No More Learning

With speech less horror the multitude saw the corpses of these last victims of the reign of terror dragged through the streets, and thrown into the river.
The broken bands of Marius threw themselves into the
neighbouring and strong cities of new burgesses Norba and Praeneste : Marius in person with the treasure and the greater part of the fugitives entered the latter. Sulla left an able oflicer, Quintus Ofella, before Praeneste just as he had done in the previous year before Capua, with instructions not to expend his strength in the siege of the strong town, but to enclose it with an extended line of blockade and starve it into surrender. He himself advanced from different sides upon the capital, which as well as the whole surrounding district he found abandoned by the enemy, and occupied without resistance. He barely took time to compose the minds of the people by an address and to make the most necessary arrangements, and im mediately passed on to Etruria, that in concert with Metellus he might dislodge his antagonists from Northern
Italy.
Metellus had meanwhile encountered and defeated
l4
CINNA AND SULLA BOOK IV
CHAP. XX CINNA AND SULLA
85
Carbo’s lieutenant Carrinas at the river Aesis (Esino between Ancona and Sinigaglia), which separated the district of Picenum from the Gallic province ; when Carbo in person came up with his superior army, Metellus had been obliged to abstain from any farther advance. But on the news of the battle at Sacriportus, Carbo, anxious about his communications, had retreated to the Flaminian road, with a view to take up his headquarters at the meeting point of Ariminum, and. from that point to hold the passes of the Apennines on the one hand and the valley of the Po on the other. In this retrograde movement different divisions fell into the hands of the enemy, and not only
Metellus against Carbo in Northern Italy.
so, but Sena Gallica was stormed andliflarbo’s rearguard Carbo
l \
was broken in a brilliant cavalry engagement by nevertheless Carbo attained on the whole his object. T e consular Norbanus took the command in the valley of the Po; Carbo himself proceeded to Etruria. But the march of Sulla with his victorious legions to Etruria altered the position of affairs; soon three Sullan armies from Gaul, Umbria, and Rome established ‘communications with each other. Metellus with the fleet went 'past. Ariminum to Ravenna, and at Faventia cut off the communication between Ariminum and the valley of the Po, into which he sent forward a division along the great road to Placentia under Marcus Lucullus, the quaestor of Sulla and brother of his admiral in the Mithradatic war. The young Pompeius and his contemporary and rival Crassus penetrated from
Picenum by mountaimpaths into Umbria and gained the Flaminian road at Spoletium, where they defeated Carbo’s legate Carrinas and shut him up in the town; he succeeded, however, in escaping from it on a rainy night and making his way, though not without loss, to the army of Carbo. Sulla himself marched from Rome into Etruria with his army in two divisions, one of which advancing along the coast defeated the corps opposed to it at Saturnia (between
assailed on three sides of Etruria.
Pompeité?
Conflicts about Praeneste.
checked.
In the vicinity of Rome also events appeared to assume
a more favourable turn for the revolutionary party, and the war seemed as if it would again be drawn chiefly towards this region. For, while the oligarchic party were concen trating all their energies on Etruria, the democracy every where put forth the utmost efforts to break the blockade of Praeneste. Even the governor of Sicily Marcus Perpenna set out for that purpose ; it does not appear, however, that he reached Praeneste. Nor was the very considerable corps under Marcius, detached by Carbo, more successful in this ; assailed and defeated by the troops of the enemy which were at Spoletium, demoralized by disorder, want of supplies, and mutiny, one portion went back to Carbo, another to Ariminum; the rest dispersed. Help in earnest on the other hand came from Southern Italy. There the Samnites under Pontius of Telesia, and the Lucanians under their experienced general Marcus Lamponius, set out without its
86 CINNA AND SULLA
IOOK rv
the rivers Ombrone and Albegna) ; the second led by Sulla in person fell in with the army of Carbo in the valley of the Clanis, and sustained a successful conflict with his Spanish cavalry. But the pitched battle which was fought between Carbo and Sulla in the region of Chiusi, although it ended without being properly decisive, was so far at any rate in favour of Carbo that Sulla’s victorious
being possible Campania
behind a corps against Carbo, returned to Latium and took up a well-chosen position in the defiles in front of Praeneste, where he barred the route of the In vain the garrison attempted to break
himself, leaving
relieving army. 1
1 It a stated, that Sulla occupied the defile by which alone Praenate was accessible (App. 1, 9o) ; and the further events showed that the road
advance was
to prevent their departure, were joined in where Capua still held out by a division of the garrison under Gutta, and thus to the number, it was said, of 70,000 marched upon Praeneste. Thereupon Sulla
can. rx CINNA AND SULLA
37
through the lines of Ofella, in vain the relieving army
to dislodge Sulla ; both remained immoveable in their strong positions, even after Damasippus, sent by Carbo, had reinforced the relieving army with two legions.
attempted
But while the war stood still in Etruria and in Latium, matters came to a decision in the valley of the Po. There
the general of the democracy, Gaius Norbanus, had hitherto Upper maintained the upper hand, had attacked Marcus Lucullus Italy. the legate of Metellus with superior force and compelled
him to shut himself up in Placentia, and had at length
turned against Metellus in person. He encountered the
latter at Faventia, and immediately made his attack late in
the afternoon with his troops fatigued by their march; the consequence was a complete defeat and the total breaking
up of his corps, of which only about 1000 men returned to Etruria. On the news of this battle Lucullus sallied from Placentia, and defeated the division left behind to oppose
him at Fidentia (between Piacenza and Parma). The Lucanian troops of Albinovanus deserted in a body : their
leader made up for his hesitation at first by inviting the
chief oflicers of the revolutionary army to banquet with
him and causing them to be put to death; in general
every one, who at all could, now concluded his peace. Ariminum with all its stores and treasures fell into the
power of Metellus ; Norbanus embarked for Rhodes; the
whole land between the Alps and Apennines acknowledged
the government of the Optimates. The troops hitherto Etrurla
employed
Etruria, the last province where their antagonists still kept Sullans. the field. When Carbo received this news in the camp
to Rome was open to him as well as to the relieving army. Beyond doubt Sulla posted himself on the cross road which turns off from the Via Latina, along which the Samnites advanced, at Valmontone towards Palestrina ; in this case Sulla communicated with the capital by the
Praenestine, and the enemy by the Latin or Labican, road
Successes of the Sullans in
there were enabled to turn to the attack of occupied by the
The Samnites and democrats attack Rome.
B8 CINNA AND SULLA BOOK IV
at Clusium, he lost his self-command; although he had still a considerable body of troops under his orders, he secretly escaped from his headquarters and embarked for Africa. Part of his abandoned troops followed the
which their general had set, and went home; part of them were destroyed by Pompeius : Carrinas gathered together the remainder and led them to Latium to join the army of Praeneste. There no change had in the meanwhile taken place; and the final decision drew nigh. The troops of Carrinas were not numerous enough to shake Sulla’s position; the vanguard of the army of the oligarchic party, hitherto employed in Etruria, was approaching under Pompeius ; in a'few days the net would be drawn tight around the army of the democrats and the Samnites.
Its leaders then determined to desist from the relief of Praeneste and to throw themselves with all their united strength on Rome, which was only a good day’s march distant. By so doing they were, in a military point of view, ruined; their line of retreat, the Latin road, would by such a movement fall into Sulla’s hands; and, even if they got possession of Rome, they would be infallibly crushed there, enclosed within a city by no means fitted for defence, and wedged in between the far superior armies of Metellus and
Sulla. Safety, however, was no longer thought of; revenge alone dictated this march to Rome, the last outbreak of fury in the passionate revolutionists and especially in the despair ing Sabellian nation. Pontius of Telesia was in earnest, when he called out to his followers that, in order to get rid of the wolves which had robbed Italy of freedom, the forest in which they harboured must be destroyed. Never was Rome in a more fearful peril than on the rst November
example
82. 672, when Pontius, Lamponius, Carrinas, Damasippus ad- vanced along the Latin road towards Rome, and encamped about a mile from the Colline gate. It was threatened with
CHAP. IX ClNNA AND SULLA
89
a day like the zoth July 365 u. c. or the 15th June 455 889. A. D. —tl16 days of the Celts and the Vandals. The time
was gone by when a coup de main against Rome was a foolish enterprise, and the assailants could have no want of connections in the capital. The band of volunteers which sallied from the city, mostly youths of quality, was scattered
like chaff before the immense superiority of force. The
only hope of safety rested on Sulla. The latter, on receiv Battle at
ing accounts of the departure of the Samnite army in the direction of Rome, had likewise set out in all haste to the assistance of the capital. The appearance of his foremost horsemen under Balbus in the course of the morning revived the sinking courage of the citizens; about midday he appeared in person with his main force, and immediately drew up his ranks for battle at the temple of the Erycine Aphrodite before the Colline gate (not far from Porta Pia). His lieutenants adjured him not to send the troops exhausted
‘by the forced march at once into action; but Sulla took into consideration what the night might bring on Rome, and, late as it was in the afternoon, ordered the attack. The battle was obstinately contested and bloody. The left wing of Sulla, which he led in person, gave way as far as the city wall, so that it became necessary to close the city gates; stragglers even brought accounts to Ofella that the battle was lost. But on the right wing Marcus Crassus overthrew the enemy and pursued him as far as Antemnae ; this somewhat relieved the left wing also, and an hour after sunset it in turn began to advance. The fight continued the whole night and even on the following morning; it was only the defection of a division of 3000 men, who immedi ately turned their arms against their former comrades, that put an end to the struggle. Rome was saved. The arm) of the insurgents, for which there was no retreat, was completely
the Colline
gate.
extirpated.
The prisoners taken in the battle—between Slaughter
3000 and 4000 in number, including the generals Dama- of the prisoners.
Slegu. "t Praeneste.
sippus, Carrinas, and the severely-wounded Pontius--were by Sulla’s orders on the third day after the battle brought to the Villa Publica in the Campus Martius and there massacred to the last man, so that the clatter of arms and the groans of the dying were distinctly heard in the neighbouring temple of Bellona, where Sulla was just holding a meeting of the senate. It was a ghastly execu tion, and it ought not to be excused ; but it is not right to forget that those very men who perished there had fallen like a band of robbers on the capital and the burgesses, and, had they found time, would have destroyed them as far as
fire and sword can destroy a city and its citizens.
With this battle the war was, in the main, at an end. The garrison of Praeneste surrendered, when it learned the issue of the battle of Rome from the heads of Carrinas and
other oflicers thrown over the walls. The leaders, the con sul Gaius Marius and the son of Pontius, after having failed in an attempt to escape, fell on each other’s swords. The multitude cherished the hope, in which it was confirmed by Cethegus, that the victor would even now have mercy upon them. But the times of mercy were past. The more un conditionally Sulla had up to the last moment granted full pardon to those who came over to him, the more inexorable he showed himself toward the leaders and communities that had held out to the end. Of the Praenestine prisoners, 12,000 in number, most of the Romans and individual Praenestines as well as the women and children were re leased, but the Roman senators, almost all the Praenestines and the whole of the Samnites, were disarmed and cut to pieces; and the rich city was given up to pillage. It was natural that, after such an occurrence, the cities of new bur gesses which had not yet passed over should continue their resistance with the utmost obstinacy. In the Latin town of Norba for instance, when Aemilius Lepidus got into it by treason, the citizens killed each other and set fire them
90
CINNA AND SULLA BOOK W
Norba.
can. ix CINNA AND SULLA
9r
selves to their town, solely in order to deprive their execu
tioners of vengeance and of booty. In Lower Italy Neapolis
had already been taken by assault, and Capua had, as it would seem, been voluntarily surrendered; but Nola was‘ Noll. only evacuated by the Samnites in 674. On his flight from $0. Nola the last surviving leader of note among the Italians,
the consul of the insurgents in the hopeful year 664, 90. Gaius Papius Mutilus, disowned by his wife to whom he had stolen in disguise and with whom he had hoped to find
an asylum, fell on his sword in Teanum before the door of his own house. As to the Samnites, the dictator declared that Rome would have no rest so long as Samnium existed, and that the Samnite name must therefore be extirpated from the earth; and, as he verified these words in terrible fashion on the prisoners taken before Rome and in Prae neste, so he appears to have also undertaken a raid for the purpose of laying waste the country, to have captured Aesernia1 (674 and to have converted that hitherto flou- 80. rishing and populous region into the desert which has since remained. In the same manner Tuder in Umbria was stormed by Marcus Crassus. A longer resistance was offered in Etruria by Populonium and above all by the im pregnable Volaterrae, which gathered out of the remains of the beaten party an army of four legions, and stood two years’ siege conducted first by Sulla in person and then by
the former praetor Gaius Carbo, the brother of the demo cratic consul, till at length in the third year after the battle
at the Colline gate (675) the garrison capitulated on 79. condition of free departure. But in this terrible time neither military law nor military discipline was regarded the soldiers raised cry of treason and stoned their too com pliant general; troop of horse sent by the Roman govern ment cut down the garrison as withdrew terms of the
Hardly any other name can well be ooncmled under the corrupt lending in Liv. 89 miam in Samnia; comp. Strabo, v. 3, 1o.
l
it
in
a
a
P),
; a it
CINNA AND SULLA BOOK 1?
The victorious army was distributed through out Italy, and all the insecure townships were furnished with strong garrisons : under the iron hand of the Sullan oflicers the last palpitations of the revolutionary and national opposition slowly died away.
There was still work to be done in the provinces. Sar dinia had been speedily wrested by Lucius Philippus from
the governor of the revolutionary government
Antonius (672), and Transalpine Gaul offered little or no resistance; but in Sicily, Spain, and Africa the cause of the party defeated in Italy seemed still by no means lost. Sicily was held for them by the trustworthy governor Marcus Perpenna. Quintus Sertorius had the skill to attach to him- self the provincials in Hither Spain, and to form from among the Romans settled in that quarter a not inconsider able army, which in the first instance closed the passes of the Pyrenees : in this he had given fresh proof that, wherever he was stationed, he was in his place, and amidst all the incapables of the revolution was the only man practically useful. In Africa the governor Hadrianus, who followed out the work of revolutionizing too thoroughly and began to give liberty to the slaves, had been, on occasion of a tumult instigated by the Roman merchants of Utica, attacked in his
82. oflicial residence and burnt with his attendants (672) ; never theless the province adhered to the revolutionary govern— ment, and Cinna’s son-in-law, the young and able Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, was invested with the supreme command there. Propagandism had even been carried from thence into the client-states, Numidia and Mauretania. Their legitimate rulers, Hiempsal II. son of Gauda, and Bogud son of Bocchus, adhered doubtless to Sulla ; but with the aid of the Cinnans the former had been dethroned by the democratic pretender Hiarbas, and similar feuds agitated the Mauretanian kingdom. The consul Carbo who had fled from Italy tarried on the island Cossyra (Pantellaria) between
92
capitulation.
Quintus
can. 1x CINNA AND SULLA
93
Africa and Sicily, at a loss, apparently, whether he should flee to Egypt or should attempt to renew the struggle in one of the faithful provinces.
Sulla sent to Spain Gaius Annius and Gaius Valerius Spain. Flaccus, the former as governor of Further Spain, the latter
as governor of the province of the Ebro. They were
spared the diflicult task of opening up the passes of the Pyrenees by force, in consequence of the general who was
sent thither by Sertorius having been killed by one of his
oflicers and his troops having thereafter melted
Sertorius, much too weak to maintain an equal struggle,
hastily collected the nearest divisions and embarked at embark-It New Carthage—for what destination he knew not himself,
for the coast of Africa, or for the Canary Islands —it mattered little whither, provided only Sulla’s arm did not reach him. Spain then willingly submitted to the Sullan magistrates (about 673) and Flaccus fought success 81. fully with the Celts, through whose territory he marched,
perhaps
the Spanish Celtiberians (674). so. )Gnaeus Pompeius was sent as propraetor to Sicily, and, Sicily.
andmwith
on the coast with no sail and six legions, the island was evacuated by Perpenna without resistance. kwompeius sent a squadron thence to Cossyra,
which captured the Marian oflicers sojourning there. Marcus Brutus and the others were immediately executed; but Pompeius had enjoined that the consul Carbo should be brought before himself at Lilybaeum in order that, un— mindful of the protection accorded to him in a season of peril by that very man (p. 78), he might personally hand him over to the executioner (672D 82.
Having been ordered to go on to Africa, Pompeius with Africa. his army, which was certainly far more numerous, defeated
the not inconsiderable forces collected by Ahenobarbus
and Hiarbas, and, declining for the time to be saluted as im
perator, he at once gave the signal for assault on the hostile
wh'éF"Eé"£isi§éared
away.
Sertoriul
Fresh difficulties with [83 Mithra dates.
not perhaps without touch of irony, saluted the youth on
his return from these easy exploits gagswthg“lf . Great. ”w
In the east also, after the embarkation of Sulla in the
spring of 671, there had been no cessation of warfare. The restoration of the old state of things and the subjugation of individual towns cost in Asia as in Italy various bloody struggles. Against the free city of Mytilene in particular Lucius Lucullus was obliged at length to bring up troops, after having exhausted all gentler measures; and even victory in the open field did not put an end to the obstinate resistance of the citizens.
Meanwhile the Roman governor of Asia, Lucius Murena, had fallen into fresh difficulties with king Mithradates. The latter had since the peace busied himself in strength_ ening anew his rule, which was shaken even in the northern provinces; he had pacified the Colchians by appointing his
94
CINNA AND SULLA noox rv
camp. Hi thus became master of the enemyinwone day; Ahenobarbus was among the fallen: with the ai 0 kn Bogud, Hiarbas'was seized and slain at Bulla, and Hiempsal was“reinstated in his hereditary kingdom’; a great razzia against the inhabitants of the desert, among whom a number of Gaetulian tribes recognized as free by Marius were made subject to Hiempsal, revived in Africa also the fallen repute of the Roman name: in gfortyjgyggfter~tbe
80. laHnding of Pompeius in Africa all ‘was, end atmanu v. w‘ (674
The senate instructed him to break up his army—an implied hint that he wasvrmt to be allowed triumph, to which as an extraordinary magistrate he could according to precedent make no claim. The general murmuredv secretly,
31. 5mm 1Qudhi. '. . iFs¢emed for. meant as
the African army would revolt against the senate and Sulla would ‘have ‘take the field against his son-in-law. But
stiller-flamed, and allowed the young man to boast of being
the only Roman who had become triumphator before he 79 wasgaisenator (12 March affect’ theazfli‘b'rtiiriate,”
a
i’).
to a
67
a
a
if
a
can. 1x CINNA AND SULLA
95
able son Mithradates as their governor; he had then made away with that son, and was now preparing for an ex pedition into his Bosporan kingdom. The assurances of Archelaus who had meanwhile been obliged to seek an asylum with Murena 50), that these preparations were directed against Rome, induced Murena, under the pretext that Mithradates still kept possession of Cappadocian frontier districts, to move his troops towards the Cappa
docian Comana and thus to violate the Pontic frontier (671). Mithradates contented himself with complaining to Murena and, when this was in vain, to the Roman government. In fact commissioners from Sulla made their appearance to dissuade the governor, but he did not submit; on the contrary he crossed the Halys and entered on the undis puted territory of Pontus, whereupon Mithradates re solved to repel force by force. His general Gordius had to detain the Roman army till the king came up with far superior forces and compelled battle; Murena was vanquished and with great loss driven back over the Roman frontier to Phrygia, and the Roman garrisons were expelled from all Cappadocia. Murena had the effrontery, no doubt, to call himself the victor and to assume the title of z'mperator on account of these events (67 2); but the sharp lesson and second admonition from Sulla induced him at last to push the matter no farther; the peace between Rome and Mithradates was renewed (673).
This foolish feud, while lasted, had postponed the reduction of the Mytilenaeans was only after long siege by land and sea, in which the Bithynian fleet rendered good service, that Murena’s successor succeeded in taking the city storm (675).
The ten years’ revolution and insurrection were at an end in the west and in the east the state had once more unity of government and peace without and within. After the terrible convulsions of the last years even this rest was
I’.
82.
Second peace.
81.
Capture of Mytilene.
79
General pm
;
it ;
by
by
(p.
it
a
a
96
CINNA AND SULLA noox IV
a relief. Whether it was to furnish more than a mere relief; whether the remarkable man, who had succeeded in the diflicult task of vanquishing the public foe and in the more diflicult work of subduing the revolution, would
be able to meet satisfactorily the most difficult task of all the re-establishing of social and political order shaken to its very foundations—could not but be speedily decided.
CRAP. X THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION
CHAPTER X
‘I! ! ! SULLAN CONSTITUTION
ABOUT the time when the first pitched battle was fought between Romans and Romans, in the night of the 6th July
67 r, the venerable temple, which had been erected by the 8! . kings, dedicated by the youthful republic, and spared by the storms of five hundred. years—the temple of the Roman Jupiter in the Capitol—perished in the flames. It was no augury, but it was an image of the state of the Roman constitution. This, too, lay in ruins and needed reconstruc- tion. The revolution was no doubt vanquished, but the victory was far from implying as a matter of course the restoration of the old government. The mass of the aris tocracy certainly was of opinion that now, after the death
of the two revolutionary consuls, it would be suflicient to make arrangements for the ordinary supplemental election and to leave it to the senate to take such steps as should seem farther requisite for the rewarding of the victorious army, for the punishment of the most guilty revolutionists,
and possibly also for the prevention of similar outbreaks.
But Sulla, in whose hands the victory had concentrated for the moment all power, formed a more correct judgment of affairs and of men. The aristocracy of Rome in its best epoch had not risen above an adherence—partly noble and partly narrow—to traditional forms ; how should the clumsy collegiate government of this period be in a position to
The restoration.
Vol. IV
107
i \.
’prise were less than ever to be found there. How thoroughly useless was the pure aristocratic blood, and how little doubt Sulla had as to its worthlessness, is shown by the fact that,
98 THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION BOOK IV
carry out with energy and thoroughness a comprehensive reform of the state i’ And at the present moment, when the last crisis had swept away almost all the leading men of the senate, the vigour and intelligence requisite for such an enter
\
iv with the exception of Quintus Metellus who was related to
Sulla regent of Rome.
I.
him by marriage, he selected all his instruments out of what was previously the middle party and the deserters from the democratic camp—such as Lucius Flaccus, Lucius Philippus,
i‘ \ Quintus Ofella, Gnaeus Pompeius. Sulla was as much in earnest about the re-establishment of the old constitution as the most vehement aristocratic emigrant; he understood however, not perhaps to the full extent—for how in that case could he have put hand to the work at all ? —but better at any rate than his party, the enormous difliculties which attended this work of restoration. Comprehensive con cessions so far as concession was possible without affecting the essence of oligarchy, and the establishment of an ener getic system of repression and prevention, were regarded by him as unavoidable ; and he saw clearly that the senate as it stood would refuse or mutilate every concession, and would parliamentarily ruin every systematic reconstruction. If Sulla had already after the Sulpician revolution carried out what he deemed necessary in both respects without asking much of their advice, he was now determined, under circumstances of far more severe and intense excitement, to
restore the oligarchy--not with the aid, but in spite, of the
(oligarchs—by his own hand.
Sulla, however, was not now consul as he had been then,
but was furnished merely with proconsular, that is to say, purely military power: he needed an authority keeping as near as possible to constitutional forms, but yet extraordinary, in order to impose his reform on friends and foes. In a
cm. it THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION
99
letter to the senate he announced to them that it seemed to him indispensable that they should place the regulation of the state in the hands of a single man equipped with unlimited plenitude of power, and that he deemed himself qualified to fulfil this difficult task. This proposal, disagree able as it was to many, was under the existing circumstances a command. By direction of the senate its chief, the in terrex Lucius Valerius Flaccus the father, as interim holder of the supreme power, submitted to the burgesses the proposal that the proconsul Lucius Cornelius Sulla should receive for the past a supplementary approval of all the oflicial acts performed by him as consul and proconsul, and should for the future be empowered to adjudicate without appeal on the life and property of the burgesses, to deal at his pleasure with the state-domains, to shift discretion the boundaries of Rome, of Italy, and of the state, to dissolve or establish urban communities in Italy, to dispose of the provinces and dependent states, to confer the supreme imperz'um instead of the people and to nominate proconsuls
and propraetors, and lastly to regulate the state for the future means of new laws; that should be left to his own judgment to determine when he had fulfilled his task and might deem time to resign this extraordinary magis tracy and, in fine, that during its continuance should depend on his pleasure whether the ordinary supreme magistracy should subsist side by side with his own or should remain in abeyance. As matter of course, the proposal
was adopted without opposition (Nov. 672); and now the 82. new master of the state, who hitherto had as proconsul avoided entering the capital, appeared for the first time within the walls of Rome. This new oflice derived its name from the dictatorship, which had been practically abolished since the Hannibalic war 56) but, as besides his armed retinue he was preceded by twice as many lictors as the dictator of earlier times, this new “dictatorship for the
;
it a
;
by
it
it
atv
Execu tions.
:00 THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION BOOK iv
making of laws and the regulation of the commonwealth,” as its official title ran, was in fact altogether different from the earlier magistracy which had been limited in point of dura tion and of powers, had not excluded appeal to the burgesses, and had not annulled the ordinary magistracy. It much more resembled that of the deamviri legibur . rm'bundir, who likewise came forward as an extraordinary government with unlimited fulness of powers superseding the ordinary magis tracy, and practically at least administered their oflice as one which was unlimited in point of time.
Or, we should rather say, this new oflice, with its absolute power based on a decree of the people and restrained by no set term or col league, was no other than the old monarchy, which in fact just rested on the free engagement of the burgesses to obey one of their number as absolute lord. It was urged even by contemporaries in vindication of Sulla that a king is better than a bad constitution,1 and presumably the title of dictator was only chosen to indicate that, as the former dictatorship implied a reassumption with various limitations
325, 368, 401), so this new dictatorship involved com. plete reassumption, of the regal power. Thus, singularly enough, the course of Sulla here also coincided with that on
/which Gaius Gracchus had entered with so wholly different design. In this respect too the conservative party had to borrow from its opponents; the protector of the oligarchic
constitution had himself to come forward as tyrant, in
order to avert the ever-impending granm'r. There was not \a little of defeat in this last victory of the oligarchy.
Sulla had not sought and had not desired the diflicult and dreadful labour of the work of restoration; but, as no other choice was left to him but either to leave to utterly incapable hands or to undertake in person, he set himself to with remorseless energy. First of all settlement had to be effected in respect to the guilty. Sulla was personally
Satiur ert uti reg‘ibur guzzm uti malir Ieg‘ibur (Ad Hermit. 26).
'
it
ii.
a
it
a
it
a
i.
a
(i.
CHAP. it THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION 101
inclined to pardon. Sanguine as he was in temperament, he could doubtless break forth into violent rage, and well might those beware who saw his eye gleam and his cheeks
colour; but the chronic vindictiveness, which characterized Marius in the embitterment of his old age, was altogether foreign to Sulla’s easy disposition. Not only had he borne himself with comparatively great moderation after the revolu tion of 666 (iii. 543); even the second revolution, which 88 had perpetrated so fearful outrages and had affected him in person so severely, had not disturbed his equilibrium. At the same time that the executioner was dragging the bodies
of his friends through the streets of the capital, he had sought to save the life of the blood-stained Fimbria, and, when the latter died by his own hand, had given orders for his decent burial. 0n landing in Italy he had earnestly offered to forgive and to forget, and no one who came to make his peace had been rejected. Even after the first successes he had negotiated in this spirit with Lucius Scipio ; it was the revolutionary party, which had not only broken off these
but had subsequently, at the last moment before their downfall, resumed the massacres afresh and more fearfully than ever, and had in fact conspired with the inveterate foes of their country for the destruction of the city of Rome. The cup was now full. By virtue of his new official authority Sulla, immediately after assuming the
regency, outlawed as enemies of their country all the civil and military oflicials who had taken an active part in favour of the revolution after the convention with Scipio (which according to Sulla’s assertion was validly concluded), and such of the other burgesses as had in any marked manner aided its cause. Whoever killed one of these outlaws was not only exempt from punishment like an executioner duly
fulfilling his oflice, but also obtained for the execution a compensation of 12,000 denarz'i (£480) ; any one on the contrary who befriended an outlaw, even the nearest relative,
negotiations,
Prescrip Lion-lists.
99. 95. 90.
87-4. 87. 85.
82.
88. 82.
99. 98. 90. 89.
and Civil wars, 24 consulars, praetorians, 60 aedilicians, 20o senators, the calculation includes partly the men who fell in the Italian war, such as the consulars Aulus Albinus, consul in 5; Titus Didius. 656; Publius Lupus, 664 Lucius Cato, 665 partly perhaps Quintus Metellus Numidicus (iii. 471), Manius Aquillius, Gaius Marius the father, Gnaeus
102 THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION noox IV
was liable to the severest punishment. The property of the proscribed was forfeited to the state like the spoil of an enemy ; their children and grandchildren were excluded from a political career, and yet, so far as they were of sena torial rank, were bound to undertake their share of senatorial burdens. The last enactments also applied to the estates and the descendants of those who had fallen'in conflict for the revolution—penalties which went even beyond those en joined by the earliest law in the case of such as had borne arms against their fatherland. The most terrible feature in this system of terror was the indefiniteness of the proposed categories, against which there was immediate remonstrance in the senate, and which Sulla himself sought to remedy by
directing the names of the proscribed to be publicly posted 81. up and fixing the 1st June 673 as the final term for closing
the lists of prescription.
Much as this bloody roll, swelling from day to day and
amounting at last to 4700 names,1 excited the just horror
1 This total number is given by Valerius Maxirnus, ix. 2. 1. According to Appian (B. C. i. 95), there were proscribed by Sulla nearly 40 senators, which number subsequently received some additions, and about 1600 equites ; according to Florus (ii. 9, whence Augustine de Civ. Dei, iii. 28), 2000 senators and equites. According to Plutarch (Sull. 31), 520 names were placed on the list in the first three days ; according to Orosius (v. 2r), 580 names during the first days. There is no material contradiction between these various reports, for it was not senators and equites alone that were put to death, and the list remained open for months. When Appian, at another passage 103), mentions as put to death or banished by Sulla, consulars, 9o senators, 2600 equites, he there confounds, as the connection shows, the victims of the civil war throughout with the victims
102. of Sulla. The 15 consulars were—Quintus Catulus, consul in 652; Marcus 97. Antonius, 655 Publius Crassus, 657 Quintus Scaevola, 659 Lucius 94. Domitius, 66o; Lucius Caesar, 664 Quintus Rufus, 666; Lucius Cinna, 88. 667-67o; Gnaeus Octavius, 667; Lucius Merula, 667; Lucius Flaccus, 668; 87. Gnaeus Carbo, 669, 670, 672; Gaius Norbanus, 671; Lucius Scipio, 671; 86. Gaius Marius, 672 of whom fourteen were killed, and one, Lucius Scipio, 84. was banished. When, on the other hand, the Livian account in Eutropius 88. (v. and Orosius 22) specifiesas swept away (conrumpti) in the Social
9) ;
5I ;
56
7
; (v.
;;
;
;
(i.
at. . . x THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION
103
of the multitude, it at any rate checked in some degree
the mere caprice of the executioners. It was not at least
to the personal resentment of the regent that the mass of
these victims were sacrificed; his furious hatred was directed
solely against the Marians, the authors of the hideous massacres of 667 and 672. By his command the tomb of 87- 82 the victor of Aquae Sextiae was broken open and his ashes
were scattered in the Anio, the monuments of his victories over Africans and Germans were overthrown, and, as death had snatched himself and his son from Sulla’s vengeance, his adopted nephew Marcus Marius Gratidianus, who had been twice praetor and was a great favourite with the Roman burgesses, was executed amid the most cruel tortures
the tomb of Catulus, who most deserved to be regretted of all the Marian victims. In other cases also death had already swept away the most notable of his opponents: of the leaders there survived only Gaius Norbanus, who laid
hands on himself at Rhodes, while the ecclerz'a was deliberat ing on his surrender; Lucius Scipio, for whom his insignifi cance and probably also his noble birth procured indulgence and permission to end his days in peace at his retreat in Massilia ; and Quintus Sertorius, who was wandering about
as an exile on the coast of Mauretania. But yet the heads of slaughtered senators were piled up at the Servilian Basin, at the point where the Vicur fugariur opened into the Forum, where the dictator had ordered them to be publicly exposed ; and among men of the second and third rank in particular death reaped a fearful harvest. In addition to those who were placed on the list for their services in or on
Strabo, whom we may certainly regard as also victims of that period, or other men whose fate is unknown to us. Of the fourteen consulars killed, three-Rufus, Cinna, and Flaccus—-fell through military revolts, while eight Sullan and three Marian consulars fell as victims to the opposite party. On a comparison of the figures given above, 50 senators and moo equites were regarded as victims of Marius, 4o senators and 1600 equites as victims of Sulla ; this furnishes a standard—at least not altogether arbitrary—for
estimating the extent of the crimes on both sides.
at
:04
THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION BOOK 1v
behalf of the revolutionary army with little discrimination, sometimes on account of money advanced to one of its officers or on account of relations of hospitality formed with such an one, the retaliation fell specially on those capitalists who had sat in judgment on the senators and had speculated in Marian confiscations—the “hoarders”; about 1600 of the equites, as they were called,1 were inscribed on the pro-
In like manner the professional accusers, the worst scourge of the nobility, who made it their trade to
bring men of the senatorial order before the equestrian courts, had now to suffer for it—“ how comes it to pass,” an advocate soon after asked, "that they have left to us the courts, when they were putting to death the accusers and judges P. ” The most savage and disgraceful passions raged without restraint for many months throughout Italy. In the capital a Celtic band was primarily charged with the executions, and Sullan soldiers and subaltem oflicers tra versed for the same purpose the different districts of Italy ; but every volunteer was also welcome, and thcflrabble high
and low pressed forward not only to earn the rewards of
murder, but also to gratify their own vindictive or covetous
dispositions under the mantle of political prosecution. It sometimes happened that the assassination did not follow, but preceded, the placing of the name on the list of the proscribed. One example shows the way in which these executions took place. At Larinum, a town of new bur gesses and favourable to Marian views, one Statius Albius Oppianicus, who had fled to Sulla’s headquarters to avoid a charge of murder, made his appearance after the victory as commissioner of the regent, deposed the magistrates of the town, installed himself and his friends in their room, and caused the person who had threatened to accuse him, along with his nearest relatives and friends, to be outlawed
l The Sextus Alfenus. frequently mentioned in Cicero's oration on behalf of Publius Quinctius, was one of these.
scription-list.
CHAP- X THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION r05
and killed. Countless persons—including not a few decided adherents of the oligarchy—thus fell as the victims of private hostility or of their own riches: the fearful confusion, and the culpable indulgence which Sulla displayed in this as in every instance towards those more closely connected with him, prevented any punishment even of the ordinary crimes that were perpetrated amidst the disorder.
The confiscated property was dealt with in a similar Confisca
Sulla from political considerations sought to induce tions. the respectable burgesses to take part in its purchase; a great portion of them, moreover, voluntarily pressed forward,
and none more zealously than the young Marcus Crassus. Under the existing circumstances the utmost depreciation
was inevitable; indeed, to some extent it was the necessary result of the Roman plan of selling the property confiscated
by the state for a round sum payable in ready money. Moreover, the regent did not forget himself; while his wife Metella mop: especially and other persons high and low closely connected with him, even freedmen and boon-com panions, were sometimes allowed to purchase without compe tition, sometimes had the purchase-money wholly or par
tially remitted. One of his freedmen, for instance, is said to have purchased a property of 6,000,000 sesterces (£60,000)
for 2000 (£20), and one of his subalterns is said to have acquired by such speculations an estate of 10,000,000 ses terces (£100,000). The indignation was great and just;
even during Sulla’s regency an advocate asked whether the nobility had waged civil war solely for the purpose of en
riching their freedmen and slaves. But in spite of this depreciation the whole proceeds of the confiscated estates amounted to not less than 3 50,000,000 sesterces (,53,500,000), which gives an approximate idea of the enormous extent of these confiscations falling chiefly on the wealthiest portion of the burgesses. It was altogether a fearful punishment. There was no longer any process or any pardon ,
way.
I06 THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION ‘00K iv
mute terror lay like a weight of lead on the land, and free speech was silenced in the market-place alike of the capital and of the country-town. The oligarchic reign of terror bore doubtless a different stamp from that of the revolution; while Marius had glutted his personal vengeance in the blood of his enemies, Sulla seemed to account terrorism in the abstract, if we may so speak, a thing necessary to the introduction of the new despotism, and to prosecute and make others prosecute the work of massacre almost with indifference. But the reign of terror presented an appearance all the more horrible, when it proceeded from the con servative side and was in some measure devoid of passion ; the commonwealth seemed all the more irretrievably lost, when the frenzy and the crime on both sides were equally balanced.
In regulating the relations of Italy and of the capital, Sulla—although he otherwise in general treated as null all
Maintai
ance of
the bur
gees-rights state-acts done during the revolution except in the trans previously
conferred.
action of current business—firmly adhered to the principle, which it had laid down, that every burgess of an Italian community was by that very fact a burgess also of Rome; the distinctions between burgesses and Italian allies, between old burgesses with better, and new burgesses with more restricted, rights, were abolished, and remained so. In the case of the freedmen alone the unrestricted right of suffrage was again withdrawn, and for them the old state of matters was restored. To the aristocratic ultras this might seem a great concession; Sulla perceived that it was necessary to wrest these mighty levers out of the hands of the revolutionary chiefs, and that the rule of the oligarchy was not materially endangered by increasing the number of the burgesses.
But with this concession in principle was combined a most rigid inquisition, conducted by special commissioners with the co-operation of the garrisons distributed throughout
CRAP. x THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION
I07
Italy, in respect to particular communities in all districts of Punish the land. Several towns were rewarded; for instance $3,938,101, Brundisium, the first community which had joined Sulla, Particular
now obtained the exemption from customs so important for such a seaport ; more were punished. The less guilty were required to pay fines, to pull down their walls, to raze their citadels ; in the case of those whose opposition had been most obstinate the regent confiscated a part of their territory, in some cases even the whole of it—as it certainly might be regarded in law as forfeited, whether they were to be treated as burgess-communities which had borne arms against their fatherland, or as allied states which had waged war with Rome contrary to their treaties of perpetual peace. In this case all the dispossessed burgesses—but these only —-were deprived of their municipal, and at the same time of the Roman, franchise, receiving in return the lowest Latin rights. 1 Sulla thus avoided furnishing the opposition with a nucleus in Italian subject-communities of inferior rights; the homeless dispossessed of necessity were soon lost in the mass of the proletariate. In Campania not only was the democratic colony of Capua done away and its domain given back to the state, as was naturally to be expected, but the island of Aenaria (Ischia) was also, probably about this time, withdrawn from the community of Neapolis. In Latium the whole territory of the large and wealthy city of Praeneste and presumably of Norba also was confiscated, as was likewise that of Spoletium
To this was added the peculiar aggravation that, while in other instances the right of the Latins, like that of the pzreg‘rini, implied membership in a definite Latin or foreign community, in this case—just as with the later freedmen of Latin and deditician rights (comp. iii. 527 n. ) -—it was without any such right of urban membership. The consequenm was, that these Latins were destitute of the privileges attaching to an urban constitution, and, strictly speaking, could not even make testa ment, since no one could execute a testament otherwise than according to the law of his town they could doubtless, however, acquire under Roman testaments, and among the living could hold dealings with each other and with Romans or Latins in the forms of Roman law.
u'
1
52.
;
a
ii.
I08 THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION 800! n
in Umbria. Sulmo in the Paelignian district was even razed. But the iron arm of the regent fell with especial weight on the two regions which had offered a serious resistance up to the end and even after the battle at the Colline gate—Etruria and Samnium. There a number of the most considerable communes, such as Florentia, Faesulae, Arretium, Volaterrae, were visited with total confiscation. Of the fate of Samnium we have already spoken ; there was no confiscation there, but the land was laid waste for ever, its flourishing towns, even the former Latin colony of Aesemia, were left in ruins, and the country was placed on the same footing with the Bruttian and
Lucanian regions.
These arrangements as to the property of the Italian soil
tions to the placed on the one hand those Roman domain-lands which
had been handed over in usufruct to the former allied communities and now on their dissolution reverted to the Roman government, and on the other hand the confiscated territories of the communities incurring punishment, at the disposal of the regent ; and he employed them for the purpose of settling thereon the soldiers of the victorious
Most of these new settlements were directed towards Etruria, as for instance to Faesulae and Arre tium, others to Latium and Campania, where Praeneste and Pompeii among other places became Sullan colonies. To repeople Samnium was, as we have said, no part of the
soldiers.
army.
regent's design.
A great part of these assignations took
place after the Gracchan mode, so that the settlers were
attached to an already-existing urban community. The
comprehensiveness of this settlement is shown by the number of land-allotments distributed, which is stated at 120,000 ; while yet some portions of land withal were otherwise applied, as in the case of the lands bestowed on the temple of Diana at Mount Tifata; others, such as the Volaterran domain and a part of the Arretine, remained
CRAP. x THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION
r09
undistributed ; others in fine, according to the old abuse legally forbidden (iii. 374) but now reviving, were taken possession of on the part of Sulla’s favourites by the right of occupation. The objects which Sulla aimed at in this colonization were of a varied kind. In the first place, he thereby redeemed the pledge given to his soldiers.
Secondly, he in so doing adopted the idea, in which the
' reform-party and the moderate conservatives concurred,
and in accordance with which he had himself as early as 666 arranged the establishment of a number of colonies -—the idea namely of augmenting the number of the small agricultural proprietors in Italy by a breaking up of the larger possessions on the part of the government; how
seriously he had this at heart is shown by the renewed prohibition of the throwing together of allotments. Lastly and'especially, he saw in these settled soldiers as it were standing garrisons, who would protect his new constitution along with their own right of property. For this reason, where the whole territory was not confiscated, as at Pompeii, the colonists were not amalgamated with the urban-com munity, but the old burgesses and the colonists were constituted as two bodies of burgesses associated within the same enclosing wall. In other respects these colonial
foundations were based, doubtless, like the older ones, on a decree of the people, but only indirectly, in so far as the regent constituted them by virtue of the clause of the Valerian law to that effect ; in reality they originated from the ruler’s plenitude of power, and so far recalled the freedom with which the former
regal authority disposed of the state-property. But, in so far as the contrast between the soldier and the burgess, which was in other instances done away by the very sending out of the soldiers or colonists, was intended to remain, and did remain, in force in the Sullan colonies even after their establishment, and
these colonists formed, as it were, the standing army of
Carnelian freedmen in Rome.
[I0 THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION B00K rv
the senate, they are not incorrectly designated, in contra distinction to the older ones, as military colonies.
Akin to this practical constituting of a standing army for the senate was the measure by which the regent selected from the slaves of the proscribed upwards of 10,000 of the youngest and most vigorous men, and manumitted them in
a body. These new Cornelians, whose civil existence was linked to the legal validity of the institutions of their patron, were designed to be a. sort of bodyguard for the oligarchy and to help it to command the city populace, on which, indeed, in the absence of a garrison everything in the capital now primarily depended.
Abolition ' /- These extraordinary supports on which the regent made
of the Gracchan institu tions.
the oligarchy primarily to rest, weak and ephemeral as they doubtless might appear even to their author, were yet its only possible buttresses, unless expedients were to be resorted to—such as the formal institution of a standing army in Rome and other similar measures—which would have put an end to the oligarchy far sooner than the attacks of demagogues. The permanent foundation of the ordinary governing power of the oligarchy of course could not but be the senate, with a power so increased and so concen trated that it presented a superiority to its non-organized opponents at every single point of attack. The system of compromises followed for forty years was at an end. The Gracchan constitution, still spared in the first Sullan
88. reform of 666, was now utterly set aside. Since the time of Gaius Gracchus the government had conceded, as it were, the right of émeute to the proletariate of the capital, and bought it off by regular distributions of corn to the burgesses domiciled there ; Sulla abolished these largesses. Gaius Gracchus had organized and consolidated the order of capitalists by the letting of the tenths and customs of the province of Asia in Rome ; Sulla abolished the system of middlemen, and converted the former contributions
CHAP- X THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION lII
of the Asiatics into fixed taxes, which were assessed on the several districts according to the valuation-rolls drawn up for the purpose of gathering in the arrears. 1 Gaius Gracchus had by entrusting the posts of jurymen to men of equestrian census procured for the capitalist class an indirect share in administering and in governing, which proved itself not seldom stronger than the official adminis
tration and government; Sulla abolished the equestrian and restored the senatorial courts. Gaius Gracchus or at any rate the Gracchan period had conceded to the equites a special place at the popular festivals, such as the senators had for long possessed ro) ; Sulla abolished it and relegated the equites to the plebeian benches. 2 The equestrian order, created as such by Gaius Gracchus, was deprived of its political existence by Sulla.
administration, and jurisdiction, unconditionally, indivisibly, and permanently, and was to be distinguished also by outward tokens not merely as a privileged, but as the only privileged, order.
For this purpose the governing board had, first of all, to
'Ilr'e senate was to exercise the supreme power in legislation,
Reorgan have its ranks filled up and to be itself placed on a footing lzation 0!
the small. fearfully reduced by the recent crises. Sulla no doubt now
1 That Sulla’s assessment of the five years’ arrears and of the war expenses levied on the communities of Asia (Appian, Mithr. 62 at 0! . ) formed a standard for the future, is shown by the facts, that the dis tribution of Asia into forty districts is referred to Sulla (Casslodor. Chron.
670) and that the Sullan apportionment was assumed as a basis in the ease of subsequent imposts (Cic. pro Flacc. 14, 32), and by the further circumstance, that on occasion of building a fleet in 672 the sums applied 82. for that purpose were deducted from the payment of tribute (expemnia 'uniigali populo Romano : Cic. Verr. L i. 35, 89). Lastly, Cicero (ad
of independence. The numbers of the senators had been
Q. fr. i. 1, 11, 33) directly says, that the Greeks “ were not in a position of themselves to pay the tax imposed on them by Sulla without publicani. "
’ iii. 351. Tradition has not indeed informed us by whom that law was issued, which rendered it necessary that the earlier privilege should be re newed by the Roscian theatre-law of 687 (Becker-Friedlander, iv, 531); 67. but under the circumstances the author of that law was undoubtedly Sulla.
i
I /
/
Its corn le ment
up by extrao
my
election. (
Mture
to the senate
i. l
band, and from Sullan oflicers and others brought into i1 prominence by the last revolution on the other. For the
IIZ THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION BOOK iv fgave to those who were exiled by the equestrian courts
liberty to return, for instance to the consular Publius Ruti lius Rufus 483), who however made no use of the per mission, and to Gaius Cotta the friend of Drusus (iii. 503) , but this made only slight amends for the gaps which the revolutionary and reactionary reigns of terror had created in the ranks of the senate. Accordingly by Sulla’s directions the senate had its complement extraordinarily made up by about 300 new senators, whom the assembly of the tribes had to nominate from among men of equestrian census,
and whom they selected, as may be conceived, chiefly from the younger men of the senatorial houses on the one
also the mode of admission to the senate was re
gulated anew and placed on an essentially different basis.
</) Admisioii As the constitution had hitherto stood, men entered the
the quaes torship.
senate either through the summons of the censors, which through 1 was the proper and ordinary way, or through the holding
i l
of one of the three curule magistracies—the consulship, the praetorship, or the aedileship-to which since the passing of the Ovinian law seat and vote in the senate
I had been de jure attached (iii. The holding of an inferior magistracy, of the tribunate or the quaestorship, gave doubtless claim dc fado to place in the senate -—-inasmuch as the censorial selection especially turned towards the men who had held such oflices—but by no means reversion de jure. Of these two modes of admis sion, Sulla abolished the former by setting aside—at least practically—vthe censorship, and altered the latter to the effect that the right__of admission to the senate was attached to the quaestorship instead of the aedile ship, and at the same time the number of quaestors to be
l.
annually
nominated was raised to twenty. 1 The prero How many quaestors had been hitherto chosen annually, not known
‘
is
a
a
7). a
a
case. at THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION‘ n3 l
gative hitherto legally pertaining to the censors, although
practically no longer exercised in its original serious sense
—of deleting any senator from the roll, with a statement
of the reasons for doing so, at the revisals which took
Aliolition of the cehsorial supervi sion of the
sehate.
place every five years (iii. 1 r)—likewise fell into abeyance
new’;
for the future ; the irrerloveable character which had
fiwmwtotm
belonged to uié'maa'nmsm
senators, which hitherto had presumably not much exceeded the old normal number of 300 and often perhaps had not even
reached was by these means considerably augmented, perhaps on an average doubled 1—an augmentation which was rendered necessary the great increase of the duties of the senate through the transference to of the functions of jurymen. As, moreover, both the extraordinarily admitted. senators and the quaestors were nominated by the :omitz'a
In 487 the number stood at eight-—two urban, two military, and four naval, quaestors (ii.