No More Learning

The term employed by the mathematicians, is progressus in infinitum. The philosophers prefer the expression progressus in indefinitum. Without detaining the reader with an examination of the reasons for such a distinction, or with remarks on the right or wrong use of the terms, I shall endeavour clearly to determine these conceptions, so far as is necessary for the purpose of this Critique.
We may, with propriety, say of a straight line, that it may be produced to infinity. In this case the distinction between a^? ro-
yressus in infinitum and a progresses in indefinitum is a mere pieceof subtlety. For, although when we say, produce a straight line --it is more correct to say in indefinitum than in infinitum ; because the former means, produce it as far as you please, the second, you must not cease to produce it ; the expression in infi
? when we are speaking of the power to do perfectly for we can always make longer we please -- on to And this remark holds good all cases, when wa
nitum
correct,
infinity.
speak of progressus, that an advancement from the coo-
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dition to the conditioned ; this possible advancement always proceeds to infinity. We may proceed from n given pair in the descending line of generation from father to son, and cogitate a never-ending line of descendants from it. For in such a case reason does not demand absolute totality in the series, because it does not presuppose it as a condition and as given (datum), but merely as conditioned, and as capable of
being given (dabile). -- Very different is the case with the problem
how far the regress, which ascends from the given conditioned to the conditions, must extend ; whether 1 can say -- it is a regrets
in infinitum, or only in indefinitum ; and whether, for example, setting out from the human beings at present alive in the world, I may ascend in the series of their ancestors, in infinitum --or whether all that can be said that so far as have pro ceeded, have discovered no empirical ground for considering the series limited, so that am justified, and indeed, compelled to search for ancestors still further back, although am not
the idea of reason to presuppose them.
My answer to this question If the series given in empirical intuition as whole, the regress in the series of its internal conditions proceeds in infinitum but, only one member of the series given, from which the regress to proceed to absolute totally, the regress possible only in
indefinitum. For example, the division of portion of matter given within certain limits -- of body, that --proceeds
For, as the condition of this whole its part, and the condition of the part part of the part, and so on, a. :d as in this regress of decomposition an unconditioned indivi sible member of the series of conditions not to be found there are no reasons or grounds in experience for stopping the division, but, on the contrary, the more remote members of the division are actually and empirically given prior to this division:' That to say, the division proceeds to infinity. On the other hand, the series of ancestors of any given human
not given, in its absolute totality, in any experience and yet the regress proceeds from every genealogical member of this series to one still higher, and does not meet with any empirical limit presenting an absolutely unconditioned, member of the series. But as the members of such series are not contained in the empirical intuition of the whole, prior to th<<
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this regress does not proceed to infinity, but Ofllj in indefinitum, that we are called upon to discover other and higher members, which are themselves always conditioned. --
finite or infinite for nothing itself; but, How the empirical regress to be commenced, and how far ought we lo proceed with And here signal distinction in the ap plication of this rule becomes apparent. If the whole
regress,
the regressus in infinitum, nor the regres the series of conditions to be considered
In neither case
sus in indefinitum,
as actually infinite in the object itself. This might be true of things in themselves, but cannot be asserted of pbsenomena, which, as conditions of each other, are only given in the em pirical regress itself. Hence, the question no longer-- What the quantity of this series of conditions in itself
? to recede in the series of its internal conditions to infinity. But the whole not given, aud can only be given by and through the empirical regress,
given empirically, possible
can only say-- possible to infinity to proceed to still higher conditions in the eeries. In the first case am justi fied in asserting that more members are empirically given in the object than attain to in the regress (of decomposition). In the second case, am justified only in saying, that can always proceed further in the regress, because no member of the series given as absolutely conditioned, and thus
higher member possible, and an inquiry with regard to neces
sary. In the one case necessary to find other members of the series, in the other necessary to inquire for others, inasmuch as experience presents no absolute limitation of the regress. For, either you do not possess perception which absolutely limits your empirical regress, and in this case the regress cannot be regarded as complete or, you do possess such limitative perception, in which case not part of your series (for that which limits must be distinct from that which limited it), and incumbent on you to continue your regress up to this condition, and so ou.
These remarks will be placed in their proper light theii application in the following section.
Kant's meaning Infinity, in the first case, quality, or raij be predicated, of the rtgrtts while in the second case, only Ix predicated of the souibilUy of the regress. -- Tr.
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321
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.
Section Ninth.
Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reaou with regard to the Cosmological Ideas.
We have shown that no transcendental use can be made either
of the conceptions of reason or of understanding. We have shown, likewise, that the demand of absolute totality in the series of conditions in the world of sense arises from a transcendental employment of reason, resting on the opinion that phenomena are to be regarded as things in themselves. Tt follows that we are not required to answer the question re specting the absolute quantity of a series -- whether it is in itself limited or unlimited. We are only called upon to de
I ermine how far we must proceed in the empirical regress from condition to condition, in order to discover, in confor mity with the rule of reason, a full and correct answer to the questions proposed by reason itself.
This pnnciple of reason is hence valid only as a rule for the extension of a possible experience --its invalidity as a principle constitutive of phenomena in themselves having been suffi ciently demonstrated. And thus, too, the antmomial conflict 'if reason with itself is completely put an end to ; inasmuch hs we have not only presented a critical solution of the fallacy lurking in the opposite statements of reason, but have shown the true meaning of the ideas which gave rise to these state ments. The dialectical principle of reason has, therefore, been changed into a doctrinal principle. But in fact, if this principle, in the subjective signification which we have shown to be its only true sense, may be guaranteed as a principle of the unceasing extension of the employment of our un
? its influence and value are just as great as if :t were an axiom for the a priori determination of objects. For such an axiom could not exert a stronger influence on the extension and rectification of our knowledge, otherwise than by Droning for the principles of the understanding the most widely expanded employment in the field of experience.
derstanding,
? ? ? 322 TKANBOJCTDEKTAX DIALECTIC.
I.
Idea of the Totality of tkt Composition of Phenomena in the Universe.
Solution of the Cotmological
Here, as well as in the case of the other cosmologies! problems, the ground of the regulative principle of reason is the proposition, that in our empirical regress no experience of an absolute limit, and consequently no experience of a con dition, which is itself absolutely unconditioned, is discover able. And the truth of this proposition itself rests upon the consideration, that such an experience must represent to us phsenomena as limited by nothing or the mere void, on which our continued regress by means of perception must abut -- which is impossible.
Now this proposition, which declares that every condition attained in the empirical regress must itself be considered em pirically conditioned, contains the rule in lerminis, which re quires me, to whatever extent I may have proceeded in the ascending series, always to look for some higher member in the series -- whether this member is to become known to me through experience, or noi.
Nothing further is necessary, then, tor the solution of the first cosmological problem, than to decide, whether, in the re gress to the unconditioned quantity of the universe (as re gards space and time), this never limited ascent ought to be called a regressus in infinitum or in indefinitum.
The general representation which we form in our minds of the series of all past states or conditions of the world, or of all the things which at present exist in it, is itself nothing more than a possible empirical regress, which is cogitated -- although in an undetermined manner--in the mind, and which gives rise to the conception of a series of conditions for a given object. * Now I have a conception of the universe, but not an intuition -- that not an intuition of as whole. Thus cannot infer the magnitude of the regress from the
* The cosmical scries can neither be greater nor smaller than the pos sible empirical regress, upon which its conception based. And as this regress cannot be determinate infinite regress, still less determinate finite (absolutely limited), evident, that we cannot regard the world as either finite or infinite, because the regress which gives us the rt ;. re- Mntatior of the <<. . '. ld i<< uthla'r finite 'ior itiltuilc.
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323
quantity or magnitude of the world, and determine the former by means of the latter ; on the contrary, I must first of all form a conception of the quantity or magnitude of the world from the magnitude of the empirical regress. But of this regress I know nothing more, than that I ought to pro ceed from every given member of the series of conditions to one still higher. But the quantity of the universe is not thereby determined, and we cannot affirm that this regress proceeds in infinitum. Such an affirmation would anticipate the members- of the series which have not yet been reached,
and represent the number of them as beyond the grasp of any empirical synthesis ; it would consequently determine the cosmical quantity prior to the regress (although only in * negative manner) --which is impossible. For the world is not given in its totality in any intuition ; consequently, its quan tity cannot be given prior to the regress. It follows that we are unable to make any declaration respecting the cosmical quantity in itself--not even that the regress in it is a regress in infinitum ; we must only endeavour to attain to a conception of the quantity of the universe, in conformity with the rule which determines the empirical regress in it. But this rule merely requires us never to admit an absolute limit to our series --how far soever we may have proceeded in but always, on the contrary, to subordinate every phenomenon to some other as its condition, and consequently to proceed to this higher phsenomenon. Such regress therefore, the regretius in indtfinitum, which, as not determining quantity in the object, clearly distinguishable from the regreseus in infinitum.
follows from what we have said that we are not justified declaring the world to be infinite in space, or as regards
past time. For this conception of an infinite given quantity empirical but we cannot apply the conception of an infinite quantity to the world as an object of the senses. cannot say, the regress from given perception to every thing limited
either this presupposes an infinite cosmical quantity neither can aay, finite -- for an absolute limit likewise impossible in experience. follows that am not entitled to make any assertion at all respecting the whole object of experience -- the world of sense must limit my declarations to the rule, accord ing to which experience or empirical knowledge to be attained.
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To the question, therefore, respecting the cosmical
tity, the first and negative answer is : The world has no be ginning in time, and no absolute limit in space.
For, in the contrary case, it would be limited by a void time on the one hand, and by a void space on the other. Now, since the world, as a phenomenon, cannot be thus limited in itself -- for a phenomenon is not a thing in itself; it must be possible for us to have a perception of this limita tion by a void time and a void space. But such a perception --such an experience is impossible ; because it has no content. Consequently, an absolute cosmical limit is empirically, and therefore absolutely, impossible. *
From this follows the affirmative answer : The regress in
the series of phsenomena --as a determination of the cosmical
quantity, proceeds in indef. nitum. This is equivalent to sny- ing--the world of sense has no absolute quantity, but the
series -- as conditioned, to one still more remote (whether
through personal experience, or by means of history, or the chain of cause and effect), and not to erase at any point in this extension of the possible empirical employment of the
And this is the proper and only use which renson can make of its principles.
The above rule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in one kind of phenomena. It does not, for example, forbid us, in our ascent from an individual human being through the line of his ancestors, to expect that we shall discover at some point of the regress a primeval pair, or to admit, in the series of heavenly bodies, a sun at the farthest possible distance from some centre. All that it demands is a perpetual pro gress from phenomena to phsenomena, even although an
* The reader will remark that the proof presented above is very dif ferent from the dogmatical demonstration given in the antithesis of the first antinomy. In that demonstration, it was taken for granted that the world is a thing in itself-- given in its totality prior to all regress, and ? determined position in space and time was denied to it--if it was not
considered as occupying all time and all space. Hence our conclusion differed from that given above ; for we inferred in the antithesis the ac tual infinity of the world.
understanding.
qnatt-
? empirical regress (through which alone the world of sense is presented to us on the side of its conditions) rests upon a rule, which requires it to proceed from every member of the
? ? ? IDEA 0? TOTALITY OF DIVTSIOS. 325
actnal perception is not presented by them (as in the case of our perceptions being so wenk, as tliat we are unable to be come conscious of them), since they, nevertheless, belong to possible experience.
Every beginning is m time, and all limits to extension are in space. But space and time are in the world of sense. Con sequently phenomena in the world are conditionally limited, but the world itself is not limited, either conditionally or un
conditionally.
For this reason, and because neither the world nor the
cosmical series of conditions to a given conditioned can be completely given, our conception of the cosmical quantity
is given only in and through the regress and not prior to it--- in a collective intuition. But the regress itself is really nothing more than the determining of the cosmical quantity, and can not therefore give us any determined conception of it -- still less a conception of a quantity which in relation to* certain standard, infinite. The regress does not, therefore, proceed to infinity (an infinity given), but only to an indefinite extent, for the purpose of presenting to us quantity -- realized only
and through the regress itself.
II.
Solution of the Cosmologieal Idea of the Totality the Division of Whole given in Intuition.
ceed from conditioned to its conditions. The division of the parts of the whole (subdivisio or decompositio) regress
the series of these conditions. The absolute totality of this series would be actually attained and given to the mind, the regress could arrive at simple parts. But all the parts iu continuous decomposition are themselves divisible, the division, that to say, the regress, proceeds from the conditioned to its conditions in infinitum because the conditions (the parts) are themselves contained in the conditioned, and, as the latter
given in limited intuition, the former are all given along with it. This regress cannot, therefore, be called regretsus indrftnitum, as happened the case of the preceding cos- Bjologicf! Mii, the regress which proceeded from the con-
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ditioned to the conditions not given contemporaneously and along with but discoverable only through the empirical repress. We are net, however, entitled to affirm of whole of this kind, which divisible in infinitum, that consists
an infinite number ofparts. For, although all the parts are contained in the intuition of the whole, the whole division not contained therein. The division contained only in the progressing decomposition --in the regress itself, which the condition of the possibility and actuality of the series. Now, ns this regress infinite, all the members (parts) to which attains must be contained in the given whole as an aggregate. but the complete series of division not contained therein. For this series, being infinite in succession and always incom plete, cannot represent an infinite number of members, and still less composition of these members into whole.
To apply this remark to space. Every limited part of space presented to intuition whole, the parts of which are always spaces --to whatever extent subdivided. Every limited space
hence divisible to infinity.
Let us again apply the remark to an external phenomenou enclosed in limits, that body. The divisibility of body rests upon the divisibility of space, which the condition of the possibility of the body as an extended whole. body
? divisible to infinity, though does not, for that reason, consist of an infinite number of parts.
It certainly seems that, as body must be cogitated as substance in space, the law of divisibility would not be appli cable to as substance. For we may and ought to grant, in the case of space, that division or decomposition, to any extent, never can utterly annihilate composition (that to say, the smallest part of space must still consist of spaces) otherwise space would entirely cease to exist -- which im
tiia pure category. Phenomenal substance not an absolute
consequently
But, the assertion on the other hand, that when all
possible.
composition in matter annihilated in thought, nothing re mains, does not seem to harmonise with the conception of substance, which must be properly the subject of all compo sition and must remain, even after the conjunction of its attri butes in space--which constituted body -- annihilated in thought. But this not the case with substance in the p'uenomenal world, which not thing in itself cogitated by
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lubject ; it is merely a permanent sensuous image, and nothing more than an intuition, in which the unconditioned is not to be found.
But, although this rule of progress to infinity is legitimate and applicable to the subdivision of a phenomenon, as a mere occupation or filling of space, it is not applicable to a whole con sisting of a number of distinct parts and constituting a quantum discretum --that is to say, an organised body. It cannot be admitted that every part in an organised whole is itself organ ised, and that, in analysing it to infinity, we must always meet with organised parts ; although we may allow that the parts of the matter which we decompose in infinitum, may be organised. For the infinity of the division of a phenomenon in space rests altogether on the fact that the divisibility of a phse nomenon is given only in and through this infinity, that is an undetermined number of parts is given, while the parts them selves are given and determined only in and through the sub division ; in a word, the infinity of the division necessarily pre supposes that the whole is not already divided in te. Hence our division determines a number of parts in the whole --a number which extends just as far as the actual regress in the division; while, on the other hand, the very notion of a body orgauised to infinity represents the whole as already and in itself divided. We expect, therefore, to find in it a determinate, but, at the same time, infinite, number of parts -- which is self-contradic tory. For we should thus have a whole containing a series of members which could not be completed in any regress --which is infinite, and at the same time complete in an organised composite. Infinite divisibility is applicable only to a quantum continuum, and is based entirely on the infinite divisibility of space. But in a quantum discretum the multi tude of parts or units is always determined, and hence always equal to some number. To what extent a body may be or ganized, experience alone can inform us ; and although, so far as onr experience of this or that body has extended, we may not have discovered any inorganic part, such parts must exist in possible experience. But how far the transcendental division of a phenomenon must extend, we cannot know from experience --it is a question which experience cannot answer; it is answered only by the principle of reason which forbid*
? ? ? ? 328 iBivscnrsxKTAL biauoro.
us to consider the empirical regress, in the analysis of extended oody, as ever absolutely complete.
Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcendental Mathematical Idea*--and Introductory to the Solution of the Dynamical Ideas.
We presented the antinomy of pure reason in a tabular form, and we endeavoured to show the ground of this self-contra diction on the part of reason, and the only means of bringing it to a conclusion -- namely, by declaring both contradictory statements to be false. We represented in these antinomies the conditions of phenomena as belonging to the conditioned according to relations of space and time--which is the usual supposition of the common understanding. In this respect, all dialectical representations of totality, in the series of con ditions to a given conditioned, were perfectly homogeneous. The condition was always a member of the series along with the conditioned, and thus the homogeneity of the whole series was assured. In this case the regress could never be cogitated as complete ; or, if this was the case, a member really con ditioned was falsely regarded as a primal member, conse quently as unconditioned. In such an antinomy, therefore, we did not consider the object, that the conditioned, but the series of conditions belonging to the object, and the magni tude of thafcseries. And thus arose the difficulty -- difficulty not to be settled by any decision regarding the claims of the two parties, but simply cutting the knot-- declaring the series proposed reason to be either too long or too short for the understanding, which could in neither case make its con ceptions adequate with the ideas.
But we have overlooked, up to this point, an essential dif ference existing between the conceptions of the understanding which reason endeavours to raise to the rank of ideas -- two of these indicating mathematical, and two dynamical synthesis of phenomena. Hitherto, was not necessary to signalize this distinction for, just as in our general representation of all transcendental ideas, we considered them under phenomenal conditions, so, the two mathematical ideas, our discussion
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? MATHEMATICAL AND DYNAMICAL IDEAS. 329
it concerned solely with an object ia the world of phenomena.
But as we are now about to proceed to the consideration of
the dynamical conceptions of the understanding, and their adequateness with ideas, we must not lose sight of this dis tinction. We shall find that it opens up to us an entirely new view of the conflict in which reason is involved. For, while in the first two antinomies, both parties were dismissed, on the ground of having advanced statements based upon false hypotheses ; in the present case the hope appears of discover ing a hypothesis which may be consistent with the demands of reason, and, the judge completing the statement of the grounds of claim, which both parties had left in an unsatis factory state, the question may be settled on its own merits, not by dismissing the claimants, but by a comparison of the arguments on both sides. --If we consider merely their exten sion, and whether they are adequate with ideas, the series of conditions may be regarded as all homogeneous.
But the conception of the understanding which lies at the basis of these ideas, contains either a synthesis of the homogeneous, (presup posed in every quantity -- in its composition as well as in its division) or of the heterogeneous, which is the case in the dynamical synthesis of cause and effect, as well as of the necessary and the contingent.
Thus it happens, that in the mathematical series of pheno mena no other than a sensuous condition is admissible --a condition which is itself a member of the series ; while the dynamical series of sensuous conditions admits a heterogeneous condition, which is not a member of the series, but, as purely intelligible, lies out of and beyond it. And thus reason is satisfied, and an unconditioned placed at the head of the series of phenomena, without introducing confusion into or discon tinuing contrary to the principles of the understanding.
Now, from the fact that the dynamical ideas admit con dition of phenomena which does not form part of the series of phenomena, arises result which we should not have ex pected from an antinomy. In former cases, the result was that both contradictory dialectical statements were declared to be false. In the present case, we find the conditioned the dynamical series connected with an empirically unconditioned, but non-sensuous condition and thus satisfaction done to the understanding on the one hand and tc th^ reason on the
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other. * While, moreover, the dialectical arguments for ut> conditioned totality in mere phenomeni fall to the ground, both propositions of reason may be shown to be true in their proper signification. This could not happen in the case of the cosmological ideas which demanded a mathematically un conditioned unity ; for no condition could be placed at the head of the series of phenomena, except one which was itself a phsenomenon, and consequently a member of the series.
III.
Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the De duction of Cosmical Events from their Causes.
There are only two modes of causality cogitable --the caus ality of nature, or of freedom. The first is the conjunction of a particular state with another preceding it in the world of sense, the former following the latter by virtue of a law. Now, as the causality of pheuomena is subject to conditions of time, and the preceding state, if it had always existed, could not have produced an effect which would make its first appearance at a particular time, the causality of a cause must itself be an effect -- must itself have begun to be, and therefore, according to the principle of the understanding, itself requires a cause.
We must understand, on the contrary, by the term freedom,
in the cosmological sense, a faculty of the spontaneous origin ation of a state ; the causality of which, therefore, is not sub ordinated to another cause determining it in time. Freedom is in this sense a pure transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains no empirical element ; the object of which, in the second place, cannot be given or determined in any expe rience, because it is a universal law of the very possibility of experience, that everything which happens' must have a cause, that consequently the causality of a cause, being itself some thing that has happened, must also have a cause. In this view
* For the understanding cannot admit among phenomena a condition which is itself empirically unconditioned. Bui if it is possible to cogitate an intelligible condition --one which is not a member of the series of phe nomena--for a conditioned phenomenon, without breaking the series of empirical conditions, such a condition may be admissible as empirically mcondiltoned, and the empirical regress continue regular, unceasing, anal inlact.
? ? ? ? IDEA OF TOTALITY OF DEDUCTION.
331
of the case, the whole field of experience, how far soever it may extend, contains nothing that is not subject to the laws cf nature. But, as we cannot by this means attain to an ab solute totality of conditions in reference to the series of causes and effects, reason creates the idea of a spontaneity, which can begin to act of itself, and without any external cause determining it to action, according to the natural law of causality.
It is especially remarkable that the practical conception of freedom is based upon the transcendental idea, and that the question of the possibility of the former is difficult only as it involves the consideration of the truth of the latter. Free- dom,jn^he_graslical tense, is the independence of the will of coercion by sensuous impulses. A will is sensuous, in so far as it is pathologically affected (by sensuous impulses) ; it is termed animal (arbitrium brutum), when it is pathologically necessitated. The human will is certainly an arbitrium sensi- twum, not brutum, but liberum ; because sensuousness does not necessitate its action, a faculty existing in man of self- determination, independently of all sensuous coercion.
? ' It is plain, that, if all causality in the world of sense were
natural --and natural only, every event would be determined
by another according to necessary laws, and that consequently, phenomena, in so far as they determine the will, must neces sitate every action as a natural effect from themselves ; and thus all practical freedom would fall to the ground with the transcendental idea. For the latter presupposes that, although a certain thing has not happened, it ought to have happened, and that, consequently, its phenomenaPcause was not so powerful and determinative as to exclude the causality of our will -- a causality capable of producing effects independently of and even in opposition to the power of natural causes, and capable, consequently, of spontaneously originating a series of events.
Here, too, we find it to be the case, as we generally found in the self-contradictions and perplexities of a reason which strives to pass the bounds of possible experience, that the pro blem ! b properly not physiological,* but transcendental. The question of the possibility of freedom does indeed concern psychology; but, as it rests upon dialectical arguments of
* Probably so error of the press, and that we >>ho"ld read ptytk*
? ? ? S32 TBAFSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
pure reason, its solution must engage the attention of trans cendental philosophy. Before attempting this solution, a task which transcendental philosophy cannot decline, it will be ad visable to make a remark with regard to its procedure in the settlement of the question.
If phsenomena were things in themselves, and time and space forms of the existence of things, condition and con ditioned would always be members of the same series ; and
I thus would arise in the present case the antinomy common to I all transcendental ideas -- that their series is either too great or too small for the understanding. The dynamical ideas,
wbicli we are about to discuss in this and the following sec tion, possess the peculiarity of relating to an object, not con sidered as a quantity, but as an existence ; and thus, in the discussion of the present question, we may make abstraction of the quantity of the series of conditions, and consider merely the dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned. The question, then, suggests itself, whether freedom is pos sible ; and, if it whether can consist with the universality of the natural law of causality and, consequently, whether we enounce proper disjunctive proposition when we say-- every effect must have its origin either nature or in free dom, or whether both cannot exist together in the same event in different relations. The principle of an unbrok-eti conuec- tion between all events in the phenomenal world, in accord- ance with the unchangeable laws of nature, well-established principle of transcendental analytic which admits of no e. icep- tion. The question, therefore, Whether an effect, deter mined according to the laws of nature, can at the same time
be produced free agent, or whether freedom and nature mutually exclude each other And here, the common, but fallacious hypothesis of the absolute reality of phsenomena manifests its injurious influence in embarrassing the procedure of reason. For phsenomena are things in themselves, free dom impossible. In this case, nature the complete and all-sufficient cause of every event and condition and con ditioned, cause and effect, are contained in the same series, and necessitated the same law. If, on the contrary, phe- nomena are held to bo, as they are in fact, nothing more than mere representations, connected with each other accordance
with empirical laws, they must have ground which
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But the causality of such an intelligible causa
phaenomenal.
is not determined or determinable
by phenomena ; although its effects, as phenomena, must be determined by other phe-
nomenal existences. This cause and its causality exist there fore out of and apart from the series of phenomena ; while its effects do exist and are discoverable in the series of em pirical conditions. Such an effect may therefore be considered to be free in relation to its intelligible cause, and necessary in relation to the phenomena from which it is a necessary con sequence --a distinction which, stated in this perfectly general and abstract manner, must appear in the highest degree subtle and obscure. The sequel will explain. It is sufficient, at present, to remark that, as the complete and unbroken con nection of phenomena is an unalterable law of nature, freedom is impossible --on the supposition that phenomena are abso lutely real. Hence those philosophers who adhere to the common opinion on this subject can never succeed in recon ciling the ideas of nature and freedom.
Possibility of Freedom in harmony with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity.
That element in a sensuous object which is not itself sen suous, I may be allowed to term intelligible. If, accordingly, an object which must be regarded as a sensuous phenomenon possesses a faculty which is not an object of sensuous intuition, but by means of which it is capable of being the cause of phenomena, the causality of an object or existence of this kind may be regarded from two different points of view. It may be considered to be intelligible, as regards its action --the action of a thing which is a thing in itself, and sensuous, as regards its effects--the effects of a phenomenon belonging to the sensuous world. We should, accordingly, have to form both an empirical and an intellectual conception of the causality of such a faculty or power --both, however, having reference to the same effect. This two-fold manner of cogitating a power residing in a sensuous object does not run counter to any of the conceptions, which we ought to form of the world of phenomena or of a possible experience. Phenomena --not
being things in themselves --must have a transcendental object as a foundation, which determines them as mere represent*
? ? ? ? 334 nUNBCENBENTAL DIALECTIC.
nut ? scribe to this transcendental object, "in addition to the pro* pertyof self-phenomenization, a causality whose effects arc to be met with in the world of phsenomena, although"~it"is not itself a phenomenon. But every effective cause must possess o character, that is to say, a law of its causality, without which it would cease to be a cause. In the above case, then, every sensuous object would possess an empirical character, which
guaranteed that its actions, as phsenomena, stand in com plete and harmonious connection, conformably to unvarying natural laws, with all other phenomena, and can be deduced from these, as conditions, and that they do thus, in connection with these, constitute a series in the order of nature. This sensuous object must, in the second place, possess an intelli
gible character, which guarantees it to be the cause of those actions, as phsenomena, although it is not itself aphenomenon nor subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense. The former may be termed the character of the thing as a phe
nomenon, the latter the character of the thing as a thing in itself.
Now this active subject would, in its character of intelligible subject, be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only a condition of phsenomena, and not of things in them selves. No action, would begin or cease to be in this subject ; it would consequently be free from the law of all determination of time --the law of change, namely, that everything which happens must have a cause in the phsenomena of a preceding state. In one word, the causality of the subject, in so far as it is intelligible, would not form part of the series of empirical conditions which determine and necessitate an event in the world of sense. Again, this intelligible character of a thing cannot be immediately cognized, because we can perceive nothing but phsenomena, but it must be capable of being cogitated in harmony with the empirical character ; for we always find ourselves compelled to place, in thought, a trans cendental object at the basis of phsenomena, although we can never know what this object is in itself.
In virtue of its empirical character, this subject would at the same time Sz subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality, and, as a phenomenon and member of the sensuous world, it*
effects would have to be accounted for by a reference to pr*
? ? ? ? '
FREKDOM ANB NECESSITY/. 335
ceding phenomena. External phenomena must be capable y of jnfiuencinj* and its actions, in accordance 'with natural laws, musTexplain *o us how its empirical character, that is,
the law of its causality, to be cognized in and by means of experience. In a word, all requisites for complete and ne cessary determination of these actions must be presented to
us by experience.
In virtue of its intelligible character, on the other hand,
- ter), the subject must be regarded as free from all sensuous
(although we possess only general conception of this charac-
influences, and from all phenomenal determination. More over, as nothing happens in this subject --for noumenon, and there does not consequently exist in any change, de manding the dynamical determination of time, and for the same reason no connection with phenomena as causes -- this active existence must in its actions be free from and indepen dent of natural necessity, for this necessity exists only in the world of phenomena. would be quite correct to say, that
originates or begins its effects in the world of sense from itself, although the action productive of these effects does not begin in itself. We should not be in this case affirming that these sensuous effects began to exist of themselves, because they are always determined by prior empirical conditions--
virtue of the empirical character, which the pheno menon' of the intelligible character --and are possible only as constituting continuation of the series of natural causes. And thus nature and freedom, each in the complete and ab solute signification of these terms, can exist, without contra diction or disagreement, in the same action.
Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in harmony with the Universal Law Natural Necessity.
have thought advisable to lay before the reader at first merely sketch of the solution of this transcendental problem, in order to enable him to form with greater ease clear con ception of the course which reason must adopt in the solution,
shall now proceed to exhibit the several momenta of this so lution, and to consider them in their order.
The natural law, that everything which happens must have cause, that the causality of this cause, that the action of
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the cause, (which cannot always have existed, hut must hit itself an event, for it precedes in time some effect which it has originated), must have itself a phenomenal cause, hy which it is determined, and, consequently, that all events are empiri cally determined in an order of nature -- this law, I say, which lies at the foundation of the possibility of experience, and of a connected system of phenomena or nature, is a law of the understanding, from which no departure, and to which no exception, can be admitted. For to except even a single phe nomenon from its operation, is to exclude it from the sphere of possible experience, and thus to admit it to be a mere fiction of thought or phantom of the brain.
Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes, in which, however, absolute totality cannot be found. But we need not detain ourselves with this question, for it has already been sufficiently answered in our discussion of the antinomies into which reason falls, when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in the series of phenomena. If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the illusion^of^tranBcen- " dental idealism, we shall find that neither nature nor freedom exists. Now the question is : Whether, admitting the exist ence of natural necessity in the world of phenomena, it is possible to consider an effect as jit the same time an effect of nature and an effect of freedom --or, whether these two modes of causality are contradictory and incompatible ?
No phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series. Every action, in so far as it is productive of an event, is itself an event or occurrence, and presupposes another pre ceding state, in which its cause existed. Thus everything that happens is but a continuation of a series, and an absolute be ginning is impossible in the sensuous world. The actions of natural causes are, accordingly, themselves effects, and pre* suppose causes preceding them in time. A primal action-- an action which forms an absolute beginning, is beyond the causal power of phenomena.
Now, is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects are phenomena, the causality of the cause of these effects must also be a phenomenon, and belong to the empirical world 1 Is it not rather possible that, although every effect in the phenomenal world must be connected with an empirical cause, according to the uurfersal law of nature, this empirical
? ? ? ? Or THE CO8MOLOBI0AL IDEA OF FRKKDOM.
587
causality may be itself the effect of a non-empirical and intel ligible causality --its connection with natural causes remaining nevertheless intact ? Such a causality would be considered, in reference to phsenomena, as the primal action of a cause, which is in so far, therefore, not phcenomenal, but, by reason of this faculty or power, intelligible ; although it must, at the same time, as a link in the chain of nature, be regarded as belonging to the seusuous world.
A belief in the reciprocal causality of phenomena is neces sary, if we are required to look for and to present the natural conditions of natural events, that is to say, their causes. This being admitted as unexceptionably valid, the requirements of the understanding, which recognises nothing but nature in the region of phenomeua, are satisfied, and our physical ex planations of physical phenomena may proceed in their regular
course, without hindrance and without opposition. But it is no stumbling-block in the way, even assuming the idea to be a pure fiction, to admit that there are some natural causes in
the possession of a faculty which is not empirical, but intelli
gible, inasmuch as it is not determined to action by empirical
? conditions, but purely and solely upon grounds brought for
ward by the understanding -- this action being still, when
the cause is phsenomenizcd, in perfect accordance with the
laws of empirical causality. Thus the acting subject, as a
causal phenomenon, would continue to preserve a complete con nection with nature and natural conditions ; and the phe
nomenon only of the subject (with all its phenomenal causality) would contain certain conditions, which, if we ascend from the
empirical to the transcendental object, must necessarily be re garded as intelligible. For, if we attend, in our inquiries with regard to causes in the world of phsenomena, to the directions of nature alone, we need not trouble ourselves about the rela tion in which the transcendental subject, which is completely unknown to us, stands to these phenomena and their connec tion in nature. The intelligible ground of phsenomena in this subject does not concern empirical questions. It has to do only with pure thought; and, although the effect*- of this thought and action of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomeua, these phsenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and complete explanation, upon purely physical grounds, and in accordance with natural laws. AndIin this
? ? ? 338 TBANSCEinVENTAL DIALECTIC.
case we attend solely to their empirical, and omit all consider ation of their intelligible character, (which is the transcendental cause of the former,) as completely unknown, except in so far as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol. Now let us apply this to experience. Man isapheromenon of the eensuous world, and at the same time, therefore, a natural cause, the causality of which must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must possess an empirical character, like all other natural phsenomena. We remark this empirical character in his actions, which reveal the presence of certain powers and faculties. If we consider inanimate, or merely animal nature, we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves any other than a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous man ner. But man, to whom nature reveals herself only through sense, cognizes himself not only by his senses, but also through pure apperception ; and this in actions and internal determi nations, which he cannot regard as sensuous impressions.
He is thus to himself, on the one hand, a phsenomenon, but on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties, a purely in- ? telligible object --intelligible, because its action cannot be as cribed to sensuous receptivity. These faculties are under standing and reason. The latter, especially, is in a peculiar manner distinct from all empirically-conditioned faculties, for
it employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects, and by mean8 of these determines the understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own conceptions, which, like the ideas of reason, are pure and non-empirical.
TbRt reason possesses the faculty of causality, iir that at leastwe are compelled so to represent it^is evident from the
? imperatives, which in the sphere of the practi/cal we impose
on many of our executive powers. The words
ought
a species of necessity, and imply a Connection with grounds which nature does not and cannot present to the mind of man.
Understanding knows nothing in nature but that which
or has been, or will be. would be absurd to say that any
nature might to be other than the relations ol time in which stands indeed, the ought, when we consult merely the course of nature, has neither application nor meali ng The question, what ought to happen in the sphere of nature, just as absurd as the question, what ought to be the properties of circle All that we are entitled to ask is, whaf
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? Or THE C08MOLOGICAI. IDEA OF FREEDOM. 339
iBKes place in nature, or, in the latter case, what an lie pro perties of a circle ?
But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action, the ground of winch is ajgure ^conceptipn , "while tin ground of a merely natural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon. This action must certainly be possible under physical conditions, if it is prescribed by the moral imperative ought; but these physical or natural conditions do not con cern the determination of the will itself, they relate to its effect alone, and the consequences of the effect in the world of phse nomena. Whatever number of motives nature may present to my will, whatever sensuous impulses--the moral ought it is beyondjtheir_p. o. 5tex- to. produce. . . They may produce a volition, which, so far from being necessary, is always conditioned -- a volition to which the ought enunciated by reason, sets an aim and a standard, gives permission or prohibition. Be the ob ject what it may, purely sensuous --as pleasure, or presented by pure reason -- as good, reason will not yield to grounds which have an empirical origin. Reason will not follow the order of things presented by experience, but, with perfect
? them according to ideas, with which it compels empirical conditions to agree. It declares, in the name of these ideas, certain actions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place, and which perhaps never will take place ; and yet presupposes that it possesses the faculty of causality in relation to these actions. For, in the
absence of thioupposition, it could not expect its ideas to produce certain effects in the world of experience.
Now, let us stop here, and admit it to be at least possible, that reason does stand in a really causal relation to phse- nomena. In this case it must -- pure reason as it is -- exhibit an empirical character. For every cause supposes a rule, ac cording to which certain phenomena follow as effects from th<< cause, and every rule requires uniformity in these effects ; and this is the proper ground of the conception of a cause -- as a faculty or power. Now this conception (of a cause) may be termed the empirical character of reason ; and this charac ter is a permanent one, while the effects produced appear, iu conformity with the various conditions which accompany and partly limit them, in various forms.
Thus the volition of every man has an empiricalIcharacter, 2
spontaneity, rearranges
? ? ? 840 TBAWflCENDKNTAI DIAlECTIC.
which is nothing more than the causality of his reason, in M far as its effects in the phenomenal world manifest the pre sence of a rule, according to which we are enabled to examine, in their several kinds and degrees, the actions of this causality and the rational grounds for these actions, and in this way to decide upou the subjective principles of the volition. Now we learn what this empirical character is only from phe nomenal effects, and from the rule of these which is presented by experience ; and for this reason all the actions of man in the world of phenomena are determined by his empirical cha racter, and the co-operative causes of nature. If, then, we
; could investigate all the phenomena of human volition to their lowest foundation in the mind, there would be no action which we could not anticipate with certainty, and recognise to
be absolutely necessary from its preceding conditions. So far as relates to this empirical character, therefore, there can be no freedom ; and it is only in the light of this character that we can consider the human will, when we confine ourselves to simple observation, and, as is the case in anthropology, insti tute a physiological investigation of the motive causes of human actions.
lation to speculative reason --but to practical reason, as the producing cause of these actions, we shall discover rule and an order very different from those of nature and experience. For the declaration of this mental faculty may be, that what has and could not but take place in the course of nature, ought not to have taken place. Sometimes, too, we discover, or be lieve that we discover, that the ideas of reason did actually stand in causal relation to certain actions 01 roan and that these actions have taken place because they were determined, not empirical causes, but the act of the will upon grounds of reason.
Now, granting that reason stands in causal relation to phenomena can an action of reason he called free, when we know that, sensuously --in its empirical character, completely determined and absolutely necessary But this empirical character itself determined the intelligible cha racter. The latter we cannot cognize we can only indicat'
by means of phenomena, which enable us to have an imme
? --But when we consider the same actions in relation to reason not for the purpose of ezplaininpAheW origin, that in re
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? 07 THB COSMOLOOICAX IDEA Of FBKEDOM. 841
diate cognition only of the empirical character. * An action, then, in so far as it is to be ascribed to an intelligible cause, does not result from it in accordance with empirical laws. That is to say, not the conditions of pure reason, but only their effects in the internal sense, precede the act. Pure reason, as n purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the conditions of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible character Joes not begin to be; it does not make its appearance at a certain time, for the purpose of producing an effect.