Reply to
Objection
1: The true resides in things and in the intellect,
as said before [108](A[1]).
as said before [108](A[1]).
Summa Theologica
As then the world was
not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear
later ([105]Q[46], A[1]), there must exist in the divine mind a form to
the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an
idea consists.
Reply to Objection 1: God does not understand things according to an
idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the
opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in
the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: Although God knows Himself and all else by His
own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things,
except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect
to other things; though not with respect to Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: God is the similitude of all things according to
His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.
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Whether ideas are many?
Objection 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is
His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one
idea.
Objection 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and
operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts
or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according
to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the
contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are
many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of
the eternal.
Objection 4: Further, these relations are either real in creatures
only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not
from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas
are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real
in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the
plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De
Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, except
"ingenerability, generation, and procession. " Ideas therefore are not
many.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas
are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of
things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and
existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine
intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being
nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed
that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so. "
I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In
proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate
end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an
army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good
existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the
Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the
universe is properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result
of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have
taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature
created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of
beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea
of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the
universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must
have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea
of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which
the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a
house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must
needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all
things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each
thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it," from
which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can
easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if
we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as
that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands,
which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the
house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to
the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not
repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many
things; though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were His
understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas
exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved
thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it
according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known
not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by
creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has
its own proper species, according to which it participates in some
degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God
knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He
knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like
manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands
many particular types of things and these are many ideas.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine essence is not called an idea in so
far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or
type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch
as many types are understood through the self-same essence.
Reply to Objection 2: By wisdom and art we signify that by which God
understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one
understands many things, and that not only according to what they are
in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is
to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an
architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form
of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as
devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he
understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house.
Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He
also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And
this means that He understands the several types of things; or that
many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.
Reply to Objection 3: Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are
caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect
comparing its own essence with these things.
Reply to Objection 4: Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in
created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as
those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood
by God.
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Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?
Objection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things
that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would
follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God.
Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
Objection 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be,
nor have been, as has been said above (A[9]). But of such things there
are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the
divine will are the determining and effective types of things. "
Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
Objection 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be
no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
Objection 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only species,
but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of
these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not
ideas in God of all things known by Him.
On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is
clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the
proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of
all things known by Him.
I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the
knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold
office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the
principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and
belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of
knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to
speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect
to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle
of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though
they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows
according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a
speculative manner.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is known by God not through its own type,
but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God,
neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type. "
Reply to Objection 2: God has no practical knowledge, except virtually,
of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with
respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an
"exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type. "
Reply to Objection 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter
as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a
concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by
God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not
apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither
exist, nor be known.
Reply to Objection 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of
species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot
exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents
that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being
along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject,
have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of
the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those
that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or
any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now
individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of
species; both because particular things are individualized by matter,
which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the
idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and
produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved.
However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to
individuals as will be shown later ([106]Q[22], A[3] ).
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OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)
Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of
the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?
(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
(3) On the comparison of the true to being.
(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.
(5) Whether God is truth?
(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?
(7) On the eternity of truth.
(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.
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Whether truth resides only in the intellect?
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect,
but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this
definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would
follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true
stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is
true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to
know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless
someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true
which is. " It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the
intellect.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If,
then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so
far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient
philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so.
Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by
different persons at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is
itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it
is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is
true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore
truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the
false reside not in things, but in the intellect. "
I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which the appetite
tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now
there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any
knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is
in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends
towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good,
is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true,
is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as
that thing is related to the appetite---and hence the aspect of
goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far
as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the
true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object
understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect
to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to
be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing
understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or
accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it
depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by
which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related
essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the
intellect upon which it does not depend.
Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by
what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true
absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it
depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a
being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that
expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words
are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far
as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine
mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to
a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus,
then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in
things according as they are related to the intellect as their
principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth.
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made
manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes
being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is
in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are
related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera
Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a
principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is
rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; for that is right which is
in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph.
viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which
is immutably attached to it. " The definition that "Truth is the
equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things,
and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect;
for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.
Reply to Objection 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of
natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by
chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they
were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our
intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and
which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not
follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation
to the divine intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by
the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there
primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine,
rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its
health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In
the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of
truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or a
word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is
true. "
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Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as
the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so
is the intellect as regards "what a thing is. " Now composition and
division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a
thing is. " Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing.
Objection 2: Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth
is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with
regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard
to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing
as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to
simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the
intellect nor in things. "
I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect,
in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the
form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing,
must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this
being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the
conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is
to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although sight
has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the
comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself
apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity
with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of
a thing "what a thing is. " When, however, it judges that a thing
corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then
first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and
dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes
from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the
predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing,
as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does
not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with
complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or
in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is
true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the
word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known.
Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing
and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what
a thing is. "
And thus the Objections given are solved.
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Whether the true and being are convertible terms?
Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible
terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated
[107](A[1]); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not
convertible.
Objection 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not
convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being;
for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not.
Therefore the true and being are not convertible.
Objection 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of
priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true
appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under
the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the
same disposition of things in being and in truth.
I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is
related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far
is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is
in some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And
therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as
good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation
to the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect,
as said before [108](A[1]). But the true that is in things is
convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the
intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the
manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said
already [109](A[1]). It may, however, be said that being also is in the
things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is
primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in
idea.
Reply to Objection 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be
known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable.
Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of
logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended
except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two
ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended,
unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is
true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended
unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But
the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended
also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the
same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot
be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be
understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly,
being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by
understanding being.
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Whether good is logically prior to the true?
Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For
what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i.
But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind
of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically
prior to the true.
Objection 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect
composing and dividing as said above [110](A[2]). But that which is in
things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is
logically prior to the true.
Objection 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from
Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says
(De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore
the good is prior to the true.
On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the
true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in
mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.
I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with
being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner
the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two
reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than
is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately;
while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some
way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the
fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true
regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be
prior in idea to the good.
Reply to Objection 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one
another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the
intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object
of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and
conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the
universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of
intelligible things the converse of the case. From the fact, then, that
the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the
order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is
prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being
itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly,
it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first,
that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in
things.
Reply to Objection 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth
in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows
himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to
"life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his
life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has
been said that truth exists in other things [111](A[1]). Whereas the
truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his
neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these
particular truths to truth in general.
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Whether God is truth?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the
intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition
and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.
Objection 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig.
xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle. " But in God there is no
likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the
first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all
being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is
truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone
sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.
On the contrary, Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"
(Jn. 14:6).
I answer that, As said above [112](A[1]), truth is found in the
intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things
according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to
the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed
to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act
of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of
every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of
understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but
that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.
Reply to Objection 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither
composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He
judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is
truth in His intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its
conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which
it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their
conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this
cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in
so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if
we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot understand this
unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one
says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another. "
Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the
principle," inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His
intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of
themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all
apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that
exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is
true"---is entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person
fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident.
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Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?
Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which
all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1),
"nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God. " Now truth is
greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of
truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not
according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore
there is no other truth but God.
Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the
relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true
things. " But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore
there is only one truth, by which all things are true.
On the contrary, it is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from
among the children of men. "
I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one,
and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that
when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in
each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each
species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things
analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper
nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is
predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is
only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is
called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is
called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health
is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something
whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have
said [113](A[1]) that truth resides primarily in the intellect; and
secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine
intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the
intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths
in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect,
according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2,
"Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one
man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths
are reflected from the one divine truth. " But if we speak of truth as
it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to
which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus,
although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the
divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to
be true.
Reply to Objection 1: The soul does not judge of things according to
any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it
is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first
principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the
primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth,
which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply,
but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that
nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as
things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether created truth is eternal?
Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says
(De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a
circle, and that two added to three make five. " But the truth of these
is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.
Objection 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals
are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is
truth, which is the most universal.
Objection 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the
present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition
regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition
regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
Objection 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal.
But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their
truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth
was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was
before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an
end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still
be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.
On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before ([114]Q[10],
A[3]).
I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of
the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself:
but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth,
according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account
of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus
urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but from the
health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been
already said that things are called true from the truth of the
intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be
eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone
truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but
God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself,
as shown already [115](A[5]).
Reply to Objection 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and
three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
Reply to Objection 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be
understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of
extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be
everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself
determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be
one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all
distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be
everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place
and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal,
except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.
Reply to Objection 3: That which now is, was future, before it
(actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if
the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But
the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was
always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future
being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.
Reply to Objection 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is
the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal,
but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was
not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the
divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to
say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason
of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason of any
truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and
not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect
apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so
far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.
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Whether truth is immutable?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De
Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals,
otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is. "
Objection 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as
primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after
all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for
after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not.
Therefore truth is immutable.
Objection 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it
changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus
change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain
rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine
mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives
from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it
has the same signification even though he does not sit. Therefore the
truth of the proposition in no way changes.
Objection 4: Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same
effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three
propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat. " Therefore the truth of
each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one.
Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for
the same reason that of any other.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 11:2),"Truths are decayed from
among the children of men. "
I answer that, Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect,
as said before [116](A[1]); but things are called true in virtue of the
truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be
regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which
consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity
may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one
of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the
intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing
which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is
changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change
from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can
be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can
escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect,
as is clear from what has been said before ([117]Q[14], A[15]). Hence
the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our
intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change,
but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus
forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect
is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this
is altogether immutable.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth.
Reply to Objection 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence
just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but
accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or
generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that
no truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was
before.
Reply to Objection 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things
are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that
which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it
said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the
truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the
intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion
changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore
this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting,
both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is
significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it
signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains,
but the second is changed.
Reply to Objection 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of
the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning
when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth
which results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions
concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though
one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains
invariable.
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CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether falsity exists in things?
(2) Whether it exists in the sense?
(3) Whether it exists in the intellect?
(4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.
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Whether falsity exists in things?
Objection 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For
Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will
be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear
to the contrary. "
Objection 2: Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But
things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33), they
show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in
things.
not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear
later ([105]Q[46], A[1]), there must exist in the divine mind a form to
the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an
idea consists.
Reply to Objection 1: God does not understand things according to an
idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the
opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in
the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: Although God knows Himself and all else by His
own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things,
except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect
to other things; though not with respect to Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: God is the similitude of all things according to
His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ideas are many?
Objection 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is
His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one
idea.
Objection 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and
operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts
or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according
to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the
contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are
many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of
the eternal.
Objection 4: Further, these relations are either real in creatures
only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not
from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas
are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real
in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the
plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De
Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, except
"ingenerability, generation, and procession. " Ideas therefore are not
many.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas
are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of
things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and
existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine
intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being
nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed
that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so. "
I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In
proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate
end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an
army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good
existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the
Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the
universe is properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result
of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have
taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature
created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of
beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea
of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the
universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must
have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea
of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which
the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a
house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must
needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all
things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each
thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it," from
which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can
easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if
we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as
that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands,
which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the
house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to
the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not
repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many
things; though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were His
understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas
exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved
thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it
according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known
not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by
creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has
its own proper species, according to which it participates in some
degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God
knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He
knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like
manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands
many particular types of things and these are many ideas.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine essence is not called an idea in so
far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or
type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch
as many types are understood through the self-same essence.
Reply to Objection 2: By wisdom and art we signify that by which God
understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one
understands many things, and that not only according to what they are
in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is
to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an
architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form
of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as
devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he
understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house.
Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He
also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And
this means that He understands the several types of things; or that
many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.
Reply to Objection 3: Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are
caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect
comparing its own essence with these things.
Reply to Objection 4: Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in
created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as
those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood
by God.
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Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?
Objection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things
that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would
follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God.
Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
Objection 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be,
nor have been, as has been said above (A[9]). But of such things there
are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the
divine will are the determining and effective types of things. "
Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
Objection 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be
no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
Objection 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only species,
but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of
these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not
ideas in God of all things known by Him.
On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is
clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the
proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of
all things known by Him.
I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the
knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold
office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the
principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and
belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of
knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to
speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect
to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle
of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though
they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows
according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a
speculative manner.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is known by God not through its own type,
but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God,
neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type. "
Reply to Objection 2: God has no practical knowledge, except virtually,
of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with
respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an
"exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type. "
Reply to Objection 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter
as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a
concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by
God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not
apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither
exist, nor be known.
Reply to Objection 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of
species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot
exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents
that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being
along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject,
have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of
the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those
that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or
any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now
individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of
species; both because particular things are individualized by matter,
which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the
idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and
produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved.
However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to
individuals as will be shown later ([106]Q[22], A[3] ).
__________________________________________________________________
OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)
Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of
the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?
(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
(3) On the comparison of the true to being.
(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.
(5) Whether God is truth?
(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?
(7) On the eternity of truth.
(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.
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Whether truth resides only in the intellect?
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect,
but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this
definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would
follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true
stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is
true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to
know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless
someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true
which is. " It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the
intellect.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If,
then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so
far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient
philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so.
Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by
different persons at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is
itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it
is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is
true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore
truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the
false reside not in things, but in the intellect. "
I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which the appetite
tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now
there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any
knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is
in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends
towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good,
is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true,
is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as
that thing is related to the appetite---and hence the aspect of
goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far
as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the
true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object
understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect
to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to
be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing
understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or
accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it
depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by
which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related
essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the
intellect upon which it does not depend.
Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by
what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true
absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it
depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a
being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that
expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words
are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far
as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine
mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to
a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus,
then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in
things according as they are related to the intellect as their
principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth.
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made
manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes
being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is
in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are
related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera
Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a
principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is
rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; for that is right which is
in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph.
viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which
is immutably attached to it. " The definition that "Truth is the
equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things,
and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect;
for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.
Reply to Objection 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of
natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by
chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they
were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our
intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and
which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not
follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation
to the divine intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by
the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there
primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine,
rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its
health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In
the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of
truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or a
word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is
true. "
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Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as
the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so
is the intellect as regards "what a thing is. " Now composition and
division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a
thing is. " Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing.
Objection 2: Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth
is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with
regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard
to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing
as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to
simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the
intellect nor in things. "
I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect,
in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the
form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing,
must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this
being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the
conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is
to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although sight
has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the
comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself
apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity
with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of
a thing "what a thing is. " When, however, it judges that a thing
corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then
first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and
dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes
from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the
predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing,
as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does
not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with
complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or
in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is
true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the
word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known.
Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing
and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what
a thing is. "
And thus the Objections given are solved.
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Whether the true and being are convertible terms?
Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible
terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated
[107](A[1]); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not
convertible.
Objection 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not
convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being;
for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not.
Therefore the true and being are not convertible.
Objection 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of
priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true
appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under
the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the
same disposition of things in being and in truth.
I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is
related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far
is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is
in some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And
therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as
good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation
to the intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect,
as said before [108](A[1]). But the true that is in things is
convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the
intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the
manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said
already [109](A[1]). It may, however, be said that being also is in the
things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is
primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in
idea.
Reply to Objection 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be
known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable.
Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of
logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended
except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two
ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended,
unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is
true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended
unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But
the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended
also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the
same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot
be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be
understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly,
being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by
understanding being.
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Whether good is logically prior to the true?
Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For
what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i.
But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind
of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically
prior to the true.
Objection 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect
composing and dividing as said above [110](A[2]). But that which is in
things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is
logically prior to the true.
Objection 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from
Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says
(De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore
the good is prior to the true.
On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the
true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in
mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.
I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with
being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner
the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two
reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than
is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately;
while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some
way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the
fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true
regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be
prior in idea to the good.
Reply to Objection 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one
another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the
intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object
of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and
conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the
universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of
intelligible things the converse of the case. From the fact, then, that
the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the
order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is
prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being
itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly,
it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first,
that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in
things.
Reply to Objection 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth
in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows
himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to
"life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his
life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has
been said that truth exists in other things [111](A[1]). Whereas the
truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his
neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these
particular truths to truth in general.
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Whether God is truth?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the
intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition
and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.
Objection 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig.
xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle. " But in God there is no
likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the
first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all
being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is
truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone
sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.
On the contrary, Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"
(Jn. 14:6).
I answer that, As said above [112](A[1]), truth is found in the
intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things
according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to
the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed
to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act
of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of
every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of
understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but
that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.
Reply to Objection 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither
composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He
judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is
truth in His intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its
conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which
it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their
conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this
cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in
so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if
we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot understand this
unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one
says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another. "
Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the
principle," inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His
intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of
themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all
apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that
exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is
true"---is entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person
fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident.
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Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?
Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which
all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1),
"nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God. " Now truth is
greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of
truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not
according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore
there is no other truth but God.
Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the
relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true
things. " But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore
there is only one truth, by which all things are true.
On the contrary, it is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from
among the children of men. "
I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one,
and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that
when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in
each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each
species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things
analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper
nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is
predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is
only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is
called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is
called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health
is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something
whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have
said [113](A[1]) that truth resides primarily in the intellect; and
secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine
intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the
intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths
in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect,
according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2,
"Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one
man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths
are reflected from the one divine truth. " But if we speak of truth as
it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to
which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus,
although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the
divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to
be true.
Reply to Objection 1: The soul does not judge of things according to
any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it
is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first
principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the
primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth,
which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply,
but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that
nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as
things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.
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Whether created truth is eternal?
Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says
(De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a
circle, and that two added to three make five. " But the truth of these
is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.
Objection 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals
are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is
truth, which is the most universal.
Objection 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the
present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition
regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition
regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
Objection 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal.
But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their
truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth
was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was
before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an
end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still
be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.
On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before ([114]Q[10],
A[3]).
I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of
the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself:
but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth,
according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account
of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus
urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but from the
health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been
already said that things are called true from the truth of the
intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be
eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone
truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but
God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself,
as shown already [115](A[5]).
Reply to Objection 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and
three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
Reply to Objection 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be
understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of
extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be
everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself
determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be
one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all
distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be
everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place
and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal,
except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.
Reply to Objection 3: That which now is, was future, before it
(actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if
the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But
the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was
always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future
being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.
Reply to Objection 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is
the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal,
but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was
not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the
divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to
say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason
of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason of any
truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and
not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect
apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so
far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.
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Whether truth is immutable?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De
Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals,
otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is. "
Objection 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as
primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after
all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for
after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not.
Therefore truth is immutable.
Objection 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it
changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus
change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain
rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine
mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives
from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it
has the same signification even though he does not sit. Therefore the
truth of the proposition in no way changes.
Objection 4: Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same
effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three
propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat. " Therefore the truth of
each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one.
Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for
the same reason that of any other.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 11:2),"Truths are decayed from
among the children of men. "
I answer that, Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect,
as said before [116](A[1]); but things are called true in virtue of the
truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be
regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which
consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity
may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one
of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the
intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing
which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is
changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change
from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can
be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can
escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect,
as is clear from what has been said before ([117]Q[14], A[15]). Hence
the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our
intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change,
but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus
forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect
is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this
is altogether immutable.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth.
Reply to Objection 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence
just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but
accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or
generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that
no truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was
before.
Reply to Objection 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things
are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that
which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it
said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the
truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the
intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion
changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore
this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting,
both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is
significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it
signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains,
but the second is changed.
Reply to Objection 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of
the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning
when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth
which results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions
concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though
one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains
invariable.
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CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether falsity exists in things?
(2) Whether it exists in the sense?
(3) Whether it exists in the intellect?
(4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.
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Whether falsity exists in things?
Objection 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For
Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it will
be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear
to the contrary. "
Objection 2: Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But
things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33), they
show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in
things.
