could will what God did not;
but in His will as reason He always willed the same as God, which
appears from what He says (Mat. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as Thou
wilt. " For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should be
fulfilled although He said that He willed something else by another
will.

Reply to Objection 1: By His rational will Christ willed the Divine
will to be fulfilled; but not by His will of sensuality, the movement
of which does not extend to the will of God---nor by His will
considered as nature which regards things absolutely considered and not
in relation to the Divine will.

Reply to Objection 2: The conformity of the human will to the Divine
regards the will of reason: according to which the wills even of
friends agree, inasmuch as reason considers something willed in its
relation to the will of a friend.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ was at once comprehensor and wayfarer,
inasmuch as He was enjoying God in His mind and had a passible body.
Hence things repugnant to His natural will and to His sensitive
appetite could happen to Him in His passible flesh.
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Whether there was contrariety of wills in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was contrariety of wills in
Christ. For contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects, as
contrariety of movements springs from contrariety of termini, as is
plain from the Philosopher (Phys. v, text. 49, seq. ). Now Christ in His
different wills wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He
wished for death, from which He shrank in His human will, hence
Athanasius says [*De Incarnat. et Cont. Arianos, written against
Apollinarius]: "When Christ says 'Father, if it be possible, let this
chalice pass from Me; yet not My will, but Thine be done,' and again,
'The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh weak,' He denotes two
wills---the human, which through the weakness of the flesh shrank from
the passion---and His Divine will eager for the passion. " Hence there
was contrariety of wills in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth
against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. " Now when the
spirit desires one thing, and the flesh another, there is contrariety
of wills. But this was in Christ; for by the will of charity which the
Holy Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed the passion, according
to Is. 53:7: "He was offered because it was His own will," yet in His
flesh He shrank from the passion. Therefore there was contrariety of
wills in Him.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 22:43) that "being in an
agony, He prayed the longer. " Now agony seems to imply a certain
struggle [*Greek, {agonia}] in a soul drawn to contrary things. Hence
it seems that there was contrariety of will in Christ.

On the contrary, In the decisions of the Sixth Council [*Third Council
of Constantinople, Act. 18] it is said: "We confess two natural wills,
not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics assert, but following His
human will, and neither withstanding nor striving against, but rather
being subject to, His Divine and omnipotent will. "

I answer that, Contrariety can exist only where there is opposition in
the same and as regards the same. For if the diversity exists as
regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not suffice
for the nature of contrariety, nor even for the nature of
contradiction, e. g. if a man were well formed or healthy as regards his
hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be contrariety of
wills in anyone it is necessary, first, that the diversity of wills
should regard the same. For if the will of one regards the doing of
something with reference to some universal reason, and the will of
another regards the not doing the same with reference to some
particular reason, there is not complete contrariety of will, e. g. when
a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for the good of the commonwealth,
and one of the latter's kindred wishes him not to be hanged on account
of a private love, there is no contrariety of wills; unless, indeed,
the desire of the private good went so far as to wish to hinder the
public good for the private good---in that case the opposition of wills
would regard the same.

Secondly, for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it should be in
the same will. For if a man wishes one thing with his rational
appetite, and wishes another thing with his sensitive appetite, there
is no contrariety, unless the sensitive appetite so far prevailed as to
change or at least keep back the rational appetite; for in this case
something of the contrary movement of the sensitive appetite would
reach the rational will.

And hence it must be said that although the natural and the sensitive
will in Christ wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there was
no contrariety of wills in Him. First, because neither the natural will
nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which the Divine
will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the passion. For
the absolute will of Christ wished the salvation of the human race,
although it did not pertain to it to will this for the sake of
something further; but the movement of sensuality could nowise extend
so far. Secondly, because neither the Divine will nor the will of
reason in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural will or the
appetite of sensuality. So, too, on the other hand, neither the Divine
will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from or retarded the
movement of the natural human will and the movement of the sensuality
in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in His Divine will, and in His will
of reason, that His natural will and will of sensuality should be moved
according to the order of their nature. Hence it is clear that in
Christ there was no opposition or contrariety of wills.

Reply to Objection 1: The fact of any will in Christ willing something
else than did the Divine will, proceeded from the Divine will, by whose
permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper
movements, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15,18,19).

Reply to Objection 2: In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or
retarded by the desires of the flesh: this did not occur in Christ.
Hence in Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us.

Reply to Objection 3: The agony in Christ was not in the rational soul,
in as far as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a diversity
of motives, as when anyone, on his reason considering one, wishes one
thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this
springs from the weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge which
is the best simply. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by His
reason He judged it best that the Divine will regarding the salvation
of the human race should be fulfilled by His passion. Nevertheless,
there was an agony in Christ as regards the sensitive part, inasmuch as
it implied a dread of coming trial, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii, 15; iii, 18,23).
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OF THE UNITY OF CHRIST'S OPERATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the unity of Christ's operation; and under this
head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in Christ there was one or several operations of the
Godhead and Manhood?

(2) Whether in Christ there were several operations of the human
nature?

(3) Whether Christ by His human operation merited anything for Himself?

(4) Whether He merited anything for us by it?
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Whether in Christ there is only one operation of the Godhead and Manhood?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there is but one operation of
the Godhead and the Manhood. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "The
most loving operation of God is made manifest to us by the
supersubstantial Word having taken flesh integrally and truly, and
having operated and suffered whatsoever befits His human and Divine
operation. " But he here mentions only one human and Divine operation,
which is written in Greek {theandrike}, i. e. God-manlike. Hence it
seems that there is but one composite operation in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, there is but one operation of the principal and
instrumental agent. Now the human nature in Christ was the instrument
of the Divine, as was said above ([4086]Q[7], A[1], ad 3;[4087] Q[8],
A[1], ad 1;[4088] Q[18], A[1], ad 2). Hence the operations of the
Divine and human natures in Christ are the same.

Objection 3: Further, since in Christ there are two natures in one
hypostasis or person, whatever pertains to the hypostasis or person is
one and the same. But operation pertains to the hypostasis or person,
for it is only a subsisting suppositum that operates; hence, according
to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1), acts belong to singulars. Hence in
Christ there is only one operation of the Godhead and the Manhood.

Objection 4: Further, as being belongs to a subsisting hypostasis, so
also does operation. But on account of the unity of hypostasis there is
only one operation of the Godhead and the ([4089]Q[17], A[2]). Hence,
on account of the same unity, there is one operation in Christ.

Objection 5: Further, as being belongs to a sub-operated there is one
operation. But the same thing was operated by the Godhead and the
Manhood, as the healing of the lepers or the raising of the dead. Hence
it seems that in Christ there is but one operation of the Godhead and
the Manhood.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 8): "How can the same
operation spring from different powers? Cannot the lesser operate as
the greater? And can there be one operation where there are different
substances? "

I answer that, As was said above ([4090]Q[18], A[1]), the aforesaid
heretics who placed one will in Christ placed one operation in Christ.
Now in order better to understand their erroneous opinion, we must bear
in mind that wherever there are several mutually ordained agents, the
inferior is moved by the superior, as in man the body is moved by the
soul and the lower powers by the reason. And thus the actions and
movements of the inferior principle are things operated rather than
operations. Now what pertains to the highest principle is properly the
operation; thus we say of man that to walk, which belongs to the feet,
and to touch, which belongs to the hand, are things operated by the
man---one of which is operated by the soul through the feet, the other
through the hands. And because it is the same soul that operates in
both cases, there is only one indifferent operation, on the part of the
thing operating, which is the first moving principle; but difference is
found on the part of what is operated. Now, as in a mere man the body
is moved by the soul, and the sensitive by the rational appetite, so in
the Lord Jesus Christ the human nature is moved and ruled by the
Divine. Hence they said that there is one indifferent operation on the
part of the Godhead operating, but divers things operated, inasmuch as
the Godhead of Christ did one thing by Itself, as to uphold all things
by the word of His power---and another thing by His human nature, as to
walk in body. Hence the Sixth Council [*Third Council of
Constantinople, Act. 10] quotes the words of Severus the heretic, who
said: "What things were done and wrought by the one Christ, differ
greatly; for some are becoming to God, and some are human, as to walk
bodily on the earth is indeed human, but to give hale steps to sickly
limbs, wholly unable to walk on the ground, is becoming to God. Yet
one, i. e. the Incarnate Word, wrought one and the other---neither was
this from one nature, and that from another; nor can we justly affirm
that because there are distinct things operated there are therefore two
operating natures and forms. "

But herein they were deceived, for what is moved by another has a
twofold action---one which it has from its own form---the other, which
it has inasmuch as it is moved by another; thus the operation of an axe
of itself is to cleave; but inasmuch as it is moved by the craftsman,
its operation is to make benches. Hence the operation which belongs to
a thing by its form is proper to it, nor does it belong to the mover,
except in so far as he makes use of this kind of thing for his work:
thus to heat is the proper operation of fire, but not of a smith,
except in so far as he makes use of fire for heating iron. But the
operation which belongs to the thing, as moved by another, is not
distinct from the operation of the mover; thus to make a bench is not
the work of the axe independently of the workman. Hence, wheresoever
the mover and the moved have different forms or operative faculties,
there must the operation of the mover and the proper operation of the
moved be distinct; although the moved shares in the operation of the
mover, and the mover makes use of the operation of the moved, and,
consequently, each acts in communion with the other.

Therefore in Christ the human nature has its proper form and power
whereby it acts; and so has the Divine. Hence the human nature has its
proper operation distinct from the Divine, and conversely.
Nevertheless, the Divine Nature makes use of the operation of the human
nature, as of the operation of its instrument; and in the same way the
human nature shares in the operation of the Divine Nature, as an
instrument shares in the operation of the principal agent. And this is
what Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Flavian. xxviii): "Both forms" (i. e. both
the Divine and the human nature in Christ) "do what is proper to each
in union with the other, i. e. the Word operates what belongs to the
Word, and the flesh carries out what belongs to flesh. "

But if there were only one operation of the Godhead and manhood in
Christ, it would be necessary to say either that the human nature had
not its proper form and power (for this could not possibly be said of
the Divine), whence it would follow that in Christ there was only the
Divine operation; or it would be necessary to say that from the Divine
and human power there was made up one power. Now both of these are
impossible. For by the first the human nature in Christ is supposed to
be imperfect; and by the second a confusion of the natures is supposed.
Hence it is with reason that the Sixth Council (Act. 18) condemned this
opinion, and decreed as follows: "We confess two natural, indivisible,
unconvertible, unconfused, and inseparable operations in the same Lord
Jesus Christ our true God"; i. e. the Divine operation and the human
operation.

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius places in Christ a theandric, i. e. a
God-manlike or Divino-human, operation not by any confusion of the
operations or powers of both natures, but inasmuch as His Divine
operation employs the human, and His human operation shares in the
power of the Divine. Hence, as he says in a certain epistle (Ad Caium
iv), "what is of man He works beyond man; and this is shown by the
Virgin conceiving supernaturally and by the unstable waters bearing up
the weight of bodily feet. " Now it is clear that to be begotten belongs
to human nature, and likewise to walk; yet both were in Christ
supernaturally. So, too, He wrought Divine things humanly, as when He
healed the leper with a touch. Hence in the same epistle he adds: "He
performed Divine works not as God does, and human works not as man
does, but, God having been made man, by a new operation of God and
man. "

Now, that he understood two operations in Christ, one of the Divine and
the other of the human nature, is clear from what he says, Div. Nom.
ii: "Whatever pertains to His human operation the Father and the Holy
Ghost no-wise share in, except, as one might say, by their most
gracious and merciful will," i. e. inasmuch as the Father and the Holy
Ghost in their mercy wished Christ to do and to suffer human things.
And he adds: "He is truly the unchangeable God, and God's Word by the
sublime and unspeakable operation of God, which, being made man for us,
He wrought. " Hence it is clear that the human operation, in which the
Father and the Holy Ghost do not share, except by Their merciful
consent, is distinct from His operation, as the Word of God, wherein
the Father and the Holy Ghost share.

Reply to Objection 2: The instrument is said to act through being moved
by the principal agent; and yet, besides this, it can have its proper
operation through its own form, as stated above of fire. And hence the
action of the instrument as instrument is not distinct from the action
of the principal agent; yet it may have another operation, inasmuch as
it is a thing. Hence the operation of Christ's human nature, as the
instrument of the Godhead, is not distinct from the operation of the
Godhead; for the salvation wherewith the manhood of Christ saves us and
that wherewith His Godhead saves us are not distinct; nevertheless, the
human nature in Christ, inasmuch as it is a certain nature, has a
proper operation distinct from the Divine, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: To operate belongs to a subsisting hypostasis; in
accordance, however, with the form and nature from which the operation
receives its species. Hence from the diversity of forms or natures
spring the divers species of operations, but from the unity of
hypostasis springs the numerical unity as regards the operation of the
species: thus fire has two operations specifically different, namely,
to illuminate and to heat, from the difference of light and heat, and
yet the illumination of the fire that illuminates at one and the same
time is numerically one. So, likewise, in Christ there are necessarily
two specifically different operations by reason of His two natures;
nevertheless, each of the operations at one and the same time is
numerically one, as one walking and one healing.

Reply to Objection 4: Being and operation belong to the person by
reason of the nature; yet in a different manner. For being belongs to
the very constitution of the person, and in this respect it has the
nature of a term; consequently, unity of person requires unity of the
complete and personal being. But operation is an effect of the person
by reason of a form or nature. Hence plurality of operations is not
incompatible with personal unity.

Reply to Objection 5: The proper work of the Divine operation is
different from the proper work of the human operation. Thus to heal a
leper is a proper work of the Divine operation, but to touch him is the
proper work of the human operation. Now both these operations concur in
one work, inasmuch as one nature acts in union with the other.
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Whether in Christ there are several human operations?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are several human
operations. For Christ as man communicates with plants by His nutritive
soul, with the brutes by His sensitive soul, and with the angels by His
intellective soul, even as other men do. Now the operations of a plant
as plant and of an animal as animal are different. Therefore Christ as
man has several operations.

Objection 2: Further, powers and habits are distinguished by their
acts. Now in Christ's soul there were divers powers and habits;
therefore also divers operations.

Objection 3: Further, instruments ought to be proportioned to their
operations. Now the human body has divers members of different form,
and consequently fitted to divers operations. Therefore in Christ there
are divers operations in the human nature.

On the contrary, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), "operation
is consequent upon the nature. " But in Christ there is only one human
nature. Therefore in Christ there is only one human operation.

I answer that, Since it is by his reason that man is what he is; that
operation is called human simply, which proceeds from the reason
through the will, which is the rational appetite. Now if there is any
operation in man which does not proceed from the reason and the will,
it is not simply a human operation, but belongs to man by reason of
some part of human nature---sometimes by reason of the nature of
elementary bodies, as to be borne downwards---sometimes by reason of
the force of the vegetative soul, as to be nourished, and to
grow---sometimes by reason of the sensitive part, as to see and hear,
to imagine and remember, to desire and to be angry. Now between these
operations there is a difference. For the operations of the sensitive
soul are to some extent obedient to reason, and consequently they are
somewhat rational and human inasmuch as they obey reason, as is clear
from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). But the operations that spring
from the vegetative soul, or from the nature of elemental bodies, are
not subject to reason; consequently they are nowise rational; nor
simply human, but only as regards a part of human nature. Now it was
said [4091](A[1]) that when a subordinate agent acts by its own form,
the operations of the inferior and of the superior agent are distinct;
but when the inferior agent acts only as moved by the superior agent,
then the operation of the superior and the inferior agent is one.

And hence in every mere man the operations of the elemental body and of
the vegetative soul are distinct from the will's operation, which is
properly human; so likewise the operations of the sensitive soul
inasmuch as it is not moved by reason; but inasmuch as it is moved by
reason, the operations of the sensitive and the rational part are the
same. Now there is but one operation of the rational part if we
consider the principle of the operation, which is the reason and the
will; but the operations are many if we consider their relationship to
various objects. And there were some who called this a diversity of
things operated rather than of operations, judging the unity of the
operation solely from the operative principle. And it is in this
respect that we are now considering the unity and plurality of
operations in Christ.

Hence in every mere man there is but one operation, which is properly
called human; but besides this there are in a mere man certain other
operations, which are not strictly human, as was said above. But in the
Man Jesus Christ there was no motion of the sensitive part which was
not ordered by reason. Even the natural and bodily operations pertained
in some respects to His will, inasmuch as it was His will "that His
flesh should do and suffer what belonged to it," as stated above
([4092]Q[18], A[5]). Much more, therefore, is there one operation in
Christ, than in any other man whatsoever.

Reply to Objection 1: The operations of the sensitive and nutritive
parts are not strictly human, as stated above; yet in Christ these
operations were more human than in others.

Reply to Objection 2: Powers and habits are diversified by comparison
with their objects. Hence in this way the diversity of operations
corresponds to the divers powers and habits, as likewise to the divers
objects. Now we do not wish to exclude this diversity of operations
from Christ's humanity, nor that which springs from a diversity of
time, but only that which regards the first active principle, as was
said above.

(St. Thomas gives no reply to OBJ[3]; some codices add: Hence may be
gathered the reply to the third objection. )
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Whether the human action of Christ could be meritorious to Him?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human action of Christ could not be
meritorious to Him. For before His death Christ was a comprehensor even
as He is now. But comprehensors do not merit: because the charity of
the comprehensor belongs to the reward of beatitude, since fruition
depends upon it. Hence it does not seem to be the principle of merit,
since merit and reward are not the same. Therefore Christ before His
passion did not merit, even as He does not merit now.

Objection 2: Further, no one merits what is due to him. But because
Christ is the Son of God by nature, the eternal inheritance is due to
Him, which other men merit by their works. And hence Christ Who, from
the beginning, was the Word of God, could not merit anything for
Himself.

Objection 3: Further, whoever has the principle does not properly merit
what flows from its possession. But Christ has the glory of the soul,
whence, in the natural course, flowed the glory of the body, as
Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios cxviii); though by a dispensation it was
brought about that in Christ the glory of the soul should not overflow
to the body. Hence Christ did not merit the glory of the body.

Objection 4: Further, the manifestation of Christ's excellence is a
good, not of Christ Himself, but of those who know Him. Hence it is
promised as a reward to such as love Christ that He will be manifested
to them, according to Jn. 14:21: "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of
My Father, and I will love him and will manifest Myself to him. "
Therefore Christ did not merit the manifestation of His greatness.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 2:8,9): "Becoming obedient
unto death . . . For which cause God also hath exalted Him. " Therefore
by obeying He merited His exaltation and thus He merited something for
Himself.

I answer that, To have any good thing of oneself is more excellent than
to have it from another, for "what is of itself a cause is always more
excellent than what is a cause through another," as is said Phys. viii,
5. Now a thing is said to have, of itself, that of which it is to some
extent the cause. But of whatever good we possess the first cause by
authority is God; and in this way no creature has any good of itself,
according to 1 Cor. 4:7: "What hast thou that thou hast not received? "
Nevertheless, in a secondary manner anyone may be a cause, to himself,
of having certain good things, inasmuch as he cooperates with God in
the matter, and thus whoever has anything by his own merit has it, in a
manner, of himself. Hence it is better to have a thing by merit than
without merit.

Now since all perfection and greatness must be attributed to Christ,
consequently He must have by merit what others have by merit; unless it
be of such a nature that its want would detract from Christ's dignity
and perfection more than would accrue to Him by merit. Hence He merited
neither grace nor knowledge nor the beatitude of His soul, nor the
Godhead, because, since merit regards only what is not yet possessed,
it would be necessary that Christ should have been without these at
some time; and to be without them would have diminished Christ's
dignity more than His merit would have increased it. But the glory of
the body, and the like, are less than the dignity of meriting, which
pertains to the virtue of charity. Hence we must say that Christ had,
by merit, the glory of His body and whatever pertained to His outward
excellence, as His Ascension, veneration, and the rest. And thus it is
clear that He could merit for Himself.

Reply to Objection 1: Fruition, which is an act of charity, pertains to
the glory of the soul, which Christ did not merit. Hence if He merited
by charity, it does not follow that the merit and the reward are the
same. Nor did He merit by charity inasmuch as it was the charity of a
comprehensor, but inasmuch as it was that of a wayfarer. For He was at
once a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as was said above ([4093]Q[15],
A[10]). And therefore, since He is no longer a wayfarer, He is not in
the state of meriting.

Reply to Objection 2: Because by nature Christ is God and the Son of
God, the Divine glory and the lordship of all things are due to Him, as
to the first and supreme Lord. Nevertheless a glory is due to Him as a
beatified man; and this He has partly without merit, and partly with
merit, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 3: It is by Divine appointment that there is an
overflow of glory from the soul to the body, in keeping with human
merit; so that as man merits by the act of the soul which he performs
in the body, so he may be rewarded by the glory of the soul overflowing
to the body. And hence not only the glory of the soul, but also the
glory of the body falls under merit, according to Rom. 8:11: "He . . .
shall quicken also our [Vulg. : 'your'] mortal bodies, because of His
Spirit that dwelleth in us [Vulg. : 'you']. " And thus it could fall
under Christ's merit.

Reply to Objection 4: The manifestation of Christ's excellence is His
good as regards the being which it has in the knowledge of others;
although in regard to the being which they have in themselves it
chiefly belongs to the good of those who know Him. Yet even this is
referred to Christ inasmuch as they are His members.
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Whether Christ could merit for others?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit for others. For
it is written (Ezech. 18:4): "The soul that sinneth, the same shall
die. " Hence, for a like reason, the soul that meriteth, the same shall
be recompensed. Therefore it is not possible that Christ merited for
others.

Objection 2: Further, of the fulness of Christ's grace we all receive,
as is written Jn. 1:16. Now other men having Christ's grace cannot
merit for others. For it is written (Ezech. 14:20) that if "Noe and
Daniel and Job be in the city [Vulg. : 'the midst thereof'] . . . they
shall deliver neither son nor daughter; but they shall only deliver
their own souls by their justice. " Hence Christ could not merit
anything for us.

Objection 3: Further, the "reward" that we merit is due "according to
justice [Vulg. : 'debt'] and not according to grace," as is clear from
Rom. 4:4. Therefore if Christ merited our salvation it follows that our
salvation is not by God's grace but by justice, and that He acts
unjustly with those whom He does not save, since Christ's merit extends
to all.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:18): "As by the offense of one,
unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all
men to justification of life. " But Adam's demerits reached to the
condemnation of others. Much more, therefore, does the merit of Christ
reach others.

I answer that, As stated above ([4094]Q[8], AA[1],5), grace was in
Christ not merely as in an individual, but also as in the Head of the
whole Church, to Whom all are united, as members to a head, who
constitute one mystical person. And hence it is that Christ's merit
extends to others inasmuch as they are His members; even as in a man
the action of the head reaches in a manner to all his members, since it
perceives not merely for itself alone, but for all the members.

Reply to Objection 1: The sin of an individual harms himself alone; but
the sin of Adam, who was appointed by God to be the principle of the
whole nature, is transmitted to others by carnal propagation. So, too,
the merit of Christ, Who has been appointed by God to be the head of
all men in regard to grace, extends to all His members.

Reply to Objection 2: Others receive of Christ's fulness not indeed the
fount of grace, but some particular grace. And hence it need not be
that men merit for others, as Christ did.

Reply to Objection 3: As the sin of Adam reaches others only by carnal
generation, so, too, the merit of Christ reaches others only by
spiritual regeneration, which takes place in baptism; wherein we are
incorporated with Christ, according to Gal. 3:27, "As many of you as
have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ"; and it is by grace
that it is granted to man to be incorporated with Christ. And thus
man's salvation is from grace.
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OF CHRIST'S SUBJECTION TO THE FATHER (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider such things as belong to Christ in relation to the
Father. Some of these things are predicated of Him because of His
relation to the Father, e. g. that He was subject to Him, that He prayed
to Him, that He ministered, to Him by priesthood. And some are
predicated, or may be predicated, of Him because of the Father's
relation to Him, e. g. that the Father adopted Him and that He
predestined Him.

Hence we must consider (1) Christ's subjection to the Father; (2) His
prayer; (3) His priesthood; (4) Adoption---whether it is becoming to
Him; (5) His predestination.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ is subject to the Father?

(2) Whether He is subject to Himself?
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Whether we may say that Christ is subject to the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that we may not say that Christ was subject
to the Father. For everything subject to the Father is a creature,
since, as is said in De Eccles. Dogm. iv, "in the Trinity there is no
dependence or subjection. " But we cannot say simply that Christ is a
creature, as was stated above ([4095]Q[16], A[8]). Therefore we cannot
say simply that Christ is subject to God the Father.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is said to be subject to God when it is
subservient to His dominion. But we cannot attribute subservience to
the human nature of Christ; for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 21):
"We must bear in mind that we may not call it" (i. e. Christ's human
nature) "a servant; for the words 'subservience' and 'domination' are
not names of the nature, but of relations, as the words 'paternity' and
'filiation. '" Hence Christ in His human nature is not subject to God
the Father.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:28): "And when all
things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be
subject unto Him that put all things under Him. " But, as is written
(Heb. 2:8): "We see not as yet all things subject to Him. " Hence He is
not yet subject to the Father, Who has subjected all things to Him.

On the contrary, Our Lord says (Jn. 14:28), "The Father is greater than
I"; and Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "It is not without reason that
the Scripture mentions both, that the Son is equal to the Father and
the Father greater than the Son, for the first is said on account of
the form of God, and the second on account of the form of a servant,
without any confusion. " Now the less is subject to the greater.
Therefore in the form of a servant Christ is subject to the Father.

I answer that, Whoever has a nature is competent to have what is proper
to that nature. Now human nature from its beginning has a threefold
subjection to God. The first regards the degree of goodness, inasmuch
as the Divine Nature is the very essence of goodness as is clear from
Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) while a created nature has a participation of
the Divine goodness, being subject, so to say, to the rays of this
goodness. Secondly, human nature is subject to God, as regards God's
power, inasmuch as human nature, even as every creature, is subject to
the operation of the Divine ordinance. Thirdly, human nature is
especially subject to God through its proper act, inasmuch as by its
own will it obeys His command. This triple subjection to God Christ
professes of Himself. The first (Mat. 19:17): "Why askest thou Me
concerning good? One is good, God. " And on this Jerome remarks: "He who
had called Him a good master, and had not confessed Him to be God or
the Son of God, learns that no man, however holy, is good in comparison
with God. " And hereby He gave us to understand that He Himself, in His
human nature, did not attain to the height of Divine goodness. And
because "in such things as are great, but not in bulk, to be great is
the same as to be good," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8), for this
reason the Father is said to be greater than Christ in His human
nature. The second subjection is attributed to Christ, inasmuch as all
that befell Christ is believed to have happened by Divine appointment;
hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that Christ "is subject to the
ordinance of God the Father. " And this is the subjection of
subservience, whereby "every creature serves God" (Judith 16:17), being
subject to His ordinance, according to Wis. 16:24: "The creature
serving Thee the Creator. " And in this way the Son of God (Phil. 2:7)
is said to have taken "the form of a servant. " The third subjection He
attributes to Himself, saying (Jn. 8:29): "I do always the things that
please Him. " And this is the subjection to the Father, of obedience
unto death. Hence it is written (Phil. 2:8) that he became "obedient"
to the Father "unto death. "

Reply to Objection 1: As we are not to understand that Christ is a
creature simply, but only in His human nature, whether this
qualification be added or not, as stated above ([4096]Q[16], A[8]), so
also we are to understand that Christ is subject to the Father not
simply but in His human nature, even if this qualification be not
added; and yet it is better to add this qualification in order to avoid
the error of Arius, who held the Son to be less than the Father.

Reply to Objection 2: The relation of subservience and dominion is
based upon action and passion, inasmuch as it belongs to a servant to
be moved by the will of his master. Now to act is not attributed to the
nature as agent, but to the person, since "acts belong to supposita and
to singulars," according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1).
Nevertheless action is attributed to the nature as to that whereby the
person or hypostasis acts. Hence, although the nature is not properly
said to rule or serve, yet every hypostasis or person may be properly
said to be ruling or serving in this or that nature. And in this way
nothing prevents Christ being subject or servant to the Father in human
nature.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8): "Christ will
give the kingdom to God and the Father, when He has brought the
faithful, over whom He now reigns by faith, to the vision," i. e.