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Whether friendliness is a special virtue?
Whether friendliness is a special virtue?
Summa Theologica
" Now the
sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 8) that hypocrites sin
out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin
against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion
from seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is
deserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, "Dissemblers and
crafty men prove the wrath of God": and the hypocrite is excluded from
seeing God, according to Job 13:16, "No hypocrite shall come before His
presence. " Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of
dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed.
Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.
Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But this
is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself a
mortal sin.
Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is
hypocrisy.
I answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness, and
simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a person
whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely, who cares
not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture
is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin:
for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through mortal sin.
But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate holiness,
which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin,
whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation
itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This
will depend on the end in view; for if this be contrary to the love of
God or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal sin: for instance if he
were to simulate holiness in order to disseminate false doctrine, or
that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment, though unworthy, or that
he may obtain any temporal good in which he fixes his end. If, however,
the end intended be not contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin,
as for instance when a man takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of
such a man it is said in Ethic. iv, 7 that "he would seem to be vain
rather than evil"; for the same applies to simulation as to a lie.
It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of
holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of
this kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated
with mortal sin.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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OF BOASTING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the first head,
namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry:
(1) To which virtue is it opposed?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
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Whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth?
Objection 1: It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of
truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast even
without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence. Thus
it is written (Esther 1:3,4) that Assuerus "made a great feast . . .
that he might show the riches of the glory" and "of his kingdom, and
the greatness and boasting of his power. " Therefore boasting is not
opposed to the virtue of truth.
Objection 2: Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4)
to be one of the four species of pride, "when," to wit, "a man boasts
of having what he has not. " Hence it is written (Jer. 48:29,30): "We
have heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness,
and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I
know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is
not according to it. " Moreover, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that
boasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed to
the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to truth,
but to humility.
Objection 3: Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches;
wherefore it is written (Wis. 5:8): "What hath pride profited us? or
what advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us? " Now excess of
riches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed to
justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 7), that
boasting is opposed to truth.
I answer that, "Jactantia" [boasting] seems properly to denote the
uplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw [jactare] a
thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift oneself, properly
speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself [*Or 'tall-talking' as we
should say in English]. This happens in two ways. For sometimes a man
speaks of himself, not above what he is in himself, but above that
which he is esteemed by men to be: and this the Apostle declines to do
when he says (2 Cor. 12:6): "I forbear lest any man should think of me
above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth of me. " In
another way a man uplifts himself in words, by speaking of himself
above that which he is in reality. And since we should judge of things
as they are in themselves, rather than as others deem them to be, it
follows that boasting denotes more properly the uplifting of self above
what one is in oneself, than the uplifting of self above what others
think of one: although in either case it may be called boasting. Hence
boasting properly so called is opposed to truth by way of excess.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes boasting as exceeding men's
opinion.
Reply to Objection 2: The sin of boasting may be considered in two
ways. First, with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is
opposed to truth; as stated (in the body of the article and[3221]
Q[110], A[2]). Secondly, with regard to its cause, from which more
frequently though not always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride
as its inwardly moving and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted
inwardly by arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of
great things about himself; though sometimes a man takes to boasting,
not from arrogance, but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein,
because he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is an
uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it is not the
same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For this reason Gregory
reckons boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the boaster
frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, and so,
according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its end.
Reply to Objection 3: Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. First,
as an occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches.
Hence (Prov. 8:18) "riches" are significantly described as "proud"
[Douay: 'glorious']. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since
according to Ethic. iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake of glory,
but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent stories about
themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for instance, they pretend to
be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination.
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Whether boasting is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is written
(Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth, and puffeth himself, stirreth up
quarrels. " Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels, since God hates
those that sow discord, according to Prov. 6:19. Therefore boasting is
a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is forbidden in God's law is a mortal
sin. Now a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, "Extol not thyself in the thoughts of
thy soul," says: "This is a prohibition of boasting and pride. "
Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an
officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying; for
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), "the boaster pretends to
something greater than he is, sometimes for no further purpose,
sometimes for the sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the sake of
money. " Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious nor a jocose
lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie. Therefore seemingly
it is always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Boasting arises from vainglory, according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin, but is
sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid. For Gregory
says (Moral. viii, 30) that "it belongs to the very perfect, by outward
deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are not inwardly
uplifted by the praise awarded them. " Therefore boasting is not always
a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3222]Q[110], A[4]), a mortal sin is
one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered
in two ways. First, in itself, as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a
mortal, and sometimes a venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man
boasts of that which is contrary to God's glory---thus it is said in
the person of the king of Tyre (Ezech. 28:2): "Thy heart is lifted up,
and thou hast said: I am God"---or contrary to the love of our
neighbor, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out into
invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee who said (Lk.
18:11): "I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers,
as also is this publican. " Sometimes it is a venial sin, when, to wit,
a man boasts of things that are against neither God nor his neighbor.
Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, namely, pride,
or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and then if it proceeds from
pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin, then the boasting will
also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a venial sin. Sometimes,
however, a man breaks out into boasting through desire of gain, and for
this very reason he would seem to be aiming at the deception and injury
of his neighbor: wherefore boasting of this kind is more likely to be a
mortal sin. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "a man who
boasts for the sake of gain, is viler than one who boasts for the sake
of glory or honor. " Yet it is not always a mortal sin because the gain
may be such as not to injure another man.
Reply to Objection 1: To boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal
sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels,
not intentionally but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not
be a mortal sin on that account.
Reply to Objection 2: This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from
pride that is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Boasting does not always involve a mischievous
lie, but only where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbor,
either in itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere
pleasure in boasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher
remarks (Ethic. iv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless
perchance he were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn
God's commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it would be
against the charity of God, in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in
its last end.
To boast for the sake of glory or gain seen to involve an officious
lie: provided it be do without injury to others, for then it would once
become a mischievous lie.
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IRONY* (TWO ARTICLES) [*Irony here must be given the signification of the
Greek {eironia}, whence it is derived: dissimulation of one's own good
points. ]
We must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether irony is a sin?
(2) Of its comparison with boasting.
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Whether irony is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that irony, which consists in belittling oneself,
is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's being strengthened by God:
and yet this leads one to belittle oneself, according to Prov. 30:1,2:
"The vision which the man spoke, with whom is God, and who being
strengthened by God, abiding with him, said, I am the most foolish of
men. " Also it is written (Amos 7:14): "Amos answered . . . I am not a
prophet. " Therefore irony, whereby a man belittles himself in words, is
not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of
the English (Regist. xii): "It is the mark of a well-disposed mind to
acknowledge one's fault when one is not guilty. " But all sin is
inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But "some belittle
themselves in words, so as to avoid pride," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. , Serm. xxix): "If thou
liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before lying,
thou hast become one by lying. "
I answer that, To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two
ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the
greater things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of
himself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle
oneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in
respect of its genus, except through corruption of one of its
circumstances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the
truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the
existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying
something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself to
possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly.
For there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly
folly annexed to it, according to 1 Cor. 3:18, "If any man among you
seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be
wise. " But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same
text goes on to say, "is foolishness with God. " Accordingly, he that is
strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the
estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which
human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, "and the wisdom of
men is not with me," and farther on, "and I have known the science of
the saints" [*Vulg. : 'and I have not known the science of the saints'].
It may also be replied that "the wisdom of men" is that which is
acquired by human reason, while the "wisdom of the saints" is that
which is received by divine inspiration.
Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not
of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, "nor am I the son of a
prophet. "
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man
tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty,
not only if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a
sin, but also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which
sometimes is not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does
not acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.
Reply to Objection 3: A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid
another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid
pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan. ): "Shun not
arrogance so as to forsake truth": and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3)
that "it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies. "
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Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting?
Objection 1: It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than
boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is a
kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any
more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin
than boasting.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony
is not a less grievous sin than boasting.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25): "When he shall speak
low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart. "
Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold
wickedness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): "Those who speak
with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, seemingly, in
their manners. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3223]Q[110], AA[2],4), one lie is more
grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is
about---thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most
grievous---and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a
mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now
irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by
any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person: so
that in this respect they are equal.
But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely,
the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man's
averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by
uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
7) that "boasting is a more grievous sin than irony. "
Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some
other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then
irony is more grievous.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting,
according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account
of its matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.
Reply to Objection 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the
other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by
outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for
instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the kind,
and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual
excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Mat. 6:16) that "they
disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast. " Wherefore
such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in
different respects, and for this reason they sin more grievously. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that it is "the practice of
boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little
of themselves": and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that
he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too
shabby, because by both do men seek glory.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, "There
is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of
deceit," and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who,
through deceitful humility, "speaks low" wickedly.
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OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and
the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning
friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a special virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
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Whether friendliness is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect friendship is
that which is on account of virtue. " Now any virtue is the cause of
friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as Dionysius states
(Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a
consequence of every virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind
of friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both from those
he loves and from those who are not his friends. " Now it seems to
pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to
those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue.
Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a wise man
decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): "The heart of
the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there
is mirth": wherefore "it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of
pleasure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), "is essentially desirous of sharing
pleasures, but fears to give pain. " Therefore this kind of friendliness
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now
it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): "Make thyself affable to the congregation
of the poor. " Therefore affability, which is what we mean by
friendship, is a special virtue.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[109], A[2]; [3224]FS, Q[55], A[3]),
since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of
good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists
in order, as stated above (Q[109], A[2]). And it behooves man to be
maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their
mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so
that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the
need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order:
and this virtue is called friendliness.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in
his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves
another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in
treating of charity ([3225]Q[23], A[1], A[3], ad 1; QQ[25],26), what
things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another
friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has
not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness
thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those
with whom he is in contact.
Reply to Objection 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a
certain general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that "every
beast loveth its like. " This love is signified by signs of friendship,
which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are
strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this:
because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not
treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to us by
special friendship.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that "the heart of the wise is
where there is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his
neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat,
thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity": but
that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus.
7:38, "Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them
that mourn. " Again, "the heart of fools is where there is mirth," not
that they may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness.
Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with
those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns,
but honest pleasures, according to Ps. 132:1, "Behold how good and how
pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity. "
Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of
some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the
virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those
among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): "Although I
made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent," and further on (2
Cor. 7:9), "I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because
you were made sorrowful unto repentance. " For this reason we should not
show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we
may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, and in a way
encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:26):
"Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and show not thy
countenance gay towards them. "
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Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of
justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this
virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably
towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part
of justice.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this
virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in
fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest
pleasures, as stated above ([3226]FS, Q[60], A[5]; [3227]FS, Q[61],
A[3]). Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is
contrary to justice, as stated above ([3228]Q[59], AA[1],2). Now,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in
like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers. " Therefore
this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.
On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a
part of justice.
I answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to it as
to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is directed to
another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of the notion of
justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is
bound to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to pay,
or by some debt arising out of a favor received. For it regards merely
a certain debt of equity, namely, that we behave pleasantly to those
among whom we dwell, unless at times, for some reason, it be necessary
to displease them for some good purpose.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([3229]Q[109], A[3], ad 1),
because man is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the
manifestation of truth without which human society could not last. Now
as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not
without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one
could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a
certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his
fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for
their good.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the
senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which have
their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves becomingly
towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they
were noisome.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that
one ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and
strangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), "it is not fitting to
please and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way. "
This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all in
a fitting manner.
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OF FLATTERY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: (1)
Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether flattery is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
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Whether flattery is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists
in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is
not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov. 31:28, "Her children
rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her. "
Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1
Cor. 10:33, "I . . . in all things please all men. " Therefore flattery
is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise.
But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise
good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore
Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against
flattery. "It must be observed," says he, "that by the wonderful
moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by detractions
but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the
flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may humble. " But
detraction is an evil, as stated above ([3230]Q[73], AA[2],3).
Therefore flattery is a good.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, "Woe to them that sew
cushions under every elbow," says, "that is to say, sweet flattery. "
Therefore flattery is a sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3231]Q[114], A[1], ad 3), although the
friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends
chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not
fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or
of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always
to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing,
and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere
intention of pleasing he is said to be "complaisant," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of
making some gain out of it, he is called a "flatterer" or "adulator. "
As a rule, however, the term "flattery" is wont to be applied to all
who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or
deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their fellows.
Reply to Objection 1: One may praise a person both well and ill,
according as one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while
observing other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person
by praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive
to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of
friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a
person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since perhaps
they are evil, according to Ps. 9:24, "The sinner is praised in the
desires of his soul"; or they may be uncertain, according to Ecclus.
27:8, "Praise not a man before he speaketh," and again (Ecclus. 11:2),
"Praise not a man for his beauty"; or because there may be fear lest
human praise should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written,
(Ecclus. 11:30), "Praise not any man before death. " Again, in like
manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster charity,
so that he may make spiritual progress therein. But it would be sinful
to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain, or to please
them in something evil, according to Ps. 52:6, "God hath scattered the
bones of them that please men," and according to the words of the
Apostle (Gal. 1:10), "If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant
of Christ. "
Reply to Objection 2: Even to blame evil is sinful, if due
circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one
another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which is
contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as regards
the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas
the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at
times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.
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Whether flattery is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to
Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is harmful. "
But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, "For the sinner is
praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The
sinner hath provoked the Lord. " Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant):
"Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery": and a gloss on
Ps. 69:4, "Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that
say to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well," says: "The tongue of the flatterer
harms more than the sword of the persecutor. " Therefore flattery is a
most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less
than others: wherefore it is written (Ps. 36:15): "Let their sword
enter into their own hearts. " Now he that flatters another induces him
to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, "Let not the oil of the
sinner fatten my head," says: "The false praise of the flatterer
softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders
it susceptive of vice. " Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in
himself.
Objection 3: Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3):
"The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and
treachery shall be degraded from his office. " Now such a punishment as
this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de Sanctis)
reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any person of
higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of necessity. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3232]Q[112], A[2]), a mortal sin is
one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to
charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways.
First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another's
sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he
speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to
sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Is. 5:20. "Woe to you
that call evil good. " Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one
man flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in
body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written
(Prov. 27:6): "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful
kisses of an enemy. " Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise of
a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an
occasion of sin. In this case it is necessary to consider, whether the
occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall,
as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal
([3233]Q[43], AA[3],4). If, however, one man flatters another from the
mere craving to please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or
to acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to
charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who
praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than
the sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of
greater consequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so
efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively,
being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be
a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (Q[43],
A[1], ad 3; [3234]FS, Q[73], A[8], ad 3; [3235]FS, Q[80], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to one that flatters with
the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than
others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning,
whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.
Reply to Objection 3: The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters
another treacherously, in order to deceive him.
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OF QUARRELING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship?
(2) Of its comparison with flattery?
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Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability?
Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of
friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord,
just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated
above ([3236]Q[37], A[1]). Therefore quarreling is also.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): "An angry man
stirreth up strife. " Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife
or quarreling is also.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:1): "From whence are wars
and quarrels [Douay: 'contentions'] among you? Are they not hence, from
your concupiscences which war in your members? " Now it would seem
contrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it
seems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship
(Ethic. iv, 6).
I answer that, Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely, one
person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be observed in
this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of
the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him
from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this seems to
pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity. Whereas at times
contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being a person to whom
someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarreling,
which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or affability, to which it
belongs to behave agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "those who are opposed to
everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody,
are said to be peevish and quarrelsome. "
Reply to Objection 1: Contention pertains rather to the contradiction
of discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the
intention of displeasing.
Reply to Objection 2: The direct opposition of virtues to vices
depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from many
causes, but on the species of their acts. And although quarreling
arises at times from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence
it does not follow that it is directly opposed to meekness.
Reply to Objection 3: James speaks there of concupiscence considered as
a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says:
"The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all
evil. "
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Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery?
Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the
contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin does
the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than
quarreling, for it is written (Is. 3:12): "O My people, they that call
thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps.
sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 8) that hypocrites sin
out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin
against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally.
Objection 3: Further, no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion
from seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is
deserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, "Dissemblers and
crafty men prove the wrath of God": and the hypocrite is excluded from
seeing God, according to Job 13:16, "No hypocrite shall come before His
presence. " Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of
dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed.
Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.
Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But this
is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself a
mortal sin.
Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is
hypocrisy.
I answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness, and
simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a person
whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely, who cares
not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture
is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin:
for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through mortal sin.
But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate holiness,
which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin,
whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation
itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This
will depend on the end in view; for if this be contrary to the love of
God or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal sin: for instance if he
were to simulate holiness in order to disseminate false doctrine, or
that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment, though unworthy, or that
he may obtain any temporal good in which he fixes his end. If, however,
the end intended be not contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin,
as for instance when a man takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of
such a man it is said in Ethic. iv, 7 that "he would seem to be vain
rather than evil"; for the same applies to simulation as to a lie.
It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of
holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of
this kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated
with mortal sin.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF BOASTING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the first head,
namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry:
(1) To which virtue is it opposed?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
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Whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth?
Objection 1: It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of
truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast even
without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence. Thus
it is written (Esther 1:3,4) that Assuerus "made a great feast . . .
that he might show the riches of the glory" and "of his kingdom, and
the greatness and boasting of his power. " Therefore boasting is not
opposed to the virtue of truth.
Objection 2: Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4)
to be one of the four species of pride, "when," to wit, "a man boasts
of having what he has not. " Hence it is written (Jer. 48:29,30): "We
have heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness,
and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I
know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is
not according to it. " Moreover, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that
boasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed to
the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to truth,
but to humility.
Objection 3: Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches;
wherefore it is written (Wis. 5:8): "What hath pride profited us? or
what advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us? " Now excess of
riches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed to
justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 7), that
boasting is opposed to truth.
I answer that, "Jactantia" [boasting] seems properly to denote the
uplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw [jactare] a
thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift oneself, properly
speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself [*Or 'tall-talking' as we
should say in English]. This happens in two ways. For sometimes a man
speaks of himself, not above what he is in himself, but above that
which he is esteemed by men to be: and this the Apostle declines to do
when he says (2 Cor. 12:6): "I forbear lest any man should think of me
above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth of me. " In
another way a man uplifts himself in words, by speaking of himself
above that which he is in reality. And since we should judge of things
as they are in themselves, rather than as others deem them to be, it
follows that boasting denotes more properly the uplifting of self above
what one is in oneself, than the uplifting of self above what others
think of one: although in either case it may be called boasting. Hence
boasting properly so called is opposed to truth by way of excess.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes boasting as exceeding men's
opinion.
Reply to Objection 2: The sin of boasting may be considered in two
ways. First, with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is
opposed to truth; as stated (in the body of the article and[3221]
Q[110], A[2]). Secondly, with regard to its cause, from which more
frequently though not always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride
as its inwardly moving and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted
inwardly by arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of
great things about himself; though sometimes a man takes to boasting,
not from arrogance, but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein,
because he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is an
uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it is not the
same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For this reason Gregory
reckons boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the boaster
frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, and so,
according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its end.
Reply to Objection 3: Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. First,
as an occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches.
Hence (Prov. 8:18) "riches" are significantly described as "proud"
[Douay: 'glorious']. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since
according to Ethic. iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake of glory,
but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent stories about
themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for instance, they pretend to
be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether boasting is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is written
(Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth, and puffeth himself, stirreth up
quarrels. " Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels, since God hates
those that sow discord, according to Prov. 6:19. Therefore boasting is
a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is forbidden in God's law is a mortal
sin. Now a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, "Extol not thyself in the thoughts of
thy soul," says: "This is a prohibition of boasting and pride. "
Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an
officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying; for
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), "the boaster pretends to
something greater than he is, sometimes for no further purpose,
sometimes for the sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the sake of
money. " Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious nor a jocose
lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie. Therefore seemingly
it is always a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Boasting arises from vainglory, according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin, but is
sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid. For Gregory
says (Moral. viii, 30) that "it belongs to the very perfect, by outward
deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are not inwardly
uplifted by the praise awarded them. " Therefore boasting is not always
a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3222]Q[110], A[4]), a mortal sin is
one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered
in two ways. First, in itself, as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a
mortal, and sometimes a venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man
boasts of that which is contrary to God's glory---thus it is said in
the person of the king of Tyre (Ezech. 28:2): "Thy heart is lifted up,
and thou hast said: I am God"---or contrary to the love of our
neighbor, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out into
invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee who said (Lk.
18:11): "I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers,
as also is this publican. " Sometimes it is a venial sin, when, to wit,
a man boasts of things that are against neither God nor his neighbor.
Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, namely, pride,
or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and then if it proceeds from
pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin, then the boasting will
also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a venial sin. Sometimes,
however, a man breaks out into boasting through desire of gain, and for
this very reason he would seem to be aiming at the deception and injury
of his neighbor: wherefore boasting of this kind is more likely to be a
mortal sin. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "a man who
boasts for the sake of gain, is viler than one who boasts for the sake
of glory or honor. " Yet it is not always a mortal sin because the gain
may be such as not to injure another man.
Reply to Objection 1: To boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal
sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels,
not intentionally but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not
be a mortal sin on that account.
Reply to Objection 2: This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from
pride that is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Boasting does not always involve a mischievous
lie, but only where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbor,
either in itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere
pleasure in boasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher
remarks (Ethic. iv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless
perchance he were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn
God's commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it would be
against the charity of God, in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in
its last end.
To boast for the sake of glory or gain seen to involve an officious
lie: provided it be do without injury to others, for then it would once
become a mischievous lie.
__________________________________________________________________
IRONY* (TWO ARTICLES) [*Irony here must be given the signification of the
Greek {eironia}, whence it is derived: dissimulation of one's own good
points. ]
We must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether irony is a sin?
(2) Of its comparison with boasting.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether irony is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that irony, which consists in belittling oneself,
is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's being strengthened by God:
and yet this leads one to belittle oneself, according to Prov. 30:1,2:
"The vision which the man spoke, with whom is God, and who being
strengthened by God, abiding with him, said, I am the most foolish of
men. " Also it is written (Amos 7:14): "Amos answered . . . I am not a
prophet. " Therefore irony, whereby a man belittles himself in words, is
not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of
the English (Regist. xii): "It is the mark of a well-disposed mind to
acknowledge one's fault when one is not guilty. " But all sin is
inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But "some belittle
themselves in words, so as to avoid pride," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. , Serm. xxix): "If thou
liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before lying,
thou hast become one by lying. "
I answer that, To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two
ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the
greater things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of
himself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle
oneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in
respect of its genus, except through corruption of one of its
circumstances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the
truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the
existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying
something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself to
possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly.
For there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly
folly annexed to it, according to 1 Cor. 3:18, "If any man among you
seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be
wise. " But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same
text goes on to say, "is foolishness with God. " Accordingly, he that is
strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the
estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which
human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, "and the wisdom of
men is not with me," and farther on, "and I have known the science of
the saints" [*Vulg. : 'and I have not known the science of the saints'].
It may also be replied that "the wisdom of men" is that which is
acquired by human reason, while the "wisdom of the saints" is that
which is received by divine inspiration.
Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not
of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, "nor am I the son of a
prophet. "
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man
tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty,
not only if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a
sin, but also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which
sometimes is not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does
not acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.
Reply to Objection 3: A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid
another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid
pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan. ): "Shun not
arrogance so as to forsake truth": and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3)
that "it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting?
Objection 1: It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than
boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is a
kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any
more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin
than boasting.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony
is not a less grievous sin than boasting.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25): "When he shall speak
low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart. "
Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold
wickedness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): "Those who speak
with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, seemingly, in
their manners. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3223]Q[110], AA[2],4), one lie is more
grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is
about---thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most
grievous---and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a
mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now
irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by
any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person: so
that in this respect they are equal.
But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely,
the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man's
averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by
uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
7) that "boasting is a more grievous sin than irony. "
Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some
other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then
irony is more grievous.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting,
according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account
of its matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.
Reply to Objection 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the
other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by
outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for
instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the kind,
and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual
excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Mat. 6:16) that "they
disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast. " Wherefore
such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in
different respects, and for this reason they sin more grievously. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that it is "the practice of
boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little
of themselves": and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that
he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too
shabby, because by both do men seek glory.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, "There
is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of
deceit," and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who,
through deceitful humility, "speaks low" wickedly.
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OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and
the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning
friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a special virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
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Whether friendliness is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect friendship is
that which is on account of virtue. " Now any virtue is the cause of
friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as Dionysius states
(Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a
consequence of every virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind
of friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both from those
he loves and from those who are not his friends. " Now it seems to
pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to
those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue.
Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a wise man
decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): "The heart of
the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there
is mirth": wherefore "it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of
pleasure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), "is essentially desirous of sharing
pleasures, but fears to give pain. " Therefore this kind of friendliness
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now
it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): "Make thyself affable to the congregation
of the poor. " Therefore affability, which is what we mean by
friendship, is a special virtue.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[109], A[2]; [3224]FS, Q[55], A[3]),
since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of
good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists
in order, as stated above (Q[109], A[2]). And it behooves man to be
maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their
mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so
that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the
need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order:
and this virtue is called friendliness.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in
his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves
another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in
treating of charity ([3225]Q[23], A[1], A[3], ad 1; QQ[25],26), what
things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another
friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has
not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness
thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those
with whom he is in contact.
Reply to Objection 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a
certain general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that "every
beast loveth its like. " This love is signified by signs of friendship,
which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are
strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this:
because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not
treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to us by
special friendship.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that "the heart of the wise is
where there is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his
neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat,
thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity": but
that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus.
7:38, "Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them
that mourn. " Again, "the heart of fools is where there is mirth," not
that they may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness.
Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with
those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns,
but honest pleasures, according to Ps. 132:1, "Behold how good and how
pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity. "
Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of
some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the
virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those
among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): "Although I
made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent," and further on (2
Cor. 7:9), "I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because
you were made sorrowful unto repentance. " For this reason we should not
show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we
may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, and in a way
encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:26):
"Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and show not thy
countenance gay towards them. "
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Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of
justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this
virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably
towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part
of justice.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this
virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in
fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest
pleasures, as stated above ([3226]FS, Q[60], A[5]; [3227]FS, Q[61],
A[3]). Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of
justice.
Objection 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is
contrary to justice, as stated above ([3228]Q[59], AA[1],2). Now,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in
like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers. " Therefore
this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.
On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a
part of justice.
I answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to it as
to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is directed to
another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of the notion of
justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is
bound to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to pay,
or by some debt arising out of a favor received. For it regards merely
a certain debt of equity, namely, that we behave pleasantly to those
among whom we dwell, unless at times, for some reason, it be necessary
to displease them for some good purpose.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([3229]Q[109], A[3], ad 1),
because man is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the
manifestation of truth without which human society could not last. Now
as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not
without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one
could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a
certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his
fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for
their good.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the
senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which have
their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves becomingly
towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they
were noisome.
Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that
one ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and
strangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), "it is not fitting to
please and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way. "
This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all in
a fitting manner.
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OF FLATTERY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: (1)
Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether flattery is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
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Whether flattery is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists
in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is
not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov. 31:28, "Her children
rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her. "
Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1
Cor. 10:33, "I . . . in all things please all men. " Therefore flattery
is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise.
But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise
good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore
Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against
flattery. "It must be observed," says he, "that by the wonderful
moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by detractions
but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the
flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may humble. " But
detraction is an evil, as stated above ([3230]Q[73], AA[2],3).
Therefore flattery is a good.
On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, "Woe to them that sew
cushions under every elbow," says, "that is to say, sweet flattery. "
Therefore flattery is a sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3231]Q[114], A[1], ad 3), although the
friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends
chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not
fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or
of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always
to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing,
and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere
intention of pleasing he is said to be "complaisant," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of
making some gain out of it, he is called a "flatterer" or "adulator. "
As a rule, however, the term "flattery" is wont to be applied to all
who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or
deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their fellows.
Reply to Objection 1: One may praise a person both well and ill,
according as one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while
observing other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person
by praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive
to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of
friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a
person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since perhaps
they are evil, according to Ps. 9:24, "The sinner is praised in the
desires of his soul"; or they may be uncertain, according to Ecclus.
27:8, "Praise not a man before he speaketh," and again (Ecclus. 11:2),
"Praise not a man for his beauty"; or because there may be fear lest
human praise should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written,
(Ecclus. 11:30), "Praise not any man before death. " Again, in like
manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster charity,
so that he may make spiritual progress therein. But it would be sinful
to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain, or to please
them in something evil, according to Ps. 52:6, "God hath scattered the
bones of them that please men," and according to the words of the
Apostle (Gal. 1:10), "If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant
of Christ. "
Reply to Objection 2: Even to blame evil is sinful, if due
circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one
another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which is
contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as regards
the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas
the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at
times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.
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Whether flattery is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to
Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is harmful. "
But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, "For the sinner is
praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The
sinner hath provoked the Lord. " Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant):
"Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery": and a gloss on
Ps. 69:4, "Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that
say to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well," says: "The tongue of the flatterer
harms more than the sword of the persecutor. " Therefore flattery is a
most grievous sin.
Objection 2: Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less
than others: wherefore it is written (Ps. 36:15): "Let their sword
enter into their own hearts. " Now he that flatters another induces him
to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, "Let not the oil of the
sinner fatten my head," says: "The false praise of the flatterer
softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders
it susceptive of vice. " Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in
himself.
Objection 3: Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3):
"The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and
treachery shall be degraded from his office. " Now such a punishment as
this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de Sanctis)
reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any person of
higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of necessity. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3232]Q[112], A[2]), a mortal sin is
one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to
charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways.
First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another's
sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he
speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to
sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Is. 5:20. "Woe to you
that call evil good. " Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one
man flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in
body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written
(Prov. 27:6): "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful
kisses of an enemy. " Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise of
a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an
occasion of sin. In this case it is necessary to consider, whether the
occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall,
as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal
([3233]Q[43], AA[3],4). If, however, one man flatters another from the
mere craving to please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or
to acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to
charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who
praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than
the sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of
greater consequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so
efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively,
being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be
a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (Q[43],
A[1], ad 3; [3234]FS, Q[73], A[8], ad 3; [3235]FS, Q[80], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to one that flatters with
the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than
others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning,
whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.
Reply to Objection 3: The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters
another treacherously, in order to deceive him.
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OF QUARRELING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship?
(2) Of its comparison with flattery?
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Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability?
Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of
friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord,
just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated
above ([3236]Q[37], A[1]). Therefore quarreling is also.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): "An angry man
stirreth up strife. " Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife
or quarreling is also.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:1): "From whence are wars
and quarrels [Douay: 'contentions'] among you? Are they not hence, from
your concupiscences which war in your members? " Now it would seem
contrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it
seems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship
(Ethic. iv, 6).
I answer that, Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely, one
person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be observed in
this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of
the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him
from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this seems to
pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity. Whereas at times
contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being a person to whom
someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarreling,
which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or affability, to which it
belongs to behave agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "those who are opposed to
everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody,
are said to be peevish and quarrelsome. "
Reply to Objection 1: Contention pertains rather to the contradiction
of discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the
intention of displeasing.
Reply to Objection 2: The direct opposition of virtues to vices
depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from many
causes, but on the species of their acts. And although quarreling
arises at times from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence
it does not follow that it is directly opposed to meekness.
Reply to Objection 3: James speaks there of concupiscence considered as
a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says:
"The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all
evil. "
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Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery?
Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the
contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin does
the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than
quarreling, for it is written (Is. 3:12): "O My people, they that call
thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps.
