Hence to know
things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in
themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their
similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God.
things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in
themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their
similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God.
Summa Theologica
Hence the knowledge
of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the
mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result
that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the knower. Now
the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being
only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But others are
subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are
not their own existence, but receive it; and these are the incorporeal
beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own
subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we
know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form of
certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the
act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in
individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is
another kind of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and
this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect
naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter; not as
they are in such individual matter, but according as they are
abstracted therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it
follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects as
universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic
intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter; but this is
beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its
present life, united as it is to the body. It follows therefore that to
know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone;
and this is beyond the natural power of any created intellect; for no
creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is
participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of
God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect,
as an object made intelligible to it.
Reply to Objection 1: This mode of knowing God is natural to an
angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel
himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the
essence of God, as was shown above [55](A[2]). Hence it does not follow
that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.
Reply to Objection 2: The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect
be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it
ought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense
every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it
does not possess the excellence which is in God.
Reply to Objection 3: The sense of sight, as being altogether material,
cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic
intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature,
can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The
proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows
concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one
particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to consider
abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things
which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite
into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by
itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it
naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to
separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that the thing
itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the
created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete
form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of
resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate
subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.
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Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the
essence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any
created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself
lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to
be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is
intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created
light.
Objection 2: Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen
in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a
medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.
Objection 3: Further, what is created can be natural to some creature.
Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, such
a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that
creature would not need any other light to see God; which is
impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should
require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God.
On the contrary, It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" (Ps.
35:10).
I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its
nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for
example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by
some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees
the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible
form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural
disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be
raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural
power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the
essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary
that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now
this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of
the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the
name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the
Apocalypse (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God hath enlightened it"---viz.
the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are
made "deiform"---i. e. like to God, according to the saying: "When He
shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg. : 'because'] we shall
see Him as He is" (1 Jn. 3:2).
Reply to Objection 1: The created light is necessary to see the essence
of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is
of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to
understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even
so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as
it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible of color.
Reply to Objection 2: This light is required to see the divine essence,
not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the
intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that
this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but
as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the
immediate vision of God.
Reply to Objection 3: The disposition to the form of fire can be
natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory
cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine
nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is
made deiform, as is said in this article.
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Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than
another?
Objection 1: It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one
does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (1 Jn.
3:2): "We shall see Him as He is. " But He is only in one way. Therefore
He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be
seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii):
"One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than
another. " But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine
essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was
shown above (A[3] ). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one
does not see more clearly than another.
Objection 3: Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another
can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on
the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it
may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the
seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude;
but this does not apply to the present question, for God is present to
the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude, but by His essence.
It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this
happens according to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it
follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see
Him the more clearly; and this is incongruous; since equality with
angels is promised to men as their beatitude.
On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according
to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only
true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in
eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by
the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" (1 Cor. 15:41).
I answer that, Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more
perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had
a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will
not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because one
intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another.
The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created
intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which
establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from
what is said above, in the preceding article.
Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God
the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the
light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater
charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes
the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence
he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and
will be the more beatified.
Reply to Objection 1: In the words,"We shall see Him as He is," the
conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the
object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is,
because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does
not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if
the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is
the perfect mode of God's existence.
Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said
that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better
than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing
understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is,
does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of
understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the
understanding of another.
Reply to Objection 3: The diversity of seeing will not arise on the
part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to
all---viz. the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse
participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will
arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed,
the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.
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Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend
God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "But I follow after, if I may
by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']. " But the Apostle did not
follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): "I . . . so run, not as at
an uncertainty. " Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others
also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: "So run that you may
comprehend. "
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That
is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is
hidden from the seer. " But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen
whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple.
Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.
Objection 3: Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not
"wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either to the
mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the
essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is
considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees
Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect
will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore all who see
the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.
On the contrary, It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful,
the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible
in thought" (Jer. 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.
I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend
God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great
beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim. , Serm. xxxvii).
In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is
perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as
it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific
demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof,
it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific
demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right
angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a
probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be
said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that
perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no
created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of
the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus
appears---Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God,
whose being is infinite, as was shown above [56](Q[7]) is infinitely
knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the
created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in
proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since
therefore the created light of glory received into any created
intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created
intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible
that it should comprehend God.
Reply to Objection 1: "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is
taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the
one comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by
intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot
be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain
Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this sense we now
take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension" is taken more
largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is
said to comprehend him when he attains to him. And in this sense God is
comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I
will not let him go" (Cant 3:4); in this sense also are to be
understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension.
And in this way "comprehension" is one of the three prerogatives of the
soul, responding to hope, as vision responds to faith, and fruition
responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is
held or possessed, forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar
off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we
always enjoy what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in
them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so
as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things
in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as
present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they
enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire.
Reply to Objection 2: God is called incomprehensible not because
anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as
He is capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is
known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it
is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition;
but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known.
Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the whole is
comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden
from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or
traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely
surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.
Reply to Objection 3: The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object;
not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the
mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he
who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is
infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend
to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person
can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable,
although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.
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Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all
things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see,
who see Him Who sees all things? " But God sees all things. Therefore
those who see God see all things.
Objection 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in
the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in
a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees
God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.
Objection 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand
the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or can
do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can
understand all that God does, or can do.
Objection 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know
all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, its
natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not
be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows
all things.
On the contrary, The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know
all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the inferior
angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels. " Also they
are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret thoughts; for
this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the
essence of God, does not know all things.
I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence,
does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that
things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in
God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things
are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that
the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen
in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one
demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of
many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he
needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can
know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in
the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created
intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above [57](A[7]).
Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does
or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God
does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it
sees God.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks as regards the object being
sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows
forth all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows
all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror
should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the
mirror itself.
Reply to Objection 3: Although it is more to see God than to see all
things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things
are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things,
but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in
this article that the more things are known in God according as He is
seen more or less perfectly.
Reply to Objection 4: The natural desire of the rational creature is to
know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect,
namely, the species and the genera of things and their types, and these
everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know other
singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the
perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out
to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things that
exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone
were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all
truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing
else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified.
Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all
these" (i. e. all creatures) "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso
knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee
and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone. "
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Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen
through any similitude?
Objection 1: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the
Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of
knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object
known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible,
and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is
informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude of
color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine essence
understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their
similitudes.
Objection 2: Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul,
seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see
the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34),
remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he
said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to
utter" (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore it must be said that certain
similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the
same way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain
similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.
On the contrary, A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one
likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.
Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own
essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or
ideas.
I answer that, Those who see the divine essence see what they see in
God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to
their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is
in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things
which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the
cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two
ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is
directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in
itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles
the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in
itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man in
himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image.
Hence to know
things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in
themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their
similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a
difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to
the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of
God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other similitudes but by
the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God
Himself is seen.
Reply to Objection 1: The created intellect of one who sees God is
assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the
Divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.
Reply to Objection 2: Some of the cognitive faculties form other images
from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived
images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden
mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and
difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the
similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the
original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God, by
the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the
similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in
Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind
of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived, is
not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.
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Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same
time?
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see
all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the
Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but
only one is understood. " But what is seen in God, is understood; for
God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see
all in Him at the same time.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God
moves the spiritual creature according to time"---i. e. by intelligence
and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God.
Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively;
for time means succession.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not
be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall
see all we know at one glance. "
I answer that, What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but
at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many
things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of
many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many
diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one
body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many
things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same
time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all
at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas if
all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood
simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in God, are not
seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one
essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not
successively.
Reply to Objection 1: We understand one thing only when we understand
by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood
simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and
"rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the
roof.
Reply to Objection 2: As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they
know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all
things simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of
understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God,
they see all at the same time.
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Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence.
For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (Gn. 32:30). But to see
Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We
see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face" (1 Cor.
13:12).
Objection 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to
mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the
Lord" (Num. 12:8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it
is possible to see the essence of God in this life.
Objection 3: Further, that wherein we know all other things, and
whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even
now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If
we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say
is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in
me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our
minds. " He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all things
according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the
duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the
incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind
could not be incommutable. " Therefore even in this life we see God
Himself.
Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24,
25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by
intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things,
not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says (Gen.
ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His
essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.
On the contrary, It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (Ex.
32:20), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be
seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own
nature. "
I answer that, God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being,
except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, as
was said above [58](A[4]), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of
the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this
life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only
what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it
is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature
of material things. For it was shown above ([59]AA[2],9) that the
knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision
of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life
to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more
our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of
receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations
of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events
are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the
soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of
intelligible objects, i. e. to the divine essence.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is
said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are
formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude
representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen God
face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure
representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of
prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as
will later be explained (SS, Q[174]) in treating of the degrees of
prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some
exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.
Reply to Objection 2: As God works miracles in corporeal things, so
also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the
minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to
the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher
of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of
rapture (SS, Q[175]).
Reply to Objection 3: All things are said to be seen in God and all
things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we
know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a
participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and
judge of sensible things in the sun, i. e. , by the sun's light. Hence
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only be
seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As therefore in order to
see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the
sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not
necessary to see the essence of God.
Reply to Objection 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in
the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.
And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our
soul, but by presence, essence and power.
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Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this
life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp
simple form. " But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above
([60]Q[3], A[7] ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
Objection 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason
without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination
of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural
knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both
good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge
of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The
weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless
purified by the justice of faith. " Therefore God cannot be known by
natural reason.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:19), "That which is known of
God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest
in them. "
I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our
natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things.
But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of
God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God
as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole
power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen.
But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be
led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know
of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all
things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the
cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He
is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are
not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because
He superexceeds them all.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to
know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is. "
Reply to Objection 2: God is known by natural knowledge through the
images of His effects.
Reply to Objection 3: As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it
belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason
can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i),
retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said in
prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth. ' For it
can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths," i. e.
by natural reason.
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Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural
reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not
obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.
i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to
Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who
nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred
by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is,"
comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to
us by grace than by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by
natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to
the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that
"it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as
screened round about by the many colored sacred veils. " Therefore we
cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith.
But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in
Ev. ) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of
knowledge. " Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent
knowledge of God by grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His
spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (1 Cor. 2:10),
namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by
natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by
natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible
objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract
from them intelligible conceptions.
Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of
grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the
infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the
human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things
better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears
in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices,
are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism,
the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the
Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (Mat. 3:17).
Reply to Objection 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life
we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to
one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more
excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we
attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which
natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and
One.
Reply to Objection 2: From the images either received from sense in the
natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much
the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the
intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given by
the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine
light.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the
intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this
determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the
believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as
faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which
belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object
by the vision and understanding of first principles.
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THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine
knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For
everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.
Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:
(1) Whether God can be named by us?
(2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him
substantially?
(3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are
all to be taken metaphorically?
(4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?
(5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally
or equivocally?
(6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied
first to God or to creatures?
(7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?
(8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?
(9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?
(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God,
by nature, by participation, and by opinion?
(11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of
God?
(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
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Whether a name can be given to God?
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be
found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the
name of His Son, if thou knowest? " (Prov. 30:4).
Objection 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But
concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do
abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any
perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.
Objection 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with
quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns
the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be
applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time;
moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be
described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing
mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns.
Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 15:3): "The Lord is a man of war,
Almighty is His name. "
I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words
are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident
that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium
of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a
name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown
above ([61]Q[12], AA[11],12) that in this life we cannot see the
essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and
also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be
named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies
Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man"
expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the
definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by
the name is the definition.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why God has no name, or is said to be
above being named, is because His essence is above all that we
understand about God, and signify in word.
Reply to Objection 2: Because we know and name God from creatures, the
names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures,
of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of
this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their
form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a
thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a
complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to
compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a
thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for
instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God
is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to
signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and
perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode
of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as
He is.
Reply to Objection 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify
the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists.
Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify
His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God
signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which
signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all
time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by
way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple
eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a
natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative
pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, not what
is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him.
Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are
applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative pronouns.
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Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially.
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God
signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or
expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or
operation. "
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a
chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly
and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God. "
Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are
distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what
expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence.
Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand
it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance.
of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the
mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result
that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the knower. Now
the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being
only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But others are
subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are
not their own existence, but receive it; and these are the incorporeal
beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own
subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we
know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form of
certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the
act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in
individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is
another kind of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and
this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect
naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter; not as
they are in such individual matter, but according as they are
abstracted therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it
follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects as
universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic
intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter; but this is
beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its
present life, united as it is to the body. It follows therefore that to
know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone;
and this is beyond the natural power of any created intellect; for no
creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is
participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of
God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect,
as an object made intelligible to it.
Reply to Objection 1: This mode of knowing God is natural to an
angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel
himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the
essence of God, as was shown above [55](A[2]). Hence it does not follow
that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.
Reply to Objection 2: The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect
be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it
ought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense
every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it
does not possess the excellence which is in God.
Reply to Objection 3: The sense of sight, as being altogether material,
cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic
intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature,
can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The
proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows
concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one
particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to consider
abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things
which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite
into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by
itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it
naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to
separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that the thing
itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the
created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete
form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of
resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate
subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.
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Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the
essence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any
created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself
lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to
be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is
intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created
light.
Objection 2: Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen
in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a
medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.
Objection 3: Further, what is created can be natural to some creature.
Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, such
a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that
creature would not need any other light to see God; which is
impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should
require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God.
On the contrary, It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" (Ps.
35:10).
I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its
nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for
example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by
some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees
the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible
form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural
disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be
raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural
power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the
essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary
that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now
this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of
the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the
name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the
Apocalypse (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God hath enlightened it"---viz.
the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are
made "deiform"---i. e. like to God, according to the saying: "When He
shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg. : 'because'] we shall
see Him as He is" (1 Jn. 3:2).
Reply to Objection 1: The created light is necessary to see the essence
of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is
of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to
understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even
so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as
it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible of color.
Reply to Objection 2: This light is required to see the divine essence,
not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the
intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that
this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but
as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the
immediate vision of God.
Reply to Objection 3: The disposition to the form of fire can be
natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory
cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine
nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is
made deiform, as is said in this article.
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Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than
another?
Objection 1: It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one
does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (1 Jn.
3:2): "We shall see Him as He is. " But He is only in one way. Therefore
He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be
seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii):
"One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than
another. " But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine
essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was
shown above (A[3] ). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one
does not see more clearly than another.
Objection 3: Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another
can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on
the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it
may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the
seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude;
but this does not apply to the present question, for God is present to
the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude, but by His essence.
It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this
happens according to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it
follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see
Him the more clearly; and this is incongruous; since equality with
angels is promised to men as their beatitude.
On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according
to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only
true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in
eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by
the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" (1 Cor. 15:41).
I answer that, Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more
perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had
a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will
not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because one
intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another.
The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created
intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which
establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from
what is said above, in the preceding article.
Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God
the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the
light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater
charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes
the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence
he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and
will be the more beatified.
Reply to Objection 1: In the words,"We shall see Him as He is," the
conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the
object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is,
because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does
not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if
the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is
the perfect mode of God's existence.
Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said
that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better
than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing
understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is,
does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of
understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the
understanding of another.
Reply to Objection 3: The diversity of seeing will not arise on the
part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to
all---viz. the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse
participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will
arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed,
the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.
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Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend
God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "But I follow after, if I may
by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']. " But the Apostle did not
follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): "I . . . so run, not as at
an uncertainty. " Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others
also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: "So run that you may
comprehend. "
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That
is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is
hidden from the seer. " But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen
whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple.
Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.
Objection 3: Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not
"wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either to the
mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the
essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is
considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees
Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect
will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore all who see
the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.
On the contrary, It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful,
the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible
in thought" (Jer. 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.
I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend
God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great
beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim. , Serm. xxxvii).
In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is
perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as
it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific
demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof,
it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific
demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right
angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a
probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be
said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that
perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no
created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of
the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus
appears---Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God,
whose being is infinite, as was shown above [56](Q[7]) is infinitely
knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the
created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in
proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since
therefore the created light of glory received into any created
intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created
intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible
that it should comprehend God.
Reply to Objection 1: "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is
taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the
one comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by
intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot
be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain
Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this sense we now
take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension" is taken more
largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is
said to comprehend him when he attains to him. And in this sense God is
comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I
will not let him go" (Cant 3:4); in this sense also are to be
understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension.
And in this way "comprehension" is one of the three prerogatives of the
soul, responding to hope, as vision responds to faith, and fruition
responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is
held or possessed, forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar
off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we
always enjoy what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in
them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so
as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things
in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as
present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they
enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire.
Reply to Objection 2: God is called incomprehensible not because
anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as
He is capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is
known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it
is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition;
but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known.
Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the whole is
comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden
from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or
traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely
surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.
Reply to Objection 3: The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object;
not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the
mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he
who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is
infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend
to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person
can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable,
although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.
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Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all
things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see,
who see Him Who sees all things? " But God sees all things. Therefore
those who see God see all things.
Objection 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in
the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in
a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees
God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.
Objection 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand
the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or can
do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can
understand all that God does, or can do.
Objection 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know
all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, its
natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not
be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows
all things.
On the contrary, The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know
all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the inferior
angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels. " Also they
are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret thoughts; for
this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the
essence of God, does not know all things.
I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence,
does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that
things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in
God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things
are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that
the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen
in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one
demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of
many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he
needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can
know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in
the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created
intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above [57](A[7]).
Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does
or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God
does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it
sees God.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks as regards the object being
sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows
forth all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows
all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror
should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the
mirror itself.
Reply to Objection 3: Although it is more to see God than to see all
things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things
are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things,
but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in
this article that the more things are known in God according as He is
seen more or less perfectly.
Reply to Objection 4: The natural desire of the rational creature is to
know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect,
namely, the species and the genera of things and their types, and these
everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know other
singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the
perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out
to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things that
exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone
were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all
truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing
else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified.
Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all
these" (i. e. all creatures) "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso
knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee
and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone. "
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Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen
through any similitude?
Objection 1: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the
Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of
knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object
known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible,
and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is
informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude of
color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine essence
understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their
similitudes.
Objection 2: Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul,
seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see
the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34),
remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he
said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to
utter" (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore it must be said that certain
similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the
same way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain
similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.
On the contrary, A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one
likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.
Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own
essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or
ideas.
I answer that, Those who see the divine essence see what they see in
God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to
their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is
in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things
which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the
cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two
ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is
directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in
itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles
the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in
itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man in
himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image.
Hence to know
things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in
themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their
similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a
difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to
the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of
God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other similitudes but by
the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God
Himself is seen.
Reply to Objection 1: The created intellect of one who sees God is
assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the
Divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.
Reply to Objection 2: Some of the cognitive faculties form other images
from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived
images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden
mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and
difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the
similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the
original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God, by
the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the
similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in
Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind
of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived, is
not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.
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Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same
time?
Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see
all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the
Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but
only one is understood. " But what is seen in God, is understood; for
God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see
all in Him at the same time.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God
moves the spiritual creature according to time"---i. e. by intelligence
and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God.
Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively;
for time means succession.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not
be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall
see all we know at one glance. "
I answer that, What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but
at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many
things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of
many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many
diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one
body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many
things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same
time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all
at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas if
all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood
simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in God, are not
seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one
essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not
successively.
Reply to Objection 1: We understand one thing only when we understand
by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood
simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and
"rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the
roof.
Reply to Objection 2: As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they
know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all
things simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of
understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God,
they see all at the same time.
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Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence.
For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (Gn. 32:30). But to see
Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We
see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face" (1 Cor.
13:12).
Objection 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to
mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the
Lord" (Num. 12:8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it
is possible to see the essence of God in this life.
Objection 3: Further, that wherein we know all other things, and
whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even
now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If
we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say
is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in
me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our
minds. " He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all things
according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the
duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the
incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind
could not be incommutable. " Therefore even in this life we see God
Himself.
Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24,
25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by
intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things,
not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says (Gen.
ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His
essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.
On the contrary, It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (Ex.
32:20), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be
seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own
nature. "
I answer that, God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being,
except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, as
was said above [58](A[4]), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of
the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this
life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only
what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it
is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature
of material things. For it was shown above ([59]AA[2],9) that the
knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision
of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life
to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more
our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of
receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations
of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events
are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the
soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of
intelligible objects, i. e. to the divine essence.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is
said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are
formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude
representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen God
face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure
representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of
prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as
will later be explained (SS, Q[174]) in treating of the degrees of
prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some
exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.
Reply to Objection 2: As God works miracles in corporeal things, so
also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the
minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to
the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher
of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of
rapture (SS, Q[175]).
Reply to Objection 3: All things are said to be seen in God and all
things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we
know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a
participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and
judge of sensible things in the sun, i. e. , by the sun's light. Hence
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only be
seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As therefore in order to
see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the
sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not
necessary to see the essence of God.
Reply to Objection 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in
the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.
And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our
soul, but by presence, essence and power.
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Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this
life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp
simple form. " But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above
([60]Q[3], A[7] ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
Objection 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason
without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination
of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural
knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both
good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge
of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The
weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless
purified by the justice of faith. " Therefore God cannot be known by
natural reason.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:19), "That which is known of
God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest
in them. "
I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our
natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things.
But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of
God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God
as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole
power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen.
But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be
led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know
of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all
things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the
cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He
is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are
not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because
He superexceeds them all.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to
know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is. "
Reply to Objection 2: God is known by natural knowledge through the
images of His effects.
Reply to Objection 3: As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it
belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason
can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i),
retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said in
prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth. ' For it
can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths," i. e.
by natural reason.
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Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural
reason?
Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not
obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.
i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to
Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who
nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred
by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is,"
comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to
us by grace than by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by
natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to
the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that
"it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as
screened round about by the many colored sacred veils. " Therefore we
cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith.
But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in
Ev. ) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of
knowledge. " Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent
knowledge of God by grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His
spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (1 Cor. 2:10),
namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by
natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by
natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible
objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract
from them intelligible conceptions.
Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of
grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the
infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the
human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things
better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears
in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices,
are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism,
the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the
Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (Mat. 3:17).
Reply to Objection 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life
we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to
one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more
excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we
attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which
natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and
One.
Reply to Objection 2: From the images either received from sense in the
natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much
the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the
intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given by
the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine
light.
Reply to Objection 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the
intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this
determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the
believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as
faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which
belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object
by the vision and understanding of first principles.
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THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)
After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine
knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For
everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.
Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:
(1) Whether God can be named by us?
(2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him
substantially?
(3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are
all to be taken metaphorically?
(4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?
(5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally
or equivocally?
(6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied
first to God or to creatures?
(7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?
(8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?
(9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?
(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God,
by nature, by participation, and by opinion?
(11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of
God?
(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
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Whether a name can be given to God?
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be
found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the
name of His Son, if thou knowest? " (Prov. 30:4).
Objection 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But
concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do
abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any
perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.
Objection 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with
quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns
the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be
applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time;
moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be
described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing
mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns.
Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 15:3): "The Lord is a man of war,
Almighty is His name. "
I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words
are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident
that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium
of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a
name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown
above ([61]Q[12], AA[11],12) that in this life we cannot see the
essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and
also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be
named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies
Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man"
expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the
definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by
the name is the definition.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why God has no name, or is said to be
above being named, is because His essence is above all that we
understand about God, and signify in word.
Reply to Objection 2: Because we know and name God from creatures, the
names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures,
of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of
this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their
form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a
thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a
complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to
compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a
thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for
instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God
is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to
signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and
perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode
of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as
He is.
Reply to Objection 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify
the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists.
Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify
His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God
signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which
signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all
time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by
way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple
eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a
natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative
pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, not what
is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him.
Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are
applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative pronouns.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?
Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially.
For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God
signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or
expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or
operation. "
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a
chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly
and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God. "
Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are
distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what
expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence.
Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand
it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance.
