Reply to Objection 4:
According
to the Philosopher (Metaph.
Summa Theologica
Therefore there are in Him but two processions.
I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the
actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is
intellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts
of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears
to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the
intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the
sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by
the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other
procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of
Love.
Reply to Objection 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on
another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the
divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is
indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom. ), goodness belongs
to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the
object of the will.
Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain
actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to
goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love,
according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and
goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: As above explained ([235]Q[14], A[5]; [236]Q[19],
A[5]), God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act
also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession
of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one
perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His
perfect fecundity.
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THE DIVINE RELATIONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether there are real relations in God?
(2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are
extrinsic to it?
(3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each
other?
(4) The number of these relations.
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Whether there are real relations in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For
Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as regards
the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated
relatively. " But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of
Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in
the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is
the relation of the same to the same. " But a relation of this kind is
only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in
reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real
relations, but are formed only by the mind.
Objection 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a
principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not
import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity
in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same
reason to the other relations in God.
Objection 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an
intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of
the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation
in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical relations.
On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the
Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation
existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son,
but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian
heresy.
I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may
consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in
the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other
genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their
strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But
relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to
another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of
things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered
to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are
necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination
and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body a
certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other
things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by
relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing
one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for
instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the
genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature,
then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the
same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore
as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as
above explained ([237]Q[27], AA[2],4), these relations, according to
the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.
Reply to Objection 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according
to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its
proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is
inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius
did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it
was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in
Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of
relation to another.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation signified by the term "the same" is
a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing;
because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by
reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some
two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are
called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus
Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in
every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not
diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of
identity.
Reply to Objection 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of
nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any
relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce
the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will,
as is above explained ([238]Q[14], AA[3],4; [239]Q[19], A[8]).
Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in
creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are
contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails
dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one
and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.
Reply to Objection 4: Relations which result from the mental operation
alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as
reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the
mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the
intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding
and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but
are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real
things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them
intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds
from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in
God.
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Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as
the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all that
is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things
relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not
refer to the substance. " Therefore the relation is not the divine
essence.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every
relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as
master is a man, and slave is a man. " Therefore, if relations exist in
God, there must be something else besides relation in God. This can
only be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.
Objection 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to
another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the
divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially
itself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the
perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and
self-subsisting ([240]Q[3], A[4]). Therefore relation is not the divine
essence.
On the contrary, Everything which is not the divine essence is a
creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the
divine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of
latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore the
distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty. "
I answer that, It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this
point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he
said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed.
To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of
the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is
the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident;
which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for
the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is
the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart
from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even the true idea
of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for
quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the
disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken
from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to
something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations
formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and
not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect
which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something
else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in
a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree
considered relation in the former mode only.
Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered
as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no
accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as
relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really
existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way
distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to
something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to
its opposite term.
Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the
same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as
in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed
in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and
essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Augustine do not imply that
paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very
being the same as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated
under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied;
but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in
God, since other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are
spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing
that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or
of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by
reason of God's supreme simplicity.
Reply to Objection 2: As the relation which exists in creatures
involves not only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so
the same applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in
the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of
relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God there
is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is not
perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were comprehended
in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above explained
([241]Q[13], A[2]), in treating of the divine names, that more is
contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified
by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything
besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by
us.
Reply to Objection 3: If the divine perfection contained only what is
signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect,
being thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing
more were contained in it than what is signified by the word "wisdom,"
it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of
the divine essence is greater than can be included in any name, it does
not follow, if a relative term or any other name applied to God signify
something imperfect, that the divine essence is in any way imperfect;
for the divine essence comprehends within itself the perfection of
every genus ([242]Q[4], A[2]).
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Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?
Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really
distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the
same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is
really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not
really distinguished from each other.
Objection 2: Further, as paternity and filiation are by name
distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and
power. But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction
of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any
real distinction of paternity and filiation.
Objection 3: Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of
origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore
the relations are not really distinguished from each other.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. ) that in God "the substance
contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity. " Therefore, if
the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there
would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is
the error of Sabellius.
I answer that, The attributing of anything to another involves the
attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is
attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him.
The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to
another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in
God there is a real relation [243](A[1]), there must also be a real
opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes
distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed,
according to that which is absolute---namely, essence, wherein there is
supreme unity and simplicity---but according to that which is relative.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this
argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing
are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical;
as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ
logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the
same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that
action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of
something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas
passion implies reference as of something "which is from" another.
Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as
the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and
definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from
each other.
Reply to Objection 2: Power and goodness do not import any opposition
in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.
Reply to Objection 3: Although relations, properly speaking, do not
arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as
opposed according to the procession of one from another.
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Whether in God there are only four real relations---paternity, filiation,
spiration, and procession?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are not only four real
relations---paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it must
be observed that in God there exist the relations of the intelligent
agent to the object understood; and of the one willing to the object
willed; which are real relations not comprised under those above
specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in God.
Objection 2: Further, real relations in God are understood as coming
from the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible
relations are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore in God
there exists an infinite series of real relations.
Objection 3: Further, ideas in God are eternal ([244]Q[15], A[1]); and
are only distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to
things, as above stated. Therefore in God there are many more eternal
relations.
Objection 4: Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are
relations: and they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more
relations are eternal in God than the above named.
Objection 5: Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are
fewer relations in God than those above named. For, according to the
Philosopher (Phys. iii text 24), "It is the same way from Athens to
Thebes, as from Thebes to Athens. " By the same way of reasoning there
is the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity, and
from the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and thus there are not
four relations in God.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every relation
is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and
passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son, the master
and the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity in God, for
He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1) it
follows that a real relation in God can be based only on action. Such
relations are not based on the actions of God according to any
extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to creatures
are not real in Him ([245]Q[13], A[7]). Hence, it follows that real
relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions
according to which there are internal, and not external, processions in
God. These processions are two only, as above explained ([246]Q[27],
A[5]), one derived from the action of the intellect, the procession of
the Word; and the other from the action of the will, the procession of
love. In respect of each of these processions two opposite relations
arise; one of which is the relation of the person proceeding from the
principle; the other is the relation of the principle Himself. The
procession of the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the
term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now the relation of the
principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity;
and the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called
filiation. But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own
([247]Q[27], A[4]); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper
name of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession is
called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called
procession: although these two names belong to the processions or
origins themselves, and not to the relations.
Reply to Objection 1: In those things in which there is a difference
between the intellect and its object, and the will and its object,
there can be a real relation, both of science to its object, and of the
willer to the object willed. In God, however, the intellect and its
object are one and the same; because by understanding Himself, God
understands all other things; and the same applies to His will and the
object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these kinds of
relations are not real; as neither is the relation of a thing to
itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a real relation;
because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible action;
and not as a thing understood. For when we understand a stone; that
which the intellect conceives from the thing understood, is called the
word.
Reply to Objection 2: Intelligible relations in ourselves are
infinitely multiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act,
and by another act understands that he understands the stone, and again
by another, understands that he understands this; thus the acts of
understanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the
relations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch as He
understands all things by one act alone.
Reply to Objection 3: Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence
it does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations
in God; but that God knows these many relations.
Reply to Objection 4: Equality and similitude in God are not real
relations; but are only logical relations ([248]Q[42], A[3], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 5: The way from one term to another and conversely
is the same; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence,
we cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the
same as that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of
something absolute, if there were such between them.
__________________________________________________________________
THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the
processions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the
persons.
First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively
as regards each other. We must consider the persons absolutely first in
common; and then singly.
The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four
points: (1) The signification of this word "person"; (2) the number of
the persons; (3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is
opposed thereto; as diversity, and similitude, and the like; and (4)
what belongs to our knowledge of the persons.
Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:(1) The
definition of "person. "
(2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis.
(3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God?
(4) What does it signify in Him?
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The definition of "person"
Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by
Boethius (De Duab. Nat. ) is insufficient---that is, "a person is an
individual substance of a rational nature. " For nothing singular can be
subject to definition. But "person" signifies something singular.
Therefore person is improperly defined.
Objection 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition of
person, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is the
former, the word "individual" is superfluous, because first substance
is individual substance; if it stands for second substance, the word
"individual" is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since
second substances are the "genera" or "species. " Therefore this
definition is incorrect.
Objection 3: Further, an intentional term must not be included in the
definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal"
would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing,
and "species" is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is the
name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature),
the word "individual" which is an intentional name comes improperly
into the definition.
Objection 4: Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in
those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally," as
Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as in
God, and in the angels. Therefore the word "nature" ought not to enter
into the definition of person, but the word should rather be "essence. "
Objection 5: Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of
the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not
properly defined as above.
I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every
genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs
to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself;
whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the
substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because it
exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the
individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their
own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances.
Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and
the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion
over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like
others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to
singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a
special name even among other substances; and this name is "person. "
Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of
person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the
term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in rational
substances.
Reply to Objection 1: Although this or that singular may not be
definable, yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be
defined; and so the Philosopher (De Praedic. , cap. De substantia) gives
a definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines
person.
Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of some, the term "substance" in
the definition of person stands for first substance, which is the
hypostasis; nor is the term "individual" superfluously added, forasmuch
as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of
universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in
general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a part.
But where "individual" is added, the idea of assumptibility is excluded
from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it
is assumed by a greater---that is, by the Word of God. It is, however,
better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as
divided into first and second, and when "individual" is added, it is
restricted to first substance.
Reply to Objection 3: Substantial differences being unknown to us, or
at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental
differences in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say
that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are the
effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms
expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if used to
signify things which are unnamed. And so the term "individual" is
placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence
which belongs to particular substances.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the
word "nature" was first used to signify the generation of living
things, which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation
comes from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the
intrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines
"nature" (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of principle is either
formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called nature.
And as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence
of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called nature.
And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab.
Nat. ) that, "nature is the specific difference giving its form to each
thing," for the specific difference completes the definition, and is
derived from the special form of a thing. So in the definition of
"person," which means the singular in a determined "genus," it is more
correct to use the term "nature" than "essence," because the latter is
taken from being, which is most common.
Reply to Objection 5: The soul is a part of the human species; and so,
although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains
its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance,
which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand nor
any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of
person belongs to it.
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Whether "person" is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that "person" is the same as "hypostasis,"
"subsistence," and "essence. " For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ) that
"the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by
the name hypostasis. " But this with us signifies "person. " Therefore
"person" is altogether the same as "hypostasis. "
Objection 2: Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we
say there are three subsistences in God; which implies that "person"
and "subsistence" have the same meaning. Therefore "person" and
"subsistence" mean the same.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed. ) that the Greek
{ousia}, which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and
form. Now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual
substance called "hypostasis" and "person. " Therefore all the aforesaid
names seem to have the same meaning.
Objection 4: On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ) that genera
and species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only subsistent,
but also substand. But subsistences are so called from subsisting, as
substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding. Therefore, since
genera and species are not hypostases or persons, these are not the
same as subsistences.
Objection 5: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed. ) that matter is called
hypostasis, and form is called {ousiosis}---that is, subsistence. But
neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person differs
from the others.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is
twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by
its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance
of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks {ousia},
what we may call "essence. " In another sense substance means a subject
or "suppositum," which subsists in the genus of substance. To this,
taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an
intention; and thus it is called "suppositum. " It is also called by
three names signifying a reality---that is, "a thing of nature,"
"subsistence," and "hypostasis," according to a threefold consideration
of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in
another, it is called "subsistence"; as we say that those things
subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies
some common nature, it is called "a thing of nature"; as, for instance,
this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the
accidents, it is called "hypostasis," or "substance. " What these three
names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name
"person" signifies in the genus of rational substances.
Reply to Objection 1: Among the Greeks the term "hypostasis," taken in
the strict interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the
genus substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the
individual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of that
nature.
Reply to Objection 2: As we say "three persons" plurally in God, and
"three subsistences," so the Greeks say "three hypostases. " But because
the word "substance," which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning
to "hypostasis," is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it
sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to
avoid any occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use
"subsistence" for hypostasis, rather than "substance. "
Reply to Objection 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is
expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the
principles of the species, but not the individual principles. Hence in
things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the
form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the
common form, as the principles of the species. But what is composed of
this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For
soul, flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul,
this flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore
hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of
essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed
of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity
([249]Q[3], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist,
inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the
fact that they belong to genera and species comprised in the
predicament of substance, but not because the species and genera
themselves subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that
the species of things subsisted separately from singular things. To
substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation to
the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species.
Reply to Objection 5: The individual composed of matter and form
substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence
Boethius says (De Trin. ): "A simple form cannot be a subject. " Its
self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does not
supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to the
matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account,
therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and {ousiosis}, or
subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of
substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting.
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Whether the word "person" should be said of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the name "person" should not be said of
God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ): "No one should ever dare to say or
think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what
has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles. " But the name
"person" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament. Therefore
"person" is not to be applied to God.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ): "The word person
seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies
and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando],
since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the
mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called {prosopa}, as they
were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes. "
This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore
the word "person" is only applied to God metaphorically.
Objection 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word
"hypostasis" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab.
Nat. ), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not
exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas. ) that, "in this word
hypostasis, poison lurks in honey. " Therefore the word "person" should
not be said of God.
Objection 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing
defined is also denied of it. But the definition of "person," as given
above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a discursive
knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above ([250]Q[14],
A[12] ); and thus God cannot be said to have "a rational nature. " And
also because God cannot be called an individual substance, since the
principle of individuation is matter; while God is immaterial: nor is
He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore
the word "person" ought not to be attributed to God.
On the contrary, In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the person
of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost. "
I answer that, "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all
nature---that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence,
since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch
as His essence contains every perfection, this name "person" is
fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures,
but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving
them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when
treating of the names of God ([251]Q[13], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 1: Although the word "person" is not found applied
to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless
what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places
of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the
most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in the
very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one could
speak about God in any but the original language of the Old or New
Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find
new words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a kind of
novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not
lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to
avoid "profane novelties of words" (1 Tim. 6:20).
Reply to Objection 2: Although this name "person" may not belong to God
as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs
to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in
comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given to signify those
who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church
came to be called "persons. " Thence by some the definition of person is
given as "hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity. " And because
subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every
individual of the rational nature is called a "person. " Now the dignity
of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name
"person" pre-eminently belongs to God.
Reply to Objection 3: The word "hypostasis" does not apply to God as
regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but
it applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify
the subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in this word,"
forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics
used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess many
essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the word
"substance," which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly
taken amongst us to mean essence.
Reply to Objection 4: It may be said that God has a rational "nature,"
if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general
sense, an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an "individual"
in the sense that His individuality comes from matter; but only in the
sense which implies incommunicability. "Substance" can be applied to
God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence. There are some,
however, who say that the definition of Boethius, quoted above
[252](A[1]), is not a definition of person in the sense we use when
speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this
definition by adding that "Person" in God is "the incommunicable
existence of the divine nature. "
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Whether this word "person" signifies relation?
Objection 1: It would seem that this word "person," as applied to God,
does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin.
vii, 6): "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing
else but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to
Himself, and not in regard to the Son. "
Objection 2: Further, the interrogation "What? " refers to essence. But,
as Augustine says: "When we say there are three who bear witness in
heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked,
Three what? the answer is, Three persons. " Therefore person signifies
essence.
Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of
a word is its definition. But the definition of "person" is this: "The
individual substance of the rational nature," as above stated.
Therefore "person" signifies substance.
Objection 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify
relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified
relation, it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in
angels.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. ) that "every word that refers
to the persons signifies relation. " But no word belongs to person more
strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore this word
"person" signifies relation.
I answer that, A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word
"person" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally of the
Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence;
nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words which express
relation.
Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses
absolutely the divine essence; as this name "God" and this word "Wise";
but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by conciliar decree
that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and especially in the
plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when we
say, "Three persons," or, "one is the person of the Father, another of
the Son," etc. Used, however, in the singular, it may be either
absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory
explanation; for, if this word "person," by force of its own
signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that
forasmuch as we speak of "three persons," so far from the heretics
being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this,
others maintained that this word "person" in God signifies both the
essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies directly
the essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as "person" means as it
were "by itself one" [per se una]; and unity belongs to the essence.
And what is "by itself" implies relation indirectly; for the Father is
understood to exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct from the Son.
Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signifies relation
directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in the definition of
"person" the term nature is mentioned indirectly; and these come nearer
to the truth.
To determine the question, we must consider that something may be
included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in
the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of
"man," and not in the meaning of "animal. " So that it is one thing to
ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning when
the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning
of this word "person" in general; and another to ask the meaning of
"person" as applied to God. For "person" in general signifies the
individual substance of a rational figure. The individual in itself is
undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore "person" in any
nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature
it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the
individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to
"person" in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a
particular human person.
Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above
([253]Q[28], AA[2],3), while relation in God is not as an accident in a
subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for
the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the
divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a
divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to
signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a
hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that
which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus
it is true to say that the name "person" signifies relation directly,
and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as
expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the
essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the
same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as
distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the
notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this
signification of the word "person" was not clearly perceived before it
was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word "person" was used just as
any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express
relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word
"person" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the
first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.
Reply to Objection 1: This word "person" is said in respect to itself,
not to another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by
way of a substance---which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine
says that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the
same as the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is
are the same.
Reply to Objection 2: The term "what" refers sometimes to the nature
expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we
answer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the
"suppositum," as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A
fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.
Reply to Objection 3: In God the individual---i. e. distinct and
incommunicable substance---includes the idea of relation, as above
explained.
Reply to Objection 4: The different sense of the less common term does
not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an
ass have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree
univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies
to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in
the signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of
a human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal sense. Though
neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally
of God and creatures ([254]Q[13], A[5]).
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THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are several persons in God?
(2) How many are they?
(3) What the numeral terms signify in God?
(4) The community of the term "person. "
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Whether there are several persons in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in God.
For person is "the individual substance of a rational nature. " If then
there are several persons in God, there must be several substances;
which appears to be heretical.
Objection 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a
distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less
therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God
there is no plurality but of relations ([255]Q[28], A[3]). Therefore
there cannot be several persons in God.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that "this is
truly one which has no number. " But plurality implies number. Therefore
there are not several persons in God.
Objection 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus,
if in God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and part
in God; which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity.
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "One is the person of the Father,
another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost. " Therefore the Father,
and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons.
I answer that, It follows from what precedes that there are several
persons in God. For it was shown above ([256]Q[29], A[4]) that this
word "person" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine
nature. It was also established ([257]Q[28], A[1]) that there are
several real relations in God; and hence it follows that there are also
several realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means that
there are several persons in God.
Reply to Objection 1: The definition of "person" includes "substance,"
not as meaning the essence, but the "suppositum" which is made clear by
the addition of the term "individual. " To signify the substance thus
understood, the Greeks use the name "hypostasis. " So, as we say, "Three
persons," they say "Three hypostases. " We are not, however, accustomed
to say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean three essences
or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification of the term.
Reply to Objection 2: The absolute properties in God, such as goodness
and wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they
really distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist,
nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities---that is,
several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not
subsist, although they are really distinguished from each other, as
whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties in
God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other ([258]Q[28],
A[3]). Hence the plurality of persons in God.
I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the
actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is
intellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts
of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears
to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the
intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the
sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by
the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other
procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of
Love.
Reply to Objection 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on
another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the
divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is
indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom. ), goodness belongs
to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the
object of the will.
Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain
actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to
goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love,
according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and
goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: As above explained ([235]Q[14], A[5]; [236]Q[19],
A[5]), God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act
also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession
of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one
perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His
perfect fecundity.
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THE DIVINE RELATIONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether there are real relations in God?
(2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are
extrinsic to it?
(3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each
other?
(4) The number of these relations.
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Whether there are real relations in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For
Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as regards
the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated
relatively. " But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of
Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in
the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is
the relation of the same to the same. " But a relation of this kind is
only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in
reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real
relations, but are formed only by the mind.
Objection 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a
principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not
import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity
in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same
reason to the other relations in God.
Objection 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an
intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of
the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation
in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical relations.
On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the
Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation
existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son,
but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian
heresy.
I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may
consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in
the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other
genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their
strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But
relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to
another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of
things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered
to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are
necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination
and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body a
certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other
things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by
relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing
one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for
instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the
genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature,
then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the
same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore
as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as
above explained ([237]Q[27], AA[2],4), these relations, according to
the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.
Reply to Objection 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according
to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its
proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is
inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius
did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it
was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in
Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of
relation to another.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation signified by the term "the same" is
a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing;
because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by
reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some
two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are
called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus
Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in
every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not
diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of
identity.
Reply to Objection 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of
nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any
relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce
the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will,
as is above explained ([238]Q[14], AA[3],4; [239]Q[19], A[8]).
Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in
creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are
contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails
dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one
and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.
Reply to Objection 4: Relations which result from the mental operation
alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as
reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the
mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the
intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding
and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but
are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real
things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them
intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds
from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in
God.
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Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as
the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all that
is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things
relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not
refer to the substance. " Therefore the relation is not the divine
essence.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every
relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as
master is a man, and slave is a man. " Therefore, if relations exist in
God, there must be something else besides relation in God. This can
only be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.
Objection 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to
another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the
divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially
itself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the
perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and
self-subsisting ([240]Q[3], A[4]). Therefore relation is not the divine
essence.
On the contrary, Everything which is not the divine essence is a
creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the
divine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of
latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore the
distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty. "
I answer that, It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this
point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he
said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed.
To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of
the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is
the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident;
which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for
the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is
the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart
from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even the true idea
of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for
quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the
disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken
from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to
something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations
formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and
not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect
which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something
else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in
a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree
considered relation in the former mode only.
Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered
as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no
accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as
relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really
existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way
distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to
something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to
its opposite term.
Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the
same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as
in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed
in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and
essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Augustine do not imply that
paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very
being the same as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated
under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied;
but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in
God, since other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are
spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing
that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or
of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by
reason of God's supreme simplicity.
Reply to Objection 2: As the relation which exists in creatures
involves not only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so
the same applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in
the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of
relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God there
is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is not
perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were comprehended
in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above explained
([241]Q[13], A[2]), in treating of the divine names, that more is
contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified
by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything
besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by
us.
Reply to Objection 3: If the divine perfection contained only what is
signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect,
being thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing
more were contained in it than what is signified by the word "wisdom,"
it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of
the divine essence is greater than can be included in any name, it does
not follow, if a relative term or any other name applied to God signify
something imperfect, that the divine essence is in any way imperfect;
for the divine essence comprehends within itself the perfection of
every genus ([242]Q[4], A[2]).
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Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?
Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really
distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the
same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is
really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not
really distinguished from each other.
Objection 2: Further, as paternity and filiation are by name
distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and
power. But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction
of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any
real distinction of paternity and filiation.
Objection 3: Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of
origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore
the relations are not really distinguished from each other.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. ) that in God "the substance
contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity. " Therefore, if
the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there
would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is
the error of Sabellius.
I answer that, The attributing of anything to another involves the
attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is
attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him.
The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to
another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in
God there is a real relation [243](A[1]), there must also be a real
opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes
distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed,
according to that which is absolute---namely, essence, wherein there is
supreme unity and simplicity---but according to that which is relative.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this
argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing
are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical;
as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ
logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the
same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that
action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of
something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas
passion implies reference as of something "which is from" another.
Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as
the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and
definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from
each other.
Reply to Objection 2: Power and goodness do not import any opposition
in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.
Reply to Objection 3: Although relations, properly speaking, do not
arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as
opposed according to the procession of one from another.
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Whether in God there are only four real relations---paternity, filiation,
spiration, and procession?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are not only four real
relations---paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it must
be observed that in God there exist the relations of the intelligent
agent to the object understood; and of the one willing to the object
willed; which are real relations not comprised under those above
specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in God.
Objection 2: Further, real relations in God are understood as coming
from the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible
relations are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore in God
there exists an infinite series of real relations.
Objection 3: Further, ideas in God are eternal ([244]Q[15], A[1]); and
are only distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to
things, as above stated. Therefore in God there are many more eternal
relations.
Objection 4: Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are
relations: and they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more
relations are eternal in God than the above named.
Objection 5: Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are
fewer relations in God than those above named. For, according to the
Philosopher (Phys. iii text 24), "It is the same way from Athens to
Thebes, as from Thebes to Athens. " By the same way of reasoning there
is the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity, and
from the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and thus there are not
four relations in God.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every relation
is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and
passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son, the master
and the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity in God, for
He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1) it
follows that a real relation in God can be based only on action. Such
relations are not based on the actions of God according to any
extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to creatures
are not real in Him ([245]Q[13], A[7]). Hence, it follows that real
relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions
according to which there are internal, and not external, processions in
God. These processions are two only, as above explained ([246]Q[27],
A[5]), one derived from the action of the intellect, the procession of
the Word; and the other from the action of the will, the procession of
love. In respect of each of these processions two opposite relations
arise; one of which is the relation of the person proceeding from the
principle; the other is the relation of the principle Himself. The
procession of the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the
term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now the relation of the
principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity;
and the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called
filiation. But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own
([247]Q[27], A[4]); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper
name of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession is
called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called
procession: although these two names belong to the processions or
origins themselves, and not to the relations.
Reply to Objection 1: In those things in which there is a difference
between the intellect and its object, and the will and its object,
there can be a real relation, both of science to its object, and of the
willer to the object willed. In God, however, the intellect and its
object are one and the same; because by understanding Himself, God
understands all other things; and the same applies to His will and the
object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these kinds of
relations are not real; as neither is the relation of a thing to
itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a real relation;
because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible action;
and not as a thing understood. For when we understand a stone; that
which the intellect conceives from the thing understood, is called the
word.
Reply to Objection 2: Intelligible relations in ourselves are
infinitely multiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act,
and by another act understands that he understands the stone, and again
by another, understands that he understands this; thus the acts of
understanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the
relations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch as He
understands all things by one act alone.
Reply to Objection 3: Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence
it does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations
in God; but that God knows these many relations.
Reply to Objection 4: Equality and similitude in God are not real
relations; but are only logical relations ([248]Q[42], A[3], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 5: The way from one term to another and conversely
is the same; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence,
we cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the
same as that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of
something absolute, if there were such between them.
__________________________________________________________________
THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the
processions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the
persons.
First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively
as regards each other. We must consider the persons absolutely first in
common; and then singly.
The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four
points: (1) The signification of this word "person"; (2) the number of
the persons; (3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is
opposed thereto; as diversity, and similitude, and the like; and (4)
what belongs to our knowledge of the persons.
Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:(1) The
definition of "person. "
(2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis.
(3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God?
(4) What does it signify in Him?
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The definition of "person"
Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by
Boethius (De Duab. Nat. ) is insufficient---that is, "a person is an
individual substance of a rational nature. " For nothing singular can be
subject to definition. But "person" signifies something singular.
Therefore person is improperly defined.
Objection 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition of
person, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is the
former, the word "individual" is superfluous, because first substance
is individual substance; if it stands for second substance, the word
"individual" is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since
second substances are the "genera" or "species. " Therefore this
definition is incorrect.
Objection 3: Further, an intentional term must not be included in the
definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal"
would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing,
and "species" is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is the
name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature),
the word "individual" which is an intentional name comes improperly
into the definition.
Objection 4: Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in
those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally," as
Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as in
God, and in the angels. Therefore the word "nature" ought not to enter
into the definition of person, but the word should rather be "essence. "
Objection 5: Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of
the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not
properly defined as above.
I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every
genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs
to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself;
whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the
substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because it
exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the
individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their
own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances.
Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and
the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion
over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like
others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to
singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a
special name even among other substances; and this name is "person. "
Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of
person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the
term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in rational
substances.
Reply to Objection 1: Although this or that singular may not be
definable, yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be
defined; and so the Philosopher (De Praedic. , cap. De substantia) gives
a definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines
person.
Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of some, the term "substance" in
the definition of person stands for first substance, which is the
hypostasis; nor is the term "individual" superfluously added, forasmuch
as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of
universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in
general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a part.
But where "individual" is added, the idea of assumptibility is excluded
from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it
is assumed by a greater---that is, by the Word of God. It is, however,
better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as
divided into first and second, and when "individual" is added, it is
restricted to first substance.
Reply to Objection 3: Substantial differences being unknown to us, or
at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental
differences in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say
that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are the
effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms
expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if used to
signify things which are unnamed. And so the term "individual" is
placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence
which belongs to particular substances.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the
word "nature" was first used to signify the generation of living
things, which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation
comes from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the
intrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines
"nature" (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of principle is either
formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called nature.
And as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence
of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called nature.
And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab.
Nat. ) that, "nature is the specific difference giving its form to each
thing," for the specific difference completes the definition, and is
derived from the special form of a thing. So in the definition of
"person," which means the singular in a determined "genus," it is more
correct to use the term "nature" than "essence," because the latter is
taken from being, which is most common.
Reply to Objection 5: The soul is a part of the human species; and so,
although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains
its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance,
which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand nor
any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of
person belongs to it.
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Whether "person" is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that "person" is the same as "hypostasis,"
"subsistence," and "essence. " For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ) that
"the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by
the name hypostasis. " But this with us signifies "person. " Therefore
"person" is altogether the same as "hypostasis. "
Objection 2: Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we
say there are three subsistences in God; which implies that "person"
and "subsistence" have the same meaning. Therefore "person" and
"subsistence" mean the same.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed. ) that the Greek
{ousia}, which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and
form. Now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual
substance called "hypostasis" and "person. " Therefore all the aforesaid
names seem to have the same meaning.
Objection 4: On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ) that genera
and species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only subsistent,
but also substand. But subsistences are so called from subsisting, as
substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding. Therefore, since
genera and species are not hypostases or persons, these are not the
same as subsistences.
Objection 5: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed. ) that matter is called
hypostasis, and form is called {ousiosis}---that is, subsistence. But
neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person differs
from the others.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is
twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by
its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance
of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks {ousia},
what we may call "essence. " In another sense substance means a subject
or "suppositum," which subsists in the genus of substance. To this,
taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an
intention; and thus it is called "suppositum. " It is also called by
three names signifying a reality---that is, "a thing of nature,"
"subsistence," and "hypostasis," according to a threefold consideration
of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in
another, it is called "subsistence"; as we say that those things
subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies
some common nature, it is called "a thing of nature"; as, for instance,
this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the
accidents, it is called "hypostasis," or "substance. " What these three
names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name
"person" signifies in the genus of rational substances.
Reply to Objection 1: Among the Greeks the term "hypostasis," taken in
the strict interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the
genus substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the
individual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of that
nature.
Reply to Objection 2: As we say "three persons" plurally in God, and
"three subsistences," so the Greeks say "three hypostases. " But because
the word "substance," which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning
to "hypostasis," is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it
sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to
avoid any occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use
"subsistence" for hypostasis, rather than "substance. "
Reply to Objection 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is
expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the
principles of the species, but not the individual principles. Hence in
things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the
form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the
common form, as the principles of the species. But what is composed of
this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For
soul, flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul,
this flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore
hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of
essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed
of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity
([249]Q[3], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist,
inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the
fact that they belong to genera and species comprised in the
predicament of substance, but not because the species and genera
themselves subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that
the species of things subsisted separately from singular things. To
substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation to
the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species.
Reply to Objection 5: The individual composed of matter and form
substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence
Boethius says (De Trin. ): "A simple form cannot be a subject. " Its
self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does not
supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to the
matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account,
therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and {ousiosis}, or
subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of
substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the word "person" should be said of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the name "person" should not be said of
God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ): "No one should ever dare to say or
think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what
has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles. " But the name
"person" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament. Therefore
"person" is not to be applied to God.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ): "The word person
seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies
and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando],
since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the
mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called {prosopa}, as they
were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes. "
This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore
the word "person" is only applied to God metaphorically.
Objection 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word
"hypostasis" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab.
Nat. ), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not
exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas. ) that, "in this word
hypostasis, poison lurks in honey. " Therefore the word "person" should
not be said of God.
Objection 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing
defined is also denied of it. But the definition of "person," as given
above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a discursive
knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above ([250]Q[14],
A[12] ); and thus God cannot be said to have "a rational nature. " And
also because God cannot be called an individual substance, since the
principle of individuation is matter; while God is immaterial: nor is
He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore
the word "person" ought not to be attributed to God.
On the contrary, In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the person
of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost. "
I answer that, "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all
nature---that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence,
since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch
as His essence contains every perfection, this name "person" is
fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures,
but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving
them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when
treating of the names of God ([251]Q[13], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 1: Although the word "person" is not found applied
to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless
what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places
of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the
most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in the
very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one could
speak about God in any but the original language of the Old or New
Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find
new words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a kind of
novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not
lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to
avoid "profane novelties of words" (1 Tim. 6:20).
Reply to Objection 2: Although this name "person" may not belong to God
as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs
to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in
comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given to signify those
who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church
came to be called "persons. " Thence by some the definition of person is
given as "hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity. " And because
subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every
individual of the rational nature is called a "person. " Now the dignity
of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name
"person" pre-eminently belongs to God.
Reply to Objection 3: The word "hypostasis" does not apply to God as
regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but
it applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify
the subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in this word,"
forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics
used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess many
essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the word
"substance," which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly
taken amongst us to mean essence.
Reply to Objection 4: It may be said that God has a rational "nature,"
if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general
sense, an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an "individual"
in the sense that His individuality comes from matter; but only in the
sense which implies incommunicability. "Substance" can be applied to
God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence. There are some,
however, who say that the definition of Boethius, quoted above
[252](A[1]), is not a definition of person in the sense we use when
speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this
definition by adding that "Person" in God is "the incommunicable
existence of the divine nature. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this word "person" signifies relation?
Objection 1: It would seem that this word "person," as applied to God,
does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin.
vii, 6): "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing
else but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to
Himself, and not in regard to the Son. "
Objection 2: Further, the interrogation "What? " refers to essence. But,
as Augustine says: "When we say there are three who bear witness in
heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked,
Three what? the answer is, Three persons. " Therefore person signifies
essence.
Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of
a word is its definition. But the definition of "person" is this: "The
individual substance of the rational nature," as above stated.
Therefore "person" signifies substance.
Objection 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify
relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified
relation, it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in
angels.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. ) that "every word that refers
to the persons signifies relation. " But no word belongs to person more
strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore this word
"person" signifies relation.
I answer that, A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word
"person" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally of the
Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence;
nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words which express
relation.
Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses
absolutely the divine essence; as this name "God" and this word "Wise";
but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by conciliar decree
that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and especially in the
plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when we
say, "Three persons," or, "one is the person of the Father, another of
the Son," etc. Used, however, in the singular, it may be either
absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory
explanation; for, if this word "person," by force of its own
signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that
forasmuch as we speak of "three persons," so far from the heretics
being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this,
others maintained that this word "person" in God signifies both the
essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies directly
the essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as "person" means as it
were "by itself one" [per se una]; and unity belongs to the essence.
And what is "by itself" implies relation indirectly; for the Father is
understood to exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct from the Son.
Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signifies relation
directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in the definition of
"person" the term nature is mentioned indirectly; and these come nearer
to the truth.
To determine the question, we must consider that something may be
included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in
the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of
"man," and not in the meaning of "animal. " So that it is one thing to
ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning when
the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning
of this word "person" in general; and another to ask the meaning of
"person" as applied to God. For "person" in general signifies the
individual substance of a rational figure. The individual in itself is
undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore "person" in any
nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature
it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the
individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to
"person" in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a
particular human person.
Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above
([253]Q[28], AA[2],3), while relation in God is not as an accident in a
subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for
the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the
divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a
divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to
signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a
hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that
which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus
it is true to say that the name "person" signifies relation directly,
and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as
expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the
essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the
same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as
distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the
notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this
signification of the word "person" was not clearly perceived before it
was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word "person" was used just as
any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express
relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word
"person" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the
first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.
Reply to Objection 1: This word "person" is said in respect to itself,
not to another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by
way of a substance---which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine
says that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the
same as the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is
are the same.
Reply to Objection 2: The term "what" refers sometimes to the nature
expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we
answer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the
"suppositum," as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A
fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.
Reply to Objection 3: In God the individual---i. e. distinct and
incommunicable substance---includes the idea of relation, as above
explained.
Reply to Objection 4: The different sense of the less common term does
not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an
ass have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree
univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies
to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in
the signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of
a human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal sense. Though
neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally
of God and creatures ([254]Q[13], A[5]).
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THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are several persons in God?
(2) How many are they?
(3) What the numeral terms signify in God?
(4) The community of the term "person. "
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Whether there are several persons in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in God.
For person is "the individual substance of a rational nature. " If then
there are several persons in God, there must be several substances;
which appears to be heretical.
Objection 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a
distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less
therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God
there is no plurality but of relations ([255]Q[28], A[3]). Therefore
there cannot be several persons in God.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that "this is
truly one which has no number. " But plurality implies number. Therefore
there are not several persons in God.
Objection 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus,
if in God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and part
in God; which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity.
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "One is the person of the Father,
another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost. " Therefore the Father,
and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons.
I answer that, It follows from what precedes that there are several
persons in God. For it was shown above ([256]Q[29], A[4]) that this
word "person" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine
nature. It was also established ([257]Q[28], A[1]) that there are
several real relations in God; and hence it follows that there are also
several realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means that
there are several persons in God.
Reply to Objection 1: The definition of "person" includes "substance,"
not as meaning the essence, but the "suppositum" which is made clear by
the addition of the term "individual. " To signify the substance thus
understood, the Greeks use the name "hypostasis. " So, as we say, "Three
persons," they say "Three hypostases. " We are not, however, accustomed
to say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean three essences
or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification of the term.
Reply to Objection 2: The absolute properties in God, such as goodness
and wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they
really distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist,
nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities---that is,
several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not
subsist, although they are really distinguished from each other, as
whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties in
God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other ([258]Q[28],
A[3]). Hence the plurality of persons in God.
