Regarded
from a
moral point of view, a real respect is due to the
action of many franc-tireurs in 1870 and 1871,
whom despair drove to try to save their country.
moral point of view, a real respect is due to the
action of many franc-tireurs in 1870 and 1871,
whom despair drove to try to save their country.
Treitschke - 1914 - His Doctrine of German Destiny
Only we must not
expect the impossible. The difficulty of the
question becomes apparent as soon as one looks
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 176 Treitschke
into its details. One then realizes that all obli-
gations of private as of other international law
are entered into and kept with a certain reserva-
tion, that, namely, they cannot be fulfilled when
they entail grave hurt to the State which promised
to carry them out. However many treaties we
may conclude in the domain of private interna-
tional law, it is always implied that we shall not
keep them if a foreigner becomes obnoxious to us.
A State must be able to expel inconvenient for-
eigners, without declaring its reasons, even though
it has signed a treaty permitting foreigners to
reside within its borders. Thus, modern States
habitually expel persons suspected of being spies
or secret agents; if explanations had to be pub-
lished before active steps were taken in such cases,
those explanations would be mostly of an exceed-
ingly unpleasant kind, and would merely imperil
the friendly relations of the States concerned. It
is, therefore, more sensible to take the line that
any alien can be expelled at any moment, with the
simple comment: You are undesirable. And the
right to act thus must be firmly maintained, if
only in the interest of honest men, who might
otherwise be molested; this proceeding, which
appears cruel on the surface, proves in reality to
be the truest humanity. On the other hand,
States must not claim the right to expel their own
subjects. That is to claim something which is
essentially illegitimate. When Germany expelled
the Jesuits, we were at least sure that they would
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 177
find a roof elsewhere. But if Germany were to
expel its own common criminals, it would be simply
blowing them into the air, for no other State would
be willing to receive them.
Wherever international law relating to private
individuals has begun to grow up, mutual un-
dertakings are soon given between the various
States to assist one another in the apprehension of
criminals. Here we reach some of the hardest
problems of international law. It is easy enough
to assert generally that mankind as a whole is
bound to pursue criminals. That is recognized
by all noble nations and is easily embodied in
their laws. But how are we to draw the line
between what is criminal and what is not? To
begin with, it is eminently necessary to distinguish
political and common offenders. Every State
must consider its own interests before it takes
action against traitors against some other State.
There may exist between two countries, nominally
at peace, a latent state of war, as is now the case
between France and Germany. In such a case
it may well happen that the man who is a political
offender against the laws of his own country is
also very welcome to the other country; it would
be silly if the latter were to be forced to hand him
over to his own government. Treaties regulating
the extradition of common malefactors are easily
made; but no State will pledge itself to deliver
up all political offenders without the option of
using its own judgment in particular cases. Un-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 178 Treitschke
derstandings, again, might be effected as to anar-
chists, pure and simple, who work with dynamite;
but about political offenders, as a class, no general
treaty can be drawn.
. With respect to common criminals, the limits
of extradition must, of course, be settled by special
agreements. Such agreements must, of course,
apply only to really grievous offences. The ju-
dicial codes of various lands vary so much that
it is emphatically desirable that as many crimes
as possible should be judged at home. Experi-
ence has here shown that the farther the juris-
diction of a nation is extended, the better the
result.
All this general movement towards securing
justice naturally tends to an ordered union be-
tween the States concerned, that is, to a political
system in which the use of fixed forms of action
is accepted even in international matters. The
quarrels of seventeenth-century Europe on matters
of ceremonial, which now strike us as so absurd,
had a sound basis, despite the ridiculous forms
which they assumed. They showed that the
States of Europe had begun to regard themselves
as members of one family. In a well-ordered
household, everyone must have his fixed place,
and his individual rights must be recognized and
maintained. The difference between empires and
small States, between great Powers and States of
the second or third rank, still exists from a practi-
cal point of view, though no documents specifically
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 179
record it. A great Power may be defined as a State
which could not, in the given circumstances, be
destroyed by any one other Power, but only by a
coalition. The preponderance of the great Powers
in Europe has lately become very marked, and it
is to this that we owe a certain security now ob-
servable in our international relations. The law
affecting embassies had been so firmly established
since the Congress of Aachen in 1818, that the
clearest lines have been drawn in all civilized
States between the different classes of diplomatists.
Through the dominance of the leading European
Powers, the practice indeed the rule has grown
up that representation at a Congress of great
Powers is granted only to those among the lesser
States which are directly concerned in the subject
to be discussed. But when once a small State
has been invited to the Congress, its voice carries
as much weight as that of any other State, large
or small. These Congresses are governed, not by
a vote of the majority, but by the liberum veto
of natural law. A meeting which is held, not to
conduct a war but to formulate its results, cannot
reasonably be bound by majority votes; it must
obtain unanimity.
It appears impossible to set up any general
principle governing international behaviour. The
doctrine that you may always intervene in the
affairs of another State is as false as the doctrine
that you may never do so. A State may find itself
driven to regard the party struggles in a neigh-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 178 Treitschke
derstandings, again, might be effected as to anar-
chists, pure and simple, who work with dynamite;
but about political offenders, as a class, no general
treaty can be drawn.
. With respect to common criminals, the limits
of extradition must, of course, be settled by special
agreements. Such agreements must, of course,
apply only to really grievous offences. The ju-
dicial codes of various lands vary so much that
it is emphatically desirable that as many crimes
as possible should be judged at home. Experi-
ence has here shown that the farther the juris-
diction of a nation is extended, the better the
result.
All this general movement towards securing
justice naturally tends to an ordered union be-
tween the States concerned, that is, to a political
system in which the use of fixed forms of action
is accepted even in international matters. The
quarrels of seventeenth-century Europe on matters
of ceremonial, which now strike us as so absurd,
had a sound basis, despite the ridiculous forms
which they assumed. They showed that the
States of Europe had begun to regard themselves
as members of one family. In a well-ordered
household, everyone must have his fixed place,
and his individual rights must be recognized and
maintained. The difference between empires and
small States, between great Powers and States of
the second or third rank, still exists from a practi-
cal point of view, though no documents specifically
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 179
record it. A great Power may be defined as a State
which could not, in the given circumstances, be
destroyed by any one other Power, but only by a
coalition. The preponderance of the great Powers
in Europe has lately become very marked, and it
is to this that we owe a certain security now ob-
servable in our international relations. The law
affecting embassies had been so firmly established
since the Congress of Aachen in 1818, that the
clearest lines have been drawn in all civilized
States between the different classes of diplomatists.
Through the dominance of the leading European
Powers, the practice indeed the rule has grown
up that representation at a Congress of great
Powers is granted only to those among the lesser
States which are directly concerned in the subject
to be discussed. But when once a small State
has been invited to the Congress, its voice carries
as much weight as that of any other State, large
or small. These Congresses are governed, not by
a vote of the majority, but by the liberum veto
of natural law. A meeting which is held, not to
conduct a war but to formulate its results, cannot
reasonably be bound by majority votes; it must
obtain unanimity.
It appears impossible to set up any general
principle governing international behaviour. The
doctrine that you may always intervene in the
affairs of another State is as false as the doctrine
that you may never do so. A State may find itself
driven to regard the party struggles in a neigh-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? i8o Treitschke
bouring country as harmful to its own peace.
Were a cosmopolitan party to seize the reins in a
State which bordered with Germany, the issue
might look so threatening to us that we should
have no option but to interfere. To interfere,
however, involves considerable risk. The modern
world has come to believe firmly in the doctrine
of national independence, and intervention will
always arouse resentment, and that not only in
the country which suffers the intervention. Hard
experience has taught this generation to be shy
of mixing in the internal affairs of its neighbours.
But when a State's existence seems to itself to be
in peril, it both may and will intervene.
IN TIME OF WAR.
The acceptance by States of common rules for
mutual relations, even in an age when physical
force tears up treaties, shows that a law governs
their conduct, but a defective and immature law.
A state of war is usually preceded by a hostile
peace. Vain efforts at mutual understanding lead,
in the first instance, to one of the States passing
laws detrimental to the other. That is legal
enough, if it is not fair, and the other State will
straightway retaliate by a similar lack of considera-
tion for its neighbour. If one of the States trespass
on an actual treaty right, the sufferer replies by
equally conscious illegalities. Preludes of these
kinds lead finally to real war. As soon as hostili-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 181
ties have actually begun, all treaties between the
two States come, legally, to an end. A formal
declaration of war is no longer needful in these
days of railways and telegraphs. Mobilizations
of troops and discussions in cabinets and parlia-
ments give clear warning that the State intends to
open hostilities ; the declaration is an empty form.
In the war of 1870, France did not send us any
declaration of war till a week after diplomatic re-
lations had been broken off.
After the outbreak of war, the primary object
seems to be to bring about new international
conditions which shall correspond to the real
strength of the warring States, and which they
must recognize. It is then legitimate to carry on
the war in the most drastic manner; the ultimate
aim peace will thus be attained as speedily as
possible. First, therefore, pierce the enemy to the
heart. The very sharpest weapons may be used,
provided that they do not inflict on the wounded
needless torments. Philanthropists may declaim
about burning shells which fall into the powder
magazines of wooden warships; that is all beside
the point. The States themselves must settle
what weapons shall not be used; at the request of
Russia it has been agreed not to use explosive
bullets for rifles. A warring nation is wholly
justified in taking every advantage of every weak-
ness in its opponent. If its enemy is disturbed
by internal revolts and conspiracies, it may make
full use of them; in 1866, it was only the swift
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 1 82 Treitschke
march of events that prevented us Prussians from
entering into agreements with the Hungarians
against their Austrian masters.
A warring nation may call to its fighting line
the whole of its troops whether barbarian or
civilized. On this point we must keep an open
mind and avoid prejudice against any particular
nation. There were howls in Germany during the
Franco-Prussian war because the French set the
Turcos to fight a highly civilized European people.
The passions of war readily breed such protests,
but science must take a dispassionate view and
declare that action such as that of the French
was not contrary to international law. A bel-
ligerent State both may and ought to bring into
the field all its physical resources, that is, all its
troops of every kind. For where can a line be
drawn? Which of all its charming subject-races
should Russia, for example, rule out of court? The
entire physical resources of the State can, and
must, be used in war. But they must only be used
when they have been embodied in those chivalrous
forms of organization which have been gradually
established during a long series of wars. The use
of the Turcos by the French put a curious com-
plexion on their claim to march at the head of
civilization. Indeed, many of the complaints
made in this respect arise from the fact that
people demand from a nation more than it is able
to fulfil. We all know that in modern national
warfare every gallant subject is a spy. The expul-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 183
sion of the 80,000 Germans from France at the
beginning of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 was,
therefore, in accordance with international law;
the one point to which we can object in the whole
proceeding is, that the French displayed a certain
brutality in dealing with these Germans.
The degree of humanity to be observed in war-
fare is affected by the doctrine that a war can
only be waged between two States, and not be-
tween individual members of those States. This
doctrine regulates all warfare in theory, though in
practice only that on land. It should be possible
to recognize, by a distinguishing mark, all men
whom the State authorizes to wage war for it, and
who must, therefore, be treated as soldiers. We
are not, as yet, all agreed on this point, and this
failure to agree constitutes a grievous gap in
international law. Humanity in war is entirely
dependent on the question as to whether the
soldier feels that his only opponent is the enemy's
soldier, and that he need not fear an attack behind
a bush from every peasant, with whom he has
had peaceful dealings half an hour earlier. If the
soldier, journeying through a hostile country, does
not know whom to regard as soldier, and whom
to look upon as robber and highwayman, he is
driven to show himself cruel and heartless. No
one can be regarded as a soldier unless he has
taken the military oath, unless he is subject to
military law, and unless he wears some distinctive
token, even if it be not (strictly speaking) a com-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 184 Treitschke
plete uniform. It is a self-evident fact that bands
of unauthorized volunteers must expect to meet
with harsh and ruthless treatment. It is impera-
tive that we should come to some sort of inter-
national agreement as to the tokens whereby one
may know an armed man to be an actual member
of an authorized army. This point was discussed
at Brussels, in 1874, an d there the conflicting
interests of the different parties were thrown into
high relief. Little States, like Switzerland, were
in no way anxious to bind themselves on such a
question.
Each State is, at present, its own judge in the
matter, and must itself determine which of its
enemies it proposes to treat as units of an army
and which as simple robbers.
Regarded from a
moral point of view, a real respect is due to the
action of many franc-tireurs in 1870 and 1871,
whom despair drove to try to save their country.
But in the light of international law, they were
mere highwaymen. In the same way, Napoleon
was right in 1809 to treat Schill and his associates
as robbers. Schill, a Prussian staff officer, him-
self deserted, and induced his men to desert, and
then began to wage war against France. He was
then, according to international law, nothing more
than a robber chief. The King's anger at this
proceeding knew no bounds. What was there
left to hold the State together, if every staff officer
chose to form a little army of his own? But, in
spite of these facts, Napoleon's resolve to adhere to
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 185
the letter of the law in this affair was an act of
unparalleled cruelty, and also an act of great
imprudence. Everyone with noble instincts will
side with Schill. Schenkendorf felt this when he
represented Schill as saying :
"My King himself will say to me,
'Rest thou in peace, my faithful Schill. '"
It would, however, be impossible to maintain that
the enemy's action was any infringement of in-
ternational law.
When it has once been determined who belongs
to the army, and who is entitled to the chivalrous
treatment due to a prisoner of war, private prop-
erty belonging to an enemy may be very generally
spared. But in this matter, also, it must be clearly
understood that we must not, in the name of
humanity, outrage the sense of honour of a nation.
At the Congress held at Brussels, the Prussians
proposed an international agreement that in a
conquered province the civil government should
pass ipso jure into the hands of the military au-
thorities of the victorious army. Such an arrange-
ment would, in many ways, prove beneficial to
material well-being. A general who knows that
he is entitled, by international law, to demand
obedience from foreign authorities, will be able to
keep a more decided check on his troops, and to
behave generally in a more humane manner. But
there are possessions which stand on a higher
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 186 Treitschke
level than trade and traffic. This German demand
expressed all the confidence of a people accustomed
to victory. But could we seriously wish that
Prussian State authorities should, by law, be
compelled to obey a Russian general? Exces-
sive humanity can lead to dishonour, and thus
become inhuman. We expect our countrymen to
use all lawful means to defeat the enemy. Think
for a moment of our own past experiences. Every
East-Prussian knows about President Dohna, who
during the Russian occupation carried off the
receipts and taxes to the lawful king, and did his
best to work against the enemy. Shall that be
forbidden in the name of philanthropy? Is not
patriotism, in this case, a higher duty? It
matters little whether a Russian, embittered by
this kind of resistance on the part of good and
honest Prussians, burns a few more villages than
he at first purposed. This is a consideration of
far less importance than that a nation should keep
the shield of its honour bright. The moral posses-
sions of a nation ought not to be destroyed, in the
name of humanity, by international law.
Even when the power of an enemy is purely
military, it is still possible to give the utmost
protection to private property, provided that the
members of the hostile army are easily recognizable.
Requisitions are allowed; it is a general practice
to give promissory notes in exchange. The task
of getting them all paid is, of course, left to the
conquered. War against private property as such,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 187
of which the laying waste of the Palatinate at the
end of the seventeenth century, by Melac, fur-
nishes us with a dreadful example, the wanton
burning of villages, is regarded today by all
civilized States as an infringement of the law of
nations. Private property may only be injured
in so far as such injury is absolutely essential to
the success of the war.
But international law becomes mere claptrap
when these principles are applied to barbarian
nations. A negro tribe must be punished by
having its villages burnt ; nothing will be achieved
without an example of this kind. Any failure on
the part of the German Empire to base its conduct
on these principles, today, could not be said to
proceed from humanity or a fine sense of justice,
but merely from scandalous weakness. I
And even where dealing with civilized nations,
it is right to legalize only those practices which are
the real outcome of the general sense of obligation,
common to all the nations concerned. The State
must not be used as an instrument wherewith to
try experiments in humanitarianism. How drastic
an example of such an error is furnished by the
Franco-Prussian War! We declared, in a burst of
false humanity, that we would respect the private
property of the French at sea. The idea was both
noble and humane. We failed, however, to observe
that among the other States there is one I mean
England which is fundamentally averse to being
1 Lecture delivered during the winter of 1891-2.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 1 88 Treitschke
schooled by noble thoughts; we also failed to
realize that France would not pay us back in our
own coin. This one-sided German humanitarian-
ism simply released France from the necessity of
using her navy to protect her merchant ships
against German men-of-war. Her whole fleet was
thus set free for the immediate purposes of war.
The marine infantry and the really excellent
marine artillery were landed, and during the
winter we very frequently found ourselves fight-
ing with these marines. It will thus be seen that
the undertaking entered upon by us merely re-
leased troops to be used against ourselves. Every
advance in humanitarianism, as expressed in inter-
national law should, therefore, be based on the
principle of reciprocity.
But there are many items about which we are
in doubt whether they are the property of the
State or of private persons. The property of the
State is, obviously and naturally, the lawful booty
of the victor. This is primarily true of all kinds
of military supplies, in the widest sense of the
word, and of such things as State railways. But
to which class must we relegate the rolling stock
of the private railway companies, to which the
State has granted an actual monopoly? The
enemy may, of course, use the railway plant be-
longing to these companies during the war; but
may he keep the carriages and trucks? Our de-
cision to do so during the last war was a perfectly
just one, in view of the nature of the French rail-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 189
ways. They were, in actual fact, the property of
the State, and we kept the carriages which we
took, and sold them back to France when terms
of peace were arranged. The question is an even
more difficult one when it relates to banks. There
are certain banks, among them the Bank of Ger-
many, in which a body of bankers outside the
country have a material interest. Such a practice
is very useful from a commercial point of view;
the bank is thus kept in touch with the great
business houses, and in a position to take its part
in the commercial activities of the moment. It
would be, however, a pure illusion to suppose that
the Bank of Germany would thereby be saved
from confiscation by a conqueror. An enemy
would certainly look upon it as a State bank, and
the fact that a few private persons had an interest
in it would in no way affect his decision.
It has also become a principle of international
law that the great treasures of civilization, which
serve the purposes of Art and Science, and are
looked upon as the property of humanity as a
whole, shall be secured against theft and pillage.
In earlier times this principle was trampled under
foot.
Individual members of the standing armies, and
all persons authorized to take part in national
defence, have a right to demand honourable treat-
ment as prisoners of war, and all attempts to force
prisoners into the enemy's army are contrary to
international law. It is, however, doubtful
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? Treitschke
whether this principle obtained during the last
century. In matters such as these, everything
depends on the sense of right and wrong which
animates the age. At the beginning of the last
century, the mercenary idea was still so grossly
prevalent that a French regiment, consisting of
course of Germans, was taken over by the Saxons
at Hochstadt, only to be lost by them at a later
date, when it went over to the Swedes. At Stral-
sund, it went over to the Prussians, with whom it
finally remained, under the name of "Jung An-
halt. " But when Frederick the Great forced the
captured Saxons into the Prussian army, at Piena,
it became evident that a practice which had once
been followed as a matter of course, had now be-
come impossible. On that occasion, the Saxons
deserted from the Prussian army in hordes.
Nowadays, an attempt of this kind would be not
only a palpable infringement of international law,
but also an unparalleled piece of stupidity.
It goes without saying that every State has not
only the right to wage war, but also to declare
itself neutral in the wars of others as far as material
conditions permit. If a State is not in a condition
to maintain its neutrality, all talk about the same
is mere claptrap. Neutrality needs as much de-
fending as the partisanship of belligerent States.
It is the duty of a neutral State to disarm every
soldier who crosses its borders. If it is unable
to do so, the circumstances justify the belliger-
ent States in ceasing to observe its neutrality,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 191
even if it has allowed an armed enemy to enter
but one village.
It is to be regretted that a sharp distinction is
still drawn in military law between its workings on
land and its workings at sea. All who have eyes to
see must here be struck by the disastrous influence
of English naval power on universal culture and
justice. We have not as yet obtained a "balance
of power'* at sea, and Schiller's melancholy dictum,
therefore, still holds good:
"Among the waves is chaos
And nothing can be held upon the sea. "
Such a state of things is deeply humiliating to our
pride as a civilized nation. England is alone to
blame, for England is so immensely pre-eminent at
sea that she can do whatever she likes. All who
desire to be humane, all who thirst to realize in
some degree the ideals of international law on the
high seas, must work for a balance of power in this
direction also. One is constantly surprised by the
infatuation of public opinion at the present day.
Countries marching on the wrong road are always
glorified, and the sentimentality of Belgian ex-
ponents of international law, and England's
barbarous views regarding maritime law, are
perpetually admired. All the other Powers would
be prepared and allow free circulation, under
certain conditions, to merchant ships in time of
war; England, alone, maintains the principle that
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 192 Treitschke
no distinction is to be made at sea between the
property of the State and that of private persons.
And as long as this one Power insists on carrying
out this principle, all other nations must travel on
the same barbarous road. It is true that the con-
ditions prevalent on land can never prevail in
quite the same way at sea, because there are many
articles of commerce which are used in warfare.
The immunity of private property at sea in time
of war can, therefore, never be quite as great as
that assured to private property on land ; but this
is no reason why naval warfare should for ever
continue to be piracy, or why the belligerent
Powers should be entitled to snatch indiscrimi-
nately the property of each other's merchants.
Maritime law has hitherto only progressed
through the efforts of the navies of second-class
Powers. One is confronted at every moment with
the dictum that the Powers are driven to adopt
humaner methods by their desire to serve their
own purposes. Herein, also, lies the explanation of
the efforts made by the second-class navies to
obtain a humaner maritime law. It is not that
the English are worse people than we are, and if
we were in their position we might, perhaps, imi-
tate their conduct. As early as 1780 the navies
of the second rank united themselves in an alliance
for armed neutrality, and laid down the principle,
firstly, that the flag must protect the merchandise
over which it floats, and that articles of commerce
having no definite connection with war shall be
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 193
allowed free passage on a neutral ship ; and, second-
ly, that every blockade must be an actual one, and
that no Power has the right to declare an entire
line of coast blockaded unless the approaches to
it are actually closed by the presence of hostile
men-of-war.
Attempts were subsequently made in innumer-
able treaties to express these principles in law.
To-day, England has at last agreed to allow that
the flag covers the merchandise. This concession
is the outcome of the development of North
American naval power. If the question had been
one for Germany to decide, she would long ago
have procured some international agreement on
the immunity of private property at sea. Theory,
alone is, however, powerless in questions of inter-
national law, if the actual power of the States
concerned does not in some measure correspond
with it.
To conclude then, the conviction grows upon us
that it can never be the task of political science to
build up for itself phantastic structure in the air;
for only that is truly human which has its roots
in the historical facts of actual life. The destinies
of nations are worked out by means of a series of
repulsions and attractions, and they follow the
law of a principle of development whose ultimate
end is veiled from mortal eyes. Its very trend is
hidden from us except at rare moments. We must
seek to understand the ways in which divine in-
telligence has gradually revealed itself in the midst
13
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 194 Treitschke
of all the conflicting movements of life; we must
not seek to dominate history. The noblest quality
of the practical statesman is his ability to point
to the signs of the times, and to realize in some
measure how universal history may develop at a
given moment. Further, nothing becomes a poli-
tician better than modesty. The circumstances
with which he is called upon to deal, are so various
and so complicated, that he must guard against
being carried away on dark and uncertain ways.
He must resign himself to desiring only the really
attainable, and to keeping his aim perpetually and
steadfastly in view. I shall be content if you have
learned during the course of these lectures how
manifold are the component parts which go to
make up a historical fact, and how it becomes us,
therefore, to be most deliberate in giving a verdict
in political matters. I shall, indeed, be satisfied
if these lectures have taught you to cultivate that
modesty which is the essential outcome of true
learning.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? FIRST ATTEMPTS AT GERMAN
COLONIZATION.
THE strange confusion of ideas which we owe to
our fluctuating and antiquated party-doings
is nowhere so glaringly obvious as in the widely
spread opinion that the younger generation today
is more conservatively inclined than the older.
Some are glad of this, while others lament it and
attribute it to the seductive arts of reactionary
teachers; but hardly anyone disputes it as a fact.
And yet it is absolutely absurd to think so, for
ever since the beginning of the world the young
have always been more free-thinking than the old,
because they possess the happy privilege of living
more in the future than the present, and nothing
justifies the assumption that this natural law has
ceased to hold good nowadays. For though the
new generation may turn away with indifference
from the catch-words of the older liberalism, this
only shows that a new age with new ideals is
dawning. In these young men, whose childhood
was illuminated by the sun of Sedan, national pride
is not a feeling attained to, as in their fathers'
case, by hard struggles, but it is a strong spontane-
ous passion.
expect the impossible. The difficulty of the
question becomes apparent as soon as one looks
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 176 Treitschke
into its details. One then realizes that all obli-
gations of private as of other international law
are entered into and kept with a certain reserva-
tion, that, namely, they cannot be fulfilled when
they entail grave hurt to the State which promised
to carry them out. However many treaties we
may conclude in the domain of private interna-
tional law, it is always implied that we shall not
keep them if a foreigner becomes obnoxious to us.
A State must be able to expel inconvenient for-
eigners, without declaring its reasons, even though
it has signed a treaty permitting foreigners to
reside within its borders. Thus, modern States
habitually expel persons suspected of being spies
or secret agents; if explanations had to be pub-
lished before active steps were taken in such cases,
those explanations would be mostly of an exceed-
ingly unpleasant kind, and would merely imperil
the friendly relations of the States concerned. It
is, therefore, more sensible to take the line that
any alien can be expelled at any moment, with the
simple comment: You are undesirable. And the
right to act thus must be firmly maintained, if
only in the interest of honest men, who might
otherwise be molested; this proceeding, which
appears cruel on the surface, proves in reality to
be the truest humanity. On the other hand,
States must not claim the right to expel their own
subjects. That is to claim something which is
essentially illegitimate. When Germany expelled
the Jesuits, we were at least sure that they would
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 177
find a roof elsewhere. But if Germany were to
expel its own common criminals, it would be simply
blowing them into the air, for no other State would
be willing to receive them.
Wherever international law relating to private
individuals has begun to grow up, mutual un-
dertakings are soon given between the various
States to assist one another in the apprehension of
criminals. Here we reach some of the hardest
problems of international law. It is easy enough
to assert generally that mankind as a whole is
bound to pursue criminals. That is recognized
by all noble nations and is easily embodied in
their laws. But how are we to draw the line
between what is criminal and what is not? To
begin with, it is eminently necessary to distinguish
political and common offenders. Every State
must consider its own interests before it takes
action against traitors against some other State.
There may exist between two countries, nominally
at peace, a latent state of war, as is now the case
between France and Germany. In such a case
it may well happen that the man who is a political
offender against the laws of his own country is
also very welcome to the other country; it would
be silly if the latter were to be forced to hand him
over to his own government. Treaties regulating
the extradition of common malefactors are easily
made; but no State will pledge itself to deliver
up all political offenders without the option of
using its own judgment in particular cases. Un-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 178 Treitschke
derstandings, again, might be effected as to anar-
chists, pure and simple, who work with dynamite;
but about political offenders, as a class, no general
treaty can be drawn.
. With respect to common criminals, the limits
of extradition must, of course, be settled by special
agreements. Such agreements must, of course,
apply only to really grievous offences. The ju-
dicial codes of various lands vary so much that
it is emphatically desirable that as many crimes
as possible should be judged at home. Experi-
ence has here shown that the farther the juris-
diction of a nation is extended, the better the
result.
All this general movement towards securing
justice naturally tends to an ordered union be-
tween the States concerned, that is, to a political
system in which the use of fixed forms of action
is accepted even in international matters. The
quarrels of seventeenth-century Europe on matters
of ceremonial, which now strike us as so absurd,
had a sound basis, despite the ridiculous forms
which they assumed. They showed that the
States of Europe had begun to regard themselves
as members of one family. In a well-ordered
household, everyone must have his fixed place,
and his individual rights must be recognized and
maintained. The difference between empires and
small States, between great Powers and States of
the second or third rank, still exists from a practi-
cal point of view, though no documents specifically
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 179
record it. A great Power may be defined as a State
which could not, in the given circumstances, be
destroyed by any one other Power, but only by a
coalition. The preponderance of the great Powers
in Europe has lately become very marked, and it
is to this that we owe a certain security now ob-
servable in our international relations. The law
affecting embassies had been so firmly established
since the Congress of Aachen in 1818, that the
clearest lines have been drawn in all civilized
States between the different classes of diplomatists.
Through the dominance of the leading European
Powers, the practice indeed the rule has grown
up that representation at a Congress of great
Powers is granted only to those among the lesser
States which are directly concerned in the subject
to be discussed. But when once a small State
has been invited to the Congress, its voice carries
as much weight as that of any other State, large
or small. These Congresses are governed, not by
a vote of the majority, but by the liberum veto
of natural law. A meeting which is held, not to
conduct a war but to formulate its results, cannot
reasonably be bound by majority votes; it must
obtain unanimity.
It appears impossible to set up any general
principle governing international behaviour. The
doctrine that you may always intervene in the
affairs of another State is as false as the doctrine
that you may never do so. A State may find itself
driven to regard the party struggles in a neigh-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 178 Treitschke
derstandings, again, might be effected as to anar-
chists, pure and simple, who work with dynamite;
but about political offenders, as a class, no general
treaty can be drawn.
. With respect to common criminals, the limits
of extradition must, of course, be settled by special
agreements. Such agreements must, of course,
apply only to really grievous offences. The ju-
dicial codes of various lands vary so much that
it is emphatically desirable that as many crimes
as possible should be judged at home. Experi-
ence has here shown that the farther the juris-
diction of a nation is extended, the better the
result.
All this general movement towards securing
justice naturally tends to an ordered union be-
tween the States concerned, that is, to a political
system in which the use of fixed forms of action
is accepted even in international matters. The
quarrels of seventeenth-century Europe on matters
of ceremonial, which now strike us as so absurd,
had a sound basis, despite the ridiculous forms
which they assumed. They showed that the
States of Europe had begun to regard themselves
as members of one family. In a well-ordered
household, everyone must have his fixed place,
and his individual rights must be recognized and
maintained. The difference between empires and
small States, between great Powers and States of
the second or third rank, still exists from a practi-
cal point of view, though no documents specifically
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 179
record it. A great Power may be defined as a State
which could not, in the given circumstances, be
destroyed by any one other Power, but only by a
coalition. The preponderance of the great Powers
in Europe has lately become very marked, and it
is to this that we owe a certain security now ob-
servable in our international relations. The law
affecting embassies had been so firmly established
since the Congress of Aachen in 1818, that the
clearest lines have been drawn in all civilized
States between the different classes of diplomatists.
Through the dominance of the leading European
Powers, the practice indeed the rule has grown
up that representation at a Congress of great
Powers is granted only to those among the lesser
States which are directly concerned in the subject
to be discussed. But when once a small State
has been invited to the Congress, its voice carries
as much weight as that of any other State, large
or small. These Congresses are governed, not by
a vote of the majority, but by the liberum veto
of natural law. A meeting which is held, not to
conduct a war but to formulate its results, cannot
reasonably be bound by majority votes; it must
obtain unanimity.
It appears impossible to set up any general
principle governing international behaviour. The
doctrine that you may always intervene in the
affairs of another State is as false as the doctrine
that you may never do so. A State may find itself
driven to regard the party struggles in a neigh-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? i8o Treitschke
bouring country as harmful to its own peace.
Were a cosmopolitan party to seize the reins in a
State which bordered with Germany, the issue
might look so threatening to us that we should
have no option but to interfere. To interfere,
however, involves considerable risk. The modern
world has come to believe firmly in the doctrine
of national independence, and intervention will
always arouse resentment, and that not only in
the country which suffers the intervention. Hard
experience has taught this generation to be shy
of mixing in the internal affairs of its neighbours.
But when a State's existence seems to itself to be
in peril, it both may and will intervene.
IN TIME OF WAR.
The acceptance by States of common rules for
mutual relations, even in an age when physical
force tears up treaties, shows that a law governs
their conduct, but a defective and immature law.
A state of war is usually preceded by a hostile
peace. Vain efforts at mutual understanding lead,
in the first instance, to one of the States passing
laws detrimental to the other. That is legal
enough, if it is not fair, and the other State will
straightway retaliate by a similar lack of considera-
tion for its neighbour. If one of the States trespass
on an actual treaty right, the sufferer replies by
equally conscious illegalities. Preludes of these
kinds lead finally to real war. As soon as hostili-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 181
ties have actually begun, all treaties between the
two States come, legally, to an end. A formal
declaration of war is no longer needful in these
days of railways and telegraphs. Mobilizations
of troops and discussions in cabinets and parlia-
ments give clear warning that the State intends to
open hostilities ; the declaration is an empty form.
In the war of 1870, France did not send us any
declaration of war till a week after diplomatic re-
lations had been broken off.
After the outbreak of war, the primary object
seems to be to bring about new international
conditions which shall correspond to the real
strength of the warring States, and which they
must recognize. It is then legitimate to carry on
the war in the most drastic manner; the ultimate
aim peace will thus be attained as speedily as
possible. First, therefore, pierce the enemy to the
heart. The very sharpest weapons may be used,
provided that they do not inflict on the wounded
needless torments. Philanthropists may declaim
about burning shells which fall into the powder
magazines of wooden warships; that is all beside
the point. The States themselves must settle
what weapons shall not be used; at the request of
Russia it has been agreed not to use explosive
bullets for rifles. A warring nation is wholly
justified in taking every advantage of every weak-
ness in its opponent. If its enemy is disturbed
by internal revolts and conspiracies, it may make
full use of them; in 1866, it was only the swift
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 1 82 Treitschke
march of events that prevented us Prussians from
entering into agreements with the Hungarians
against their Austrian masters.
A warring nation may call to its fighting line
the whole of its troops whether barbarian or
civilized. On this point we must keep an open
mind and avoid prejudice against any particular
nation. There were howls in Germany during the
Franco-Prussian war because the French set the
Turcos to fight a highly civilized European people.
The passions of war readily breed such protests,
but science must take a dispassionate view and
declare that action such as that of the French
was not contrary to international law. A bel-
ligerent State both may and ought to bring into
the field all its physical resources, that is, all its
troops of every kind. For where can a line be
drawn? Which of all its charming subject-races
should Russia, for example, rule out of court? The
entire physical resources of the State can, and
must, be used in war. But they must only be used
when they have been embodied in those chivalrous
forms of organization which have been gradually
established during a long series of wars. The use
of the Turcos by the French put a curious com-
plexion on their claim to march at the head of
civilization. Indeed, many of the complaints
made in this respect arise from the fact that
people demand from a nation more than it is able
to fulfil. We all know that in modern national
warfare every gallant subject is a spy. The expul-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 183
sion of the 80,000 Germans from France at the
beginning of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 was,
therefore, in accordance with international law;
the one point to which we can object in the whole
proceeding is, that the French displayed a certain
brutality in dealing with these Germans.
The degree of humanity to be observed in war-
fare is affected by the doctrine that a war can
only be waged between two States, and not be-
tween individual members of those States. This
doctrine regulates all warfare in theory, though in
practice only that on land. It should be possible
to recognize, by a distinguishing mark, all men
whom the State authorizes to wage war for it, and
who must, therefore, be treated as soldiers. We
are not, as yet, all agreed on this point, and this
failure to agree constitutes a grievous gap in
international law. Humanity in war is entirely
dependent on the question as to whether the
soldier feels that his only opponent is the enemy's
soldier, and that he need not fear an attack behind
a bush from every peasant, with whom he has
had peaceful dealings half an hour earlier. If the
soldier, journeying through a hostile country, does
not know whom to regard as soldier, and whom
to look upon as robber and highwayman, he is
driven to show himself cruel and heartless. No
one can be regarded as a soldier unless he has
taken the military oath, unless he is subject to
military law, and unless he wears some distinctive
token, even if it be not (strictly speaking) a com-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 184 Treitschke
plete uniform. It is a self-evident fact that bands
of unauthorized volunteers must expect to meet
with harsh and ruthless treatment. It is impera-
tive that we should come to some sort of inter-
national agreement as to the tokens whereby one
may know an armed man to be an actual member
of an authorized army. This point was discussed
at Brussels, in 1874, an d there the conflicting
interests of the different parties were thrown into
high relief. Little States, like Switzerland, were
in no way anxious to bind themselves on such a
question.
Each State is, at present, its own judge in the
matter, and must itself determine which of its
enemies it proposes to treat as units of an army
and which as simple robbers.
Regarded from a
moral point of view, a real respect is due to the
action of many franc-tireurs in 1870 and 1871,
whom despair drove to try to save their country.
But in the light of international law, they were
mere highwaymen. In the same way, Napoleon
was right in 1809 to treat Schill and his associates
as robbers. Schill, a Prussian staff officer, him-
self deserted, and induced his men to desert, and
then began to wage war against France. He was
then, according to international law, nothing more
than a robber chief. The King's anger at this
proceeding knew no bounds. What was there
left to hold the State together, if every staff officer
chose to form a little army of his own? But, in
spite of these facts, Napoleon's resolve to adhere to
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 185
the letter of the law in this affair was an act of
unparalleled cruelty, and also an act of great
imprudence. Everyone with noble instincts will
side with Schill. Schenkendorf felt this when he
represented Schill as saying :
"My King himself will say to me,
'Rest thou in peace, my faithful Schill. '"
It would, however, be impossible to maintain that
the enemy's action was any infringement of in-
ternational law.
When it has once been determined who belongs
to the army, and who is entitled to the chivalrous
treatment due to a prisoner of war, private prop-
erty belonging to an enemy may be very generally
spared. But in this matter, also, it must be clearly
understood that we must not, in the name of
humanity, outrage the sense of honour of a nation.
At the Congress held at Brussels, the Prussians
proposed an international agreement that in a
conquered province the civil government should
pass ipso jure into the hands of the military au-
thorities of the victorious army. Such an arrange-
ment would, in many ways, prove beneficial to
material well-being. A general who knows that
he is entitled, by international law, to demand
obedience from foreign authorities, will be able to
keep a more decided check on his troops, and to
behave generally in a more humane manner. But
there are possessions which stand on a higher
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 186 Treitschke
level than trade and traffic. This German demand
expressed all the confidence of a people accustomed
to victory. But could we seriously wish that
Prussian State authorities should, by law, be
compelled to obey a Russian general? Exces-
sive humanity can lead to dishonour, and thus
become inhuman. We expect our countrymen to
use all lawful means to defeat the enemy. Think
for a moment of our own past experiences. Every
East-Prussian knows about President Dohna, who
during the Russian occupation carried off the
receipts and taxes to the lawful king, and did his
best to work against the enemy. Shall that be
forbidden in the name of philanthropy? Is not
patriotism, in this case, a higher duty? It
matters little whether a Russian, embittered by
this kind of resistance on the part of good and
honest Prussians, burns a few more villages than
he at first purposed. This is a consideration of
far less importance than that a nation should keep
the shield of its honour bright. The moral posses-
sions of a nation ought not to be destroyed, in the
name of humanity, by international law.
Even when the power of an enemy is purely
military, it is still possible to give the utmost
protection to private property, provided that the
members of the hostile army are easily recognizable.
Requisitions are allowed; it is a general practice
to give promissory notes in exchange. The task
of getting them all paid is, of course, left to the
conquered. War against private property as such,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 187
of which the laying waste of the Palatinate at the
end of the seventeenth century, by Melac, fur-
nishes us with a dreadful example, the wanton
burning of villages, is regarded today by all
civilized States as an infringement of the law of
nations. Private property may only be injured
in so far as such injury is absolutely essential to
the success of the war.
But international law becomes mere claptrap
when these principles are applied to barbarian
nations. A negro tribe must be punished by
having its villages burnt ; nothing will be achieved
without an example of this kind. Any failure on
the part of the German Empire to base its conduct
on these principles, today, could not be said to
proceed from humanity or a fine sense of justice,
but merely from scandalous weakness. I
And even where dealing with civilized nations,
it is right to legalize only those practices which are
the real outcome of the general sense of obligation,
common to all the nations concerned. The State
must not be used as an instrument wherewith to
try experiments in humanitarianism. How drastic
an example of such an error is furnished by the
Franco-Prussian War! We declared, in a burst of
false humanity, that we would respect the private
property of the French at sea. The idea was both
noble and humane. We failed, however, to observe
that among the other States there is one I mean
England which is fundamentally averse to being
1 Lecture delivered during the winter of 1891-2.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 1 88 Treitschke
schooled by noble thoughts; we also failed to
realize that France would not pay us back in our
own coin. This one-sided German humanitarian-
ism simply released France from the necessity of
using her navy to protect her merchant ships
against German men-of-war. Her whole fleet was
thus set free for the immediate purposes of war.
The marine infantry and the really excellent
marine artillery were landed, and during the
winter we very frequently found ourselves fight-
ing with these marines. It will thus be seen that
the undertaking entered upon by us merely re-
leased troops to be used against ourselves. Every
advance in humanitarianism, as expressed in inter-
national law should, therefore, be based on the
principle of reciprocity.
But there are many items about which we are
in doubt whether they are the property of the
State or of private persons. The property of the
State is, obviously and naturally, the lawful booty
of the victor. This is primarily true of all kinds
of military supplies, in the widest sense of the
word, and of such things as State railways. But
to which class must we relegate the rolling stock
of the private railway companies, to which the
State has granted an actual monopoly? The
enemy may, of course, use the railway plant be-
longing to these companies during the war; but
may he keep the carriages and trucks? Our de-
cision to do so during the last war was a perfectly
just one, in view of the nature of the French rail-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 189
ways. They were, in actual fact, the property of
the State, and we kept the carriages which we
took, and sold them back to France when terms
of peace were arranged. The question is an even
more difficult one when it relates to banks. There
are certain banks, among them the Bank of Ger-
many, in which a body of bankers outside the
country have a material interest. Such a practice
is very useful from a commercial point of view;
the bank is thus kept in touch with the great
business houses, and in a position to take its part
in the commercial activities of the moment. It
would be, however, a pure illusion to suppose that
the Bank of Germany would thereby be saved
from confiscation by a conqueror. An enemy
would certainly look upon it as a State bank, and
the fact that a few private persons had an interest
in it would in no way affect his decision.
It has also become a principle of international
law that the great treasures of civilization, which
serve the purposes of Art and Science, and are
looked upon as the property of humanity as a
whole, shall be secured against theft and pillage.
In earlier times this principle was trampled under
foot.
Individual members of the standing armies, and
all persons authorized to take part in national
defence, have a right to demand honourable treat-
ment as prisoners of war, and all attempts to force
prisoners into the enemy's army are contrary to
international law. It is, however, doubtful
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? Treitschke
whether this principle obtained during the last
century. In matters such as these, everything
depends on the sense of right and wrong which
animates the age. At the beginning of the last
century, the mercenary idea was still so grossly
prevalent that a French regiment, consisting of
course of Germans, was taken over by the Saxons
at Hochstadt, only to be lost by them at a later
date, when it went over to the Swedes. At Stral-
sund, it went over to the Prussians, with whom it
finally remained, under the name of "Jung An-
halt. " But when Frederick the Great forced the
captured Saxons into the Prussian army, at Piena,
it became evident that a practice which had once
been followed as a matter of course, had now be-
come impossible. On that occasion, the Saxons
deserted from the Prussian army in hordes.
Nowadays, an attempt of this kind would be not
only a palpable infringement of international law,
but also an unparalleled piece of stupidity.
It goes without saying that every State has not
only the right to wage war, but also to declare
itself neutral in the wars of others as far as material
conditions permit. If a State is not in a condition
to maintain its neutrality, all talk about the same
is mere claptrap. Neutrality needs as much de-
fending as the partisanship of belligerent States.
It is the duty of a neutral State to disarm every
soldier who crosses its borders. If it is unable
to do so, the circumstances justify the belliger-
ent States in ceasing to observe its neutrality,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 191
even if it has allowed an armed enemy to enter
but one village.
It is to be regretted that a sharp distinction is
still drawn in military law between its workings on
land and its workings at sea. All who have eyes to
see must here be struck by the disastrous influence
of English naval power on universal culture and
justice. We have not as yet obtained a "balance
of power'* at sea, and Schiller's melancholy dictum,
therefore, still holds good:
"Among the waves is chaos
And nothing can be held upon the sea. "
Such a state of things is deeply humiliating to our
pride as a civilized nation. England is alone to
blame, for England is so immensely pre-eminent at
sea that she can do whatever she likes. All who
desire to be humane, all who thirst to realize in
some degree the ideals of international law on the
high seas, must work for a balance of power in this
direction also. One is constantly surprised by the
infatuation of public opinion at the present day.
Countries marching on the wrong road are always
glorified, and the sentimentality of Belgian ex-
ponents of international law, and England's
barbarous views regarding maritime law, are
perpetually admired. All the other Powers would
be prepared and allow free circulation, under
certain conditions, to merchant ships in time of
war; England, alone, maintains the principle that
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 192 Treitschke
no distinction is to be made at sea between the
property of the State and that of private persons.
And as long as this one Power insists on carrying
out this principle, all other nations must travel on
the same barbarous road. It is true that the con-
ditions prevalent on land can never prevail in
quite the same way at sea, because there are many
articles of commerce which are used in warfare.
The immunity of private property at sea in time
of war can, therefore, never be quite as great as
that assured to private property on land ; but this
is no reason why naval warfare should for ever
continue to be piracy, or why the belligerent
Powers should be entitled to snatch indiscrimi-
nately the property of each other's merchants.
Maritime law has hitherto only progressed
through the efforts of the navies of second-class
Powers. One is confronted at every moment with
the dictum that the Powers are driven to adopt
humaner methods by their desire to serve their
own purposes. Herein, also, lies the explanation of
the efforts made by the second-class navies to
obtain a humaner maritime law. It is not that
the English are worse people than we are, and if
we were in their position we might, perhaps, imi-
tate their conduct. As early as 1780 the navies
of the second rank united themselves in an alliance
for armed neutrality, and laid down the principle,
firstly, that the flag must protect the merchandise
over which it floats, and that articles of commerce
having no definite connection with war shall be
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? International Law 193
allowed free passage on a neutral ship ; and, second-
ly, that every blockade must be an actual one, and
that no Power has the right to declare an entire
line of coast blockaded unless the approaches to
it are actually closed by the presence of hostile
men-of-war.
Attempts were subsequently made in innumer-
able treaties to express these principles in law.
To-day, England has at last agreed to allow that
the flag covers the merchandise. This concession
is the outcome of the development of North
American naval power. If the question had been
one for Germany to decide, she would long ago
have procured some international agreement on
the immunity of private property at sea. Theory,
alone is, however, powerless in questions of inter-
national law, if the actual power of the States
concerned does not in some measure correspond
with it.
To conclude then, the conviction grows upon us
that it can never be the task of political science to
build up for itself phantastic structure in the air;
for only that is truly human which has its roots
in the historical facts of actual life. The destinies
of nations are worked out by means of a series of
repulsions and attractions, and they follow the
law of a principle of development whose ultimate
end is veiled from mortal eyes. Its very trend is
hidden from us except at rare moments. We must
seek to understand the ways in which divine in-
telligence has gradually revealed itself in the midst
13
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? 194 Treitschke
of all the conflicting movements of life; we must
not seek to dominate history. The noblest quality
of the practical statesman is his ability to point
to the signs of the times, and to realize in some
measure how universal history may develop at a
given moment. Further, nothing becomes a poli-
tician better than modesty. The circumstances
with which he is called upon to deal, are so various
and so complicated, that he must guard against
being carried away on dark and uncertain ways.
He must resign himself to desiring only the really
attainable, and to keeping his aim perpetually and
steadfastly in view. I shall be content if you have
learned during the course of these lectures how
manifold are the component parts which go to
make up a historical fact, and how it becomes us,
therefore, to be most deliberate in giving a verdict
in political matters. I shall, indeed, be satisfied
if these lectures have taught you to cultivate that
modesty which is the essential outcome of true
learning.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-08-05 01:02 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uiuo. ark:/13960/t5j962q2q Public Domain in the United States / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us
? FIRST ATTEMPTS AT GERMAN
COLONIZATION.
THE strange confusion of ideas which we owe to
our fluctuating and antiquated party-doings
is nowhere so glaringly obvious as in the widely
spread opinion that the younger generation today
is more conservatively inclined than the older.
Some are glad of this, while others lament it and
attribute it to the seductive arts of reactionary
teachers; but hardly anyone disputes it as a fact.
And yet it is absolutely absurd to think so, for
ever since the beginning of the world the young
have always been more free-thinking than the old,
because they possess the happy privilege of living
more in the future than the present, and nothing
justifies the assumption that this natural law has
ceased to hold good nowadays. For though the
new generation may turn away with indifference
from the catch-words of the older liberalism, this
only shows that a new age with new ideals is
dawning. In these young men, whose childhood
was illuminated by the sun of Sedan, national pride
is not a feeling attained to, as in their fathers'
case, by hard struggles, but it is a strong spontane-
ous passion.
