In another context,
Anguttara
iv.
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Saeki observes that, according to the Sautrantikas, vipaiyana and Samatha are excluded. Samyutta, v. 219'. katamam ca bhikkhave ajjhattam samkhittam cittam/ yam bhikkhave
cittam thinamiddhasahagatam thinamiddhasampayuttam/ idarh vuccati. . . / katamam ca. . . bahiddha vikkhittam cittam/ yam . . . cittam bahiddha paHca gune drabbha anuvikkhittam anuvisatam/ idarh vuccati. . .
61. Hsuan-tsang translates: "In fact we do not admit (pu-hsu ^? - ? ? pratijnayate) that a defiled mind, associated with langour, is distracted. " The same for Paramartha: "We donotestablish(pu-li ^ft )? ? ? "
Vyakhya: kim iti krtvd viksiptatvam atra na pratijnayate/ kim middhasahagate citte viksiptatvam ndstiti na pratijnayate dhosvid vidyamdnam api viksiptatvam samksiptatvend- vasthdpitatvdn na pratijnayate/ ubhayathdpi vyacaksate/ kecid vyacaksate/ middhasahaga- tdt Mist ad? ad anyat klistam tad viksiptam pratijnayate middhasahagatam tu klistam aklistam vdvisesena samksiptam eveti/ apare punar vyacaksate/? an middhasamyuktam tat samksiptam eva na viksiptam/ ? at tu visayesu visrtam tad eva viksiptam ity ato'tra middhasamprayukte citte [viksiptatvam] na pratijnayate.
62. Vyakhya: abuddhokyam abhidharmaiastram ity abhiprayah. Compare KoS'a, i. 3, iii. 32.
63. The defilement, klistatva, of the first minds is not differentiated: it consists of association, samprayoga, with the klefas which are found in all defiled minds; the goodness, ku/alatva, of the second minds consists of association with the dharmas which are found in all good minds, ii. 25, 26.
Vyakhya: sarvani tani klistany uktantti/ klistatvalaksanam esam viksiptadinam avimuktantdnam / Klistatvam punah klesamahdbhumikaih samprayogah/ sam ksiptapragrhitddindm cdbhinnalaksanavacandn ndrthavihsa ukto bhavati . . . / ku/alatvam esam abhinnam/ kim punah kusalatvam/ kusalamahdbhumikaih samprayogah.
64. Vyakhya: sutre hi stydnamiddhasahagatam samksiptam uktam/ stydnayogena ? at klistam middhasamyuktam tat samksiptam na kusalam stydnasya klesamahdbhumikatvdt.
65. The Vaibhasikas are of the opinion that: yad eva linam tad evoddhatam, "a lina mind is an uddhata mind. " We draw this conclusion from their definition: linam cittam klistam kausidyasamprayogdt; uddatam cittam klistam auddhatyasamprayogdt. (Below note 70, for another version).
66. If lina and uddhata were identical, the Sutra would say: "When the mind is lina it is not the time to cultivate prasrabdhi . . . priti. When the mind is uddhata it is not the time to cultivate prasrabdhi . . . priti. " Or rather: "When the mind is lina or uddhata it is not the time to cultivate prahabdhi. . . priti. "
61. The cultivation of the seven parts of Bodhi is simultaneous.
68. With regard to smrti, the Blessed one said: smrtimkhalv aham sarvatragatdm vaddmi.
69. Hsuan-tsang: "But we are not in contradiction with the Sutra! Even though a defiled mind is both lina and uddhata, the mind in which kausidya predominates is termed lina in the Sutra; the one in which auddhatya predominates is called uddhata in the Sutra. But, considering their constant association, I say that they are one in nature. "
70. A defiled mind is lina through association with kausidya; a defiled mind is uddhata through association with auddhatya. Compare ii, trans, p. 194.
71. Vyakhya: Acdrya aha ndbhiprdyikam yavat sutre tu nayam abhiprdya iti.
72. A Saiksa has, at the present time, a pure mind, for example the thought of impermanence; but there remains in him the possession of the rdga of Kamadhatu if he is not an Anagamin . . .
73. Anus'aydnardgdlambanatvdt, see v. 17.
? 74. The thoughts of the Arhat which form part of the Arhat are never impure, for these thoughts are pure by definition and are not the object of the "active" defilements of another, v. l8a-b; but these conventional thoughts (samvrtijndna), like his body, are impure (sdsrava) in the sense that the defilements of another can become active with respect to them (i. 4b). See viii. 25c.
We observe that Paramartha translates very clearly: "If a thought is sardga by the fact that it grasps rdga as its object;. . . yuanyii wet ching chieh ? ? ? ? ? -
7$. The second masters, above note 50.
76. "Even though they have a real thing for their object. " 77. See above page 1094 line 19.
78. See above page 1094 line 11.
79- "Arising is extinguished by me": that is to say: arising is abandoned; this is to see the Truth of Arising under four aspects (vii,13a); "The religious life is cultivated": four aspects of the Path; "That which should be done is done": four aspects of Extinction; "I do not see any further existence": two aspects of the Truth of Suffering, impermanence and suffering. Among the commentaries on this fourfold formula, Samantapdsddikd, i. 168. Some remarks, of which I should like to be more confident, in Nirvana (1925), p. 60.
80. The Vydkhya explains: asty etat sthdnam ity asty etal laksanam ity arthah/ asty etad vastv ity ayam hetur ity arthah/ ? ogavihitato vijdniydd ity aviparitato vijdniydd ity arthah/.
According to Saeki, this is an excerpt from the Vijndnakdya, TD 26, p. 559c29 and p. 565al6. This formula and the formula of wrong views (page 1109 line 20) are repeated to repletion (with some variants) in the Vijndnakdya, on the subject of the multiple types of thoughts: "Does a thought belonging to Kamadhatu know 1. the dharmas of Kamadhatu, 2. the dharmas of Rupadhatu, 3- the dharmas of Arupyadhatu, 4. the dharmas not included in the Dhatus, 5. the dharmas of Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu . . . ? " This thought is good, bad, neutral, to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. The way in which a thought sees these different dharmas depends on its nature and on the nature of these dharmas.
I do not find the passage where the Vijndnakdya explains the manner in which a thought "not included in the Dhatus" sees the dharmas of Kamadhatu. But it explains itself with respect to the thoughts of the Saiksa and the Asaiksa (which are two types of thoughts not included in the Dhatus), p. 565al6. Its text is identical to that quoted by Vasubandhu, with the difference that the formula asty etat sthdnam asty etad vastu is preceded by the words asty eso hetuh (? ), asty esa utpdda (? ).
The mind of the ? aiksa or ASaiksa only knows the dharmas of Kamadhatu under the aspects of the first two truths (anitya . . . pratyayatas); a good mind of Kamadhatu however knows the dharmas under the aspects that Vasubandhu has specified (vi. 49d) as characteristics of the "worldly path": auddrikatas, duhkhilatas, dvaranatas, and even ialyatas, etc.
81. The Seeing of the Truths at least partially dispells rdga, dvesa, mdna, and moha. A thought to be abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths would contain rdga, etc. ; the text therefore says rajyeta, etc. This thought is not free of satkdyadrsti, so it considers the dharmas as dtman and dtmiya; it is not free of antaghrdhadrsti, and so considers the dharmas as destined to perish (uccheda) or as eternal (safvata) . . .
We have this formula throughout the Vijndnakdya, TD 26, p. 559c29, p. 563b20, p. 578b8, and elsewhere.
82. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 408c9, and the Samyuktdbhidharmahrdaya, TD 28, p. 918al9. The dkdras of the Vimoksamukhas, viii. 24.
Footnotes 1187
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The specification of the dkdras of the Abhidharma are not found in the Abhidhamma (see for example Patisambhiddmagga, i. 107, 118, 241, Visuddhi, 494); it is not canonical: Anguttara, i. 38 (list of sannas), and iv. 422 where the ascetic considers the Amatadhatu as ianta, panita, etc. , and the things of his stage as dukkha, roga, gantfa, etc. We have seen (vi. 49), the dkdras of the worldly path: we have to observe that Vasubandhu gets his inspiration from the VijHdnakdya, fol. 59b, line 18 and elsewhere.
83. It results from this that abhisamaya is anupurva, vi. 27.
84. On the meaning of mdrga and pratipad, vi. 65b-d, 66a, vii. 28c.
85. See Samyutta, iii. 66, for variants.
86. Compare v. 27, trans, p. 820.
87. Compare vi. 60a.
88. Hsiian-tsang: "going, entering into the city of Nirvana. " Compare vi68:
nirvdnapratipddandt.
pratipan
89. These explanations are according to the glosses and the context. Vydkhyd: chandamu- lakd iti chandahetukd ity arthah. trsndparydya iha chandah. chandasamudayd iti chandasamutksamd (? ) ity arthah (read samutthdndP). chandajdtiyd iti chandapratyayd ity arthah.
Paramartha translates jdtiya by sheng *fe , "to arise," and prabhava by yu ? , bhava, "existence"; Hsiian-tsang has respectively lei ? , "species," and sheng ? JE. , "to arise. " Samyutta,iii. 100,Majjhima,Hi. 16:pancupdddnakkhandhdkimmulaka. . . chandanwlakd.
In another context, Anguttara iv. 400: tanhdmulaka.
We have Papisambhiddmagga, ii. I l l : jardmaranam kimniddnam kirnsanudayam
kimjdtikam kimpabhavam.
90. Vydkhyd: prabhavasabdah kevalam ? ? /cdt pathitavyah/ dbhidhdrmikair iti vdkhyddhyd- hdrah/ sutranusaranam hi kartavyam ity abhiprayah. The Abhidharmikas, in the list of the aspects of this Truth, should place the prabhava aspect after the pratyaya aspect, for one should be guided by the Sutra.
91. The five updddnaskandhas are thus said to have this type of chanda for their mula or hetu.
92. On virya, vipdka and prabhava of a fruit from the earth as food, or of a drug, Sarvadar/anasamgraha, 16. 22, Kandali, 130, Sufruta, i. l and 40.
93. Paramartha: "According to the Sutra of the trsndvicaritas, there are two groups of five, and two groups of four. " All that follows to page 1114 line 30 is omitted.
Our text is closely related to Anguttara, ii. 212, on the eighteen tanhdvicaritas, where the readings are uncertain, and to Vibhanga 392-400, where they are more certain but remain difficult to interpret (Mrs. Rhys Davids had the kindness to communicate to me the text of the Sammohavinodani and the Manorathapurani; see the following note).
We can compare the list: "Did I exist in the past? . . . ," Kofa, iii. 22c, Majjhima, i. 8, i. l 11, Visuddhimagga, 599, Madhyamakavrtti, 593.
According to chapter ii trans, p. 282, chanda is relative to the future.
94. The Vibhanga, in place of sad asmiti and asad asmiti has 1. as'asmiti {-nicco'smi. . . ) and 2. sat*asmiti or sat'asmi {-ucchissdmi na bhavissdmi). The commentary says: atthiti asa/ niccass'etam adhivacanam. Mrs Rhys Davids remarks: as = asa = asan = asanto = "bad," Jataka, iv. 435: satam vd ason (accusitive singular). We would have: "I am bad, I am good. " The Manorathapurani explains sata by sidati in the sense of anicca: this is the explanation that we have encountered for satkdya, Kola, v. p. 873. The commentary of the Vibhanga understands sydm as "Shall I be? "
? Footnotes 1189 95. Onpravrtti, ii. 6. Perhapsvattupaccheda=vartmopacchedathatIthinkwemustreadin
Mahdvastu, ii. 285, iii. 200, quoted in Koia, ii. trans, note 395.
%. According to Saeki, Samyukta 17. 16; see also TD 2, p. 66? 4.
97. In his shorter treatise, Samghabhadra takes into consideration this explanation in order to prove that the "aspects" are indeed sixteen in number.
98. Vydkhyd: nityam sukham dtmiyam dtmeti ca Arms' caritam esarh ta ime mtyasukhdtm- tydtmadfsticaritdh.
99. See v. 26, trans, note 98; iii. 50a.
100. The meaning of pratyaya is discussed in Koia, iii. 28. 101. 13b-d. On dkdra, see ii. 34b-d, trans, note 173.
102. This explanation is satisfactory, for we indeed conceive that prajnd--the discerning consciousness (ii. 24)--grasps the "aspects", that is to say grasps things {alambana) in a certain manner (as impermanent, etc. ). Furthermore this explanation takes into account the word dkdra:
One takes the sound d from alambana, the final kdra from prakdra, and one has dkdra by cancelling -lambanagrahanapra-.
103. On the dharmas "which have an object", Koia, ii. 34b. Kathdvatthu, ix. 3-7; Vibhanga, 428, Dhammasangani, 1185,1508. The Madhyamakavrtti, 84, quotes the Agama: salambana dharmdhkatame/ sarvecittacaittdh.
104. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 408c25: There are three systems: 1. Prajtld is dkdra, grdhaka, and gfhya; the cittacaittas associated with prajtld are grdhaka and grhya; what is concomitant {sahabhu) with prajtld and what is cittaviprayukta is gfhya. 2. All cittacaitta is dkdra, grdhaka, gfhya; all other dharmas are gfhya. 3. AH dharmas are dkdra; but the samprayuklta dharmas are dkdra, grdhaka and gfhya and the viprayuktadharmas are dkdra and gfhya (The meaning of dkdra is quite different here).
105. In the Udstra, dharmajndna begins the list.
106. We can understand why a being in Arupyadhatu cannot manifest the dharmajndna which has for its object suffering, its arising, etc. of the sphere of Kamadhatu, but why are beings in Rupadhatu incapable of it? We have seen that a person manifests this jtldna by entering into the dhydnas (which are Rupadhatu) (vii. l4c). Some say: "Dharmajndna has for its end the detesting {vidunana) of Kamadhatu; now a person in Rupadhatu has abandoned Kamadhatu by the very fact that he has transmigrated to a sphere of detachment [from Kamadhatu]; therefore the dharmajfldna does not have to arise. The case of a person detached from Kamadhatu [and who has entered into a dhydna due to this detachment] is different: he can manifest the dharmajndna because his existence in Kamadhatu is not exhausted. "
Samghabhadra explains differently why dharmajndna can only be manifested by beings in Kamadhatu: tatsamdpattivyutthdnacittdndm kdmadhdtdv eva sadbhdvdt/ anuparivarta- kdiraydbhdvdd vd/ dharmajHdndnuparivartakasya hi iilasya kdmdvacardny eva bhutdny diraya dauhiUyasamutthdpakakleiaprdptivibandhakatvdt prdtipaksikatvdt/ tdni ca tatra na santUi dharmajtldnam kdmadhdtvdirayam eva: "Because it is only in Kamadhatu that the thoughts of departing from the absorption [in which one realizes dharmajndna] is possible; or rather because, in the two higher spheres, the elements {bhutas) which can serve as the support {diraya) of the type of morality (iila) which necessarily accompanies dharmajndna are missing. This morality is opposed to the kleias which produce immorality (dauhiilya); immorality exists only in Kamadhatu; the elements susceptible of supporting morality which are opposed to this therefore exist only in Kamadhatu.
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107. See iv. 13c.
108. This preamble is missing in Paramartha.
109. According to Hsuan-tsang. Paramartha literally translates his original which is rendered in Tibetan by: chos bcu dag ni sbyar bar bya: "Ten dharmas should by placed in relationship", and he adds the Bhusya: "In order to determine the object of the jndnas, one should establish the relationship of the ten jndnas with the ten types of dharma. What are these ten types of dharmas} . . . "
110. On one hand pratisamkhydnirodha or Nirvana, on the other hand apratisamkhydni- rodha and dkds'a.
111. Marge dharmajndna bears on the Path; the morality which is andsravasarhvara, that is to say rupa (iv. l3c) forms part of the Path.
112. Hsiian-tsang: Is there a moment of knowledge which grasps all the dharmas for its object?
This appears to be the beginning of the discussion of Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 43a2, quoted by Saeki: "Is there ? jndna which knows all the dharmas? No. What is it that the jndna, which knows that all the dharmas are not an dtman, does not know? It does not know itself; it does not know the dharmas which are associated with it or which coexist with it. By saying that it does not know itself, one refutes the thesis of the Mahasamghikas; by saying that it does not know the dharmas associated with it, one refutes the thesis of the Dharmaguptas (fa-mi-pu ? ? ? )'> by saying that it does not know the dharmas which coexist with it, one refutes the thesis of the Mahisasakas; by saying that jndna knows, one refutes the thesis of the Vatsiputriyas [which attribute consciousness to the Pudgala? ]. "
Compare Kathdvatthu, v. 9, where the Andhakas quote a text: sabbasankhdresu antccat? dipphesu tarn pi ndnam aniccato dippham hoti. The Vyakhyd quotes the Sutra: ihdsmdkam bho gautama upasthdnasdldydm samnisanndndm samnipatitdndm evamrupo'natardkatha- samuddharo'bhut/ sramanogautamah kilaivam aha/ ndstisa kascic chramano vdbrdhmano vdyah sakrt sarvarh jdniydt sarvam pasyed iti/ tathyam idarh bho gautama/.
113. Bodhicaryavatara, ix. 18: na cchinatti yathdtmdnam asidhard tathd manah. This is a common position in Indian philosophy; nevertheless the Sautrantika-Vijnanavadins say that the lamp illumines itself. By a curious contradiction, the Vaibhasikas who deny that the mind knows itself, admit that sensation (vedand) is felt not by another sensation, but by the very fact that it is present (iv. 49).
114. Paramartha omits the last phrase ("If it were otherwise . . . ") and translates: "When it is a jndna in Kamadhatu it is a prajfid of hearing and reflection; when it is a jndna in Rupadhatu, it is only a prajnd of hearing, not of meditation, for this last type of prajnd always has a determined sphere for its object. "
Vasubandhu follows the Samyuktdbhidharma-hrdaya, TD 28, p. 953c21: "This jndna is a prajnd of hearing, and reflection, but not of meditation; for the prajfid of absorption has a delimited object. "
Vyakhyd: tasya vyavacchinnabhumydlambanatvdd iti/ yasmdd bhdvandmayam rupdvacaram samvrtijHdnam vyavacchinndm eva bhumim dlambate/ kdmadhdtum vd prathamam vd dhydnam ydvad bhavdgram vd/ kim kdranam/ dnantaryavimuktimdrgdndm adharottarabhumydlambavatvdd yathoktam yathdkramam santddyudaradyakara uttarddha- ragocara iti vacandt (vi. 49) yadi ca tat sarvabhumyalambanam sydt sarvato ? ? gap ad vairdgyam sydt/ prayogavihsamdrgayor yathdsambhavam kd cid eva bhumir dlambanam/ katham/ nirvedhabhdgiyaprayogamargasamgrhitasyahiyasyakdmadhdturdlambanamna tasyetarau dhdtu/ yasyetarau dhdtu na tasya kdmadhdtur dlambanam/ aiubhdpramdndbhi- bhvdyatanddividusanavis'esamdrgasa mgrhitasya kdmadhdtur evdlambanam netarau dhdtu.
According to Yasbmitra, a faithful interpreter of Vasubandhu who is, on this point,
? approved of by Samghabhadra, it is solely through a prajn~d of meditation (bhdvand) that one obtains detachment (vairdgya). The prajfid of hearing and reflection, which is in Kumadhatu, cannot bear on the dharmas of all the spheres: it is not enough to become disgusted with it: the prajnd of bhdvand is more powerful (iv. l23c). Based on this, Vasubandhu concludes that the universal consciousness of "the absence of self" of the dharmas belongs to Kamadhatu, for if it belonged to Rupadhatu (that is to say arising from bhdvand, and being obtained in the dhyanas) it would produce detachment from all of the spheres. Samghabhadra contests this reasoning, for the prajnd cultivated in dhyanas (impure prajnd, since it is a samvrtijndna) never includes disgust for the higher sphere to which it wishes to deliver itself (vi. 49)
Let us note here that Hsuan-tsang translates the two pddas 18c-d (TD 29, p. 138a22) by three pddas: "Samvrtijndna, by excluding its group, together has all the dharmas for its object, by comprehending them under the aspect of non-self", and he adds a fourth pdda: "it arises from hearing and reflection. "
Samghabhadra, in his second treatise, the Prakaranasdsana (TD 29, p. 952al0) corrects the kdrikds where Vasubandhu departs from correct Vaibhasika doctrine; the version of Hsuan-tsang (p. 138a23) gives, in the fourth pdda: "It arises from hearing, reflection and meditation. " Samghabhadra thinks in fact (in his first treatise, the Nydydnusdra, TD 29,p. 742cl8 and following): "This jndna is only in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu, but not in Arupyadhatu . . . It is a prajfid of hearing, reflection, and meditation (bhdvand): for these three prajnas are capable of having all the dharmas for their object with the exclusion of themselves and their group. It is true that the Sautrantika (=Vasubandhu) says: 'This jndna is not a prajnd of meditation . . . ' But this is false. In our system the prajnd of meditation of the sphere of the dhydna takes for its object the sphere in which it is found, namely, the higher sphere; it produces disgust with respect to the lower sphere, and joy with respect to the higher sphere: thus it does not produce detachment with respect to the higher sphere. The argument of the Sautrantika is therefore null and void. "
It appears that, according to what Yasomitra says here, we should consider as viiesamdrga (vi. 65) the disgust (vidusana) which includes [the qualities, guna, namely] aiubhd (vi. 9), the apramdnas (viii. 29) and the abhibhvdyatanas (viii. 35a). All these qualities are visesa (v. 10a, trans, p. 785); they are acquired through prayoga, dnantarya, vimuktimdrga, and are prolongued in visesamdrga (vi. 65); see vii. 25d.
115. Hsiian-tsang: In the states or moments which do not include any augmentation of the number ofjndnas (3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th moments of abhisamaya), he possesses the jndnas of the last previous moment which does include augmentation. Therefore, at the beginning of bhdvandmdrga (16th moment), he necessarily possesses seven jndnas.
116. This last phrase has been added by Hsiian-tsang.
117. Vydkhyd: iha dvividhd bhdvanddhikrtdpratilambhabhdvand nisevanabhdvand ca/ pratilambhabhdvand prdptitah/ nisevanabhdvand sammukhibhdvatah.
"Cultivation" is understood here as the acquisition or taking possession, and manifestation. (See vii. 27).
118. Yathotpanndni bhdvyante = ydni ydny utpanndni tdni tdni bhdvyante (bhdvyante = bhdvandm gacchanti). Bhdvyante signifies "are acquired", since it refers to future ksdntis and jndnas.
119.
Saeki observes that, according to the Sautrantikas, vipaiyana and Samatha are excluded. Samyutta, v. 219'. katamam ca bhikkhave ajjhattam samkhittam cittam/ yam bhikkhave
cittam thinamiddhasahagatam thinamiddhasampayuttam/ idarh vuccati. . . / katamam ca. . . bahiddha vikkhittam cittam/ yam . . . cittam bahiddha paHca gune drabbha anuvikkhittam anuvisatam/ idarh vuccati. . .
61. Hsuan-tsang translates: "In fact we do not admit (pu-hsu ^? - ? ? pratijnayate) that a defiled mind, associated with langour, is distracted. " The same for Paramartha: "We donotestablish(pu-li ^ft )? ? ? "
Vyakhya: kim iti krtvd viksiptatvam atra na pratijnayate/ kim middhasahagate citte viksiptatvam ndstiti na pratijnayate dhosvid vidyamdnam api viksiptatvam samksiptatvend- vasthdpitatvdn na pratijnayate/ ubhayathdpi vyacaksate/ kecid vyacaksate/ middhasahaga- tdt Mist ad? ad anyat klistam tad viksiptam pratijnayate middhasahagatam tu klistam aklistam vdvisesena samksiptam eveti/ apare punar vyacaksate/? an middhasamyuktam tat samksiptam eva na viksiptam/ ? at tu visayesu visrtam tad eva viksiptam ity ato'tra middhasamprayukte citte [viksiptatvam] na pratijnayate.
62. Vyakhya: abuddhokyam abhidharmaiastram ity abhiprayah. Compare KoS'a, i. 3, iii. 32.
63. The defilement, klistatva, of the first minds is not differentiated: it consists of association, samprayoga, with the klefas which are found in all defiled minds; the goodness, ku/alatva, of the second minds consists of association with the dharmas which are found in all good minds, ii. 25, 26.
Vyakhya: sarvani tani klistany uktantti/ klistatvalaksanam esam viksiptadinam avimuktantdnam / Klistatvam punah klesamahdbhumikaih samprayogah/ sam ksiptapragrhitddindm cdbhinnalaksanavacandn ndrthavihsa ukto bhavati . . . / ku/alatvam esam abhinnam/ kim punah kusalatvam/ kusalamahdbhumikaih samprayogah.
64. Vyakhya: sutre hi stydnamiddhasahagatam samksiptam uktam/ stydnayogena ? at klistam middhasamyuktam tat samksiptam na kusalam stydnasya klesamahdbhumikatvdt.
65. The Vaibhasikas are of the opinion that: yad eva linam tad evoddhatam, "a lina mind is an uddhata mind. " We draw this conclusion from their definition: linam cittam klistam kausidyasamprayogdt; uddatam cittam klistam auddhatyasamprayogdt. (Below note 70, for another version).
66. If lina and uddhata were identical, the Sutra would say: "When the mind is lina it is not the time to cultivate prasrabdhi . . . priti. When the mind is uddhata it is not the time to cultivate prasrabdhi . . . priti. " Or rather: "When the mind is lina or uddhata it is not the time to cultivate prahabdhi. . . priti. "
61. The cultivation of the seven parts of Bodhi is simultaneous.
68. With regard to smrti, the Blessed one said: smrtimkhalv aham sarvatragatdm vaddmi.
69. Hsuan-tsang: "But we are not in contradiction with the Sutra! Even though a defiled mind is both lina and uddhata, the mind in which kausidya predominates is termed lina in the Sutra; the one in which auddhatya predominates is called uddhata in the Sutra. But, considering their constant association, I say that they are one in nature. "
70. A defiled mind is lina through association with kausidya; a defiled mind is uddhata through association with auddhatya. Compare ii, trans, p. 194.
71. Vyakhya: Acdrya aha ndbhiprdyikam yavat sutre tu nayam abhiprdya iti.
72. A Saiksa has, at the present time, a pure mind, for example the thought of impermanence; but there remains in him the possession of the rdga of Kamadhatu if he is not an Anagamin . . .
73. Anus'aydnardgdlambanatvdt, see v. 17.
? 74. The thoughts of the Arhat which form part of the Arhat are never impure, for these thoughts are pure by definition and are not the object of the "active" defilements of another, v. l8a-b; but these conventional thoughts (samvrtijndna), like his body, are impure (sdsrava) in the sense that the defilements of another can become active with respect to them (i. 4b). See viii. 25c.
We observe that Paramartha translates very clearly: "If a thought is sardga by the fact that it grasps rdga as its object;. . . yuanyii wet ching chieh ? ? ? ? ? -
7$. The second masters, above note 50.
76. "Even though they have a real thing for their object. " 77. See above page 1094 line 19.
78. See above page 1094 line 11.
79- "Arising is extinguished by me": that is to say: arising is abandoned; this is to see the Truth of Arising under four aspects (vii,13a); "The religious life is cultivated": four aspects of the Path; "That which should be done is done": four aspects of Extinction; "I do not see any further existence": two aspects of the Truth of Suffering, impermanence and suffering. Among the commentaries on this fourfold formula, Samantapdsddikd, i. 168. Some remarks, of which I should like to be more confident, in Nirvana (1925), p. 60.
80. The Vydkhya explains: asty etat sthdnam ity asty etal laksanam ity arthah/ asty etad vastv ity ayam hetur ity arthah/ ? ogavihitato vijdniydd ity aviparitato vijdniydd ity arthah/.
According to Saeki, this is an excerpt from the Vijndnakdya, TD 26, p. 559c29 and p. 565al6. This formula and the formula of wrong views (page 1109 line 20) are repeated to repletion (with some variants) in the Vijndnakdya, on the subject of the multiple types of thoughts: "Does a thought belonging to Kamadhatu know 1. the dharmas of Kamadhatu, 2. the dharmas of Rupadhatu, 3- the dharmas of Arupyadhatu, 4. the dharmas not included in the Dhatus, 5. the dharmas of Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu . . . ? " This thought is good, bad, neutral, to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. The way in which a thought sees these different dharmas depends on its nature and on the nature of these dharmas.
I do not find the passage where the Vijndnakdya explains the manner in which a thought "not included in the Dhatus" sees the dharmas of Kamadhatu. But it explains itself with respect to the thoughts of the Saiksa and the Asaiksa (which are two types of thoughts not included in the Dhatus), p. 565al6. Its text is identical to that quoted by Vasubandhu, with the difference that the formula asty etat sthdnam asty etad vastu is preceded by the words asty eso hetuh (? ), asty esa utpdda (? ).
The mind of the ? aiksa or ASaiksa only knows the dharmas of Kamadhatu under the aspects of the first two truths (anitya . . . pratyayatas); a good mind of Kamadhatu however knows the dharmas under the aspects that Vasubandhu has specified (vi. 49d) as characteristics of the "worldly path": auddrikatas, duhkhilatas, dvaranatas, and even ialyatas, etc.
81. The Seeing of the Truths at least partially dispells rdga, dvesa, mdna, and moha. A thought to be abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths would contain rdga, etc. ; the text therefore says rajyeta, etc. This thought is not free of satkdyadrsti, so it considers the dharmas as dtman and dtmiya; it is not free of antaghrdhadrsti, and so considers the dharmas as destined to perish (uccheda) or as eternal (safvata) . . .
We have this formula throughout the Vijndnakdya, TD 26, p. 559c29, p. 563b20, p. 578b8, and elsewhere.
82. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 408c9, and the Samyuktdbhidharmahrdaya, TD 28, p. 918al9. The dkdras of the Vimoksamukhas, viii. 24.
Footnotes 1187
? 1188 Chapter Seven
The specification of the dkdras of the Abhidharma are not found in the Abhidhamma (see for example Patisambhiddmagga, i. 107, 118, 241, Visuddhi, 494); it is not canonical: Anguttara, i. 38 (list of sannas), and iv. 422 where the ascetic considers the Amatadhatu as ianta, panita, etc. , and the things of his stage as dukkha, roga, gantfa, etc. We have seen (vi. 49), the dkdras of the worldly path: we have to observe that Vasubandhu gets his inspiration from the VijHdnakdya, fol. 59b, line 18 and elsewhere.
83. It results from this that abhisamaya is anupurva, vi. 27.
84. On the meaning of mdrga and pratipad, vi. 65b-d, 66a, vii. 28c.
85. See Samyutta, iii. 66, for variants.
86. Compare v. 27, trans, p. 820.
87. Compare vi. 60a.
88. Hsiian-tsang: "going, entering into the city of Nirvana. " Compare vi68:
nirvdnapratipddandt.
pratipan
89. These explanations are according to the glosses and the context. Vydkhyd: chandamu- lakd iti chandahetukd ity arthah. trsndparydya iha chandah. chandasamudayd iti chandasamutksamd (? ) ity arthah (read samutthdndP). chandajdtiyd iti chandapratyayd ity arthah.
Paramartha translates jdtiya by sheng *fe , "to arise," and prabhava by yu ? , bhava, "existence"; Hsiian-tsang has respectively lei ? , "species," and sheng ? JE. , "to arise. " Samyutta,iii. 100,Majjhima,Hi. 16:pancupdddnakkhandhdkimmulaka. . . chandanwlakd.
In another context, Anguttara iv. 400: tanhdmulaka.
We have Papisambhiddmagga, ii. I l l : jardmaranam kimniddnam kirnsanudayam
kimjdtikam kimpabhavam.
90. Vydkhyd: prabhavasabdah kevalam ? ? /cdt pathitavyah/ dbhidhdrmikair iti vdkhyddhyd- hdrah/ sutranusaranam hi kartavyam ity abhiprayah. The Abhidharmikas, in the list of the aspects of this Truth, should place the prabhava aspect after the pratyaya aspect, for one should be guided by the Sutra.
91. The five updddnaskandhas are thus said to have this type of chanda for their mula or hetu.
92. On virya, vipdka and prabhava of a fruit from the earth as food, or of a drug, Sarvadar/anasamgraha, 16. 22, Kandali, 130, Sufruta, i. l and 40.
93. Paramartha: "According to the Sutra of the trsndvicaritas, there are two groups of five, and two groups of four. " All that follows to page 1114 line 30 is omitted.
Our text is closely related to Anguttara, ii. 212, on the eighteen tanhdvicaritas, where the readings are uncertain, and to Vibhanga 392-400, where they are more certain but remain difficult to interpret (Mrs. Rhys Davids had the kindness to communicate to me the text of the Sammohavinodani and the Manorathapurani; see the following note).
We can compare the list: "Did I exist in the past? . . . ," Kofa, iii. 22c, Majjhima, i. 8, i. l 11, Visuddhimagga, 599, Madhyamakavrtti, 593.
According to chapter ii trans, p. 282, chanda is relative to the future.
94. The Vibhanga, in place of sad asmiti and asad asmiti has 1. as'asmiti {-nicco'smi. . . ) and 2. sat*asmiti or sat'asmi {-ucchissdmi na bhavissdmi). The commentary says: atthiti asa/ niccass'etam adhivacanam. Mrs Rhys Davids remarks: as = asa = asan = asanto = "bad," Jataka, iv. 435: satam vd ason (accusitive singular). We would have: "I am bad, I am good. " The Manorathapurani explains sata by sidati in the sense of anicca: this is the explanation that we have encountered for satkdya, Kola, v. p. 873. The commentary of the Vibhanga understands sydm as "Shall I be? "
? Footnotes 1189 95. Onpravrtti, ii. 6. Perhapsvattupaccheda=vartmopacchedathatIthinkwemustreadin
Mahdvastu, ii. 285, iii. 200, quoted in Koia, ii. trans, note 395.
%. According to Saeki, Samyukta 17. 16; see also TD 2, p. 66? 4.
97. In his shorter treatise, Samghabhadra takes into consideration this explanation in order to prove that the "aspects" are indeed sixteen in number.
98. Vydkhyd: nityam sukham dtmiyam dtmeti ca Arms' caritam esarh ta ime mtyasukhdtm- tydtmadfsticaritdh.
99. See v. 26, trans, note 98; iii. 50a.
100. The meaning of pratyaya is discussed in Koia, iii. 28. 101. 13b-d. On dkdra, see ii. 34b-d, trans, note 173.
102. This explanation is satisfactory, for we indeed conceive that prajnd--the discerning consciousness (ii. 24)--grasps the "aspects", that is to say grasps things {alambana) in a certain manner (as impermanent, etc. ). Furthermore this explanation takes into account the word dkdra:
One takes the sound d from alambana, the final kdra from prakdra, and one has dkdra by cancelling -lambanagrahanapra-.
103. On the dharmas "which have an object", Koia, ii. 34b. Kathdvatthu, ix. 3-7; Vibhanga, 428, Dhammasangani, 1185,1508. The Madhyamakavrtti, 84, quotes the Agama: salambana dharmdhkatame/ sarvecittacaittdh.
104. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 408c25: There are three systems: 1. Prajtld is dkdra, grdhaka, and gfhya; the cittacaittas associated with prajtld are grdhaka and grhya; what is concomitant {sahabhu) with prajtld and what is cittaviprayukta is gfhya. 2. All cittacaitta is dkdra, grdhaka, gfhya; all other dharmas are gfhya. 3. AH dharmas are dkdra; but the samprayuklta dharmas are dkdra, grdhaka and gfhya and the viprayuktadharmas are dkdra and gfhya (The meaning of dkdra is quite different here).
105. In the Udstra, dharmajndna begins the list.
106. We can understand why a being in Arupyadhatu cannot manifest the dharmajndna which has for its object suffering, its arising, etc. of the sphere of Kamadhatu, but why are beings in Rupadhatu incapable of it? We have seen that a person manifests this jtldna by entering into the dhydnas (which are Rupadhatu) (vii. l4c). Some say: "Dharmajndna has for its end the detesting {vidunana) of Kamadhatu; now a person in Rupadhatu has abandoned Kamadhatu by the very fact that he has transmigrated to a sphere of detachment [from Kamadhatu]; therefore the dharmajfldna does not have to arise. The case of a person detached from Kamadhatu [and who has entered into a dhydna due to this detachment] is different: he can manifest the dharmajndna because his existence in Kamadhatu is not exhausted. "
Samghabhadra explains differently why dharmajndna can only be manifested by beings in Kamadhatu: tatsamdpattivyutthdnacittdndm kdmadhdtdv eva sadbhdvdt/ anuparivarta- kdiraydbhdvdd vd/ dharmajHdndnuparivartakasya hi iilasya kdmdvacardny eva bhutdny diraya dauhiUyasamutthdpakakleiaprdptivibandhakatvdt prdtipaksikatvdt/ tdni ca tatra na santUi dharmajtldnam kdmadhdtvdirayam eva: "Because it is only in Kamadhatu that the thoughts of departing from the absorption [in which one realizes dharmajndna] is possible; or rather because, in the two higher spheres, the elements {bhutas) which can serve as the support {diraya) of the type of morality (iila) which necessarily accompanies dharmajndna are missing. This morality is opposed to the kleias which produce immorality (dauhiilya); immorality exists only in Kamadhatu; the elements susceptible of supporting morality which are opposed to this therefore exist only in Kamadhatu.
? 1190 Chapter Seven
107. See iv. 13c.
108. This preamble is missing in Paramartha.
109. According to Hsuan-tsang. Paramartha literally translates his original which is rendered in Tibetan by: chos bcu dag ni sbyar bar bya: "Ten dharmas should by placed in relationship", and he adds the Bhusya: "In order to determine the object of the jndnas, one should establish the relationship of the ten jndnas with the ten types of dharma. What are these ten types of dharmas} . . . "
110. On one hand pratisamkhydnirodha or Nirvana, on the other hand apratisamkhydni- rodha and dkds'a.
111. Marge dharmajndna bears on the Path; the morality which is andsravasarhvara, that is to say rupa (iv. l3c) forms part of the Path.
112. Hsiian-tsang: Is there a moment of knowledge which grasps all the dharmas for its object?
This appears to be the beginning of the discussion of Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 43a2, quoted by Saeki: "Is there ? jndna which knows all the dharmas? No. What is it that the jndna, which knows that all the dharmas are not an dtman, does not know? It does not know itself; it does not know the dharmas which are associated with it or which coexist with it. By saying that it does not know itself, one refutes the thesis of the Mahasamghikas; by saying that it does not know the dharmas associated with it, one refutes the thesis of the Dharmaguptas (fa-mi-pu ? ? ? )'> by saying that it does not know the dharmas which coexist with it, one refutes the thesis of the Mahisasakas; by saying that jndna knows, one refutes the thesis of the Vatsiputriyas [which attribute consciousness to the Pudgala? ]. "
Compare Kathdvatthu, v. 9, where the Andhakas quote a text: sabbasankhdresu antccat? dipphesu tarn pi ndnam aniccato dippham hoti. The Vyakhyd quotes the Sutra: ihdsmdkam bho gautama upasthdnasdldydm samnisanndndm samnipatitdndm evamrupo'natardkatha- samuddharo'bhut/ sramanogautamah kilaivam aha/ ndstisa kascic chramano vdbrdhmano vdyah sakrt sarvarh jdniydt sarvam pasyed iti/ tathyam idarh bho gautama/.
113. Bodhicaryavatara, ix. 18: na cchinatti yathdtmdnam asidhard tathd manah. This is a common position in Indian philosophy; nevertheless the Sautrantika-Vijnanavadins say that the lamp illumines itself. By a curious contradiction, the Vaibhasikas who deny that the mind knows itself, admit that sensation (vedand) is felt not by another sensation, but by the very fact that it is present (iv. 49).
114. Paramartha omits the last phrase ("If it were otherwise . . . ") and translates: "When it is a jndna in Kamadhatu it is a prajfid of hearing and reflection; when it is a jndna in Rupadhatu, it is only a prajnd of hearing, not of meditation, for this last type of prajnd always has a determined sphere for its object. "
Vasubandhu follows the Samyuktdbhidharma-hrdaya, TD 28, p. 953c21: "This jndna is a prajnd of hearing, and reflection, but not of meditation; for the prajfid of absorption has a delimited object. "
Vyakhyd: tasya vyavacchinnabhumydlambanatvdd iti/ yasmdd bhdvandmayam rupdvacaram samvrtijHdnam vyavacchinndm eva bhumim dlambate/ kdmadhdtum vd prathamam vd dhydnam ydvad bhavdgram vd/ kim kdranam/ dnantaryavimuktimdrgdndm adharottarabhumydlambavatvdd yathoktam yathdkramam santddyudaradyakara uttarddha- ragocara iti vacandt (vi. 49) yadi ca tat sarvabhumyalambanam sydt sarvato ? ? gap ad vairdgyam sydt/ prayogavihsamdrgayor yathdsambhavam kd cid eva bhumir dlambanam/ katham/ nirvedhabhdgiyaprayogamargasamgrhitasyahiyasyakdmadhdturdlambanamna tasyetarau dhdtu/ yasyetarau dhdtu na tasya kdmadhdtur dlambanam/ aiubhdpramdndbhi- bhvdyatanddividusanavis'esamdrgasa mgrhitasya kdmadhdtur evdlambanam netarau dhdtu.
According to Yasbmitra, a faithful interpreter of Vasubandhu who is, on this point,
? approved of by Samghabhadra, it is solely through a prajn~d of meditation (bhdvand) that one obtains detachment (vairdgya). The prajfid of hearing and reflection, which is in Kumadhatu, cannot bear on the dharmas of all the spheres: it is not enough to become disgusted with it: the prajnd of bhdvand is more powerful (iv. l23c). Based on this, Vasubandhu concludes that the universal consciousness of "the absence of self" of the dharmas belongs to Kamadhatu, for if it belonged to Rupadhatu (that is to say arising from bhdvand, and being obtained in the dhyanas) it would produce detachment from all of the spheres. Samghabhadra contests this reasoning, for the prajnd cultivated in dhyanas (impure prajnd, since it is a samvrtijndna) never includes disgust for the higher sphere to which it wishes to deliver itself (vi. 49)
Let us note here that Hsuan-tsang translates the two pddas 18c-d (TD 29, p. 138a22) by three pddas: "Samvrtijndna, by excluding its group, together has all the dharmas for its object, by comprehending them under the aspect of non-self", and he adds a fourth pdda: "it arises from hearing and reflection. "
Samghabhadra, in his second treatise, the Prakaranasdsana (TD 29, p. 952al0) corrects the kdrikds where Vasubandhu departs from correct Vaibhasika doctrine; the version of Hsuan-tsang (p. 138a23) gives, in the fourth pdda: "It arises from hearing, reflection and meditation. " Samghabhadra thinks in fact (in his first treatise, the Nydydnusdra, TD 29,p. 742cl8 and following): "This jndna is only in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu, but not in Arupyadhatu . . . It is a prajfid of hearing, reflection, and meditation (bhdvand): for these three prajnas are capable of having all the dharmas for their object with the exclusion of themselves and their group. It is true that the Sautrantika (=Vasubandhu) says: 'This jndna is not a prajnd of meditation . . . ' But this is false. In our system the prajnd of meditation of the sphere of the dhydna takes for its object the sphere in which it is found, namely, the higher sphere; it produces disgust with respect to the lower sphere, and joy with respect to the higher sphere: thus it does not produce detachment with respect to the higher sphere. The argument of the Sautrantika is therefore null and void. "
It appears that, according to what Yasomitra says here, we should consider as viiesamdrga (vi. 65) the disgust (vidusana) which includes [the qualities, guna, namely] aiubhd (vi. 9), the apramdnas (viii. 29) and the abhibhvdyatanas (viii. 35a). All these qualities are visesa (v. 10a, trans, p. 785); they are acquired through prayoga, dnantarya, vimuktimdrga, and are prolongued in visesamdrga (vi. 65); see vii. 25d.
115. Hsiian-tsang: In the states or moments which do not include any augmentation of the number ofjndnas (3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th moments of abhisamaya), he possesses the jndnas of the last previous moment which does include augmentation. Therefore, at the beginning of bhdvandmdrga (16th moment), he necessarily possesses seven jndnas.
116. This last phrase has been added by Hsiian-tsang.
117. Vydkhyd: iha dvividhd bhdvanddhikrtdpratilambhabhdvand nisevanabhdvand ca/ pratilambhabhdvand prdptitah/ nisevanabhdvand sammukhibhdvatah.
"Cultivation" is understood here as the acquisition or taking possession, and manifestation. (See vii. 27).
118. Yathotpanndni bhdvyante = ydni ydny utpanndni tdni tdni bhdvyante (bhdvyante = bhdvandm gacchanti). Bhdvyante signifies "are acquired", since it refers to future ksdntis and jndnas.
119.
