No More Learning

% According to Thompson, "from October 1918 to January 1919 the Soviet government of-
ficially proposed peace to the Western powers on at least seven different occasions. " Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 88; and see also Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 87 n. 50.
95 See Lenin, Selected Works, 3:55-56; Bunyan, Intervention, Civil War, and Communism,
[1591
?
? Revolution and War
the outstanding questions," which he followed with a conciliatory message to Wilson the next day. Addressing the "one-sided accusations against So- viet Russia," Litvinov appealed to Wilson's "sense of justice and impartial- ity," reiterated the Bolshevik desire for peace, and called for the Entente to withdraw its troops, lift the blockade, and "come to an understanding with the Sovnet Govemment. "97
AlliedResponses. TheSovietpeaceoffensivereceivedafavorableresponse from Britain and the United States. The Imperial War Cabinet authorized preliminary talks with Litvinov, and Wilson sent a young diplomat, William H. Buckler, to meet with Litvinov in Stockholm in January. Litvinov told Buckler his government was "prepared to compromise on all points, in- cluding the Russian foreign debt, protection to existing foreign enterprise, and the granting of new concessions in Russia. " He also declared that Bol- shevik propaganda would end as soon as a peace settlement was reached, and stated that the "Russians realize that in certain western countries con- ditions are not favorable for a revolution. "98
In response, Britain and the United States made several attempts to end the civil war and terminate their involvement in Russia. Buckler's talks with Litvinov convinced the Allies to approve a British proposal for negotiations on "conditions for a general settlement," and the Allied representatives at the Paris Peace Conference overcame French objections and voted on January 21 to invite representatives of the "organized groups now contending for the leadership and guidance of Russia" to a conference to be held at the Prinkipo
Islands in rnid-February. 99 The Soviet government accepted the proposal on February 4, 1919. The decision reflected its overwhelming desire to end the civil war and its confidence that any concessions it might be forced to make would be reversed once the revolution had spread to the West. 100 The leaders
97 Litvinov also requested outside aid and technical support to help the Soviet governme! 1lt "exploit [Russia's) natural richness . . . for the benefit of all countries. " See Degras, Soviet Doc- uments, 1:123, 129-32; and Foreign Relations 1919, Russia, 1-2. For a description of other Sovieft activities along these lines, see McFadden, Alternative Paths, 176-80.
98 See Foreign Relations 1919, Russia, 15-17.
99 See Foreign Relations 1919, Russia, 2-3, 3<r-31; Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 93--95 and passim; Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 95-100. French foreign ministe[ Stephen Piclhon protested that France would "make no contract with crime," and Ambas- sador Noulens made a dramatic presentation in which he portrayed the Soviet government as both an awesome menace and a weak and vulnerable foe. See Foreign Relations, 1919, Peace Conference, 3:623-42; and Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, 427.
100 See Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:137-39; Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 115-18; and McFadden, Alternative Paths, 202-205. Trotsky had already declared, "All that we cede now will come back to us, because Soviet Russia gives in to lhe imperialists only tem- porarily," and Chicherin remarked that "Brest-Litovsk had shown that such [imperialist] an- nexations could be only of short duration. " Quoted in Piotr S. Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 102.
[ t6o]
? The Russian Revolution
of the various ex-Russian territories accepted the Allied invitation as well, but the representatives of the anti-Bolshevik Whites refused to participate, on the grounds that negotiations would legitimize Bolshevik rule. 101 The French govemment encouraged the Whites to reject the invitation, and con- servatives in Britain and the United States waged a fierce press campaign against any contact with the Bolshevik IIcriminals. " The date for the confer- ence soon passed and the "Prinkipo proposal" merely confirmed each side's belief in the immutable malice of the other. 102
The next attempt to reach an accommodation with the Soviet regime began in February, when Wilson authorized an unofficial mission to Moscow by William Bullitt, a journalist attached to the U. S. delegation in Paris. The mission was originally intended to gather information about so- cial and political conditions in Russia, but as Bullitt later recounted, some Entente officials decided to use the opportunity "to obtain from the Soviet Government an exact statement of the terms on which they were ready to stop fighting. " Members of the British and U. S. delegations gave Bullitt sev- eral specific proposals for ending the civil war and restoring normal rela- tions between Russia and the West and asked him to determine whether these terms would be acceptable to the Bolsheviks. 103
Bullitt's observations in Russia convinced him that the Soviet regime en- joyed substantial popular support and was governing effectively in the ter- ritories it controlled. The Soviet leaders accepted his proposals with only minor modifications. Their willingness to concede vast amounts of territory to the Whites in exchange for the cessation of Allied assistance testifies to the importance they attached to ending foreign intervention and to Lenin's belief that the White armies could not survive on their own. 104
101 See Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, 432-39; Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 123-24; and Nadia Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile: Russian Emigres in Paris, 1918-1925,'' (Ph. D. diss. , Stanford University, 1979), 132-33.
102 The failure of the Prinkipo proposal is analyzed in Richard K. Debo, Survival and Con- s o l i d a t i o n : T h e F o r e i g n P o l i c y of S o v i e t R u s s i a , 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 2 1 ( M o n t r e a l : M e G i l l / Q u e e n ' s U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1992), 31-33; Chamberlin, Russian Revolution, 2:157-59; McFadden, Alternative Paths, chap 8; Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 107-17; Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 1 19-30; Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, 436-49; and Carley, Revolution and Interven- tion, 152-53.
103 These proposals were worked out by Bullitt, Edward House, and Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary, and Wilson was not informed of this step (although Lloyd George probably was). The lack of clear agreement on the purpose of the mission contributed to its failure and underscored Soviet impressions of Western perfidy. See Debo, Survival and Con- solidation, 44-49; McFadden, Alternative Paths, chap. 9; Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Ver- sailles, 149-56; and Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 145-46.
104 As Lenin told a British journalist in 1920, "We proposed this treaty (to Bullitt] with the knowledge that if peace were signed, those [White] governments could never hold out. " Quoted in McFadden, Alternative Paths, 231; and also see Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 154, 164-75. For Bullitt's report, see Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 85-95.
[161]
? Revolution and War
Bullitt hurriedly cabled these terms to Paris on March 16 but returned there to find that nothing had been done. As it turned out, the proposals he had submitted in Moscow did not even reflect a consensus among U. S. offi? ? cials (let alone the Entente as a whole), and both Lloyd George and Wilson faced strong domestic opposition to any compromise with the Bolshevilk regime. 105 Bullitt's own progressive sympathies made it easier for conserva- tives to discount his testimony, and though his conduct in Moscow showed him to be a tough and effective negotiator, the terms he achieved still con- tained significant flaws. Bullitt's efforts also fell victim to bad timing, as the agenda of the peace conference had shifted by the time he returned to Paris and his sponsors now chose to focus their energies on other issues. 106
With hindsight, the Bullitt mission is best seen as a lost opportunity for the Allies to end their involvement in Russia on far better terms than they ultimately obtained. The concessions offered to Bullitt did not mean that the Bolsheviks had abandoned their revolutionary ambitions, and a sincere ef- fort to follow up on Bullitt's initiative would hardly have guaranteed a sig- nificant improvement in Soviet relations with the West; however, the Soviets' response suggested that they were willing to pursue more or less normal relations with the Allied powers, even if out of necessity rather thal! 1l conviction. 107 And since their acceptance of virtually all Bullitt's conditions had gained them nothing, it is hardly surprising that they saw this episode as additional evidence of imperialist hostility.
The final attempt to reach an accommodation with the Soviet regime dur- ing the first half of 1919 was the so-called Hoover-Nansen plan, whiclh linked Western relief aid to a ceasefire between the Red Army and the Whites. The proposal suffered the same dim fate as its predecessors. The
105 Wilson refused to meet with Bullitt upon the latter's return to Paris, and Lloyd George answered Bullitt's pleas by waving a copy of the conservative Daily Mail and saying, "As long as the British press is doing this kind of thing, how can you expect me to sensible abouR Russia? " Lloyd George later recalled, "Personally I would have dealt with the Soviets as the defacto government of Russia. So would President Wilson. But we both agreed that we could! not carry to that extent our colleagues at the [peace conference] nor the public opinion of our own countries which was frightened by Bolshevik violence and feared its spread. " See hls Truth about the Peace Treaties, 1:331; Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 50; Levin, Wilson and World Politi! Cs, 214-15; and Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 153-56.
106 The agreement called for a cease-fire and a joint pledge of noninterference in domestic politics but did not explain how either provision would be enforced. It also required an end! to Allied support for the Whites, which in effect meant abandoning the policy the Entente had followed for over a year.
107 The Bolshevik decision to accept Bullitt's proposals was clearly controversial; Zinoviev refused to speak with Bullitt, and Trotsky referred to the delegation as "eavesdroppers" sent "to assess whether we should hold firm or not. " Chicherin defended the compromise, warn- ing that a refusal would lead to renewed support for the Whites, and Lenin reminded several party gatherings that "our country alone cannot overthrow world imperialism. . . . We have to make concessions [to it]. " See Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 47-48; and McFadden, Al- ternative Paths, 228-30.
[162]
? ? The Russian Revolution
French governen\ nt reluctantly endorsed it on April t6 but Kolchak and the emigre Political Committee protested that relief aid would merely prolong Bolshevik rule. 108 The Soviet government did not even learn of the proposal until May 4, and then responded by blaming food shortages in Russia on the civil war and the Allied blockade and pointing out that the political is- sues raised in the proposal could only be addressed by formal peace talks. By the time this message was received, however, reports of Kolchak's early
successes had reached Paris, and the Hoover-Nansen plan was quickly dropped. Like the Prinkipo proposal and the Bullitt mission, the speed with which this initiative was abandoned underscores the Entente's continued ambivalence about the proper approach to the new regime in Moscow. 109
The failure of accommodation highlights some of the obstacles to im- proving relations with a revolutionary government. The first problem was the sheer difficulty of negotiating with an unrecognized regime: the Soviets were not present at the peace conference, and unlike the Whites, they had no community of sympathizers in Paris to lobby on their behalf. Communi-
cation was hampered further by the Entente's fear that contacts with the Soviet regime might imply recognition (although this objection did not pre- vent them from sending military attaches and other representatives to work directly with the Whites). As a result, negotiations were conducted either via erratic radio broadcasts or through semiofficial emissaries such as Bul- litt. These constraints increased uncertainty and made detrimental misun- derstandings more likely. 110
Second, the opposition to accommodation was reinforced by anti-Bolshe- vik propaganda, much of it traceable to Russian exiles and the White forces themselves. Not only did the exiles' Political Committee in Paris enjoy close ties with the French government (which shared its anti-Bolshevik world- view}, but the conservative opposition that constrained Lloyd George was fueled in part by misleading or fic. titious reports from unreliable anti-Bol- shevik sources. m Thus, the general lack of information was exacerbated by "facts" that were politically inspired and predictably biased.
Third, accommodation was hampered by disagreements among the Allies as a whole and within the individual Allied governments. These divisions
108 On the origins and outcome of the Hoover-Nansen plan, see Levin, Wilson and World Politics, 217-18; Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 256-62; Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, 1oo-102, 108-10<); and McFadden, Alternative Paths, chap. 10.
109 According to Ullman, the Allied commissioners did not receive the Soviet reply until May 14, because the French receiving station in the Eiffel Tower refused to relay the message. See Britain and the Russian Civil War, 160; and Foreign Relations, 1 9 1 9, Russia, 1 1 1-15, 351-54.
110 See Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 16o-61.
111 These reports, published in a British government white paper, contained accusations that the Bolsheviks had nationalized women and established "commissariats of free love," that they were using Chinese torturers, and that churches were being converted into broth- els. See Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 141-44, 173-77-
[163]
? ? Revolution and War
were partly due to normal political rivalries but were enlarged by the per- sistent dearth of information. The consequence was a stalemate: the Whites received enough support to continue but not enough to win, and the Allies never followed up on the Soviets' favorable responses to their halfhearted\ proposals for detente. 112
Finally, the failure of accommodation reflected the basic truth that the Bol- sheviks were more interested in a settlement than the Allies were. No West- em leader wanted Russia to remain under Bolshevik control, and even those who opposed intervention were unwilling to pursue accommodation in the face of domestic opposition or reports of White successes. The result was a self-defeating mixture of confrontation and conciliation that simultaneously reinforced Soviet perceptions of threat and helped them strengthen their hold on power.
The Diplomacy ofIsolation
After the demise of the Hoover-Nansen plan, the Soviet government sus- pended its efforts at accommodation in favor of greater reliance on revolu- tionary propaganda. An international congress of socialist parties convened in Moscow in March, and the delegates responded to a fiery speech by an Austrian representative by voting to establish the Third Communist Inter- national, or Comintern. 113 The congress also called for colonial revolts
against the imperialist powers (a theme that the Bolsheviks repeated throughout the year}, and Foreign Minister Chicherin began propaganda broadcasts encouraging foreign workers to oppose intervention in Russia. 114
Soviet relliance on propaganda during this period was partly ideological in origin and partly a matter of necessity. The failure of the peace offensive confirmed Soviet beliefs about capitalist hostility and the inevitability of
112 As an Itallian delegate later . recalled: "We had to choose in Russia between two policies equally logical and defendable. The first is that of intervention; to go to Moscow if necessary and crush Bolshevism by force. The second consists in regarding Bolshevism as a govern- ment defacto, and to establish relations with it, if not cordial at least more or less normal. We did not know how to adopt either one or the other and we have suffered the worst conse- quences for pursuing both at the same time. Without going to war, we are in a state of war with Russia. " Quoted in Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 104.
113 The Austrian delegate, Karl Steinhardt, told the congress that "all eyes [in Europe) are turned toward revolutionary Russia. They are only waiting for her to give them the password to go into action. " Quoted in Melograni, Lenin and World Revolution, 56; and see also James W. Hulse, The Forming ofthe Communist International (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 19-20; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:1 18-26.
114 As Chicherin described Soviet diplomacy during this period: "We write fewer notes to governments but more appeals to the working classes. " Two Years of Soviet Foreign Policy: the Relations of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic with Foreign Nations, from November 7, 1917, to November 7, 1919 (New York: Russian Soviet Government Bureau, 1920), 35? Also see Carr, BolshevikRevolution, 3:122-23, 235-36; and Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:15o-178.
? ? The Russian Revolution
war, while evidence of unrest in the West sustained the hope that the spread of revolution would undermine the imperialist powers and provide Soviet Russia with new allies. As Lenin told the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919: "We are living not merely in a state, but in a system ofstates; and it is in- conceivable that the Soviet republic should continue to exist for a long pe- riod side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately one or the other must conquer. "115 Although a Communist uprising in Berlin was crushed in Janu- ary, the Bolsheviks were heartened by mutinies that forced the French expe- ditionary force to withdraw from the Ukraine and by the establishment of a Soviet republic in Hungary in March. Indeed, when a Soviet government was proclaimed in Bavaria in April, Lenin declared, "Our victory on an in- ternational scale is now completely secure. " The head of the Comintern, Gregor Zinoviev, echoed this assessment by predicting that within a year, one would begin to forget that there was ever a struggle over Communism in Europe. Lenin made a similar forecast two months later, saying that '. 'this July will be our last difficult July, and next July we shall greet the victory of
the international Soviet republic. "116 Although statements such as these were probably intended to bolster morale, they also reveal a continued faith in the inevitability of world revolution. As it happened, neither the Hun- garian nor Bavarian regime would last more than a few months, and an at- tempted Communist uprising in Vienna was to be crushed in June. 117 For the moment, however, these events reinforced the Soviets' faith in Europe's rev- olutionary potential and encouraged their continued efforts to promote it.
The Soviet government also believed that the threat of revolution might convince the Allies to abandon their support for the Whites. Chicherin's radio broadcasts were intended to hasten this process, and the British So- cialist Party's "Hands Off Russia" campaign in February 1919 and an abortive general strike later in the spring convinced Soviet leaders that rev- olutionary propaganda was an effective way to undermine public support for intervention. As Lenin told a British journalist early in the year, "En- gland may seem to you untouched, but the microbe is already there. "118 The
115 Quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:115 (emphasis in the original).
116 AsLenintoldtheComintemCongressinMarch,"Whenwehearhowquicklytheidea of Soviets is spreading in Germany and even in Britain, it is very important evidence that the proletarian revolution will be victorious. " See Lenin, Selected Works, 3:162, 176-77; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:129.
117 On these events, see Werner T. Angress, "The Takeover that Remained in Limbo: The Ger- man Experience, 1918-1923," and Paul Ignotus, "The First Two Communist Takeovers of Hun- gary: 1919 and 1948," in The Anatomy ofCommunist Takeovers, ed. Thomas T. Hammond (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975); Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, chaps. 17, 21, 24; and Peter Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin (Boulder, Colo. : East European Quarterly, 1976).
118 Quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:128. For descriptions of domestic conditions in Europe, see Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, 559-62 and chaps. 1 8-20, 25; and Walter Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain, 190o-1921 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 187--95?
[165]
? Revolution and War
Bolsheviks' faith in these tactics was based partly on their own isolation; lacking reliable information about social conditions in Europe, they exag- gerated the strength of socialist forces in the West and failed to recognize how different conditions in Europe were from those in Russia in 1917.
Finally, the Soviets relied on propaganda simply because they had no other options. Attempting to spark other proletarian revolutions was not only consistent with Bolshevik ideology, it was the only policy available once the peace offensive failed. Even if full-fledged revolutions did not occur else- where, the threat of domestic disturbances might persuade the Entente to abandon its support for the Whites. Nor was this hope entirely fanciful, as the fear of domestic unrest was one reason why Lloyd George and others had opposed an all-out effort to topple the Soviet regime in the first place.
HintsofDetente. ThefailureoftheWhitesforcedtheEntentetoreconsider its policy toward Soviet Russia, and Lloyd George began to sketch an alter- native approach in November 1919. After acknowledging that Denikin's of- fensive had been "temporarily checked," he suggested that "other methods must finally be resorted to for restoring peace and good government" in Russia. Tlhe prime minister defended the Allies' past actions by claiming they had given the anti-Bolshevik forces a fair chance, but he emphasized that "we cannot, of course, afford to continue so costly an intervention in an interminable civil war. " Although he qualified his remarks to mollify British Conservatives, Lloyd George was signaling a major shift in British policy. 119
Evidence of the change was soon apparent. Negotiations for a prisoner ex-
. change began in November-marking the first significant contact between the Entente and the Bolsheviks since the demise of the Hoover-Nansen plan-and a final agreement was signed in February 1920. 120 The Entente began to abandon counterrevolution in favor of a policy of containment, and this new objective was tacitly approved at an inter-Allied conference in De- cember. Convinced that a permanent division of the former tsarist empire would reduce the threat to British imperial interests, the British offered de facto recognition to Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in early 1920, seeking to use them as a barrier against further Soviet encroachments. 121
Lloyd George invoked the classic liberal arguments about the benefits of trade to justify his new policy. He stressed the contribution that Russian
119 The Bolsheviks did not miss the change, and Chicherin subsequently announced, "Re- lations between Britain and Russia are quite possible in spite of the profound differences be- tween Britain's and Russia's regime. . . . We are ready even to make sacrifices for the sake of a close economic connection with Britain. " Quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, p51-52; and see also Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 34<r"52? and Ullman, Britain and the Rus- sian Civil War, 304-307.
120 See Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 33<r"43?
121 Ibid. , 322-25; and Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 33o-35, 344-45.
[166]
? The Russian Revolution
grain could make to alleviating famine and high food prices in Europe and argued that trade would exert a "civilizing" influence on Soviet behavior as well. On January 16, 1920, the Allies agreed to lift the blockade and com- mence trade with Russia for the first time since 1918. As the prospects for a successful counterrevolution were fading, in short, the Entente was turning to a combination of containment and detente.
The Soviet government was clearly interested in expanding its ties with foreign powers. In addition to the negotiations for a prisoner exchange with Great Britain, the Soviet government began peace talks with Poland and Estonia and signed a formal treaty with the latter in February 1920. 122 Rela- tions with Germany were beginning to show signs of life as well; the sup- pression of the Spartacist uprising in Berlin and the collapse of the Bavarian Soviet had reduced the German fear of Bolshevism, and the harsh peace terms imposed by the Entente made collaboration with Russia more attrac- tive.
Soviet-German cooperation was supported by their mutual antipathy to Poland, and Germany's rejection of an Allied request to renew the block- ade of Russia in October was clear evidence of a growing detente. A pris- oner exchange soon followed, and Germany withdrew its remaining forces from the Baltic region, thereby sowing the seeds for a future rapproche-
ment. 123 The appeals for economic links expressed during Moscow's earlier peace offensive were renewed, and efforts to initiate talks with Western gov- ernments and private business interests began in earnest later in the year. 124
Finally, the Soviet government was also starting to show a renewed com- mitment to traditional Russian interests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is- sued a formal protest when the Paris Peace Conference awarded the Aland Islands to Finland, and it repeated its protests when Norway received Spitzbergen. Thus, as Carr points out, despite its initial disdain for "bour- geois" diplomacy, "the Soviet government found itself almost involuntarily in the posture of defending, not the interests of world revolution, but na-
122 Lenin termed the peace treaty with Estonia of "gigantic historical significance" and took up the phrase "peaceful coexistence" shortly thereafter. See Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 18; and Xenia Eudin and Harold Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West: A Documentary Survey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), 7--9?
123 See Freund, Unholy Alliance, 42-52. The Soviet-German rapprochement was facilitated by discussions between Karl Radek, a Polish member of the Bolshevik Party who had been arrested in Germany in 1918, and a series of German officials who visited him in prison. See Edward Hallett Carr, "Radek's 'Political Salon' in Berlin, 1919,'' Soviet Studies 3, no. 4 (1952); Lionel Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic (Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1954), 16-18; and Warren Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 85--<)0.
124 As early as October 1919, Lenin had remarked, "We are decidedly for an economic un- derstanding with America-with all countries but especially with America. " See McFadden, Alternative Paths, 267.
? ? Revolution and War
tional interests which any government of Russia would be obliged to de- fend. "125
By the spring of 1920, foreign involvement in the Russian Civil War was nearly over. The new regime had proved stronger than it looked, and the Entente was now abandoning its modest attempts to overthrow it and searching for other ways to defuse the danger. The Soviet commitment to world revolution remained intact, but the Bolsheviks, still acutely aware of their own weakness, were actively interested in a settlement with the West. 126 Unfortunately, the first moves toward a more normal relationship were temporarily interrupted by the Russo-Polish war.
The Russo-Polish War and the Balance of Threats
The first dash between Soviet and Polish troops took place in February 1919, after Soviet troops entered border areas claimed by the new govern- ment in Warsaw. Intermittent fighting continued throughout the year, with the Poles capturing Wilno in April and extending their holdings as far as Minsk by auturnn. 127
Poiand's new leaders disagreed about the final form that the new state should take, but the main factions all favored expanded borders that would provide greater security against both Russia and Germany. 128 The Poles de- clined Soviet proposals for peace negotiations, and in December the Polish head of state, Joseph Pilsudski (who was also commander-in-chief of the army), ordered the Ministry of Military Affairs to prepare for "a definitive settlement of the Russian question" in April 1920. 129
The Polish invasion began on April 25 . Mistakenly believing that the bulk of the Red Army was in the south, Pilsudski concentrated his forces there in
125 See Carr, Russian Revolution, 3:157-58; and Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:169-170, 181-82.
126 In an interview with the Manchester Guardian in October, Lenin reiterated Soviet will- ingness to abide by the terms agreed upon during Bullitt's visit to Moscow in March. See Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and Versailles, 354?
127 In Churchill's apt phrase, "The War of the Giants has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun. " See Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1920 (New York: St. Martin's, 1972), 21, 27. Other accounts of the war include Wandycz, Soviet- Polish Relations; Thomas C. Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 1920: From Permanent Revolu- tion to Peaceful Coexistence (New York: St. Martin's, 1990); Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, chaps. 4? ; Warren Lerner, "Attempting a Revolution from Without: Poland in 1920," in Hammond, Anatomy ofCommunist Takeovers; Lincoln, Red Victory, chap. 12; and James M. McCann, "Be- yond the Bug: Soviet Historiography of the Soviet-Polish War of 1920," Soviet Studies 36, no. 4 (1984).
128 See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 29-30; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94-100, 104-10, 118-22; and Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, 3d ed. (Seat- tle: University of Washington Press, 1979), 31-34.
129 Pilsudski held secret talks with Bolshevik representatives in the fall of 1919 and agreed to stay out of the civil war, in part because the Whites refused to acknowledge Polish inde- pendence. See Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:177-78; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 86-87.
[ 168]
? ? The Russian Revolution
the hopes of landing a knock-out blow. The invaders encountered only light opposition and swept rapidly across the Ukraine, occupying Kiev on May 6 and pushing across the Dnieper River a few days later. The Poles' initial suc- cess was short-lived, however, and a Soviet counteroffensive soon had them racing back west nearly as fast as they had come. Poland's belligerence had already cost it most of its international support, but the possibility that the Red Army might invade Poland reawakened Western concerns. Lloyd George was especially worried that the war would interfere with the nego- tiations for a trade agreement that had just commenced in London, and
Great Britain issued a formal demarche on July 1 1 warning that if Soviets crossed the boundary set by the peace conference, "the Allies would feel bound to assist the Polish nation to defend its existence with all the means at their disposal. "130
The note also invited the Soviets to attend a conference in London to set- tle the remaining border issues in the east. On July 16, however, the Soviet Politburo rejected British mediation and ordered the Red Army "to continue and step up the offensive. " Chicherin offered to begin bilateral talks with the Poles-noting that the Soviet government had already signed peace treaties with several Baltic states "without the participation of other par- ties"-and he also announced that the Soviets would send an "enlarged" delegation to the next round of trade talks in London, in order to reach a "final" peace. 131 More ominously, his response implied that a peace settle- ment would require adjustments in Poland's internal arrangements, and in- deed the Soviets subsequently insisted that the Polish Army be replaced by
a militia "organized among the workers. "132
The Soviet decision to invade Poland is best seen as a calculated risk. 133 Lenin's support for this step is somewhat surprising, as he had opposed
1 30 In April, Lloyd George said the Poles "have gone rather mad" and described them as "a menace to the peace of Europe. " See Debo, Survival and Consolidation, 215; Ullman, Anglo- Soviet Accord, 48, i37-39; and W. P. Coates and Zelda Coates, A History ofAnglo-Soviet Rela- tions (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1944), 35?
131 See Degras, Soviet Documents, 194-97; Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 148-49, 168-69; and Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern (Stanford: Hoover In- stitute Press, 1972), 1:273.
132 As Pyotr Wandycz points out, this condition was "equivalent to a demand for complete surrender. " See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 245-47; Degras, Soviet Documents, 1:196, 201-202; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, 3:213.
133 The decision to invade Poland remains the object of controversy. The traditional view is that Lenin insisted on an attempt to impose Bolshevism by force, overruling Trotsky, Stalin, and thePolishCommunists;seeCarr,BolshevikRevolution,J:209-10;Ullman, Anglo-SovietAc- cord, 165-70, 184-85; Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 98-102, and "Poland in 1920: A Case Study in Foreign-Policy Decision Making under Lenin," South Atlantic Quarterly 72, no. 3 (1973); Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 213-15; and Davies, White Eagle, Red Star. For alter- native interpretations, see Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland; and Melograni, Lenin and the Myth ofWorld Revolution, 97-102, 112-13.
? ? Revolution and War
precipitous attempts to export the revolution since the seizure of power in 1917. He still believed the imperialist powers were intent on overthrowing the Soviet regime, however, and he seems to have viewed a Soviet Poland both as a barrier to imperialist pressure and as a bridge to Germany, which was still the main object of the Bolsheviks' revolutionary hopes. Finally, the invasion coincided with the Second Comintern Congress in Petrograd, and a socialist takeover in Poland at that moment would have strengthened Moscow's claims to primacy within the international socialist movement. 134
The Soviets did not expect to conquer Poland solely by force of arms; rather, the invasion would allow the Polish workers and peasants to over- throw the bourgeois government and establish an independent Soviet regime. 135 And Lenin was adamant about what he would do if this assump- tion were incorrect: "If the expected uprising does not occur, . . . would it be fitting to push military operations more thoroughly, risking a dangerous turn of events? Without doubt, no! " Thus, the invasion of Poland was a gamble but a limited one, and Lenin was unwilling to raise the stakes if his hopes turned out to be incorrect. 136
His error was soon apparent: the Polish proletariat did not rise up to wel- come the invading Red Army, and a Polish counterattack at the outskirts of Warsaw split the Soviet forces and sent them scurrying back across the bor- der. Peace negotiations commenced in Riga in November, and a final peace treaty was concluded in March 1918. 137
The Balance of Threats. The war between Russia and Poland supports the general proposition that revolutions alter the balance of threats in ways that make war more likely. By affecting the balance of power, perceptions of in- tent, and assessments of the offense-defense balance, the revolution in Rus-
134 Lenin saw the Poles' actions as intended "to strengthen the barrier and to deepen the gulf which separates us from the proletariat of Germany," and he told a group of European socialists that "if Poland gives itself to Communism, the universal revolution would take a decisive step. . . . [It) would mean Germany shortly falling due, Hungary reconquered, the Balkans in revolt against capitalism, Italy shaken up, it would mean bourgeois Europe crack- ing apart in a formidable hurricane. " Quoted in Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 1 14; and Fid- dick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 122-23. See also Vladimir I. Lenin, Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1966), 31:305; Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, 1:274-'77; and Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, p87-201. .
135 In May 1920, the president of the Soviet Executive Central Committee, Mikhail Kalinin, had predicted, "If we deliver the first blow, the Polish proletariat will deliver the second and final one. . . . The western capitalists . . . will only succeed in founding yet another Soviet state with which we will enjoy close relations with the proletariat of the West. " Quoted . in Davies,
White Eagle, Red Star, 1 14.
136 Quoted in Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 123-24; and see also Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 105.
137 The Treaty of Riga was quite favorable to Poland, which received considerable territory in the east and financial compensations as well. See Eudin and Fisher, Soviet Russia and the West, 18.
? ? ? ? ? The Russian Revolution
sia heightened Soviet-Polish animosity and made the use of force appear espeCially attractive.
First we examine the issue of the balance of power. The underlying cause of the Russo? ? Polish war was each side's sense of insecurity. For the Poles, expansion was seen as essential to ensure their long-term security against Germany and Russia. Pilsudski "described himself as a "realist, without prejudices or theories," and Poland's unhappy past had taught him that
? Poland would either be "a state equal to the great powers of the world, or a small state that needed protection of the mighty. " He saw the revolution in Russia and the German defeat in World War I as a once-in-a-lifetime oppor- tunity and believed that the conquest of the borderlands would give Poland the size and strength it needed to survive. Failing to seize this chance, by contrast, would doom Poland to permanent inferiority. 138
Soviet behavior reflected similar concerns. In addition to the ideological commitment to world revolution, Soviet leaders saw the creation of addi- tional Soviet republics as the best way to protect Soviet Russia from outside interference. If Poland remained independent and tied to the West, Russia would be cut off from Europe and the prospects for subsequent revolutions would decrease. Even before the Red Arrriy had crossed the Polish border, in fact, Trotsky had declared that the existence of an independent bourgeois Poland was a threat to Soviet Russia. 139 If the Polish government were over- thrown, however, Russia would be more secure in the short term and better able to support revolutionary efforts elsewhere. Moreover, the restoration of Russian authority in the borderlands would eliminate the threat of further
Polish encroachments or a renewed counterrevolutionary invasion.
By contrast, ideological antipathies played only a secondary role. Al- though Pilsudski declared Bolshevism to be a "purely Russian disease" and sought to push this "foreign way of life" as far from Poland as possible, his main focus was on the balance of power. Poland's leaders were equally hos- tile to the Whites; as Pilsudski put it, "Irrespective of what her government will be Russia is terribly imperialistic. " The head of the Polish Socialist Party opposed Allied proposals for Polish intervention in Russia by saying_ "We want to be neither the advance guard nor the gendarmerie of the East," and the leader of the Populist Party stated, "A struggle against Bolshevism in particular is neither our aim nor our task. " Instead, the Polish Supreme Command emphasized that the main goal was territory, because the "re-
duction of Russia to her historical frontiers is a condition of [Poland's] exis? tence. " Ort the Soviet side, ideology exacerbated Soviet fears and inflated their hopes of spreading the revolution, but as Pyotr Wandycz notes, even
1? 38 Quoted in Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94, 159-60; and also see temer, "Poland in 1920," 409?
139 See Lerner, "Revolution from Without," 98.
? ? ? ? Revolution and War
in their case "ideological motives blended with the requirements of Russian
raison d'etat. "140
In sum, relations between bourgeois Poland and revolutionary Russia displayed the classic symptoms of an intense security dilemma. Both states saw their own expansion as necessary for their security and expansion by the other as a serious threat.
The security dilemma between Russia and Poland was compounded by a second factor, perception of intent. Each side believed that the other was hostile, sentiments that were reinforced by ignorance and ideology, com- bined with the adversary's subsequent behavior. Thus, relations between Soviet Russia and Poland confirm the tendency for revolutionary states to enter a spiral of suspicion with other powers. The shared belief that war was inevitable provided both sides with a powerful incentive to initiate it as soon as circumstances seemed favorable.
Polish behavior gave the Soviet government ample grounds for suspi- cion. The murder of four Russian Red Cross officials by Polish security forces in January 1919 was a clear warning, and Poland's refusal to negoti- ate and its steady movement east convinced Lenin and Trotsky that their ef- forts at accommodation had simply invited further aggression. The Polish invasion in April merely confirmed Soviet perceptions of threat and in- creased their incentive to replace the Polish state with a Soviet regime. 141
These perceptions of Polish hostility were magnified by the belief that Poland was a tool of the Entente. Lenin believed that with the Polish capture of Wilno the Entente "became even more impudent," and he saw the inva- sion as imperialism's latest attempt to overthrow the Soviet regime. 142 The Bolsheviks still feared a renewal of Allied support for the Whites, and! Wrangel's spring offensive seemed too well timed to be purely coincidental. This image of implacable imperialist aggression was reinforced when King George of England sent a message congratulating the Poles on the two hun- dredth anniversary of the Polish Constitution of 1791, which the Soviets in- correctly saw as an endorsement of the Polish invasion. 143
141 As one Bolshevik leader declared in July, "With these people [the Poles) there can be no peace. . . . [The] historical strife between Russia and Poland must end by friendship and uni- fication ofthe Russian and Polish Soviet republics. " See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 174, 221; and Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 29.
142 In May, Lenin told a group of soldiers that Poland's invasion had been "instigated by the Entente," and he later declared that "international capital . . . was the chief force driving the Poles into a war with us. " See Lenin, Selected Works, 3:431, and Collected Works, Jl:JOl. For Lenin's reaction to the seizure of Wilno, see Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 128.
143 Some Bolshevik leaders saw the British government as divided between hardline anti- Bolsheviks and moderate advocates of accommodation, but Lenin told Trotsky that the talks in England "have shown withfull clarity that England is helping and will help both the Poles and Wrangel. There is absolutely only one line. " Lenin's appraisal was incorrect, as the British had rejected Polish requests for military ai. d in the fall of 1919 and did little to aid the Poles.
140 See Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 94, 107-108, 126-27, 198, 287.
? ? ? The Russian Revolution
Polish suspicions of Russia were equally intense. In addition to reacting to a long history of Russian domination, the Poles understandably read the Bolsheviks' early attempts to establish "Soviet" republics in the Baltic states and Byelorussia as evidence of expansionist intentions. Pilsudski was con- vinced that a war with Soviet Russia was inevitable, and he viewed the var- ious Soviet peace offers simply as attempts to buy time. 144
The defensive expansionism that drove subsequent Soviet and Polish policies underscored each state's worst fears. Poland began planning an all- out offensive in December 1919, and Lenin told Trotsky in February to "get ready for war with Poland. " Soviet preparations just strengthened the Poles' desire to strike first. 145
Momentum for war was increased by mutual perceptions. of an offen- sive advantage. In addition to believing that war was inevitable, both sides believed that they would win a swift and decisive victory. The repa- triation of Polish units at the end of World War I had brought the Polish Army up to a strength of 590,000 troops, and an assault on Pinsk in March 1920 had been surprisingly easy. In addition, the Poles were aware that Russia had been weakened by the revolution and distracted by the civil war, an assessment shared by foreign military experts and several Soviet leaders as well. 146
The Poles also recognized that this opportunity was unlikely to last. Vic- tories over Kolchak and Yudenich allowed the Soviets to fo? s more atten- tion on Poland, and Soviet troop strength in the west increased steadily after January 1920. Concerned that the Soviets would draw out the peace talks in order to build up their forces, Pilsudski decided to seize the opportunity be- fore the window closed. Thus, the Polish invasion of the Ukraine in April 1920 contains elements of preventive and preemptive war: Pilsudski at- tacked while the balance of power still favored Poland and "to forestall by his offensive an attack by Soviet troops/ti47
SeeUllman, Anglo-Soviet Accord, 137-47, 163, 173-83; Fiddick, Russia's Retreatfrom Poland, 45, 100-101, 168; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 161-62, 211-12; Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 92--93, 172-73- 220, "Lloyd George and Poland, 1919-20," 132-% and Marjan Kukiel, "The Polish-Soviet Campaign of 1920," Slavonic Review 8, no. 1 (1929), 59?
144 See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 26-27, 65; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 144-45.
145 Pilsudski told a French journalist in March, "My impression of Bolshevik behavior is that peace is out of the question. I know the Bolsheviks are concentrating large forces on our front. They are making a mistake. . . . Our Army is ready. " See Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 88, 98--<)9; Wandycz, Soviet-Polish Relations, 167, 1 78.
146 Pilsudski referred to White and Red Russia as "cadavers" and tried to get Wrangel to renew the war in southern Russia so as to stretch the Soviet forces even further.