The types of men who sought the highest honours are said to have been
Napoleon
Caesar!
Nietzsche - Works - v15 - Will to Power - b
To feel one's self adrift from all of ancestry, conscience, and duty--this is the danger with which every great man is
confronted. Yet this is precisely what he desires: he desires the great goal, and consequently the means thereto.
i 737-
In times when man is led by reward and punishment, the class of man which the legislator has in view is still of a low and primitive type: he is treated as one treats a child. In our latter day culture, general degeneracy removes all sense from reward and punishment. This determina tion of action by the prospect of reward and punishment presupposes young, strong, and vigorous races. In effete races impulses are so irrepressible that a mere idea has no force what ever. Inability to offer any resistance to a stimulus,
and the feeling that one must react to It: this
great questions
souls).
? ? ? A [96
THE WILL TO POWER.
excessive susceptibility of decadents makes all such systems of punishment and reform altogether senseless.
*
The idea " amelioration " presupposes a norm and strong creature whose action must in some way be balanced or cancelled if he is not to be lost and turned into an enemy of the community.
738
The efi'ect of prohibition--Every power which forbids and which knows how to excite fear in the person forbidden creates a guilty conscience. (That is to say, a person has a certain desire but is conscious of the danger of gratifying and consequently forced to be secretive, underhand, and cautious. ) Thus any prohibition deteriorates the character of those who do not willingly
? submit themselves to thereto.
739
" Punishment and rewara'. "--These two things stand or fall together. Nowadays no one will accept reward or acknowledge that any authority should have the power to punish. Warfare has been reformed. We have desire: meets with opposition: we then see that we shall most easily obtain by coming to some agreement--by draw ing up contract. In modern society where every one has given his assent to certain con
but are constrained
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? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
197
i Ttract, the criminal is a man who breaks that
This at least clear concept. But in that case, anarchists and enemies of social order could not be tolerated.
74?
Crimes belong to the category of revolt against the social system. A rebel not punished, he
\pppti'act.
He may be an utterly contemptible and pitiful creature; but there
nothing intrinsically despicable about rebellion-- in fact, in our particular society revolt far from
simply suppressed.
? There are cases in which rebel deserves honour precisely because he
conscious of certain elements in society which cry aloud for hostility; for such a man rouses us from our slumbers. When criminal commits but one crime against particular person, does not alter the fact that all his instincts urge him to make a stand against the whole social system.
His isolated act merely symptom.
The idea of punishment ought to be reduced
to the concept of the suppression of revolt, weapon against the vanquished (by means of long
or short terms of imprisonment). But punish ment should not be associated in any way with
being disgraceful.
A criminal at all events man who has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake; he therefore man of courage. Neither should punishment be regarded as penance or retribution, as though there were some recognised rate of exchange between crime and punishment. Punish
contempt.
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? 198
THE WILL TO POWER.
ment does not purify, simply because crime does not sully.
A criminal should not be prevented from making his peace with society, provided he does not belong to the race of criminals. In the latter case, however, he should be opposed even before he has committed an act of hostility. (As soon as he gets into the clutches of society the first
operation to be performed upon him should be that of castration. ) A criminal's bad manners and his low degree of intelligence should not be reckoned against him. Nothing is more common than that he should misunderstand himself (more particularly when his rebellious instinct--the ran cour of the unclassed--has not reached conscious ness simply because he has not read enough). It is natural that he should deny and dishonour his deed while under the influence of fear at its failure. All this is quite distinct from those cases in which, psychologically speaking, the criminal yields to an incomprehensible impulse, and attributes a motive to his deed by associating it with' a merely incidental and insignificant action (for example,
robbing a man, when his real desire was to take
his blood).
The worth of a man should not be measured by
any one isolated act. Napoleon warned us against this. Deeds which are only skin-deep are more particularly insignificant. If we have no crime-- let us say no murder--on our conscience; why is
it? It simply means that a few favourable circum stances have been wanting in our lives. And sup posing we were induced to commit such a crime
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
would our worth be materially affected? As matter of fact, we should only be despised, we were not credited with possessing the power to kill man under certain circumstances. In nearly every crime certain qualities come into play without which no one would be a true man. Dostoievsky was not far wrong when he said of the inmates of the penal colonies in Siberia, that they constituted the strongest and most valuable portion of the Russian people. The fact that in our society the criminal happens to be badly nourished and stunted animal simply condemnation of our system. In the days of the Renaissance the criminal was flourishing specimen of humanity, and acquired his own virtue for himself--Virtue in the sense of the Renaissance--that to say, virtd free from moralic acid.
It only those whom we do not despise that we are able to elevate. Moral contempt far greater indignity and insult than any kind of crime.
741- . .
Shame was first introduced into punishment when certain penalties were inflicted on persons held in contempt, such as slaves. was de spised class that was most frequently punished, and thus came to pass that punishment and contempt were associated.
742
In the ancient idea of punishment religious con cept was immanent, namely, the retributive power
199
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? 200 THE WILL TO POWER.
of chastisement. Penalties purified: in modern society, however, penalties degrade. Punishment is a form of paying off a debt: once it has been paid, one is freed from the deed for which one was so ready to suffer. Provided belief in the power of punishment exist, once the penalty is paid a feel ing of relief and lightheartedness results, which is not so very far removed from a state of conval escence and health. One has made one's peace with society, and one appears to one's self more dignified--"pure. " . . . To-day, however, punish ment. isolates even more than the crime; the fate behind the sin has become so formidable that it is almost hopeless. One rises from punishment still an enemy of society. Henceforward it reckons yet another enemy against it. The jus talionis may spring from the spirit of retribution (that is to say, from a sort of modification of the instinct of re venge); but in the Book of Manu, for instance, it is the need of having some equivalent in order to do penance, or to become free in a religious sense.
743
My pretty radical note of interrogation in the case of all more modern laws of punish ment is this: should not the punishment fit the crime ? --for in your heart of hearts thus would you have it. But then the susceptibility of the particular criminal to pain would have to be taken into account. In other words, there should be no such thing- as a preconceived penalty for any crime ---no fixed penal code. But as it would be no
? ? ? ? . SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL. 201
easy matter to ascertain the degree of sensitiveness of each individual criminal, punishment would have to be abolished in practice? What a sacrifice!
Is it not? Consequently . . .
7 44'
Ah ! and the philosophy of jurisprudence ! That is a science which, like all moral sciences, has not even been wrapped in swaddling-clothes yet. Even among jurists who consider themselves liberal, the oldest and most valuable significance of punish ment is still misunderstood--it is not even known. So long as jurisprudence does not build upon a new foundation--on history and comparative an thropology--it will never cease to quarrel over the fundamentally false abstractions which are fondly imagined to be the "philosophy of law," and which have nothing whatever to do with modern man.
The man of to-day, however, is such a complicated woof even in regard to his legal valuation that he allows of the most varied interpretation.
745
An old Chinese sage once said he had heard that when mighty empires were doomed they began to have numberless laws.
746
Schopenhauer would have all rapscallions cast rated, and all geese shut up in convents. But from
? ? ? ? 202 THE \VILL TO POWER.
what point of view would this be desirable? The rascal has at least this advantage over other men-- that he is not mediocre; and the fool is superior to us inasmuch as he does not suffer at the sight of mediocrity. It would be better to widen the gulf--that is to say, roguery and stupidity should
be increased. In this way human nature would become broader . . . but, after all, this is Fate, and it will happen, whether we desire it or not. Idiocy and roguery are increasing: this is part of modern
progress.
'
747
Society, to-day, is full of consideration, tact, and reticence, and of good-natured respect for other people's rights--even for the exactions of strangers. To an even greater degree is there a certain charit able and instinctive depreciation of the worthof man as shown by all manner of trustful habits. Respect for men, and not only for the most virtuous, is
perhaps the real parting of the ways between us and the Christian mythologists. We also have our good share of irony even when listening to moral sermons. He who preaches morality to us debases himself in our eyes and becomes almost comical. Liberal-mindedness regarding morality is one of the best signs of our age. In cases where it is most distinctly wanting, we regard it as a sign of a morbid condition (the case of Carlyle in England,
of Ibsen in Norway, and Schopenhauer's pessimism throughout Europe). If there is anything which can reconcile us to our own age, it is precisely the amount of immorality which it allows itself without
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
falling in its own estimation--very much the re verse ! In what, then, does the superiority of culture over the want of culture consist--of the Renais sance, for instance, over the Middle Ages ? In this alone: the greater quantity of acknowledged im morality. From this it necessarily follows that the very zenith of human development must be regarded by the moral fanatic as the non plus ultra of cor ruption (in this connection let us recall Savona rola's judgment of Florence, Plato's indictment of Athens under Pericles, Luther's condemnation of Rome, Rousseau's anathemas against the society of Voltaire, and Germany's hostility to Goethe).
748
A little more fresh air, for Heaven's sake! This ridiculous condition of Europe must not last any longer. Is there a single idea behind this bovine nationalism? What possible value can there be in encouraging this arrogant self-conceit when every thing togday points to greater and more common interests ? --at a moment when the spiritual de pendence and denationalisation, which are obvious to all, are paving the way for the reciprocal rapprochements and fertilisations which make up the real value and sense of present-day culture! . . . And it is precisely now that "the new German Empire " has been founded upon the most thread bare and discredited of ideas--universal suffrage
'and equal right for all.
Think of all this struggling for advantage among
conditions which are in every way degenerate: of
203
? ? ? ? 204
THE WILL TO POWER.
this culture of big cities, of newspapers, of hurry and
scurry, and of " aimlessness " I
The economic unity of Europe must necessarily come--and with as
reaction, the pacivist movement.
A pacivist party, free from all sentimentality,
which forbids its children to wage war; which forbids recourse to courts of justice; which for swears all fighting, all contradiction, and all perse cution for while the party of the oppressed, and later the powerful party :--this party would be op
posed to everything in the shape of revenge and resentment.
There will also be war party, exercising the same thoroughness and severity towards itself, which will proceed in precisely the opposite direction.
749
The princes of Europe should really consider whether as a matter of fact they can dispense with our services--with us, the immoralists. We are to-day the only power which can win a victory without allies: and we are therefore far and away the strongest of the strong. We can even do with
' out lying, and let me ask what other power can dispense with this weapon? A strong temptation fights for us the strongest, perhaps, that exists _the temptation of truth. . Truth? How do
come by this word? must withdraw must repudiate this proud word. But no. We do not even want it--we shall be quite able to achieve our victory of power without its help. The real charm which fights for us, the eye of Venus which our
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? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
opponents themselves deaden and blind--this charm the magic of the extreme. The fascina tion which everything extreme exercises: we immoralists---we are in every way the extremists.
75?
The corrupted ruling classes have brought ruling into evil odour. The State administration ofjustice piece of cowardice, because the great man who can serve as standard lacking. At last
the feeling of insecurity becomes so great that men fall in the dust before any sort of will-power that commands.
751
" The will to power " so loathed in democratic ages that the whole of the psychology of these ages seems directed towards its belittlement and slander.
The types of men who sought the highest honours are said to have been Napoleon Caesar! and Alexander ! --as these had not been precisely the greatest scorners of honour.
And Helvetius Would fain show us that we strive after power in order to have those pleasures which are at the disposal of the mighty--that to say, according to him, this striving after power _is the will to pleasure--hedonisml
752.
According as to whether people feels: "the rights, the keenness of vision, and the gifts of lead ing, etc. , are with the few " or " with the many "---
20$
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? 206 THE WILL TO POWER.
it constitutes an oligarchic or a democratic com munity.
Monarchy represents the belief in a man who is completely superior--a leader, a saviour, a demigod.
Aristocracy represents the belief in a chosen few--in a higher caste.
Democracy represents the disbelief in all great men and in all e? lite societies: everybody is every body else's equal. "At bottom we are all herd and mob. "
753
I am opposed to Socialism because it dreams . ingenuously of " goodness, truth, beauty, and equal rights" (anarchy pursues the same ideal,
but in a more brutal fashion).
I am opposed to parliamentary government
and the power Of the press, because they are the means whereby cattle become masters.
754
The arming of the people means in the end the arming of the mob.
755
Socialists are particularly ridiculous in my eyes, because of their absurd optimism concerning the "good man" who is supposed to be waiting in their cupboard, and who will come into being when the
present order of society has been overturned and has made way for natural instincts. But the
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
207
opposing party quite as ludicrous, because will not see the act of violence which lies beneath every law, the severity and egoism inherent in every kind of authority. "I and my kind will rule and prevail. Whoever degenerates will be either expelled or annihilated. "--This was the fundamental feeling of all ancient legislation. The idea of a higher order of man hated much more profoundly than monarchs themselves. Hatred of aristocracy always uses hatred of
as mask.
756.
monarchy
? __
How treacherous are all parties! They bring to light something concerning their leaders which the latter, perhaps, have hitherto kept hidden beneath a bushel with consummate art.
757
Modern Socialism would fain create profane counterpart to jesuitism: everybody perfect instrument. But as to the object of all, the
purpose of it--this has not yet been ascertained.
753
The slavery of to-a'ay piece of barbarism. Where are the masters for whom these slaves work? One must not always expect the simultaneous appearance of the two complement ary castes of society.
Utility and pleasure are slave theories of life.
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? 208 THE WILL To POWER.
" The blessing of work " is an ennobling phrase for slaves. Incapacity for leisure.
~
759
There is no such thing as a right to live, a right to work, or a right to be happy: in this
'respect man is not different from the meanest worm.
760.
We must undoubtedly think of these things as uncompromisingly as Nature does: they preserve the species.
761.
We should look upon the needs of the masses with ironic compassion: they want something which we have got--Ah!
762.
European democracy is only in a very slight
? the manifestation of unfettered powers. It represents, above all, the unfettering of laziness, fatigue, and weakness.
763
Concerning the future of the workman--Work men should learn to regard their duties as soldiers do. They receive emoluments, incomes, but they do not get wages!
There is no relationship between work done and money received; the individual should,
degree
? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
according to his kind, be so placed as to perfom the lug/zest that compatible with his powers.
76+
Noblemen ought one day to live as the bour geois do now--but above them, distinguishing themselves by the simplicity of their wants-- the superior caste will then live in
and simpler way and yet be in possession of power.
For lower orders of mankind the reverse valuations hold good: matter of implanting "virtues " in them. Absolute commands, terrible compulsory methods, in order that they may rise above mere ease in life. The remainder may
but their vanity demands that they may feel themselves dependent, not upon great men, but upon principles.
765.
" T/ze Atonement of all Sin. "
obey,
of the " profound injustice " of the social arrangement, as the fact that one man born in favourable circumstances and that
another born unfavourable ones--or that one should possess gifts the other has not, were on the face of an injustice. Among the more honest of these opponents of society, this what
said: "We, with all the bad, morbid, criminal
People speak
which we acknowledge we possess, are only the inevitable result of the oppression for
qualities vor. . 1:.
poorer
209
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? 210 THE WILL TO POWER.
ages of the weak by the strong " ; thus they insinu ate their evil natures into the consciences of the ruling classes. They threaten and storm and curse. They become virtuous from sheer indignation-- they don't want to have become bad men and canaille for nothing. The name for this attitude, which is an invention of the last century, is, if I am not mistaken, pessimism; and even that pessimism which is the outcome of indignation. It is in this attitude of mind that history is judged, that it is deprived of its inevitable fatality, and that
responsibility and even guilt is discovered in it. For the great desideratum is to find guilty people in it. The botched and the bungled, the de cadents of all kinds, are revolted at themselves, and require sacrifices in order that they may not
slake their thirst for destruction upon themselves
? might, indeed, be the most reasonable
(which
procedure).
require a semblance of justification, i. e. a theory according to which the fact of their existence, and of their character, may be expiated by a scapegoat. This scapegoat may be God,--in Russia such resentful atheists are not wanting,--or the order
of society, or education and upbringing, or the jews, or the nobles, or, finally, the well-constituted of every kind. "It is a sin for a man to have been born in decent circumstances, for by so doing he disinherits the others, he pushes them aside, he imposes upon them the curse of vice and of work. . . . How can I be made answerable for my misery; surely some one must be respons
ible for or could not bear to live. "
But for this purpose they at least
? ? it, I
.
. .
? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL. 211
In short, resentful pessimism discovers responsible parties in order to create pleasurable sensation for itself--revenge. . "Sweeter than honey "-- thus does even old Homer speak of revenge.
The fact that such theory no longer meets with understanding-wr rather, let us say, contempt-- accounted for by that particle of Christianity
which still circulates in the blood of every one of us; makes us tolerant towards things simply because we scent Christian savour about them. . The Socialists appeal to the Christian instincts; this their really refined piece of cleverness. . Thanks to Christianity, we have now accustomed to the superstitious concept of soul--of an immortal soul, of soul monads, which, as matter of fact, hails from somewhere else, and which has only become inherent in certain cases--that to say, become incarnate in them--by accident: but the nature Of these cases not altered, let alone determined by it. The circumstances of society, of relationship, and Of history are only accidents for the soul, perhaps misadventures: in any case, the world not their work. By means of the idea of soul the individual
made transcendental thanks to ridiculous amount of importance can be attributed to him.
I As matter of fact, was Christianity which first induced the individual to take up this position of judge of all things. It made megalomania almost his duty has made everything temporary and limited subordinate to eternal rights! What
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? 212 THE WILL TO POWER.
is the State, what is society, what are historical laws, what is physiology to me? Thus speaks something from beyond Becoming, an immutable entity throughout history: thus speaks something immortal, something divine--it is the soul!
Another Christian, but no less insane, concept has percolated even deeper into the tissues of modern ideas: the concept of the equality of all souls before God. In this concept the prototype of all theories concerning equal rights is to be found. Man was first taught to stammer this proposition religiously : later, it was converted into a moral; no wonder he has ultimately begun to take it seriously, to take it practicaltyl--that is to say,
politically, socialistically, resento-pessimistically. Where'ver responsible circumstances or people have been looked for, it was the instinct qf revenge
that sought them. This instinct of
obtained such an ascendancy over man in the course of centuries that the whole of metaphysics, psychology, ideas of society, and, above all, morality, are tainted with it. Man has nourished this idea of responsibility to such an extent that he has introduced the bacillus of vengeance into everything. By means of it he has made God
Himself ill, and killed innocence in the universe, by tracing every condition of things to acts of will, to intentions, to responsible agents. The whole teaching of will, this most fatal fraud that has ever existed in psychology hitherto, was invented essentially for the purpose of punishment. It was the social utility of punishment that lent this concept its dignity, its power, and its truth.
? revenge
? ? ? -
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
2I3
The originator of that psychology, that we shall call volitional psychology, must be sought in those classes which had the right of punishment in their hands; above all, therefore, among the priests who stood on the very pinnacle of ancient social systems: these people wanted to create for themselves the right to wreak revenge--they wanted to supply God with the privilege of
For this purpose; man was declared "free": to this end every action had to be re
garded as voluntary, and the origin of every deed had to be considered as lying in consciousness. But by such propositions as these ancient psych
vengeance.
? refuted.
To-day, when Europe seems to have taken the
contrary direction; when we halcyonians would fain withdraw, dissipate, and banish the concept of guilt and punishment with all our might from the world; when our most serious endeavours are
concentrated upon purifying psychology, morality, history, nature, social institutions and privileges, and even God Himself, from this filth; in whom must we recognise our most mortal enemies? Precisely in those apostles of revenge and resentment, in those who are par excellence
ology
from indignation, who make their mission to sanctify their filth with the name of "righteous indignation. " . We others, whose
one desire to reclaim innocence on behalf of Becoming, would fain be the missionaries of purer thought, namely, that no one responsible for man's qualities; neither God, nor society, nor his parents, nor his ancestors, nor himself--in fact,
pessimists
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THE WILL TO POWER.
thatnooneistoblameforhim. . . Thebeing who might be made responsible for a man's exist ence, for the fact that he is constituted in a particular way, or for his birth in certain circum stances and in a certain environment, is absolutely lacking--And it is a great hlessz'ng that such a being is non-existent. . . . We are not the result of an eternal design, of a will, of a desire: there is no attempt being made with us to attain to an "ideal of perfection," to an "ideal of happiness," to an " ideal of virtue,"--and we are just as little the result of a' mistake on God's part in the presence of which He ought to feel uneasy
(a thought which is known to be at the very root
? of the Old Testament). There is not a place nor a purpose nor a sense to which we can attribute our existence or our kind of existence. In the first place, no one is in a position to do
this: it is quite impossible to judge, to measure, or to compare, or even to deny the whole universe! And why ? ---For five reasons, all accessible to the man of average intelligence: for instance, because there is no existence outside the universe . . . and let us say it again, this is a great blessing, for therein lies the whole innocence of our lives.
2. THE INDIVIDUAL.
766.
Fundamental errors: to regard the herd as an aim instead of the individual! The herd is only a means and nothing more! But nowadays
? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
people are trying to understand the herd as they would an individual, and to confer higher rights
than upon isolated personalities.
mistake In addition to this, all that makes for
gregariousness, eg. sympathy, regarded as the more valuable side of our natures.
767.
The individual something quite new, and capable of creating new things. He something absolute, and all his actions are quite his own. The individual in the end has to seek the valua tion for his actions in himself: because he has to give an individual meaning even to traditional
words and notions.
confronted. Yet this is precisely what he desires: he desires the great goal, and consequently the means thereto.
i 737-
In times when man is led by reward and punishment, the class of man which the legislator has in view is still of a low and primitive type: he is treated as one treats a child. In our latter day culture, general degeneracy removes all sense from reward and punishment. This determina tion of action by the prospect of reward and punishment presupposes young, strong, and vigorous races. In effete races impulses are so irrepressible that a mere idea has no force what ever. Inability to offer any resistance to a stimulus,
and the feeling that one must react to It: this
great questions
souls).
? ? ? A [96
THE WILL TO POWER.
excessive susceptibility of decadents makes all such systems of punishment and reform altogether senseless.
*
The idea " amelioration " presupposes a norm and strong creature whose action must in some way be balanced or cancelled if he is not to be lost and turned into an enemy of the community.
738
The efi'ect of prohibition--Every power which forbids and which knows how to excite fear in the person forbidden creates a guilty conscience. (That is to say, a person has a certain desire but is conscious of the danger of gratifying and consequently forced to be secretive, underhand, and cautious. ) Thus any prohibition deteriorates the character of those who do not willingly
? submit themselves to thereto.
739
" Punishment and rewara'. "--These two things stand or fall together. Nowadays no one will accept reward or acknowledge that any authority should have the power to punish. Warfare has been reformed. We have desire: meets with opposition: we then see that we shall most easily obtain by coming to some agreement--by draw ing up contract. In modern society where every one has given his assent to certain con
but are constrained
? ? a
it
it a
a
a
it,
it, is
? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
197
i Ttract, the criminal is a man who breaks that
This at least clear concept. But in that case, anarchists and enemies of social order could not be tolerated.
74?
Crimes belong to the category of revolt against the social system. A rebel not punished, he
\pppti'act.
He may be an utterly contemptible and pitiful creature; but there
nothing intrinsically despicable about rebellion-- in fact, in our particular society revolt far from
simply suppressed.
? There are cases in which rebel deserves honour precisely because he
conscious of certain elements in society which cry aloud for hostility; for such a man rouses us from our slumbers. When criminal commits but one crime against particular person, does not alter the fact that all his instincts urge him to make a stand against the whole social system.
His isolated act merely symptom.
The idea of punishment ought to be reduced
to the concept of the suppression of revolt, weapon against the vanquished (by means of long
or short terms of imprisonment). But punish ment should not be associated in any way with
being disgraceful.
A criminal at all events man who has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake; he therefore man of courage. Neither should punishment be regarded as penance or retribution, as though there were some recognised rate of exchange between crime and punishment. Punish
contempt.
? ? . _. . -. -. ~_. -_~. __. .
- . . _- ,
is
a
is
a
a
is
is
a
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a isais
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THE WILL TO POWER.
ment does not purify, simply because crime does not sully.
A criminal should not be prevented from making his peace with society, provided he does not belong to the race of criminals. In the latter case, however, he should be opposed even before he has committed an act of hostility. (As soon as he gets into the clutches of society the first
operation to be performed upon him should be that of castration. ) A criminal's bad manners and his low degree of intelligence should not be reckoned against him. Nothing is more common than that he should misunderstand himself (more particularly when his rebellious instinct--the ran cour of the unclassed--has not reached conscious ness simply because he has not read enough). It is natural that he should deny and dishonour his deed while under the influence of fear at its failure. All this is quite distinct from those cases in which, psychologically speaking, the criminal yields to an incomprehensible impulse, and attributes a motive to his deed by associating it with' a merely incidental and insignificant action (for example,
robbing a man, when his real desire was to take
his blood).
The worth of a man should not be measured by
any one isolated act. Napoleon warned us against this. Deeds which are only skin-deep are more particularly insignificant. If we have no crime-- let us say no murder--on our conscience; why is
it? It simply means that a few favourable circum stances have been wanting in our lives. And sup posing we were induced to commit such a crime
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
would our worth be materially affected? As matter of fact, we should only be despised, we were not credited with possessing the power to kill man under certain circumstances. In nearly every crime certain qualities come into play without which no one would be a true man. Dostoievsky was not far wrong when he said of the inmates of the penal colonies in Siberia, that they constituted the strongest and most valuable portion of the Russian people. The fact that in our society the criminal happens to be badly nourished and stunted animal simply condemnation of our system. In the days of the Renaissance the criminal was flourishing specimen of humanity, and acquired his own virtue for himself--Virtue in the sense of the Renaissance--that to say, virtd free from moralic acid.
It only those whom we do not despise that we are able to elevate. Moral contempt far greater indignity and insult than any kind of crime.
741- . .
Shame was first introduced into punishment when certain penalties were inflicted on persons held in contempt, such as slaves. was de spised class that was most frequently punished, and thus came to pass that punishment and contempt were associated.
742
In the ancient idea of punishment religious con cept was immanent, namely, the retributive power
199
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of chastisement. Penalties purified: in modern society, however, penalties degrade. Punishment is a form of paying off a debt: once it has been paid, one is freed from the deed for which one was so ready to suffer. Provided belief in the power of punishment exist, once the penalty is paid a feel ing of relief and lightheartedness results, which is not so very far removed from a state of conval escence and health. One has made one's peace with society, and one appears to one's self more dignified--"pure. " . . . To-day, however, punish ment. isolates even more than the crime; the fate behind the sin has become so formidable that it is almost hopeless. One rises from punishment still an enemy of society. Henceforward it reckons yet another enemy against it. The jus talionis may spring from the spirit of retribution (that is to say, from a sort of modification of the instinct of re venge); but in the Book of Manu, for instance, it is the need of having some equivalent in order to do penance, or to become free in a religious sense.
743
My pretty radical note of interrogation in the case of all more modern laws of punish ment is this: should not the punishment fit the crime ? --for in your heart of hearts thus would you have it. But then the susceptibility of the particular criminal to pain would have to be taken into account. In other words, there should be no such thing- as a preconceived penalty for any crime ---no fixed penal code. But as it would be no
? ? ? ? . SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL. 201
easy matter to ascertain the degree of sensitiveness of each individual criminal, punishment would have to be abolished in practice? What a sacrifice!
Is it not? Consequently . . .
7 44'
Ah ! and the philosophy of jurisprudence ! That is a science which, like all moral sciences, has not even been wrapped in swaddling-clothes yet. Even among jurists who consider themselves liberal, the oldest and most valuable significance of punish ment is still misunderstood--it is not even known. So long as jurisprudence does not build upon a new foundation--on history and comparative an thropology--it will never cease to quarrel over the fundamentally false abstractions which are fondly imagined to be the "philosophy of law," and which have nothing whatever to do with modern man.
The man of to-day, however, is such a complicated woof even in regard to his legal valuation that he allows of the most varied interpretation.
745
An old Chinese sage once said he had heard that when mighty empires were doomed they began to have numberless laws.
746
Schopenhauer would have all rapscallions cast rated, and all geese shut up in convents. But from
? ? ? ? 202 THE \VILL TO POWER.
what point of view would this be desirable? The rascal has at least this advantage over other men-- that he is not mediocre; and the fool is superior to us inasmuch as he does not suffer at the sight of mediocrity. It would be better to widen the gulf--that is to say, roguery and stupidity should
be increased. In this way human nature would become broader . . . but, after all, this is Fate, and it will happen, whether we desire it or not. Idiocy and roguery are increasing: this is part of modern
progress.
'
747
Society, to-day, is full of consideration, tact, and reticence, and of good-natured respect for other people's rights--even for the exactions of strangers. To an even greater degree is there a certain charit able and instinctive depreciation of the worthof man as shown by all manner of trustful habits. Respect for men, and not only for the most virtuous, is
perhaps the real parting of the ways between us and the Christian mythologists. We also have our good share of irony even when listening to moral sermons. He who preaches morality to us debases himself in our eyes and becomes almost comical. Liberal-mindedness regarding morality is one of the best signs of our age. In cases where it is most distinctly wanting, we regard it as a sign of a morbid condition (the case of Carlyle in England,
of Ibsen in Norway, and Schopenhauer's pessimism throughout Europe). If there is anything which can reconcile us to our own age, it is precisely the amount of immorality which it allows itself without
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
falling in its own estimation--very much the re verse ! In what, then, does the superiority of culture over the want of culture consist--of the Renais sance, for instance, over the Middle Ages ? In this alone: the greater quantity of acknowledged im morality. From this it necessarily follows that the very zenith of human development must be regarded by the moral fanatic as the non plus ultra of cor ruption (in this connection let us recall Savona rola's judgment of Florence, Plato's indictment of Athens under Pericles, Luther's condemnation of Rome, Rousseau's anathemas against the society of Voltaire, and Germany's hostility to Goethe).
748
A little more fresh air, for Heaven's sake! This ridiculous condition of Europe must not last any longer. Is there a single idea behind this bovine nationalism? What possible value can there be in encouraging this arrogant self-conceit when every thing togday points to greater and more common interests ? --at a moment when the spiritual de pendence and denationalisation, which are obvious to all, are paving the way for the reciprocal rapprochements and fertilisations which make up the real value and sense of present-day culture! . . . And it is precisely now that "the new German Empire " has been founded upon the most thread bare and discredited of ideas--universal suffrage
'and equal right for all.
Think of all this struggling for advantage among
conditions which are in every way degenerate: of
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THE WILL TO POWER.
this culture of big cities, of newspapers, of hurry and
scurry, and of " aimlessness " I
The economic unity of Europe must necessarily come--and with as
reaction, the pacivist movement.
A pacivist party, free from all sentimentality,
which forbids its children to wage war; which forbids recourse to courts of justice; which for swears all fighting, all contradiction, and all perse cution for while the party of the oppressed, and later the powerful party :--this party would be op
posed to everything in the shape of revenge and resentment.
There will also be war party, exercising the same thoroughness and severity towards itself, which will proceed in precisely the opposite direction.
749
The princes of Europe should really consider whether as a matter of fact they can dispense with our services--with us, the immoralists. We are to-day the only power which can win a victory without allies: and we are therefore far and away the strongest of the strong. We can even do with
' out lying, and let me ask what other power can dispense with this weapon? A strong temptation fights for us the strongest, perhaps, that exists _the temptation of truth. . Truth? How do
come by this word? must withdraw must repudiate this proud word. But no. We do not even want it--we shall be quite able to achieve our victory of power without its help. The real charm which fights for us, the eye of Venus which our
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opponents themselves deaden and blind--this charm the magic of the extreme. The fascina tion which everything extreme exercises: we immoralists---we are in every way the extremists.
75?
The corrupted ruling classes have brought ruling into evil odour. The State administration ofjustice piece of cowardice, because the great man who can serve as standard lacking. At last
the feeling of insecurity becomes so great that men fall in the dust before any sort of will-power that commands.
751
" The will to power " so loathed in democratic ages that the whole of the psychology of these ages seems directed towards its belittlement and slander.
The types of men who sought the highest honours are said to have been Napoleon Caesar! and Alexander ! --as these had not been precisely the greatest scorners of honour.
And Helvetius Would fain show us that we strive after power in order to have those pleasures which are at the disposal of the mighty--that to say, according to him, this striving after power _is the will to pleasure--hedonisml
752.
According as to whether people feels: "the rights, the keenness of vision, and the gifts of lead ing, etc. , are with the few " or " with the many "---
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it constitutes an oligarchic or a democratic com munity.
Monarchy represents the belief in a man who is completely superior--a leader, a saviour, a demigod.
Aristocracy represents the belief in a chosen few--in a higher caste.
Democracy represents the disbelief in all great men and in all e? lite societies: everybody is every body else's equal. "At bottom we are all herd and mob. "
753
I am opposed to Socialism because it dreams . ingenuously of " goodness, truth, beauty, and equal rights" (anarchy pursues the same ideal,
but in a more brutal fashion).
I am opposed to parliamentary government
and the power Of the press, because they are the means whereby cattle become masters.
754
The arming of the people means in the end the arming of the mob.
755
Socialists are particularly ridiculous in my eyes, because of their absurd optimism concerning the "good man" who is supposed to be waiting in their cupboard, and who will come into being when the
present order of society has been overturned and has made way for natural instincts. But the
? ? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
207
opposing party quite as ludicrous, because will not see the act of violence which lies beneath every law, the severity and egoism inherent in every kind of authority. "I and my kind will rule and prevail. Whoever degenerates will be either expelled or annihilated. "--This was the fundamental feeling of all ancient legislation. The idea of a higher order of man hated much more profoundly than monarchs themselves. Hatred of aristocracy always uses hatred of
as mask.
756.
monarchy
? __
How treacherous are all parties! They bring to light something concerning their leaders which the latter, perhaps, have hitherto kept hidden beneath a bushel with consummate art.
757
Modern Socialism would fain create profane counterpart to jesuitism: everybody perfect instrument. But as to the object of all, the
purpose of it--this has not yet been ascertained.
753
The slavery of to-a'ay piece of barbarism. Where are the masters for whom these slaves work? One must not always expect the simultaneous appearance of the two complement ary castes of society.
Utility and pleasure are slave theories of life.
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" The blessing of work " is an ennobling phrase for slaves. Incapacity for leisure.
~
759
There is no such thing as a right to live, a right to work, or a right to be happy: in this
'respect man is not different from the meanest worm.
760.
We must undoubtedly think of these things as uncompromisingly as Nature does: they preserve the species.
761.
We should look upon the needs of the masses with ironic compassion: they want something which we have got--Ah!
762.
European democracy is only in a very slight
? the manifestation of unfettered powers. It represents, above all, the unfettering of laziness, fatigue, and weakness.
763
Concerning the future of the workman--Work men should learn to regard their duties as soldiers do. They receive emoluments, incomes, but they do not get wages!
There is no relationship between work done and money received; the individual should,
degree
? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
according to his kind, be so placed as to perfom the lug/zest that compatible with his powers.
76+
Noblemen ought one day to live as the bour geois do now--but above them, distinguishing themselves by the simplicity of their wants-- the superior caste will then live in
and simpler way and yet be in possession of power.
For lower orders of mankind the reverse valuations hold good: matter of implanting "virtues " in them. Absolute commands, terrible compulsory methods, in order that they may rise above mere ease in life. The remainder may
but their vanity demands that they may feel themselves dependent, not upon great men, but upon principles.
765.
" T/ze Atonement of all Sin. "
obey,
of the " profound injustice " of the social arrangement, as the fact that one man born in favourable circumstances and that
another born unfavourable ones--or that one should possess gifts the other has not, were on the face of an injustice. Among the more honest of these opponents of society, this what
said: "We, with all the bad, morbid, criminal
People speak
which we acknowledge we possess, are only the inevitable result of the oppression for
qualities vor. . 1:.
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ages of the weak by the strong " ; thus they insinu ate their evil natures into the consciences of the ruling classes. They threaten and storm and curse. They become virtuous from sheer indignation-- they don't want to have become bad men and canaille for nothing. The name for this attitude, which is an invention of the last century, is, if I am not mistaken, pessimism; and even that pessimism which is the outcome of indignation. It is in this attitude of mind that history is judged, that it is deprived of its inevitable fatality, and that
responsibility and even guilt is discovered in it. For the great desideratum is to find guilty people in it. The botched and the bungled, the de cadents of all kinds, are revolted at themselves, and require sacrifices in order that they may not
slake their thirst for destruction upon themselves
? might, indeed, be the most reasonable
(which
procedure).
require a semblance of justification, i. e. a theory according to which the fact of their existence, and of their character, may be expiated by a scapegoat. This scapegoat may be God,--in Russia such resentful atheists are not wanting,--or the order
of society, or education and upbringing, or the jews, or the nobles, or, finally, the well-constituted of every kind. "It is a sin for a man to have been born in decent circumstances, for by so doing he disinherits the others, he pushes them aside, he imposes upon them the curse of vice and of work. . . . How can I be made answerable for my misery; surely some one must be respons
ible for or could not bear to live. "
But for this purpose they at least
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? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL. 211
In short, resentful pessimism discovers responsible parties in order to create pleasurable sensation for itself--revenge. . "Sweeter than honey "-- thus does even old Homer speak of revenge.
The fact that such theory no longer meets with understanding-wr rather, let us say, contempt-- accounted for by that particle of Christianity
which still circulates in the blood of every one of us; makes us tolerant towards things simply because we scent Christian savour about them. . The Socialists appeal to the Christian instincts; this their really refined piece of cleverness. . Thanks to Christianity, we have now accustomed to the superstitious concept of soul--of an immortal soul, of soul monads, which, as matter of fact, hails from somewhere else, and which has only become inherent in certain cases--that to say, become incarnate in them--by accident: but the nature Of these cases not altered, let alone determined by it. The circumstances of society, of relationship, and Of history are only accidents for the soul, perhaps misadventures: in any case, the world not their work. By means of the idea of soul the individual
made transcendental thanks to ridiculous amount of importance can be attributed to him.
I As matter of fact, was Christianity which first induced the individual to take up this position of judge of all things. It made megalomania almost his duty has made everything temporary and limited subordinate to eternal rights! What
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is the State, what is society, what are historical laws, what is physiology to me? Thus speaks something from beyond Becoming, an immutable entity throughout history: thus speaks something immortal, something divine--it is the soul!
Another Christian, but no less insane, concept has percolated even deeper into the tissues of modern ideas: the concept of the equality of all souls before God. In this concept the prototype of all theories concerning equal rights is to be found. Man was first taught to stammer this proposition religiously : later, it was converted into a moral; no wonder he has ultimately begun to take it seriously, to take it practicaltyl--that is to say,
politically, socialistically, resento-pessimistically. Where'ver responsible circumstances or people have been looked for, it was the instinct qf revenge
that sought them. This instinct of
obtained such an ascendancy over man in the course of centuries that the whole of metaphysics, psychology, ideas of society, and, above all, morality, are tainted with it. Man has nourished this idea of responsibility to such an extent that he has introduced the bacillus of vengeance into everything. By means of it he has made God
Himself ill, and killed innocence in the universe, by tracing every condition of things to acts of will, to intentions, to responsible agents. The whole teaching of will, this most fatal fraud that has ever existed in psychology hitherto, was invented essentially for the purpose of punishment. It was the social utility of punishment that lent this concept its dignity, its power, and its truth.
? revenge
? ? ? -
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
2I3
The originator of that psychology, that we shall call volitional psychology, must be sought in those classes which had the right of punishment in their hands; above all, therefore, among the priests who stood on the very pinnacle of ancient social systems: these people wanted to create for themselves the right to wreak revenge--they wanted to supply God with the privilege of
For this purpose; man was declared "free": to this end every action had to be re
garded as voluntary, and the origin of every deed had to be considered as lying in consciousness. But by such propositions as these ancient psych
vengeance.
? refuted.
To-day, when Europe seems to have taken the
contrary direction; when we halcyonians would fain withdraw, dissipate, and banish the concept of guilt and punishment with all our might from the world; when our most serious endeavours are
concentrated upon purifying psychology, morality, history, nature, social institutions and privileges, and even God Himself, from this filth; in whom must we recognise our most mortal enemies? Precisely in those apostles of revenge and resentment, in those who are par excellence
ology
from indignation, who make their mission to sanctify their filth with the name of "righteous indignation. " . We others, whose
one desire to reclaim innocence on behalf of Becoming, would fain be the missionaries of purer thought, namely, that no one responsible for man's qualities; neither God, nor society, nor his parents, nor his ancestors, nor himself--in fact,
pessimists
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thatnooneistoblameforhim. . . Thebeing who might be made responsible for a man's exist ence, for the fact that he is constituted in a particular way, or for his birth in certain circum stances and in a certain environment, is absolutely lacking--And it is a great hlessz'ng that such a being is non-existent. . . . We are not the result of an eternal design, of a will, of a desire: there is no attempt being made with us to attain to an "ideal of perfection," to an "ideal of happiness," to an " ideal of virtue,"--and we are just as little the result of a' mistake on God's part in the presence of which He ought to feel uneasy
(a thought which is known to be at the very root
? of the Old Testament). There is not a place nor a purpose nor a sense to which we can attribute our existence or our kind of existence. In the first place, no one is in a position to do
this: it is quite impossible to judge, to measure, or to compare, or even to deny the whole universe! And why ? ---For five reasons, all accessible to the man of average intelligence: for instance, because there is no existence outside the universe . . . and let us say it again, this is a great blessing, for therein lies the whole innocence of our lives.
2. THE INDIVIDUAL.
766.
Fundamental errors: to regard the herd as an aim instead of the individual! The herd is only a means and nothing more! But nowadays
? ? ? SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
people are trying to understand the herd as they would an individual, and to confer higher rights
than upon isolated personalities.
mistake In addition to this, all that makes for
gregariousness, eg. sympathy, regarded as the more valuable side of our natures.
767.
The individual something quite new, and capable of creating new things. He something absolute, and all his actions are quite his own. The individual in the end has to seek the valua tion for his actions in himself: because he has to give an individual meaning even to traditional
words and notions.
