[426] This distribution
of the army appeared to Cæsar a more easy manner to supply it with
provisions.
of the army appeared to Cæsar a more easy manner to supply it with
provisions.
Napoleon - History of Julius Caesar - b
The latter was no sooner informed of the
approach of the legions, than he repaired to Cæsar, and assured him that
he would not fail in his duties towards the Roman people. Indutiomarus,
on the contrary, raised troops, and caused to be placed in safety, in
the immense forest of the Ardennes, which extended across the country of
the Treviri from the Rhine to the territory of the Remi, all those whose
age rendered them incapable of carrying arms. But when he saw several
chiefs (_principes_), drawn by their alliance with Cingetorix or
intimidated by the approach of the Romans, treat with Cæsar, fearing to
be abandoned by all, he made his submission. Although Cæsar put no faith
in his sincerity, yet, as he did not want to pass the fine season among
the Treviri, and as he was desirous of hastening to Boulogne, where all
was ready for the expedition into Britain, he was satisfied with
exacting 200 hostages, among whom were the son and all the kindred of
Indutiomarus, and, after having assembled the principal chiefs, he
conferred the authority on Cingetorix. This preference accorded to a
rival turned Indutiomarus into an irreconcileable enemy. [388]
[Sidenote: Departure for the Isle of Britain. ]
II. Hoping that he had pacified the country by these measures, Cæsar
proceeded with his four legions to the Portus Itius. His fleet,
perfectly equipped, was ready to sail. Including the vessels of the
preceding years, it was composed of six hundred transport ships and
twenty-eight galleys. It wanted only forty ships built in the country of
the Meldæ,[389] which a tempest had driven back to their point of
departure; adding to it a certain number of light barques which many
chiefs had caused to be built for their own personal usage, the total
amounted to 800 sail. [390] The Roman army concentrated at Boulogne
consisted of eight legions and 4,000 cavalry raised in the whole of Gaul
and in Spain;[391] but the expeditionary body was composed only of five
legions and 2,000 cavalry. Labienus received orders to remain on the
coast of the Channel with three legions, and one-half of the cavalry, to
guard the ports, provide for the supply of the troops, keep watch upon
Gaul, and act according to circumstances. Cæsar had convoked the
principal citizens, of each people (_principes ex omnibus civitatibus_),
and left upon the continent but the small number of those of whose
fidelity he was assured, taking with him the others as pledges of
tranquillity during his absence. Dumnorix, who commanded the Æduan
cavalry in the expedition, was of all the chiefs the one it was most
important to carry with him. Restless, ambitious, and distinguished by
his courage and credit, this man had tried every means in vain to obtain
permission to remain in his country. Irritated by the refusal, he became
a conspirator, and said openly that Cæsar only dragged the nobles into
Britain to sacrifice them. These plots were known and watched with care.
It was the end of June. The wind from the north-west, which on this
coast blows habitually at this period of the year, retarded the
departure of the fleet twenty-five days; at length a favourable wind
rose, and the army received orders to embark. In the middle of the
bustle and confusion of starting, Dumnorix left the camp secretly with
the Æduan cavalry, and took the road for his own country. When this was
known, the embarkment was suspended, and a great part of the cavalry
went in pursuit of the fugitive, with orders to bring him back dead or
alive. Dumnorix, soon overtaken, resists, and is surrounded and slain.
The Æduan cavalry all returned to the camp.
On the 20th of July, we believe, the fleet raised anchor at sunset, with
a light breeze from the south-west. This wind having ceased towards
midnight, the fleet was carried rather far out of its route by the
current of the rising tide. At daybreak, Cæsar perceived that he had
left Britain to his left. (_See Plate_ 16. ) But then came on the
shifting of the current, of which he took advantage, and, aided by the
reflux (_jusant_), laboured with all oars to gain the part of the isle
found, in the preceding year, to offer an easy landing. Under these
circumstances, the soldiers, with a persevering energy, succeeded, by
means of their oars, in giving to the transport ships, in spite of their
heaviness, the speed of galleys. The army landed, towards noon, on
several points at once,[392] without any appearance of the enemy.
Prisoners reported subsequently that the barbarians, terrified at the
view of so great a number of ships, had withdrawn to the heights. [393]
[Sidenote: March into the interior of the Country. ]
III. Having effected the landing, Cæsar established his camp in a good
position, near the sea. [394] The fleet, left at anchor near the shore,
on a level beach without shoals, under the command of Atrius, inspired
him with no uneasiness. [395] As soon as he knew where the enemy was
posted, he began his march at the third watch (midnight), leaving ten
cohorts[396] and 300 cavalry to guard the fleet. After having proceeded
during the night about twelve miles, the Romans at daybreak came in
sight of the barbarians, posted on the heights of Kingston, beyond a
stream of water now called the Little Stour. [397] These caused their
cavalry and chariots to advance as far as the bank of the stream,
seeking, from their commanding position, to dispute the passage; but,
repulsed by the cavalry, they withdrew into a forest where there was a
place singularly fortified by nature and art, a refuge constructed in
former times in their intestine wars. [398] Numerous _abatis_ of felled
trees closed all the avenues. The Romans pushed the enemy up to the
border of the wood, and made an attempt to carry the position. The
Britons issued forth in small groups to defend the approaches of their
_oppidum_; but the soldiers of the 7th legion, having formed the
tortoise and pushed a terrace up to the inclosure, obtained possession
of the retrenchment, and drove them out of the wood without sensible
loss. Cæsar prevented the pursuit; he was unacquainted with the country,
and wished to employ the rest of the day in fortifying his camp. [399]
[Sidenote: Destruction of a part of the Fleet. ]
IV. Next morning, he divided the infantry and cavalry into three bodies,
and sent them separately in pursuit of the enemy. The troops had
advanced a considerable distance, and already the hindmost of the
fugitives were in view, when a party of cavalry, despatched by Q.
Atrius, came to announce that, in the preceding night, a violent
tempest had damaged and thrown on shore nearly all the vessels. Neither
anchors nor cordage had been strong enough to resist; the efforts of
pilots and sailors had been powerless, and the shocks of the vessels
against one another had caused serious loss. At this news, Cæsar called
in his troops, ordered them to limit their efforts to repulsing the
enemy as they retired, and hurried on before them to his fleet. He
verified the correctness of the losses which were announced: about forty
ships were destroyed, and the repair of the others required a long
labour. He took the workmen attached to the legions, and brought others
from the continent; wrote to Labienus to build, with his troops, the
greatest number of ships possible; and lastly, in order to place his
fleet in safety from all danger, he resolved, in spite of the labour it
must entail upon him, to haul all the vessels on land, and inclose them
in the camp by a new retrenchment. [400] The soldiers employed ten entire
days in this work, without interruption, even during the night. [401]
[Sidenote: Cæsar resumes the offensive. ]
V. The vessels once placed on dry ground and surrounded with substantial
defences, Cæsar left in the camp the same troops as before, and
returned towards the localities where he had been obliged to abandon the
pursuit of the Britons. He found them collected in great number. The
general direction of the war had been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose
states were separated from the maritime districts by the Thames, a river
which was about eighty miles distant from the coast. [402] This chief had
heretofore had to sustain continual wars against the other peoples of
the island; but, in face of the danger, all, with unanimous accord,
agreed in giving him the command.
The enemy’s cavalry, with the war-chariots, attacked vigorously the
cavalry in its march; they were everywhere beaten and driven back into
the woods or to the heights. A short time after, while the Romans were
labouring without distrust at their retrenchments, the Britons suddenly
issued from the woods and attacked their advanced posts. The struggle
becoming obstinate, Cæsar sent forward two picked cohorts, the first of
two legions. They had hardly taken their position, leaving a slight
interval between them, when the barbarians, manœuvring with their
chariots according to custom, so intimidated the Romans by this mode of
fighting, that they passed and repassed with impunity across the
interval between the cohorts. The enemy was only repulsed on the arrival
of re-enforcements. Q. Laberius Durus, a military tribune, perished in
this action.
The description of this battle, as given in the “Commentaries,” has been
differently understood. According to Dio Cassius, the Britons had at
first thrown the ranks of the Romans into disorder by means of their
chariots; but Cæsar, to baffle this manœuvre, had opened for them a
free passage by placing his cohorts at greater intervals. He would thus
have repeated the dispositions taken by Scipio at the battle of Zama, to
protect him against the Carthaginian elephants.
This engagement, which took place before the camp and under the eyes of
the army, showed how little the Roman tactics were fitted for this kind
of warfare. The legionary, heavily armed, and accustomed to combat in
line, could neither pursue the enemy in his retreat, nor move too far
from his ensigns. There existed a still greater disadvantage for the
cavalry. The Britons, by a simulated flight, drew them away from the
legionaries, and then, jumping down from their chariots, engaged on foot
in an unequal struggle; for, always supported by their cavalry, they
were as dangerous in the attack as in the defence. [403]
The following day, the enemies took a position far from the camp, on the
heights; they only showed themselves in small parties, isolated,
harassing the cavalry with less ardour than before. But, towards the
middle of the day, Cæsar having sent three legions and the cavalry,
under the orders of the lieutenant C. Trebonius, to forage, they rushed
from all sides upon the foragers with such impetuosity, that they
approached the eagles and legions which had remained under arms. The
infantry repulsed them vigorously, and, though they usually left to the
cavalry the care of the pursuit, this time they did not cease to drive
them before them till the cavalry, feeling themselves supported, came
themselves to complete the rout. These left them time neither to rally
nor to halt, nor to descend from their chariots, but made a great
carnage of them. After this defeat, the Britons resolved to combat no
more with their forces united, but to confine themselves to harassing
the Roman army, so as to drag on the war in length. [404]
[Sidenote: March towards the Thames. ]
VI. Cæsar, penetrating their design, hesitated no longer, in order to
terminate the campaign promptly, to advance to the very centre of their
strength: he directed his march towards the territory of Cassivellaunus,
passing, no doubt, by Maidstone and Westerham. (_See Plate 16. _)
Arriving at the banks of the Thames, which was then fordable only at one
place, perhaps at Sunbury, he perceived a multitude of enemies drawn up
on the opposite bank. [405] It was defended by a palisade of sharp
pointed stakes, before which other stakes driven into the bed of the
river remained hidden under the water. Cæsar was informed of this by
prisoners and deserters, and he sent the cavalry forward (probably a
certain distance above or below), in order to turn the enemy’s position
and occupy his attention, while the infantry destroyed the obstacles and
crossed the ford. The soldiers entered the river resolutely, and,
although they were in the water up to their shoulders, such was their
ardour that the enemy could not sustain the shock, but abandoned the
bank and fled. Polyænus relates that on this occasion Cæsar made use of
an elephant to facilitate the passage; but, as the “Commentaries” do not
mention such a fact, it is difficult to believe. [406]
[Sidenote: Submission of a part of Britain. ]
VII. This check deprived Cassivellaunus of all hope of resistance; he
sent away the greatest part of his troops, and only kept with him about
4,000 men, mounted in chariots. (Supposing six _essedarii_ to the
chariot, this would still amount to the considerable number of 660
carriages. ) Sometimes confining himself to watching the march of the
army, at others hiding in places of difficult access, or making a void
before the march of the Roman columns; often, also, profiting by his
knowledge of the localities, he fell unexpectedly with his chariots on
the cavalry when it ventured far plundering and sacking, which obliged
the latter to keep near the legions. Thus the damage inflicted on the
enemy could not extend beyond the march of the infantry.
Meanwhile the Trinobantes, one of the most powerful peoples of Britain,
sent deputies to offer their submission and demand Mandubratius for
their king. This young man, flying from the anger of Cassivellaunus, who
had put his father to death, had come to the continent to implore the
protection of Cæsar, and had accompanied him into Britain. The Roman
general listened favourably to the demand of the Trinobantes, and
exacted from them forty hostages and wheat for the army.
The protection obtained by the Trinobantes engaged the Cenimagni, the
Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi (_see p. 168_), to
follow their example. The deputies of these different peoples informed
Cæsar that the _oppidum_ of Cassivellaunus (_St. Albans_) stood at a
short distance, defended by marshes and woods, and containing a great
number of men and cattle. [407] Although this formidable position had
been further fortified by the hands of men, Cæsar led his legions
thither, and attacked it on two points without hesitation. After a
feeble resistance, the barbarians, in their attempt to escape, were
slain or captured in great numbers.
Nevertheless, Cæsar was operating too far from his point of departure
not to tempt Cassivellaunus to deprive him of the possibility of
returning to the continent, by seizing upon his fleet. In effect,
Cassivellaunus had ordered the four kings of the different parts of
Cantium (_Kent_), Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segovax, to
collect all their troops, and attack unexpectedly the camp in which the
Roman ships were inclosed. They hastened thither; but the cohorts did
not leave them time to attack; they made a sortie, killed a great number
of barbarians, captured one of their principal chiefs, Lugotorix, and
re-entered their camp without loss. On the news of this defeat,
Cassivellaunus, discouraged by so many reverses and the defection of
several peoples, employed Commius to offer his submission. [408]
[Sidenote: Re-embarkment of the Army. ]
VIII. Summer approached its end (they were in the last days of August).
Cæsar, aware that there no longer remained sufficient time to be
employed with advantage, prepared for his departure; he wished,
moreover, to pass the winter on the continent, fearing sudden revolts on
the part of the Gauls. He therefore caused hostages to be delivered to
him, fixed the tribute to be paid annually by Britain to the Roman
people, and expressly prohibited Cassivellaunus from all acts of
hostility against Mandubratius and the Trinobantes.
After receiving the hostages, Cæsar hastened to return in person to the
coast, and ordered his army to follow him afterwards; he found the ships
repaired, and caused them to be put afloat. His great number of
prisoners, and the loss of several of his ships, obliged him to pass the
army across the channel in two convoys. It is remarkable that, of so
many ships employed several times in the passage this year or the year
before, not one of those which carried the troops was lost; but, on the
contrary, the greater part of the ships which returned empty, after
having landed the soldiers of the first transport, and those built by
Labienus, to the number of sixty, did not reach their destination; they
were nearly all thrown back upon the coast of the continent. Cæsar, who
had resolved to leave Britain only with the last convoy, waited for them
some time in vain. The approach of the equinox led him to fear that the
period favourable for navigation would pass by, and he decided on
overloading his ships with soldiers, sailed in a moment of calm at the
beginning of the second watch (nine o’clock), and, after a favourable
passage, landed at daybreak. [409]
This second expedition, though more successful than the first, did not
bring as its result the complete submission of the isle of Britain.
According to Cæsar, the Romans did not even obtain any booty; yet Strabo
speaks of a considerable booty,[410] and another author confirms this
fact by relating that Cæsar formed out of the spoils of the enemy a
cuirass ornamented with pearls, which he consecrated to Venus. [411]
[Sidenote: Observations. ]
IX. Several indications enable us again to fix precisely the period of
the second expedition to Britain. We know, from a letter from Quintus to
his brother Cicero, that Cæsar was at the end of May at Lodi (we admit
the 22nd of May). [412] He might therefore have arrived towards the 2nd
of June on the shores of the ocean, where he inspected his fleet. During
the interval before it assembled at the Portus Itius, he proceeded to
the country of the Treviri, where he did not remain long; for, towards
the middle of the summer (_ne æstatem in Treviris consumere cogeretur_),
he started for Boulogne, where he arrived at the end of June. The winds
from the north-west retained him there twenty-five days, that is, till
towards the end of July. On another hand, Cicero wrote to Atticus on the
26th of July: “I see, from my brother’s letters, that he must already be
in Britain. ”[413] In reply to another letter of Quintus, dated on the
4th of the Ides of August (the 8th of August), he rejoices at having
received on the day of the Ides of September (9th of September), the
news of his arrival in that island. [414] These data fix the departure of
the expedition to the end of July, for the letters took from twenty to
thirty days to pass from Britain to Rome. [415] When the army moved from
the coasts, the news was naturally much longer on the way; and in the
month of October, Cicero wrote to his brother, “Here are fifty days
passed without the arrival of letter or sign of life from you, or Cæsar,
or even from where you are. ”[416] Having ascertained the month of July
for that of his departure, we have next to find the day on which that
departure took place.
Cæsar sailed at sunset, that is, towards eight o’clock (_solis occasu
naves solvit, leni Africo provectus_). The wind having ceased at
midnight, he was drawn by the currents towards the north; and when day
broke, at four o’clock in the morning, he saw on his left the cliffs of
the South Foreland; but then, the current changing with the tide, by
force of rowing he made land towards midday, as in the preceding summer,
near Deal.
To determine the day on which Cæsar landed, it is necessary, in the
first place, to know to what part the Roman fleet was carried during the
night. It is evident, first, that it was borne towards the north-east by
the current of the rising tide or flux, for otherwise we could not
understand how Cæsar, at sunrise, could have perceived Britain on his
left. We may add that it wandered from its way till it came to the
latitude of the Northern Sea, which is situated to the east of Deal, and
at about ten maritime miles from the coast. (_See Plate 14. _) In fact,
according to the text, the fleet took advantage of the current contrary
to that which had carried it away, and consequently of the reflux or
current of the ebbing tide, to reach the coast. Now, we are obliged by
this fact to conclude that it had been carried northward at least to the
latitude of Deal; for, if it had only arrived to the south of that
latitude, the reflux would necessarily have thrown it back into the
Straits. Lastly, to cause the fleet by force of rowing and aided by the
reflux to require eight hours to effect the last part of its passage to
Deal, it must, according to the best information obtained from sailors,
have been, at sunrise, ten miles from the coast.
This being granted, it is evidently sufficient, for determining the day
of landing, to resolve this question: on what day of the month of July
in the year 700 the current of the descending tide began to be perceived
_at sunrise, that is, towards four o’clock in the morning_, in the part
of the sea at ten miles to the east of Deal? or otherwise, if we
consider that the reflux begins there about four hours and a half after
the hour of high tide at Dover,[417] what day of the month of July in
the year 700 it was high tide at Dover towards half-past eleven o’clock
at night?
By following a train of reasoning similar to that which we applied to
determine the day of Cæsar’s first landing in Britain, and remarking
that the tides of the days preceding the full moon of the month of July,
700, which fell on the 21st, correspond to those of the days which
preceded the full moon of the 26th of July, 1858, we find that it was
either fifteen days or one day before the 21st of July of the year 700,
that is, the 6th or the 20th of July, that it was high tide at Dover
towards half-past eleven at night. Cæsar, therefore, landed on the 7th
or on the 21st of July. We adopt the second date, because, according to
Cicero’s letter cited above, he received, before the 26th of July, at
Rome news of his brother, which must have been of the 6th of the same
month, as the couriers were twenty days on the road. In this letter
Quintus announced his approaching departure for Britain.
This date, according to which the Roman army would have landed on the
eve of the day of the full moon, is the more probable, as Cæsar,
immediately on his arrival in Britain, made a night march, which would
have been impossible in complete darkness. The passage of the sea had
taken fifteen hours. In the return, it only took nine hours, since
Cæsar started at nine o’clock in the evening (_secunda inita cum
solvisset vigilia_), and arrived at Boulogne at daybreak (_prima luce_),
which, in the middle of September, is at six o’clock in the
morning. [418]
The date of his return is nearly fixed by a letter of Cicero, who
expresses himself thus: “On the 11th of the Calends of November (17th of
October), I received letters from my brother Quintus, and from Cæsar;
the expedition was finished, and the hostages delivered. They had made
no booty. They had only imposed contributions. The letters, written from
the shores of Britain, are dated on the 6th of the Calends of October
(21st of September), at the moment of embarking the army, which they are
bringing back. ”[419] This information accords with the date of the
equinox, which fell on the 26th of September, and which, according to
the “Commentaries,” was close at hand (_quod equinoctium suberat_).
Cæsar had, then, remained in Britain about sixty days.
[Sidenote: Presumed Dates of the Second Campaign in Britain. ]
X. Departure of Cæsar from Lodi[420] May 22.
Arrival at the army, in the
country of the Belgæ (in
12 days) June 2.
Inspection of the fleet and of the winter
quarters; junction of the four legions
in the country of the Remi, on the
Meuse, towards Sedan. From June 2 to June 7.
Passage from Sedan to the country of
the Treviri (80 kilometres, 3 days),
From June 8 to June 10.
Occurrences among the Treviri,
From June 10 to June 15.
Passage from Treviri to Boulogne (330
kil. , 12 days) From June 15 to June 26.
Delay of 25 days at Boulogne,
From June 26 to July 20.
Embarkment July 20.
Landing July 21.
Combat July 22.
Cæsar returns to his fleet July 23.
Ten days of reparations, From July 24 to August 2.
New march against the Britons August 3.
Combat August 4.
March towards the Thames (from the
Little Stour to Sunbury, 140 kilomètres)
From August 5 to August 11.
March from the Thames to the _oppidum_
of Cassivellaunus, From August 12 to August 15.
Time employed in negotiations and receiving
hostages (8 days),
From August 16 to August 23.
Return of Cæsar (in person) towards
the sea-coast. The 28th of August,
on his arrival at the fleet, he writes
to Cicero. --(_Epist. ad Quintum_, III.
1. ) August 28.
March of his army to the coast,
From August 24 to Sept. 10.
Embarkation of the last convoy Sept. 21.
[Sidenote: Distribution of the Legions in their Winter Quarters. ]
XI. Cæsar had no sooner arrived on the continent than he caused his
ships to be brought on ground, and then held at Samarobriva, (_Amiens_)
the assembly of Gaul. The defective harvest, caused by the dryness of
the season, obliged him to distribute his winter quarters differently
from the preceding years, by spreading them over a greater extent. [421]
The number of his legions was eight and a half, because, independent of
the eight legions brought together at Boulogne before the departure for
Britain, he had no doubt formed five cohorts of soldiers and sailors
employed on his fleet. The troops were distributed in the following
manner: he sent one legion into the country of the Morini (_to Saint
Pol_), under the orders of C. Fabius; another to the Nervii (_at
Charleroy_), with Quintus Cicero;[422] a third to the Essuvii (_at Sées,
in Normandy_), under the command of L. Roscius; a fourth, under T.
Labienus, to the country of the Remi, near the frontier of the Treviri
(_at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe_). [423] He placed three in Belgium,[424]
one at Samarobriva itself (_Amiens_), under the orders of Trebonius; the
second in the country of the Bellovaci, under M. Crassus, his questor,
at twenty-five miles from Amiens (_Montdidier_); the third under L.
Munatius Plancus, near the confluence of the Oise and the Aisne (_at
Champlieu_). The legion last raised[425] among the Transpadans repaired
with five cohorts, under the orders of Titurius Sabinus and Aurunculeius
Cotta, to the Eburones, whose country, situated in great part between
the Meuse and the Rhine, was governed by Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. It
occupied a fortress named Aduatuca (_Tongres_).
[426] This distribution
of the army appeared to Cæsar a more easy manner to supply it with
provisions. Moreover, these different winter quarters, with the
exception of that of M. Roscius, who occupied the most peaceable part of
Gaul, were all included within a circle of a hundred miles radius (148
kil. ). It was Cæsar’s intention not to leave them until he knew that the
legions were firmly established and their quarters fortified. (_See
Plate 14_, the sites of the winter quarters. )
There was among the Carnutes (_country of Chartres_) a man of high
birth, named Tasgetius, whose ancestors had reigned over that nation. In
consideration of his valour and of his important military services,
Cæsar had replaced him, during three years, in the rank held by his
forefather, when his enemies publicly massacred him. The men who had
participated in this crime were so numerous, that there was reason for
fearing that the revolt would spread over the whole country. To prevent
it, Cæsar despatched in the greatest haste L. Plancus at the head of his
legion, with orders to establish his quarters in the country of the
Carnutes, and to send him the accomplices in the murder of
Tasgetius. [427]
[Sidenote: Defeat of Sabinus at Aduatuca. ]
XII. He received at the same period (the end of October), from the
lieutenants and the questor, the news that the legions had arrived and
retrenched in their quarters. They had indeed been established in them
about a fortnight, when suddenly a revolt took place at the instigation
of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. These chiefs had at first repaired to the
limits of their territory to meet Sabinus and Cotta, and had even
furnished them with provisions; but soon after, urged on by the Treviran
Indutiomaras, they raise the country, fall unexpectedly on the soldiers
occupied in seeking wood, and attack the camp of Sabinus with
considerable forces. Immediately the Romans run to arms and mount on the
_vallum_. The Spanish cavalry makes a successful sortie, and the enemies
retire, deceived in their hope of carrying the retrenchments by storm.
Having then recourse to stratagem, they utter, according to their
custom, loud cries, and demand to enter into negotiations and deliberate
on their common interests, C. Arpineius, a Roman knight and the friend
of Sabinus, and the Spaniard Q. Junius, who had been employed on several
missions to Ambiorix, were sent to them. Ambiorix declared that he had
not forgotten the numerous benefits he had received from Cæsar, but that
he was forced to follow the movement of Gaul, which had conspired in a
common effort to recover its liberty. That very day, according to his
statement, the various quarters were to be attacked at the same time, so
as to hinder them from lending each other mutual succour; the Germans
had passed the Rhine, and would arrive in two days; Sabinus had no
other chance of safety but by abandoning his camp and rejoining Cicero
or Labienus, who were at a distance of fifty miles. In the end, Ambiorix
promised under an oath to give him a free passage. The envoys reported
to Sabinus and Cotta what they had heard. Troubled at this news, and the
more disposed to put faith in it because it was hardly credible that so
small a people as the Eburones would have dared alone to brave the Roman
power, the two lieutenants submitted the affair to a council of war: it
became the subject of warm disputes. Cotta, and with him several of the
tribunes and centurions of the first class, were of opinion that they
should not act hastily, but wait for orders from Cæsar. Their camp was
strong enough to resist all the forces of the Germans; they were not
pressed by want of food; they might receive succours, and, under
circumstances of so much gravity, it would be disgraceful to take their
counsel from the enemy.
Sabinus replied with force that it would be too late to decide when the
number of the assailants would be increased by the arrival of the
Germans, and when the neighbouring quarters would have experienced some
disaster. “The movement requires a prompt decision. Cæsar has, no doubt,
started for Italy: otherwise, would the Carnutes have dared to slay
Tasgetius, and the Eburones to attack the camp with so much boldness? We
must consider the counsel itself, and not him who gives it: the Rhine is
at a short distance; the Germans are irritated by the death of
Ariovistus, and by their preceding defeats; Gaul is in flames; she
supports with impatience the Roman yoke, and the loss of her ancient
military glory. Would Ambiorix have engaged without powerful motives in
such an enterprise? It is safest, therefore, to follow his counsel, and
to gain as quickly as possible the nearest quarters. ”
Cotta and the centurions of the first class earnestly maintained the
contrary opinion. “Let it then be as you will! ” said Sabinus; and then,
raising his voice to be heard by the soldiers, he shouted: “Death does
not terrify me; but behold, Cotta, those who will require of thee a
reckoning for the misfortunes which thou art preparing for them. After
to-morrow, if you would agree to it, they could have rejoined the
nearest legion, and, united with it, incur together the chances of war;
they will know that thou hast preferred leaving them, far from their
companions, exposed to perish by the sword or by famine. ”
When the council was ended, the lieutenants are surrounded and implored
not to compromise the safety of the army by their misunderstanding; let
them go or remain, provided they are agreed, everything will be easy.
The debate is prolonged into the middle of the night; at last, Cotta,
moved, yields to the opinion of Sabinus, and agrees to repair to Cicero,
encamped in the country of the Nervii; the departure is fixed for
daybreak. The rest of the night is passed in the midst of preparations;
the soldier chooses what articles of his winter equipment he will carry
with him. And, as if the danger were not sufficiently great, he seems as
if he wished to increase it by fatigue and watching. At daybreak, the
troops, in full security, begin their march in a long column,
encumbered with a numerous baggage.
At the distance of three kilomètres (_a millibus passuum circiter
duobus_) from the town of Tongres is the vale of Lowaige, closed in
between two hills, and forming a great defile of about 2,500 mètres in
length (_magnam convallem_). It is traversed by a stream, the Geer. The
hills, now denuded, were, only a century ago, covered with wood;[428] it
was there that the Eburones lay in wait for the Roman army.
Informed of the intended retreat by the noise and tumult, they had
divided themselves into two bodies, on the right and left of the vale,
and placed themselves in ambush in the middle of the woods. When they
saw the greater part of the Roman troops engaged in the defile, they
attacked them in rear and in front, profiting by all the advantages of
the locality.
Then Sabinus, like a man who had shown no foresight, becomes troubled,
hurries hither and thither, hesitates in all his measures--as happens to
him who, taken by surprise, is obliged to act decisively in the middle
of danger. Cotta, on the contrary, who had calculated the fatal chances
of the departure which he had opposed, neglects nothing for the general
safety. He encourages the troops, combats in the ranks--a general and a
soldier at the same time. As the length of the column prevented the
lieutenants from seeing all and ordering all themselves, they caused the
soldiers to pass on from mouth to mouth the order to abandon the baggage
and form the circle. This resolution, though justified by the
circumstances, had, nevertheless, a disastrous effect; it diminished the
confidence of the Romans, and increased the ardour of the Eburones, who
ascribed so desperate a resolution to fear and discouragement. There
resulted from it, too, an inevitable inconvenience: the soldiers quitted
their ensigns in crowds to run to the baggage, and take their more
valuable effects; and on all parts there was nothing but shouts and
confusion.
The barbarians acted with intelligence. Their chiefs, fearing that they
would disperse to pillage the baggage of the Romans, sent orders on all
points that every one must keep his rank, declaring that the thing
important was first to assure themselves of the victory, and that
afterwards the booty would fall into their hands.
The Eburones were rough adversaries; but by their number and their
courage, the Romans might have maintained the struggle. Although
abandoned by their chief and by fortune, they relied upon themselves for
everything, and every time that a cohort fell upon the enemies, it made
a great carnage of them. Ambiorix perceived this: he shouted loudly his
commands that his men should throw their missiles from a distance, and
not approach near; that they should retire whenever the Romans rushed
forward, and only attack them in their retreat, when they returned to
their ensigns--a manœuvre easy to the Eburones, practised in such
exercises, and nimble on account of the lightness of their equipment.
The order was faithfully executed. When a cohort quitted the circle to
charge the enemies, they fled with speed; but the cohort, in its
advance, left its right flank (not protected, like the left flank, by
the bucklers) exposed to the missiles; when it resumed its former
position, it was surrounded on all sides both by those who had
retreated, and by those who had remained on its flanks.
If, instead of sending forward their cohorts in succession, the Romans
stood firm in their circle, they lost the advantage of attacking, and
their close ranks made them more exposed to the multitude of missiles.
Meanwhile, the number of the wounded increased every moment. It was two
o’clock; the combat had lasted from sunrise, and yet the Roman soldiers
had not ceased to show themselves worthy of themselves. At this moment
the struggle becomes more desperate. T. Balventius, a brave and
respected man, who, in the previous year, had commanded as primipilus,
has his two thighs transpierced by a javelin; Q. Lucanius, an officer of
the same grade, is killed fighting valiantly to rescue his son, who is
surrounded by enemies. Cotta himself, while he runs from rank to rank to
encourage the soldiers, is wounded in the face by a missile from a
sling.
At this sight, Sabinus, discouraged, sees no other help but to treat
with Ambiorix. Perceiving him at a distance in the act of urging on his
troops, he sends to him his interpreter Cn. Pompeius, to pray him to
spare him and his men. Ambiorix replies that he is quite willing to
enter into negotiations with Sabinus, whose person he undertakes under
the obligation of his oath to cause to be respected; that further, he
hopes to obtain from the Eburones safety of life for the Roman soldiers.
Sabinus communicates this reply to Cotta, who is already wounded, and
proposes that they should go together to confer with Ambiorix; this step
may secure the safety of themselves and the army. Cotta refuses
obstinately, and declares that he will never treat with an enemy in
arms.
Sabinus enjoins to the tribunes of the soldiers who stand round him, and
to the centurions of the first class, to follow him. Arriving near
Ambiorix, he is summoned to lay down his sword: he obeys, and orders his
men to imitate his example. While they discuss the conditions in an
interview which the chief of the Eburones prolongs intentionally,
Sabinus is gradually surrounded and massacred. Then the barbarians,
raising, according to their custom, wild cries, rush upon the Romans and
break their ranks. Cotta and the greatest part of his soldiers perish
with their arms in their hands; the others seek refuge in the camp of
Aduatuca, from whence they had started. The ensign-bearer, L.
Petrosidius, pressed by a crowd of enemies, throws the eagle into the
retrenchments, and dies defending himself bravely at the foot of the
rampart. The unfortunate soldiers strive to sustain the combat till
night, and that very night they kill one another in despair. A few,
however, escaping from the field of battle, cross the forests, and gain
by chance the quarters of T. Labienus, to whom they give information of
this disaster. [429]
[Sidenote: Attack on Cicero’s Camp. ]
XIII. Elated by this victory, Ambiorix immediately repairs with his
cavalry into the country of the Aduatuci, a people adjoining to his
states, and marches without interruption all the night and the following
day: the infantry has orders to follow him. He announces his successes
to the Aduatuci, and urges them to take up arms. Next day he proceeds to
the Nervii, presses them to seize this occasion to avenge their injuries
and deliver themselves for ever from the yoke of the Romans; he informs
them of the death of two lieutenants, and of the destruction of a great
part of the Roman army; he adds that the legion in winter quarters among
them, under the command of Cicero, will be easily surprised and
annihilated; he offers his alliance to the Nervii, and easily persuades
them.
These immediately give information to the Ceutrones, the Grudii, the
Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, tribes under their dependence:
they collect all the troops they can, and proceed unexpectedly to the
winter quarters of Cicero, before he had learnt the disaster and death
of Sabinus. There, as it had happened recently at Aduatuca, some
soldiers, occupied in cutting wood in the forest, are surprised by the
cavalry. Soon a considerable number of Eburones, Aduatuci, and Nervii,
with their allies and clients, proceed to attack the camp. The Romans
rush to arms, and mount the _vallum_; but that day they make head with
difficulty against an enemy who has placed all his hope in the
promptness of an unforeseen attack, and was convinced that after this
victory nothing further could resist him. [430]
[Sidenote: Cæsar marches to the succour of Cicero. ]
XIV. Cæsar was still at Amiens, ignorant of the events which had just
taken place. Cicero immediately wrote to him, and promised great
recompenses to those who should succeed in delivering his letters to
him; but all the roads were watched, and nobody could reach him. During
the night twenty towers were raised, with an incredible celerity, by
means of the wood which had been already brought for fortifying the
camp,[431] and the works were completed. Next day, the enemies, whose
forces had increased, returned to the attack and began to fill the
fosse. The resistance was as energetic as the day before, and continued
during the following days; among these heroic soldiers constancy and
energy seemed to increase with the peril. Each night they prepare
everything necessary for the defence on the morrow. They make a great
number of stakes hardened by fire, and _pila_ employed in sieges; they
establish with planks the floors of the towers, and by means of hurdles
make parapets and battlements. They work without intermission: neither
wounded nor sick take repose. Cicero himself, though a man of feeble
health, is day and night at work, in spite of the entreaties of his
soldiers, who implore him to spare himself.
Meanwhile, the chiefs and _principes_ of the Nervii proposed an
interview to Cicero. They repeated to him what Ambiorix had said to
Sabinus: “All Gaul is in arms; the Germans have passed the Rhine; the
quarters of Cæsar and his lieutenants are attacked. ” They added:
“Sabinus and his cohorts have perished; the presence of Ambiorix is a
proof of their veracity; Cicero would deceive himself if he reckoned on
the succour of the other legions. As to them, they have no hostile
intention, provided the Romans will discontinue occupying their country.
The legion has full liberty to retire without fear whither it likes. ”
Cicero replied “that it was not the custom of the Roman people to accept
conditions from an enemy in arms; but that, if they consented to lay
them down, he would serve them as a mediator with Cæsar, who would
decide. ”
Deceived in their expectation of intimidating Cicero, the Nervii
surrounded the camp with a rampart nine feet high, and a fosse fifteen
wide. They had observed the Roman works in the preceding campaigns, and
learnt from some prisoners to imitate them. But, as they did not possess
the necessary instruments of iron, they were obliged to cut the turf
with their swords, to take the earth with their hands, and to carry it
in their cloaks. We may judge of their great number by the fact that in
less than three hours they completed a retrenchment of 15,000 feet in
circuit. [432] On the following days, they raised towers to the height of
the _vallum_, prepared hooks (_falces_), and covered galleries
(_testudines_), which they had similarly been taught by the
prisoners. [433]
On the seventh day of the siege, a great wind having arisen, the enemies
threw into the camp fiery darts, and launched from their slings balls of
burning clay (_ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes_). [434] The barracks,
roofed with straw, in the Gaulish manner, soon took fire, and the wind
spread the flames in an instant through the whole camp. Then, raising
great shouts, as though they had already gained the victory, they pushed
forward their towers and covered galleries, and attempted, by means of
ladders, to scale the _vallum_; but such were the courage and steadiness
of the Roman soldiers, that, though surrounded with flames, overwhelmed
with a shower of darts, and knowing well that the fire was devouring
their baggage and their property, not one of them quitted his post, or
even dreamt of turning his head, so much did that desperate struggle
absorb their minds. This was their most trying day. Meanwhile, many of
the enemies were killed and wounded, because, crowding to the foot of
the rampart, the last ranks stopped the retreat of the first. The fire
having been appeased, the barbarians pushed up a tower against the
_vallum_. [435] The centurions of the third cohort, who happened to be
there, drew their men back, and, in bravado, invited, by their gesture
and voice, the enemies to enter. Nobody ventured. Then they drove them
away by a shower of stones, and the tower was burnt. There were in that
legion two centurions, T. Pulio and L. Vorenus, who emulated each other
in bravery by rushing into the midst of the assailants. Thrown down in
turn, and surrounded by enemies, they mutually rescued each other
several times, and returned into the camp without wounds. Defensive arms
then permitted individual courage to perform actual prodigies.
Still the siege continued, and the number of the defenders diminished
daily; provisions began to fall short, as well as the necessaries for
tending the wounded. [436] The frequent messengers sent by Cicero to
Cæsar were intercepted, and some of them cruelly put to death within
view of the camp. At last, Vertico, a Nervian chieftain who had embraced
the cause of the Romans, prevailed upon one of his slaves to take charge
of a letter to Cæsar. His quality of a Gaul enabled him to pass
unperceived, and to give intelligence to the general of Cicero’s danger.
Cæsar received this information at Amiens towards the eleventh hour of
the day (four o’clock in the afternoon). He had only at hand three
legions--that of Trebonius, at Amiens; that of M. Crassus, whose
quarters were at Montdidier, in the country of the Bellovaci, at a
distance of twenty-five miles; and lastly, that which, under C. Fabius,
was wintering in the country of the Morini, at Saint-Pol. [437] (_See
Plate 14. _) He despatched a courier to Crassus, charged with delivering
to him his order to start with his legion in the middle of the night,
and join him in all haste at Amiens, to relieve there the legion of
Trebonius. Another courier was sent to the lieutenant C. Fabius, to
direct him to take his legion into the territory of the Atrebates, which
Cæsar would cross, and where their junction was to be effected. He wrote
similarly to Labienus, to march with his legion towards the country of
the Nervii, if he could without peril. As to the legion of Roscius and
that of Plancus, which were too far distant, they remained in their
quarters.
Crassus had no sooner received his orders than he began his march; and
next day, towards the third hour (ten o’clock), his couriers announced
his approach. Cæsar left him at Amiens, with one legion, to guard the
baggage of the army, the hostages, the archives, and the winter
provisions. He immediately started in person, without waiting for the
rest of the army, with the legion of Trebonius, and four hundred cavalry
from the neighbouring quarters. He followed, no doubt, the direction
from Amiens to Cambrai, and made that day twenty miles (thirty
kilomètres). He was subsequently joined on his road, probably towards
Bourcies, between Bapaume and Cambrai, by Fabius, who had not lost a
moment in executing his orders. Meanwhile arrived the reply of Labienus.
He informed Cæsar of the events which had taken place among the
Eburones, and of their effect among the Treviri. These latter had just
risen. All their troops had advanced towards him, and surrounded him at
a distance of three miles. In this position, fearing that he should not
be able to resist enemies proud of a recent victory, who would take his
departure for a flight, he thought that there would be danger in
quitting his winter quarters.
Cæsar approved of the resolution taken by Labienus, although it reduced
to two the three legions on which he counted; and, although their
effective force did not amount to more than 7,000 men, as the safety of
the army depended on the celerity of his movements, he proceeded by
forced marches to the country of the Nervii; there he learnt from
prisoners the perilous situation of Cicero. He immediately engaged, by
the promise of great recompenses, a Gaulish horseman to carry a letter
to him: it was written in Greek,[438] in order that the enemy, if he
intercepted it, might not know its meaning. Further, in case the Gaul
could not penetrate to Cicero, he had directed him to attach the letter
to the _amentum_ (see page 37, note 2) of his javelin, and throw it over
the retrenchments. Cæsar wrote that he was approaching in great haste
with his legions, and he exhorted Cicero to persevere in his energetic
defence. According to Polyænus, the despatch contained these words:
θαῥῥεἱν βοἡθειαν προσδἑχου (“Courage! expect succour”). [439]
As soon as he arrived near the camp, the Gaul, not daring to penetrate
to it, did as Cæsar had directed him. By chance his javelin remained two
days stuck in a tower. It was only on the third that it was seen and
carried to Cicero. The letter, read in the presence of the assembled
soldiers, excited transports of joy. Soon afterwards they perceived in
the distance the smoke of burning habitations, which announced the
approach of the army of succour. At that moment, after a five days’
march, it had arrived within twenty kilomètres of Charleroi, near
Binche, where it encamped. The Gauls, when they were informed of it by
their scouts, raised the siege, and then, to the number of about 60,000,
marched to meet the legions.
Cicero, thus liberated, sent another Gaul to announce to Cæsar that the
enemy were turning all their forces against him. At this news, received
towards the middle of the night, Cæsar informed his soldiers, and
strengthened them in their desire of vengeance. At daybreak next day he
raised his camp. After advancing four miles, he perceived a crowd of
enemies on the other side of a great valley traversed by the stream of
the Haine. [440] Cæsar did not consider it prudent to descend into the
valley to engage in combat against so great a number of troops.
Moreover, Cicero once rescued, there was no need for hurrying his march;
he therefore halted, and chose a good position for retrenching--mount
Sainte-Aldegonde. Although his camp, containing hardly 7,000 men,
without baggage, was necessarily of limited extent, he diminished it as
much as possible by giving less width to the streets, in order to
deceive the enemy as to his real strength. At the same time he sent out
scouts to ascertain the best place for crossing the valley.
That day passed in skirmishes of cavalry on the banks of the stream, but
each kept his positions: the Gauls, because they were waiting for
re-enforcements; Cæsar, because he counted on his simulated fear to draw
the enemies out of their position, and compel them to fight on his side
of the Haine, before his camp. If he could not succeed, he obtained time
to reconnoitre the roads sufficiently to pass the river and valley with
less danger. On the morrow, at daybreak, the enemy’s cavalry came up to
the retrenchments, and attacked that of the Romans. Cæsar ordered his
men to give way, and return into the camp; at the same time he caused
the height of the ramparts to be increased, the gates to be stopped up
with mere lumps of turf, and directed his soldiers to execute his
directions with tumultuous haste and all the signs of fear.
The Gauls, drawn on by this feint, passed the stream, and formed in
order of battle in a disadvantageous place. Seeing that the Romans had
even abandoned the _vallum_, they approached nearer to it, threw their
missiles over it from all sides, and caused their heralds to proclaim
round the retrenchments that, until the third hour (ten o’clock), every
Gaul or Roman who should desert to them should have his life saved. At
last, having no hope of forcing the gates, which they supposed to be
solidly fortified, they carried their boldness so far as to begin to
fill up the fosse, and to pull down the palisades with their hands. But
Cæsar held his troops in readiness to profit by the excessive confidence
of the Gauls: at a signal given, they rush through all the gates at
once; the enemy does not resist, but takes to flight, abandoning their
arms, and leaves the ground covered with his dead.
Cæsar did not pursue far, on account of the woods and marshes; he would
not have been able, indeed, to inflict further loss; he marched with his
troops, without having suffered any loss, towards the camp of Cicero,
where he arrived the same day. [441] The towers, the covered galleries,
and the retrenchments of the barbarians, excited his astonishment.
Having assembled the soldiers of Cicero’s legion, nine-tenths of whom
were wounded, he could judge how much danger they had run and how much
courage they had displayed. He loaded with praise the general and
soldiers, addressing individually the centurions and the tribunes who
had distinguished themselves. The prisoners gave him more ample details
on the deaths of Sabinus and Cotta, whose disaster had produced a deep
impression in the army. The next day he reminds the troops convoked for
that purpose of the past event, consoles and encourages them, throws the
fault of this check on the imprudence of the lieutenant, and exhorts
them to resignation the more, because, thanks to the valour of the
soldiers and the protection of the gods, the expiation had been prompt,
and left no further reason for the enemies to rejoice, or for the Romans
to be afflicted. [442]
We see, from what precedes, how small a number of troops, disseminated
over a vast territory, surmounted, by discipline and courage, a
formidable insurrection. Quintus Cicero, by following the principle
invoked by Cotta, _not to enter into negotiations with an enemy in
arms_, saved both his army and his honour. As to Cæsar, he gave proof,
in this circumstance, of an energy and strength of mind which Quintus
Cicero did not fail to point out to his brother when he wrote to
him. [443] If we believe Suetonius and Polyænus, Cæsar felt so great a
grief for the check experienced by Sabinus, that, in sign of mourning,
he let his beard and hair grow until he had avenged his
lieutenants,[444] which only happened in the year following, by the
destruction of the Eburones and the Nervii.
[Sidenote: Cæsar places his Troops in Winter Quarters. Labienus defeats
Indutiomarus. ]
XV. Meanwhile the news of Cæsar’s victory reached Labienus, across the
country of the Remi, with incredible speed: his winter quarters were at
a distance of about sixty miles from Cicero’s camp, where Cæsar had only
arrived after the ninth hour of the day (three o’clock in the
afternoon), and yet before midnight shouts of joy were raised at the
gates of the camp, the acclamations of the Remi who came to congratulate
Labienus. The noise spread in the army of the Treviri, and Indutiomarus,
who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus next day, withdrew
during the night, and took all his troops with him.
These events having been accomplished, Cæsar distributed the seven
legions he had left in the following manner: he sent Fabius with his
legion to his winter quarters among the Morini, and established himself
in the neighbourhood of Amiens with three legions, which he separated in
three quarters: they were the legion of Crassus, which had remained
stationary, that of Cicero, and that of Trebonius. There are still seen,
along the Somme, in the neighbourhood of Amiens, three camps at a short
distance from each other, which appear to have been those of that
period. [445] Labienus, Plancus, and Roscius continued to occupy the same
positions.
approach of the legions, than he repaired to Cæsar, and assured him that
he would not fail in his duties towards the Roman people. Indutiomarus,
on the contrary, raised troops, and caused to be placed in safety, in
the immense forest of the Ardennes, which extended across the country of
the Treviri from the Rhine to the territory of the Remi, all those whose
age rendered them incapable of carrying arms. But when he saw several
chiefs (_principes_), drawn by their alliance with Cingetorix or
intimidated by the approach of the Romans, treat with Cæsar, fearing to
be abandoned by all, he made his submission. Although Cæsar put no faith
in his sincerity, yet, as he did not want to pass the fine season among
the Treviri, and as he was desirous of hastening to Boulogne, where all
was ready for the expedition into Britain, he was satisfied with
exacting 200 hostages, among whom were the son and all the kindred of
Indutiomarus, and, after having assembled the principal chiefs, he
conferred the authority on Cingetorix. This preference accorded to a
rival turned Indutiomarus into an irreconcileable enemy. [388]
[Sidenote: Departure for the Isle of Britain. ]
II. Hoping that he had pacified the country by these measures, Cæsar
proceeded with his four legions to the Portus Itius. His fleet,
perfectly equipped, was ready to sail. Including the vessels of the
preceding years, it was composed of six hundred transport ships and
twenty-eight galleys. It wanted only forty ships built in the country of
the Meldæ,[389] which a tempest had driven back to their point of
departure; adding to it a certain number of light barques which many
chiefs had caused to be built for their own personal usage, the total
amounted to 800 sail. [390] The Roman army concentrated at Boulogne
consisted of eight legions and 4,000 cavalry raised in the whole of Gaul
and in Spain;[391] but the expeditionary body was composed only of five
legions and 2,000 cavalry. Labienus received orders to remain on the
coast of the Channel with three legions, and one-half of the cavalry, to
guard the ports, provide for the supply of the troops, keep watch upon
Gaul, and act according to circumstances. Cæsar had convoked the
principal citizens, of each people (_principes ex omnibus civitatibus_),
and left upon the continent but the small number of those of whose
fidelity he was assured, taking with him the others as pledges of
tranquillity during his absence. Dumnorix, who commanded the Æduan
cavalry in the expedition, was of all the chiefs the one it was most
important to carry with him. Restless, ambitious, and distinguished by
his courage and credit, this man had tried every means in vain to obtain
permission to remain in his country. Irritated by the refusal, he became
a conspirator, and said openly that Cæsar only dragged the nobles into
Britain to sacrifice them. These plots were known and watched with care.
It was the end of June. The wind from the north-west, which on this
coast blows habitually at this period of the year, retarded the
departure of the fleet twenty-five days; at length a favourable wind
rose, and the army received orders to embark. In the middle of the
bustle and confusion of starting, Dumnorix left the camp secretly with
the Æduan cavalry, and took the road for his own country. When this was
known, the embarkment was suspended, and a great part of the cavalry
went in pursuit of the fugitive, with orders to bring him back dead or
alive. Dumnorix, soon overtaken, resists, and is surrounded and slain.
The Æduan cavalry all returned to the camp.
On the 20th of July, we believe, the fleet raised anchor at sunset, with
a light breeze from the south-west. This wind having ceased towards
midnight, the fleet was carried rather far out of its route by the
current of the rising tide. At daybreak, Cæsar perceived that he had
left Britain to his left. (_See Plate_ 16. ) But then came on the
shifting of the current, of which he took advantage, and, aided by the
reflux (_jusant_), laboured with all oars to gain the part of the isle
found, in the preceding year, to offer an easy landing. Under these
circumstances, the soldiers, with a persevering energy, succeeded, by
means of their oars, in giving to the transport ships, in spite of their
heaviness, the speed of galleys. The army landed, towards noon, on
several points at once,[392] without any appearance of the enemy.
Prisoners reported subsequently that the barbarians, terrified at the
view of so great a number of ships, had withdrawn to the heights. [393]
[Sidenote: March into the interior of the Country. ]
III. Having effected the landing, Cæsar established his camp in a good
position, near the sea. [394] The fleet, left at anchor near the shore,
on a level beach without shoals, under the command of Atrius, inspired
him with no uneasiness. [395] As soon as he knew where the enemy was
posted, he began his march at the third watch (midnight), leaving ten
cohorts[396] and 300 cavalry to guard the fleet. After having proceeded
during the night about twelve miles, the Romans at daybreak came in
sight of the barbarians, posted on the heights of Kingston, beyond a
stream of water now called the Little Stour. [397] These caused their
cavalry and chariots to advance as far as the bank of the stream,
seeking, from their commanding position, to dispute the passage; but,
repulsed by the cavalry, they withdrew into a forest where there was a
place singularly fortified by nature and art, a refuge constructed in
former times in their intestine wars. [398] Numerous _abatis_ of felled
trees closed all the avenues. The Romans pushed the enemy up to the
border of the wood, and made an attempt to carry the position. The
Britons issued forth in small groups to defend the approaches of their
_oppidum_; but the soldiers of the 7th legion, having formed the
tortoise and pushed a terrace up to the inclosure, obtained possession
of the retrenchment, and drove them out of the wood without sensible
loss. Cæsar prevented the pursuit; he was unacquainted with the country,
and wished to employ the rest of the day in fortifying his camp. [399]
[Sidenote: Destruction of a part of the Fleet. ]
IV. Next morning, he divided the infantry and cavalry into three bodies,
and sent them separately in pursuit of the enemy. The troops had
advanced a considerable distance, and already the hindmost of the
fugitives were in view, when a party of cavalry, despatched by Q.
Atrius, came to announce that, in the preceding night, a violent
tempest had damaged and thrown on shore nearly all the vessels. Neither
anchors nor cordage had been strong enough to resist; the efforts of
pilots and sailors had been powerless, and the shocks of the vessels
against one another had caused serious loss. At this news, Cæsar called
in his troops, ordered them to limit their efforts to repulsing the
enemy as they retired, and hurried on before them to his fleet. He
verified the correctness of the losses which were announced: about forty
ships were destroyed, and the repair of the others required a long
labour. He took the workmen attached to the legions, and brought others
from the continent; wrote to Labienus to build, with his troops, the
greatest number of ships possible; and lastly, in order to place his
fleet in safety from all danger, he resolved, in spite of the labour it
must entail upon him, to haul all the vessels on land, and inclose them
in the camp by a new retrenchment. [400] The soldiers employed ten entire
days in this work, without interruption, even during the night. [401]
[Sidenote: Cæsar resumes the offensive. ]
V. The vessels once placed on dry ground and surrounded with substantial
defences, Cæsar left in the camp the same troops as before, and
returned towards the localities where he had been obliged to abandon the
pursuit of the Britons. He found them collected in great number. The
general direction of the war had been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose
states were separated from the maritime districts by the Thames, a river
which was about eighty miles distant from the coast. [402] This chief had
heretofore had to sustain continual wars against the other peoples of
the island; but, in face of the danger, all, with unanimous accord,
agreed in giving him the command.
The enemy’s cavalry, with the war-chariots, attacked vigorously the
cavalry in its march; they were everywhere beaten and driven back into
the woods or to the heights. A short time after, while the Romans were
labouring without distrust at their retrenchments, the Britons suddenly
issued from the woods and attacked their advanced posts. The struggle
becoming obstinate, Cæsar sent forward two picked cohorts, the first of
two legions. They had hardly taken their position, leaving a slight
interval between them, when the barbarians, manœuvring with their
chariots according to custom, so intimidated the Romans by this mode of
fighting, that they passed and repassed with impunity across the
interval between the cohorts. The enemy was only repulsed on the arrival
of re-enforcements. Q. Laberius Durus, a military tribune, perished in
this action.
The description of this battle, as given in the “Commentaries,” has been
differently understood. According to Dio Cassius, the Britons had at
first thrown the ranks of the Romans into disorder by means of their
chariots; but Cæsar, to baffle this manœuvre, had opened for them a
free passage by placing his cohorts at greater intervals. He would thus
have repeated the dispositions taken by Scipio at the battle of Zama, to
protect him against the Carthaginian elephants.
This engagement, which took place before the camp and under the eyes of
the army, showed how little the Roman tactics were fitted for this kind
of warfare. The legionary, heavily armed, and accustomed to combat in
line, could neither pursue the enemy in his retreat, nor move too far
from his ensigns. There existed a still greater disadvantage for the
cavalry. The Britons, by a simulated flight, drew them away from the
legionaries, and then, jumping down from their chariots, engaged on foot
in an unequal struggle; for, always supported by their cavalry, they
were as dangerous in the attack as in the defence. [403]
The following day, the enemies took a position far from the camp, on the
heights; they only showed themselves in small parties, isolated,
harassing the cavalry with less ardour than before. But, towards the
middle of the day, Cæsar having sent three legions and the cavalry,
under the orders of the lieutenant C. Trebonius, to forage, they rushed
from all sides upon the foragers with such impetuosity, that they
approached the eagles and legions which had remained under arms. The
infantry repulsed them vigorously, and, though they usually left to the
cavalry the care of the pursuit, this time they did not cease to drive
them before them till the cavalry, feeling themselves supported, came
themselves to complete the rout. These left them time neither to rally
nor to halt, nor to descend from their chariots, but made a great
carnage of them. After this defeat, the Britons resolved to combat no
more with their forces united, but to confine themselves to harassing
the Roman army, so as to drag on the war in length. [404]
[Sidenote: March towards the Thames. ]
VI. Cæsar, penetrating their design, hesitated no longer, in order to
terminate the campaign promptly, to advance to the very centre of their
strength: he directed his march towards the territory of Cassivellaunus,
passing, no doubt, by Maidstone and Westerham. (_See Plate 16. _)
Arriving at the banks of the Thames, which was then fordable only at one
place, perhaps at Sunbury, he perceived a multitude of enemies drawn up
on the opposite bank. [405] It was defended by a palisade of sharp
pointed stakes, before which other stakes driven into the bed of the
river remained hidden under the water. Cæsar was informed of this by
prisoners and deserters, and he sent the cavalry forward (probably a
certain distance above or below), in order to turn the enemy’s position
and occupy his attention, while the infantry destroyed the obstacles and
crossed the ford. The soldiers entered the river resolutely, and,
although they were in the water up to their shoulders, such was their
ardour that the enemy could not sustain the shock, but abandoned the
bank and fled. Polyænus relates that on this occasion Cæsar made use of
an elephant to facilitate the passage; but, as the “Commentaries” do not
mention such a fact, it is difficult to believe. [406]
[Sidenote: Submission of a part of Britain. ]
VII. This check deprived Cassivellaunus of all hope of resistance; he
sent away the greatest part of his troops, and only kept with him about
4,000 men, mounted in chariots. (Supposing six _essedarii_ to the
chariot, this would still amount to the considerable number of 660
carriages. ) Sometimes confining himself to watching the march of the
army, at others hiding in places of difficult access, or making a void
before the march of the Roman columns; often, also, profiting by his
knowledge of the localities, he fell unexpectedly with his chariots on
the cavalry when it ventured far plundering and sacking, which obliged
the latter to keep near the legions. Thus the damage inflicted on the
enemy could not extend beyond the march of the infantry.
Meanwhile the Trinobantes, one of the most powerful peoples of Britain,
sent deputies to offer their submission and demand Mandubratius for
their king. This young man, flying from the anger of Cassivellaunus, who
had put his father to death, had come to the continent to implore the
protection of Cæsar, and had accompanied him into Britain. The Roman
general listened favourably to the demand of the Trinobantes, and
exacted from them forty hostages and wheat for the army.
The protection obtained by the Trinobantes engaged the Cenimagni, the
Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi (_see p. 168_), to
follow their example. The deputies of these different peoples informed
Cæsar that the _oppidum_ of Cassivellaunus (_St. Albans_) stood at a
short distance, defended by marshes and woods, and containing a great
number of men and cattle. [407] Although this formidable position had
been further fortified by the hands of men, Cæsar led his legions
thither, and attacked it on two points without hesitation. After a
feeble resistance, the barbarians, in their attempt to escape, were
slain or captured in great numbers.
Nevertheless, Cæsar was operating too far from his point of departure
not to tempt Cassivellaunus to deprive him of the possibility of
returning to the continent, by seizing upon his fleet. In effect,
Cassivellaunus had ordered the four kings of the different parts of
Cantium (_Kent_), Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segovax, to
collect all their troops, and attack unexpectedly the camp in which the
Roman ships were inclosed. They hastened thither; but the cohorts did
not leave them time to attack; they made a sortie, killed a great number
of barbarians, captured one of their principal chiefs, Lugotorix, and
re-entered their camp without loss. On the news of this defeat,
Cassivellaunus, discouraged by so many reverses and the defection of
several peoples, employed Commius to offer his submission. [408]
[Sidenote: Re-embarkment of the Army. ]
VIII. Summer approached its end (they were in the last days of August).
Cæsar, aware that there no longer remained sufficient time to be
employed with advantage, prepared for his departure; he wished,
moreover, to pass the winter on the continent, fearing sudden revolts on
the part of the Gauls. He therefore caused hostages to be delivered to
him, fixed the tribute to be paid annually by Britain to the Roman
people, and expressly prohibited Cassivellaunus from all acts of
hostility against Mandubratius and the Trinobantes.
After receiving the hostages, Cæsar hastened to return in person to the
coast, and ordered his army to follow him afterwards; he found the ships
repaired, and caused them to be put afloat. His great number of
prisoners, and the loss of several of his ships, obliged him to pass the
army across the channel in two convoys. It is remarkable that, of so
many ships employed several times in the passage this year or the year
before, not one of those which carried the troops was lost; but, on the
contrary, the greater part of the ships which returned empty, after
having landed the soldiers of the first transport, and those built by
Labienus, to the number of sixty, did not reach their destination; they
were nearly all thrown back upon the coast of the continent. Cæsar, who
had resolved to leave Britain only with the last convoy, waited for them
some time in vain. The approach of the equinox led him to fear that the
period favourable for navigation would pass by, and he decided on
overloading his ships with soldiers, sailed in a moment of calm at the
beginning of the second watch (nine o’clock), and, after a favourable
passage, landed at daybreak. [409]
This second expedition, though more successful than the first, did not
bring as its result the complete submission of the isle of Britain.
According to Cæsar, the Romans did not even obtain any booty; yet Strabo
speaks of a considerable booty,[410] and another author confirms this
fact by relating that Cæsar formed out of the spoils of the enemy a
cuirass ornamented with pearls, which he consecrated to Venus. [411]
[Sidenote: Observations. ]
IX. Several indications enable us again to fix precisely the period of
the second expedition to Britain. We know, from a letter from Quintus to
his brother Cicero, that Cæsar was at the end of May at Lodi (we admit
the 22nd of May). [412] He might therefore have arrived towards the 2nd
of June on the shores of the ocean, where he inspected his fleet. During
the interval before it assembled at the Portus Itius, he proceeded to
the country of the Treviri, where he did not remain long; for, towards
the middle of the summer (_ne æstatem in Treviris consumere cogeretur_),
he started for Boulogne, where he arrived at the end of June. The winds
from the north-west retained him there twenty-five days, that is, till
towards the end of July. On another hand, Cicero wrote to Atticus on the
26th of July: “I see, from my brother’s letters, that he must already be
in Britain. ”[413] In reply to another letter of Quintus, dated on the
4th of the Ides of August (the 8th of August), he rejoices at having
received on the day of the Ides of September (9th of September), the
news of his arrival in that island. [414] These data fix the departure of
the expedition to the end of July, for the letters took from twenty to
thirty days to pass from Britain to Rome. [415] When the army moved from
the coasts, the news was naturally much longer on the way; and in the
month of October, Cicero wrote to his brother, “Here are fifty days
passed without the arrival of letter or sign of life from you, or Cæsar,
or even from where you are. ”[416] Having ascertained the month of July
for that of his departure, we have next to find the day on which that
departure took place.
Cæsar sailed at sunset, that is, towards eight o’clock (_solis occasu
naves solvit, leni Africo provectus_). The wind having ceased at
midnight, he was drawn by the currents towards the north; and when day
broke, at four o’clock in the morning, he saw on his left the cliffs of
the South Foreland; but then, the current changing with the tide, by
force of rowing he made land towards midday, as in the preceding summer,
near Deal.
To determine the day on which Cæsar landed, it is necessary, in the
first place, to know to what part the Roman fleet was carried during the
night. It is evident, first, that it was borne towards the north-east by
the current of the rising tide or flux, for otherwise we could not
understand how Cæsar, at sunrise, could have perceived Britain on his
left. We may add that it wandered from its way till it came to the
latitude of the Northern Sea, which is situated to the east of Deal, and
at about ten maritime miles from the coast. (_See Plate 14. _) In fact,
according to the text, the fleet took advantage of the current contrary
to that which had carried it away, and consequently of the reflux or
current of the ebbing tide, to reach the coast. Now, we are obliged by
this fact to conclude that it had been carried northward at least to the
latitude of Deal; for, if it had only arrived to the south of that
latitude, the reflux would necessarily have thrown it back into the
Straits. Lastly, to cause the fleet by force of rowing and aided by the
reflux to require eight hours to effect the last part of its passage to
Deal, it must, according to the best information obtained from sailors,
have been, at sunrise, ten miles from the coast.
This being granted, it is evidently sufficient, for determining the day
of landing, to resolve this question: on what day of the month of July
in the year 700 the current of the descending tide began to be perceived
_at sunrise, that is, towards four o’clock in the morning_, in the part
of the sea at ten miles to the east of Deal? or otherwise, if we
consider that the reflux begins there about four hours and a half after
the hour of high tide at Dover,[417] what day of the month of July in
the year 700 it was high tide at Dover towards half-past eleven o’clock
at night?
By following a train of reasoning similar to that which we applied to
determine the day of Cæsar’s first landing in Britain, and remarking
that the tides of the days preceding the full moon of the month of July,
700, which fell on the 21st, correspond to those of the days which
preceded the full moon of the 26th of July, 1858, we find that it was
either fifteen days or one day before the 21st of July of the year 700,
that is, the 6th or the 20th of July, that it was high tide at Dover
towards half-past eleven at night. Cæsar, therefore, landed on the 7th
or on the 21st of July. We adopt the second date, because, according to
Cicero’s letter cited above, he received, before the 26th of July, at
Rome news of his brother, which must have been of the 6th of the same
month, as the couriers were twenty days on the road. In this letter
Quintus announced his approaching departure for Britain.
This date, according to which the Roman army would have landed on the
eve of the day of the full moon, is the more probable, as Cæsar,
immediately on his arrival in Britain, made a night march, which would
have been impossible in complete darkness. The passage of the sea had
taken fifteen hours. In the return, it only took nine hours, since
Cæsar started at nine o’clock in the evening (_secunda inita cum
solvisset vigilia_), and arrived at Boulogne at daybreak (_prima luce_),
which, in the middle of September, is at six o’clock in the
morning. [418]
The date of his return is nearly fixed by a letter of Cicero, who
expresses himself thus: “On the 11th of the Calends of November (17th of
October), I received letters from my brother Quintus, and from Cæsar;
the expedition was finished, and the hostages delivered. They had made
no booty. They had only imposed contributions. The letters, written from
the shores of Britain, are dated on the 6th of the Calends of October
(21st of September), at the moment of embarking the army, which they are
bringing back. ”[419] This information accords with the date of the
equinox, which fell on the 26th of September, and which, according to
the “Commentaries,” was close at hand (_quod equinoctium suberat_).
Cæsar had, then, remained in Britain about sixty days.
[Sidenote: Presumed Dates of the Second Campaign in Britain. ]
X. Departure of Cæsar from Lodi[420] May 22.
Arrival at the army, in the
country of the Belgæ (in
12 days) June 2.
Inspection of the fleet and of the winter
quarters; junction of the four legions
in the country of the Remi, on the
Meuse, towards Sedan. From June 2 to June 7.
Passage from Sedan to the country of
the Treviri (80 kilometres, 3 days),
From June 8 to June 10.
Occurrences among the Treviri,
From June 10 to June 15.
Passage from Treviri to Boulogne (330
kil. , 12 days) From June 15 to June 26.
Delay of 25 days at Boulogne,
From June 26 to July 20.
Embarkment July 20.
Landing July 21.
Combat July 22.
Cæsar returns to his fleet July 23.
Ten days of reparations, From July 24 to August 2.
New march against the Britons August 3.
Combat August 4.
March towards the Thames (from the
Little Stour to Sunbury, 140 kilomètres)
From August 5 to August 11.
March from the Thames to the _oppidum_
of Cassivellaunus, From August 12 to August 15.
Time employed in negotiations and receiving
hostages (8 days),
From August 16 to August 23.
Return of Cæsar (in person) towards
the sea-coast. The 28th of August,
on his arrival at the fleet, he writes
to Cicero. --(_Epist. ad Quintum_, III.
1. ) August 28.
March of his army to the coast,
From August 24 to Sept. 10.
Embarkation of the last convoy Sept. 21.
[Sidenote: Distribution of the Legions in their Winter Quarters. ]
XI. Cæsar had no sooner arrived on the continent than he caused his
ships to be brought on ground, and then held at Samarobriva, (_Amiens_)
the assembly of Gaul. The defective harvest, caused by the dryness of
the season, obliged him to distribute his winter quarters differently
from the preceding years, by spreading them over a greater extent. [421]
The number of his legions was eight and a half, because, independent of
the eight legions brought together at Boulogne before the departure for
Britain, he had no doubt formed five cohorts of soldiers and sailors
employed on his fleet. The troops were distributed in the following
manner: he sent one legion into the country of the Morini (_to Saint
Pol_), under the orders of C. Fabius; another to the Nervii (_at
Charleroy_), with Quintus Cicero;[422] a third to the Essuvii (_at Sées,
in Normandy_), under the command of L. Roscius; a fourth, under T.
Labienus, to the country of the Remi, near the frontier of the Treviri
(_at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe_). [423] He placed three in Belgium,[424]
one at Samarobriva itself (_Amiens_), under the orders of Trebonius; the
second in the country of the Bellovaci, under M. Crassus, his questor,
at twenty-five miles from Amiens (_Montdidier_); the third under L.
Munatius Plancus, near the confluence of the Oise and the Aisne (_at
Champlieu_). The legion last raised[425] among the Transpadans repaired
with five cohorts, under the orders of Titurius Sabinus and Aurunculeius
Cotta, to the Eburones, whose country, situated in great part between
the Meuse and the Rhine, was governed by Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. It
occupied a fortress named Aduatuca (_Tongres_).
[426] This distribution
of the army appeared to Cæsar a more easy manner to supply it with
provisions. Moreover, these different winter quarters, with the
exception of that of M. Roscius, who occupied the most peaceable part of
Gaul, were all included within a circle of a hundred miles radius (148
kil. ). It was Cæsar’s intention not to leave them until he knew that the
legions were firmly established and their quarters fortified. (_See
Plate 14_, the sites of the winter quarters. )
There was among the Carnutes (_country of Chartres_) a man of high
birth, named Tasgetius, whose ancestors had reigned over that nation. In
consideration of his valour and of his important military services,
Cæsar had replaced him, during three years, in the rank held by his
forefather, when his enemies publicly massacred him. The men who had
participated in this crime were so numerous, that there was reason for
fearing that the revolt would spread over the whole country. To prevent
it, Cæsar despatched in the greatest haste L. Plancus at the head of his
legion, with orders to establish his quarters in the country of the
Carnutes, and to send him the accomplices in the murder of
Tasgetius. [427]
[Sidenote: Defeat of Sabinus at Aduatuca. ]
XII. He received at the same period (the end of October), from the
lieutenants and the questor, the news that the legions had arrived and
retrenched in their quarters. They had indeed been established in them
about a fortnight, when suddenly a revolt took place at the instigation
of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. These chiefs had at first repaired to the
limits of their territory to meet Sabinus and Cotta, and had even
furnished them with provisions; but soon after, urged on by the Treviran
Indutiomaras, they raise the country, fall unexpectedly on the soldiers
occupied in seeking wood, and attack the camp of Sabinus with
considerable forces. Immediately the Romans run to arms and mount on the
_vallum_. The Spanish cavalry makes a successful sortie, and the enemies
retire, deceived in their hope of carrying the retrenchments by storm.
Having then recourse to stratagem, they utter, according to their
custom, loud cries, and demand to enter into negotiations and deliberate
on their common interests, C. Arpineius, a Roman knight and the friend
of Sabinus, and the Spaniard Q. Junius, who had been employed on several
missions to Ambiorix, were sent to them. Ambiorix declared that he had
not forgotten the numerous benefits he had received from Cæsar, but that
he was forced to follow the movement of Gaul, which had conspired in a
common effort to recover its liberty. That very day, according to his
statement, the various quarters were to be attacked at the same time, so
as to hinder them from lending each other mutual succour; the Germans
had passed the Rhine, and would arrive in two days; Sabinus had no
other chance of safety but by abandoning his camp and rejoining Cicero
or Labienus, who were at a distance of fifty miles. In the end, Ambiorix
promised under an oath to give him a free passage. The envoys reported
to Sabinus and Cotta what they had heard. Troubled at this news, and the
more disposed to put faith in it because it was hardly credible that so
small a people as the Eburones would have dared alone to brave the Roman
power, the two lieutenants submitted the affair to a council of war: it
became the subject of warm disputes. Cotta, and with him several of the
tribunes and centurions of the first class, were of opinion that they
should not act hastily, but wait for orders from Cæsar. Their camp was
strong enough to resist all the forces of the Germans; they were not
pressed by want of food; they might receive succours, and, under
circumstances of so much gravity, it would be disgraceful to take their
counsel from the enemy.
Sabinus replied with force that it would be too late to decide when the
number of the assailants would be increased by the arrival of the
Germans, and when the neighbouring quarters would have experienced some
disaster. “The movement requires a prompt decision. Cæsar has, no doubt,
started for Italy: otherwise, would the Carnutes have dared to slay
Tasgetius, and the Eburones to attack the camp with so much boldness? We
must consider the counsel itself, and not him who gives it: the Rhine is
at a short distance; the Germans are irritated by the death of
Ariovistus, and by their preceding defeats; Gaul is in flames; she
supports with impatience the Roman yoke, and the loss of her ancient
military glory. Would Ambiorix have engaged without powerful motives in
such an enterprise? It is safest, therefore, to follow his counsel, and
to gain as quickly as possible the nearest quarters. ”
Cotta and the centurions of the first class earnestly maintained the
contrary opinion. “Let it then be as you will! ” said Sabinus; and then,
raising his voice to be heard by the soldiers, he shouted: “Death does
not terrify me; but behold, Cotta, those who will require of thee a
reckoning for the misfortunes which thou art preparing for them. After
to-morrow, if you would agree to it, they could have rejoined the
nearest legion, and, united with it, incur together the chances of war;
they will know that thou hast preferred leaving them, far from their
companions, exposed to perish by the sword or by famine. ”
When the council was ended, the lieutenants are surrounded and implored
not to compromise the safety of the army by their misunderstanding; let
them go or remain, provided they are agreed, everything will be easy.
The debate is prolonged into the middle of the night; at last, Cotta,
moved, yields to the opinion of Sabinus, and agrees to repair to Cicero,
encamped in the country of the Nervii; the departure is fixed for
daybreak. The rest of the night is passed in the midst of preparations;
the soldier chooses what articles of his winter equipment he will carry
with him. And, as if the danger were not sufficiently great, he seems as
if he wished to increase it by fatigue and watching. At daybreak, the
troops, in full security, begin their march in a long column,
encumbered with a numerous baggage.
At the distance of three kilomètres (_a millibus passuum circiter
duobus_) from the town of Tongres is the vale of Lowaige, closed in
between two hills, and forming a great defile of about 2,500 mètres in
length (_magnam convallem_). It is traversed by a stream, the Geer. The
hills, now denuded, were, only a century ago, covered with wood;[428] it
was there that the Eburones lay in wait for the Roman army.
Informed of the intended retreat by the noise and tumult, they had
divided themselves into two bodies, on the right and left of the vale,
and placed themselves in ambush in the middle of the woods. When they
saw the greater part of the Roman troops engaged in the defile, they
attacked them in rear and in front, profiting by all the advantages of
the locality.
Then Sabinus, like a man who had shown no foresight, becomes troubled,
hurries hither and thither, hesitates in all his measures--as happens to
him who, taken by surprise, is obliged to act decisively in the middle
of danger. Cotta, on the contrary, who had calculated the fatal chances
of the departure which he had opposed, neglects nothing for the general
safety. He encourages the troops, combats in the ranks--a general and a
soldier at the same time. As the length of the column prevented the
lieutenants from seeing all and ordering all themselves, they caused the
soldiers to pass on from mouth to mouth the order to abandon the baggage
and form the circle. This resolution, though justified by the
circumstances, had, nevertheless, a disastrous effect; it diminished the
confidence of the Romans, and increased the ardour of the Eburones, who
ascribed so desperate a resolution to fear and discouragement. There
resulted from it, too, an inevitable inconvenience: the soldiers quitted
their ensigns in crowds to run to the baggage, and take their more
valuable effects; and on all parts there was nothing but shouts and
confusion.
The barbarians acted with intelligence. Their chiefs, fearing that they
would disperse to pillage the baggage of the Romans, sent orders on all
points that every one must keep his rank, declaring that the thing
important was first to assure themselves of the victory, and that
afterwards the booty would fall into their hands.
The Eburones were rough adversaries; but by their number and their
courage, the Romans might have maintained the struggle. Although
abandoned by their chief and by fortune, they relied upon themselves for
everything, and every time that a cohort fell upon the enemies, it made
a great carnage of them. Ambiorix perceived this: he shouted loudly his
commands that his men should throw their missiles from a distance, and
not approach near; that they should retire whenever the Romans rushed
forward, and only attack them in their retreat, when they returned to
their ensigns--a manœuvre easy to the Eburones, practised in such
exercises, and nimble on account of the lightness of their equipment.
The order was faithfully executed. When a cohort quitted the circle to
charge the enemies, they fled with speed; but the cohort, in its
advance, left its right flank (not protected, like the left flank, by
the bucklers) exposed to the missiles; when it resumed its former
position, it was surrounded on all sides both by those who had
retreated, and by those who had remained on its flanks.
If, instead of sending forward their cohorts in succession, the Romans
stood firm in their circle, they lost the advantage of attacking, and
their close ranks made them more exposed to the multitude of missiles.
Meanwhile, the number of the wounded increased every moment. It was two
o’clock; the combat had lasted from sunrise, and yet the Roman soldiers
had not ceased to show themselves worthy of themselves. At this moment
the struggle becomes more desperate. T. Balventius, a brave and
respected man, who, in the previous year, had commanded as primipilus,
has his two thighs transpierced by a javelin; Q. Lucanius, an officer of
the same grade, is killed fighting valiantly to rescue his son, who is
surrounded by enemies. Cotta himself, while he runs from rank to rank to
encourage the soldiers, is wounded in the face by a missile from a
sling.
At this sight, Sabinus, discouraged, sees no other help but to treat
with Ambiorix. Perceiving him at a distance in the act of urging on his
troops, he sends to him his interpreter Cn. Pompeius, to pray him to
spare him and his men. Ambiorix replies that he is quite willing to
enter into negotiations with Sabinus, whose person he undertakes under
the obligation of his oath to cause to be respected; that further, he
hopes to obtain from the Eburones safety of life for the Roman soldiers.
Sabinus communicates this reply to Cotta, who is already wounded, and
proposes that they should go together to confer with Ambiorix; this step
may secure the safety of themselves and the army. Cotta refuses
obstinately, and declares that he will never treat with an enemy in
arms.
Sabinus enjoins to the tribunes of the soldiers who stand round him, and
to the centurions of the first class, to follow him. Arriving near
Ambiorix, he is summoned to lay down his sword: he obeys, and orders his
men to imitate his example. While they discuss the conditions in an
interview which the chief of the Eburones prolongs intentionally,
Sabinus is gradually surrounded and massacred. Then the barbarians,
raising, according to their custom, wild cries, rush upon the Romans and
break their ranks. Cotta and the greatest part of his soldiers perish
with their arms in their hands; the others seek refuge in the camp of
Aduatuca, from whence they had started. The ensign-bearer, L.
Petrosidius, pressed by a crowd of enemies, throws the eagle into the
retrenchments, and dies defending himself bravely at the foot of the
rampart. The unfortunate soldiers strive to sustain the combat till
night, and that very night they kill one another in despair. A few,
however, escaping from the field of battle, cross the forests, and gain
by chance the quarters of T. Labienus, to whom they give information of
this disaster. [429]
[Sidenote: Attack on Cicero’s Camp. ]
XIII. Elated by this victory, Ambiorix immediately repairs with his
cavalry into the country of the Aduatuci, a people adjoining to his
states, and marches without interruption all the night and the following
day: the infantry has orders to follow him. He announces his successes
to the Aduatuci, and urges them to take up arms. Next day he proceeds to
the Nervii, presses them to seize this occasion to avenge their injuries
and deliver themselves for ever from the yoke of the Romans; he informs
them of the death of two lieutenants, and of the destruction of a great
part of the Roman army; he adds that the legion in winter quarters among
them, under the command of Cicero, will be easily surprised and
annihilated; he offers his alliance to the Nervii, and easily persuades
them.
These immediately give information to the Ceutrones, the Grudii, the
Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, tribes under their dependence:
they collect all the troops they can, and proceed unexpectedly to the
winter quarters of Cicero, before he had learnt the disaster and death
of Sabinus. There, as it had happened recently at Aduatuca, some
soldiers, occupied in cutting wood in the forest, are surprised by the
cavalry. Soon a considerable number of Eburones, Aduatuci, and Nervii,
with their allies and clients, proceed to attack the camp. The Romans
rush to arms, and mount the _vallum_; but that day they make head with
difficulty against an enemy who has placed all his hope in the
promptness of an unforeseen attack, and was convinced that after this
victory nothing further could resist him. [430]
[Sidenote: Cæsar marches to the succour of Cicero. ]
XIV. Cæsar was still at Amiens, ignorant of the events which had just
taken place. Cicero immediately wrote to him, and promised great
recompenses to those who should succeed in delivering his letters to
him; but all the roads were watched, and nobody could reach him. During
the night twenty towers were raised, with an incredible celerity, by
means of the wood which had been already brought for fortifying the
camp,[431] and the works were completed. Next day, the enemies, whose
forces had increased, returned to the attack and began to fill the
fosse. The resistance was as energetic as the day before, and continued
during the following days; among these heroic soldiers constancy and
energy seemed to increase with the peril. Each night they prepare
everything necessary for the defence on the morrow. They make a great
number of stakes hardened by fire, and _pila_ employed in sieges; they
establish with planks the floors of the towers, and by means of hurdles
make parapets and battlements. They work without intermission: neither
wounded nor sick take repose. Cicero himself, though a man of feeble
health, is day and night at work, in spite of the entreaties of his
soldiers, who implore him to spare himself.
Meanwhile, the chiefs and _principes_ of the Nervii proposed an
interview to Cicero. They repeated to him what Ambiorix had said to
Sabinus: “All Gaul is in arms; the Germans have passed the Rhine; the
quarters of Cæsar and his lieutenants are attacked. ” They added:
“Sabinus and his cohorts have perished; the presence of Ambiorix is a
proof of their veracity; Cicero would deceive himself if he reckoned on
the succour of the other legions. As to them, they have no hostile
intention, provided the Romans will discontinue occupying their country.
The legion has full liberty to retire without fear whither it likes. ”
Cicero replied “that it was not the custom of the Roman people to accept
conditions from an enemy in arms; but that, if they consented to lay
them down, he would serve them as a mediator with Cæsar, who would
decide. ”
Deceived in their expectation of intimidating Cicero, the Nervii
surrounded the camp with a rampart nine feet high, and a fosse fifteen
wide. They had observed the Roman works in the preceding campaigns, and
learnt from some prisoners to imitate them. But, as they did not possess
the necessary instruments of iron, they were obliged to cut the turf
with their swords, to take the earth with their hands, and to carry it
in their cloaks. We may judge of their great number by the fact that in
less than three hours they completed a retrenchment of 15,000 feet in
circuit. [432] On the following days, they raised towers to the height of
the _vallum_, prepared hooks (_falces_), and covered galleries
(_testudines_), which they had similarly been taught by the
prisoners. [433]
On the seventh day of the siege, a great wind having arisen, the enemies
threw into the camp fiery darts, and launched from their slings balls of
burning clay (_ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes_). [434] The barracks,
roofed with straw, in the Gaulish manner, soon took fire, and the wind
spread the flames in an instant through the whole camp. Then, raising
great shouts, as though they had already gained the victory, they pushed
forward their towers and covered galleries, and attempted, by means of
ladders, to scale the _vallum_; but such were the courage and steadiness
of the Roman soldiers, that, though surrounded with flames, overwhelmed
with a shower of darts, and knowing well that the fire was devouring
their baggage and their property, not one of them quitted his post, or
even dreamt of turning his head, so much did that desperate struggle
absorb their minds. This was their most trying day. Meanwhile, many of
the enemies were killed and wounded, because, crowding to the foot of
the rampart, the last ranks stopped the retreat of the first. The fire
having been appeased, the barbarians pushed up a tower against the
_vallum_. [435] The centurions of the third cohort, who happened to be
there, drew their men back, and, in bravado, invited, by their gesture
and voice, the enemies to enter. Nobody ventured. Then they drove them
away by a shower of stones, and the tower was burnt. There were in that
legion two centurions, T. Pulio and L. Vorenus, who emulated each other
in bravery by rushing into the midst of the assailants. Thrown down in
turn, and surrounded by enemies, they mutually rescued each other
several times, and returned into the camp without wounds. Defensive arms
then permitted individual courage to perform actual prodigies.
Still the siege continued, and the number of the defenders diminished
daily; provisions began to fall short, as well as the necessaries for
tending the wounded. [436] The frequent messengers sent by Cicero to
Cæsar were intercepted, and some of them cruelly put to death within
view of the camp. At last, Vertico, a Nervian chieftain who had embraced
the cause of the Romans, prevailed upon one of his slaves to take charge
of a letter to Cæsar. His quality of a Gaul enabled him to pass
unperceived, and to give intelligence to the general of Cicero’s danger.
Cæsar received this information at Amiens towards the eleventh hour of
the day (four o’clock in the afternoon). He had only at hand three
legions--that of Trebonius, at Amiens; that of M. Crassus, whose
quarters were at Montdidier, in the country of the Bellovaci, at a
distance of twenty-five miles; and lastly, that which, under C. Fabius,
was wintering in the country of the Morini, at Saint-Pol. [437] (_See
Plate 14. _) He despatched a courier to Crassus, charged with delivering
to him his order to start with his legion in the middle of the night,
and join him in all haste at Amiens, to relieve there the legion of
Trebonius. Another courier was sent to the lieutenant C. Fabius, to
direct him to take his legion into the territory of the Atrebates, which
Cæsar would cross, and where their junction was to be effected. He wrote
similarly to Labienus, to march with his legion towards the country of
the Nervii, if he could without peril. As to the legion of Roscius and
that of Plancus, which were too far distant, they remained in their
quarters.
Crassus had no sooner received his orders than he began his march; and
next day, towards the third hour (ten o’clock), his couriers announced
his approach. Cæsar left him at Amiens, with one legion, to guard the
baggage of the army, the hostages, the archives, and the winter
provisions. He immediately started in person, without waiting for the
rest of the army, with the legion of Trebonius, and four hundred cavalry
from the neighbouring quarters. He followed, no doubt, the direction
from Amiens to Cambrai, and made that day twenty miles (thirty
kilomètres). He was subsequently joined on his road, probably towards
Bourcies, between Bapaume and Cambrai, by Fabius, who had not lost a
moment in executing his orders. Meanwhile arrived the reply of Labienus.
He informed Cæsar of the events which had taken place among the
Eburones, and of their effect among the Treviri. These latter had just
risen. All their troops had advanced towards him, and surrounded him at
a distance of three miles. In this position, fearing that he should not
be able to resist enemies proud of a recent victory, who would take his
departure for a flight, he thought that there would be danger in
quitting his winter quarters.
Cæsar approved of the resolution taken by Labienus, although it reduced
to two the three legions on which he counted; and, although their
effective force did not amount to more than 7,000 men, as the safety of
the army depended on the celerity of his movements, he proceeded by
forced marches to the country of the Nervii; there he learnt from
prisoners the perilous situation of Cicero. He immediately engaged, by
the promise of great recompenses, a Gaulish horseman to carry a letter
to him: it was written in Greek,[438] in order that the enemy, if he
intercepted it, might not know its meaning. Further, in case the Gaul
could not penetrate to Cicero, he had directed him to attach the letter
to the _amentum_ (see page 37, note 2) of his javelin, and throw it over
the retrenchments. Cæsar wrote that he was approaching in great haste
with his legions, and he exhorted Cicero to persevere in his energetic
defence. According to Polyænus, the despatch contained these words:
θαῥῥεἱν βοἡθειαν προσδἑχου (“Courage! expect succour”). [439]
As soon as he arrived near the camp, the Gaul, not daring to penetrate
to it, did as Cæsar had directed him. By chance his javelin remained two
days stuck in a tower. It was only on the third that it was seen and
carried to Cicero. The letter, read in the presence of the assembled
soldiers, excited transports of joy. Soon afterwards they perceived in
the distance the smoke of burning habitations, which announced the
approach of the army of succour. At that moment, after a five days’
march, it had arrived within twenty kilomètres of Charleroi, near
Binche, where it encamped. The Gauls, when they were informed of it by
their scouts, raised the siege, and then, to the number of about 60,000,
marched to meet the legions.
Cicero, thus liberated, sent another Gaul to announce to Cæsar that the
enemy were turning all their forces against him. At this news, received
towards the middle of the night, Cæsar informed his soldiers, and
strengthened them in their desire of vengeance. At daybreak next day he
raised his camp. After advancing four miles, he perceived a crowd of
enemies on the other side of a great valley traversed by the stream of
the Haine. [440] Cæsar did not consider it prudent to descend into the
valley to engage in combat against so great a number of troops.
Moreover, Cicero once rescued, there was no need for hurrying his march;
he therefore halted, and chose a good position for retrenching--mount
Sainte-Aldegonde. Although his camp, containing hardly 7,000 men,
without baggage, was necessarily of limited extent, he diminished it as
much as possible by giving less width to the streets, in order to
deceive the enemy as to his real strength. At the same time he sent out
scouts to ascertain the best place for crossing the valley.
That day passed in skirmishes of cavalry on the banks of the stream, but
each kept his positions: the Gauls, because they were waiting for
re-enforcements; Cæsar, because he counted on his simulated fear to draw
the enemies out of their position, and compel them to fight on his side
of the Haine, before his camp. If he could not succeed, he obtained time
to reconnoitre the roads sufficiently to pass the river and valley with
less danger. On the morrow, at daybreak, the enemy’s cavalry came up to
the retrenchments, and attacked that of the Romans. Cæsar ordered his
men to give way, and return into the camp; at the same time he caused
the height of the ramparts to be increased, the gates to be stopped up
with mere lumps of turf, and directed his soldiers to execute his
directions with tumultuous haste and all the signs of fear.
The Gauls, drawn on by this feint, passed the stream, and formed in
order of battle in a disadvantageous place. Seeing that the Romans had
even abandoned the _vallum_, they approached nearer to it, threw their
missiles over it from all sides, and caused their heralds to proclaim
round the retrenchments that, until the third hour (ten o’clock), every
Gaul or Roman who should desert to them should have his life saved. At
last, having no hope of forcing the gates, which they supposed to be
solidly fortified, they carried their boldness so far as to begin to
fill up the fosse, and to pull down the palisades with their hands. But
Cæsar held his troops in readiness to profit by the excessive confidence
of the Gauls: at a signal given, they rush through all the gates at
once; the enemy does not resist, but takes to flight, abandoning their
arms, and leaves the ground covered with his dead.
Cæsar did not pursue far, on account of the woods and marshes; he would
not have been able, indeed, to inflict further loss; he marched with his
troops, without having suffered any loss, towards the camp of Cicero,
where he arrived the same day. [441] The towers, the covered galleries,
and the retrenchments of the barbarians, excited his astonishment.
Having assembled the soldiers of Cicero’s legion, nine-tenths of whom
were wounded, he could judge how much danger they had run and how much
courage they had displayed. He loaded with praise the general and
soldiers, addressing individually the centurions and the tribunes who
had distinguished themselves. The prisoners gave him more ample details
on the deaths of Sabinus and Cotta, whose disaster had produced a deep
impression in the army. The next day he reminds the troops convoked for
that purpose of the past event, consoles and encourages them, throws the
fault of this check on the imprudence of the lieutenant, and exhorts
them to resignation the more, because, thanks to the valour of the
soldiers and the protection of the gods, the expiation had been prompt,
and left no further reason for the enemies to rejoice, or for the Romans
to be afflicted. [442]
We see, from what precedes, how small a number of troops, disseminated
over a vast territory, surmounted, by discipline and courage, a
formidable insurrection. Quintus Cicero, by following the principle
invoked by Cotta, _not to enter into negotiations with an enemy in
arms_, saved both his army and his honour. As to Cæsar, he gave proof,
in this circumstance, of an energy and strength of mind which Quintus
Cicero did not fail to point out to his brother when he wrote to
him. [443] If we believe Suetonius and Polyænus, Cæsar felt so great a
grief for the check experienced by Sabinus, that, in sign of mourning,
he let his beard and hair grow until he had avenged his
lieutenants,[444] which only happened in the year following, by the
destruction of the Eburones and the Nervii.
[Sidenote: Cæsar places his Troops in Winter Quarters. Labienus defeats
Indutiomarus. ]
XV. Meanwhile the news of Cæsar’s victory reached Labienus, across the
country of the Remi, with incredible speed: his winter quarters were at
a distance of about sixty miles from Cicero’s camp, where Cæsar had only
arrived after the ninth hour of the day (three o’clock in the
afternoon), and yet before midnight shouts of joy were raised at the
gates of the camp, the acclamations of the Remi who came to congratulate
Labienus. The noise spread in the army of the Treviri, and Indutiomarus,
who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus next day, withdrew
during the night, and took all his troops with him.
These events having been accomplished, Cæsar distributed the seven
legions he had left in the following manner: he sent Fabius with his
legion to his winter quarters among the Morini, and established himself
in the neighbourhood of Amiens with three legions, which he separated in
three quarters: they were the legion of Crassus, which had remained
stationary, that of Cicero, and that of Trebonius. There are still seen,
along the Somme, in the neighbourhood of Amiens, three camps at a short
distance from each other, which appear to have been those of that
period. [445] Labienus, Plancus, and Roscius continued to occupy the same
positions.
