Therefore
it
does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their
pertaining to the Divine worship.
does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their
pertaining to the Divine worship.
Summa Theologica
9:7): "Not with sadness or necessity: for God
loveth a cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do
gladly; and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully,
it is done in thee, not by thee. " Therefore the mode of virtue falls
under the precept of the law.
On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has
the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8).
Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished.
Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue, would
deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the
intention of the law, which aims at leading man to virtue, by
habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of virtue does not
fall under the precept.
I answer that, As stated above ([2093]Q[90], A[3], ad 2), a precept of
law has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law
is brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law. Now
the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9,
because that properly falls under the precept of the law, for which the
penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are
differently situated as to the appointment of penalties; since the
penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under
the judgment of the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with
the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law, is competent to
judge only of outward acts; because "man seeth those things that
appear," according to 1 Kings 16:7: while God alone, the framer of the
Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills,
according to Ps. 7:10: "The searcher of hearts and reins is God. "
Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some
sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect it is
regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way,
it is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the mode
of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic.
ii. The first is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject
to the judgment of both Divine and human law; because what a man does
in ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and
Divine law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be
punishable or pardonable.
The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i. e. "from
choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake"; wherein a
twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention,
about which we have spoken above (QQ[8], 12): and concerning these two,
Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human
law does not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas
the Divine law does, according to Mat. 5:22: "Whosoever is angry with
his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment. "
The third point is that he should "act from a firm and immovable
principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies
that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode
of virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of human
law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the
law, who gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of
filial piety.
Reply to Objection 1: The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls
under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but
not that they be done from the habit of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His
aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of
the law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear
on the matter itself of the precept: and this is something leading or
disposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept
and the matter of the precept are not the same: just as neither in
other things is the end the same as that which conduces to the end.
Reply to Objection 3: That works of virtue should be done without
sadness, falls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works
with sadness works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i. e.
joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in
so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbor
(which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure: and in
another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as pleasure
ensues from a habit; for "pleasure taken in a work proves the existence
of a habit," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. For an act may give pleasure
either on account of its end, or through its proceeding from a becoming
habit.
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Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the
precept of the Divine law. For it is written (Mat. 19:17): "If thou
wilt enter into life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to follow
that the observance of the commandments suffices for entrance into
life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they
be done from charity: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my
body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. "
Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment.
Objection 2: Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in
doing all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the glory of God. " Therefore
the mode of charity falls under the precept.
Objection 3: Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the
precept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without
having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done
without grace, which is always united to charity. Therefore one can
fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of
Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii). Therefore the
mode of charity is included in the commandment.
On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If
therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that
whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has
not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows
that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does,
however good this may be in itself: which is absurd.
I answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some
have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept;
and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this
precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity from God.
Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins
mortally whenever he does something good of its kind: because it is an
affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and is binding
not for all time, but only for such time as one is in a state of
charity. On the other hand, some have said that the mode of charity is
altogether outside the precept.
Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of
charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an act by itself: and
thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes
it, viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor. " In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not
impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity;
since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he possesses
it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as
being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, i. e. inasmuch as the
acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is "the end of
the commandment," as stated in 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above
([2094]Q[12], A[4]) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of
the act ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true
in saying that the mode of charity does not fall under the precept,
that is to say that this commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean
that a man must honor his father from charity, but merely that he must
honor him. Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity,
does not break this precept: although he does break the precept
concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be
punished.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into
life, keep one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among
which is included the commandment concerning the love of God and our
neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept of charity contains the injunction
that God should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all
things would be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the
precept of charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore
he that honors his father and mother, is bound to honor them from
charity, not in virtue of the precept, "Honor thy father and mother,"
but in virtue of the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with
thy whole heart. " And since these are two affirmative precepts, not
binding for all times, they can be binding, each one at a different
time: so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honoring
his father and mother, without at the same time breaking the precept
concerning the omission of the mode of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law,
unless he fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without
charity. Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for
man to fulfil the law without grace.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides
the decalogue?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral
precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord
declared (Mat. 22:40), "on these two commandments" of charity
"dependeth the whole law and the prophets. " But these two commandments
are explained by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there
is no need for other moral precepts.
Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial
and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[99], AA[3],4). But the
determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and
ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts are contained in
the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated
above [2095](A[3]). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral
precepts besides the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the
virtues, as stated above [2096](A[2]). Therefore, as the Law contains,
besides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion,
liberality, mercy, and chastity; so there should have been added some
precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude,
sobriety, and so forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore
unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law besides those
of the decalogue.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:8): "The law of the Lord is
unspotted, converting souls. " But man is preserved from the stain of
sin, and his soul is converted to God by other moral precepts besides
those of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include
other moral precepts.
I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated (Q[99],
AA[3],4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from
their institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed
of no consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the
moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural
reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these there
are three grades: for some are most certain, and so evident as to need
no promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our
neighbor, and others like these, as stated above [2097](A[3]), which
are, as it were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can
have an erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts are more detailed,
the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet
they need to be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few
instances, happens to be led astray concerning them: these are the
precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of
which is not so evident to everyone, but only the wise; these are moral
precepts added to the decalogue, and given to the people by God through
Moses and Aaron.
But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we
know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to
the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so
many corollaries. Thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids
the worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts
forbidding things relating to worship of idols: thus it is written (Dt.
18:10,11): "Neither let there be found among you anyone that shall
expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . .
. neither let there by any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that
consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the
truth from the dead. " The second commandment forbids perjury. To this
is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15, seqq) and the
prohibition of false doctrine (Dt. 13). To the third commandment are
added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth commandment
prescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about
honoring the aged, according to Lev. 19:32: "Rise up before the hoary
head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and likewise all the
precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed towards our betters,
or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth
commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of hatred
and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according to
Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor":
likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother (Lev. 19:17):
"Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart. " To the sixth
commandment which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition about
whoredom, according to Dt. 23:17: "There shall be no whore among the
daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel"; and the
prohibition against unnatural sins, according to Lev. 28:22,23: "Thou
shalt not lie with mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any
beast. " To the seventh commandment which prohibits theft, is added the
precept forbidding usury, according to Dt. 23:19: "Thou shalt not lend
to thy brother money to usury"; and the prohibition against fraud,
according to Dt. 25:13: "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy
bag"; and universally all prohibitions relating to peculations and
larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony, is
added the prohibition against false judgment, according to Ex. 23:2:
"Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of the most part,
to stray from the truth"; and the prohibition against lying (Ex. 23:7):
"Thou shalt fly lying," and the prohibition against detraction,
according to Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor a
whisperer among the people. " To the other two commandments no further
precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all kinds of evil
desires.
Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the
love of God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty
towards them; but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining
thereto less evidently.
Reply to Objection 2: It is in virtue of their institution that the
ceremonial and judicial precepts "are determinations of the precepts of
the decalogue," not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of
the superadded moral precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of a law are ordained for the common
good, as stated above ([2098]Q[90], A[2]). And since those virtues
which direct our conduct towards others pertain directly to the common
good, as also does the virtue of chastity, in so far as the generative
act conduces to the common good of the species; hence precepts bearing
directly on these virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in
addition thereto. As to the act of fortitude there are the order to be
given by the commanders in the war, which is undertaken for the common
good: as is clear from Dt. 20:3, where the priest is commanded (to
speak thus): "Be not afraid, do not give back. " In like manner the
prohibition of acts of gluttony is left to paternal admonition, since
it is contrary to the good of the household; hence it is said (Dt.
21:20) in the person of parents: "He slighteth hearing our admonitions,
he giveth himself to revelling, and to debauchery and banquetings. "
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Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law
justified man. Because the Apostle says (Rom. 2:13): "For not the
hearers of the Law are justified before God, but the doers of the Law
shall be justified. " But the doers of the Law are those who fulfil the
precepts of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the
Law was a cause of justification.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 18:5): "Keep My laws and My
judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them. " But the spiritual
life of man is through justice. Therefore the fulfilling of the
precepts of the Law was a cause of justification.
Objection 3: Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human
law. But human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice
consisting in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts of
the Law justified man.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): "The letter killeth":
which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv), refers even to
the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts did not cause justice.
I answer that, Just as "healthy" is said properly and first of that
which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign
or a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly the
causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly, as it were, it
may denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be
taken in the last two ways, it is evident that it was conferred by the
precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed men to the
justifying grace of Christ, which they also signified, because as
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 24), "even the life of that people
foretold and foreshadowed Christ. "
But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must
notice that it can be considered as in the habit or as in the act: so
that accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First,
according as man is made just, by becoming possessed of the habit of
justice: secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in
this sense justification is nothing else than the execution of justice.
Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or
the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated ([2099]Q[63],
A[4]). The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue
is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter is true justice,
of which we are speaking now, and in this respect of which a man is
said to be just before God, according to Rom. 4:2: "If Abraham were
justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God. "
Hence this justice could not be caused by moral precepts, which are
about human actions: wherefore the moral precepts could not justify man
by causing justice.
If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution of
justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified man, but in various
ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole contained
something just in itself, in so far as they aimed at offering worship
to God; whereas taken individually they contained that which is just,
not in itself, but by being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it
is said of these precepts that they did not justify man save through
the devotion and obedience of those who complied with them. On the
other hand the moral and judicial precepts, either in general or also
in particular, contained that which is just in itself: but the moral
precepts contained that which is just in itself according to that
"general justice" which is "every virtue" according to Ethic. v, 1:
whereas the judicial precepts belonged to "special justice," which is
about contracts connected with the human mode of life, between one man
and another.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle takes justification for the execution
of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is
said to live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death,
which the Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle
quotes this passage (Gal. 3:12).
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of human law justify man by acquired
justice: it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only about
that justice which is before God.
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OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must
consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, their
duration. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts;
(2) Whether they are figurative?
(3) Whether there should have been many of them?
(4) Of their various kinds.
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Whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts consists in their pertaining
to the worship of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts
does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God. Because, in
the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from
food (Lev. 11); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes,
e. g. (Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two
sorts"; and again (Num. 15:38): "To make to themselves fringes in the
corners of their garments. " But these are not moral precepts; since
they do not remain in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts;
since they do not pertain to the pronouncing of judgment between man
and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no
way to pertain to the worship of God. Therefore the nature of the
ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to Divine
worship.
Objection 2: Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those
which pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from the
"cerei" [candles] which are lit up on those occasions. But many other
things besides solemnities pertain to the worship of God.
Therefore it
does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their
pertaining to the Divine worship.
Objection 3: Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are
patterns, i. e. rules, of salvation: because the Greek {chaire} is the
same as the Latin "salve. " But all the precepts of the Law are rules of
salvation, and not only those that pertain to the worship of God.
Therefore not only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are
called ceremonial.
Objection 4: Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii) that the
ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason. But
there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of
God; such as the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the Passover
and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is
set down in the Law. Therefore the ceremonial precepts are not those
which pertain to the worship of God.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 18:19,20): "Be thou to the people
in those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the people the
ceremonies and the manner of worshipping. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2100]Q[99], A[4]), the ceremonial
precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is
directed to God, just as the judicial precepts are determinations of
the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is
directed to God by the worship due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are
properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship. The
reason for their being so called was given above ([2101]Q[99], A[3]),
when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the
other precepts.
Reply to Objection 1: The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices
and the like, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also
those things whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him:
thus too in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes
under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts
of the Law which regard the clothing and food of God's worshippers, and
other such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of the ministers,
with the view of fitting them for the Divine worship: just as those who
administer to a king make use of certain special observances.
Consequently such are contained under the ceremonial precepts.
Reply to Objection 2: The alleged explanation of the name does not seem
very probable: especially as the Law does not contain many instances of
the lighting of candles in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the
Candlestick were furnished with "oil of olives," as stated in Lev.
24:2. Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the Divine
worship were more carefully observed on solemn festivals: so that all
ceremonial precepts may be included under the observance of
solemnities.
Reply to Objection 3: Neither does this explanation of the name appear
to be very much to the point, since the word "ceremony" is not Greek
but Latin. We may say, however, that, since man's salvation is from
God, those precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation, which
direct man to God: and accordingly those which refer to Divine worship
are called ceremonial precepts.
Reply to Objection 4: This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a
certain amount of probability: not that they are called ceremonial
precisely because there is no evident reason for them; this is a kind
of consequence. For, since the precepts referring to the Divine worship
must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on [2102](A[2]),
the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident.
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Whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not
figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in
such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr.
Christ. iv, 4,10) and this seems very necessary in the framing of a
law: because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for which
reason a law should be manifest, as Isidore declares (Etym. v, 21). If
therefore the precepts of the Law were given as figures of something,
it seems unbecoming that Moses should have delivered these precepts
without explaining what they signified.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should
be entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions in
representation of others, seems to savor of the theatre or of the
drama: because formerly the actions performed in theatres were done to
represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things
should not be done for the worship of God. But the ceremonial precepts
are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated above [2103](A[1]).
Therefore they should not be figurative.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, iv) that "God is
worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity. " But the precepts of
faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial
precepts should not be figurative.
Objection 4: Further, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and
they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth. " But a
figure is not the very truth: in fact one is condivided with the other.
Therefore the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship,
should not be figurative.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17): "Let no man . . .
judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of
the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to
come. "
I answer that, As stated above [2104](A[1]; Q[99], AA[3],4), the
ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now
the Divine worship is twofold: internal, and external. For since man is
composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the
worship of God; the soul by an interior worship; the body by an outward
worship: hence it is written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God. " And as the body is ordained to God through
the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the internal worship.
Now interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the
intellect and affections. Wherefore according to the various ways in
which the intellect and affections of the man who worships God are
rightly united to God, his external actions are applied in various ways
to the Divine worship.
For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will gaze on the
Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external worship will not consist
in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding
from the inward knowledge and affection, according to Is. 51:3: "Joy
and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of
praise. "
But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine
Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light to shine upon us
under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states (Coel.
Hier. i); in various ways, however, according to the various states of
human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine Truth
manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that manifestation as
yet opened out, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9:8). Hence the external
worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future
truth to be manifested in our heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who
is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation. But under the New
Law this way is already revealed: and therefore it needs no longer to
be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds as
something past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is
not yet revealed, alone needs to be foreshadowed. This is what the
Apostle says (Heb. 11:1): "The Law has [Vulg. : 'having'] a shadow of
the good things to come, not the very image of the things": for a
shadow is less than an image; so that the image belongs to the New Law,
but the shadow to the Old.
Reply to Objection 1: The things of God are not to be revealed to man
except in proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of
downfall, were he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more
beneficial that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured
people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at least
implicitly by using those figures to the honor of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical
expressions on account of their being lacking in truth, so does it fail
to grasp Divine things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of the
truth they contain: and therefore in both cases there is need of signs
by means of sensible figures.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking there of internal worship;
to which, however, external worship should be ordained, as stated
above.
The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: because men were
taught by Him to practice more perfectly the spiritual worship of God.
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Whether there should have been man ceremonial precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been many
ceremonial precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should be
proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above
([2105]AA[1],2), are ordained to the worship of God, and to the
foreshadowing of Christ. Now "there is but one God, of Whom are all
things . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things" (1 Cor.
8:6). Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.
Objection 2: Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was
an occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter (Acts
15:10): "Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the
disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear? "
Now the transgression of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man's
salvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce to man's
salvation, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3), it seems that the ceremonial
precepts should not have been given in great number.
Objection 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward
and bodily worship of God, as stated above [2106](A[2]). But the Law
should have lessened this bodily worship: since it directed men to
Christ, Who taught them to worship God "in spirit and in truth," as
stated in Jn. 4:23. Therefore there should not have been many
ceremonial precepts.
On the contrary, (Osee 8:12): "I shall write to them [Vulg. : 'him'] My
manifold laws"; and (Job 11:6): "That He might show thee the secrets of
His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2107]Q[96], A[1]), every law is given
to a people. Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to
evil, who have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as stated
above ([2108]Q[95], A[1]); some, inclined to good, either from nature
or from custom, or rather from grace; and the like have to be taught
and improved by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, with
regard to both kinds of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds
of men it was expedient that the Old Law should contain many ceremonial
precepts. For in that people there were many prone to idolatry;
wherefore it was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial
precepts from the worship of idols to the worship of God. And since men
served idols in many ways, it was necessary on the other hand to devise
many means of repressing every single one: and again, to lay many
obligations on such like men, in order that being burdened, as it were,
by their duties to the Divine worship, they might have no time for the
service of idols. As to those who were inclined to good, it was again
necessary that there should be many ceremonial precepts; both because
thus their mind turned to God in many ways, and more continually; and
because the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed by these
ceremonial precepts, brought many boons to the world, and afforded men
many considerations, which needed to be signified by various
ceremonies.
Reply to Objection 1: When that which conduces to an end is sufficient
to conduce thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end: thus one
remedy, if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to
health, and then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when that
which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be
multiplied: thus many remedies are given to a sick man, when one is not
enough to heal him. Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak and
imperfect, both for representing the mystery of Christ, on account of
its surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men's minds to God.
Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18,19): "There is a setting aside of the
former commandment because of the weakness and unprofitableness
thereof, for the law brought nothing to perfection. " Consequently these
ceremonies needed to be in great number.
Reply to Objection 2: A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser
transgressions, that the greater may be avoided. And therefore, in
order to avoid the sin of idolatry, and the pride which would arise in
the hearts of the Jews, were they to fulfil all the precepts of the
Law, the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of
disobedience did not prevent God from giving them many ceremonial
precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways.
Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any
person. Many such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily
worship; as Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. iii).
Nevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God so
much as to allow men to fall away into the worship of idols.
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Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law are suitably divided into sacrifices,
sacred things, sacraments, and observances?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are
unsuitably divided into "sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and
observances. " For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ.
But this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the
sacrifice in which Christ "delivered Himself an oblation and a
sacrifice to God" (Eph. 5:2). Therefore none but the sacrifices were
ceremonies.
Objection 2: Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the
New Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in the
Old Law there should be no distinction between "sacrifices" and
"sacraments. "
Objection 3: Further, a "sacred thing" is something dedicated to God:
in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be
consecrated. But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the
worship of God, as stated above [2109](A[1]). Therefore all ceremonies
were sacred things. Therefore "sacred things" should not be taken as a
part of the ceremonies.
Objection 4: Further, "observances" are so called from having to be
observed. But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed: for it is
written (Dt. 8:11): "Observe [Douay: 'Take heed'] and beware lest at
any time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments and
judgments and ceremonies. " Therefore the "observances" should not be
considered as a part of the ceremonies.
Objection 5: Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the
ceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to come (Col. 2:16,17):
and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from
the words of the Apostle (Heb. 9:9): and yet these do not seem to be
inclined in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division
of ceremonies is unsuitable.
On the contrary, In the Old Law each of the above is called a ceremony.
For the sacrifices are called ceremonies (Num. 15:24): "They shall
offer a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the
ceremonies require. " Of the sacrament of Order it is written (Lev.
7:35): "This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies. "
Of sacred things also it is written (Ex. 38:21): "These are the
instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony . . . in the ceremonies
of the Levites. " And again of the observances it is written (3 Kings
9:6): "If you . . . shall turn away from following Me, and will not
observe [Douay: 'keep'] My . . . ceremonies which I have set before
you. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2110]AA[1],2), the ceremonial precepts
are ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider
the worship itself, the worshippers, and the instruments of worship.
The worship consists specially in "sacrifices," which are offered up in
honor of God. The instruments of worship refer to the "sacred things,"
such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard to the
worshippers two points may be considered. The first point is their
preparation for Divine worship, which is effected by a sort of
consecration either of the people or of the ministers; and to this the
"sacraments" refer. The second point is their particular mode of life,
whereby they are distinguished from those who do not worship God: and
to this pertain the "observances," for instance, in matters of food,
clothing, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered
both in some certain place and by some certain men: and all this
pertained to the worship of God. Wherefore just as their sacrifices
signified Christ the victim, so too their sacraments and sacred things
of the New Law; while their observances foreshadowed the mode of life
of the people under the New Law: all of which things pertain to Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: The sacrifice of the New Law, viz. the Eucharist,
contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification: for He
sanctified "the people by His own blood" (Heb. 13:12). Hence this
Sacrifice is also a sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did
not contain Christ, but foreshadowed Him; hence they are not called
sacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments
apart from the sacrifices of the Old Law, which sacraments were figures
of the sanctification to come. Nevertheless to certain consecrations
certain sacrifices were united.
Reply to Objection 3: The sacrifices and sacraments were of course
sacred things. But certain things were sacred, through being dedicated
to the Divine worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments:
wherefore they retained the common designation of sacred things.
Reply to Objection 4: Those things which pertained to the mode of life
of the people who worshipped God, retained the common designation of
observances, in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were
not called sacred things, because they had no immediate connection with
the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. But by
a sort of consequence they were matters of ceremony, in so far as they
affected the fitness of the people who worshipped God.
Reply to Objection 5: Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed
place, so were they offered at fixed times: for which reason the solemn
festivals seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. The oblations
and gifts are counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle
says (Heb. 5:1): "Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained
for men in things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and
sacrifices. "
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OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under which
head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?
(2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or
figurative?
(3) The causes of the sacrifices;
(4) The causes of the sacrifices;
(5) The causes of the sacred things;
(6) The causes of the observances.
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Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial
precepts. Because on Eph. 2:15, "Making void the law of the
commandments," the gloss says, (i. e. ) "making void the Old Law as to
the carnal observances, by substituting decrees, i. e. evangelical
precepts, which are based on reason. " But if the observances of the Old
Law were based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by
the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no reason
for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law.
loveth a cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do
gladly; and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully,
it is done in thee, not by thee. " Therefore the mode of virtue falls
under the precept of the law.
On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has
the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8).
Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished.
Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue, would
deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the
intention of the law, which aims at leading man to virtue, by
habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of virtue does not
fall under the precept.
I answer that, As stated above ([2093]Q[90], A[3], ad 2), a precept of
law has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law
is brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law. Now
the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9,
because that properly falls under the precept of the law, for which the
penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are
differently situated as to the appointment of penalties; since the
penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under
the judgment of the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with
the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law, is competent to
judge only of outward acts; because "man seeth those things that
appear," according to 1 Kings 16:7: while God alone, the framer of the
Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills,
according to Ps. 7:10: "The searcher of hearts and reins is God. "
Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some
sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect it is
regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way,
it is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the mode
of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic.
ii. The first is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject
to the judgment of both Divine and human law; because what a man does
in ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and
Divine law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be
punishable or pardonable.
The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i. e. "from
choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake"; wherein a
twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention,
about which we have spoken above (QQ[8], 12): and concerning these two,
Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human
law does not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas
the Divine law does, according to Mat. 5:22: "Whosoever is angry with
his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment. "
The third point is that he should "act from a firm and immovable
principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies
that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode
of virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of human
law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the
law, who gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of
filial piety.
Reply to Objection 1: The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls
under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but
not that they be done from the habit of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His
aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of
the law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear
on the matter itself of the precept: and this is something leading or
disposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept
and the matter of the precept are not the same: just as neither in
other things is the end the same as that which conduces to the end.
Reply to Objection 3: That works of virtue should be done without
sadness, falls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works
with sadness works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i. e.
joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in
so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbor
(which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure: and in
another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as pleasure
ensues from a habit; for "pleasure taken in a work proves the existence
of a habit," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. For an act may give pleasure
either on account of its end, or through its proceeding from a becoming
habit.
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Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the
precept of the Divine law. For it is written (Mat. 19:17): "If thou
wilt enter into life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to follow
that the observance of the commandments suffices for entrance into
life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they
be done from charity: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my
body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. "
Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment.
Objection 2: Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in
doing all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the glory of God. " Therefore
the mode of charity falls under the precept.
Objection 3: Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the
precept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without
having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done
without grace, which is always united to charity. Therefore one can
fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of
Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii). Therefore the
mode of charity is included in the commandment.
On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If
therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that
whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has
not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows
that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does,
however good this may be in itself: which is absurd.
I answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some
have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept;
and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this
precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity from God.
Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins
mortally whenever he does something good of its kind: because it is an
affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and is binding
not for all time, but only for such time as one is in a state of
charity. On the other hand, some have said that the mode of charity is
altogether outside the precept.
Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of
charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an act by itself: and
thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes
it, viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor. " In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not
impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity;
since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he possesses
it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as
being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, i. e. inasmuch as the
acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is "the end of
the commandment," as stated in 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above
([2094]Q[12], A[4]) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of
the act ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true
in saying that the mode of charity does not fall under the precept,
that is to say that this commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean
that a man must honor his father from charity, but merely that he must
honor him. Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity,
does not break this precept: although he does break the precept
concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be
punished.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into
life, keep one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among
which is included the commandment concerning the love of God and our
neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept of charity contains the injunction
that God should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all
things would be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the
precept of charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore
he that honors his father and mother, is bound to honor them from
charity, not in virtue of the precept, "Honor thy father and mother,"
but in virtue of the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with
thy whole heart. " And since these are two affirmative precepts, not
binding for all times, they can be binding, each one at a different
time: so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honoring
his father and mother, without at the same time breaking the precept
concerning the omission of the mode of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law,
unless he fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without
charity. Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for
man to fulfil the law without grace.
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Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides
the decalogue?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral
precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord
declared (Mat. 22:40), "on these two commandments" of charity
"dependeth the whole law and the prophets. " But these two commandments
are explained by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there
is no need for other moral precepts.
Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial
and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[99], AA[3],4). But the
determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and
ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts are contained in
the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated
above [2095](A[3]). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral
precepts besides the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the
virtues, as stated above [2096](A[2]). Therefore, as the Law contains,
besides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion,
liberality, mercy, and chastity; so there should have been added some
precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude,
sobriety, and so forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore
unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law besides those
of the decalogue.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:8): "The law of the Lord is
unspotted, converting souls. " But man is preserved from the stain of
sin, and his soul is converted to God by other moral precepts besides
those of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include
other moral precepts.
I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated (Q[99],
AA[3],4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from
their institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed
of no consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the
moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural
reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these there
are three grades: for some are most certain, and so evident as to need
no promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our
neighbor, and others like these, as stated above [2097](A[3]), which
are, as it were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can
have an erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts are more detailed,
the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet
they need to be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few
instances, happens to be led astray concerning them: these are the
precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of
which is not so evident to everyone, but only the wise; these are moral
precepts added to the decalogue, and given to the people by God through
Moses and Aaron.
But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we
know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to
the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so
many corollaries. Thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids
the worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts
forbidding things relating to worship of idols: thus it is written (Dt.
18:10,11): "Neither let there be found among you anyone that shall
expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . .
. neither let there by any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that
consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the
truth from the dead. " The second commandment forbids perjury. To this
is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15, seqq) and the
prohibition of false doctrine (Dt. 13). To the third commandment are
added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth commandment
prescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about
honoring the aged, according to Lev. 19:32: "Rise up before the hoary
head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and likewise all the
precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed towards our betters,
or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth
commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of hatred
and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according to
Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor":
likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother (Lev. 19:17):
"Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart. " To the sixth
commandment which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition about
whoredom, according to Dt. 23:17: "There shall be no whore among the
daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel"; and the
prohibition against unnatural sins, according to Lev. 28:22,23: "Thou
shalt not lie with mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any
beast. " To the seventh commandment which prohibits theft, is added the
precept forbidding usury, according to Dt. 23:19: "Thou shalt not lend
to thy brother money to usury"; and the prohibition against fraud,
according to Dt. 25:13: "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy
bag"; and universally all prohibitions relating to peculations and
larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony, is
added the prohibition against false judgment, according to Ex. 23:2:
"Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of the most part,
to stray from the truth"; and the prohibition against lying (Ex. 23:7):
"Thou shalt fly lying," and the prohibition against detraction,
according to Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor a
whisperer among the people. " To the other two commandments no further
precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all kinds of evil
desires.
Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the
love of God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty
towards them; but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining
thereto less evidently.
Reply to Objection 2: It is in virtue of their institution that the
ceremonial and judicial precepts "are determinations of the precepts of
the decalogue," not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of
the superadded moral precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of a law are ordained for the common
good, as stated above ([2098]Q[90], A[2]). And since those virtues
which direct our conduct towards others pertain directly to the common
good, as also does the virtue of chastity, in so far as the generative
act conduces to the common good of the species; hence precepts bearing
directly on these virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in
addition thereto. As to the act of fortitude there are the order to be
given by the commanders in the war, which is undertaken for the common
good: as is clear from Dt. 20:3, where the priest is commanded (to
speak thus): "Be not afraid, do not give back. " In like manner the
prohibition of acts of gluttony is left to paternal admonition, since
it is contrary to the good of the household; hence it is said (Dt.
21:20) in the person of parents: "He slighteth hearing our admonitions,
he giveth himself to revelling, and to debauchery and banquetings. "
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Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law
justified man. Because the Apostle says (Rom. 2:13): "For not the
hearers of the Law are justified before God, but the doers of the Law
shall be justified. " But the doers of the Law are those who fulfil the
precepts of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the
Law was a cause of justification.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 18:5): "Keep My laws and My
judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them. " But the spiritual
life of man is through justice. Therefore the fulfilling of the
precepts of the Law was a cause of justification.
Objection 3: Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human
law. But human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice
consisting in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts of
the Law justified man.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): "The letter killeth":
which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv), refers even to
the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts did not cause justice.
I answer that, Just as "healthy" is said properly and first of that
which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign
or a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly the
causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly, as it were, it
may denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be
taken in the last two ways, it is evident that it was conferred by the
precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed men to the
justifying grace of Christ, which they also signified, because as
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 24), "even the life of that people
foretold and foreshadowed Christ. "
But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must
notice that it can be considered as in the habit or as in the act: so
that accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First,
according as man is made just, by becoming possessed of the habit of
justice: secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in
this sense justification is nothing else than the execution of justice.
Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or
the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated ([2099]Q[63],
A[4]). The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue
is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter is true justice,
of which we are speaking now, and in this respect of which a man is
said to be just before God, according to Rom. 4:2: "If Abraham were
justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God. "
Hence this justice could not be caused by moral precepts, which are
about human actions: wherefore the moral precepts could not justify man
by causing justice.
If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution of
justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified man, but in various
ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole contained
something just in itself, in so far as they aimed at offering worship
to God; whereas taken individually they contained that which is just,
not in itself, but by being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it
is said of these precepts that they did not justify man save through
the devotion and obedience of those who complied with them. On the
other hand the moral and judicial precepts, either in general or also
in particular, contained that which is just in itself: but the moral
precepts contained that which is just in itself according to that
"general justice" which is "every virtue" according to Ethic. v, 1:
whereas the judicial precepts belonged to "special justice," which is
about contracts connected with the human mode of life, between one man
and another.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle takes justification for the execution
of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is
said to live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death,
which the Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle
quotes this passage (Gal. 3:12).
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of human law justify man by acquired
justice: it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only about
that justice which is before God.
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OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must
consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, their
duration. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts;
(2) Whether they are figurative?
(3) Whether there should have been many of them?
(4) Of their various kinds.
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Whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts consists in their pertaining
to the worship of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts
does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God. Because, in
the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from
food (Lev. 11); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes,
e. g. (Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two
sorts"; and again (Num. 15:38): "To make to themselves fringes in the
corners of their garments. " But these are not moral precepts; since
they do not remain in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts;
since they do not pertain to the pronouncing of judgment between man
and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no
way to pertain to the worship of God. Therefore the nature of the
ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to Divine
worship.
Objection 2: Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those
which pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from the
"cerei" [candles] which are lit up on those occasions. But many other
things besides solemnities pertain to the worship of God.
Therefore it
does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their
pertaining to the Divine worship.
Objection 3: Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are
patterns, i. e. rules, of salvation: because the Greek {chaire} is the
same as the Latin "salve. " But all the precepts of the Law are rules of
salvation, and not only those that pertain to the worship of God.
Therefore not only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are
called ceremonial.
Objection 4: Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii) that the
ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason. But
there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of
God; such as the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the Passover
and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is
set down in the Law. Therefore the ceremonial precepts are not those
which pertain to the worship of God.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 18:19,20): "Be thou to the people
in those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the people the
ceremonies and the manner of worshipping. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2100]Q[99], A[4]), the ceremonial
precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is
directed to God, just as the judicial precepts are determinations of
the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is
directed to God by the worship due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are
properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship. The
reason for their being so called was given above ([2101]Q[99], A[3]),
when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the
other precepts.
Reply to Objection 1: The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices
and the like, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also
those things whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him:
thus too in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes
under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts
of the Law which regard the clothing and food of God's worshippers, and
other such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of the ministers,
with the view of fitting them for the Divine worship: just as those who
administer to a king make use of certain special observances.
Consequently such are contained under the ceremonial precepts.
Reply to Objection 2: The alleged explanation of the name does not seem
very probable: especially as the Law does not contain many instances of
the lighting of candles in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the
Candlestick were furnished with "oil of olives," as stated in Lev.
24:2. Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the Divine
worship were more carefully observed on solemn festivals: so that all
ceremonial precepts may be included under the observance of
solemnities.
Reply to Objection 3: Neither does this explanation of the name appear
to be very much to the point, since the word "ceremony" is not Greek
but Latin. We may say, however, that, since man's salvation is from
God, those precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation, which
direct man to God: and accordingly those which refer to Divine worship
are called ceremonial precepts.
Reply to Objection 4: This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a
certain amount of probability: not that they are called ceremonial
precisely because there is no evident reason for them; this is a kind
of consequence. For, since the precepts referring to the Divine worship
must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on [2102](A[2]),
the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident.
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Whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not
figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in
such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr.
Christ. iv, 4,10) and this seems very necessary in the framing of a
law: because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for which
reason a law should be manifest, as Isidore declares (Etym. v, 21). If
therefore the precepts of the Law were given as figures of something,
it seems unbecoming that Moses should have delivered these precepts
without explaining what they signified.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should
be entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions in
representation of others, seems to savor of the theatre or of the
drama: because formerly the actions performed in theatres were done to
represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things
should not be done for the worship of God. But the ceremonial precepts
are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated above [2103](A[1]).
Therefore they should not be figurative.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, iv) that "God is
worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity. " But the precepts of
faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial
precepts should not be figurative.
Objection 4: Further, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:24): "God is a spirit, and
they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth. " But a
figure is not the very truth: in fact one is condivided with the other.
Therefore the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship,
should not be figurative.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17): "Let no man . . .
judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of
the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to
come. "
I answer that, As stated above [2104](A[1]; Q[99], AA[3],4), the
ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now
the Divine worship is twofold: internal, and external. For since man is
composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the
worship of God; the soul by an interior worship; the body by an outward
worship: hence it is written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God. " And as the body is ordained to God through
the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the internal worship.
Now interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the
intellect and affections. Wherefore according to the various ways in
which the intellect and affections of the man who worships God are
rightly united to God, his external actions are applied in various ways
to the Divine worship.
For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will gaze on the
Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external worship will not consist
in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding
from the inward knowledge and affection, according to Is. 51:3: "Joy
and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of
praise. "
But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine
Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light to shine upon us
under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states (Coel.
Hier. i); in various ways, however, according to the various states of
human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine Truth
manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that manifestation as
yet opened out, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9:8). Hence the external
worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future
truth to be manifested in our heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who
is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation. But under the New
Law this way is already revealed: and therefore it needs no longer to
be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds as
something past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is
not yet revealed, alone needs to be foreshadowed. This is what the
Apostle says (Heb. 11:1): "The Law has [Vulg. : 'having'] a shadow of
the good things to come, not the very image of the things": for a
shadow is less than an image; so that the image belongs to the New Law,
but the shadow to the Old.
Reply to Objection 1: The things of God are not to be revealed to man
except in proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of
downfall, were he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more
beneficial that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured
people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at least
implicitly by using those figures to the honor of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical
expressions on account of their being lacking in truth, so does it fail
to grasp Divine things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of the
truth they contain: and therefore in both cases there is need of signs
by means of sensible figures.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking there of internal worship;
to which, however, external worship should be ordained, as stated
above.
The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: because men were
taught by Him to practice more perfectly the spiritual worship of God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there should have been man ceremonial precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been many
ceremonial precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should be
proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above
([2105]AA[1],2), are ordained to the worship of God, and to the
foreshadowing of Christ. Now "there is but one God, of Whom are all
things . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things" (1 Cor.
8:6). Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.
Objection 2: Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was
an occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter (Acts
15:10): "Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the
disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear? "
Now the transgression of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man's
salvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce to man's
salvation, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3), it seems that the ceremonial
precepts should not have been given in great number.
Objection 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward
and bodily worship of God, as stated above [2106](A[2]). But the Law
should have lessened this bodily worship: since it directed men to
Christ, Who taught them to worship God "in spirit and in truth," as
stated in Jn. 4:23. Therefore there should not have been many
ceremonial precepts.
On the contrary, (Osee 8:12): "I shall write to them [Vulg. : 'him'] My
manifold laws"; and (Job 11:6): "That He might show thee the secrets of
His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2107]Q[96], A[1]), every law is given
to a people. Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to
evil, who have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as stated
above ([2108]Q[95], A[1]); some, inclined to good, either from nature
or from custom, or rather from grace; and the like have to be taught
and improved by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, with
regard to both kinds of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds
of men it was expedient that the Old Law should contain many ceremonial
precepts. For in that people there were many prone to idolatry;
wherefore it was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial
precepts from the worship of idols to the worship of God. And since men
served idols in many ways, it was necessary on the other hand to devise
many means of repressing every single one: and again, to lay many
obligations on such like men, in order that being burdened, as it were,
by their duties to the Divine worship, they might have no time for the
service of idols. As to those who were inclined to good, it was again
necessary that there should be many ceremonial precepts; both because
thus their mind turned to God in many ways, and more continually; and
because the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed by these
ceremonial precepts, brought many boons to the world, and afforded men
many considerations, which needed to be signified by various
ceremonies.
Reply to Objection 1: When that which conduces to an end is sufficient
to conduce thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end: thus one
remedy, if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to
health, and then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when that
which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be
multiplied: thus many remedies are given to a sick man, when one is not
enough to heal him. Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak and
imperfect, both for representing the mystery of Christ, on account of
its surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men's minds to God.
Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18,19): "There is a setting aside of the
former commandment because of the weakness and unprofitableness
thereof, for the law brought nothing to perfection. " Consequently these
ceremonies needed to be in great number.
Reply to Objection 2: A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser
transgressions, that the greater may be avoided. And therefore, in
order to avoid the sin of idolatry, and the pride which would arise in
the hearts of the Jews, were they to fulfil all the precepts of the
Law, the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of
disobedience did not prevent God from giving them many ceremonial
precepts.
Reply to Objection 3: The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways.
Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any
person. Many such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily
worship; as Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. iii).
Nevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God so
much as to allow men to fall away into the worship of idols.
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Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law are suitably divided into sacrifices,
sacred things, sacraments, and observances?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are
unsuitably divided into "sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and
observances. " For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ.
But this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the
sacrifice in which Christ "delivered Himself an oblation and a
sacrifice to God" (Eph. 5:2). Therefore none but the sacrifices were
ceremonies.
Objection 2: Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the
New Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in the
Old Law there should be no distinction between "sacrifices" and
"sacraments. "
Objection 3: Further, a "sacred thing" is something dedicated to God:
in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be
consecrated. But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the
worship of God, as stated above [2109](A[1]). Therefore all ceremonies
were sacred things. Therefore "sacred things" should not be taken as a
part of the ceremonies.
Objection 4: Further, "observances" are so called from having to be
observed. But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed: for it is
written (Dt. 8:11): "Observe [Douay: 'Take heed'] and beware lest at
any time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments and
judgments and ceremonies. " Therefore the "observances" should not be
considered as a part of the ceremonies.
Objection 5: Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the
ceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to come (Col. 2:16,17):
and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from
the words of the Apostle (Heb. 9:9): and yet these do not seem to be
inclined in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division
of ceremonies is unsuitable.
On the contrary, In the Old Law each of the above is called a ceremony.
For the sacrifices are called ceremonies (Num. 15:24): "They shall
offer a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the
ceremonies require. " Of the sacrament of Order it is written (Lev.
7:35): "This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies. "
Of sacred things also it is written (Ex. 38:21): "These are the
instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony . . . in the ceremonies
of the Levites. " And again of the observances it is written (3 Kings
9:6): "If you . . . shall turn away from following Me, and will not
observe [Douay: 'keep'] My . . . ceremonies which I have set before
you. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2110]AA[1],2), the ceremonial precepts
are ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider
the worship itself, the worshippers, and the instruments of worship.
The worship consists specially in "sacrifices," which are offered up in
honor of God. The instruments of worship refer to the "sacred things,"
such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard to the
worshippers two points may be considered. The first point is their
preparation for Divine worship, which is effected by a sort of
consecration either of the people or of the ministers; and to this the
"sacraments" refer. The second point is their particular mode of life,
whereby they are distinguished from those who do not worship God: and
to this pertain the "observances," for instance, in matters of food,
clothing, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered
both in some certain place and by some certain men: and all this
pertained to the worship of God. Wherefore just as their sacrifices
signified Christ the victim, so too their sacraments and sacred things
of the New Law; while their observances foreshadowed the mode of life
of the people under the New Law: all of which things pertain to Christ.
Reply to Objection 2: The sacrifice of the New Law, viz. the Eucharist,
contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification: for He
sanctified "the people by His own blood" (Heb. 13:12). Hence this
Sacrifice is also a sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did
not contain Christ, but foreshadowed Him; hence they are not called
sacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments
apart from the sacrifices of the Old Law, which sacraments were figures
of the sanctification to come. Nevertheless to certain consecrations
certain sacrifices were united.
Reply to Objection 3: The sacrifices and sacraments were of course
sacred things. But certain things were sacred, through being dedicated
to the Divine worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments:
wherefore they retained the common designation of sacred things.
Reply to Objection 4: Those things which pertained to the mode of life
of the people who worshipped God, retained the common designation of
observances, in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were
not called sacred things, because they had no immediate connection with
the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. But by
a sort of consequence they were matters of ceremony, in so far as they
affected the fitness of the people who worshipped God.
Reply to Objection 5: Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed
place, so were they offered at fixed times: for which reason the solemn
festivals seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. The oblations
and gifts are counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle
says (Heb. 5:1): "Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained
for men in things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and
sacrifices. "
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OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under which
head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?
(2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or
figurative?
(3) The causes of the sacrifices;
(4) The causes of the sacrifices;
(5) The causes of the sacred things;
(6) The causes of the observances.
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Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial
precepts. Because on Eph. 2:15, "Making void the law of the
commandments," the gloss says, (i. e. ) "making void the Old Law as to
the carnal observances, by substituting decrees, i. e. evangelical
precepts, which are based on reason. " But if the observances of the Old
Law were based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by
the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no reason
for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law.
