Despite the
warnings
they received of Hyder's preparations, they were
united in a foolish optimism which they did not abandon till they
received the news (23 July) that his horse was already ravaging the
Carnatic.
united in a foolish optimism which they did not abandon till they
received the news (23 July) that his horse was already ravaging the
Carnatic.
Cambridge History of India - v5 - British India
He quickly extended his rule to the
Malabar Coast; but when he turned his attention to the north he
found his way blocked by the Marathas and the Nizam. Meanwhile
his conquests on the Malabar Coast had brought him into contact
with the English factories there. At first the Bombay. Presidency
was in favour of an agreement. It decided to afford Hyder facilities
for building fighting vessels in the Marine Yard at Bombay; and
hoped that Madras would be able to accommodate the disputes sub-
sisting between Hyder and Walajah. Hyder also hoped for advant-
ages from supplies of arms and gunpowder from the English, and
offered his alliance, both parties affording military help to the other
in case of need. This was in 1766, just before Caillaud's treaty with
the Nizam. But by then Hyder's conquest of the petty Nair chiefs
with whom the English were in alliance had on the whole indisposed
the Bombay Government to any formal alliance with its restless
neighbour, though it was at the same time anxious to avoid hostilities
if possible. In the meantime, as has been seen, the Madras Govern-
ment had agreed to assist the Nizam against Hyder as the price of the
cession of the Northern Sarkars, rather than face the probable alter-
native of an alliance between Hyder 'Ali and the Nizam against
Walajah.
1 Caillaud's proceedings on this mission are recorded in two volumes (Mili-
tory Sundries, 31-32) in the Madras Record Office.
? Forrest, Bombay Selections, 11, 123-31
## p. 276 (#304) ############################################
276
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
English hopes rested in the triple alliance of themselves, the
Nizam, and the Marathas. But the Marathas, who were first in the
field, were quickly bought off by, Hyder. The Nizam, accompanied
by a detachment under the command of General Joseph Smith,
invaded Mysore, and advanced within sight of Bangalore. But the
attack was not seriously pressed home; the invaders entered Mysore
on 29 April, 1767, but all the time Mahfuz Khan (brother and rival of
Walajah) remained in the Nizam's camp as Hyder's agent; many
letters passed between the enemies; and a secret understanding was
reached, probably while the Nizam was still before Bangalore. Thus
the English were abandoned by the allies on whose assistance they
had relied, and left by themselves to encounter the full brunt of
Hyder's attack. They had indeed managed matters with a great
want of skill.
The war which followed (August, 1767, to April, 1769) was one
of tactical success and strategic failure in the Carnatic. At Changama
and Tiruvannamalai Smith succeeded in driving Hyder off the field
of battle; and after the severe lessons which he received on those
occasions, Hyder was careful how he ventured within the reach of
the English infantry; but these successes led to nothing. The English
leaders had not at their disposal sufficient bodies of cavalry to keep
the enemy's horse out of the Carnatic. They were further distracted
by personal jealousies between Smith, the senior commander, and
Colonel Wood, the favourite of the council. And they were harassed
by the appointment of "field-deputies” sent by the council to keep
watch over their movements. On 23 February, 1768, the Nizam made
peace with the English in the same irresponsible manner as he had
broken with them; confirming his previous treaty engagements, con-
senting to a limitation of the forces which the English were obliged
to send to him on demand to two battalions and six guns, and ceding
to the Company the diwanni of Mysore when that country should
have been conquered from the enemy. About the same time the
Bombay forces managed to capture the town of Mangalore; but the
place was not defended when Hyder appeared to recover it, and the
peace with the Nizam made little difference to the course of the war.
The Carnatic lay still open to the ravages of the enemy horse, so that
the principal sources of English finance were dried up; and, finally,
when in the month of March, 1769, Hyder appeared before Madras
at the head of a body of cavalry, and when Smith had conspicuously
failed to expel the enemy from the nawab's country, the Madras
Government resolved to make peace. But it had to do so on Hyder's
terms. These were generous enough, but included the burden of a
defensive alliance, so that the Madras Council was still far from free
of the political difficulties in which it had become involved. In the
1 Smith's Narrative, ap. Orme MŚS, - Various, 10; and Cosby's Journal (Brit.
Mus. Add. MSS, 29898).
## p. 277 (#305) ############################################
ENGLISH POLICY
277
1
following year a further treaty was concluded between Hyder and
the Bombay Government, which thereby secured further commercial
privileges,
The general conduct of the war, incompetent as it had been, was
a small evil, compared with the purposeless, undecided policy by
which it was preceded and followed. At this time the interests of
Southern and Western India were closely connected; the Marathas,
the Nizam, Hyder 'Ali, and the English at Bombay and Madras, were
in close and intimate association from which they could not escape.
Moreover, the interests of the three Indian powers were mutually
destructive. The one certain thing about the situation was that an
alliance between any two of them against the third would be only
temporary, and would be dissolved by its own success. In these
circumstances the obvious course for the English was to avoid entan-
glements with any of the parties. But what they did was to ally
themselves first with the Nizam, then with Hyder, and then with a
party of the Marathas, without any clear idea of the responsibilities
to which they were pledging themselves, and without the vigour to
carry out the responsibilities which they had undertaken. But we
must remember that they had certain excuses for the imbecility of
their policy. In the first place their interests were divided between
the rival presidencies of Madras and Bombay; and when under the
Regulating Act the government of Bengal tried to impose on the
subordinate presidencies a common policy, its action was neutralised
by the jealousies of the minor governments for each other and for the
Supreme Government. In the second place the action of the Madras
Presidency was hampered by the conduct of its protégé the nawab
Walajah. He was jealous of the superior rank of the Nizam; he was
jealous of the assumed and (in his eyes) illegitimate rank of Hyder;
he was jealous of the influence which the English claimed to exercise
in his councils in virtue of the military power which alone preserved
his position in the face of an enemy_incomparably his superior in
vigour and talent. So that while the English had imposed on them-
selves the impossible duties of assisting both the Nizam and Hyder
in their various policies, the nawab was always seeking to impose on
them the further duty, hardly more inconsistent with their treaty
obligations, of assisting the Marathas. In the third place the local
governments were always liable to the interference of the home
authorities, sometimes ill-informed, sometimes ill-authorised, but at
this time generally incalculable.
In 1770 this was illustrated by the arrival of a small naval squad-
ron in Indian waters, under the command of Sir John Lindsay, who
proceeded to take an active, authorised, but illegitimate part in the
politics of Madras. His appointment was the result of a series of
intrigues in England in which the ministry was on the whole discre.
1 Dupré to Orme, 10 June, 1769 (Love, Vestiges, 11, 599); Auber, I, 266.
## p. 278 (#306) ############################################
278
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
ditably concerned. The discussions of 1766-7 had left the ministry
decidedly inclined to interfere in the conduct of Indian affairs; and
occasions were not wanting to provide it with excuses. In 1768, on
the news that the government of Bengal had allowed the French at
Chandernagore to mount cannon on their walls contrary to the treaty
of Paris, Shelburne had written with some justification :
I cannot conceal from you His Majesty's surprise that so extraordinary a
transaction with a foreign power, by which the articles of a treaty of peace
have been dispensed with, should have passed in India by the sole authority
of the Company's servants and have received your approbation at home, with-
out your having previously attempted to know His Majesty's opinion or receive
his commands upon so hazardous a concession. . . .
In the following year complaints were received from the ambassador
at Constantinople about the conduct of the Company's servants in
the Persian Gulf;” and at the same time, the Company gave an
opening to the ministry by asking for naval assistance on an alarm
of French preparations. At this moment the Company was proposing
to send three supervisors to India with extraordinary powers.
Grafton, who was now secretary of state, seized, the occasion to try
to secure some controlling share in the proposed commission; he
suggested that the commander of the naval force which the Company
had asked for should be joined with the supervisors. This proposal
was rejected by the Company. About the time that these affairs were
in progress there arrived from Madras John Macpherson on a mission
from the nawab of Arcot. He had gone out as purser on an East-
Indiaman, and had got access to the s3wab on the pretext of showing
him "some electrical experiments and the phenomenon of the magic
lanthorn”. 4 He appears to have persuaded Grafton that the nawab
was a much ill-used person. The result was that, as the Company
would not agree to giving Lindsay the powers that the ministry
demanded, he was sent with a secret commission, which was not
communicated to the Company, empowering him not only to act as
plenipotentiary on behalf of the crown with all the princes of India,
but also to enquire into the relations between the nawab and the
Company's servants on the Coromandel Coast.
3
“As there is great reason to fear”, his secret instructions ran, “that the
Nabob of Arcot has been treated in a manner by no means correspondent to the
friendly stipulations which His Majesty procured in his favour at the Company's
request (in the Treaty of Paris) . . . it is therefore His Majesty's pleasure that
you make the strictest enquiry into their conduct towards the Nabob of Arcot
since the last peace in order to judge how far it has coincided with His Majesty's
friendly declarations. " J
1 Shelburne to the Company, 21 January, 1768 (Lansdowne House MSS,
No. 99).
2 Michell to Wood, 17 March, 1769 (P. R. O. , C. O. 77-21).
3 Wood to the Chairs, 26 July, 1769 (loc. cit. ).
4 Harland to Rochford, 1 September, 1772 (1. 0. , Hoine Miscellaneous, 110,
6 Weymouth to Lindsay, Secret, 13 September, 1769, (P. R. O. , T. 49-1).
p. 495).
## p. 279 (#307) ############################################
LINDSAY'S MISSION
270
Lindsay arrived at Bombay early in 1770 and after some preliminary
enquiries into the position of the Marathas, sailed for Madras. His
secret mission naturally involved him in disputes with the council,
which knew nothing of it, and had received no instructions to admit
him to a part in its political deliberations. The result was that the
commodore was thrown into the nawab's arms and adopted his
political views. He advocated an alliance with the Marathas and the
abandonment of the treaty with Hyder; and interfered at Bombay
to prevent the council there from entering into a treaty promising
Hyder the same friendship and support that had been promised by
the Treaty of Madras. In the course of the war between Hyder and
Madhu Rao. in 1770-1 Lindsay did his utmost to bring the Com-
pany in on the side of the Marathas; and his successor, Harland, in
1771, actually threatened to enter into negotiations and frame a
treaty with Madhu Rao on his own account. When the council ob.
jected that that would be a violation of its treaty with Hyder,
Harland replied :
Should it be found expedient to enter into an alliance with any Indian power
for the preservation of the Carnatic, for the security of the possessions of the
East India Company in it, and to give a probability of permanency to the British
interests in this country, which may be incompatible with the agreement you
made with Hyder Ally, in 1769, it would be so far from a breach of national
faith that even as private persons you stand exculpated. 1
The threatened treaty was indeed avoided. But backed by the
plenipotentiary on the one side, and the corrupt influences of the
private debt on the other, the nawab became irresistible and exacted
from the council its agreement to the attack and capture of the little
kingdom of Tanjore. Its relations with the nawab were regulated by
a treaty of 1762 which Pigot, the governor, and the council of that time
had forced upon the nawab. It was alleged that the raja had violated
its terms partly by neglect to pay the stipulated tribute, and partly
by hostile intrigues with Hyder 'Ali and with Yusuf Khan, the sepoy
commandant who had rebelled at Madura and whom it had taken
the English long months and considerable efforts to reduce. The first
attack took place in 1771; but on that occasion the raja was allowed
to remain on terms. But two years later he was again attacked, and
this time his kingdom was annexed to the nawab's possessions. About
the same time English expeditions were sent to reduce the two great
southern poligars of Ramnad and Sivaganga.
These acquisitions caused much stir in England. By some, and by
the Burkes in particular, they were attributed to the corrupt intrigues
of the Company's servants. A whole pamphlet literature sprang up
on the subject, fathered by the Burkes and their friends on the one
side, and by the two Macphersons on the other. The truth of the
matter, as distinguished from the mere external facts, remains very
1 Harland to Dupré, etc. , 25 December, 1771 (P. R. O. ; C. O. 77-22).
## p. 280 (#308) ############################################
280
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
obscure. It is certain that the presidents, Bouchier and Wynch, were
exceedingly averse to these extensions of the nawab's power; and these
events were associated with and followed by furious disputes between
the nawab and the Madras authorities. Matters became worse when
the Company sent orders that Tanjore was to be given back to the
raja. George Pigot, who had so distinguished himself in the Seven
Years' War and had bought himself an Irish barony, returned as
governor for a second term to put these orders into execution. This
brought him into violent collision not only with the nawab but also
with the creditors, Benfield at their head, who had acquired interests
in Tanjore which were injured by the orders for its retrocession. They
were supported by a majority of the council and by the commander-
in-chief, Sir Robert Fletcher, who had formerly displayed his talent
for intrigue in the officers' mutiny in Bengal. Pigot claimed, as did
Hastings in like case, to have the power of adjourning the council at
his pleasure and of refusing to put motions of which he disapproved.
But unlike Hastings, he attempted to establish his claims by moving
the suspension of his principal opponents, and thus excluding them
from the council. This measure was countered by a conspiracy, in
which Benfield and the nawab were much concerned, having for its
object the seizure of his person and the overthrow of his government. '
The conspirators were assisted by the second-in-command, Colonel
James Stuart, who condescended to act as their decoy; and Pigot was
seized as he drove from the fort to the governor's garden house one
evening in August, 1776, and hurried off into military confinement
at the Mount. He died in the following year while still in confine-
ment.
This event marked the apogee of the nawab's power. He had not
only evaded all attempts to establish the Company's influence in his
territories or to control his administration, but he had also brought
to condign punishment a governor who had ventured to thwart his
will, even though that governor was acting under the explicit orders
of the Company. Indeed this series of events at Madras illustrates
quite as clearly as the simultaneous events in Bengal how far the ill-
judged interference from England had weakened the stability of the
English government in India. Nor was the balance to be restored
until Pitt's India Act had re-established one effective control over
Indian affairs. In the present case although the guilty members of
the council were recalled and tried before the Court of King's Bench,
their punishment was lmiited to fines of £1000 each; and although
for the moment Benfield was recalled, he was allowed to return to
the scene of his intrigues in 1781.
After a short interregnum Sir Thomas Rumbold was appointed
governor and sent out to Madras, with Sir Hector Munro, the hero
of Baksar, as commander-in-chief. Rumbold, against whom at a later
1 See Palk MSS, p. 289.
## p. 281 (#309) ############################################
RUMBOLD'S NEGOTIATIONS
281
date was exhibited a bill of pains and penalties, was accused of having
a
displayed great corruption in his administration. But the principal
evidence of his having done so consists in his having summoned the
zamindars of the Northern Sarkars down to Madras in order to make
a settlement with them. This was taking that very profitable business
out of the hands of the local chiefs, and probably explains why such
an outcry was raised against what may well have been a perfectly
innocent and even meritorious action.
But Rumbold's political conduct was more open to criticism. He
was reluctant to follow the lead of the government of Bengal, and
succeeded in provoking the resentment of the Nizam at the very time
when the war with the Marathas made good relations with the other
powers of India of supreme importance. Under the treaty of 1766
as revised in 1768 the Company held the Northern Sarkars on con-
dition of paying an annual tribute of nine lakhs of rupees. As the
sarkar of Guntoor had been granted for life to Nizam 'Ali's brother,
Basalat Jang, a deduction of two lakhs was made on that account;
so that in fact the Company only held four out of the five sarkars and
owed a tribute of seven lakhs. This was a heavy burden; and Basalat
Jang had used his liberty to entertain a body of French troops on
whom the English naturally looked with suspicion. In these circum-
stances war with the French broke out in 1778 and was followed by
the immediate reduction of Pondichery by Munro. So far all was
well. But Rumbold proceeded to attempt to secure the sarkar of
Guntoor by direct negotiations with Basalat Jang. In this he suc-
ceeded; and at once the district was leased to Walajah. To the Nizam,
ruffled by such conduct, he then proposed that the Company should
discontinue its payment of tribute. His reasoning on this head is
difficult to understand. He argued that the Nizam had broken the
treaty of 1768 by taking into his service the French troops who had
been driven from that of Basalat Jang; that this of itself relieved the
Company from any obligations which it had under the treaty; and
that the Nizam was likely to recognise this and acquiesce in the
abandonment of tribute, if he were civilly asked to do so. To Hastings
the proposals seemed big with mischief. He at once intervened,
diplomatically representing the Madras proposals as proceeding from
the unauthorised action of the Madras envoy; and, when the Madras
Government refused to accept his decision, and recalled the Madras
servant, Hollond, whom it had sent to Hyderabad, he appointed
him to act as Resident with the Nizam on behalf of the Bengal Gov-
ernment. The matter led to a most unedifying dispute between the
two governments. Rumbold held that the Supreme Government had
exceeded its powers under the act in writing direct to the Nizam
and Hollond.
The manner in which they took up our proceedings . . . and the manner
in which they interfered to put a stop to them . . . too plainly indicate that the
## p. 282 (#310) ############################################
282
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
design was not to serve any interest of the Company as to exercise
an act
of authority with a view of raising their authority at the expense of ours. . . . l
Madras dismissed Hollond for having communicated his instructions
to Bengal and having obeyed the orders of that government; but in
the long run was obliged to yield so far as to restore Guntoor to
Basalat Jang, although that was deferred until the opening of the
Second Mysore War had robbed this action of all appearance of grace
or goodwill. The net result was that the Nizam was seriously indis-
posed against the English at the very moment when his goodwill
would have been more valuable than at any time since the last war
with Hyder.
Hyder too was alienated from them at the same time and in part
by the same train of events. He had long had his eye on the sarkar of
Guntoor and was much offended at the English attempts to gain
possession of it. By way of signifying his annoyance he prevented
the English troops marching to occupy it from moving through his
territories. The war with the French gave him further motives for
anger. By reason of his conquests on the Malabar Coast he claimed
full sovereignty over the whole area, including the European settle-
ments. The Europeans had never acknowledged this claim; the
English in particular had rejected it; and now, in defiance of his warn-
ing that he regarded the French factory of Mahé as lying under his
protection, the Madras council dispatched an expedition which
besieged and captured it. But in all probability what indisposed him
much more than either of these circumstances was the fact that he
had been wholly unable to induce them to renew that treaty of offen-
sive and defensive alliance which they had concluded in 1769 but never
carried out. He had made more than one overture with that end
in view, one of them so late as 1778;. but while they were ready
enough to make declarations of friendship, which in fact would have
committed them to nothing, they had evaded his principal demand.
He had therefore made up his mind that nothing was to be gained
from their alliance; and turned his attention to the French. The
outbreak of the Maratha War gave him a further opening, of which
he was not slow to avail himself; and the quarrel between Rumbold
and the Nizam freed him from every anxiety for his northern fron-
tiers. These reasons, one presumes, impelled him to decide to attack
his life-long enemy Walajah and the latter's English protectors, in the
middle of 1780.
His hostility of feeling though not his intention of war was well
known at the beginning of the year. In 1779 the missionary Swartz
was sent to Hyder to sound his intentions and got nothing from him
but threatening messages. In January, 1780, George Grey, a Com-
1 Military dispatch from Madras to the Company, 3 April, 1780.
2 Runbold's minute, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 4 July, 1778.
3 Idem, 23 October, 1779.
## p. 283 (#311) ############################################
OUTBREAK OF WAR
283
pany's servant, was sent with a similar intention; but Hyder refused
to accept the presents with which he was charged. In ordinary
circumstances this would have been warning sufficient. But un-
luckily about this time a regiment of king's troops Macleod's
Highlanders arrived at Madras; and the council easily persuaded
itself that Hyder would not dare to attack the English now that they
had received this accession of strength. Early in April Rumbold,
whose health had been for some time but indifferent, sailed for
England, without any real apprehensions of the storm that was
overhanging the presidency. After the event his contemporary
enemies accused him of having known of Hyder's intentions and fled
from the dangers which he had brought about. But in fact he does
not seem to have displayed more than that very ordinary degree of
blindness which all but men of extraordinary gifts display in the face
of the future, Rumbold's own talents were not such as to make his
presence or absence a matter of great concern. But unhappily he
left the chair to a man, John Whitehill, who in many ways recalls
the character of Foote's Nabob, Sir Matthew Mite. To mediocre
talent he joined a passionate acquisitive temperament, impatient of
opposition, incapable of cool judgment. He was believed to have
shared in the corruption which had distinguished the revenue collec-
tions in the sarkars, and to have been concerned in the equipment of a
French privateer. Unluckily too the commander-in-chief, Munro, was
a man whose best days were long past; personally honest, he was also
slow-minded, irresolute in an emergency, unable to profit by the ideas
of other people. He could see no reason for opposing the governor so
long as the latter did not interfere with his military plans. Rumbold's
departure left the Select Committee, to which was entrusted the
conduct of political affairs, reduced to four members; so that the
governor and commander-in-chief, so long as they agreed, had full,
control of the situation. At an earlier time the disputes between
those high personages had almost brought Madras to ruin; but now
their agreement went nearer still to produce the same unhappy end.
Despite the warnings they received of Hyder's preparations, they were
united in a foolish optimism which they did not abandon till they
received the news (23 July) that his horse was already ravaging the
Carnatic.
Even then they did not realise, the seriousness of the position.
With that contempt of the enemy, which, as Macleod observed, gene-
rally leads to "a damned rap over the knuckles”,3 Munro resolved to
concentrate his forces at Conjeeveram instead of near Madras, with
the result that the active Hyder intercepted and destroyed at Polilur
a detachment marching under Colonel Baillie from the northward.
3
1 Grey's Journal, 1. o. , Home Miscellaneous, 250, pp. 1-19.
2 Rumbold's minute, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 1 April, 1780, p. 440.
3 Hook, Life of Baird, 1, 17.
## p. 284 (#312) ############################################
284
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
The action passed so close to the main body of the English that they
heard the guns firing, and, had Munro moved resolutely towards
Baillie, the courage and confidence of his troops might have carried
the day even against Hyder's superiority of force. But the campaign
had been begun hastily, without due preparation, and without the
necessary supplies or transport. That, and Munro's blind confidence
in the English success, prevented him from making any decisive
movement. On learning what had actually occurred, his confidence
gave way to panic, and he retired hurriedly, losing much of his
baggage, to Chingleput, and then to Madras.
The material loss had been considerable, but it was unimportant
compared with the loss of moral which accompanied this disastrous
opening of the war. The nawab's garrisons at Arcot and elsewhere
surrendered, as they had done in the last war, after but the feeblest
of defences, except at Wandiwash, where Lieutenant William Flint,
of the Company's service, arrived just in time to take the command
out of the hands of the nawab's killadar and inspire the garrison with
such confidence in his leadership as secured a long and successful
defence. At Madras, meanwhile, Whitehill and the Select Committee
could find no prospect of successfully carrying on the war but in
obtaining help at the earliest moment from Bengal. The news reached
that presidency on 23 September. Hastings rose to the occasion. On
.
13 October the commander-in-chief, Coote, sailed to assume the
command, with nearly 600 Europeans and fifteen lakhs of rupees;
a considerable body of sepoys set out overland; and orders were
issued for the suspension of the governor, Whitehill, on the ground
of disobedience to the orders of the Supreme Government in the
matter of Guntoor. The monsoon months were occupied in putting
these orders into execution and preparing to take the field, and at
last on 17 January, 1781, Coote marched from St Thomas Mount.
The campaign which followed closely resembled that of Joseph
Smith in the First Mysore War. Coote lacked cavalry to meet that
of the enemy; he lacked transport, partly owing to the lack of pre-
parations before war broke out, partly owing to the systematic
ravaging of the country by Hyder; and his movements were further
hampered by a great train of artillery, which he probably needed to
keep the enemy horse at a respectful distance, and by enormous
hordes of camp-followers, whom he would not take adequate measures
to reduce. In these circumstances, due partly to the inefficient
government which had been in control, partly to the defects of the
military system which had grown up, and partly to the vigorous,
conduct of his adversary, Coote never succeeded in commanding a
greater extent of territory than was covered by his guns. He won a
considerable tactical victory at Porto Novo (1 July, 1781), where
Hyder committed himself more closely to action than he ventured to
do again; and at Polilur, the scene of Baillie's destruction (7 August),
and Sholinghur (27 September) he drove the enemy from the field
## p. 285 (#313) ############################################
SUFFREN
285
of battle; but although these successes restored the English confidence
in themselves and their leader, such a war of attrition would exhaust
them sooner than the enemy; and neither in this year nor in 1782
did Coote make the least progress towards driving Hyder out of the
nawab's possessions, while the English resources and finances steadily
decayed.
Meanwhile a French squadron had appeared in the Indian waters,
under the command of a leader of transcendent abilities. Early in
1782 Suffren, who had succeeded to the command of the French
squadron by the death of d'Orves, announced his arrival by the
capture of grain vessels bound for Madras from the northward. At
this time the English men-of-war were under the command of Sir
Edward Hughes, a stout fighter, but without the spark of genius.
In the previous year he had actively co-operated in the capture of
Negapatam from the Dutch, and had then sailed to Ceylon, where
he had taken Trinkomali. He had under his command nine ships
of the line, of which six had been in the East for some time, with the
result that their bottoms were foul and their crews depleted. Against
them Suffren could place twelve ships in the line. In the course of
1782 four actions took place between the two squadrons-17 February,
11 April, 5 July, and 3 September. From the first the English began
to get rather the worst of it, in consequence of the superior numbers
and superior tactical skill of the French leader. Twice he succeeded
in bringing the greater part of his squadron to bear on a small part
of ours, but on the whole the English held their own by a stubborn
resistance against superior concentrations. In February the French
landed somė 2000 men under the command of Du Chemin; but
luckily he proved not nearly so competent a leader as Suffren, and
his junction with Hyder led to no change in the military situation.
On 31 August Trinkomali surrendered to Suffren, Hughes having
failed to refit himself in time to relieve it.
On the whole the campaign against Hyder in the Carnatic seems
to have been conceived on false lines. The easiest way to drive him
out was not to accept battle in the nawab's territory but to carry the
war into the enemy's dominions, which lay exposed to attack fron
the sea all along the Malabar Coast. Then he would have been
obliged to decide whether to ravage his own country or to allow the
enemy to make war in it at ease. In either case he would early have
become disgusted with a war carried on to his own evident detriment.
This was self-evident, and, as soon as Bombay had been relieved by
the progress of Hastings's negotiations from the pressure of the
Maratha War, the Supreme Government urged upon that presidency
the necessity of taking measures for an expedition against Hyder's
western provinces. The Madras Government had constantly urged
1 Bengal to Madras, 16 May, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 5 June, 1782.
p. 1710.
## p. 286 (#314) ############################################
286
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
the same point, much to Coote's indignation, who thought that the
principal forces should be concentrated in the Carnatic under his
own command. However, a body of reinforcements from Europe
had been landed at Calicut, and the royal officer in command, Colonel
Humberstone, had assumed command of the Bombay troops there
and moved inland, a threat which had compelled Hyder to send his
son Tipu with a part of his army to repulse the invaders. Humber-
stone had been too weak to do more than make a demonstration and
had had to fall back before Tipu's advance; but in the beginning of
1783 the Bombay Government equipped an expedition, under the
command of one of its own officers, Brigadier Mathews, to attack
Mangalore and the province of Bednur. His success was unexpect-
edly rapid. Mangalore was carried, the passage up the ghats was
forced with ease; and the capital of the province surrendered almost
at once. But this success was due rather to the weakness of the enemy
than to the skill of the English. The Mysorean commander, Aiyaz
Khan, was disaffected to Tipu, who had then just succeeded his father,
and surrendered the capital of the province, Bednur, on condition of
retaining the management of the country under the new masters.
But these swift successes were quickly followed by complete over-
throw. Mathews scattered his scanty forces in detachments all over
the country, and neglected to concentrate them or secure his com-
munications with the coast on the news of Tipu's approach. Then,
too, the army had been distracted by quarrels over the Bednur prize-
money, and disputes between the king's and the Company's officers.
So that when Tipu appeared, as he speedily did, having for that
purpose withdrawn most of his troops from the Carnatic, he was able
to re-establish his power as quickly as he had lost it. Mathews and
all his men fell into the enemy's hands; and small garrisons in the
sea-ports of Mangalore and Honawar alone remained to keep up the
struggle.
In the autumn of 1782 Coote had returned to Calcutta, leaving
the command with Stuart, the officer who had played so dubious a
part in the Pigot business of 1776. Like Munro he had lost all the
talent he had ever had; and he had, moreover, lost a leg at the second
battle of Polilur, so that he was not only unenterprising but also
immobile. During the monsoon of 1782 he failed to get the army
ready to take the field again; so that when Hyder died early in
December, he was unable to take advantage of the three weeks that
elapsed between Hyder's death and Tipu's arrival from the Malabar.
Coast where he had been opposing Hümberstone. He did not actually
take the field until the short successes of Mathews had summoned
Tipu with the bulk of his army to the other side of India
This
was the first piece of good fortune that had befallen the English
since the beginning of the war. It was lucky that Stuart did not have
1 Coote to. Madras, 21 June, . ep. Madras Mill. Consultations of same dale,
1782, p. 1893
## p. 287 (#315) ############################################
BUSSY'S EXPEDITION
287
to encounter Hyder in the field; it was supremely lucky that he did
not have to encounter Hyder reinforced with the large body of
French troops under Bussy who arrived on the coast in the month
of April, only to find that their expected allies were elsewhere. In
these circumstances Bussy established himself at Cuddalore. In May
Stuart reluctantly marched south to oppose him. After a march of
extraordinary languor he arrived before Cuddalore on 8 June. On
the 13th followed a stubborn action in which the English secured
only a very incomplete success. Stuart's movement had been covered
by Hughes's squadron; but on the 20th in action against Suffren the
latter was so severely handled that he had to abandon his position
and put back to Madras to refit. On the 25th Bussy attacked Stuart's
position. The French were repulsed; but Hughes's retreat had placed
the English army in a most dangerous situation. Stuart at this crisis
wrote that he could not answer for the consequences if Hughes had
really gone to Madras. ' But luck still was on the side of the English.
On the 23rd Benfield received news by a special messenger that the
French and English had signed the preliminaries of peace. The news
was communicated at once to Bussy who agreed to a suspension of
arms, and the English army was saved.
The Madras army was thus set free to renew the struggle with
Tipu; it had been already decided to try a complete change of
operations and commanders; Colonel Fullarton, though far from
being the next senior officer to Stuart, was selected to attack the
southern possessions of Mysore. A beginning had already been made
earlier in the year by the capture of Dindigul. On 1 June, Fullarton
captured Dharapuram, and was preparing for a further advance when
he received orders to suspend operations until the issue of peace
proposals to Tipu should be known.
Ever since 1781, when Lord Macartney arrived as governor of
Madras, in succession to a series of Company's servants who had
clearly fallen short of the demands of their position, the Madras
Council had eagerly desired the conclusion of peace. In September,
1781, Macartney, in conjunction with Coole, Hughes and John
Macpherson, who was passing through Madras on his way to take his
seat in the council of the governor-general, took it on themselves to
address the Maratha ministry at Poona, assuring it of the sincerity
of the English proposals for an accoinmodation. This measure
Hastings had naturally and bitterly resented. Later on the Madras
authorities had repeatedly asked the Bengal Government for powers
to negotiate a peace with Hyder; a request which Hastings had
p. 2903.
1 Stuart tó Madras, 28 June, ap. Mudras Mil. Consultations, 4 July, 1783,
· Letter of 11 September, 1781, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 30 January,
1782, p. 243. Cf. Macartney to the Chairs, 31 July, 1781 (I. O. , Home Miscel-
laneous, 246, p. 16) and Macartney. Coote and Macpherson to Hastings, 11
September, 1781 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 22454, f. 25).
## p. 288 (#316) ############################################
288
THE CARNATIC. 1761-84
evaded, preferring to entrust the negotiations to Coote. Cuote's discus-
sions, however, had come to nothing; so also did informal overtures
which were made to Tipu by Macartney, without sanction from
Bengal, early in 1783. But the preliminaries concluded in Europe
contained stipulations (Article xvi) to the effect that all allies should
be invited to accede to the present pacification. On the strength of
this, Macartney reopened conversations with Tipu, thinking it likely
that the loss of his French allies, following on the peace which Hastings
had made with the Marathas, would permit of effective negotiations;
and on applying to Bengal, he received a guarded permission, not
to enter into a separate treaty with Tipu, but to negotiate for a
cessation of hostilities and a release of prisoners. In other words,
Hastings relied on the provisions of the Treaty of Salbai to secure
a settlement. Macartney, however, was bent on making peace,
being confident that that would serve the interests of the Company
better than waiting indefinitely for Sindhia to take action against
Tipu. He dispatched commissioners to confer with Tipu, who was
still lying before Mangalore. The commandant of the English
garrison, Colonel Campbell, had accepted very disadvantageous
terms for a suspension of hostilities. He had agreed for instance to
receive no supplies of victuals by sea—the only way by which he
could possibly receive supplies. Each occasion on which the Com-
pany's vessels revictualled him occasioned therefore sharp disputes;
and Tipu seems to have considered himself warranted by his acquies-
cence in continuing work on his entrenchments, which was also a
contravention of the suspension of arms. At last on 29 January, 1784,
Campbell preferred giving up the place to continuing longer to hold
it, being driven to this by the rapidity with which the garrison was
falling sick. The situation before Mangalore had produced more than
one report that hostilities had broken out again. As a result, in
December, 1783, Brigadier Macleod had seized Kannanur, belonging
not indeed to Tipu but to one of his allies; while Fullarton also had
renewed his attack on the southern possessions of Tipu, capturing
Palghaut and Coimbatore before his movements could be counter-
manded by the deputies on their way to Mangalore.
The latter reached that place shortly after it had surrendered
and immediately opened negotiations. On 7 March terms were agreed
to which completely ignored the Treaty of Salbai. However, they
were not unreasonable. Both parties were to give up their conquests;
all prisoners were to be released; certain specified allies were included.
in short, much the same terms were obtained from Tipu as Hastings
had managed to get from the Marathas. But men's minds were
irritable with defeat and the treaty became the object of a host of
legends. Tipu was said to have treated the deputies with unparalle-
1 Articles dated 2 August, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 27 September,
1783, p. 4332.
## p. 289 (#317) ############################################
MACARTNEY'S POLICY
289
Jed indignity, erecting a gallows by their encampment, and keeping
them in such a state of panic that they contemplated flight to the
English ships off the town. There is reason to think that these
stories had their origin in the excitable imagination of Brigadier
Macleod. They seem to have passed to Calcutta by way of Bombay,
along with extraordinary versions of the ill-treatment accorded to the
prisoners by Tipu. The facts seem to have been that the commissioners
of their own accord pitched their tents near a gallows which had been
set up before the surrender of Mangalore for the execution of one of
Tipu's officers who had entered into communication with the English
garrison; and that, while the prisoners were not well treated, there
are no grounds for believing that any of them were deliberately
murdered. In one respect Tipu certainly violated the treaty. He did
not release all the prisoners in his hands. This was made a very
serious charge against Macartney. But we must remember that in 1793,
after a successful war, Cornwallis did not succeed in getting Tipu to
release all the prisoners whom he had taken; and it is clearly unfair
to condemn Macartney for failing to do what Cornwallis himself
after a successful war could not effect. The probability is that in each
case the persons detained were those who had submitted to circum-
cision and accepted Tipu's service; and who, though kept under a
guard, were considered by Tipu as on a different footing from those
who had consistently rejected his offers and defied his threats. These
matters, along with the fact that the treaty was distinct from, and
independent of, the treaty of Salbai induced Hastings to condemn
it with extraordinary asperity, and to move Macartney's suspension
for having disobeyed the orders of the Supreme Government. But
he can hardly have judged the matter with an unbiassed mind. The
episode of the treaty came at the end of a long series of disputes
between the Bengal and Madras Governments in which Hastings
displayed something less than the serene and balanced judgment of
which at one time he had given such striking evidence.
At the close of 1780 Lord Macartney had been appointed governor
of Madras at the moment when Hastings's friends, with Laurence
Sulivan at their head, had contracted a short-lived alliance with the
ministry under North. Macartney was therefore pledged to the
support of Hastings, and indeed came out with the full intention of
so doing. But on his arrival he found himself unable to adopt the
measures which Hastings had recommended to the southern presi-
dency. Hastings had urged an alliance with the Dutch, in order
to obtain from them a force of European infantry in return for the
cession of the district of Tinnevelly by the nawab. But Macartney
had brought out with him orders to seize the Dutch factories, since
the United Provinces had just joined the French and the Americans
in the war against Great Britain. In the second place Hastings had
advised the cession of the sarkars to the Nizam on condition of
substantial assistance from him against Hyder. Macartney had no
1
19
## p. 290 (#318) ############################################
290
THE CARNATIC: 1761-84
specific orders from the Company on this head; but none the less he
stoutly refused to dismember the Company's possessions; he urged
that such a cession would not produce effects commensurate with the
cost, and in that he was very likely right. A third cause of difference
between the two was fortuitous. Hastings, on Macartney's arrival,
had written to him advising that the raja of Tanjore should be
required, and if necessary compelled, to contribute his share to the
cost of the war. Macartney was in agreement with this view; and
forwarded an extract from Hastings's letter to the chairman and
deputy chairman of the Company in support of his own arguments.
Unfortunately the letter arrived in England when Sulivan and
Hastings's friends had lost control of the directorate; and led to severe
and unmerited reproaches directed against Hastings by the new
chairs. Hastings accused Macartney of having betrayed him to his
enemies; and does not seem to have been convinced by Macartney's
temperate and candid explanation. Gleig, it may be noted, was
mistaken in supposing that no answer was returned to Hastings's
letter of accusation. Besides these occasions of difference in which
Macartney was in the right there was that unfortunate letter to the
Marathas, which has already been mentioned, in which he was
decidedly in the wrong. The result was a strong tendency in each to
suspect and question the opinions of the other.
At the same time Macartney was involved in disputes with Coote
and with the nawab. In sending Coote to Madras the Bengal Gov-
ernment had invested him with separate and independent powers,
as the Madras Government had done with Clive, in not dissimilar
circumstances in 1756. Coote interpreted them in the widest possible
sense, neglecting to attend the meetings of the Select Committee and
declining to explain his plans for the conduct of the war, while he
harassed the committee with ceaseless complaints regarding the
shortness of transport and supplies. Both sides complained to Bengal;
and Bengal preferred to support Coote, without seriously considering
the Madras assertions that the financial management of the army,
as distinguished from the military conduct of the war, was wasteful
and extravagant. Underlying these disputes were intrigues in which
Paul Benfield took a considerable part, exasperating Coote's irritable
mind against the unfortunate governor.
From the first the resources of Madras had been wholly unequal
to the maintenance of the war. Bengal had contributed largely,
sending no less than 265 lakhs of rupees, in specie, bills, and supplies,
in the course of the four years that the war continued. But the goy-
ernment had frequently and loudly declared that it was incumbent on
the Madras Government to do everything in its power to increase its
own resources, particularly the contributions from the nawab's
! Macartney to Hastings, 10. May, 1783 (Brit. Mus. · Add. MSS, 22455,
f. 47 verso).
## p. 291 (#319) ############################################
ASSIGNMENT OF REVENUES
291
revenues. But that spring had completely dried up. Twenty years
of financial mismanagement had exhausted the nawab's treasury,
never very full. In the crisis which resulted from Hyder's invasion,
he had sought to evade payment rather than to provide with funds
the only power that would protect him. To the demands of the
Madras authorities he had returned blank refusals. Foreseeing that
this course could not be continued indefinitely, he had sent a mission
to Calcutta where terms were settled between him and the Supreme
Government, which proceeded to dispatch to Madras a special agent,
chosen with singular lack of tact from among the Madras covenanted
servants, to watch over the performance of the treaty. This was in
1781, before Macartney had arrived. In so doing Hastings and his
council had clearly overstepped the limits of their statutory powers;
but they had not doubted their power of coercing the Madras Gov-
ernment into obedience. It was as discredited as had been that of
Drake in 1756. But Macartney's arrival had changed the situation
altogether. He soon made this clear. He and the Select Committee
declared that they could not acquiesce in the appointment of an agent
to perform the functions with which they were specially charged by
the Company. But though they refused to recognise the agent whom
Hastings had appointed, they did adopt the Bengal treaty as the basis
of a new agreement which Macartney proceeded to negotiate with
the nawab. On 2 December, 1781, the latter executed an assignment
of his revenues to Macartney in person for a fixed term of five years,
reserving to his own use one-fifth of what amounts should be collected.
This agreement was formally approved by the Bengal Government.
But it soon was evident that it was no more genuine than had been
all the previous promises of the durbar. The revenues which were
collected were not paid in to the Company, but secretly transmitted
to the nawab. When it was proposed to appoint inspectors to watch
over the revenue officials, the nawab refused to grant them the
necessary powers; when it was proposed to lease out the country to
renters, the nawab refused to sign the documents appointing them.
In these circumstances Macartney resolved no longer to give way,
but to exercise himself the power of appointing the renters. In this
conduct he was confirmed by a letter from Bengal, written indeed
without knowledge of the crisis that had arisen at Madras, but
strongly and pointedly urging the absolute necessity of making the
assignment . a 'reality in order that all the resources of the country
might be made available for the conduct of the war.
Malabar Coast; but when he turned his attention to the north he
found his way blocked by the Marathas and the Nizam. Meanwhile
his conquests on the Malabar Coast had brought him into contact
with the English factories there. At first the Bombay. Presidency
was in favour of an agreement. It decided to afford Hyder facilities
for building fighting vessels in the Marine Yard at Bombay; and
hoped that Madras would be able to accommodate the disputes sub-
sisting between Hyder and Walajah. Hyder also hoped for advant-
ages from supplies of arms and gunpowder from the English, and
offered his alliance, both parties affording military help to the other
in case of need. This was in 1766, just before Caillaud's treaty with
the Nizam. But by then Hyder's conquest of the petty Nair chiefs
with whom the English were in alliance had on the whole indisposed
the Bombay Government to any formal alliance with its restless
neighbour, though it was at the same time anxious to avoid hostilities
if possible. In the meantime, as has been seen, the Madras Govern-
ment had agreed to assist the Nizam against Hyder as the price of the
cession of the Northern Sarkars, rather than face the probable alter-
native of an alliance between Hyder 'Ali and the Nizam against
Walajah.
1 Caillaud's proceedings on this mission are recorded in two volumes (Mili-
tory Sundries, 31-32) in the Madras Record Office.
? Forrest, Bombay Selections, 11, 123-31
## p. 276 (#304) ############################################
276
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
English hopes rested in the triple alliance of themselves, the
Nizam, and the Marathas. But the Marathas, who were first in the
field, were quickly bought off by, Hyder. The Nizam, accompanied
by a detachment under the command of General Joseph Smith,
invaded Mysore, and advanced within sight of Bangalore. But the
attack was not seriously pressed home; the invaders entered Mysore
on 29 April, 1767, but all the time Mahfuz Khan (brother and rival of
Walajah) remained in the Nizam's camp as Hyder's agent; many
letters passed between the enemies; and a secret understanding was
reached, probably while the Nizam was still before Bangalore. Thus
the English were abandoned by the allies on whose assistance they
had relied, and left by themselves to encounter the full brunt of
Hyder's attack. They had indeed managed matters with a great
want of skill.
The war which followed (August, 1767, to April, 1769) was one
of tactical success and strategic failure in the Carnatic. At Changama
and Tiruvannamalai Smith succeeded in driving Hyder off the field
of battle; and after the severe lessons which he received on those
occasions, Hyder was careful how he ventured within the reach of
the English infantry; but these successes led to nothing. The English
leaders had not at their disposal sufficient bodies of cavalry to keep
the enemy's horse out of the Carnatic. They were further distracted
by personal jealousies between Smith, the senior commander, and
Colonel Wood, the favourite of the council. And they were harassed
by the appointment of "field-deputies” sent by the council to keep
watch over their movements. On 23 February, 1768, the Nizam made
peace with the English in the same irresponsible manner as he had
broken with them; confirming his previous treaty engagements, con-
senting to a limitation of the forces which the English were obliged
to send to him on demand to two battalions and six guns, and ceding
to the Company the diwanni of Mysore when that country should
have been conquered from the enemy. About the same time the
Bombay forces managed to capture the town of Mangalore; but the
place was not defended when Hyder appeared to recover it, and the
peace with the Nizam made little difference to the course of the war.
The Carnatic lay still open to the ravages of the enemy horse, so that
the principal sources of English finance were dried up; and, finally,
when in the month of March, 1769, Hyder appeared before Madras
at the head of a body of cavalry, and when Smith had conspicuously
failed to expel the enemy from the nawab's country, the Madras
Government resolved to make peace. But it had to do so on Hyder's
terms. These were generous enough, but included the burden of a
defensive alliance, so that the Madras Council was still far from free
of the political difficulties in which it had become involved. In the
1 Smith's Narrative, ap. Orme MŚS, - Various, 10; and Cosby's Journal (Brit.
Mus. Add. MSS, 29898).
## p. 277 (#305) ############################################
ENGLISH POLICY
277
1
following year a further treaty was concluded between Hyder and
the Bombay Government, which thereby secured further commercial
privileges,
The general conduct of the war, incompetent as it had been, was
a small evil, compared with the purposeless, undecided policy by
which it was preceded and followed. At this time the interests of
Southern and Western India were closely connected; the Marathas,
the Nizam, Hyder 'Ali, and the English at Bombay and Madras, were
in close and intimate association from which they could not escape.
Moreover, the interests of the three Indian powers were mutually
destructive. The one certain thing about the situation was that an
alliance between any two of them against the third would be only
temporary, and would be dissolved by its own success. In these
circumstances the obvious course for the English was to avoid entan-
glements with any of the parties. But what they did was to ally
themselves first with the Nizam, then with Hyder, and then with a
party of the Marathas, without any clear idea of the responsibilities
to which they were pledging themselves, and without the vigour to
carry out the responsibilities which they had undertaken. But we
must remember that they had certain excuses for the imbecility of
their policy. In the first place their interests were divided between
the rival presidencies of Madras and Bombay; and when under the
Regulating Act the government of Bengal tried to impose on the
subordinate presidencies a common policy, its action was neutralised
by the jealousies of the minor governments for each other and for the
Supreme Government. In the second place the action of the Madras
Presidency was hampered by the conduct of its protégé the nawab
Walajah. He was jealous of the superior rank of the Nizam; he was
jealous of the assumed and (in his eyes) illegitimate rank of Hyder;
he was jealous of the influence which the English claimed to exercise
in his councils in virtue of the military power which alone preserved
his position in the face of an enemy_incomparably his superior in
vigour and talent. So that while the English had imposed on them-
selves the impossible duties of assisting both the Nizam and Hyder
in their various policies, the nawab was always seeking to impose on
them the further duty, hardly more inconsistent with their treaty
obligations, of assisting the Marathas. In the third place the local
governments were always liable to the interference of the home
authorities, sometimes ill-informed, sometimes ill-authorised, but at
this time generally incalculable.
In 1770 this was illustrated by the arrival of a small naval squad-
ron in Indian waters, under the command of Sir John Lindsay, who
proceeded to take an active, authorised, but illegitimate part in the
politics of Madras. His appointment was the result of a series of
intrigues in England in which the ministry was on the whole discre.
1 Dupré to Orme, 10 June, 1769 (Love, Vestiges, 11, 599); Auber, I, 266.
## p. 278 (#306) ############################################
278
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
ditably concerned. The discussions of 1766-7 had left the ministry
decidedly inclined to interfere in the conduct of Indian affairs; and
occasions were not wanting to provide it with excuses. In 1768, on
the news that the government of Bengal had allowed the French at
Chandernagore to mount cannon on their walls contrary to the treaty
of Paris, Shelburne had written with some justification :
I cannot conceal from you His Majesty's surprise that so extraordinary a
transaction with a foreign power, by which the articles of a treaty of peace
have been dispensed with, should have passed in India by the sole authority
of the Company's servants and have received your approbation at home, with-
out your having previously attempted to know His Majesty's opinion or receive
his commands upon so hazardous a concession. . . .
In the following year complaints were received from the ambassador
at Constantinople about the conduct of the Company's servants in
the Persian Gulf;” and at the same time, the Company gave an
opening to the ministry by asking for naval assistance on an alarm
of French preparations. At this moment the Company was proposing
to send three supervisors to India with extraordinary powers.
Grafton, who was now secretary of state, seized, the occasion to try
to secure some controlling share in the proposed commission; he
suggested that the commander of the naval force which the Company
had asked for should be joined with the supervisors. This proposal
was rejected by the Company. About the time that these affairs were
in progress there arrived from Madras John Macpherson on a mission
from the nawab of Arcot. He had gone out as purser on an East-
Indiaman, and had got access to the s3wab on the pretext of showing
him "some electrical experiments and the phenomenon of the magic
lanthorn”. 4 He appears to have persuaded Grafton that the nawab
was a much ill-used person. The result was that, as the Company
would not agree to giving Lindsay the powers that the ministry
demanded, he was sent with a secret commission, which was not
communicated to the Company, empowering him not only to act as
plenipotentiary on behalf of the crown with all the princes of India,
but also to enquire into the relations between the nawab and the
Company's servants on the Coromandel Coast.
3
“As there is great reason to fear”, his secret instructions ran, “that the
Nabob of Arcot has been treated in a manner by no means correspondent to the
friendly stipulations which His Majesty procured in his favour at the Company's
request (in the Treaty of Paris) . . . it is therefore His Majesty's pleasure that
you make the strictest enquiry into their conduct towards the Nabob of Arcot
since the last peace in order to judge how far it has coincided with His Majesty's
friendly declarations. " J
1 Shelburne to the Company, 21 January, 1768 (Lansdowne House MSS,
No. 99).
2 Michell to Wood, 17 March, 1769 (P. R. O. , C. O. 77-21).
3 Wood to the Chairs, 26 July, 1769 (loc. cit. ).
4 Harland to Rochford, 1 September, 1772 (1. 0. , Hoine Miscellaneous, 110,
6 Weymouth to Lindsay, Secret, 13 September, 1769, (P. R. O. , T. 49-1).
p. 495).
## p. 279 (#307) ############################################
LINDSAY'S MISSION
270
Lindsay arrived at Bombay early in 1770 and after some preliminary
enquiries into the position of the Marathas, sailed for Madras. His
secret mission naturally involved him in disputes with the council,
which knew nothing of it, and had received no instructions to admit
him to a part in its political deliberations. The result was that the
commodore was thrown into the nawab's arms and adopted his
political views. He advocated an alliance with the Marathas and the
abandonment of the treaty with Hyder; and interfered at Bombay
to prevent the council there from entering into a treaty promising
Hyder the same friendship and support that had been promised by
the Treaty of Madras. In the course of the war between Hyder and
Madhu Rao. in 1770-1 Lindsay did his utmost to bring the Com-
pany in on the side of the Marathas; and his successor, Harland, in
1771, actually threatened to enter into negotiations and frame a
treaty with Madhu Rao on his own account. When the council ob.
jected that that would be a violation of its treaty with Hyder,
Harland replied :
Should it be found expedient to enter into an alliance with any Indian power
for the preservation of the Carnatic, for the security of the possessions of the
East India Company in it, and to give a probability of permanency to the British
interests in this country, which may be incompatible with the agreement you
made with Hyder Ally, in 1769, it would be so far from a breach of national
faith that even as private persons you stand exculpated. 1
The threatened treaty was indeed avoided. But backed by the
plenipotentiary on the one side, and the corrupt influences of the
private debt on the other, the nawab became irresistible and exacted
from the council its agreement to the attack and capture of the little
kingdom of Tanjore. Its relations with the nawab were regulated by
a treaty of 1762 which Pigot, the governor, and the council of that time
had forced upon the nawab. It was alleged that the raja had violated
its terms partly by neglect to pay the stipulated tribute, and partly
by hostile intrigues with Hyder 'Ali and with Yusuf Khan, the sepoy
commandant who had rebelled at Madura and whom it had taken
the English long months and considerable efforts to reduce. The first
attack took place in 1771; but on that occasion the raja was allowed
to remain on terms. But two years later he was again attacked, and
this time his kingdom was annexed to the nawab's possessions. About
the same time English expeditions were sent to reduce the two great
southern poligars of Ramnad and Sivaganga.
These acquisitions caused much stir in England. By some, and by
the Burkes in particular, they were attributed to the corrupt intrigues
of the Company's servants. A whole pamphlet literature sprang up
on the subject, fathered by the Burkes and their friends on the one
side, and by the two Macphersons on the other. The truth of the
matter, as distinguished from the mere external facts, remains very
1 Harland to Dupré, etc. , 25 December, 1771 (P. R. O. ; C. O. 77-22).
## p. 280 (#308) ############################################
280
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
obscure. It is certain that the presidents, Bouchier and Wynch, were
exceedingly averse to these extensions of the nawab's power; and these
events were associated with and followed by furious disputes between
the nawab and the Madras authorities. Matters became worse when
the Company sent orders that Tanjore was to be given back to the
raja. George Pigot, who had so distinguished himself in the Seven
Years' War and had bought himself an Irish barony, returned as
governor for a second term to put these orders into execution. This
brought him into violent collision not only with the nawab but also
with the creditors, Benfield at their head, who had acquired interests
in Tanjore which were injured by the orders for its retrocession. They
were supported by a majority of the council and by the commander-
in-chief, Sir Robert Fletcher, who had formerly displayed his talent
for intrigue in the officers' mutiny in Bengal. Pigot claimed, as did
Hastings in like case, to have the power of adjourning the council at
his pleasure and of refusing to put motions of which he disapproved.
But unlike Hastings, he attempted to establish his claims by moving
the suspension of his principal opponents, and thus excluding them
from the council. This measure was countered by a conspiracy, in
which Benfield and the nawab were much concerned, having for its
object the seizure of his person and the overthrow of his government. '
The conspirators were assisted by the second-in-command, Colonel
James Stuart, who condescended to act as their decoy; and Pigot was
seized as he drove from the fort to the governor's garden house one
evening in August, 1776, and hurried off into military confinement
at the Mount. He died in the following year while still in confine-
ment.
This event marked the apogee of the nawab's power. He had not
only evaded all attempts to establish the Company's influence in his
territories or to control his administration, but he had also brought
to condign punishment a governor who had ventured to thwart his
will, even though that governor was acting under the explicit orders
of the Company. Indeed this series of events at Madras illustrates
quite as clearly as the simultaneous events in Bengal how far the ill-
judged interference from England had weakened the stability of the
English government in India. Nor was the balance to be restored
until Pitt's India Act had re-established one effective control over
Indian affairs. In the present case although the guilty members of
the council were recalled and tried before the Court of King's Bench,
their punishment was lmiited to fines of £1000 each; and although
for the moment Benfield was recalled, he was allowed to return to
the scene of his intrigues in 1781.
After a short interregnum Sir Thomas Rumbold was appointed
governor and sent out to Madras, with Sir Hector Munro, the hero
of Baksar, as commander-in-chief. Rumbold, against whom at a later
1 See Palk MSS, p. 289.
## p. 281 (#309) ############################################
RUMBOLD'S NEGOTIATIONS
281
date was exhibited a bill of pains and penalties, was accused of having
a
displayed great corruption in his administration. But the principal
evidence of his having done so consists in his having summoned the
zamindars of the Northern Sarkars down to Madras in order to make
a settlement with them. This was taking that very profitable business
out of the hands of the local chiefs, and probably explains why such
an outcry was raised against what may well have been a perfectly
innocent and even meritorious action.
But Rumbold's political conduct was more open to criticism. He
was reluctant to follow the lead of the government of Bengal, and
succeeded in provoking the resentment of the Nizam at the very time
when the war with the Marathas made good relations with the other
powers of India of supreme importance. Under the treaty of 1766
as revised in 1768 the Company held the Northern Sarkars on con-
dition of paying an annual tribute of nine lakhs of rupees. As the
sarkar of Guntoor had been granted for life to Nizam 'Ali's brother,
Basalat Jang, a deduction of two lakhs was made on that account;
so that in fact the Company only held four out of the five sarkars and
owed a tribute of seven lakhs. This was a heavy burden; and Basalat
Jang had used his liberty to entertain a body of French troops on
whom the English naturally looked with suspicion. In these circum-
stances war with the French broke out in 1778 and was followed by
the immediate reduction of Pondichery by Munro. So far all was
well. But Rumbold proceeded to attempt to secure the sarkar of
Guntoor by direct negotiations with Basalat Jang. In this he suc-
ceeded; and at once the district was leased to Walajah. To the Nizam,
ruffled by such conduct, he then proposed that the Company should
discontinue its payment of tribute. His reasoning on this head is
difficult to understand. He argued that the Nizam had broken the
treaty of 1768 by taking into his service the French troops who had
been driven from that of Basalat Jang; that this of itself relieved the
Company from any obligations which it had under the treaty; and
that the Nizam was likely to recognise this and acquiesce in the
abandonment of tribute, if he were civilly asked to do so. To Hastings
the proposals seemed big with mischief. He at once intervened,
diplomatically representing the Madras proposals as proceeding from
the unauthorised action of the Madras envoy; and, when the Madras
Government refused to accept his decision, and recalled the Madras
servant, Hollond, whom it had sent to Hyderabad, he appointed
him to act as Resident with the Nizam on behalf of the Bengal Gov-
ernment. The matter led to a most unedifying dispute between the
two governments. Rumbold held that the Supreme Government had
exceeded its powers under the act in writing direct to the Nizam
and Hollond.
The manner in which they took up our proceedings . . . and the manner
in which they interfered to put a stop to them . . . too plainly indicate that the
## p. 282 (#310) ############################################
282
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
design was not to serve any interest of the Company as to exercise
an act
of authority with a view of raising their authority at the expense of ours. . . . l
Madras dismissed Hollond for having communicated his instructions
to Bengal and having obeyed the orders of that government; but in
the long run was obliged to yield so far as to restore Guntoor to
Basalat Jang, although that was deferred until the opening of the
Second Mysore War had robbed this action of all appearance of grace
or goodwill. The net result was that the Nizam was seriously indis-
posed against the English at the very moment when his goodwill
would have been more valuable than at any time since the last war
with Hyder.
Hyder too was alienated from them at the same time and in part
by the same train of events. He had long had his eye on the sarkar of
Guntoor and was much offended at the English attempts to gain
possession of it. By way of signifying his annoyance he prevented
the English troops marching to occupy it from moving through his
territories. The war with the French gave him further motives for
anger. By reason of his conquests on the Malabar Coast he claimed
full sovereignty over the whole area, including the European settle-
ments. The Europeans had never acknowledged this claim; the
English in particular had rejected it; and now, in defiance of his warn-
ing that he regarded the French factory of Mahé as lying under his
protection, the Madras council dispatched an expedition which
besieged and captured it. But in all probability what indisposed him
much more than either of these circumstances was the fact that he
had been wholly unable to induce them to renew that treaty of offen-
sive and defensive alliance which they had concluded in 1769 but never
carried out. He had made more than one overture with that end
in view, one of them so late as 1778;. but while they were ready
enough to make declarations of friendship, which in fact would have
committed them to nothing, they had evaded his principal demand.
He had therefore made up his mind that nothing was to be gained
from their alliance; and turned his attention to the French. The
outbreak of the Maratha War gave him a further opening, of which
he was not slow to avail himself; and the quarrel between Rumbold
and the Nizam freed him from every anxiety for his northern fron-
tiers. These reasons, one presumes, impelled him to decide to attack
his life-long enemy Walajah and the latter's English protectors, in the
middle of 1780.
His hostility of feeling though not his intention of war was well
known at the beginning of the year. In 1779 the missionary Swartz
was sent to Hyder to sound his intentions and got nothing from him
but threatening messages. In January, 1780, George Grey, a Com-
1 Military dispatch from Madras to the Company, 3 April, 1780.
2 Runbold's minute, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 4 July, 1778.
3 Idem, 23 October, 1779.
## p. 283 (#311) ############################################
OUTBREAK OF WAR
283
pany's servant, was sent with a similar intention; but Hyder refused
to accept the presents with which he was charged. In ordinary
circumstances this would have been warning sufficient. But un-
luckily about this time a regiment of king's troops Macleod's
Highlanders arrived at Madras; and the council easily persuaded
itself that Hyder would not dare to attack the English now that they
had received this accession of strength. Early in April Rumbold,
whose health had been for some time but indifferent, sailed for
England, without any real apprehensions of the storm that was
overhanging the presidency. After the event his contemporary
enemies accused him of having known of Hyder's intentions and fled
from the dangers which he had brought about. But in fact he does
not seem to have displayed more than that very ordinary degree of
blindness which all but men of extraordinary gifts display in the face
of the future, Rumbold's own talents were not such as to make his
presence or absence a matter of great concern. But unhappily he
left the chair to a man, John Whitehill, who in many ways recalls
the character of Foote's Nabob, Sir Matthew Mite. To mediocre
talent he joined a passionate acquisitive temperament, impatient of
opposition, incapable of cool judgment. He was believed to have
shared in the corruption which had distinguished the revenue collec-
tions in the sarkars, and to have been concerned in the equipment of a
French privateer. Unluckily too the commander-in-chief, Munro, was
a man whose best days were long past; personally honest, he was also
slow-minded, irresolute in an emergency, unable to profit by the ideas
of other people. He could see no reason for opposing the governor so
long as the latter did not interfere with his military plans. Rumbold's
departure left the Select Committee, to which was entrusted the
conduct of political affairs, reduced to four members; so that the
governor and commander-in-chief, so long as they agreed, had full,
control of the situation. At an earlier time the disputes between
those high personages had almost brought Madras to ruin; but now
their agreement went nearer still to produce the same unhappy end.
Despite the warnings they received of Hyder's preparations, they were
united in a foolish optimism which they did not abandon till they
received the news (23 July) that his horse was already ravaging the
Carnatic.
Even then they did not realise, the seriousness of the position.
With that contempt of the enemy, which, as Macleod observed, gene-
rally leads to "a damned rap over the knuckles”,3 Munro resolved to
concentrate his forces at Conjeeveram instead of near Madras, with
the result that the active Hyder intercepted and destroyed at Polilur
a detachment marching under Colonel Baillie from the northward.
3
1 Grey's Journal, 1. o. , Home Miscellaneous, 250, pp. 1-19.
2 Rumbold's minute, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 1 April, 1780, p. 440.
3 Hook, Life of Baird, 1, 17.
## p. 284 (#312) ############################################
284
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
The action passed so close to the main body of the English that they
heard the guns firing, and, had Munro moved resolutely towards
Baillie, the courage and confidence of his troops might have carried
the day even against Hyder's superiority of force. But the campaign
had been begun hastily, without due preparation, and without the
necessary supplies or transport. That, and Munro's blind confidence
in the English success, prevented him from making any decisive
movement. On learning what had actually occurred, his confidence
gave way to panic, and he retired hurriedly, losing much of his
baggage, to Chingleput, and then to Madras.
The material loss had been considerable, but it was unimportant
compared with the loss of moral which accompanied this disastrous
opening of the war. The nawab's garrisons at Arcot and elsewhere
surrendered, as they had done in the last war, after but the feeblest
of defences, except at Wandiwash, where Lieutenant William Flint,
of the Company's service, arrived just in time to take the command
out of the hands of the nawab's killadar and inspire the garrison with
such confidence in his leadership as secured a long and successful
defence. At Madras, meanwhile, Whitehill and the Select Committee
could find no prospect of successfully carrying on the war but in
obtaining help at the earliest moment from Bengal. The news reached
that presidency on 23 September. Hastings rose to the occasion. On
.
13 October the commander-in-chief, Coote, sailed to assume the
command, with nearly 600 Europeans and fifteen lakhs of rupees;
a considerable body of sepoys set out overland; and orders were
issued for the suspension of the governor, Whitehill, on the ground
of disobedience to the orders of the Supreme Government in the
matter of Guntoor. The monsoon months were occupied in putting
these orders into execution and preparing to take the field, and at
last on 17 January, 1781, Coote marched from St Thomas Mount.
The campaign which followed closely resembled that of Joseph
Smith in the First Mysore War. Coote lacked cavalry to meet that
of the enemy; he lacked transport, partly owing to the lack of pre-
parations before war broke out, partly owing to the systematic
ravaging of the country by Hyder; and his movements were further
hampered by a great train of artillery, which he probably needed to
keep the enemy horse at a respectful distance, and by enormous
hordes of camp-followers, whom he would not take adequate measures
to reduce. In these circumstances, due partly to the inefficient
government which had been in control, partly to the defects of the
military system which had grown up, and partly to the vigorous,
conduct of his adversary, Coote never succeeded in commanding a
greater extent of territory than was covered by his guns. He won a
considerable tactical victory at Porto Novo (1 July, 1781), where
Hyder committed himself more closely to action than he ventured to
do again; and at Polilur, the scene of Baillie's destruction (7 August),
and Sholinghur (27 September) he drove the enemy from the field
## p. 285 (#313) ############################################
SUFFREN
285
of battle; but although these successes restored the English confidence
in themselves and their leader, such a war of attrition would exhaust
them sooner than the enemy; and neither in this year nor in 1782
did Coote make the least progress towards driving Hyder out of the
nawab's possessions, while the English resources and finances steadily
decayed.
Meanwhile a French squadron had appeared in the Indian waters,
under the command of a leader of transcendent abilities. Early in
1782 Suffren, who had succeeded to the command of the French
squadron by the death of d'Orves, announced his arrival by the
capture of grain vessels bound for Madras from the northward. At
this time the English men-of-war were under the command of Sir
Edward Hughes, a stout fighter, but without the spark of genius.
In the previous year he had actively co-operated in the capture of
Negapatam from the Dutch, and had then sailed to Ceylon, where
he had taken Trinkomali. He had under his command nine ships
of the line, of which six had been in the East for some time, with the
result that their bottoms were foul and their crews depleted. Against
them Suffren could place twelve ships in the line. In the course of
1782 four actions took place between the two squadrons-17 February,
11 April, 5 July, and 3 September. From the first the English began
to get rather the worst of it, in consequence of the superior numbers
and superior tactical skill of the French leader. Twice he succeeded
in bringing the greater part of his squadron to bear on a small part
of ours, but on the whole the English held their own by a stubborn
resistance against superior concentrations. In February the French
landed somė 2000 men under the command of Du Chemin; but
luckily he proved not nearly so competent a leader as Suffren, and
his junction with Hyder led to no change in the military situation.
On 31 August Trinkomali surrendered to Suffren, Hughes having
failed to refit himself in time to relieve it.
On the whole the campaign against Hyder in the Carnatic seems
to have been conceived on false lines. The easiest way to drive him
out was not to accept battle in the nawab's territory but to carry the
war into the enemy's dominions, which lay exposed to attack fron
the sea all along the Malabar Coast. Then he would have been
obliged to decide whether to ravage his own country or to allow the
enemy to make war in it at ease. In either case he would early have
become disgusted with a war carried on to his own evident detriment.
This was self-evident, and, as soon as Bombay had been relieved by
the progress of Hastings's negotiations from the pressure of the
Maratha War, the Supreme Government urged upon that presidency
the necessity of taking measures for an expedition against Hyder's
western provinces. The Madras Government had constantly urged
1 Bengal to Madras, 16 May, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 5 June, 1782.
p. 1710.
## p. 286 (#314) ############################################
286
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
the same point, much to Coote's indignation, who thought that the
principal forces should be concentrated in the Carnatic under his
own command. However, a body of reinforcements from Europe
had been landed at Calicut, and the royal officer in command, Colonel
Humberstone, had assumed command of the Bombay troops there
and moved inland, a threat which had compelled Hyder to send his
son Tipu with a part of his army to repulse the invaders. Humber-
stone had been too weak to do more than make a demonstration and
had had to fall back before Tipu's advance; but in the beginning of
1783 the Bombay Government equipped an expedition, under the
command of one of its own officers, Brigadier Mathews, to attack
Mangalore and the province of Bednur. His success was unexpect-
edly rapid. Mangalore was carried, the passage up the ghats was
forced with ease; and the capital of the province surrendered almost
at once. But this success was due rather to the weakness of the enemy
than to the skill of the English. The Mysorean commander, Aiyaz
Khan, was disaffected to Tipu, who had then just succeeded his father,
and surrendered the capital of the province, Bednur, on condition of
retaining the management of the country under the new masters.
But these swift successes were quickly followed by complete over-
throw. Mathews scattered his scanty forces in detachments all over
the country, and neglected to concentrate them or secure his com-
munications with the coast on the news of Tipu's approach. Then,
too, the army had been distracted by quarrels over the Bednur prize-
money, and disputes between the king's and the Company's officers.
So that when Tipu appeared, as he speedily did, having for that
purpose withdrawn most of his troops from the Carnatic, he was able
to re-establish his power as quickly as he had lost it. Mathews and
all his men fell into the enemy's hands; and small garrisons in the
sea-ports of Mangalore and Honawar alone remained to keep up the
struggle.
In the autumn of 1782 Coote had returned to Calcutta, leaving
the command with Stuart, the officer who had played so dubious a
part in the Pigot business of 1776. Like Munro he had lost all the
talent he had ever had; and he had, moreover, lost a leg at the second
battle of Polilur, so that he was not only unenterprising but also
immobile. During the monsoon of 1782 he failed to get the army
ready to take the field again; so that when Hyder died early in
December, he was unable to take advantage of the three weeks that
elapsed between Hyder's death and Tipu's arrival from the Malabar.
Coast where he had been opposing Hümberstone. He did not actually
take the field until the short successes of Mathews had summoned
Tipu with the bulk of his army to the other side of India
This
was the first piece of good fortune that had befallen the English
since the beginning of the war. It was lucky that Stuart did not have
1 Coote to. Madras, 21 June, . ep. Madras Mill. Consultations of same dale,
1782, p. 1893
## p. 287 (#315) ############################################
BUSSY'S EXPEDITION
287
to encounter Hyder in the field; it was supremely lucky that he did
not have to encounter Hyder reinforced with the large body of
French troops under Bussy who arrived on the coast in the month
of April, only to find that their expected allies were elsewhere. In
these circumstances Bussy established himself at Cuddalore. In May
Stuart reluctantly marched south to oppose him. After a march of
extraordinary languor he arrived before Cuddalore on 8 June. On
the 13th followed a stubborn action in which the English secured
only a very incomplete success. Stuart's movement had been covered
by Hughes's squadron; but on the 20th in action against Suffren the
latter was so severely handled that he had to abandon his position
and put back to Madras to refit. On the 25th Bussy attacked Stuart's
position. The French were repulsed; but Hughes's retreat had placed
the English army in a most dangerous situation. Stuart at this crisis
wrote that he could not answer for the consequences if Hughes had
really gone to Madras. ' But luck still was on the side of the English.
On the 23rd Benfield received news by a special messenger that the
French and English had signed the preliminaries of peace. The news
was communicated at once to Bussy who agreed to a suspension of
arms, and the English army was saved.
The Madras army was thus set free to renew the struggle with
Tipu; it had been already decided to try a complete change of
operations and commanders; Colonel Fullarton, though far from
being the next senior officer to Stuart, was selected to attack the
southern possessions of Mysore. A beginning had already been made
earlier in the year by the capture of Dindigul. On 1 June, Fullarton
captured Dharapuram, and was preparing for a further advance when
he received orders to suspend operations until the issue of peace
proposals to Tipu should be known.
Ever since 1781, when Lord Macartney arrived as governor of
Madras, in succession to a series of Company's servants who had
clearly fallen short of the demands of their position, the Madras
Council had eagerly desired the conclusion of peace. In September,
1781, Macartney, in conjunction with Coole, Hughes and John
Macpherson, who was passing through Madras on his way to take his
seat in the council of the governor-general, took it on themselves to
address the Maratha ministry at Poona, assuring it of the sincerity
of the English proposals for an accoinmodation. This measure
Hastings had naturally and bitterly resented. Later on the Madras
authorities had repeatedly asked the Bengal Government for powers
to negotiate a peace with Hyder; a request which Hastings had
p. 2903.
1 Stuart tó Madras, 28 June, ap. Mudras Mil. Consultations, 4 July, 1783,
· Letter of 11 September, 1781, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 30 January,
1782, p. 243. Cf. Macartney to the Chairs, 31 July, 1781 (I. O. , Home Miscel-
laneous, 246, p. 16) and Macartney. Coote and Macpherson to Hastings, 11
September, 1781 (Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 22454, f. 25).
## p. 288 (#316) ############################################
288
THE CARNATIC. 1761-84
evaded, preferring to entrust the negotiations to Coote. Cuote's discus-
sions, however, had come to nothing; so also did informal overtures
which were made to Tipu by Macartney, without sanction from
Bengal, early in 1783. But the preliminaries concluded in Europe
contained stipulations (Article xvi) to the effect that all allies should
be invited to accede to the present pacification. On the strength of
this, Macartney reopened conversations with Tipu, thinking it likely
that the loss of his French allies, following on the peace which Hastings
had made with the Marathas, would permit of effective negotiations;
and on applying to Bengal, he received a guarded permission, not
to enter into a separate treaty with Tipu, but to negotiate for a
cessation of hostilities and a release of prisoners. In other words,
Hastings relied on the provisions of the Treaty of Salbai to secure
a settlement. Macartney, however, was bent on making peace,
being confident that that would serve the interests of the Company
better than waiting indefinitely for Sindhia to take action against
Tipu. He dispatched commissioners to confer with Tipu, who was
still lying before Mangalore. The commandant of the English
garrison, Colonel Campbell, had accepted very disadvantageous
terms for a suspension of hostilities. He had agreed for instance to
receive no supplies of victuals by sea—the only way by which he
could possibly receive supplies. Each occasion on which the Com-
pany's vessels revictualled him occasioned therefore sharp disputes;
and Tipu seems to have considered himself warranted by his acquies-
cence in continuing work on his entrenchments, which was also a
contravention of the suspension of arms. At last on 29 January, 1784,
Campbell preferred giving up the place to continuing longer to hold
it, being driven to this by the rapidity with which the garrison was
falling sick. The situation before Mangalore had produced more than
one report that hostilities had broken out again. As a result, in
December, 1783, Brigadier Macleod had seized Kannanur, belonging
not indeed to Tipu but to one of his allies; while Fullarton also had
renewed his attack on the southern possessions of Tipu, capturing
Palghaut and Coimbatore before his movements could be counter-
manded by the deputies on their way to Mangalore.
The latter reached that place shortly after it had surrendered
and immediately opened negotiations. On 7 March terms were agreed
to which completely ignored the Treaty of Salbai. However, they
were not unreasonable. Both parties were to give up their conquests;
all prisoners were to be released; certain specified allies were included.
in short, much the same terms were obtained from Tipu as Hastings
had managed to get from the Marathas. But men's minds were
irritable with defeat and the treaty became the object of a host of
legends. Tipu was said to have treated the deputies with unparalle-
1 Articles dated 2 August, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 27 September,
1783, p. 4332.
## p. 289 (#317) ############################################
MACARTNEY'S POLICY
289
Jed indignity, erecting a gallows by their encampment, and keeping
them in such a state of panic that they contemplated flight to the
English ships off the town. There is reason to think that these
stories had their origin in the excitable imagination of Brigadier
Macleod. They seem to have passed to Calcutta by way of Bombay,
along with extraordinary versions of the ill-treatment accorded to the
prisoners by Tipu. The facts seem to have been that the commissioners
of their own accord pitched their tents near a gallows which had been
set up before the surrender of Mangalore for the execution of one of
Tipu's officers who had entered into communication with the English
garrison; and that, while the prisoners were not well treated, there
are no grounds for believing that any of them were deliberately
murdered. In one respect Tipu certainly violated the treaty. He did
not release all the prisoners in his hands. This was made a very
serious charge against Macartney. But we must remember that in 1793,
after a successful war, Cornwallis did not succeed in getting Tipu to
release all the prisoners whom he had taken; and it is clearly unfair
to condemn Macartney for failing to do what Cornwallis himself
after a successful war could not effect. The probability is that in each
case the persons detained were those who had submitted to circum-
cision and accepted Tipu's service; and who, though kept under a
guard, were considered by Tipu as on a different footing from those
who had consistently rejected his offers and defied his threats. These
matters, along with the fact that the treaty was distinct from, and
independent of, the treaty of Salbai induced Hastings to condemn
it with extraordinary asperity, and to move Macartney's suspension
for having disobeyed the orders of the Supreme Government. But
he can hardly have judged the matter with an unbiassed mind. The
episode of the treaty came at the end of a long series of disputes
between the Bengal and Madras Governments in which Hastings
displayed something less than the serene and balanced judgment of
which at one time he had given such striking evidence.
At the close of 1780 Lord Macartney had been appointed governor
of Madras at the moment when Hastings's friends, with Laurence
Sulivan at their head, had contracted a short-lived alliance with the
ministry under North. Macartney was therefore pledged to the
support of Hastings, and indeed came out with the full intention of
so doing. But on his arrival he found himself unable to adopt the
measures which Hastings had recommended to the southern presi-
dency. Hastings had urged an alliance with the Dutch, in order
to obtain from them a force of European infantry in return for the
cession of the district of Tinnevelly by the nawab. But Macartney
had brought out with him orders to seize the Dutch factories, since
the United Provinces had just joined the French and the Americans
in the war against Great Britain. In the second place Hastings had
advised the cession of the sarkars to the Nizam on condition of
substantial assistance from him against Hyder. Macartney had no
1
19
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290
THE CARNATIC: 1761-84
specific orders from the Company on this head; but none the less he
stoutly refused to dismember the Company's possessions; he urged
that such a cession would not produce effects commensurate with the
cost, and in that he was very likely right. A third cause of difference
between the two was fortuitous. Hastings, on Macartney's arrival,
had written to him advising that the raja of Tanjore should be
required, and if necessary compelled, to contribute his share to the
cost of the war. Macartney was in agreement with this view; and
forwarded an extract from Hastings's letter to the chairman and
deputy chairman of the Company in support of his own arguments.
Unfortunately the letter arrived in England when Sulivan and
Hastings's friends had lost control of the directorate; and led to severe
and unmerited reproaches directed against Hastings by the new
chairs. Hastings accused Macartney of having betrayed him to his
enemies; and does not seem to have been convinced by Macartney's
temperate and candid explanation. Gleig, it may be noted, was
mistaken in supposing that no answer was returned to Hastings's
letter of accusation. Besides these occasions of difference in which
Macartney was in the right there was that unfortunate letter to the
Marathas, which has already been mentioned, in which he was
decidedly in the wrong. The result was a strong tendency in each to
suspect and question the opinions of the other.
At the same time Macartney was involved in disputes with Coote
and with the nawab. In sending Coote to Madras the Bengal Gov-
ernment had invested him with separate and independent powers,
as the Madras Government had done with Clive, in not dissimilar
circumstances in 1756. Coote interpreted them in the widest possible
sense, neglecting to attend the meetings of the Select Committee and
declining to explain his plans for the conduct of the war, while he
harassed the committee with ceaseless complaints regarding the
shortness of transport and supplies. Both sides complained to Bengal;
and Bengal preferred to support Coote, without seriously considering
the Madras assertions that the financial management of the army,
as distinguished from the military conduct of the war, was wasteful
and extravagant. Underlying these disputes were intrigues in which
Paul Benfield took a considerable part, exasperating Coote's irritable
mind against the unfortunate governor.
From the first the resources of Madras had been wholly unequal
to the maintenance of the war. Bengal had contributed largely,
sending no less than 265 lakhs of rupees, in specie, bills, and supplies,
in the course of the four years that the war continued. But the goy-
ernment had frequently and loudly declared that it was incumbent on
the Madras Government to do everything in its power to increase its
own resources, particularly the contributions from the nawab's
! Macartney to Hastings, 10. May, 1783 (Brit. Mus. · Add. MSS, 22455,
f. 47 verso).
## p. 291 (#319) ############################################
ASSIGNMENT OF REVENUES
291
revenues. But that spring had completely dried up. Twenty years
of financial mismanagement had exhausted the nawab's treasury,
never very full. In the crisis which resulted from Hyder's invasion,
he had sought to evade payment rather than to provide with funds
the only power that would protect him. To the demands of the
Madras authorities he had returned blank refusals. Foreseeing that
this course could not be continued indefinitely, he had sent a mission
to Calcutta where terms were settled between him and the Supreme
Government, which proceeded to dispatch to Madras a special agent,
chosen with singular lack of tact from among the Madras covenanted
servants, to watch over the performance of the treaty. This was in
1781, before Macartney had arrived. In so doing Hastings and his
council had clearly overstepped the limits of their statutory powers;
but they had not doubted their power of coercing the Madras Gov-
ernment into obedience. It was as discredited as had been that of
Drake in 1756. But Macartney's arrival had changed the situation
altogether. He soon made this clear. He and the Select Committee
declared that they could not acquiesce in the appointment of an agent
to perform the functions with which they were specially charged by
the Company. But though they refused to recognise the agent whom
Hastings had appointed, they did adopt the Bengal treaty as the basis
of a new agreement which Macartney proceeded to negotiate with
the nawab. On 2 December, 1781, the latter executed an assignment
of his revenues to Macartney in person for a fixed term of five years,
reserving to his own use one-fifth of what amounts should be collected.
This agreement was formally approved by the Bengal Government.
But it soon was evident that it was no more genuine than had been
all the previous promises of the durbar. The revenues which were
collected were not paid in to the Company, but secretly transmitted
to the nawab. When it was proposed to appoint inspectors to watch
over the revenue officials, the nawab refused to grant them the
necessary powers; when it was proposed to lease out the country to
renters, the nawab refused to sign the documents appointing them.
In these circumstances Macartney resolved no longer to give way,
but to exercise himself the power of appointing the renters. In this
conduct he was confirmed by a letter from Bengal, written indeed
without knowledge of the crisis that had arisen at Madras, but
strongly and pointedly urging the absolute necessity of making the
assignment . a 'reality in order that all the resources of the country
might be made available for the conduct of the war.
