No More Learning

Another thesis comes in hand with the last one; it is a stronger thesis which is logically and scientifically undeniable: Philosophy is science and it is the only sense in which the other disciplines can be called sciences. If their scientificity depends on a philosophical judgment that has to be acknowledged as such; otherwise, to accept such a definition would be an unscientific act. Here one sees how untenable the thought is of those who believe that Hegel's science would be a science of a strange kind different from the other sciences, for these derive their scientificity from the scientificity of Philosophy.
The predictable failure of an a posteriori method to define science is acknowledged by Rosenblueth (although without being aware of it) at the end of his essay when he says: "I have to admit that many men of science would not agree with many of the statements that I have made" (op. cit. 89). If scientists do not agree with him it is because accepting Rosenblueth's concept of science would imply that the disciplines they
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practice are not sciences. This means that Rosenblueth did not include them in the group of treatises he intended to examine in order to see what they have in common; and he did not include them because that would constraint him to an a priori concept of science, which could be either true or false, but that is certainly not to be determined by inspecting scientific treatises.
The case of Rosenblueth is completely typical; all the methodolo- gists, without a single exception, do the same thing: Taylor and Wheel- er, Margenau, D'Abro, Born, Einstein himself, etcetera. Each of them rules out by means of philosophical arguments (either good or bad ones) a lot of what sciences do, and they bear the hope to find out that what they 'really' have to do is what every methodologist ought to do. If someone raised an objection against this practice or against the exclusion of other elements, the argument would have to be of a philo- sophical kind.
It is very important for us to underline this point. One only needs to see how Margenau rules out in his discussion of science the necessity to suppose that nature consists in something else than mere empirical and perceptual data.
Indeed the unsophisticated person who sees no reason to exclude from the nature the tree in front of his house while he himself is away makes tacit metaphysical assumptions which could not stand in the face of Hume's or Berkeley's criticism. Now my personal opinion is that these assumptions are entirely valid and that, therefore, I may just as well include the tree in nature. But I think it important to point out that physics can get along with an interpretation of nature which is not tied to these metaphysical assump- tions. (1978, 97).
In the last text of Einstein we have quoted the exact opposite thesis is backed up. This discussion would really have to be philosophical and, of course, Hume and Berkeley would gladly engage in it. If, according to Margenau, physics can do away with what is actually and imme- diately perceived, the opposite side would state that physics explains with 'forces' many phenomena, even though 'forces' are not empirical data, as Margenau himself recognizes. "Nobody has seen this force of physical attraction, and no one ever will. " (ibid. , 335). The question whether force is empirically perceived falls within the realm of philo- sophical epistemology. Even to find out if two statements of physics
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contradict themselves or not is a logical and philosophical question, which evidently is not resolved by examining a posteriori what scientists do. It is particularly philosophical, as we will see in later chapters, the question whether the militant and antimetaphysical concepts they em- ploy depict reality.
Let us mention one more example of this. After listing concepts such as amplitude, probability, crystal, atom, potential, magnetic field, etcetera, Margenau adds: "These elements are not and can never be part of sensed nature; they serve in fact the purpose of explaining nature. By physical explanation the physicist means nothing more than the es- tablishment of organized relations between constituents of nature and these elements. Every other interpretation, as the search for the Causes of Things, draws in more metaphysics than the minimum we are admit- ting. " (op. cit. , 98) It becomes clear thereby that the concept of science professed by Margenau is determined by philosophical conceptions. How logic or antiscientific is to admit that 'a little bit of metaphysics does not hurt anyone' is something to be determined by Philosophy. Likewise, to determine up to which point an 'organized relation' re- ally constitutes the explanation of something is a problem acutely philosophical, for it is clear that by an 'organized relation' Margenau understands a law (i. e. a preposition) that says whenever we have x, we have y', but if we ask why it thunders when there are black clouds in the sky and someone answers us 'whenever there are black clouds, it thunders', no explanation is given to us at all.
To put it briefly, the methodologists, who allegedly call themselves scientists, intend to obtain a posteriori the concept of science, but first they forget that doing that would be to accept something by authority (an eminently unscientific conduct), and second, they always end up failing in their task. And they could only do so, for without a previous (philo- sophical) concept of what they look for in the world, they could not con- ceive the group of scientific things from which they would extract, by means of generalization, the concept they were supposedly searching.
Rosenblueth discovers that explaining is not a task of science. Mar- genau discovers the opposite. This is an evident proof of the ingenuity of those who believe that the concept of science is attainable by means of induction.
If we stick to what contemporary scientists think, the harvest we collect is extremely contradictory. In each of the following disjunctives underlies two very different definitions of science:
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Hegel was right
1.
2.
3.
4. 5.
6. 7. 8.
9.
10. 11.
12. 13.
Some think that reality is as is it is given to us by empirical data and that science essentially investigates reality. Others think that science deals with phenomena and that it cannot determine whether we know reality as it is.
Some scientists hold that it is unscientific to draw suppositions. Others hold that science has to suppose some things and has to start with a group of conjectures.
Some say that Mathematics is not a science (cfr. Rosenblueth). Others say that it is.
Some say that Logic is not a science. Others assert the opposite. Some affirm that science has first to determine with precision of what it speaks. Others emphatically deny this (cf. Taylor and Wheeler).
Some hold that science is essentially experimentation. Others contradict this.
Some say that the theory of Darwin is not science. Others, spe- cially the most part of the biologists, believe it to be so.
Some believe that it is a task of science to know things. Others judge that the task of science is to predict future events so that we can manipulate phenomena. Here we have a definition of science as knowledge and a definition of science as a technique.
Some vehemently affirm that only what is expressed in quantities is scientific. Others strongly disagree with this.
Some say that psychoanalysis is not a science. Others say that it is. Some affirm that the task of science is to explain phenomena. Others believe that science's only task is to describe and to draw relations between distinct elements.
Some think that historiography is not a science. Others think that it is.
Some think that Sociology is not a science. Others disagree. Et- cetera.
In addition, of course, there is the vulgar conception according to which science consists in collecting empirical data. Evidently, the man in the street has not realized that this conception implies that Mathematics is not a science, something he would not be willing to defend. Besides, he would not pretend to be smarter than Einstein, who explicitly prevented us against the reliability on our senses:
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The discovery and use of scientific reasoning by Galileo was one of the most important achievements in the history of human thought, and marks the real beginning of physics. This discovery taught us that intuitive conclu- sions based on immediate observation are not always to be trusted, for they sometimes lead to mistakes. (1984, 14).
As we have seen before, the discovery that Einstein attributes to Galileo was made twenty-two centuries ago by Philosophy and not by physics. But regardless of this, what is important is that the un- truthfulness of empirical data imposes itself to anyone who reflects a little upon the matter. Empirical data tells us that the sun 'rises' in the morning, but if the earth is the one that spins around the sun, as it will be clearly admitted nowadays, to say that the sun 'raises' is completely false. Empirical data affirms the existence of the surface of the table, on which I write, but nowadays we know that there are no continuous or tangible things, that there is 10,000 times more void space than space filled with matter, and that matter itself varies according to the move- ments of its electrons. Surfaces do not exist. Empirical data provides testimony of the stillness of the lamp, but nowadays we know that the lamp and the house in which it is are traveling at a speed rate of 30 km per second. It would be ludicrous and false to reply that we dis- tort empirical data appealing to other empirical data. Such an opponent would demand a justification for our relying on other sensible data since we were previously deceived by them. Evidently, it does not de- pend on sensible data whether we rely on something, for both things are equally attached to the senses.
As Einstein says, scientific thought has taught us to distrust imme- diate data. Hegel had already said this when distinguishing skepticism (scientific skepticism) from the half complete skepticism that prevails nowadays: "(True) skepticism was essentially alien to considering the objects of our immediate certainty as true" (GP II 375). This imme- diate certainty is what some unreflective scientists, following vulgar conceptions, believe to be a magic wand with which they can dem- onstrate something and interrupt thereby the processus ad indefinitum with which one comes across when everything has to be demonstrated: in order to demonstrate we need prepositions, and these prepositions have to be demonstrated as well, etcetera. But sensible certitude does not work magic like that; it does not break the processus for the simple reason that it is not trust-worthy. In regard to authentic skepticism,
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Hegel says many times that his Philosophy, the true science, is "that skepticism which is fulfilled" (PG 67). It does not accept anything by authority, not even the definition of science, and hence it is more scientific than the disciplines so-called sciences, for each of them take this definition for granted.
Let us keep this in mind: although it may be legitimate for the indi- vidual scientist to suppose some things, science as a whole cannot do this, for if it supposes something it does not demonstrate and hence it is not science. "First, we cannot make suppositions; this is a big principle which is extremely important" (GP III 128).
It seems obvious to me that Hegel's science is interpretatively cas- trated if we understand it as if it were different from the scientificity towards which other sciences aspire or as if it worked on its own kind of basis. Hegel is extremely clear in that regard: "There can only be one method in every science and knowledge. Method is the concept which displays itself, nothing more, and it is only one. " (PR I 62).
"On this regard one must briefly say that, despite the others' con- ceptions of what Philosophy is, I consider the exercise of Philosophy something intrinsically attached to scientificity. " (A? sth I 50).
Hegel reproaches Kantian philosophy precisely what Hegel's com- mentators want him to do: "Kantian philosophy has been unable to have any influence at all on the treatment of sciences. It leaves the cate- gories and the method of ordinary knowledge completely untouched. " (EPW 60A)
Those who make Hegel innocuous for sciences banish him from the world. Findlay is an example of this: "There is no doubt that Hegel be- lieves in the complete validity of ordinary scientific methods at the level at which they are applied. His criticisms of them are a matter of 'second review', a consideration of them from a vantage-point foreign to them as scientific.
" (1958, 349) As we will immediately see, this irenism pretends to place Hegel within the non-agression pact with sciences in which many Philosophy professors have decided to live peacefully and with professional prestige. If we asked Findlay what does he under- stand by science when he says that Hegel accepts the ordinary scienti- fic methods, the vulgar conception of science would certainly float to the surface (a conception which, as we have already examined, destroys itself with the first act of reflection); or at least, the belief according to which it is possible to determine by means of an a posteriori survey what science is would reappear, but we have seen that such belief is a myth.
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The same happens with Lauer when he says: "The 'science' of which Hegel speaks bears little resemblance to the contemporary notion of science" (1982, 222). But there is no contemporary notion of science! I mean, aside from the vulgar one that annuls itself. The most learned ones we have mentioned in our list considerably differ from each other and it is impossible to find a common denominator between them.
Findlay and Lauer exemplify the extremes of all Hegelian scholars. The former wants to castrate Hegel because he hates his theses, while the latter, with great sensibility and merit, accepts all the Hegelian theses as a whole, but not scientifically. And that changes everything, even the meaning of the theses themselves. Even a priori it is unthinkable that the parts remain unaltered once we take into account the sole purpose of Hegel's works: "The rebirth of all sciences through Philosophy" (JS 170), for a "new epoch has arrived in the world" (GP III 460).
What has happened to scholars is that, having forgotten that "the spirit has left Art behind" (PG 492), they confuse Philosophy with Literature. Let us see what Findlay says: ". . . his transitions are only necessary and inevitable in the rather indefinite sense in which there is necessity and inevitability in a work of art. " (1958, 74). And Laurer too:
The greatness of the great philosophers does not rest on the inner consistency or on the convincing power of such rational elaborations. Rather, their greatness consists (as does that of the great poet or great artist) in the quality of their experience, its capacity to reveal in a new way the possibilities of human experience. (1977, 25s).
The parenthesis is of Lauer himself.
Those who avoid Hegel's scientific assault in defense of what there is today, get involved, voluntarily or involuntarily, with the modern 'syndrome of science', which is the front-cover of half complete skep- ticism. These skeptics believe blindfoldedly in science in order not to believe in other things (the most important ones), but they do not know what science is or what it says, nor they care to find out; for they do not intend to embrace it; they want to leave it aside so that 'every- thing else' becomes relative and suits the taste of each person. It is very easy to be a fanatic of science without being obliged to say what one understands by science. As we said, they do this blindfolded; they accept to be told what science is and what is not. "What would the
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ancient skeptics have said of that illegitimate skepticism which dares to look for reconciliation with the bare dogmatism of these sciences? " (JS 226) This text serves us to evaluate the untruthfulness of some commentators when saying that Hegel believes in the validity of ordi- nary scientific methods.
That is the syndrome; no one knows what science is; people point their fingers at each other and no one ventures to defend with ar- guments --that is to say, with Philosophy-- his concept of science. In addition, it is not true that one appeals to what others have said, for while examining what others say or do, one only considers to be scientific that which one had in mind before, so this turns out to be a strategy in order not to defend one's own concept of science, which is only negative since its function is to exclude the themes which are truly important.
While comparing Sextus Empiricus scientific skepticism with modern, half complete skepticism, Hegel says:
The invincible figures of speech of dogmatism were employed by Sextus Empiricus with great success against dogmatism, especially in Physics, a science that, along with applied mathematics, is the true empire (. . . ) of the restricted concepts of the infinite, but physics is for the modern skeptics a science which challenges all reasonable incredulity (JS 246).
Let us point once and for all which is the naive dogmatism of the contemporary sciences that claim to be empirical, for that will be the bridge for our next chapters:
The fundamental deception in scientific empiricism is always this one: it employs metaphysical categories like matter, force, unity, plurality, uni- versality, infinite, etcetera. In addition, it joyfully makes inferences on the grounds of these categories and in doing that it presupposes and applies the forms of inference, and during this process this empiricism does not know that it contains itself and applies metaphysics, and uses the said cat- egories and junctions in a non-critical and unconscious way. (EPW 38 A).
"As a matter of fact, they cannot do without the concept, but by some sort of tacit arrangement they run certain concepts, such as 'parts' and 'forces', without knowing in the least if they contain a truth or how they contain it. " (GP II 171)
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It is impossible to force Hegel into this non-aggression pact that pre- vails in university faculties as well as in the whole world, for that would mean to embrace the 'autonomy of sciences', which is preached by the Church and which is only respected by it. Hegel, who is on the same side as the Church, is not willing to observe this pact, since he explicitly says: "The physical atomism (die Atomistik) places itself face to face before the idea of a creation and a conservation of the world by a different being. But suddenly the research of nature feels that, on account of atomism, it is exempted of having an explanation to the world. " (GP I 361) "In this regard the step contradicts the principle of these sciences [. . . ] On this point the spirit is equal in Catholicism and Protestantism" (WG 913); "the excessively mathematical point of view that identifies the quantity --which is a particular stage of the idea-- with the idea itself, that point of view is nothing else than the principle of materialism" (EPW 99z). "Materialism and naturalism are the following system of empiricism" (EPW 60A).
To a non-aggression proposal Hegel answers: "But there are false truc- es" (EGP 196). "It is a false idea: there can only be one truth. " (EGP 290) Neither sciences nor Theology can pretend to achieve autonomy from reason, and we saw in fact that they never achieve independence from Philosophy, for it is always Philosophy or a pseudo Philosophy
what decides what is scientific and what is not.
The initiative of Hegel, to reach at last truth scientifically, is the most
ambitious enterprise that reason has ever set out on. But it will be accused for being prideful and excessive by him who does not under- stand that "the internal knowledge of the scientificity of knowledge lies in the nature itself of knowledge" (PG 12). It is an initiative that sooner or later someone had to take. It is not possible to think that human rea- son would have eternally resigned itself to this irrational languor in which convictions are adopted because one likes them, or because they are useful, or due to any other motive that is not their scientifically proven truth.
Far from being prideful, it is an authentically humble enterprise, as Hegel repeatedly warns: "The rational is the real path in which every- body goes and nobody stands out. " (Rph 15 Z)
Thinking is what is universal: by this means one places oneself in the point of view of the rest of mankind and renounces to the particularity of his own heart and genius. In that moment all peculiarities step aside and are
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Hegel was right
cancelled. Thinking is what is universal in and by itself. Living on such grounds is the highest humility. Humility means to make aside every distinction, every peculiarity, and to submerge oneself into the universal. (EGP 282)
"Philosophy is not something particular as an artwork" (GP II 23).
Into that position of universality, not of originality, this present book steps forward. For that reason, even though I think like this, even though this is my system, this book presents itself as an interpretation of another philosopher who, on his part, incorporates Plato and Aris- totle and all the history of Philosophy. I prove thereby that I actually believe that truth is knowable to the human mind, for I make clear that it has certainly been known before.
The only way to interpret Hegel is to give more weight to demonstra- tions than to interpretations; otherwise, one does not make Philosophy but literary criticism. Hence our title is Hegel was right. There are certain questions, especially those which are naturally linked with the sub- sequent development of sciences after Hegel's death, in which Hegel only outlined the path which demonstrations ought to follow; the present book cannot leave that only as an outline, which means I will not ex- pose how Hegel thinks without engaging my own views. The only way to do this is to rely only on what is demonstrative, that is to say, on what is truly philosophical.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? chapter ii
Why the subject?
? ? What we will put forward on chapter three in regard to the on- tical consistence of the subject is not only the key to Hegel's philosophy, as he repeatedly warns, but the key to all Phi- losophy and all sciences, and it is the most important discovery that the human mind has ever made in all history.
However, there is a certain school of thought which obstinately re- fuses to take the subject into account, and which even says that science should forbid itself from making any consideration on it. Our present chapter examines this resistance and demonstrates that, far from being scientific, this resistance is scientifically untenable because, once we do away with the subject, it becomes impossible to provide scientific con- cepts with any meaning at all. If we do away with the subject, sciences do not know what they are speaking of. Our present chapter also dis- pels one of the most widespread and inveterate prejudices there are: the belief in the empirical origin of concepts.
1. Something about modem phySicS
We must first say that our century has not contributed with any single wonder to this parade of obstinacies which deny the subject. In fact,
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in order to avoid it, those positions claim to rely only on the physi- cal manifestations and therefore reduce all realities --even the psychic and biological ones-- to physical processes, in the hope that this sys- tematic and "objective" approach will scare away the subject once and for all. But Physics itself has proven these hopes barren by reinserting the observing subject into the picture, and this is not something trivial but the absolutely decisive factor that determines the characteristics of any observed objects or phenomena: both relativity and quantum physics make all objective data to depend on the subject. Here we see the subject reappearing where they never expected him to be.
One can barely restrain the laughs by reading Taylor and Wheeler when they say: "The word 'observer' is a shorthand way of speaking about the whole collection of recording clocks associated with one inertial frame of reference. " (1966, 19).
They fill up every inch of the universe with watches and rods whose masses and fields would distort even the most robust and delicate physi- cal phenomenon, leaving it unrecognizable and unobservable --which was the only thing at stake. Watches and rods without masses and fields are a physical impossibility; consequently, the unperturbed phe- nomena of which Taylor and Wheeler speak are not effectively observable and hence inexistent to modern physics. Taylor and Wheeler have not yet come to understand that, according to the theory of relativity and to quantum physics, any speculation about phenomena that is not re- ally observable falls outside the realm of the physical sciences.
The acknowledged physic C. F. von Weizsa? cker sums up very well the present state of affairs of his discipline: "An object is an object for subjects in the world. This would be made even clearer if the concept of object could be reduced to decidable alternatives. " (Bastin 1971, 253)
Avoiding the subject is thus reduced to a simple wishful thinking that lacks any kind of scientificity.
Leon Brillouin provides a more extended analysis of the situation, but the quote here presented is worthwhile examining; I display it here for the best interest of my readers who are not as well acquainted with modern physics:
I become very suspicious whenever I hear the word 'given'. There is only one occasion when it has a definite meaning; this is in the statement of a problem given by an examiner to some helpless students. In this situation the velocity is supposed to be exactly the given velocity, with no possible error or
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