No More Learning

Reply to Objection 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we
grant to be more perfect than the gifts.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes
another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God
precedes love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the
intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The
other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's
neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in this way
moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, through
being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly
subordinate to God.

Reply to Objection 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts
of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which
"dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and
understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as
they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the
perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory
means to say.
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OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?

(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?

(3) Of the number of the beatitudes;

(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.
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Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the
virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns
the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq. ) to the gifts of the Holy
Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq. , ascribes the
beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.

Objection 2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the
reason and the eternal law, as stated above ([1665]Q[19], A[3];[1666]
Q[21], A[1]). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while
the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost,
as is clear from what has been said ([1667]Q[68], AA[1],3, seqq. ).
Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of
the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes
do not differ from them.

Objection 3: Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness,
justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.

On the contrary, Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that
are neither virtues nor gifts, e. g. poverty, mourning, and peace.
Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.

I answer that, As stated above ([1668]Q[2], A[7];[1669] Q[3], A[1]),
happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the
end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are
full of hope"; and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "We are saved by
hope. " Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved
towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action.
And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of
virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal
happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be
moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may
obey and follow him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the
virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to
the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts
are more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above
([1670]Q[68], A[8]). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes
propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas
Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples
on the mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them
to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that no other habits,
besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.

Reply to Objection 3: Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of
meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these
might seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts,
because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues
perfect him, as stated above ([1671]Q[68], A[2]).
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Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes
do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because
they hope for a reward, as stated above [1672](A[1]). Now the object of
hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to
come.

Objection 2: Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to
the beatitudes, Lk. 6:25, where we read: "Woe to you that are filled;
for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn
and weep. " Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because
frequently men are not punished in this life, according to Job 21:13:
"They spend their days in wealth. " Therefore neither do the rewards of
the beatitudes refer to this life.

Objection 3: Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the
reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant
fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps.
16:15: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall
appear. " Again, it is only in the future life that we shall see God,
and that our Divine sonship will be made manifest, according to 1 Jn.
3:2: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we
shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him,
because we shall see Him as He is. " Therefore these rewards refer to
the future life.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These
promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been
fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete
change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us
after this life. "

I answer that, Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of
these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all
these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life; and Chrysostom
in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and
some to the present life.

In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future
happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of our having
a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by
way of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of future
happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope
that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and
another, when we see the first signs of the fruit.

Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the
beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to happiness,
either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards,
may be either perfect happiness, so as to refer to the future life, or
some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have
attained perfection, in which case they refer to the present life.
Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues
and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as
a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.

Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards future happiness as the last end:
yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to
that end, according to Ps. 27:7: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I
have been helped. "

Reply to Objection 2: Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo
temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment.
Hence Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so,
Lord---that the disordered mind should be its own punishment. " The
Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is
divided against itself . . . one part pulls this way, another that";
and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a man so
miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice. " In like manner,
although, on the other hand, the good sometimes do not receive material
rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in
this life, according to Mat. 19:29, and Mk. 10:30: "Ye shall receive a
hundred times as much" even "in this time. "

Reply to Objection 3: All these rewards will be fully consummated in
the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in
this life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xiv; *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote the beginning
of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men.
The "possession" of the land denotes the well-ordered affections of the
soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal
inheritance, signified by "the land. " They are "comforted" in this
life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is called the "Paraclete," i. e.
the Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food
of which Our Lord said (Jn. 4:34): "My meat is to do the will of Him
that sent Me. " Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy. " Again,
the eye being cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to
speak, "see God. " Likewise, in this life, those who are the
"peacemakers" of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and
are called "the children of God. " Nevertheless these things will be
more perfectly fulfilled in heaven.
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Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably
enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated
above (A[1], ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and
understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is
assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters
connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently enumerated.

Objection 2: Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the
active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e. g. knowledge and
counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with
the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently indicated.

Objection 3: Further, among the executive gifts connected with the
active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety
seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included
directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently enumerated.

Objection 4: Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ.
Thus, it is written (Job 5:17): "Blessed is the man whom God
correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in
the counsel of the ungodly"; and (Prov. 3:13): "Blessed is the man that
findeth wisdom. " Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently
enumerated.

Objection 5: On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned.
For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes
are indicated.

Objection 6: Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth
chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matthew 5
are too many.

I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make
this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to
consist in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual
life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life [*See
Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations
to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy.
Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an
obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a
disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if
perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is
a beginning thereof.

And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as
removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure
consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods,
whether riches or honors; from which man is withdrawn---by a virtue so
that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent
way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude is:
"Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the
contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from
humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of
one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the
irascible passions man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that they are
kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a
gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's will,
is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is:
"Blessed are the meek. " From following the concupiscible passions, man
is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in
moderation---and by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside
altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice
of sorrow [*Cf. [1673] Q[35], A[3]]; hence the third beatitude is:
"Blessed are they that mourn. "

Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor,
either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the former
we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty
to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and by a gift, so that we
do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with
an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with
eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice. " With regard to spontaneous favors we
are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we
should give, e. g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains
to the virtue of liberality--and by a gift, so that, through reverence
for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our
gratuitous bounty: hence it is written (Lk. 14:12,13): "When thou
makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren," etc
. . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc. ; which, properly, is
to have mercy: hence the fifth beatitude is: "Blessed are the
merciful. "

Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final
beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are
included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the
effects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative
life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active
life, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in
himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by
the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of
heart. " But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected
in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace,
according to Is. 32:17: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the
seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers. "

Reply to Objection 1: The acts of the gifts which belong to the active
life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining
to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason
given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift of
understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God,"
corresponds to the gift of wisdom.

Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to the active life,
knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of
operation, as even the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And
therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes
do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active
life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e. g. to
counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but,
on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts
have the direction, as, e. g. mourning in respect of knowledge, and
mercy in respect of counsel.

Reply to Objection 3: In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may
consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the
first five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to
their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed among the
executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and
mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects man in his relations to
others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on Lk. 6:22: "It is the
business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation,"
fortitude being about the irascible passions: poverty and mourning to
the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of
the world.

Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this
way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the
principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to
piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows
his failings and those of worldly things, according to Eccles. 1:18:
"He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]. " The
principal motive for hungering after the works of justice is fortitude
of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel,
according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king
[Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy
iniquities with works of mercy to the poor. " It is thus that Augustine
assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4).

Reply to Objection 4: All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be
reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because
they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life.
Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom the Lord
correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we
read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the
ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we read,
"Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the
reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that
can be adduced.

Reply to Objection 5: The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and
declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that
a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it
follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the
eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.

Reply to Objection 6: Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to
the multitude (Lk. 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according
to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than
pleasure, temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our
Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. The
first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by
saying: "Blessed are ye poor. " The second is that man be well off as to
his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying
in the second place: "Blessed are ye that hunger. " The third is that it
should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts
aside by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now. " The fourth is the
outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: "Blessed
shall you be, when men shall hate you. " And as Ambrose says on Lk.
6:20, "poverty corresponds to temperance, which is unmoved by delights;
hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through
compassion gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable
things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude. "
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Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are
unsuitably enumerated.
Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal
life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of
heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned.

Objection 2: Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward,
both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same
ground it should have been assigned to all.

Objection 3: Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending
order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the
rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess
the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of heaven. " Therefore
these rewards are unsuitably enumerated.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these
rewards.

I answer that, These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering
the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of
happiness indicated above [1674](A[3]). For the first three beatitudes
concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual
happiness consists: which happiness man desires by seeking the object
of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in
temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the rewards of the first
three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find
in earthly happiness. For men seek in external things, viz. riches and
honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied
in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and
abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of
heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by
wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain security
for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful
possession of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of
eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of
the present life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our
Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.

Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are
the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbor:
from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of
their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards in
correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For
there are some who recede from acts of justice, and instead of
rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may
abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger
after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, again, recede
from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery.
Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain mercy, and
be delivered from all misery.

The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude:
hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the dispositions
included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see
clearly: hence the clean of heart are promised that they shall see God.
Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to
be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a
reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, consisting in
perfect union with God through consummate wisdom.

Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth. ), all these
rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human
intellect cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means
of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion to the
merits to which those rewards are assigned.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of
all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes.
Hence it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other
rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according to
Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor
in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who suffer
persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the glory of the
body.

Reply to Objection 3: The rewards are also arranged in ascending order.
For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply
to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly
and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than
to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of
which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fill
than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies abundance of
comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more
than he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God,
even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees
the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace
belongs to the king's son.
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OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?

(2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?

(3) Of their number?

(4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.
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Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5)
are acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost,
enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23), are not acts. For that which
bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on
indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit: for it is written (Wis.
3:15): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and (Jn. 4:36): "He that
reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting. "
Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits.

Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy
[*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the
English 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing
in them. " But our will should not rest in our actions for their own
sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits.

Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle
numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity.
Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above ([1675]Q[55],
A[1]). Therefore the fruits are not actions.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:33): "By the fruit the tree is
known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain
the passage. Therefore human actions are called fruits.

I answer that, The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material
to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the
product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain
sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree that produces
it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in
spiritual matters, we may take the word "fruit" in two ways: first, so
that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that which he
produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers.

Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and
gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet these
are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which
man intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In this sense
man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment.

If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human
actions are called fruits: because operation is the second act of the
operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's
operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be
the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a
higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's
operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine
seed, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God,
committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him. "

Reply to Objection 1: Since fruit is something last and final, nothing
hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate
to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the
Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are
referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called
flowers: hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:23): "My flowers are the
fruits of honor and riches. "

Reply to Objection 2: When the will is said to delight in a thing for
its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the
expression "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and
in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last
end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way,
a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason of its form.
Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, for its own sake,
as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something
tasty; and in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own sake, but only for
the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must
delight in God for His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous
deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent
goodness which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De
Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they
refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight. "

Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to
their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan. ): "Faith is to
believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity
is the movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbor. " It is thus
that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits.
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Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the
beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated
above ([1676]Q[69], A[1], ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as
he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are
fruits of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future
beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the
present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on
hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with future
beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.

Objection 3: Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and
delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above
([1677]Q[3], A[1];[1678] Q[4], A[1]). Therefore fruit and beatitude
have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from
one another.

On the contrary, Things divided into different species, differ from one
another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, as
is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the
fruits differ from the beatitudes.

I answer that, More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit.
Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and
delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and
excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice
versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights:
whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and which, by reason
of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to the
virtues, as already stated ([1679]Q[69], A[1], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits,
but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.

Reply to Objection 2: The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect
simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other
hand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and
perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes.

Reply to Objection 3: More is required for a beatitude than for a
fruit, as stated.
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Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by
the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is
only one fruit of the present life; according to Rom. 6:22: "You have
your fruit unto sanctification. " Moreover it is written (Is. 27:9):
"This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away. "
Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits.

Objection 2: Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated
(A[1] ). But Our Lord mentions (Mat. 13:23) a threefold fruit as
growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold,
sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold. " Therefore one should not reckon twelve
fruits.

Objection 3: Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something
ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits
mentioned by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply
a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but rather
something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are
enumerated.

Objection 4: On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated
insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated [1680](A[2])
that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned
here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and of
many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are
insufficiently enumerated.

I answer that, The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the
Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the
twelve fruits of which it is written (Apoc. 22:2): "On both sides of
the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits. " Since, however, a fruit
is something that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root, the
difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways
in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us: which process consists in this,
that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to
itself; secondly, in regard to things that are near it; thirdly, in
regard to things that are below it.

Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has
a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things. Now the
first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by
love, which is the first of our emotions and the root of them all, as
stated above ([1681]Q[27], A[4]). Wherefore among the fruits of the
Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a
special manner, as in His own likeness, since He Himself is love. Hence
it is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us. " The necessary result of
the love of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being
united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in God
Whom it loves, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity,
abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore the sequel of charity is
"joy. " Now the perfection of joy is peace in two respects. First, as
regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to
rejoice perfectly in the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the
enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at
peace in one object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he
accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written (Ps. 118:165):
"Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no
stumbling-block," because, to wit, external things do not disturb them
in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the
restless desire: for he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not
satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two
things, namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and that
our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and
joy, "peace" is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a
good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being
disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience";
secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed;
which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of
evil" (Ethic. v, 3).

Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his
neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this belongs
"goodness. " Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this
belongs "benignity," for the benign are those in whom the salutary
flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to
their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the evils
his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs
anger. Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our
neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or deceit. To
this pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we
take it for the faith whereby we believe in God, then man is directed
thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect
and, consequently, all that is his, to God.

Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards
external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe the "mode" in all our
words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and
"chastity": whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man
from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because
the continent man is subject to concupiscence, but is not led away;
whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from them.

Reply to Objection 1: Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by
which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there
in the singular, on account of its being generically one, though
divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits.

Reply to Objection 2: The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits
do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various
degrees of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the
married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; the
contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency,
by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways in which holy
men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the three degrees
of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of
anything is considered with respect to its beginning, its middle, and
its end.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact of not being disturbed by painful things
is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the
foundation, it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as
much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith,
which is certainly about the unseen. "

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says on Gal. 5:22,23, "the Apostle
had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or
fruits of the Spirit] there are; but to show how the former should be
avoided, and the latter sought after. " Hence either more or fewer
fruits might have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the
gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of
fittingness, in so far as all the virtues and gifts must needs direct
the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of
wisdom and of any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity, joy
and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that
these imply either enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils,
which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit.
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Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not
contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates (Gal.
5:19, seqq. ). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works
of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit
are not contrary to them.

Objection 2: Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle
mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore
the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to
one another.

Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place
is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication,
uncleanness, and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the
flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not
contrary to the works of the flesh.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth
against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. "

I answer that, The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may
be taken in two ways.