Therefore
those things that are
possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have
dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the
"faculty of will and reason.
possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have
dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the
"faculty of will and reason.
Summa Theologica
Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human
nature.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation
of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being. " Therefore
that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the
constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways:
firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the
individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a
thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate matter,
and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature
considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong
to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of
Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.
Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one
individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the
matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that
the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which,
they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man.
So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by
posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human
nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.
But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of
the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude
of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to
these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food,
they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural
heat, and prevent the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead
or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire.
But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the
same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can
cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be
generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the
human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its
subject: else the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it
can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed
into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire
matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in
the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like.
Thus there would only be one individual of the human species. Thirdly,
because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than
either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so
that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the
substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of
matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude
cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity
it can only result from division. Therefore some other substance must
be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being
changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either
by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some
other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly
by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in
the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a
man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child.
Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to
Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things were created together as to the
substance of matter, but not as to the specific form. " Consequently the
multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food
being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man
does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative
soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not
increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished,
but through some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication cannot be
natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain
fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either
by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently
the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called
"natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is altogether
inadmissible.
Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to
exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general:
but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual
the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it
is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it
never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the
individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true
human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite
quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food
into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a
quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this matter, they
state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not
required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the
quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food,
this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However,
this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of living
bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of
generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating
their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the
nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by
their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true
nature. Secondly, because the active seminal power is a certain
impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above
([986]Q[118], A[1]). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting,
than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal
power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much
more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of
human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is
needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be
needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action
of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed
from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that
which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does
that which is formed from the food.
Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really
changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the
specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as it is
potentially flesh. "
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what
enters into the mouth, but "all"---because something from every kind of
food is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is
generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast
aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.
Reply to Objection 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have
understood that which first receives the human species, which is
derived from the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the
individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what
is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but
as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle.
For he says there, that "just as in things which have their species in
matter"---for instance, wood or stone---"so in flesh, there is
something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter. "
Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things,
which are not generated seminally, or nourished. Again, since what is
generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so
nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says
there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is
added, cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by
being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying that one
is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.
It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is
not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from
different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the
species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it
remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together
with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to
matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and
renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but
the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in
its place.
Reply to Objection 3: The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever
the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it
cannot be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the
"nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly the
specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the
like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species
remains in its root, which is not destroyed.
Reply to Objection 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by
continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the
transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform
not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth.
Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost,
and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins
decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies.
Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is
weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length
watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
Reply to Objection 5: As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a
certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to
be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already
existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter
together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into
fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of
wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece
is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time:
because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. It is the
same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is
renewed which was consumed by natural heat.
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Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?
Objection 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the
surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature,
producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is begotten. "
But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the
semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.
Objection 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that
which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is
generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive
nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never
existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or
ancestors, than to any other men.
Objection 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh
of cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from
surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the
cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were
in Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of
the body. " But this would not be, if the semen were produced from
surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal.
i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food. "
I answer that, This question depends in some way on what has been
stated above [987](A[1]; [988]Q[118], A[1]). For if human nature has a
virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in
another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which
at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form
communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing
should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things
generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards
perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the proper and
determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the
generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or
the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a certain common
virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is
subsequently determinate to this or that part.
Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what
is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this
solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken
from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would be
due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the
power of transforming something else into the likeness of that nature.
But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, then,
since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have
the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature, but
only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution
is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the nature
of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and
generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as mud is
generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being
cut in two: which is inadmissible.
It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something
separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the
whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of
the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above [989](A[1];
[990]Q[108], A[1] ). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is
that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into
the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this.
In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative
power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed
as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the
Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food,
have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and
generated seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter
in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the
form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the
substance.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is
on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that
generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his
grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should
have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue
derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father. In like
manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in relation
to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.
Reply to Objection 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood
as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from
which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that
both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which
is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance,
is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power
of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue (in the
production) of this man.
But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal
substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter
from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin
Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not
derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal
virtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For "such a
birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary,
O. P. ], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.
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FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART (FS) (QQ[1]-114)
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TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5)
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PROLOGUE
Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be
made in God's image, in so far as the image implies "an intelligent
being endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have
treated of the exemplar, i. e. God, and of those things which came forth
from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to
treat of His image, i. e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of
his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.
__________________________________________________________________
OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and
secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards this
end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is
ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is stated to
be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2)
happiness.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
(2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?
(3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?
(4) Whether there is any last end of human life?
(5) Whether one man can have several last ends?
(6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?
(7) Whether all men have the same last end?
(8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?
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Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an
end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name,
implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But
that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this
preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does
not belong to man to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an
end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
Objection 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he
acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation,
sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one
moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on
something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are derived from the
principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human
operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it
belongs to man to do everything for an end.
I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone are properly called
"human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from
irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore
those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master.
Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence,
too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty and will of reason. "
Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a
deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be
called actions "of a man," but not properly "human" actions, since they
are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions
proceed from a power, are caused by that power in accordance with the
nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the
good. Therefore all human actions must be for an end.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the end be last in the order of
execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And
it is this way that it is a cause.
Reply to Objection 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be
voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action
is voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the
will, e. g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by
the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible
for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end. For the
object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is color:
wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing,
because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object; so the
first appetible, i. e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing.
Consequently it follows that if a human action be the last end, it must
be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man,
at least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore whatever a man
does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does
that action in which the last end consists.
Reply to Objection 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions;
since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the
proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an
imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.
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Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to
act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, never
acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that
have no knowledge of an end; either because they are altogether without
knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend
the idea of an end as such, as irrational animals. Therefore it seems
proper to the rational nature to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an
end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to
things that lack reason.
Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will.
But "the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to act for
an end belongs to none but a rational nature.
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only
mind but also nature acts for an end. "
I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a
number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the
others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes
is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive
form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces
itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out
of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some
particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another:
consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of
necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of
an end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational
nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in
other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is
called the "natural appetite. "
Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its
action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to
the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as
an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer
who directs his action to the end.
Therefore those things that are
possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have
dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the
"faculty of will and reason. " But those things that lack reason tend to
an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not by
themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and
consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be ordained to
an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in
comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent, as stated
above ([991]FP, Q[22], A[2], ad 4; [992]FP, Q[103], A[1], ad 3).
Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as
directing [agens] and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper
to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by
another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do
not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether
void of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows
the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when
he acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's
compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it is
thus with irrational creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which
directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to
that which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an
irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in
universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack
reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but
they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to
some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved
by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends the
common good, moves, by his command, all the particular departments of
the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity,
moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to
the universal good, namely by the Divine will.
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Whether human acts are specified by their end?
Objection 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their
end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified by
an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their
end.
Objection 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist
before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a
human act does not derive its species from the end.
Objection 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But
one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends.
Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13):
"According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds
worthy of blame or praise. "
I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and
not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and
form are established in their respective species by their own forms.
And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since
movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these
receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act which is
the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus
of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than
a certain movement proceeding from heat, while heating as a passion is
nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition
that shows the specific nature. And either way, human acts, whether
they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species
from the end. For human acts can be considered in both ways, since man
moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above
[993](A[1]) that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a
deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the end.
And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as
they are human, is the end. In like manner it is their terminus: for
the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end;
thus in natural agents the form of the thing generated is conformed to
the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. super
Luc. ) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking
receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as
human acts.
Reply to Objection 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act,
because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it
just this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something,
considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as
passion.
Reply to Objection 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the
intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it
is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral act.
Reply to Objection 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds
once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which
it has its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of
which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an act
which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several
ends of the will: thus this act "to kill a man," which is but one act
in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as to an end, to
the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result
being that there would be several acts in different species of
morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another,
an act of vice. For a movement does not receive its species from that
which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its
"per se" terminus. Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing,
and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality.
Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered
in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered in their
moral species, and conversely.
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Whether there is one last end of human life?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but
that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds
from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other
good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has
the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends.
Objection 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied
to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same
reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number,
the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is
consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that
there is also an infinite series of ends.
Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will.
But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can
will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore
there is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is no
last end of the human will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose
a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good. " But the good is
that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the
nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to
fix one last end.
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed
indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in
whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the
first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of
necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.
viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement,
because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can
the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first
mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends---the order
of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders
there must be something first. For that which is first in the order of
intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite;
consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to
move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is
that wherein operation has its beginning; and if this principle be
taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the
intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is the
first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, on
neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no
last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its term,
nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no
first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would begin
to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue
indefinitely.
On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that
are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for
accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that
there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the
end.
Reply to Objection 1: The very nature of good is that something flows
from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore,
good has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this
argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that from the
end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards
those things that are ordained to the end. And this would be true if we
considered but the power of the First Good, which is infinite. But,
since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to
which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a
certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the
flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods
share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does
not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wis. 11:21), God
disposes all things "in number, weight and measure. "
Reply to Objection 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins
from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term.
Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no
infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process of
things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one
another. But in those things which are accidentally connected, nothing
hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is accidental
to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be
added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders the reason
from an indefinite process.
Reply to Objection 3: This multiplication of acts of the will reacting
on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the
fact that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself
indifferently once or several times.
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Whether one man can have several last ends?
Objection 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed
at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four
things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue. "
But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place
the last end of his will in many things.
Objection 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not
exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in
opposition to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is
the last end of the will does not exclude others.
Objection 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one
thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its
last end in that thing, e. g. pleasure, it could place it in something
else, e. g. riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in
pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches.
Therefore it is possible for one man's will to be directed at the same
time to several things, as last ends.
On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his last end, is
master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of
life. Hence of gluttons it is written (Phil. 3:19): "Whose god is their
belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the
belly. Now according to Mat. 6:24, "No man can serve two masters,"
such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is
impossible for one man to have several last ends not ordained to one
another.
I answer that, It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at
the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be
assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own
perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires
as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1):
"In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it passes away so
as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be complete. " It is
therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that
nothing is left besides it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if
something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not
possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were
its perfect good.
The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the
principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the
rational appetite, i. e. the will, the principle needs to be that which
is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to
one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational
appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to
its last end, is one.
The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their
species from the end, as stated above [994](A[3]), they must needs
receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all:
just as natural things are placed in a genus according to a common
form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong,
as such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more
because in every genus there is one first principle; and the last end
has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last
end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last
end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all
men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man
must be fixed on one last end.
Reply to Objection 1: All these several objects were considered as one
perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last
end.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible to find several things
which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a
thing's perfect good, that anything besides be required for that
thing's perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will does not extend to making
opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to
tend to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above
(ad 2).
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Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he
wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said
to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious
matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to the last
end.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his
Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake.
Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end.
Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last
end.
Objection 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of
that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that he
desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the
last end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end
of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we
love it for its own sake. "
I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he
desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First,
because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good.
And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he
must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because
the beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is
clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every
beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is
achieved through the last end. Secondly, because the last end stands in
the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other
movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move
save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary
objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to
the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.
Reply to Objection 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any
external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they
afford him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his
last end.
Reply to Objection 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is
desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good,
which is the ultimate end.
Reply to Objection 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end,
whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first
intention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every
desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be
not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the
road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step.
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Whether all men have the same last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For
before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man.
But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore
all men have not the same last end.
Objection 2: Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last
end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have
various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.
Objection 3: Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of
individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet they
differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not
the same last end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree
in desiring the last end, which is happiness.
I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways: first,
considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the
thing in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the
aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all
desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this
fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above [995](A[5]).
But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not
agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their
consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to every
taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most
pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar.
Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which
he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good
is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires
for his last end.
Reply to Objection 1: Those who sin turn from that in which their last
end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of
the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.
Reply to Objection 2: Various pursuits in life are found among men by
reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end.
Reply to Objection 3: Although actions are of individuals, yet their
first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as
stated above [996](A[5]).
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Whether other creatures concur in that last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's
last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's
beginning---i. e. God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all
other things concur in man's last end.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all
things to Himself as to their last end.
nature.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation
of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being. " Therefore
that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the
constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways:
firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the
individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a
thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate matter,
and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature
considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong
to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of
Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.
Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one
individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the
matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that
the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which,
they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man.
So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by
posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human
nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.
But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of
the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude
of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to
these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food,
they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural
heat, and prevent the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead
or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire.
But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the
same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can
cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be
generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the
human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its
subject: else the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it
can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed
into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire
matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in
the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like.
Thus there would only be one individual of the human species. Thirdly,
because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than
either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so
that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the
substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of
matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude
cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity
it can only result from division. Therefore some other substance must
be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being
changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either
by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some
other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly
by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in
the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a
man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child.
Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to
Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things were created together as to the
substance of matter, but not as to the specific form. " Consequently the
multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food
being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man
does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative
soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not
increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished,
but through some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication cannot be
natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain
fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either
by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently
the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called
"natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is altogether
inadmissible.
Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to
exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general:
but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual
the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it
is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it
never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the
individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true
human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite
quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food
into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a
quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this matter, they
state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not
required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the
quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food,
this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However,
this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of living
bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of
generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating
their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the
nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by
their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true
nature. Secondly, because the active seminal power is a certain
impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above
([986]Q[118], A[1]). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting,
than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal
power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much
more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of
human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is
needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be
needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action
of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed
from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that
which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does
that which is formed from the food.
Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really
changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the
specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as it is
potentially flesh. "
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what
enters into the mouth, but "all"---because something from every kind of
food is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is
generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast
aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.
Reply to Objection 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have
understood that which first receives the human species, which is
derived from the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the
individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what
is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but
as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle.
For he says there, that "just as in things which have their species in
matter"---for instance, wood or stone---"so in flesh, there is
something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter. "
Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things,
which are not generated seminally, or nourished. Again, since what is
generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so
nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says
there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is
added, cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by
being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying that one
is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.
It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is
not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from
different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the
species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it
remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together
with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to
matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and
renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but
the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in
its place.
Reply to Objection 3: The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever
the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it
cannot be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the
"nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly the
specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the
like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species
remains in its root, which is not destroyed.
Reply to Objection 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by
continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the
transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform
not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth.
Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost,
and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins
decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies.
Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is
weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length
watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
Reply to Objection 5: As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a
certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to
be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already
existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter
together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into
fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of
wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece
is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time:
because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. It is the
same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is
renewed which was consumed by natural heat.
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Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?
Objection 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the
surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature,
producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is begotten. "
But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the
semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.
Objection 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that
which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is
generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive
nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never
existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or
ancestors, than to any other men.
Objection 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh
of cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from
surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the
cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.
Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were
in Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of
the body. " But this would not be, if the semen were produced from
surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal.
i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food. "
I answer that, This question depends in some way on what has been
stated above [987](A[1]; [988]Q[118], A[1]). For if human nature has a
virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in
another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which
at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form
communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing
should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things
generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards
perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the proper and
determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the
generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or
the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a certain common
virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is
subsequently determinate to this or that part.
Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what
is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this
solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken
from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would be
due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the
power of transforming something else into the likeness of that nature.
But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, then,
since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have
the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature, but
only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution
is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the nature
of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and
generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as mud is
generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being
cut in two: which is inadmissible.
It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something
separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the
whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of
the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above [989](A[1];
[990]Q[108], A[1] ). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is
that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into
the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this.
In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative
power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed
as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the
Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food,
have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and
generated seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter
in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the
form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the
substance.
Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is
on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that
generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his
grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should
have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue
derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father. In like
manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in relation
to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.
Reply to Objection 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood
as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from
which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that
both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which
is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance,
is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power
of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue (in the
production) of this man.
But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal
substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter
from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin
Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not
derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal
virtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For "such a
birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary,
O. P. ], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.
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FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART (FS) (QQ[1]-114)
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TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5)
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PROLOGUE
Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be
made in God's image, in so far as the image implies "an intelligent
being endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have
treated of the exemplar, i. e. God, and of those things which came forth
from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to
treat of His image, i. e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of
his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.
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OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and
secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards this
end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is
ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is stated to
be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2)
happiness.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
(2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?
(3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?
(4) Whether there is any last end of human life?
(5) Whether one man can have several last ends?
(6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?
(7) Whether all men have the same last end?
(8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?
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Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an
end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name,
implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But
that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this
preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does
not belong to man to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an
end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
Objection 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he
acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation,
sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one
moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on
something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are derived from the
principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human
operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it
belongs to man to do everything for an end.
I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone are properly called
"human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from
irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore
those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master.
Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence,
too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty and will of reason. "
Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a
deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be
called actions "of a man," but not properly "human" actions, since they
are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions
proceed from a power, are caused by that power in accordance with the
nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the
good. Therefore all human actions must be for an end.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the end be last in the order of
execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And
it is this way that it is a cause.
Reply to Objection 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be
voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action
is voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the
will, e. g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by
the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible
for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end. For the
object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is color:
wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing,
because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object; so the
first appetible, i. e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing.
Consequently it follows that if a human action be the last end, it must
be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man,
at least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore whatever a man
does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does
that action in which the last end consists.
Reply to Objection 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions;
since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the
proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an
imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.
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Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to
act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, never
acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that
have no knowledge of an end; either because they are altogether without
knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend
the idea of an end as such, as irrational animals. Therefore it seems
proper to the rational nature to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an
end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to
things that lack reason.
Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will.
But "the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to act for
an end belongs to none but a rational nature.
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only
mind but also nature acts for an end. "
I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a
number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the
others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes
is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive
form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces
itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out
of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some
particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another:
consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of
necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of
an end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational
nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in
other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is
called the "natural appetite. "
Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its
action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to
the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as
an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer
who directs his action to the end.
Therefore those things that are
possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have
dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the
"faculty of will and reason. " But those things that lack reason tend to
an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not by
themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and
consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be ordained to
an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in
comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent, as stated
above ([991]FP, Q[22], A[2], ad 4; [992]FP, Q[103], A[1], ad 3).
Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as
directing [agens] and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper
to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by
another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do
not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether
void of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows
the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when
he acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's
compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it is
thus with irrational creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which
directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to
that which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an
irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in
universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack
reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but
they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to
some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved
by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends the
common good, moves, by his command, all the particular departments of
the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity,
moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to
the universal good, namely by the Divine will.
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Whether human acts are specified by their end?
Objection 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their
end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified by
an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their
end.
Objection 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist
before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a
human act does not derive its species from the end.
Objection 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But
one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends.
Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13):
"According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds
worthy of blame or praise. "
I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and
not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and
form are established in their respective species by their own forms.
And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since
movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these
receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act which is
the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus
of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than
a certain movement proceeding from heat, while heating as a passion is
nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition
that shows the specific nature. And either way, human acts, whether
they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species
from the end. For human acts can be considered in both ways, since man
moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above
[993](A[1]) that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a
deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the end.
And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as
they are human, is the end. In like manner it is their terminus: for
the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end;
thus in natural agents the form of the thing generated is conformed to
the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. super
Luc. ) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking
receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as
human acts.
Reply to Objection 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act,
because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it
just this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something,
considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as
passion.
Reply to Objection 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the
intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it
is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral act.
Reply to Objection 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds
once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which
it has its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of
which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an act
which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several
ends of the will: thus this act "to kill a man," which is but one act
in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as to an end, to
the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result
being that there would be several acts in different species of
morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another,
an act of vice. For a movement does not receive its species from that
which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its
"per se" terminus. Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing,
and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality.
Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered
in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered in their
moral species, and conversely.
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Whether there is one last end of human life?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but
that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds
from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other
good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has
the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends.
Objection 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied
to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same
reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number,
the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is
consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that
there is also an infinite series of ends.
Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will.
But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can
will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore
there is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is no
last end of the human will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose
a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good. " But the good is
that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the
nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to
fix one last end.
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed
indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in
whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the
first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of
necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.
viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement,
because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can
the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first
mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends---the order
of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders
there must be something first. For that which is first in the order of
intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite;
consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to
move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is
that wherein operation has its beginning; and if this principle be
taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the
intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is the
first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, on
neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no
last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its term,
nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no
first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would begin
to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue
indefinitely.
On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that
are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for
accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that
there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the
end.
Reply to Objection 1: The very nature of good is that something flows
from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore,
good has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this
argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that from the
end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards
those things that are ordained to the end. And this would be true if we
considered but the power of the First Good, which is infinite. But,
since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to
which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a
certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the
flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods
share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does
not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wis. 11:21), God
disposes all things "in number, weight and measure. "
Reply to Objection 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins
from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term.
Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no
infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process of
things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one
another. But in those things which are accidentally connected, nothing
hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is accidental
to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be
added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders the reason
from an indefinite process.
Reply to Objection 3: This multiplication of acts of the will reacting
on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the
fact that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself
indifferently once or several times.
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Whether one man can have several last ends?
Objection 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed
at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four
things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue. "
But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place
the last end of his will in many things.
Objection 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not
exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in
opposition to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is
the last end of the will does not exclude others.
Objection 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one
thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its
last end in that thing, e. g. pleasure, it could place it in something
else, e. g. riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in
pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches.
Therefore it is possible for one man's will to be directed at the same
time to several things, as last ends.
On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his last end, is
master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of
life. Hence of gluttons it is written (Phil. 3:19): "Whose god is their
belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the
belly. Now according to Mat. 6:24, "No man can serve two masters,"
such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is
impossible for one man to have several last ends not ordained to one
another.
I answer that, It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at
the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be
assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own
perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires
as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1):
"In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it passes away so
as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be complete. " It is
therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that
nothing is left besides it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if
something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not
possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were
its perfect good.
The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the
principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the
rational appetite, i. e. the will, the principle needs to be that which
is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to
one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational
appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to
its last end, is one.
The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their
species from the end, as stated above [994](A[3]), they must needs
receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all:
just as natural things are placed in a genus according to a common
form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong,
as such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more
because in every genus there is one first principle; and the last end
has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last
end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last
end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all
men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man
must be fixed on one last end.
Reply to Objection 1: All these several objects were considered as one
perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last
end.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible to find several things
which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a
thing's perfect good, that anything besides be required for that
thing's perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will does not extend to making
opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to
tend to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above
(ad 2).
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Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he
wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said
to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious
matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to the last
end.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his
Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake.
Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end.
Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last
end.
Objection 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of
that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that he
desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the
last end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end
of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we
love it for its own sake. "
I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he
desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First,
because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good.
And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he
must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because
the beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is
clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every
beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is
achieved through the last end. Secondly, because the last end stands in
the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other
movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move
save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary
objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to
the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.
Reply to Objection 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any
external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they
afford him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his
last end.
Reply to Objection 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is
desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good,
which is the ultimate end.
Reply to Objection 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end,
whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first
intention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every
desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be
not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the
road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step.
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Whether all men have the same last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For
before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man.
But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore
all men have not the same last end.
Objection 2: Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last
end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have
various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.
Objection 3: Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of
individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet they
differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not
the same last end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree
in desiring the last end, which is happiness.
I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways: first,
considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the
thing in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the
aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all
desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this
fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above [995](A[5]).
But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not
agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their
consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to every
taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most
pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar.
Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which
he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good
is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires
for his last end.
Reply to Objection 1: Those who sin turn from that in which their last
end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of
the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.
Reply to Objection 2: Various pursuits in life are found among men by
reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end.
Reply to Objection 3: Although actions are of individuals, yet their
first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as
stated above [996](A[5]).
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Whether other creatures concur in that last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's
last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's
beginning---i. e. God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all
other things concur in man's last end.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all
things to Himself as to their last end.
