These were
continued
without result
up to 1175.
up to 1175.
Cambridge Medieval History - v4 - Eastern Roman Empire
Hence it is that
Manuel is open to the reproach of having cared less for realities than for
show, of having attempted to carry out simultaneously projects on a
gigantic scale, any single one of which would have taxed the resources of
the Empire. This is the weak side of his policy. Manuel attempted to
get others to carry out the tasks which he could not himself accomplish;
hence arose the failures he met with. It would appear further that
Manuel was fitted only for success, and was incapable of bearing mis-
fortune. At his only defeat, the disaster of Myriocephalum, when he
saw that he was beaten and in danger of being slain by the enemy
with the poor remains of his army, his one idea was to take to flight
without giving a thought to his soldiers. Only the opposition of his
captains prevented him from carrying out this disgraceful intention.
Manuel's devotion to the ideals of chivalry and his two marriages
with Western princesses fostered in him a strong preference for the Latins.
Men of Western race, whether Germans, French, Normans, Italians, or
English, were sure of his eager welcome, and of finding posts about his
court or in his army. Though ignorant of the Greek language, these
foreigners who “spat better than they spoke” contrived, nevertheless, to
fill considerable administrative offices, to the great disgust of the Emperor's
subjects. Nor were they any better pleased to see the Venetians, Pisans,
and Genoese settle down at Constantinople. This policy on the part of
Manuel led to the accumulation of the national hatred against the Latins
which was to burst forth in the reign of Andronicus.
Manuel, like his grandfather Alexius, brought a keen interest to
theological questions. He prided himself on being a theologian and took
pleasure in theological discussions, as the Patriarch Cosmas found, who
## p. 363 (#405) ############################################
His character
363
was deposed in 1147 for his adhesion to the doctrines of Niphon, a
Bogomile monk. Manuel considered himself to possess inspired know-
ledge, and was in the habit of imposing his decisions upon the clergy. In
the cases of Soterichus Panteugenus, of Basilaces, and of Michael of
Thessalonica (the representatives of a little group of priests charged with
holding views inspired by Platonic philosophy), the Emperor's sentence
was decisive (1157). Later on, towards the close of the reign, in the teeth
of the opposition of the clergy and the Patriarch, Manuel imposed his own
view in a discussion which brought up afresh the doctrine promulgated
by the Councils of Nicaea and Constantinople regarding the relation be-
tween the Father and the Son. Manuel decided the question in a sense
opposite to the traditional doctrine. Finally, we must note the attempt
made by Manuel in 1170 to bring about the re-union of the Armenian
and Greek Churches. Despite the skill of Theorianus, who was entrusted
by the Emperor with the duty of carrying on the negotiation with the
Katholikos Nerses, the discussions led to no result.
In contrast to Manuel the theologian there was another Manuel, a
dabbler in astrology. Astrologers enjoyed great prestige at the imperial
court. The Basileus consulted them upon all important expeditions, and
forbade his generals to give battle unless the stars were propitious. Manuel
was a believer in magic and in spells. Even on his deathbed his confidence
in all the charlatans who surrounded him remained unskaken.
Theological and scientific questions, however, did not engross the
Emperor's interest. Manuel, and following his example the whole court,
took a pride in shewing a taste for letters; the literary revival initiated
in the preceding century in the time of Psellus was continued during
this reign. The princesses of the imperial family encouraged authors;
the Empress Irene accepted the dedication of the Chiliads of Tzetzes,
and another Irene, wife of Andronicus, Manuel's brother, was the ac-
knowledged patroness of literary men. A little court of the learned
gathered round her, among the ornaments of which were Tzetzes, Con-
stantine Manasses, and one of the Prodromoi. Manuel's niece and mistress,
Theodora, was the correspondent of Glycas. Other court ladies took to
writing themselves, and it was at this time that Anna Comnena finished
her Aleriad, the continuation of Bryennius' work in honour of Alexius.
Her example was followed by Zonaras and Glycas, the compilers of
chronicles, and at the same time Cinnamus and Nicetas Acominatus
collected the materials for their works.
Rhetoric also had its representatives, and one of the best judges of
classical antiquity, Eustathius, Archbishop of Thessalonica, pronounced
some of his orations during this reign. He was one of the most distin-
guished members of the learned and scholarly group of clergy, devoted
to philosophical speculation, several of whom have already been men-
tioned in dealing with the theological controversies of the day.
The arts were not neglected at Manuel's court. If he took pleasure
CH. XII.
## p. 364 (#406) ############################################
364
Manuel's administration
in re-building the palace of the Blachernae, which he decorated with
mosaics commemorating his exploits, and in erecting sumptuous villas
on the coast of Asia Minor and on the islands in the neighbour-
hood of Constantinople where he could go for relaxation after his
military exertions, he did not forget public edifices. He had the
walls of Constantinople repaired, spent money freely on constructing
aqueducts, and undertook operations to make the closing of the harbour
possible. On the other hand he did little in the way of ecclesiastical
building. He used to rally his courtiers on the vanity which urged them
to build monasteries or churches on purpose to erect their tombs there,
and used to declare that he only approved of monks in solitary places,
and looked with horror on the turbulent monks dwelling in towns and
devoting themselves solely to increasing the possessions of their monas-
teries. By way of setting an example he built a monastery near the
entrance to the strait of the Bosphorus, to which he made no donation
of lands, confining himself to a yearly grant out of the public treasury
sufficient for the maintenance of the monks. Manuel's legislation as to
ecclesiastical property is inspired by the same spirit. The imperial
Novels forbid churches and monasteries to add to the lands already
in their possession, but on the other hand legalise the ownership of those
actually held, even when the title could not be shewn or was defective.
In this way a general settlement was arrived at, but at the expense of the
lay owners, who now saw a legal sanction given to all the usurpations of
which they had been victims.
The foreign policy of Manuel was carried out at enormous expense,
and was extremely burdensome to the imperial treasury. In order to fill
it the Emperor was forced to use great severity in the collection of the
taxes and to have recourse to all kinds of financial expedients. The
most important seems to have been the converting of the obligation to
maintain the navy, which was laid upon certain themes, into a tax-
measure analogous to that formerly resorted to by Constantine IX
with regard to service in the army. In conjunction with this measure
should be noted the novel distributions of land on condition of mili-
tary service, grants made for the most part to prisoners of war or to
barbarian tribes. These ineasures caused great disturbances in the
provinces and brought about a strained situation there, chiefly known
to us through the efforts made later by Andronicus Comnenus to find a
remedy.
John Comnenus, in choosing his youngest son to succeed him, had
set aside the rights of the elder, the Sebastocrator Isaac. If the young
Emperor had the army on his side his brother had the advantage
of being in the capital. In order that a conflict might be avoided,
Manuel must at all costs make himself master of Constantinople before
the news of John's death was known there. The business was entrusted
to Axuch, who successfully carried out the task confided to him. He
## p. 365 (#407) ############################################
Turkish attacks
365
contrived to seize both Isaacs, uncle and nephew, and with no great
difficulty defeated a plot to set the crown on the head of the Caesar
John-Roger, Manuel's brother-in-law. When the Emperor appeared
before his capital, peace was already established; he reached his palace
easily enough, and largess, distributed on a lavish scale to clergy and
people, secured his popularity.
On the death of John Comnenus the Latins of Antioch had again
taken the offensive, and even while Manuel was still in the East had
begun hostilities and occupied several places in Cilicia. This provocation
had been keenly resented by Manuel, who made it his first care to send
troops to Cilicia to deal with the Latins. The Greek arms were victorious,
and in 1145 Raymond of Poitiers had to submit to the humiliation of
coming to Constantinople to ask mercy of Manuel; he was compelled
to visit the church of the Pantokrator and make the amende at the dead
Emperor's tomb.
While the Byzantine army was on its way back from Cilicia, the
troops of the Sultan of Iconium had carried off several persons of impor-
tance at court; further invasions had then taken place, the Muslim bands
advancing as far as Pithecas near Nicaea ; the whole of the Byzantine
possessions in Asia Minor were devastated, ruins were heaped up on every
side, and the luckless populations were forced to leave their villages and
seek refuge in the towns along the coast. Thus one of the first tasks
with which Manuel was faced was to secure his frontier in Asia by the
erection of a series of fortified posts, intended to check the invaders. This
was his main work, and he pursued it to the end of his reign. At
the same time he attempted to strike at the heart of the Musulman
power, more than once endeavouring to reduce Iconium. At the opening
of his reign he was aided in his struggle against Masóūd by the divisions
among the Muslim leaders which had followed upon the death of the
Dānishmandite prince Mahomet (1141). His lands were divided be-
tween his son, Dhü'l-Nun, who obtained Caesarea, and his brothers,
Yaʻqūb Arslān and ‘Ain-ad-Daulah, whose shares respectively were Sīwās
and Melitene. Threatened by Masóūd, Yaʻqūb Arslān, the most powerful
of the heirs of Mahomet, treated with Manuel who helped him with
subsidies. During the years 1146-1147 the Greeks fought with no great
measure of success; Manuel got as far as Iconium, but failed to take it.
At the moment when the crusaders appeared before Constantinople,
Manuel had just concluded a truce with Masóūd.
During this period the policy of Manuel in the West had yielded
no striking results. For a short time the Emperor seemed to be meditating
a league with the King of Sicily, but he soon returned to the idea
of a German alliance, and in January 1146 took to wife Bertha of
Sulzbach, sister-in-law of Conrad. But at the very time when this
marriage seemed to have set a seal upon his friendship with Germany,
all that had been gained by it was lost by the opening of the Second
CH. XII.
## p. 366 (#408) ############################################
366
The Second Crusade
Crusade, the Greek Empire being left to confront the Norman
power
in
a state of complete isolation.
Learning of the new Crusade by letters from Louis VII and the Pope,
Eugenius III, Manuel immediately set himself to obtain guarantees
against all eventualities by demanding of the Pope that the crusaders
should bind themselves to him by engagements similar to those taken by
the leaders of the First Crusade to Alexius. In return he promised that
on payment being forthcoming provisions should be supplied. At the
assembly of Étampes (February 1147) Manuel's envoys met those of
Roger II, who had been instructed to bring about the diversion of the
Crusade to their master's profit by promising large advantages. The
influence of Conrad, who had only joined in the project for a Crusade
at the end of 1146, was certainly not without its weight in the decision
to go by Constantinople. The fact that not only the King of France
but also the King of Germany was to take part in the expedition made
the position of Manuel with regard to the crusaders all the more perilous.
He was haunted by the fear that, if the Western troops collected outside
his capital, they might be tempted to an assault upon Constantinople.
He made every effort to avoid this danger, his task being rendered easier
by the ill-feeling of Conrad towards the French.
The measures taken with regard to the crusaders were of the same
kind as those employed by Alexius in the case of the First Crusade. The
Byzantine troops were disposed so as to confinė the streams of pilgrims
in a single channel and to prevent the pillaging bands from wandering
too far from the prescribed route. The elements of which the crusading
army was composed made these precautions necessary. Not only were
there warriors on the march; the bulk of the army consisted of pilgrims
and of a rout of adventurers ready for any mischief.
The Germans were first to pass through the imperial territory. Their
relations with the Greeks were as bad as possible, outrages being committed
on both sides which generated violent excitement. Hadrianople was
especially the scene of bloodshed. Manuel made a last effort to divert
the crusaders from the route through Constantinople and to persuade
them to pass through Sestos, but his suggestions were listened to with
suspicion and were rejected. Many disasters would have been avoided
if his advice had been taken, and it was the route recommended
by him which Louis VII took after the destruction of the German
army.
Little is known of the relations between Manuel and Conrad during
the time that the crusading army remained before Constantinople. It
is probable that the two Emperors did not meet; at the same time they
appear to have come to an agreement. The news of the arrival of Louis
VII decided Conrad upon crossing over into Asia Minor—a step which
all the urgency of Manuel had not availed to secure. The march of the
German army upon Iconium ended in disaster. The crusaders, although
## p. 367 (#409) ############################################
Conrad III and Louis VII
367
aware of the length of the journey, had not brought a sufficient quantity
of provisions ; famine soon made its appearance, whereupon the Greek
guides were alarmed by accusations of treachery, which caused them to
abandon the army and take to flight. The crusaders were forced to fall
back upon Nicomedia, harassed as they marched by the Turks who slew
them in thousands; as many perished by famine. At Nicomedia the
remnants of Conrad's army found the French.
The journey of the French across the Greek territories was equally
accompanied by acts of violence; but a Latin eye-witness admits that
up to their arrival before Constantinople the Franks did as much injury
to the Greeks as they received from them, and that the wrongs were
on both sides. Manuel welcomed Louis VII, but made every effort to in-
duce him to cross at once to the coast of Asia Minor. The apprehension
which the Greek Emperor shewed is justified by the known fact that
there was a regular party in the King of France's council urgent for the
taking of Constantinople.
The French once across the Bosphorus, new difficulties arose. Manuel
demanded that the barons should do homage and swear fealty to him,
and after long parleying Louis ended by yielding. Having joined the
wrecks of the German army, the French gave up the idea of marching
upon Iconium and took the road for Attalia. At Ephesus Conrad fell ill,
and abandoned the Crusade. The march of the crusaders through the
Asiatic provinces of the Byzantine Empire was marked by similar acts of
violence to those committed in Europe; this explains the fighting which
took place between the Greeks and the Latins. The chief accusation
brought against the Greeks is that they did not supply provisions and
that they charged too dear for such as they did supply. The vast numbers
of the crusaders made provisioning a matter of great difficulty, and the
presence of unnumbered multitudes in one place is a sufficient explana-
tion of the dearness of commodities.
The army of Louis VII, thus ill-provided, suffered greatly on the
march from Laodicea to Attalia. The Musulman bands had appeared,
and their unceasing attacks added to the difficulties of the mountain
route. The army reached Attalia in a deplorable state. Here provisions
were still lacking. Louis VII and the chief lords hired ships of the Greeks
and departed, forsaking the mass of the pilgrims. The leaders left in
charge abandoned them in their turn. The wretched people fell a prey to
the Turks, and to the Greeks who were exasperated at the acts of pillage
which the famished multitude had committed.
Manuel has been held responsible for the failure of the Second Crusade.
Such accusations are now to a large extent discredited by historians.
The ill-success of the Crusade was due to defective organisation, to the
want of discipline among the crusaders, and to their obstinate persistence,
in spite of the Emperor's advice, in following the road taken by Godfrey
of Bouillon and his companions.
CH. XII.
## p. 368 (#410) ############################################
368
Manuel and Roger II
Conrad, who had been left behind sick at Ephesus, was received by
Manuel, who brought him to Constantinople and loaded him with
attentions. The fact was that Manuel was just then threatened by a
danger which made the prospect of help from the German King of
great value to him. Profiting by the difficulties into which the Basileus
was thrown by the coming of the crusaders, Roger II of Sicily had
in the autumn of 1147 directed a naval attack upon the coast of the
Empire. Corfù had fallen into his hands; Negropont and Cerigo had
been ravaged. The Normans then sailed up the Gulf of Corinth and
took Thebes and Corinth (centres of the silk-trade and two of the
most important commercial towns in the Empire), their rich warehouses
being given up to pillage. In order to resist this aggression, Manuel, while
the crusaders were still on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, had in
vain begged for help from Conrad and Louis. He was obliged to meet
the Normans with his own forces, for which however he had secured the
support of the Venetian fleet.
Being detained by an invasion of the Cumans (1148), Manuel sent
the Grand Domestic Axuch and the Grand Duke Alexius Contoste-
phanus to occupy the places taken by the Normans and to besiege Corfù.
It was during the winter of 1148–1149 that Manuel received Conrad,
who was returning from the Holy Land, and concluded a treaty with
him, by which the German king bound himself to make a descent upon
Italy in order to attack Roger II (1149).
Corfù having been re-taken (summer of 1149), Manuel resolved to
organise an expedition to punish Roger II. A revolt among the Serbs,
supported by the King of Sicily, prevented him from carrying out his
plan. Roger II, threatened by the Germano-Byzantine alliance, created
difficulties for them both which hindered them from carrying out their
project of an invasion of Italy. While Welf, thanks to supplies furnished
by Roger, fomented an agitation which detained Conrad in Germany, the
Sicilian king was launching the Serbs and Hungarians against the Greek
Empire. Hungary and Constantinople were at that time on very bad terms
owing to their pursuing a diametrically opposite policy in Russia. While
Géza, King of Hungary, maintained the claims of his brother-in-law
Izyaslav to the throne of Kiev, Manuel gave his support to George Dolgo-
ruki, son of Vladímir Monomachus, who was also favoured by Vladimirko,
Prince of Halicz. At the instigation of the King of Sicily, Géza en-
couraged the Župan of Rascia, Pervoslav Uroš, to revolt, and the
disturbance which broke out in Serbia in the autumn of 1149 kept
Manuel occupied until 1150. The Serbs having been subdued, Manuel,
eager to punish their Hungarian supporters, took advantage in 1151 of
the absence of Géza, who was maintaining Izyaslav's cause in Russia against
Vladimirko, to take Semlin and ravage the country between the Save and
the Danube. Peace was signed the same year, but in 1152 hostilities broke
out again, and Géza formed a connexion with Manuel's cousin, Andronicus
## p. 369 (#411) ############################################
The Greeks in Italy
369
Comnenus, the future Emperor. This treason was discovered and An-
dronicus was arrested. The struggle lasted until 1155, when peace was
signed. The only appreciable result of the campaigns seems to have been
the conquest of Semlin.
Roger II had not been satisfied with stirring up the Serbs and Hun-
garians against Manuel; he had at the same time made use of the failure
of the Crusade to attempt the organisation of a European coalition
against him. Louis VII sympathised with these projects, but Conrad's
fidelity to the Byzantine alliance, and the rupture which took place in
1150 between Pope Eugenius III and Roger, prevented the latter's designs
from taking effect. Finally in 1152 the death of Conrad delivered the
Norman King from the peril of a Germano-Byzantine alliance.
With Conrad's successor,
Frederick Barbarossa, Manuel was never able
to come to an understanding. From the beginning of his reign Bar-
barossa refused to countenance any territorial advantage which might be
gained by the Basileus in Italy—a concession which Conrad had made.
From 1152 to 1158 numerous embassies came and went between the two
Emperors, but it was found impossible to arrange an alliance. Wishing
to take advantage of the death of Roger II in 1154, Frederick Barbarossa
made a descent upon Italy. Manuel, fearing that this expedition having
been made without reference to him might prove to have been made against
him, decided to try his fortune single-handed and to make his profit out of
the unsettled conditions which had followed on the death of Roger II. He
dispatched to Italy Michael Palaeologus, who in the course of 1155, thanks
to the support of Robert of Loritello, a revolted vassal of the Norman
King William I, and his fellow-rebels, achieved unlooked-for success. In
a few months the Greek Emperor's authority was recognised from Ancona
to Taranto. This success turned Manuel's head, and was chiefly instru-
mental in giving a new direction to his policy. At the very time when
in 1155 the German Emperor, forced to own himself unable to maintain
order in Italy and to play the part he had assumed of protector of the
Papacy, abandoned the idea of invading the Norman Kingdom, the
Basileus was enforcing the recognition of his own imperial authority in
all that part of Italy which had formerly been in the possession of the
Greek Emperors. Hence arose in Manuel the desire to restore the Eastern
Empire to what it had been in the time of Justinian, and to obtain from
the Pope the re-establishment of imperial unity in exchange for the re-
union of the Greek Church with the Church of Rome. The first nego-
tiations with this object were begun with Hadrian IV, and the rupture
which took place at this time between the Papacy and the Western
Emperor seemned to Manuel likely to further the accomplishment of his
dream.
The counter-strokes of William I, which in a short time demolished
the frail edifice of Byzantine conquest, did not avail to dissuade Manuel
from his project. Southern Italian questions became of secondary im-
C. MED. H. VOL. IV. CH. XII.
24
## p. 370 (#412) ############################################
370
Manuel and Alexander III
portance to him in comparison with the schemes he was caressing, and
he made no difficulty in 1158 in complying with the suggestions of the
Papacy, which, leaning as it did on the support of the kingdom of Sicily
and of the Greek Empire, desired to see peace restored between its two
allies.
From 1157 onwards Byzantine policy is governed wholly by the idea
of restoring the unity of the Empire. For the sake of clearness we will
consider in order the relations of Manuel with Italy and Frederick Bar-
barossa, with the Hungarians and Serbs, and finally with the Muslims
and the Latins of the East.
It was natural that Manuel should shew himself favourable to the
Pope, Alexander III. During the years from 1161 to 1163 long nego-
tions went on between the Emperor, Alexander III, and Louis VII con-
cerning a coalition to be formed against the Western Emperor. Three
years later Manuel judged that the Pope was sufficiently in need of his
help to make it safe to acquaint him completely with his desire to re-
establish the unity of the Empire under his sceptre. Negotiations about
this project went on for several years, Manuel remaining the ally of Alex-
ander until the preliminaries of the Peace of Venice (1177). Although his
name does not appear as one of the signatories of the peace, the connexion
between the Papacy and Constantinople lasted as long as Manuel reigned.
If the understanding between the Pope and the Greek Emperor led to
nothing, one of the chief causes of this was the opposition maintained by
the King of Sicily to the Byzantine policy. It will readily be understood
that neither William I nor William II looked with favour on the attempts
of Manuel to gain a footing in Italy, but that both on the contrary
offered a vigorous resistance. Manuel tried every means of overcoming
their opposition; he had recourse to Louis VII, and on two occasions he
endeavoured to arrange for the marriage of his daughter Mary with
William II. But just as matters seemed to be finally settled, the match
was broken off, Barbarossa having made overtures to Manuel which seemed
to him to promise a more brilliant future to his daughter than alliance
with William of Sicily could offer.
Manuel's attitude towards the Italian cities was a natural result of
his policy with regard to Alexander III. He endeavoured by every
possible means to attach to his interest a group of dependent Italian
towns, or at least to be able to rely on the support of a party in the
more important cities. Milan was encouraged by him in her struggle
with Barbarossa, and Byzantine gold helped to rebuild her streets.
Cremona and Pavia had their share of the Greek subsidies. Once already
Ancona had given itself up to Palaeologus, and later on, about 1166, its
population embraced the Greek cause, won over by the gold of Manuel's
emissaries. In 1167 Barbarossa was only able to win a partial advantage
over them.
With Pisa Manuel in 1161 entered into negotiations which lasted
## p. 371 (#413) ############################################
Manuel, Venice, and Barbarossa
371
until 1172. Dragged in different directions by their Ghibelline sym-
pathies and their desire to take advantage of the commercial privileges
offered by the Basileus, the Pisans pursued an indecisive policy. The
Genoese in the same way treated with the Greek Emperor in 1155, but
also with Barbarossa in 1162. Though intercourse between them and
Constantinople was broken off in 1162, it was resumed in 1164, and went
on until 1170. Manuel was never able to bring the Genoese to the
point of breaking with Barbarossa.
The Greek occupation of Ancona and the recapture of the Dalmatian
towns gave some anxiety to the Venetians, who had very nearly come to a
breach with Manuel at the time of the siege of Corfù, as the result of an
unpleasant incident which occurred between the troops of the two nations.
Things reached such a point that in 1167 relations between the two
countries were completely broken off. The doge even recalled all those
of his nation who had settled upon Greek territory. Diplomatic inter-
course, resumed at the request of Manuel who drew the Venetians into a
veritable snare, was again definitively broken off on 12 March 1171. On
this date Manuel ordered the arrest of all Venetians settled in his dominions
and the confiscation of their goods. Enormous damage was thus inflicted
upon Venice. In revenge the republic during the winter of 1171-2
pillaged the coasts of the Empire and ravaged Negropont, Chios, and
Lesbos. In the course of the campaign negotiations were initiated in
which the Venetians were duped.
These were continued without result
up to 1175. At this date Venice made an alliance with William II, King
of Sicily. Thus directly threatened, Manuel decided upon concessions.
He set at liberty the prisoners arrested in 1171, restored their goods to
them, and granted to Venice the privileges enjoyed under former treaties
of commerce. In the interval, in 1173, Venice had given help to the
Germans in their attempt to take Ancona from the Greeks.
The policy which Manuel pursued in Italy naturally reacted upon
the relations between the Greek Empire and the Germans. The atti-
tude which he took up there would naturally have as its first consequence
a complete rupture with Barbarossa. This, however, was postponed for
some time owing to the secrecy with which the Greek Emperor con-
trived to cover up his intrigues. It was only when the occupation of
Ancona took place in 1166 that Manuel's hostility to Barbarossa shewed
itself clearly. From 1159 to 1165 several embassies were exchanged
between the two Emperors, and in 1166 Henry, Duke of Austria, made a
useless journey to Manuel's court to attempt to bring about an under-
standing. Just at that time Manuel's occupation of Ancona had opened
Barbarossa's eyes, and he was determined to avenge himself on the earliest
opportunity. However, the progress made by Manuel in Italy, marked
by the treaties with Genoa in 1169 and with Pisa in 1170, decided Bar-
barossa on attempting a reconciliation. From 1170 to 1172 proposals
were discussed for the marriage of Manuel's daughter with Barbarossa's
CB. XII.
24-2
## p. 372 (#414) ############################################
372
Manuel and Hungary
son. They led to nothing, and in 1173 Barbarossa was engaged in the
siege of Ancona (which had given itself up to the Greeks), and was also
trying to negotiate an alliance with William II, evidently directed against
Manuel. At the same time the Western Emperor was attempting in his
turn to create difficulties for his adversary, and was treating with the
Sultan of Iconium. Manuel took no share in the Treaty of Venice (1177)
and, as we shall see, continued the struggle with the Western Emperor
up to the last day of his life.
His Italian policy, being based wholly on diplomacy, always left the
greater part of the military forces of the Empire free, a circumstance
which enabled the Emperor at the same time to pursue a more active
and warlike course in two other quarters, Hungary and Asia. Since the
peace signed with Géza, Manuel had played a waiting game in Hungary,
content with giving a refuge at Constantinople to two of the king's
brothers, the future Stephen IV and Ladislas. At the death of Géza
(1161), Manuel had made use of the pretenders whom he had at hand
in order to interfere in the concerns of the Hungarian succession, calcu-
lating thus to secure some advantage for the Empire. The laws of
succession were not yet fully fixed in Hungary, and Stephen IV could
plead in his favour the ancient usage by which the brother of a dead
king was to be preferred to the son, in order to put forward a claim
to the throne to the prejudice of his nephew Stephen III. Manuel
supported the claims of his protégé by Byzantine troops. A strong party
grew up in Hungary hostile to the claims of Géza's son, but refusing
to admit those of Stephen IV, who was looked upon as too much the
vassal of Constantinople. The Hungarians feared that by giving the
crown to Stephen IV their country might become a mere satellite of
Constantinople, and to avoid this danger made choice of Ladislas, brother
of Stephen IV, whom they regarded as less submissive to the influence of
the Byzantine court. Ladislas was barely seated on the throne when he
died (1162). The struggle between the two Stephens then recommenced,
Manuel still giving support to his candidate. To bring the contest to an
end, the counsellors of the young King Stephen III offered to hand over
to Manuel another son of Géza's named Béla, who was recognised as the
future heir to the crown of Hungary and granted a considerable appanage
which included Dalmatia. As the appanage of Béla, who would be brought
up in Constantinople, Dalmatia practically fell back into the hands of
the Byzantines, and the result of Manuel's Hungarian policy was an im-
portant territorial acquisition. To make his success the surer, Manuel,
who as yet had no son, decided to betroth his daughter Mary to the
Hungarian prince, whom he destined for his successor. By this means
Hungary would have been united to the Greek Empire.
It was not without difficulty that the Greeks entered into possession
of Dalmatia. As the position of Stephen III grew stronger, the Hun-
garians came to regret the sacrifice they had agreed to, and for several
## p. 373 (#415) ############################################
Manuel and Serbia
373
years the war was renewed. Manuel, having become master of Dalmatia
in 1166, remained in the end the victor. The birth of a son to him in
1169 caused him to alter his arrangements. Béla ceased to be heir pre-
sumptive and, his betrothal to Mary having been set aside, he was married
to the Emperor's sister-in-law, a daughter of Constance of Antioch. On
the death of Stephen III, Béla with the aid of Byzantine troops mounted
the throne of Hungary. As the price of his support Manuel kept his
hold on Bela’s appanage. Béla always remained devoted to him, although
it was only after his patron's death that he recovered Dalmatia.
The continual wars which were waged during this period on the
Danube frontier kept up a state of unrest among the Serbs, who were
vassals of the Empire. Manuel was repeatedly obliged to intervene. He
deposed Pervoslav Uroš, replacing him by his brother Béla (1161? ).
Then, Béla having retired from power, Manuel set up as his successor
Dessa, another son of Béla Uroš (c. 1162). Dessa, who a few years
later took the name of Stephen Nemanja, attempted to throw off the
Byzantine suzerainty. More than once Manuel was forced to interfere
to restore order; finally he seized Stephen Nemanja, whom he kept prisoner
for some time in Constantinople. It is not known exactly at what date
Stephen regained his liberty. He took advantage of the disorder which
followed the death of Manuel to secure the independence of his
country.
It was not until about 1150 that the affairs of the East called for the
intervention of Manuel. At that time the situation of the Byzantine
possessions had become critical. Thoros, son of the Armenian prince
Leo, had escaped from captivity, and had succeeded in taking from the
Greeks a large part of Cilicia. At the same time the Muslim conquest had
made a great step in advance by the capture of Edessa, and the position
of the Latin states in Palestine was rendered even more precarious by the
entrance into the contest of the Musulmans of Iconium, who with Qilij
Arslān, son of Mas'ūd, wished to have their share in the dismembering of
the Latin principalities. In the extreme peril in which they stood the
Latins asked for help from the West, but the danger was so threatening
that they had recourse to the Emperor of Constantinople. Manuel
ordered his troops in the East to support the Latins. About the same
time he bought from the wife of Joscelin II, Count of Edessa, all that
remained in her hands of the possessions of her husband. Constance,
Princess of Antioch, having become a widow, also turned to the Emperor
for protection. The position of things thus favoured Greek intervention.
Manuel charged his cousin, Andronicus Comnenus, with the task of re-
ducing Thoros, and sent also his brother-in-law the Caesar John-Roger
whom he proposed to Constance as a husband. This projected marriage
never took place, and Andronicus only succeeded in getting himself de-
feated before Mamistra.
Manuel then changed his policy and attempted to secure the submission
CH. XII.
## p. 374 (#416) ############################################
374
The Latin East
of Thoros by means of Masóūd. The latter accepted Manuel's offers all
the more willingly as he had himself subjects of complaint against Thoros.
The Armenian prince had pillaged Cappadocia, taking advantage of the
struggle between Masóūd and the Dānishmandite rulers, Yaʻqūb Arslān
and Dhū’l-Qarnain, son and heir of 'Ain-ad-Daulah. The result of this
experiment did not correspond to Manuel's hopes. On a first occasion
Masóūd treated with Thoros but at Manuel's expense; on a second the
Musulman troops were thoroughly beaten. Profiting by the inaction of
Manuel, who was detained by affairs in Italy, Thoros approached Reginald
of Chatillon who had become Prince of Antioch through his marriage
with Constance, and the two set on foot an expedition against the island
of Cyprus, where immense booty was obtained (1155 or 1156).
This aggression against the Byzantines greatly displeased the King of
Jerusalem, Baldwin, for, confronted by the growing success of the Atābeg
Nūr-ad-Dīn, the master of Damascus, he was meditating a rapprochement
with Manuel, to whom he had applied for the hand of a princess of the
imperial family. The request of Baldwin came just as the imperial idea
was beginning to take shape in Manuel's mind. The Emperor, whose
Oriental policy, like that of his predecessors, was dominated by the wish
to regain Antioch for the Empire, eagerly welcomed the proposal of
Baldwin, which would give him an opportunity of posing as the protector
of the Holy Places. He gave the King of Jerusalem the hand of his niece
Theodora, daughter of his brother Isaac, and as soon as peace had been
concluded with the King of Sicily (1157) he organised a great expedition
for the East.
By about the month of September 1158 Manuel had arrived in
Cilicia at the head of a very considerable force. None of his adversaries
dared to stand against him, and in succession Reginald of Chatillon and
Thoros were obliged to come in penitential garments and submit them-
selves to his mercy. The Emperor consented to pardon them. Reginald
was obliged to acknowledge himself the vassal of the Empire, engaging
to supply a strong contingent of troops whenever required to do so by
the Emperor. Ambassadors from most of the Oriental princes were to
be found hastening to the imperial camp before Mamistra. The Latins
themselves, the King of Jerusalem first among them, sought help of
Manuel in whom they now placed all their hopes; Baldwin himself entered
into a treaty, he also being obliged to furnish troops to the Greek
Empire.
In April 1159 Manuel left Cilicia to make his solemn entry into
Antioch, escorted by the Latin princes on foot and unarmed, and followed
by the King of Jerusalem on horseback but without weapons. Passing
through streets adorned with carpets and hangings, to the sound of drums
and trumpets and to the singing of triumphal hymns, the Emperor was
brought in procession to the cathedral by the Patriarch in his pontifical
robes, while the imperial banners were hoisted on the city walls.
## p. 375 (#417) ############################################
Manuel's marriage with Mary of Antioch
375
His stay at Antioch marks the highest pitch of glory to which Manuel
attained throughout his reign. He took pleasure in the pomp with which
he surrounded himself, and in the largess which he distributed to dazzle
the Latins and Orientals. For a week feasts and shows followed each
other rapidly, and on one day the Emperor might be seen descending
into the lists to measure himself against Reginald of Chatillon, while the
officers of the imperial army contended with the Frankish knights.
Towards the end of May the Emperor left Antioch with all the
materials for a siege, taking the road to Edessa, but after a few days'
march the army halted, for the negotiations with Nūr-ad-Dīn had
just reached a conclusion. Manuel procured the liberation of all the
captives held in the Atābeg's prison, the number of whom reached six
thousand. The abandonment of the campaign which had been begun
caused the deepest disappointment to the Christians of the East. To
justify the retreat of the Greeks, a rumour was circulated that a con-
spiracy had been discovered at Constantinople. There is perhaps no
need to lay stress on the explanations put forward at the time. May it
not be supposed that Manuel entered into the treaty because he had no
kind of interest in the destruction of the power of Nūr-ad-Dīn? It was
to the struggle of the Atābegs and the Christians that the Empire owed
the advantages which had been won in the East. Had he subjugated
Nūr-ad-Dīn, Manuel would have delivered the Latins from their dread of
the Musulman peril, and they as soon as the danger was removed would,
as they had done before, make haste to forget their engagements to the
Empire. In order that the suzerainty of Constantinople might be recog-
nised by the Latins, it was necessary that the Musulman peril should con-
tinue to exist. This appears to give the most reasonable explanation of
Manuel's conduct.
On his return to Constantinople Manuel, who had been left a widower,
meditated drawing closer the bonds between himself and the Latins of
Palestine by marrying a Latin princess. He requested the King of Jeru-
salem to grant him the hand of Millicent, sister of Raymond III, Count
of Tripolis. But, the marriage being once agreed upon, the negotiations
were drawn out for more than a year, until at last Manuel suddenly broke
them off and transferred his choice to Mary, daughter of Constance,
Princess of Antioch. The chief result of the marriage was to bring Antioch
more decidedly within the sphere of Byzantine influence, which was now
exerted energetically on the side of the Latins against the Turks. At
the battle of the Bukaia (1163) and at Hārim (1164) the Greeks fought
side by side with the Latin lords. After the defeat at Hārim the Emperor
sent reinforcements to Cilicia, but he made the mistake of committing
the province to his cousin Andronicus as governor. Andronicus ruined the
imperial policy by procuring the murder of Sdephanê, the brother of
Thoros, who was thus alienated from the Empire. Then, having fallen
in love with Philippa, Manuel's sister-in-law, Andronicus deserted his
CH. XII.
## p. 376 (#418) ############################################
376
Amaury of Jerusalem
post as governor in order to fly with the object of his passion. In spite
of these incidents Constantinople and Antioch remained on excellent
terms. Manuel came to the help of his brother-in-law Bohemond III
with financial support, and obtained from him permission for the Greek
Patriarch to return to Antioch. While Amaury, the Latin Patriarch,
departed hurling anathemas against the city, the Greek, Athanasius, took
possession of the see. This supplies a fresh proof of the influence exercised
over Antioch by the Greek element. There was then in this quarter
substantial progress on the part of the Byzantines.
Such was not the case in Cilicia. Thoros having died (c. 1167), his
son Rupen II succeeded him, but after a short time was robbed of his
crown by his uncle Mleh, who in order to seize power had allied himself
with Nur-ad-Dīn. With the latter's help Mleh succeeded in maintaining
his position until the death of his patron, when he was overthrown and,
Rupen II being dead, was replaced by Rupen III, son of Sdephanê, the
victim of Andronicus. Throughout these struggles Constantinople seems
to have played a very secondary part in Cilicia. It is only the attempt
by Manuel to bring about the union of the Greek and Armenian Churches
which shews that Constantinople had not yet lost interest in Armenian
affairs. It is quite probable that the object aimed at by the Emperor
was at least as much political as religious, and that the opposition offered
by the Armenian clergy, which caused the failure of the negotiations,
was also political in character.
Baldwin's successor on the throne of Jerusalem, Amaury, after having
at the opening of his reign sought in vain for help from the West, turned
decidedly from 1165 onwards towards Constantinople. He asked for
the hand of a princess of the imperial family, and on 29 August 1167
his marriage took place at Tyre with the daughter of the Protosebastos
John Comnenus, a nephew of the Emperor, the son of his brother
Andronicus. Through this new connexion the ties between Constanti-
nople and the kingdom of Jerusalem became closer, and Manuel agreed
to lend his help to King Amaury, who, in order to prevent Nūr-ad-Dīn
from occupying Egypt, where the Caliphate had fallen into utter de-
cadence, wished to annex the country himself. Several attempts by the
Jerusalem had failed; it was now decided that in 1169 the Greeks
and Latins should try to effect a joint conquest of Egypt. Delays on the
part of Amaury caused the expedition to fail, for the provisions of the
Greeks, calculated to last for three months, had been already largely con-
sumed when their feet quitted Acre.
The Greek fleet under the command of the Grand Duke Alexius
Contostephanus had a strength of 150 biremes and 60 transport ships.
It left the port of Coela near Sestos in July. But the expedition, in-
stead of setting out in August as had been agreed, only left Syria to
besiege Damietta in October. The siege lasted for two months, at the end
of which the town made terms with Amaury. The campaign had failed,
King
## p. 377 (#419) ############################################
Wars with the Turks
377
and the Greeks, who were suffering greatly from want of provisions, were
in haste to depart. Their return journey was disastrous, a large number
of their vessels being lost at sea, and the Empire derived no advantage
whatever from the expedition.
Manuel, however, was not discouraged by this want of success, and in
1171 he gave a favourable reception to Amaury, who had come to Con-
stantinople to ask for his support. A treaty was signed by which Manuel
pledged himself to assist the King of Jerusalem in a renewed attempt
upon Egypt. According to a Greek chronicler, Amaury at this time
acknowledged himself the vassal of the Emperor, but as the statement
cannot be verified it is impossible to speak decidedly on the point. As
to the proposed expedition, we know that Manuel urged Amaury's suc-
cessor, Baldwin IV, to march upon Egypt(1177). The opposition of Philip,
Count of Flanders and Vermandois, who was then in Palestine, was fatal
to the plan which had been agreed on, its execution being deferred to
some unspecified date.
It remains for us to consider the relations of Manuel with the Sultan
of Iconium. Mas'ûd had died (c. 1155) and had been succeeded at Iconium
by Qilij Arslān, and at Gangra and Ancyra by another of his sons,
Shāhinshāh. On its return from Antioch in 1159 the Greek army was
attacked near Cotyaeum by Musulman bands, and next year Manuel
undertook a campaign in order to chastise Qilij Arslān. In this struggle
he relied on the support of other Mohammedan princes, Ya'qub Arslan,
Dhū’l-Nun, Mahomet, son of Dhü'l-Qarnain, and also on Shāhinshāh,
brother of Qilij Arslān. In 1160 Ya'qub Arslān was attacking Qilij
Arslān, while on all sides the Greeks were falling upon such Turkish tribes
as were to be found in the neighbourhood of the frontier. In consequence
of this general onslaught Qilij Arslān treated for peace during the winter
of 1161. The negotiations fell through, and war was resumed at the begin-
ning of spring. Manuel, by way of Philadelphia, invaded the dominions
of the Sultan, who retorted by attacks upon Phileta and Laodicea.
In 1162 Manuel called upon all his vassals to strike a decisive
blow. Finding himself seriously menaced, Qilij Arslān made friends with
Ya'qūb Arslān and Shāhinshāh, and then negotiated with Manuel,
with whom he finally concluded a treaty of alliance. Soon after, Qilij
Arslān appeared at Constantinople, where he remained for more than three
months. He departed loaded with presents, having made the Emperor
the fairest of promises for the future. He had pledged himself to restore
to the Empire a number of towns which had been taken by the Musulmans.
Not one of these promises was ever carried out.
The years from 1162 to 1174 were occupied by perpetual strife among
the Musulmans of Asia Minor, the Greeks being thus allowed some respite.
In the end Qilij Arslān was left victor over his chief adversaries. His
brother Shāhinshāh and Dhü'l-Nun then sought refuge at Constan-
tinople.
CH. XII.
## p. 378 (#420) ############################################
378
Battle of Myriocephalum
In order to be able to pursue his European policy undisturbed, Manuel
had since his treaty with Qilij Arslān supplied the latter with heavy
subsidies as the price of peace. In proportion as his power increased, the
Sultan of Iconium, urged on perhaps by Frederick Barbarossa, assumed
a more independent attitude towards the Empire, while the incursions of
the nomad tribes of Turks were renewed with greater frequency than ever.
To secure his frontier, Manuel repaired the fortifications of a certain
number of strongholds, notably Pergamus and Chliara. He then fortified
the two lines of defence supplied by the rivers Maeander and Hermus.
It was not till 1175 that a definitive rupture took place between
Manuel and the Sultan of Iconium. The former insisted that Qilij
Arslān should fulfil his promise to restore to the Empire certain towns
which he had taken from it. Supported by Frederick Barbarossa, Qilij
Arslān refused to comply with the Emperor's demands, and Manuel decided
upon war, counting upon the support of all the remaining partisans of
Shāhinshāh and Dhū’l-Nun among the Musulmans. While a detach-
ment of Greek troops was sent under Gabras and Shāhinshāh to occupy
Amasia, which was still in the hands of the latter's supporters, Manuel
carried out the fortification of a whole series of towns, Dorylaeum, an
important strategic point on the road to Iconium, Lampe, and Sublaeum
(1175). Next year the Emperor resolved to attack Iconium. With this
object he preached a regular crusade, calling upon all his vassals for help.
While Andronicus Vatatzes went to attack Neo-Caesarea, Manuel himself
took command of the army which was to march upon Iconium. The fate
of both expeditions was equally disastrous. Vatatzes failed before Neo-
Caesarea and was killed, his army being routed. Manuel himself became
entangled with his whole army in the mountainous region to the east
of Sublaeum (Homa). He had neglected to explore the country-side
with scouts during his march, and was caught by the Muslims in the
narrow defiles at Myriocephalum. The Greeks met with a complete dis-
aster, in which the finest of the imperial troops were slaughtered by the
Musulmans. Manuel himself compared his defeat to that of Romanus
Diogenes at Manzikert. For reasons unknown to us Qilij Arslān used his
victory with moderation, and offered peace on honourable terms, stipu-
lating only for the destruction of the fortifications at Dorylaeum and
Sublaeum. Manuel agreed to the conditions proposed, and led the wreck
of his army back to Constantinople.
With the disaster of Myriocephalum all enterprises on a large scale in
the East came to an end. Though broken by his defeat, the Emperor
did indeed renew the war during the latter part of his reign; but the Greek
generals had to confine themselves to the defence of the frontier, and
all idea of an advance upon Iconium, to attack the central seat of the
Musulman power, was abandoned. In fact, the battle of Myriocephalum
sealed the fate of the Comnenian dynasty, if not of the Byzantine
Empire.
## p. 379 (#421) ############################################
Death of Manuel
379
As a result of his defeat Manuel met with a mortification from
Frederick Barbarossa which he must have felt keenly. The Western
Emperor wrote to the Basileus, and remembering old scores himself
spoke of the unity of the Empire. In his letter he clearly asserts the
superiority of the Emperor of the West, sole heir of the Roman Emperors,
over all other sovereigns, in particular, over the King of the Greeks.
Manuel, who feared that the Westerns might profit by his defeat to
attack his Empire, strove by all the means which he had before found
successful to paralyse Barbarossa's forces. He supported William,
Marquess of Montferrat, when he raised a revolt in Italy, and, in order to
set a seal on the alliance, married his daughter Mary to Renier, one of
William's sons. Again it was Byzantine gold that helped to equip the
troops that defeated Frederick’s Arch-Chancellor, Christian of Mayence,
near Camerino. Manuel was trying to arrange for the purchase of Christian,
whom Conrad of Montferrat had made prisoner, when his own death put
a stop to the negotiations. Thus after lasting twenty years the struggle
between the two Empires came to an end-a struggle in which diplomacy
counted for more than armies. Manuel's policy with regard to Barbarossa
was very burdensome to the imperial treasury, for money was the weapon
with which he chiefly carried on the contest. If his policy seems to have
yielded no very striking results, it must be remembered that Manuel was
successful in keeping the forces of his enemy in a state of inaction, and
was thus able to pursue his policy of conquest in Hungary and the East
unhindered.
The only success which sweetened the bitterness of Manuel's last
years
was the marriage of his son Alexius with Agnes, the daughter of Louis VII
of France. This match had been arranged at the Emperor's request by
Philip, Count of Flanders, who on his return from an expedition to the
Holy Land had passed through Constantinople in 1178. The little
princess, who reached Constantinople in a Genoese vessel, was married to
the heir of the Empire on 2 March 1180. On 24 September in the same
year the Emperor died after a long illness, during which, confident in
the predictions of astrologers, he never ceased to nurse illusions as to his
prospect of recovery. This conviction that he would recover prevented
him from making any arrangements for the organisation of the govern-
ment during the minority of his son.
Alexius II, son and successor of Manuel Comnenus, was twelve years
old at the time of his father's death. Naturally therefore he had no
share in state affairs, the regency being in the hands of his mother Mary
of Antioch, whose charm and beauty the chroniclers vie in celebrating.
Every man about the court, convinced that the Empress could be wooed
and won, endeavoured to attract her attention. For some time the court was
the scene of all manner of intrigues, and, in order to gain favour with the
Empress, young and old rivalled one another in the elegance and splendour
CH. XII.
Manuel is open to the reproach of having cared less for realities than for
show, of having attempted to carry out simultaneously projects on a
gigantic scale, any single one of which would have taxed the resources of
the Empire. This is the weak side of his policy. Manuel attempted to
get others to carry out the tasks which he could not himself accomplish;
hence arose the failures he met with. It would appear further that
Manuel was fitted only for success, and was incapable of bearing mis-
fortune. At his only defeat, the disaster of Myriocephalum, when he
saw that he was beaten and in danger of being slain by the enemy
with the poor remains of his army, his one idea was to take to flight
without giving a thought to his soldiers. Only the opposition of his
captains prevented him from carrying out this disgraceful intention.
Manuel's devotion to the ideals of chivalry and his two marriages
with Western princesses fostered in him a strong preference for the Latins.
Men of Western race, whether Germans, French, Normans, Italians, or
English, were sure of his eager welcome, and of finding posts about his
court or in his army. Though ignorant of the Greek language, these
foreigners who “spat better than they spoke” contrived, nevertheless, to
fill considerable administrative offices, to the great disgust of the Emperor's
subjects. Nor were they any better pleased to see the Venetians, Pisans,
and Genoese settle down at Constantinople. This policy on the part of
Manuel led to the accumulation of the national hatred against the Latins
which was to burst forth in the reign of Andronicus.
Manuel, like his grandfather Alexius, brought a keen interest to
theological questions. He prided himself on being a theologian and took
pleasure in theological discussions, as the Patriarch Cosmas found, who
## p. 363 (#405) ############################################
His character
363
was deposed in 1147 for his adhesion to the doctrines of Niphon, a
Bogomile monk. Manuel considered himself to possess inspired know-
ledge, and was in the habit of imposing his decisions upon the clergy. In
the cases of Soterichus Panteugenus, of Basilaces, and of Michael of
Thessalonica (the representatives of a little group of priests charged with
holding views inspired by Platonic philosophy), the Emperor's sentence
was decisive (1157). Later on, towards the close of the reign, in the teeth
of the opposition of the clergy and the Patriarch, Manuel imposed his own
view in a discussion which brought up afresh the doctrine promulgated
by the Councils of Nicaea and Constantinople regarding the relation be-
tween the Father and the Son. Manuel decided the question in a sense
opposite to the traditional doctrine. Finally, we must note the attempt
made by Manuel in 1170 to bring about the re-union of the Armenian
and Greek Churches. Despite the skill of Theorianus, who was entrusted
by the Emperor with the duty of carrying on the negotiation with the
Katholikos Nerses, the discussions led to no result.
In contrast to Manuel the theologian there was another Manuel, a
dabbler in astrology. Astrologers enjoyed great prestige at the imperial
court. The Basileus consulted them upon all important expeditions, and
forbade his generals to give battle unless the stars were propitious. Manuel
was a believer in magic and in spells. Even on his deathbed his confidence
in all the charlatans who surrounded him remained unskaken.
Theological and scientific questions, however, did not engross the
Emperor's interest. Manuel, and following his example the whole court,
took a pride in shewing a taste for letters; the literary revival initiated
in the preceding century in the time of Psellus was continued during
this reign. The princesses of the imperial family encouraged authors;
the Empress Irene accepted the dedication of the Chiliads of Tzetzes,
and another Irene, wife of Andronicus, Manuel's brother, was the ac-
knowledged patroness of literary men. A little court of the learned
gathered round her, among the ornaments of which were Tzetzes, Con-
stantine Manasses, and one of the Prodromoi. Manuel's niece and mistress,
Theodora, was the correspondent of Glycas. Other court ladies took to
writing themselves, and it was at this time that Anna Comnena finished
her Aleriad, the continuation of Bryennius' work in honour of Alexius.
Her example was followed by Zonaras and Glycas, the compilers of
chronicles, and at the same time Cinnamus and Nicetas Acominatus
collected the materials for their works.
Rhetoric also had its representatives, and one of the best judges of
classical antiquity, Eustathius, Archbishop of Thessalonica, pronounced
some of his orations during this reign. He was one of the most distin-
guished members of the learned and scholarly group of clergy, devoted
to philosophical speculation, several of whom have already been men-
tioned in dealing with the theological controversies of the day.
The arts were not neglected at Manuel's court. If he took pleasure
CH. XII.
## p. 364 (#406) ############################################
364
Manuel's administration
in re-building the palace of the Blachernae, which he decorated with
mosaics commemorating his exploits, and in erecting sumptuous villas
on the coast of Asia Minor and on the islands in the neighbour-
hood of Constantinople where he could go for relaxation after his
military exertions, he did not forget public edifices. He had the
walls of Constantinople repaired, spent money freely on constructing
aqueducts, and undertook operations to make the closing of the harbour
possible. On the other hand he did little in the way of ecclesiastical
building. He used to rally his courtiers on the vanity which urged them
to build monasteries or churches on purpose to erect their tombs there,
and used to declare that he only approved of monks in solitary places,
and looked with horror on the turbulent monks dwelling in towns and
devoting themselves solely to increasing the possessions of their monas-
teries. By way of setting an example he built a monastery near the
entrance to the strait of the Bosphorus, to which he made no donation
of lands, confining himself to a yearly grant out of the public treasury
sufficient for the maintenance of the monks. Manuel's legislation as to
ecclesiastical property is inspired by the same spirit. The imperial
Novels forbid churches and monasteries to add to the lands already
in their possession, but on the other hand legalise the ownership of those
actually held, even when the title could not be shewn or was defective.
In this way a general settlement was arrived at, but at the expense of the
lay owners, who now saw a legal sanction given to all the usurpations of
which they had been victims.
The foreign policy of Manuel was carried out at enormous expense,
and was extremely burdensome to the imperial treasury. In order to fill
it the Emperor was forced to use great severity in the collection of the
taxes and to have recourse to all kinds of financial expedients. The
most important seems to have been the converting of the obligation to
maintain the navy, which was laid upon certain themes, into a tax-
measure analogous to that formerly resorted to by Constantine IX
with regard to service in the army. In conjunction with this measure
should be noted the novel distributions of land on condition of mili-
tary service, grants made for the most part to prisoners of war or to
barbarian tribes. These ineasures caused great disturbances in the
provinces and brought about a strained situation there, chiefly known
to us through the efforts made later by Andronicus Comnenus to find a
remedy.
John Comnenus, in choosing his youngest son to succeed him, had
set aside the rights of the elder, the Sebastocrator Isaac. If the young
Emperor had the army on his side his brother had the advantage
of being in the capital. In order that a conflict might be avoided,
Manuel must at all costs make himself master of Constantinople before
the news of John's death was known there. The business was entrusted
to Axuch, who successfully carried out the task confided to him. He
## p. 365 (#407) ############################################
Turkish attacks
365
contrived to seize both Isaacs, uncle and nephew, and with no great
difficulty defeated a plot to set the crown on the head of the Caesar
John-Roger, Manuel's brother-in-law. When the Emperor appeared
before his capital, peace was already established; he reached his palace
easily enough, and largess, distributed on a lavish scale to clergy and
people, secured his popularity.
On the death of John Comnenus the Latins of Antioch had again
taken the offensive, and even while Manuel was still in the East had
begun hostilities and occupied several places in Cilicia. This provocation
had been keenly resented by Manuel, who made it his first care to send
troops to Cilicia to deal with the Latins. The Greek arms were victorious,
and in 1145 Raymond of Poitiers had to submit to the humiliation of
coming to Constantinople to ask mercy of Manuel; he was compelled
to visit the church of the Pantokrator and make the amende at the dead
Emperor's tomb.
While the Byzantine army was on its way back from Cilicia, the
troops of the Sultan of Iconium had carried off several persons of impor-
tance at court; further invasions had then taken place, the Muslim bands
advancing as far as Pithecas near Nicaea ; the whole of the Byzantine
possessions in Asia Minor were devastated, ruins were heaped up on every
side, and the luckless populations were forced to leave their villages and
seek refuge in the towns along the coast. Thus one of the first tasks
with which Manuel was faced was to secure his frontier in Asia by the
erection of a series of fortified posts, intended to check the invaders. This
was his main work, and he pursued it to the end of his reign. At
the same time he attempted to strike at the heart of the Musulman
power, more than once endeavouring to reduce Iconium. At the opening
of his reign he was aided in his struggle against Masóūd by the divisions
among the Muslim leaders which had followed upon the death of the
Dānishmandite prince Mahomet (1141). His lands were divided be-
tween his son, Dhü'l-Nun, who obtained Caesarea, and his brothers,
Yaʻqūb Arslān and ‘Ain-ad-Daulah, whose shares respectively were Sīwās
and Melitene. Threatened by Masóūd, Yaʻqūb Arslān, the most powerful
of the heirs of Mahomet, treated with Manuel who helped him with
subsidies. During the years 1146-1147 the Greeks fought with no great
measure of success; Manuel got as far as Iconium, but failed to take it.
At the moment when the crusaders appeared before Constantinople,
Manuel had just concluded a truce with Masóūd.
During this period the policy of Manuel in the West had yielded
no striking results. For a short time the Emperor seemed to be meditating
a league with the King of Sicily, but he soon returned to the idea
of a German alliance, and in January 1146 took to wife Bertha of
Sulzbach, sister-in-law of Conrad. But at the very time when this
marriage seemed to have set a seal upon his friendship with Germany,
all that had been gained by it was lost by the opening of the Second
CH. XII.
## p. 366 (#408) ############################################
366
The Second Crusade
Crusade, the Greek Empire being left to confront the Norman
power
in
a state of complete isolation.
Learning of the new Crusade by letters from Louis VII and the Pope,
Eugenius III, Manuel immediately set himself to obtain guarantees
against all eventualities by demanding of the Pope that the crusaders
should bind themselves to him by engagements similar to those taken by
the leaders of the First Crusade to Alexius. In return he promised that
on payment being forthcoming provisions should be supplied. At the
assembly of Étampes (February 1147) Manuel's envoys met those of
Roger II, who had been instructed to bring about the diversion of the
Crusade to their master's profit by promising large advantages. The
influence of Conrad, who had only joined in the project for a Crusade
at the end of 1146, was certainly not without its weight in the decision
to go by Constantinople. The fact that not only the King of France
but also the King of Germany was to take part in the expedition made
the position of Manuel with regard to the crusaders all the more perilous.
He was haunted by the fear that, if the Western troops collected outside
his capital, they might be tempted to an assault upon Constantinople.
He made every effort to avoid this danger, his task being rendered easier
by the ill-feeling of Conrad towards the French.
The measures taken with regard to the crusaders were of the same
kind as those employed by Alexius in the case of the First Crusade. The
Byzantine troops were disposed so as to confinė the streams of pilgrims
in a single channel and to prevent the pillaging bands from wandering
too far from the prescribed route. The elements of which the crusading
army was composed made these precautions necessary. Not only were
there warriors on the march; the bulk of the army consisted of pilgrims
and of a rout of adventurers ready for any mischief.
The Germans were first to pass through the imperial territory. Their
relations with the Greeks were as bad as possible, outrages being committed
on both sides which generated violent excitement. Hadrianople was
especially the scene of bloodshed. Manuel made a last effort to divert
the crusaders from the route through Constantinople and to persuade
them to pass through Sestos, but his suggestions were listened to with
suspicion and were rejected. Many disasters would have been avoided
if his advice had been taken, and it was the route recommended
by him which Louis VII took after the destruction of the German
army.
Little is known of the relations between Manuel and Conrad during
the time that the crusading army remained before Constantinople. It
is probable that the two Emperors did not meet; at the same time they
appear to have come to an agreement. The news of the arrival of Louis
VII decided Conrad upon crossing over into Asia Minor—a step which
all the urgency of Manuel had not availed to secure. The march of the
German army upon Iconium ended in disaster. The crusaders, although
## p. 367 (#409) ############################################
Conrad III and Louis VII
367
aware of the length of the journey, had not brought a sufficient quantity
of provisions ; famine soon made its appearance, whereupon the Greek
guides were alarmed by accusations of treachery, which caused them to
abandon the army and take to flight. The crusaders were forced to fall
back upon Nicomedia, harassed as they marched by the Turks who slew
them in thousands; as many perished by famine. At Nicomedia the
remnants of Conrad's army found the French.
The journey of the French across the Greek territories was equally
accompanied by acts of violence; but a Latin eye-witness admits that
up to their arrival before Constantinople the Franks did as much injury
to the Greeks as they received from them, and that the wrongs were
on both sides. Manuel welcomed Louis VII, but made every effort to in-
duce him to cross at once to the coast of Asia Minor. The apprehension
which the Greek Emperor shewed is justified by the known fact that
there was a regular party in the King of France's council urgent for the
taking of Constantinople.
The French once across the Bosphorus, new difficulties arose. Manuel
demanded that the barons should do homage and swear fealty to him,
and after long parleying Louis ended by yielding. Having joined the
wrecks of the German army, the French gave up the idea of marching
upon Iconium and took the road for Attalia. At Ephesus Conrad fell ill,
and abandoned the Crusade. The march of the crusaders through the
Asiatic provinces of the Byzantine Empire was marked by similar acts of
violence to those committed in Europe; this explains the fighting which
took place between the Greeks and the Latins. The chief accusation
brought against the Greeks is that they did not supply provisions and
that they charged too dear for such as they did supply. The vast numbers
of the crusaders made provisioning a matter of great difficulty, and the
presence of unnumbered multitudes in one place is a sufficient explana-
tion of the dearness of commodities.
The army of Louis VII, thus ill-provided, suffered greatly on the
march from Laodicea to Attalia. The Musulman bands had appeared,
and their unceasing attacks added to the difficulties of the mountain
route. The army reached Attalia in a deplorable state. Here provisions
were still lacking. Louis VII and the chief lords hired ships of the Greeks
and departed, forsaking the mass of the pilgrims. The leaders left in
charge abandoned them in their turn. The wretched people fell a prey to
the Turks, and to the Greeks who were exasperated at the acts of pillage
which the famished multitude had committed.
Manuel has been held responsible for the failure of the Second Crusade.
Such accusations are now to a large extent discredited by historians.
The ill-success of the Crusade was due to defective organisation, to the
want of discipline among the crusaders, and to their obstinate persistence,
in spite of the Emperor's advice, in following the road taken by Godfrey
of Bouillon and his companions.
CH. XII.
## p. 368 (#410) ############################################
368
Manuel and Roger II
Conrad, who had been left behind sick at Ephesus, was received by
Manuel, who brought him to Constantinople and loaded him with
attentions. The fact was that Manuel was just then threatened by a
danger which made the prospect of help from the German King of
great value to him. Profiting by the difficulties into which the Basileus
was thrown by the coming of the crusaders, Roger II of Sicily had
in the autumn of 1147 directed a naval attack upon the coast of the
Empire. Corfù had fallen into his hands; Negropont and Cerigo had
been ravaged. The Normans then sailed up the Gulf of Corinth and
took Thebes and Corinth (centres of the silk-trade and two of the
most important commercial towns in the Empire), their rich warehouses
being given up to pillage. In order to resist this aggression, Manuel, while
the crusaders were still on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, had in
vain begged for help from Conrad and Louis. He was obliged to meet
the Normans with his own forces, for which however he had secured the
support of the Venetian fleet.
Being detained by an invasion of the Cumans (1148), Manuel sent
the Grand Domestic Axuch and the Grand Duke Alexius Contoste-
phanus to occupy the places taken by the Normans and to besiege Corfù.
It was during the winter of 1148–1149 that Manuel received Conrad,
who was returning from the Holy Land, and concluded a treaty with
him, by which the German king bound himself to make a descent upon
Italy in order to attack Roger II (1149).
Corfù having been re-taken (summer of 1149), Manuel resolved to
organise an expedition to punish Roger II. A revolt among the Serbs,
supported by the King of Sicily, prevented him from carrying out his
plan. Roger II, threatened by the Germano-Byzantine alliance, created
difficulties for them both which hindered them from carrying out their
project of an invasion of Italy. While Welf, thanks to supplies furnished
by Roger, fomented an agitation which detained Conrad in Germany, the
Sicilian king was launching the Serbs and Hungarians against the Greek
Empire. Hungary and Constantinople were at that time on very bad terms
owing to their pursuing a diametrically opposite policy in Russia. While
Géza, King of Hungary, maintained the claims of his brother-in-law
Izyaslav to the throne of Kiev, Manuel gave his support to George Dolgo-
ruki, son of Vladímir Monomachus, who was also favoured by Vladimirko,
Prince of Halicz. At the instigation of the King of Sicily, Géza en-
couraged the Župan of Rascia, Pervoslav Uroš, to revolt, and the
disturbance which broke out in Serbia in the autumn of 1149 kept
Manuel occupied until 1150. The Serbs having been subdued, Manuel,
eager to punish their Hungarian supporters, took advantage in 1151 of
the absence of Géza, who was maintaining Izyaslav's cause in Russia against
Vladimirko, to take Semlin and ravage the country between the Save and
the Danube. Peace was signed the same year, but in 1152 hostilities broke
out again, and Géza formed a connexion with Manuel's cousin, Andronicus
## p. 369 (#411) ############################################
The Greeks in Italy
369
Comnenus, the future Emperor. This treason was discovered and An-
dronicus was arrested. The struggle lasted until 1155, when peace was
signed. The only appreciable result of the campaigns seems to have been
the conquest of Semlin.
Roger II had not been satisfied with stirring up the Serbs and Hun-
garians against Manuel; he had at the same time made use of the failure
of the Crusade to attempt the organisation of a European coalition
against him. Louis VII sympathised with these projects, but Conrad's
fidelity to the Byzantine alliance, and the rupture which took place in
1150 between Pope Eugenius III and Roger, prevented the latter's designs
from taking effect. Finally in 1152 the death of Conrad delivered the
Norman King from the peril of a Germano-Byzantine alliance.
With Conrad's successor,
Frederick Barbarossa, Manuel was never able
to come to an understanding. From the beginning of his reign Bar-
barossa refused to countenance any territorial advantage which might be
gained by the Basileus in Italy—a concession which Conrad had made.
From 1152 to 1158 numerous embassies came and went between the two
Emperors, but it was found impossible to arrange an alliance. Wishing
to take advantage of the death of Roger II in 1154, Frederick Barbarossa
made a descent upon Italy. Manuel, fearing that this expedition having
been made without reference to him might prove to have been made against
him, decided to try his fortune single-handed and to make his profit out of
the unsettled conditions which had followed on the death of Roger II. He
dispatched to Italy Michael Palaeologus, who in the course of 1155, thanks
to the support of Robert of Loritello, a revolted vassal of the Norman
King William I, and his fellow-rebels, achieved unlooked-for success. In
a few months the Greek Emperor's authority was recognised from Ancona
to Taranto. This success turned Manuel's head, and was chiefly instru-
mental in giving a new direction to his policy. At the very time when
in 1155 the German Emperor, forced to own himself unable to maintain
order in Italy and to play the part he had assumed of protector of the
Papacy, abandoned the idea of invading the Norman Kingdom, the
Basileus was enforcing the recognition of his own imperial authority in
all that part of Italy which had formerly been in the possession of the
Greek Emperors. Hence arose in Manuel the desire to restore the Eastern
Empire to what it had been in the time of Justinian, and to obtain from
the Pope the re-establishment of imperial unity in exchange for the re-
union of the Greek Church with the Church of Rome. The first nego-
tiations with this object were begun with Hadrian IV, and the rupture
which took place at this time between the Papacy and the Western
Emperor seemned to Manuel likely to further the accomplishment of his
dream.
The counter-strokes of William I, which in a short time demolished
the frail edifice of Byzantine conquest, did not avail to dissuade Manuel
from his project. Southern Italian questions became of secondary im-
C. MED. H. VOL. IV. CH. XII.
24
## p. 370 (#412) ############################################
370
Manuel and Alexander III
portance to him in comparison with the schemes he was caressing, and
he made no difficulty in 1158 in complying with the suggestions of the
Papacy, which, leaning as it did on the support of the kingdom of Sicily
and of the Greek Empire, desired to see peace restored between its two
allies.
From 1157 onwards Byzantine policy is governed wholly by the idea
of restoring the unity of the Empire. For the sake of clearness we will
consider in order the relations of Manuel with Italy and Frederick Bar-
barossa, with the Hungarians and Serbs, and finally with the Muslims
and the Latins of the East.
It was natural that Manuel should shew himself favourable to the
Pope, Alexander III. During the years from 1161 to 1163 long nego-
tions went on between the Emperor, Alexander III, and Louis VII con-
cerning a coalition to be formed against the Western Emperor. Three
years later Manuel judged that the Pope was sufficiently in need of his
help to make it safe to acquaint him completely with his desire to re-
establish the unity of the Empire under his sceptre. Negotiations about
this project went on for several years, Manuel remaining the ally of Alex-
ander until the preliminaries of the Peace of Venice (1177). Although his
name does not appear as one of the signatories of the peace, the connexion
between the Papacy and Constantinople lasted as long as Manuel reigned.
If the understanding between the Pope and the Greek Emperor led to
nothing, one of the chief causes of this was the opposition maintained by
the King of Sicily to the Byzantine policy. It will readily be understood
that neither William I nor William II looked with favour on the attempts
of Manuel to gain a footing in Italy, but that both on the contrary
offered a vigorous resistance. Manuel tried every means of overcoming
their opposition; he had recourse to Louis VII, and on two occasions he
endeavoured to arrange for the marriage of his daughter Mary with
William II. But just as matters seemed to be finally settled, the match
was broken off, Barbarossa having made overtures to Manuel which seemed
to him to promise a more brilliant future to his daughter than alliance
with William of Sicily could offer.
Manuel's attitude towards the Italian cities was a natural result of
his policy with regard to Alexander III. He endeavoured by every
possible means to attach to his interest a group of dependent Italian
towns, or at least to be able to rely on the support of a party in the
more important cities. Milan was encouraged by him in her struggle
with Barbarossa, and Byzantine gold helped to rebuild her streets.
Cremona and Pavia had their share of the Greek subsidies. Once already
Ancona had given itself up to Palaeologus, and later on, about 1166, its
population embraced the Greek cause, won over by the gold of Manuel's
emissaries. In 1167 Barbarossa was only able to win a partial advantage
over them.
With Pisa Manuel in 1161 entered into negotiations which lasted
## p. 371 (#413) ############################################
Manuel, Venice, and Barbarossa
371
until 1172. Dragged in different directions by their Ghibelline sym-
pathies and their desire to take advantage of the commercial privileges
offered by the Basileus, the Pisans pursued an indecisive policy. The
Genoese in the same way treated with the Greek Emperor in 1155, but
also with Barbarossa in 1162. Though intercourse between them and
Constantinople was broken off in 1162, it was resumed in 1164, and went
on until 1170. Manuel was never able to bring the Genoese to the
point of breaking with Barbarossa.
The Greek occupation of Ancona and the recapture of the Dalmatian
towns gave some anxiety to the Venetians, who had very nearly come to a
breach with Manuel at the time of the siege of Corfù, as the result of an
unpleasant incident which occurred between the troops of the two nations.
Things reached such a point that in 1167 relations between the two
countries were completely broken off. The doge even recalled all those
of his nation who had settled upon Greek territory. Diplomatic inter-
course, resumed at the request of Manuel who drew the Venetians into a
veritable snare, was again definitively broken off on 12 March 1171. On
this date Manuel ordered the arrest of all Venetians settled in his dominions
and the confiscation of their goods. Enormous damage was thus inflicted
upon Venice. In revenge the republic during the winter of 1171-2
pillaged the coasts of the Empire and ravaged Negropont, Chios, and
Lesbos. In the course of the campaign negotiations were initiated in
which the Venetians were duped.
These were continued without result
up to 1175. At this date Venice made an alliance with William II, King
of Sicily. Thus directly threatened, Manuel decided upon concessions.
He set at liberty the prisoners arrested in 1171, restored their goods to
them, and granted to Venice the privileges enjoyed under former treaties
of commerce. In the interval, in 1173, Venice had given help to the
Germans in their attempt to take Ancona from the Greeks.
The policy which Manuel pursued in Italy naturally reacted upon
the relations between the Greek Empire and the Germans. The atti-
tude which he took up there would naturally have as its first consequence
a complete rupture with Barbarossa. This, however, was postponed for
some time owing to the secrecy with which the Greek Emperor con-
trived to cover up his intrigues. It was only when the occupation of
Ancona took place in 1166 that Manuel's hostility to Barbarossa shewed
itself clearly. From 1159 to 1165 several embassies were exchanged
between the two Emperors, and in 1166 Henry, Duke of Austria, made a
useless journey to Manuel's court to attempt to bring about an under-
standing. Just at that time Manuel's occupation of Ancona had opened
Barbarossa's eyes, and he was determined to avenge himself on the earliest
opportunity. However, the progress made by Manuel in Italy, marked
by the treaties with Genoa in 1169 and with Pisa in 1170, decided Bar-
barossa on attempting a reconciliation. From 1170 to 1172 proposals
were discussed for the marriage of Manuel's daughter with Barbarossa's
CB. XII.
24-2
## p. 372 (#414) ############################################
372
Manuel and Hungary
son. They led to nothing, and in 1173 Barbarossa was engaged in the
siege of Ancona (which had given itself up to the Greeks), and was also
trying to negotiate an alliance with William II, evidently directed against
Manuel. At the same time the Western Emperor was attempting in his
turn to create difficulties for his adversary, and was treating with the
Sultan of Iconium. Manuel took no share in the Treaty of Venice (1177)
and, as we shall see, continued the struggle with the Western Emperor
up to the last day of his life.
His Italian policy, being based wholly on diplomacy, always left the
greater part of the military forces of the Empire free, a circumstance
which enabled the Emperor at the same time to pursue a more active
and warlike course in two other quarters, Hungary and Asia. Since the
peace signed with Géza, Manuel had played a waiting game in Hungary,
content with giving a refuge at Constantinople to two of the king's
brothers, the future Stephen IV and Ladislas. At the death of Géza
(1161), Manuel had made use of the pretenders whom he had at hand
in order to interfere in the concerns of the Hungarian succession, calcu-
lating thus to secure some advantage for the Empire. The laws of
succession were not yet fully fixed in Hungary, and Stephen IV could
plead in his favour the ancient usage by which the brother of a dead
king was to be preferred to the son, in order to put forward a claim
to the throne to the prejudice of his nephew Stephen III. Manuel
supported the claims of his protégé by Byzantine troops. A strong party
grew up in Hungary hostile to the claims of Géza's son, but refusing
to admit those of Stephen IV, who was looked upon as too much the
vassal of Constantinople. The Hungarians feared that by giving the
crown to Stephen IV their country might become a mere satellite of
Constantinople, and to avoid this danger made choice of Ladislas, brother
of Stephen IV, whom they regarded as less submissive to the influence of
the Byzantine court. Ladislas was barely seated on the throne when he
died (1162). The struggle between the two Stephens then recommenced,
Manuel still giving support to his candidate. To bring the contest to an
end, the counsellors of the young King Stephen III offered to hand over
to Manuel another son of Géza's named Béla, who was recognised as the
future heir to the crown of Hungary and granted a considerable appanage
which included Dalmatia. As the appanage of Béla, who would be brought
up in Constantinople, Dalmatia practically fell back into the hands of
the Byzantines, and the result of Manuel's Hungarian policy was an im-
portant territorial acquisition. To make his success the surer, Manuel,
who as yet had no son, decided to betroth his daughter Mary to the
Hungarian prince, whom he destined for his successor. By this means
Hungary would have been united to the Greek Empire.
It was not without difficulty that the Greeks entered into possession
of Dalmatia. As the position of Stephen III grew stronger, the Hun-
garians came to regret the sacrifice they had agreed to, and for several
## p. 373 (#415) ############################################
Manuel and Serbia
373
years the war was renewed. Manuel, having become master of Dalmatia
in 1166, remained in the end the victor. The birth of a son to him in
1169 caused him to alter his arrangements. Béla ceased to be heir pre-
sumptive and, his betrothal to Mary having been set aside, he was married
to the Emperor's sister-in-law, a daughter of Constance of Antioch. On
the death of Stephen III, Béla with the aid of Byzantine troops mounted
the throne of Hungary. As the price of his support Manuel kept his
hold on Bela’s appanage. Béla always remained devoted to him, although
it was only after his patron's death that he recovered Dalmatia.
The continual wars which were waged during this period on the
Danube frontier kept up a state of unrest among the Serbs, who were
vassals of the Empire. Manuel was repeatedly obliged to intervene. He
deposed Pervoslav Uroš, replacing him by his brother Béla (1161? ).
Then, Béla having retired from power, Manuel set up as his successor
Dessa, another son of Béla Uroš (c. 1162). Dessa, who a few years
later took the name of Stephen Nemanja, attempted to throw off the
Byzantine suzerainty. More than once Manuel was forced to interfere
to restore order; finally he seized Stephen Nemanja, whom he kept prisoner
for some time in Constantinople. It is not known exactly at what date
Stephen regained his liberty. He took advantage of the disorder which
followed the death of Manuel to secure the independence of his
country.
It was not until about 1150 that the affairs of the East called for the
intervention of Manuel. At that time the situation of the Byzantine
possessions had become critical. Thoros, son of the Armenian prince
Leo, had escaped from captivity, and had succeeded in taking from the
Greeks a large part of Cilicia. At the same time the Muslim conquest had
made a great step in advance by the capture of Edessa, and the position
of the Latin states in Palestine was rendered even more precarious by the
entrance into the contest of the Musulmans of Iconium, who with Qilij
Arslān, son of Mas'ūd, wished to have their share in the dismembering of
the Latin principalities. In the extreme peril in which they stood the
Latins asked for help from the West, but the danger was so threatening
that they had recourse to the Emperor of Constantinople. Manuel
ordered his troops in the East to support the Latins. About the same
time he bought from the wife of Joscelin II, Count of Edessa, all that
remained in her hands of the possessions of her husband. Constance,
Princess of Antioch, having become a widow, also turned to the Emperor
for protection. The position of things thus favoured Greek intervention.
Manuel charged his cousin, Andronicus Comnenus, with the task of re-
ducing Thoros, and sent also his brother-in-law the Caesar John-Roger
whom he proposed to Constance as a husband. This projected marriage
never took place, and Andronicus only succeeded in getting himself de-
feated before Mamistra.
Manuel then changed his policy and attempted to secure the submission
CH. XII.
## p. 374 (#416) ############################################
374
The Latin East
of Thoros by means of Masóūd. The latter accepted Manuel's offers all
the more willingly as he had himself subjects of complaint against Thoros.
The Armenian prince had pillaged Cappadocia, taking advantage of the
struggle between Masóūd and the Dānishmandite rulers, Yaʻqūb Arslān
and Dhū’l-Qarnain, son and heir of 'Ain-ad-Daulah. The result of this
experiment did not correspond to Manuel's hopes. On a first occasion
Masóūd treated with Thoros but at Manuel's expense; on a second the
Musulman troops were thoroughly beaten. Profiting by the inaction of
Manuel, who was detained by affairs in Italy, Thoros approached Reginald
of Chatillon who had become Prince of Antioch through his marriage
with Constance, and the two set on foot an expedition against the island
of Cyprus, where immense booty was obtained (1155 or 1156).
This aggression against the Byzantines greatly displeased the King of
Jerusalem, Baldwin, for, confronted by the growing success of the Atābeg
Nūr-ad-Dīn, the master of Damascus, he was meditating a rapprochement
with Manuel, to whom he had applied for the hand of a princess of the
imperial family. The request of Baldwin came just as the imperial idea
was beginning to take shape in Manuel's mind. The Emperor, whose
Oriental policy, like that of his predecessors, was dominated by the wish
to regain Antioch for the Empire, eagerly welcomed the proposal of
Baldwin, which would give him an opportunity of posing as the protector
of the Holy Places. He gave the King of Jerusalem the hand of his niece
Theodora, daughter of his brother Isaac, and as soon as peace had been
concluded with the King of Sicily (1157) he organised a great expedition
for the East.
By about the month of September 1158 Manuel had arrived in
Cilicia at the head of a very considerable force. None of his adversaries
dared to stand against him, and in succession Reginald of Chatillon and
Thoros were obliged to come in penitential garments and submit them-
selves to his mercy. The Emperor consented to pardon them. Reginald
was obliged to acknowledge himself the vassal of the Empire, engaging
to supply a strong contingent of troops whenever required to do so by
the Emperor. Ambassadors from most of the Oriental princes were to
be found hastening to the imperial camp before Mamistra. The Latins
themselves, the King of Jerusalem first among them, sought help of
Manuel in whom they now placed all their hopes; Baldwin himself entered
into a treaty, he also being obliged to furnish troops to the Greek
Empire.
In April 1159 Manuel left Cilicia to make his solemn entry into
Antioch, escorted by the Latin princes on foot and unarmed, and followed
by the King of Jerusalem on horseback but without weapons. Passing
through streets adorned with carpets and hangings, to the sound of drums
and trumpets and to the singing of triumphal hymns, the Emperor was
brought in procession to the cathedral by the Patriarch in his pontifical
robes, while the imperial banners were hoisted on the city walls.
## p. 375 (#417) ############################################
Manuel's marriage with Mary of Antioch
375
His stay at Antioch marks the highest pitch of glory to which Manuel
attained throughout his reign. He took pleasure in the pomp with which
he surrounded himself, and in the largess which he distributed to dazzle
the Latins and Orientals. For a week feasts and shows followed each
other rapidly, and on one day the Emperor might be seen descending
into the lists to measure himself against Reginald of Chatillon, while the
officers of the imperial army contended with the Frankish knights.
Towards the end of May the Emperor left Antioch with all the
materials for a siege, taking the road to Edessa, but after a few days'
march the army halted, for the negotiations with Nūr-ad-Dīn had
just reached a conclusion. Manuel procured the liberation of all the
captives held in the Atābeg's prison, the number of whom reached six
thousand. The abandonment of the campaign which had been begun
caused the deepest disappointment to the Christians of the East. To
justify the retreat of the Greeks, a rumour was circulated that a con-
spiracy had been discovered at Constantinople. There is perhaps no
need to lay stress on the explanations put forward at the time. May it
not be supposed that Manuel entered into the treaty because he had no
kind of interest in the destruction of the power of Nūr-ad-Dīn? It was
to the struggle of the Atābegs and the Christians that the Empire owed
the advantages which had been won in the East. Had he subjugated
Nūr-ad-Dīn, Manuel would have delivered the Latins from their dread of
the Musulman peril, and they as soon as the danger was removed would,
as they had done before, make haste to forget their engagements to the
Empire. In order that the suzerainty of Constantinople might be recog-
nised by the Latins, it was necessary that the Musulman peril should con-
tinue to exist. This appears to give the most reasonable explanation of
Manuel's conduct.
On his return to Constantinople Manuel, who had been left a widower,
meditated drawing closer the bonds between himself and the Latins of
Palestine by marrying a Latin princess. He requested the King of Jeru-
salem to grant him the hand of Millicent, sister of Raymond III, Count
of Tripolis. But, the marriage being once agreed upon, the negotiations
were drawn out for more than a year, until at last Manuel suddenly broke
them off and transferred his choice to Mary, daughter of Constance,
Princess of Antioch. The chief result of the marriage was to bring Antioch
more decidedly within the sphere of Byzantine influence, which was now
exerted energetically on the side of the Latins against the Turks. At
the battle of the Bukaia (1163) and at Hārim (1164) the Greeks fought
side by side with the Latin lords. After the defeat at Hārim the Emperor
sent reinforcements to Cilicia, but he made the mistake of committing
the province to his cousin Andronicus as governor. Andronicus ruined the
imperial policy by procuring the murder of Sdephanê, the brother of
Thoros, who was thus alienated from the Empire. Then, having fallen
in love with Philippa, Manuel's sister-in-law, Andronicus deserted his
CH. XII.
## p. 376 (#418) ############################################
376
Amaury of Jerusalem
post as governor in order to fly with the object of his passion. In spite
of these incidents Constantinople and Antioch remained on excellent
terms. Manuel came to the help of his brother-in-law Bohemond III
with financial support, and obtained from him permission for the Greek
Patriarch to return to Antioch. While Amaury, the Latin Patriarch,
departed hurling anathemas against the city, the Greek, Athanasius, took
possession of the see. This supplies a fresh proof of the influence exercised
over Antioch by the Greek element. There was then in this quarter
substantial progress on the part of the Byzantines.
Such was not the case in Cilicia. Thoros having died (c. 1167), his
son Rupen II succeeded him, but after a short time was robbed of his
crown by his uncle Mleh, who in order to seize power had allied himself
with Nur-ad-Dīn. With the latter's help Mleh succeeded in maintaining
his position until the death of his patron, when he was overthrown and,
Rupen II being dead, was replaced by Rupen III, son of Sdephanê, the
victim of Andronicus. Throughout these struggles Constantinople seems
to have played a very secondary part in Cilicia. It is only the attempt
by Manuel to bring about the union of the Greek and Armenian Churches
which shews that Constantinople had not yet lost interest in Armenian
affairs. It is quite probable that the object aimed at by the Emperor
was at least as much political as religious, and that the opposition offered
by the Armenian clergy, which caused the failure of the negotiations,
was also political in character.
Baldwin's successor on the throne of Jerusalem, Amaury, after having
at the opening of his reign sought in vain for help from the West, turned
decidedly from 1165 onwards towards Constantinople. He asked for
the hand of a princess of the imperial family, and on 29 August 1167
his marriage took place at Tyre with the daughter of the Protosebastos
John Comnenus, a nephew of the Emperor, the son of his brother
Andronicus. Through this new connexion the ties between Constanti-
nople and the kingdom of Jerusalem became closer, and Manuel agreed
to lend his help to King Amaury, who, in order to prevent Nūr-ad-Dīn
from occupying Egypt, where the Caliphate had fallen into utter de-
cadence, wished to annex the country himself. Several attempts by the
Jerusalem had failed; it was now decided that in 1169 the Greeks
and Latins should try to effect a joint conquest of Egypt. Delays on the
part of Amaury caused the expedition to fail, for the provisions of the
Greeks, calculated to last for three months, had been already largely con-
sumed when their feet quitted Acre.
The Greek fleet under the command of the Grand Duke Alexius
Contostephanus had a strength of 150 biremes and 60 transport ships.
It left the port of Coela near Sestos in July. But the expedition, in-
stead of setting out in August as had been agreed, only left Syria to
besiege Damietta in October. The siege lasted for two months, at the end
of which the town made terms with Amaury. The campaign had failed,
King
## p. 377 (#419) ############################################
Wars with the Turks
377
and the Greeks, who were suffering greatly from want of provisions, were
in haste to depart. Their return journey was disastrous, a large number
of their vessels being lost at sea, and the Empire derived no advantage
whatever from the expedition.
Manuel, however, was not discouraged by this want of success, and in
1171 he gave a favourable reception to Amaury, who had come to Con-
stantinople to ask for his support. A treaty was signed by which Manuel
pledged himself to assist the King of Jerusalem in a renewed attempt
upon Egypt. According to a Greek chronicler, Amaury at this time
acknowledged himself the vassal of the Emperor, but as the statement
cannot be verified it is impossible to speak decidedly on the point. As
to the proposed expedition, we know that Manuel urged Amaury's suc-
cessor, Baldwin IV, to march upon Egypt(1177). The opposition of Philip,
Count of Flanders and Vermandois, who was then in Palestine, was fatal
to the plan which had been agreed on, its execution being deferred to
some unspecified date.
It remains for us to consider the relations of Manuel with the Sultan
of Iconium. Mas'ûd had died (c. 1155) and had been succeeded at Iconium
by Qilij Arslān, and at Gangra and Ancyra by another of his sons,
Shāhinshāh. On its return from Antioch in 1159 the Greek army was
attacked near Cotyaeum by Musulman bands, and next year Manuel
undertook a campaign in order to chastise Qilij Arslān. In this struggle
he relied on the support of other Mohammedan princes, Ya'qub Arslan,
Dhū’l-Nun, Mahomet, son of Dhü'l-Qarnain, and also on Shāhinshāh,
brother of Qilij Arslān. In 1160 Ya'qub Arslān was attacking Qilij
Arslān, while on all sides the Greeks were falling upon such Turkish tribes
as were to be found in the neighbourhood of the frontier. In consequence
of this general onslaught Qilij Arslān treated for peace during the winter
of 1161. The negotiations fell through, and war was resumed at the begin-
ning of spring. Manuel, by way of Philadelphia, invaded the dominions
of the Sultan, who retorted by attacks upon Phileta and Laodicea.
In 1162 Manuel called upon all his vassals to strike a decisive
blow. Finding himself seriously menaced, Qilij Arslān made friends with
Ya'qūb Arslān and Shāhinshāh, and then negotiated with Manuel,
with whom he finally concluded a treaty of alliance. Soon after, Qilij
Arslān appeared at Constantinople, where he remained for more than three
months. He departed loaded with presents, having made the Emperor
the fairest of promises for the future. He had pledged himself to restore
to the Empire a number of towns which had been taken by the Musulmans.
Not one of these promises was ever carried out.
The years from 1162 to 1174 were occupied by perpetual strife among
the Musulmans of Asia Minor, the Greeks being thus allowed some respite.
In the end Qilij Arslān was left victor over his chief adversaries. His
brother Shāhinshāh and Dhü'l-Nun then sought refuge at Constan-
tinople.
CH. XII.
## p. 378 (#420) ############################################
378
Battle of Myriocephalum
In order to be able to pursue his European policy undisturbed, Manuel
had since his treaty with Qilij Arslān supplied the latter with heavy
subsidies as the price of peace. In proportion as his power increased, the
Sultan of Iconium, urged on perhaps by Frederick Barbarossa, assumed
a more independent attitude towards the Empire, while the incursions of
the nomad tribes of Turks were renewed with greater frequency than ever.
To secure his frontier, Manuel repaired the fortifications of a certain
number of strongholds, notably Pergamus and Chliara. He then fortified
the two lines of defence supplied by the rivers Maeander and Hermus.
It was not till 1175 that a definitive rupture took place between
Manuel and the Sultan of Iconium. The former insisted that Qilij
Arslān should fulfil his promise to restore to the Empire certain towns
which he had taken from it. Supported by Frederick Barbarossa, Qilij
Arslān refused to comply with the Emperor's demands, and Manuel decided
upon war, counting upon the support of all the remaining partisans of
Shāhinshāh and Dhū’l-Nun among the Musulmans. While a detach-
ment of Greek troops was sent under Gabras and Shāhinshāh to occupy
Amasia, which was still in the hands of the latter's supporters, Manuel
carried out the fortification of a whole series of towns, Dorylaeum, an
important strategic point on the road to Iconium, Lampe, and Sublaeum
(1175). Next year the Emperor resolved to attack Iconium. With this
object he preached a regular crusade, calling upon all his vassals for help.
While Andronicus Vatatzes went to attack Neo-Caesarea, Manuel himself
took command of the army which was to march upon Iconium. The fate
of both expeditions was equally disastrous. Vatatzes failed before Neo-
Caesarea and was killed, his army being routed. Manuel himself became
entangled with his whole army in the mountainous region to the east
of Sublaeum (Homa). He had neglected to explore the country-side
with scouts during his march, and was caught by the Muslims in the
narrow defiles at Myriocephalum. The Greeks met with a complete dis-
aster, in which the finest of the imperial troops were slaughtered by the
Musulmans. Manuel himself compared his defeat to that of Romanus
Diogenes at Manzikert. For reasons unknown to us Qilij Arslān used his
victory with moderation, and offered peace on honourable terms, stipu-
lating only for the destruction of the fortifications at Dorylaeum and
Sublaeum. Manuel agreed to the conditions proposed, and led the wreck
of his army back to Constantinople.
With the disaster of Myriocephalum all enterprises on a large scale in
the East came to an end. Though broken by his defeat, the Emperor
did indeed renew the war during the latter part of his reign; but the Greek
generals had to confine themselves to the defence of the frontier, and
all idea of an advance upon Iconium, to attack the central seat of the
Musulman power, was abandoned. In fact, the battle of Myriocephalum
sealed the fate of the Comnenian dynasty, if not of the Byzantine
Empire.
## p. 379 (#421) ############################################
Death of Manuel
379
As a result of his defeat Manuel met with a mortification from
Frederick Barbarossa which he must have felt keenly. The Western
Emperor wrote to the Basileus, and remembering old scores himself
spoke of the unity of the Empire. In his letter he clearly asserts the
superiority of the Emperor of the West, sole heir of the Roman Emperors,
over all other sovereigns, in particular, over the King of the Greeks.
Manuel, who feared that the Westerns might profit by his defeat to
attack his Empire, strove by all the means which he had before found
successful to paralyse Barbarossa's forces. He supported William,
Marquess of Montferrat, when he raised a revolt in Italy, and, in order to
set a seal on the alliance, married his daughter Mary to Renier, one of
William's sons. Again it was Byzantine gold that helped to equip the
troops that defeated Frederick’s Arch-Chancellor, Christian of Mayence,
near Camerino. Manuel was trying to arrange for the purchase of Christian,
whom Conrad of Montferrat had made prisoner, when his own death put
a stop to the negotiations. Thus after lasting twenty years the struggle
between the two Empires came to an end-a struggle in which diplomacy
counted for more than armies. Manuel's policy with regard to Barbarossa
was very burdensome to the imperial treasury, for money was the weapon
with which he chiefly carried on the contest. If his policy seems to have
yielded no very striking results, it must be remembered that Manuel was
successful in keeping the forces of his enemy in a state of inaction, and
was thus able to pursue his policy of conquest in Hungary and the East
unhindered.
The only success which sweetened the bitterness of Manuel's last
years
was the marriage of his son Alexius with Agnes, the daughter of Louis VII
of France. This match had been arranged at the Emperor's request by
Philip, Count of Flanders, who on his return from an expedition to the
Holy Land had passed through Constantinople in 1178. The little
princess, who reached Constantinople in a Genoese vessel, was married to
the heir of the Empire on 2 March 1180. On 24 September in the same
year the Emperor died after a long illness, during which, confident in
the predictions of astrologers, he never ceased to nurse illusions as to his
prospect of recovery. This conviction that he would recover prevented
him from making any arrangements for the organisation of the govern-
ment during the minority of his son.
Alexius II, son and successor of Manuel Comnenus, was twelve years
old at the time of his father's death. Naturally therefore he had no
share in state affairs, the regency being in the hands of his mother Mary
of Antioch, whose charm and beauty the chroniclers vie in celebrating.
Every man about the court, convinced that the Empress could be wooed
and won, endeavoured to attract her attention. For some time the court was
the scene of all manner of intrigues, and, in order to gain favour with the
Empress, young and old rivalled one another in the elegance and splendour
CH. XII.
