" But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may consist
in a mere movement of the will.
in a mere movement of the will.
Summa Theologica
Accordingly if
during the time of grace men are bound, under necessity of precept, to
pay tithes in those countries where tithes are not paid, they would all
be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the ministers of the
Church for dissembling. But this seems unreasonable. Therefore during
the time of grace men are not bound under necessity of precept to pay
tithes.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Append. Serm. cclxxcii], whose words are
quoted 16, qu. i [*Can. Decimae], says: "It is a duty to pay tithes,
and whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to another. "
I answer that, In the Old Law tithes were paid for the sustenance of
the ministers of God. Hence it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring all
the tithes into My [Vulg. : 'the'] store-house that there may be meat in
My house. " Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was partly
moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly judicial,
deriving its force from its divine institution. Because natural reason
dictates that the people should administer the necessaries of life to
those who minister the divine worship for the welfare of the whole
people even as it is the people's duty to provide a livelihood for
their rulers and soldiers and so forth. Hence the Apostle proves this
from human custom, saying (1 Cor. 9:7): "Who serveth as a soldier at
any time at his own charge? Who planteth a vineyard and eateth not of
the fruit thereof? " But the fixing of the proportion to be offered to
the ministers of divine worship does not belong to the natural law, but
was determined by divine institution, in accordance with the condition
of that people to whom the law was being given. For they were divided
into twelve tribes, and the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was
engaged exclusively in the divine ministry and had no possessions
whence to derive a livelihood: and so it was becomingly ordained that
the remaining eleven tribes should give one-tenth part of their
revenues to the Levites [*Num. 18:21] that the latter might live
respectably; and also because some, through negligence, would disregard
this precept. Hence, so far as the tenth part was fixed, the precept
was judicial, since all institutions established among this people for
the special purpose of preserving equality among men, in accordance
with this people's condition, are called "judicial precepts. "
Nevertheless by way of consequence these institutions foreshadowed
something in the future, even as everything else connected with them,
according to 1 Cor. 12, "All these things happened to them in figure. "
In this respect they had something in common with the "ceremonial
precepts," which were instituted chiefly that they might be signs of
the future. Hence the precept about paying tithes foreshadowed
something in the future. For ten is, in a way, the perfect number
(being the first numerical limit, since the figures do not go beyond
ten but begin over again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth,
which is the sign of perfection, reserving the nine other parts for
himself, acknowledged by a sign that imperfection was his part, and
that the perfection which was to come through Christ was to be hoped
for from God. Yet this proves it to be, not a ceremonial but a judicial
precept, as stated above.
There is this difference between the ceremonial and judicial precepts
of the Law, as we stated above ([3049]FS, Q[104], A[3]), that it is
unlawful to observe the ceremonial precepts at the time of the New Law,
whereas there is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during the
time of grace although they are not binding. Indeed they are bound to
be observed by some, if they be ordained by the authority of those who
have power to make laws. Thus it was a judicial precept of the Old Law
that he who stole a sheep should restore four sheep (Ex. 22:1), and if
any king were to order this to be done his subjects would be bound to
obey. In like manner during the time of the New Law the authority of
the Church has established the payment of tithe; thus showing a certain
kindliness, lest the people of the New Law should give less to the
ministers of the New Testament than did the people of the Old Law to
the ministers of the Old Testament; for the people of the New Law are
under greater obligations, according to Mat. 5:20, "Unless your justice
abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter
into the kingdom of heaven," and, moreover, the ministers of the New
Testament are of greater dignity than the ministers of the Old
Testament, as the Apostle shows (2 Cor. 3:7,8).
Accordingly it is evident that man's obligation to pay tithes arises
partly from natural law, partly from the institution of the Church;
who, nevertheless, in consideration of the requirements of time and
persons might ordain the payment of some other proportion.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept about paying tithes, in so far as it
was a moral precept, was given in the Gospel by our Lord when He said
(Mat. 10:10) [*The words as quoted are from Lk. 10:7: Matthew has
'meat' instead of 'hire']: "The workman is worthy of his hire," and the
Apostle says the same (1 Cor. 9:4 seqq. ). But the fixing of the
particular proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church.
Reply to Objection 3: Before the time of the Old Law the ministry of
the divine worship was not entrusted to any particular person; although
it is stated that the first-born were priests, and that they received a
double portion. For this very reason no particular portion was directed
to be given to the ministers of the divine worship: but when they met
with one, each man of his own accord gave him what he deemed right.
Thus Abraham by a kind of prophetic instinct gave tithes to
Melchisedech, the priest of the Most High God, according to Gn. 14:20,
and again Jacob made a vow to give tithes [*Gn. 28:20], although he
appears to have vowed to do so, not by paying them to ministers, but
for the purpose of the divine worship, for instance for the fulfilling
of sacrifices, hence he said significantly: "I will offer tithes to
Thee. "
Reply to Objection 4: The second kind of tithe, which was reserved for
the offering of sacrifices, has no place in the New Law, since the
legal victims had ceased. But the third kind of tithe which they had to
eat with the poor, is increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded
us to give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our surplus,
according to Lk. 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms. " Moreover the
tithes that are given to the ministers of the Church should be
dispensed by them for the use of the poor.
Reply to Objection 5: The ministers of the Church ought to be more
solicitous for the increase of spiritual goods in the people, than for
the amassing of temporal goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to
make use of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his livelihood
from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest he should occasion a
hindrance to the Gospel of Christ [*1 Cor. 9:12]. Nor did they sin who
did not contribute to his upkeep, else the Apostle would not have
omitted to reprove them. In like manner the ministers of the Church
rightly refrain from demanding the Church's tithes, when they could not
demand them without scandal, on account of their having fallen into
desuetude, or for some other reason. Nevertheless those who do not give
tithes in places where the Church does not demand them are not in a
state of damnation, unless they be obstinate, and unwilling to pay even
if tithes were demanded of them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether men are bound to pay tithes of all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to give tithes of all
things. The paying of tithes seems to be an institution of the Old Law.
Now the Old Law contains no precept about personal tithes, viz. those
that are payable on property acquired by one's own act, for instance by
commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is bound to pay tithes on such
things.
Objection 2: Further, it is not right to make oblations of that which
is ill-gotten, as stated above ([3050]Q[86], A[3]). Now oblations,
being offered to God immediately, seem to be more closely connected
with the divine worship than tithes which are offered to the ministers.
Therefore neither should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods.
Objection 3: Further, in the last chapter of Leviticus (30,32) the
precept of paying tithes refers only to "corn, fruits of trees" and
animals "that pass under the shepherd's rod. " But man derives a revenue
from other smaller things, such as the herbs that grow in his garden
and so forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound to pay
tithes.
Objection 4: Further, man cannot pay except what is in his power. Now a
man does not always remain in possession of all his profit from land
and stock, since sometimes he loses them by theft or robbery; sometimes
they are transferred to another person by sale; sometimes they are due
to some other person, thus taxes are due to princes, and wages due to
workmen. Therefore one ought not to pay tithes on such like things.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 28:22): "Of all things that Thou
shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee. "
I answer that, In judging about a thing we should look to its
principle. Now the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt
whereby carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things,
according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:11), "If we have sown
unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal
things? " [thus implying that on the contrary "it is no great matter if
we reap your carnal things"] [*The phrase in the brackets is omitted in
the Leonine edition]. For this debt is the principle on which is based
the commandment of the Church about the payment of tithes. Now whatever
man possesses comes under the designation of carnal things. Therefore
tithes must be paid on whatever one possesses.
Reply to Objection 1: In accordance with the condition of that people
there was a special reason why the Old Law did not include a precept
about personal tithes; because, to wit, all the other tribes had
certain possessions wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient
livelihood for the Levites who had no possessions, but were not
forbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations as the other
Jews did. On the other hand the people of the New Law are spread abroad
throughout the world, and many of them have no possessions, but live by
trade, and these would contribute nothing to the support of God's
ministers if they did not pay tithes on their trade profits. Moreover
the ministers of the New Law are more strictly forbidden to occupy
themselves in money-making trades, according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man
being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business. "
Wherefore in the New Law men are bound to pay personal tithes,
according to the custom of their country and the needs of the
ministers: hence Augustine, whose words are quoted 16, qu. 1, cap.
Decimae, says [*Append. Serm. cclxxvii]: "Tithes must be paid on the
profits of soldiering, trade or craft. "
Reply to Objection 2: Things are ill-gotten in two ways. First, because
the getting itself was unjust: such, for instance, are things gotten by
robbery, theft or usury: and these a man is bound to restore, and not
to pay tithes on them. If, however, a field be bought with the profits
of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce, because the
latter is not gotten usuriously but given by God. On the other hand
certain things are said to be ill-gotten, because they are gotten of a
shameful cause, for instance of whoredom or stage-playing, and the
like. Such things a man is not bound to restore, and consequently he is
bound to pay tithes on them in the same way as other personal tithes.
Nevertheless the Church must not accept the tithe so long as those
persons remain in sin, lest she appear to have a share in their sins:
but when they have done penance, tithes may be accepted from them on
these things.
Reply to Objection 3: Things directed to an end must be judged
according to their fittingness to the end. Now the payment of tithes is
due not for its own sake, but for the sake of the ministers, to whose
dignity it is unbecoming that they should demand minute things with
careful exactitude, for this is reckoned sinful according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2). Hence the Old Law did not order the payment
of tithes on such like minute things, but left it to the judgment of
those who are willing to pay, because minute things are counted as
nothing. Wherefore the Pharisees who claimed for themselves the perfect
justice of the Law, paid tithes even on these minute things: nor are
they reproved by our Lord on that account, but only because they
despised greater, i. e. spiritual, precepts; and rather did He show them
to be deserving of praise in this particular, when He said (Mat.
23:23): "These things you ought to have done," i. e. during the time of
the Law, according to Chrysostom's [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commentary. This also seems to
denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore now too men are
not bound to pay tithes on such minute things, except perhaps by reason
of the custom of one's country.
Reply to Objection 4: A man is not bound to pay tithes on what he has
lost by theft or robbery, before he recovers his property: unless he
has incurred the loss through his own fault or neglect, because the
Church ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat that
has not been tithed, the Church can command the tithes due to her, both
from the buyer who has a thing due to the Church, and from the seller,
because so far as he is concerned he has defrauded the Church: yet if
one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on the fruits of the
earth, in so far as these fruits are the gift of God. Wherefore tithes
do not come under a tax, nor are they subject to workmen's wages. Hence
it is not right to deduct one's taxes and the wages paid to workmen,
before paying tithes: but tithes must be paid before anything else on
one's entire produce.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether tithes should be paid to the clergy?
Objection 1: It would seem that tithes should not be paid to the
clergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the Old Testament, because
they had no portion in the people's possessions, according to Num.
18:23,24. But in the New Testament the clergy have possessions not only
ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover they receive
first-fruits, and oblations for the living and the dead. Therefore it
is unnecessary to pay tithes to them.
Objection 2: Further, it sometimes happens that a man dwells in one
parish, and farms in another; or a shepherd may take his flock within
the bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the
bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the bounds
of another parish during the other part of the year; or he may have his
sheepfold in one parish, and graze the sheep in another. Now in all
these and similar cases it seems impossible to decide to which clergy
the tithes ought to be paid. Therefore it would seem that no fixed
tithe ought to be paid to the clergy.
Objection 3: Further, it is the general custom in certain countries for
the soldiers to hold the tithes from the Church in fee; and certain
religious receive tithes. Therefore seemingly tithes are not due only
to those of the clergy who have care of souls.
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 18:21): "I have given to the sons
of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the ministry
wherewith they serve Me in the Tabernacle. " Now the clergy are the
successors of the sons of Levi in the New Testament. Therefore tithes
are due to the clergy alone.
I answer that, Two things have to be considered with regard to tithes:
namely, the right to receive tithes, and the things given in the name
of tithes. The right to receive tithes is a spiritual thing, for it
arises from the debt in virtue of which the ministers of the altar have
a right to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal things are due
to those who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns none but the
clergy who have care of souls, and so they alone are competent to have
this right.
On the other hand the things given in the name of tithes are material,
wherefore they may come to be used by anyone, and thus it is that they
fall into the hands of the laity.
Reply to Objection 1: In the Old Law, as stated above (A[1], ad 4),
special tithes were earmarked for the assistance of the poor. But in
the New Law the tithes are given to the clergy, not only for their own
support, but also that the clergy may use them in assisting the poor.
Hence they are not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations and
first-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary for this same purpose.
Reply to Objection 2: Personal tithes are due to the church in whose
parish a man dwells, while predial tithes seem more reasonably to
belong to the church within whose bounds the land is situated. The law,
however, prescribes that in this matter a custom that has obtained for
a long time must be observed [*Cap. Cum sint, and Cap. Ad apostolicae,
de Decimis, etc. ]. The shepherd who grazes his flock at different
seasons in two parishes, should pay tithe proportionately to both
churches. And since the fruit of the flock is derived from the pasture,
the tithe of the flock is due to the church in whose lands the flock
grazes, rather than to the church on whose land the fold is situated.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the Church can hand over to a layman the
things she receives under the title of tithe, so too can she allow him
to receive tithes that are yet to be paid, the right of receiving being
reserved to the ministers of the Church. The motive may be either the
need of the Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers through
being granted to them in fee by the Church, or it may be the succoring
of the poor; thus certain tithes have been granted by way of alms to
certain lay religious, or to those that have no care of souls. Some
religious, however, are competent to receive tithes, because they have
care of souls.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the clergy also are bound to pay tithes?
Objection 1: It would seem that clerics also are bound to pay tithes.
By common law [*Cap. Cum homines, de Decimis, etc. ] the parish church
should receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory. Now
it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain lands of their own on
the territory of some parish church, or that one church has
ecclesiastical property on the territory of another. Therefore it would
seem that the clergy are bound to pay predial tithes.
Objection 2: Further, some religious are clerics; and yet they are
bound to pay tithes to churches on account of the lands which they
cultivate even with their own hands [*Cap. Ex parte, and Cap. Nuper. ].
Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune from the payment
of tithes.
Objection 3: Further, in the eighteenth chapter of Numbers (26,28), it
is prescribed not only that the Levites should receive tithes from the
people, but also that they should themselves pay tithes to the
high-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the
Sovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to
the clergy.
Objection 4: Further, tithes should serve not only for the support of
the clergy, but also for the assistance of the poor. Therefore, if the
clergy are exempt from paying tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the
latter is not true. Therefore the former is false.
On the contrary, A decretal of Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says: "It is
a new form of exaction when the clergy demand tithes from the clergy"
[*Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc. ].
I answer that, The cause of giving cannot be the cause of receiving, as
neither can the cause of action be the cause of passion; yet it happens
that one and the same person is giver and receiver, even as agent and
patient, on account of different causes and from different points of
view. Now tithes are due to the clergy as being ministers of the altar
and sowers of spiritual things among the people. Wherefore those
members of the clergy as such, i. e. as having ecclesiastical property,
are not bound to pay tithes; whereas from some other cause through
holding property in their own right, either by inheriting it from their
kindred, or by purchase, or in any other similar manner, they are bound
to the payment of tithes.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, because the clergy
like anyone else are bound to pay tithes on their own lands to the
parish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church,
because to possess a thing as one's private property is not the same as
possessing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even though
they be within the boundaries of another parish.
Reply to Objection 2: Religious who are clerics, if they have care of
souls, and dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to
pay tithes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other
religious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the
people; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay tithes,
but they are somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions granted
by the Apostolic See [*Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad audientiam,
de Decimis, etc. ].
Reply to Objection 3: In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the
priests, and tithes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below
the priests, the Lord commanded that the former should pay the
high-priest "the tenth part of the tenth" [*Num. 18:26] instead of
first-fruits: wherefore for the same reason the clergy are bound now to
pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For natural
reason dictates that he who has charge of the common estate of a
multitude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be able to
carry out whatever is necessary for the common welfare.
Reply to Objection 4: Tithes should be employed for the assistance of
the poor, through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have
no reason for accepting tithes, but they are bound to pay them.
__________________________________________________________________
SERVICE BY PROMISE (Q[88])
OF VOWS (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God. Under
this head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) What is a vow?
(2) What is the matter of a vow?
(3) Of the obligation of vows;
(4) Of the use of taking vows;
(5) Of what virtue is it an act?
(6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than
without a vow?
(7) Of the solemnizing of a vow;
(8) Whether those who are under another's power can take vows?
(9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion?
(10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation?
(11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of
continence?
(12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a dispensation
from a vow?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a purpose
of the will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III,
xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], "a vow is a
conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind,
whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain
thing.
" But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may consist
in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere
purpose of the will.
Objection 2: Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from
"voluntas" [will], for one is said to do a thing "proprio voto" [by
one's own vow] when one does it voluntarily. Now to "purpose" is an act
of the will, while to "promise" is an act of the reason. Therefore a
vow consists in a mere act of the will.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 9:62): "No man putting his
hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God. "
Now from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts
his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from
his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God. Therefore by a
mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even without making a
promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow consists in a mere
purpose of the will.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
promise displeaseth Him. " Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow is
a promise.
I answer that, A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular
thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a promise,
which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct.
For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what
others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is
to do for another. Now a promise between man and man can only be
expressed in words or any other outward signs; whereas a promise can be
made to God by the mere inward thought, since according to 1 Kings
16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the
heart. " Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, either to arouse
ourselves, as was stated above with regard to prayer ([3051]Q[83],
A[12]), or to call others to witness, so that one may refrain from
breaking the vow, not only through fear of God, but also through
respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing
something: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is the act
of a deliberate will. Accordingly three things are essential to a vow:
the first is deliberation. the second is a purpose of the will; and the
third is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of a vow.
Sometimes, however, two other things are added as a sort of
confirmation of the vow, namely, pronouncement by word of mouth,
according to Ps. 65:13, "I will pay Thee my vows which my lips have
uttered"; and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master says (Sent.
iv, D, 38) that a vow is "the witnessing of a spontaneous promise and
ought to be made to God and about things relating to God": although the
"witnessing" may strictly refer to the inward protestation.
Reply to Objection 1: The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed
by the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a
promise.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's will moves the reason to promise something
relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from
the will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.
Reply to Objection 3: He that puts his hand to the plough does
something already; while he that merely purposes to do something does
nothing so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about
doing, although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that
puts his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he
stretches out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a vow should always be about a better good?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow need not be always about a better
good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation. But vows
are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about matters of
salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil and his pomps,
and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye, and
pay to the Lord your God"; and Jacob vowed (Gn. 28:21) that the Lord
should be his God. Now this above all is necessary for salvation.
Therefore vows are not only about a better good.
Objection 2: Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Heb. 11:32).
Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges 11).
Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better good,
but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not only
about a better good, but also about something unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or
that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good.
Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend
to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent matters
and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not always
about a better good.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 23:22): "If thou wilt not promise
thou shalt be without sin. "
I answer that, As stated above [3052](A[1]), a vow is a promise made to
God. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for
someone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say that
one would do something against someone. In like manner it would be
futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore, as
every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God unless
it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or indifferent, but
only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a vow. But as a vow
denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity excludes voluntariness,
whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to be or not to be, can
nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would be foolish to vow that one
would die or that one would not fly.
On the other hand, if a thing be necessary. not absolutely but on the
supposition of an end---for instance if salvation be unattainable
without it---it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done
voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it.
But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the
supposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most
properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good in
comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation.
Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good.
Reply to Objection 1: Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the
faith of Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these
things are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation.
The same answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also be
explained that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by
giving Him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for
instance by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the
same passage.
Reply to Objection 2: Certain things are good, whatever be their
result; such are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking,
the matter of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as
those things which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the
matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and as
such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result, in
which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of
Jephte, who as related in Judges 11:30,31, "made a vow to the Lord,
saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands,
whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and
shall meet me when I return in peace . . . the same will I offer a
holocaust to the Lord. " For this could have an evil result if, as
indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be
unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome
says [*Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin. : Comment. in Micheam vi, viii:
Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist.
Scholast. ]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and
in keeping his vow he was wicked. " Yet it is premised (Judges 11:29)
that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," because his faith and
devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy Ghost;
and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also by reason
of the victory which he obtained, and because it is probable that he
repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless foreshadowed something
good.
Reply to Objection 3: The mortification of one's own body, for instance
by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it
is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due
discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without overburdening
nature. on this condition such things may be the matter of a vow. Hence
the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1), "Present your bodies a living
sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," adds, "your reasonable service. "
Since, however, man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning
himself, such vows as these are more fittingly kept or disregarded
according to the judgment of a superior, yet so that, should a man find
that without doubt he is seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and
should he be unable to appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it.
As to vows about vain and useless things they should be ridiculed
rather than kept.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all vows are binding?
Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man needs
things that are done by another, more than God does, since He has no
need for our goods (Ps. 15:2). Now according to the prescription of
human laws [*Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat. , i] a simple promise made to a
man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed on account of the
changeableness of the human will. Much less binding therefore is a
simple promise made to God, which we call a vow.
Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now
sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, either
because it depends on another's decision, as when, for instance, a man
vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse to receive him: or
on account of some defect arising, for instance when a woman vows
virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a man vows to give a
sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is not always
binding.
Objection 3: Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so
at once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if
it be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore
a vow is not always binding.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3,4): "Whatsoever thou hast
vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not
to perform the things promised. "
I answer that, For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's
promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [*Ep. xxxii, 2: De Mendac.
xx] faith takes its name "from a man's deed agreeing with his word"
[*'Fides . . . fiunt dicta' Cicero gives the same etymology (De Offic.
i, 7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to God above all, both on account
of God's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he has received from
God. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows he has made to
God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to God. On the other
hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of infidelity. Wherefore Solomon
gives the reason why vows should be paid to God, because "an unfaithful
. . . promise displeaseth Him" [*Eccles. 5:3].
Reply to Objection 1: Honesty demands that a man should keep any
promise he makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the
natural law. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a
promise he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although God
needs not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so
that a vow made to Him is most binding.
Reply to Objection 2: If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible
to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that he
have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed
to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power to be
received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself to
enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this
particular form of religious life, or this place, as being most
agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received
there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his principal
intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious life,
or to this particular place, because the one or the other pleases him
in some special way, he is not bound to enter another religious house,
if they are unwilling to receive him into this particular one. on the
other hand, if he be rendered incapable of fulfilling his vow through
his own fault, he is bound over and above to do penance for his past
fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is afterwards violated,
she is bound not only to observe what is in her power, namely,
perpetual continency, but also to repent of what she has lost by
sinning.
Reply to Objection 3: The obligation of a vow is caused by our own will
and intention, wherefore it is written (Dt. 23:23): "That which is once
gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast
promised to the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will and
with thy own mouth. " Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one's
intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound
to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain
time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate
fulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to
bind oneself, for it is written (Dt. 23:21): "When thou hast made a vow
to the Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord
thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee
for a sin. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is expedient to take vows?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It is
not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God has
given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man is
liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in
a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take vows.
Objection 2: Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But
whoever takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before
taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of danger
to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine
says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin. ): "Since thou hast vowed, thou
hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou dost not what
thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou
not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good:
whereas now if thou breakest faith with God (which God forbid) thou art
the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have been happier, hadst thou kept
thy vow. " Therefore it is not expedient to take vows.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers
of me, as I also am of Christ. " But we do not read that either Christ
or the Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to
take vows.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye and pay to the Lord
your God. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3053]AA[1],2), a vow is a promise made
to God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God
under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own
profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and
that we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that
service: whereas we make promises to God not for His but for our own
profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin. ): "He
is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our
payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him. " And just as
what we give God is useful not to Him but to us, since "what is given
Him is added to the giver," as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment.
et Paulin. ), so also a promise whereby we vow something to God, does
not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but it
conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills
immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient to
take vows.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one
being unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will
firmly fixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God
and the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a
certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence,
Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin. ) that "happy is the
necessity that compels us to do the better things. "
Reply to Objection 2: When danger arises from the deed itself, this
deed is not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a
tottering bridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the
deed, the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient
to mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the
horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, that
may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles.
11:4): "He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that
considereth the clouds shall never reap. " Now a man incurs danger, not
from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind by
breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et
Paulin. ): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that
thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy
detriment. "
Reply to Objection 3: It was incompetent for Christ, by His very
nature, to take a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man,
His will was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a "comprehensor. "
By a kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps.
21:26): "I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when
He is speaking of His body, which is the Church.
The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the
state of perfection when "they left all things and followed Christ. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a vow is an act of latria or religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or
religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem to
pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it. Therefore a
vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially.
Objection 2: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs
to religion to offer God worship and ceremonial rites. But he who takes
a vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it.
Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.
Objection 3: Further, religious worship should be offered to none but
God. But a vow is made not only to God, but also to the saints and to
one's superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their
profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 19:21): "(The Egyptians) shall
worship Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to
the Lord, and perform them. " Now, the worship of God is properly the
act of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or
religion.
I answer that, As stated above ([3054]Q[81], A[1], ad 1), every act of
virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as it
is directed to the reverence of God which is the proper end of latria.
Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to the
commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the
direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the proper
act of latria.
Now, it is evident from what has been said above ([3055]AA[1],2) that a
vow is a promise made to God, and that a promise is nothing else than a
directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise is
made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship or
service of God. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is properly an
act of latria or religion.
Reply to Objection 1: The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of
another virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing
continency; while sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a
sacrifice or praying. But promising either of them to God belongs to
religion, for the reason given above.
during the time of grace men are bound, under necessity of precept, to
pay tithes in those countries where tithes are not paid, they would all
be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the ministers of the
Church for dissembling. But this seems unreasonable. Therefore during
the time of grace men are not bound under necessity of precept to pay
tithes.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Append. Serm. cclxxcii], whose words are
quoted 16, qu. i [*Can. Decimae], says: "It is a duty to pay tithes,
and whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to another. "
I answer that, In the Old Law tithes were paid for the sustenance of
the ministers of God. Hence it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring all
the tithes into My [Vulg. : 'the'] store-house that there may be meat in
My house. " Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was partly
moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly judicial,
deriving its force from its divine institution. Because natural reason
dictates that the people should administer the necessaries of life to
those who minister the divine worship for the welfare of the whole
people even as it is the people's duty to provide a livelihood for
their rulers and soldiers and so forth. Hence the Apostle proves this
from human custom, saying (1 Cor. 9:7): "Who serveth as a soldier at
any time at his own charge? Who planteth a vineyard and eateth not of
the fruit thereof? " But the fixing of the proportion to be offered to
the ministers of divine worship does not belong to the natural law, but
was determined by divine institution, in accordance with the condition
of that people to whom the law was being given. For they were divided
into twelve tribes, and the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was
engaged exclusively in the divine ministry and had no possessions
whence to derive a livelihood: and so it was becomingly ordained that
the remaining eleven tribes should give one-tenth part of their
revenues to the Levites [*Num. 18:21] that the latter might live
respectably; and also because some, through negligence, would disregard
this precept. Hence, so far as the tenth part was fixed, the precept
was judicial, since all institutions established among this people for
the special purpose of preserving equality among men, in accordance
with this people's condition, are called "judicial precepts. "
Nevertheless by way of consequence these institutions foreshadowed
something in the future, even as everything else connected with them,
according to 1 Cor. 12, "All these things happened to them in figure. "
In this respect they had something in common with the "ceremonial
precepts," which were instituted chiefly that they might be signs of
the future. Hence the precept about paying tithes foreshadowed
something in the future. For ten is, in a way, the perfect number
(being the first numerical limit, since the figures do not go beyond
ten but begin over again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth,
which is the sign of perfection, reserving the nine other parts for
himself, acknowledged by a sign that imperfection was his part, and
that the perfection which was to come through Christ was to be hoped
for from God. Yet this proves it to be, not a ceremonial but a judicial
precept, as stated above.
There is this difference between the ceremonial and judicial precepts
of the Law, as we stated above ([3049]FS, Q[104], A[3]), that it is
unlawful to observe the ceremonial precepts at the time of the New Law,
whereas there is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during the
time of grace although they are not binding. Indeed they are bound to
be observed by some, if they be ordained by the authority of those who
have power to make laws. Thus it was a judicial precept of the Old Law
that he who stole a sheep should restore four sheep (Ex. 22:1), and if
any king were to order this to be done his subjects would be bound to
obey. In like manner during the time of the New Law the authority of
the Church has established the payment of tithe; thus showing a certain
kindliness, lest the people of the New Law should give less to the
ministers of the New Testament than did the people of the Old Law to
the ministers of the Old Testament; for the people of the New Law are
under greater obligations, according to Mat. 5:20, "Unless your justice
abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter
into the kingdom of heaven," and, moreover, the ministers of the New
Testament are of greater dignity than the ministers of the Old
Testament, as the Apostle shows (2 Cor. 3:7,8).
Accordingly it is evident that man's obligation to pay tithes arises
partly from natural law, partly from the institution of the Church;
who, nevertheless, in consideration of the requirements of time and
persons might ordain the payment of some other proportion.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept about paying tithes, in so far as it
was a moral precept, was given in the Gospel by our Lord when He said
(Mat. 10:10) [*The words as quoted are from Lk. 10:7: Matthew has
'meat' instead of 'hire']: "The workman is worthy of his hire," and the
Apostle says the same (1 Cor. 9:4 seqq. ). But the fixing of the
particular proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church.
Reply to Objection 3: Before the time of the Old Law the ministry of
the divine worship was not entrusted to any particular person; although
it is stated that the first-born were priests, and that they received a
double portion. For this very reason no particular portion was directed
to be given to the ministers of the divine worship: but when they met
with one, each man of his own accord gave him what he deemed right.
Thus Abraham by a kind of prophetic instinct gave tithes to
Melchisedech, the priest of the Most High God, according to Gn. 14:20,
and again Jacob made a vow to give tithes [*Gn. 28:20], although he
appears to have vowed to do so, not by paying them to ministers, but
for the purpose of the divine worship, for instance for the fulfilling
of sacrifices, hence he said significantly: "I will offer tithes to
Thee. "
Reply to Objection 4: The second kind of tithe, which was reserved for
the offering of sacrifices, has no place in the New Law, since the
legal victims had ceased. But the third kind of tithe which they had to
eat with the poor, is increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded
us to give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our surplus,
according to Lk. 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms. " Moreover the
tithes that are given to the ministers of the Church should be
dispensed by them for the use of the poor.
Reply to Objection 5: The ministers of the Church ought to be more
solicitous for the increase of spiritual goods in the people, than for
the amassing of temporal goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to
make use of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his livelihood
from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest he should occasion a
hindrance to the Gospel of Christ [*1 Cor. 9:12]. Nor did they sin who
did not contribute to his upkeep, else the Apostle would not have
omitted to reprove them. In like manner the ministers of the Church
rightly refrain from demanding the Church's tithes, when they could not
demand them without scandal, on account of their having fallen into
desuetude, or for some other reason. Nevertheless those who do not give
tithes in places where the Church does not demand them are not in a
state of damnation, unless they be obstinate, and unwilling to pay even
if tithes were demanded of them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether men are bound to pay tithes of all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to give tithes of all
things. The paying of tithes seems to be an institution of the Old Law.
Now the Old Law contains no precept about personal tithes, viz. those
that are payable on property acquired by one's own act, for instance by
commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is bound to pay tithes on such
things.
Objection 2: Further, it is not right to make oblations of that which
is ill-gotten, as stated above ([3050]Q[86], A[3]). Now oblations,
being offered to God immediately, seem to be more closely connected
with the divine worship than tithes which are offered to the ministers.
Therefore neither should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods.
Objection 3: Further, in the last chapter of Leviticus (30,32) the
precept of paying tithes refers only to "corn, fruits of trees" and
animals "that pass under the shepherd's rod. " But man derives a revenue
from other smaller things, such as the herbs that grow in his garden
and so forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound to pay
tithes.
Objection 4: Further, man cannot pay except what is in his power. Now a
man does not always remain in possession of all his profit from land
and stock, since sometimes he loses them by theft or robbery; sometimes
they are transferred to another person by sale; sometimes they are due
to some other person, thus taxes are due to princes, and wages due to
workmen. Therefore one ought not to pay tithes on such like things.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 28:22): "Of all things that Thou
shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee. "
I answer that, In judging about a thing we should look to its
principle. Now the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt
whereby carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things,
according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:11), "If we have sown
unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal
things? " [thus implying that on the contrary "it is no great matter if
we reap your carnal things"] [*The phrase in the brackets is omitted in
the Leonine edition]. For this debt is the principle on which is based
the commandment of the Church about the payment of tithes. Now whatever
man possesses comes under the designation of carnal things. Therefore
tithes must be paid on whatever one possesses.
Reply to Objection 1: In accordance with the condition of that people
there was a special reason why the Old Law did not include a precept
about personal tithes; because, to wit, all the other tribes had
certain possessions wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient
livelihood for the Levites who had no possessions, but were not
forbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations as the other
Jews did. On the other hand the people of the New Law are spread abroad
throughout the world, and many of them have no possessions, but live by
trade, and these would contribute nothing to the support of God's
ministers if they did not pay tithes on their trade profits. Moreover
the ministers of the New Law are more strictly forbidden to occupy
themselves in money-making trades, according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man
being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business. "
Wherefore in the New Law men are bound to pay personal tithes,
according to the custom of their country and the needs of the
ministers: hence Augustine, whose words are quoted 16, qu. 1, cap.
Decimae, says [*Append. Serm. cclxxvii]: "Tithes must be paid on the
profits of soldiering, trade or craft. "
Reply to Objection 2: Things are ill-gotten in two ways. First, because
the getting itself was unjust: such, for instance, are things gotten by
robbery, theft or usury: and these a man is bound to restore, and not
to pay tithes on them. If, however, a field be bought with the profits
of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce, because the
latter is not gotten usuriously but given by God. On the other hand
certain things are said to be ill-gotten, because they are gotten of a
shameful cause, for instance of whoredom or stage-playing, and the
like. Such things a man is not bound to restore, and consequently he is
bound to pay tithes on them in the same way as other personal tithes.
Nevertheless the Church must not accept the tithe so long as those
persons remain in sin, lest she appear to have a share in their sins:
but when they have done penance, tithes may be accepted from them on
these things.
Reply to Objection 3: Things directed to an end must be judged
according to their fittingness to the end. Now the payment of tithes is
due not for its own sake, but for the sake of the ministers, to whose
dignity it is unbecoming that they should demand minute things with
careful exactitude, for this is reckoned sinful according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2). Hence the Old Law did not order the payment
of tithes on such like minute things, but left it to the judgment of
those who are willing to pay, because minute things are counted as
nothing. Wherefore the Pharisees who claimed for themselves the perfect
justice of the Law, paid tithes even on these minute things: nor are
they reproved by our Lord on that account, but only because they
despised greater, i. e. spiritual, precepts; and rather did He show them
to be deserving of praise in this particular, when He said (Mat.
23:23): "These things you ought to have done," i. e. during the time of
the Law, according to Chrysostom's [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commentary. This also seems to
denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore now too men are
not bound to pay tithes on such minute things, except perhaps by reason
of the custom of one's country.
Reply to Objection 4: A man is not bound to pay tithes on what he has
lost by theft or robbery, before he recovers his property: unless he
has incurred the loss through his own fault or neglect, because the
Church ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat that
has not been tithed, the Church can command the tithes due to her, both
from the buyer who has a thing due to the Church, and from the seller,
because so far as he is concerned he has defrauded the Church: yet if
one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on the fruits of the
earth, in so far as these fruits are the gift of God. Wherefore tithes
do not come under a tax, nor are they subject to workmen's wages. Hence
it is not right to deduct one's taxes and the wages paid to workmen,
before paying tithes: but tithes must be paid before anything else on
one's entire produce.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether tithes should be paid to the clergy?
Objection 1: It would seem that tithes should not be paid to the
clergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the Old Testament, because
they had no portion in the people's possessions, according to Num.
18:23,24. But in the New Testament the clergy have possessions not only
ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover they receive
first-fruits, and oblations for the living and the dead. Therefore it
is unnecessary to pay tithes to them.
Objection 2: Further, it sometimes happens that a man dwells in one
parish, and farms in another; or a shepherd may take his flock within
the bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the
bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the bounds
of another parish during the other part of the year; or he may have his
sheepfold in one parish, and graze the sheep in another. Now in all
these and similar cases it seems impossible to decide to which clergy
the tithes ought to be paid. Therefore it would seem that no fixed
tithe ought to be paid to the clergy.
Objection 3: Further, it is the general custom in certain countries for
the soldiers to hold the tithes from the Church in fee; and certain
religious receive tithes. Therefore seemingly tithes are not due only
to those of the clergy who have care of souls.
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 18:21): "I have given to the sons
of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the ministry
wherewith they serve Me in the Tabernacle. " Now the clergy are the
successors of the sons of Levi in the New Testament. Therefore tithes
are due to the clergy alone.
I answer that, Two things have to be considered with regard to tithes:
namely, the right to receive tithes, and the things given in the name
of tithes. The right to receive tithes is a spiritual thing, for it
arises from the debt in virtue of which the ministers of the altar have
a right to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal things are due
to those who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns none but the
clergy who have care of souls, and so they alone are competent to have
this right.
On the other hand the things given in the name of tithes are material,
wherefore they may come to be used by anyone, and thus it is that they
fall into the hands of the laity.
Reply to Objection 1: In the Old Law, as stated above (A[1], ad 4),
special tithes were earmarked for the assistance of the poor. But in
the New Law the tithes are given to the clergy, not only for their own
support, but also that the clergy may use them in assisting the poor.
Hence they are not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations and
first-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary for this same purpose.
Reply to Objection 2: Personal tithes are due to the church in whose
parish a man dwells, while predial tithes seem more reasonably to
belong to the church within whose bounds the land is situated. The law,
however, prescribes that in this matter a custom that has obtained for
a long time must be observed [*Cap. Cum sint, and Cap. Ad apostolicae,
de Decimis, etc. ]. The shepherd who grazes his flock at different
seasons in two parishes, should pay tithe proportionately to both
churches. And since the fruit of the flock is derived from the pasture,
the tithe of the flock is due to the church in whose lands the flock
grazes, rather than to the church on whose land the fold is situated.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the Church can hand over to a layman the
things she receives under the title of tithe, so too can she allow him
to receive tithes that are yet to be paid, the right of receiving being
reserved to the ministers of the Church. The motive may be either the
need of the Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers through
being granted to them in fee by the Church, or it may be the succoring
of the poor; thus certain tithes have been granted by way of alms to
certain lay religious, or to those that have no care of souls. Some
religious, however, are competent to receive tithes, because they have
care of souls.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the clergy also are bound to pay tithes?
Objection 1: It would seem that clerics also are bound to pay tithes.
By common law [*Cap. Cum homines, de Decimis, etc. ] the parish church
should receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory. Now
it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain lands of their own on
the territory of some parish church, or that one church has
ecclesiastical property on the territory of another. Therefore it would
seem that the clergy are bound to pay predial tithes.
Objection 2: Further, some religious are clerics; and yet they are
bound to pay tithes to churches on account of the lands which they
cultivate even with their own hands [*Cap. Ex parte, and Cap. Nuper. ].
Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune from the payment
of tithes.
Objection 3: Further, in the eighteenth chapter of Numbers (26,28), it
is prescribed not only that the Levites should receive tithes from the
people, but also that they should themselves pay tithes to the
high-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the
Sovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to
the clergy.
Objection 4: Further, tithes should serve not only for the support of
the clergy, but also for the assistance of the poor. Therefore, if the
clergy are exempt from paying tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the
latter is not true. Therefore the former is false.
On the contrary, A decretal of Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says: "It is
a new form of exaction when the clergy demand tithes from the clergy"
[*Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc. ].
I answer that, The cause of giving cannot be the cause of receiving, as
neither can the cause of action be the cause of passion; yet it happens
that one and the same person is giver and receiver, even as agent and
patient, on account of different causes and from different points of
view. Now tithes are due to the clergy as being ministers of the altar
and sowers of spiritual things among the people. Wherefore those
members of the clergy as such, i. e. as having ecclesiastical property,
are not bound to pay tithes; whereas from some other cause through
holding property in their own right, either by inheriting it from their
kindred, or by purchase, or in any other similar manner, they are bound
to the payment of tithes.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, because the clergy
like anyone else are bound to pay tithes on their own lands to the
parish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church,
because to possess a thing as one's private property is not the same as
possessing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even though
they be within the boundaries of another parish.
Reply to Objection 2: Religious who are clerics, if they have care of
souls, and dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to
pay tithes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other
religious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the
people; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay tithes,
but they are somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions granted
by the Apostolic See [*Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad audientiam,
de Decimis, etc. ].
Reply to Objection 3: In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the
priests, and tithes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below
the priests, the Lord commanded that the former should pay the
high-priest "the tenth part of the tenth" [*Num. 18:26] instead of
first-fruits: wherefore for the same reason the clergy are bound now to
pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For natural
reason dictates that he who has charge of the common estate of a
multitude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be able to
carry out whatever is necessary for the common welfare.
Reply to Objection 4: Tithes should be employed for the assistance of
the poor, through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have
no reason for accepting tithes, but they are bound to pay them.
__________________________________________________________________
SERVICE BY PROMISE (Q[88])
OF VOWS (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God. Under
this head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) What is a vow?
(2) What is the matter of a vow?
(3) Of the obligation of vows;
(4) Of the use of taking vows;
(5) Of what virtue is it an act?
(6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than
without a vow?
(7) Of the solemnizing of a vow;
(8) Whether those who are under another's power can take vows?
(9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion?
(10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation?
(11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of
continence?
(12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a dispensation
from a vow?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a purpose
of the will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III,
xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], "a vow is a
conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind,
whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain
thing.
" But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may consist
in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere
purpose of the will.
Objection 2: Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from
"voluntas" [will], for one is said to do a thing "proprio voto" [by
one's own vow] when one does it voluntarily. Now to "purpose" is an act
of the will, while to "promise" is an act of the reason. Therefore a
vow consists in a mere act of the will.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 9:62): "No man putting his
hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God. "
Now from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts
his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from
his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God. Therefore by a
mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even without making a
promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow consists in a mere
purpose of the will.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
promise displeaseth Him. " Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow is
a promise.
I answer that, A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular
thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a promise,
which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct.
For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what
others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is
to do for another. Now a promise between man and man can only be
expressed in words or any other outward signs; whereas a promise can be
made to God by the mere inward thought, since according to 1 Kings
16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the
heart. " Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, either to arouse
ourselves, as was stated above with regard to prayer ([3051]Q[83],
A[12]), or to call others to witness, so that one may refrain from
breaking the vow, not only through fear of God, but also through
respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing
something: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is the act
of a deliberate will. Accordingly three things are essential to a vow:
the first is deliberation. the second is a purpose of the will; and the
third is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of a vow.
Sometimes, however, two other things are added as a sort of
confirmation of the vow, namely, pronouncement by word of mouth,
according to Ps. 65:13, "I will pay Thee my vows which my lips have
uttered"; and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master says (Sent.
iv, D, 38) that a vow is "the witnessing of a spontaneous promise and
ought to be made to God and about things relating to God": although the
"witnessing" may strictly refer to the inward protestation.
Reply to Objection 1: The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed
by the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a
promise.
Reply to Objection 2: Man's will moves the reason to promise something
relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from
the will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.
Reply to Objection 3: He that puts his hand to the plough does
something already; while he that merely purposes to do something does
nothing so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about
doing, although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that
puts his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he
stretches out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a vow should always be about a better good?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow need not be always about a better
good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation. But vows
are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about matters of
salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil and his pomps,
and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye, and
pay to the Lord your God"; and Jacob vowed (Gn. 28:21) that the Lord
should be his God. Now this above all is necessary for salvation.
Therefore vows are not only about a better good.
Objection 2: Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Heb. 11:32).
Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges 11).
Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better good,
but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not only
about a better good, but also about something unlawful.
Objection 3: Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or
that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good.
Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend
to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent matters
and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not always
about a better good.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 23:22): "If thou wilt not promise
thou shalt be without sin. "
I answer that, As stated above [3052](A[1]), a vow is a promise made to
God. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for
someone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say that
one would do something against someone. In like manner it would be
futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore, as
every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God unless
it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or indifferent, but
only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a vow. But as a vow
denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity excludes voluntariness,
whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to be or not to be, can
nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would be foolish to vow that one
would die or that one would not fly.
On the other hand, if a thing be necessary. not absolutely but on the
supposition of an end---for instance if salvation be unattainable
without it---it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done
voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it.
But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the
supposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most
properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good in
comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation.
Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good.
Reply to Objection 1: Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the
faith of Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these
things are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation.
The same answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also be
explained that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by
giving Him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for
instance by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the
same passage.
Reply to Objection 2: Certain things are good, whatever be their
result; such are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking,
the matter of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as
those things which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the
matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and as
such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result, in
which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of
Jephte, who as related in Judges 11:30,31, "made a vow to the Lord,
saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands,
whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and
shall meet me when I return in peace . . . the same will I offer a
holocaust to the Lord. " For this could have an evil result if, as
indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be
unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome
says [*Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin. : Comment. in Micheam vi, viii:
Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist.
Scholast. ]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and
in keeping his vow he was wicked. " Yet it is premised (Judges 11:29)
that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," because his faith and
devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy Ghost;
and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also by reason
of the victory which he obtained, and because it is probable that he
repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless foreshadowed something
good.
Reply to Objection 3: The mortification of one's own body, for instance
by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it
is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due
discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without overburdening
nature. on this condition such things may be the matter of a vow. Hence
the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1), "Present your bodies a living
sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," adds, "your reasonable service. "
Since, however, man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning
himself, such vows as these are more fittingly kept or disregarded
according to the judgment of a superior, yet so that, should a man find
that without doubt he is seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and
should he be unable to appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it.
As to vows about vain and useless things they should be ridiculed
rather than kept.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all vows are binding?
Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man needs
things that are done by another, more than God does, since He has no
need for our goods (Ps. 15:2). Now according to the prescription of
human laws [*Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat. , i] a simple promise made to a
man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed on account of the
changeableness of the human will. Much less binding therefore is a
simple promise made to God, which we call a vow.
Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now
sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, either
because it depends on another's decision, as when, for instance, a man
vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse to receive him: or
on account of some defect arising, for instance when a woman vows
virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a man vows to give a
sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is not always
binding.
Objection 3: Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so
at once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if
it be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore
a vow is not always binding.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3,4): "Whatsoever thou hast
vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not
to perform the things promised. "
I answer that, For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's
promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [*Ep. xxxii, 2: De Mendac.
xx] faith takes its name "from a man's deed agreeing with his word"
[*'Fides . . . fiunt dicta' Cicero gives the same etymology (De Offic.
i, 7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to God above all, both on account
of God's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he has received from
God. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows he has made to
God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to God. On the other
hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of infidelity. Wherefore Solomon
gives the reason why vows should be paid to God, because "an unfaithful
. . . promise displeaseth Him" [*Eccles. 5:3].
Reply to Objection 1: Honesty demands that a man should keep any
promise he makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the
natural law. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a
promise he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although God
needs not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so
that a vow made to Him is most binding.
Reply to Objection 2: If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible
to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that he
have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed
to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power to be
received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself to
enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this
particular form of religious life, or this place, as being most
agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received
there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his principal
intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious life,
or to this particular place, because the one or the other pleases him
in some special way, he is not bound to enter another religious house,
if they are unwilling to receive him into this particular one. on the
other hand, if he be rendered incapable of fulfilling his vow through
his own fault, he is bound over and above to do penance for his past
fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is afterwards violated,
she is bound not only to observe what is in her power, namely,
perpetual continency, but also to repent of what she has lost by
sinning.
Reply to Objection 3: The obligation of a vow is caused by our own will
and intention, wherefore it is written (Dt. 23:23): "That which is once
gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast
promised to the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will and
with thy own mouth. " Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one's
intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound
to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain
time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate
fulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to
bind oneself, for it is written (Dt. 23:21): "When thou hast made a vow
to the Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord
thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee
for a sin. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is expedient to take vows?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It is
not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God has
given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man is
liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in
a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take vows.
Objection 2: Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But
whoever takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before
taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of danger
to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine
says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin. ): "Since thou hast vowed, thou
hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou dost not what
thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou
not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good:
whereas now if thou breakest faith with God (which God forbid) thou art
the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have been happier, hadst thou kept
thy vow. " Therefore it is not expedient to take vows.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers
of me, as I also am of Christ. " But we do not read that either Christ
or the Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to
take vows.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye and pay to the Lord
your God. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3053]AA[1],2), a vow is a promise made
to God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God
under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own
profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and
that we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that
service: whereas we make promises to God not for His but for our own
profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin. ): "He
is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our
payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him. " And just as
what we give God is useful not to Him but to us, since "what is given
Him is added to the giver," as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment.
et Paulin. ), so also a promise whereby we vow something to God, does
not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but it
conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills
immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient to
take vows.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one
being unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will
firmly fixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God
and the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a
certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence,
Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin. ) that "happy is the
necessity that compels us to do the better things. "
Reply to Objection 2: When danger arises from the deed itself, this
deed is not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a
tottering bridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the
deed, the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient
to mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the
horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, that
may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles.
11:4): "He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that
considereth the clouds shall never reap. " Now a man incurs danger, not
from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind by
breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et
Paulin. ): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that
thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy
detriment. "
Reply to Objection 3: It was incompetent for Christ, by His very
nature, to take a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man,
His will was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a "comprehensor. "
By a kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps.
21:26): "I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when
He is speaking of His body, which is the Church.
The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the
state of perfection when "they left all things and followed Christ. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a vow is an act of latria or religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or
religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem to
pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it. Therefore a
vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially.
Objection 2: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs
to religion to offer God worship and ceremonial rites. But he who takes
a vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it.
Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.
Objection 3: Further, religious worship should be offered to none but
God. But a vow is made not only to God, but also to the saints and to
one's superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their
profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 19:21): "(The Egyptians) shall
worship Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to
the Lord, and perform them. " Now, the worship of God is properly the
act of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or
religion.
I answer that, As stated above ([3054]Q[81], A[1], ad 1), every act of
virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as it
is directed to the reverence of God which is the proper end of latria.
Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to the
commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the
direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the proper
act of latria.
Now, it is evident from what has been said above ([3055]AA[1],2) that a
vow is a promise made to God, and that a promise is nothing else than a
directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise is
made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship or
service of God. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is properly an
act of latria or religion.
Reply to Objection 1: The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of
another virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing
continency; while sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a
sacrifice or praying. But promising either of them to God belongs to
religion, for the reason given above.
